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# WAR JOURNAL

OF

FRANZ HALDER

War journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder,  
Chief of the General Staff of Supreme Command  
of the German Army (HGH), Vol. I. Historical  
Division, SSYSA. 24 Aug 39 - 10 Sep 39.


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Volume I





**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL  
OF  
GENERALOBERST FRANZ HALDER**

**Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

**14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942**

**VOLUME I**

# CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- ✓ **Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

## PREFATORY NOTE

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The private war journal of former Generaloberst (Four Star General) Franz Halder, who was Chief of the General Staff of the Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH) from 1 September 1938 to 24 September 1942, comprises seven volumes and covers the period from 14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942, the date of Halder's dismissal by Hitler.

The journal was kept by Halder personally in his own shorthand notes jotted down in connection with conferences, memoranda, staff talks, lectures, reports, etc., as they occurred during the discharge of his functions as Chief of Staff. They are not to be confused with the official War Diaries kept by the Supreme Command of the German Army, but are rather to be considered the personal notes, views, and impressions of Halder contemporaneously recorded.

The entire journal was introduced by the Prosecution as a documentary exhibit (No. 1359) in the record of the case entitled the United States of America vs. Wilhelm von Leeb et al (Case # 12) brought before Military Tribunal V. Excerpts from the journal which either the Prosecution or the Defense wished particularly to bring to the Court's attention were translated in the record during the course of the trial.

The journal was reduced to typewritten form from the original notes written in the Gabelsberger system of German shorthand under the guidance of Mr. Phillip Willner, Chief of the Court Reporting Branch (German) of the Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OMGUS). In order to prepare an authoritative text, the entire journal was reviewed with Halder by Mr. Arnold Lissance, Interrogator and Editorial Analyst, Evidence Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OMGUS). A very few words, mostly cut of context, could not be reconstructed, or, allowing more than one interpretation, remained doubtful. They are so indicated in the text. The work of assembling the final mimeographed version was completed under the supervision of Mr. Ludwig R. Borinski, Language Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OMGUS). The entire project was carried out under the supervision of Mr. Walter H. Rapp, Director, Evidence Division, Office of Chief of Counsel for War Crimes (OMGUS).

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## EDITOR'S FOREWORD

The seven volumes of shorthand notes which have become known as the Halder Diary do not technically represent a personal diary. Gen. Franz Halder has always insisted that they were mere notebooks for matters reported to him and which he in turn had to take up with Field Marshal von Brauchitsch, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ground Forces, and the interested Chiefs of the various OKH Sections. This description is an accurate one for the earlier entries, but in the later volumes the notebooks change into something more rounded out and personal.

As such records go, the Halder Diary is unique in scope and continuity, and probably has few equals in importance among individual contributions to the records of this war. Their value to the military student requires no emphasis. The interest for the general reader will be in the drama of the war as seen on the highest military level, in the picture of the functions and activities of the Chief of Staff of a huge army, and in the better comprehension it will afford of the position of the German General Staff in the German State in the recent past.

Like any diary, this one is fragmentary in that the author noted only the striking details and omitted the contemporaneous setting which often alone gives them significance: it was unnecessary for him to put down what was common knowledge for him and for others. As a result, the reader will often need some further information to understand the entries. The footnotes, based on Gen. Halder's explanations, will serve this purpose and will help to reconstruct the settings for personalities and events.

Intended to serve as a notebook, the Diary does not furnish a complete record of all activities during the war years they cover. There was no

need, for instance, to put down as an aid to memory all those matters that were discussed daily or hourly, for everyone would be expected to have them fresh in his mind. Thus it sometimes happens that a secondary issue receives more attention than one of first-rank importance. A case in point is the almost total lack of notes on the planning for the breakthrough at Sedan, in 1940, while that for the subsidiary effort of Army Group C, to the south, appears in great prominence. The reason for this is that in preparing for the thrust through the Ardennes, the author was in continuous contact with his planning staffs and needed no notes to refresh his memory. On the other hand, the conferences for the operation "Gelb" and its train of secondary operations on the southern part of the offensive front were so widely spaced that notation of important details was essential.

As the war went on, the entries began to lose their original character of mere memo notes. In the pressure of campaigns when, late at night, the members of the planning staffs were not available for consultations and the quiet after a day of high-pitched tenseness favored such an activity, Gen. Halder would find it very helpful to do his thinking on paper, when working out the fateful decisions he had to make or suggest. In the notes, which were not destined for any readers (except perhaps in later years a select few German military historians), and certainly not for the eyes of non-Germans, we find a day-by-day and phase-by-phase account of the development of the French campaign that, incidentally, throws an interesting light on some controversial aspects of it. The record becomes even more complete and revealing throughout the preparations for, and execution of, the campaign in Russia. Looking backward, it is possible to fix the date almost to the day in the earliest phase of the invasion, when the foundation was laid for the eventual defeat of the German Armies by the Russian.

A decisive change in the character of the Diary comes at the end of 1941, when von Brauchitsch resigned. It now became Gen. Halder's function to present the daily situation report to the Fuehrer. The entries in the Diary generally diminish. The notes for the situation report were now made on slips of paper destroyed after the conferences;

it would have been unwise to use the book in the presence of the Fuehrer, who had taken a sharp dislike to Gen. Halder's notebooks on previous occasions. At the same time the personal entries increase. Often these meetings with the Fuehrer ended in clashes of opinion and personality, and the Diary became the only outlet for the author's exasperation in the bleak winter of 1941/2 when many of his old associates had left General Headquarters.

The Diary closes with the removal of Gen. Halder from his post, after a period of racking strain, on September 24, 1942, just as Gen. Paulus's Sixth Army was battling its way into the gigantic man-trap that was to be Stalingrad.

It was recognized very early that an adequate translation of the Diary required amplification. Explanatory annotations would have to indicate significant connections and supply essential information which did not appear in the original entries, because it was part of everyone's knowledge at General Headquarters. Plentiful though they may seem, it became increasingly evident as the editing progressed that there are actually not enough footnotes for best understanding. This deficiency is due to several factors, some of which could not be controlled.

Chief among these factors was the time limitation set on the availability for consultation of Gen. Halder, which could not be offset by his cooperativeness. The mere reading of the 1,200 pages of German text to verify the correctness of the transcript from the shorthand notes, took up nearly one half of the aggregate 400 hours spent with him.

Next among these factors is that Gen. Halder obviously could not answer questions that were not asked. Sometimes the need for an explanation became apparent only long after the period of consultation; in such cases elucidation was obtained by letter. But there may be other instances where the meaning seemed plain and clarification appeared unnecessary; some notations, therefore, may have been unwittingly misconstrued in the translating. In a very few instances, neither

Gen. Halder, who had to rely solely on his extraordinary memory, nor any of his associates, could furnish the desired explanation in the absence of the original OKH records. And finally, there is also one category of ~~unexplained~~ subjects, where a certain blockage to answering the questions may have played a part.

By the time the working relationship had developed to the point where questions were more freely asked and answered, the limitation of time prohibited reviewing the volumes already gone over. It is thus fully realized that the body of footnotes obtained leaves many areas uncovered. The rich material would justify considerably more intensive consultation with Gen. Halder to fill in all the spaces of the mere skeleton that is the Diary. Conceivably it might be found desirable after obtaining additional information, to make its contents more accessible by rewriting it on a topical basis.

Another unavoidable omission in the translated version of the Diary, due to the fact that time grew short toward the end, is the absence of at least diagrammatic situation maps for a score of key dates. Many of the developments can be fully appreciated only against such a background. Indeed, but for the fact that a number of the original situation maps were available for checking the translation of the part of the Diary that covers the period winter, 1941, through summer, 1942, it would often have been impossible to render the true meaning of the entries. The reader will be saved some confusion by a few editorial footnotes which, for instance, clear up the seeming contradiction when the Diary, in the Russian Campaign, refers to an eastern and a western front in addition to the main front.

How necessary it was to exercise the greatest care in translating the highly condensed telegram style of the Diary, and continually to check with the context, may be illustrated by the following two examples. The sentence "Es fehlt noch Royal Oak" could easily be interpreted, e.g., that the Royal Oak was still unaccounted for. It was so translated until it was found out in some other connection that the Royal Oak had been sunk some time

before; accordingly, in the context of the entry, the correct rendering was to the effect that the British Navy had not yet replaced that capital ship. Or, "Verhalten der 4. Armee" had nothing to do with the conduct or action of the Fourth Army, but referred to "ver-halten", to hold back, which checked with the plan of attack for that Army.

An effort was made in translating the terse entries of the Diary to keep on the same linguistic level as the original, that is, neither over-formal nor altogether colloquial. Lapses into colloquialisms follow the author's in expressing some pent-up feeling. Eschewing the more colorful language which a war correspondent can and must use, the translation may sometimes seem repetitious or pedestrian; it could not, after all, depart too freely from the text. The author himself is frank in acknowledging the stylistic deficiencies of his Diary.

Apart from lacking a motivation for choice writing, he rarely had the time to organize subject matter and sentence structure or to ponder over better words for those that came into his head first. Many of the notations were made at the telephone or while visitors talked to him, when all that mattered was to catch the gist correctly. (During the Fuehrer's speeches at the full-dress meetings before or after major events, Gen. Halder would keep the 8 x 12 ledger-type books on his knees and make notes, much to the annoyance of the Fuehrer, who could not bear divided attention, and held the notebooks in abomination; Gen. Halder continued to make notes at such meetings but he had to do so behind someone's back.) The telescoped sentences and the endless periods which often resulted from this type of writing were unscrambled in consistency with the context, with the aid of the author's explanation of what he had wanted to say at the time.

A peculiarity of the text is the seemingly repetitious and redundant use of the words "apparently" (anscheinend) and "reported", "alleged", "believed to be", etc. (angeblich). The former is applied to any occurrence not observed at first hand or lacking confirmation; the latter is reserved for



frontline reports pending verification, and mentally discounts the professional over-optimism to which field commanders are prone in announcing successes.

A note would appear to be indicated on the meaning of the word "political" in the Diary, which varies with the context. Used in connection with the Fuehrer and the Foreign Office (von Weizsaecker, von Etzdorf) the term refers to international relations; "political channels" means "Foreign Office" channels. In connection with von Brauchitsch or other Generals and with civilian visitors, the term refers to the domestic political situation. It is interesting to note here that Dr. Goerdeler, whose name is prominently associated with the events of the 20th July, 1944, appears in the Diary twice: the first time referred to as "Dr.", in longhand (17 March, 1940), and the second time with his full name written out in shorthand (2 Oct., 1941), and thus almost as invisible as if written with sympathetic ink.

Very eloquent use is made of exclamation points in the Diary. They may indicate speechless amazement, perplexed or amused incredulity, or forthright indignation. The intensity of the feeling can be gauged in the original by the size, boldness or duplication of the mark; only the latter method could be reproduced by the typewriter.

A change in handwriting often indicated a time lapse between two notations within an entry, or a comment on the first notation. The inflexibility of the typewriter precludes rendering of such inflections, as it were. Longer horizontal spacing (six spaces) or dropping to the end of the following line was resorted to in order to indicate these differences. The notations ObdH, Org. Sec., Op. Sec., etc., set off from the text, indicate that the subject referred to had to be taken up with the person or Section in question. Striking out an entry is another means to indicate that the matter has been attended to. Markings on the notes that could not be reproduced on the typewriter were translated into words placed between brackets to indicate that they were not part

of the original text.

Some of the military terms in the Diary were coined by Gen. Halder and found general acceptance throughout the German Army. Their translation is based on the author's explanations. The other military terms used are based on Handbook of German Military Forces (War Dept. Tech. Man. TM-E, 30-45) and Dictionary of United States Army Terms (War Dept. Tech. Man. TM 20-205, Jan. 1944). German terms and abbreviations used in the translation are listed in a glossary following this foreword.

The foregoing notes which, it is hoped, may give some guidance to the reader, must be concluded with the acknowledgment of the untiring cooperation of Mr. Ludwig R. Borinski who did the first draft translation of six of the seven volumes of the Diary, attended to all details of production supervision, checked proof-read material, organized the footnotes and, with his unusual memory, made possible that measure of coordination that the translation may show. Credit is due to Mr. Fred. L. Pera for his competent proofreading. And finally, to the German typists, Fraeulein Annemarie Joeckel, Frau Annemarie von Kleist, Fraeulein Ingeborg Schulten and Frau Else Stich, goes sincere appreciation for their unflagging interest in the work which was a sustaining factor throughout the arduous production of the difficult English text.

Arnold Lissance

NOTE! The asterisks found throughout the text were inserted to mark the subjects for which footnotes were prepared. Owing to the shortage of time, these footnotes could not be included in the body of the Diary and must be supplied in a separate volume. They will be arranged to facilitate clipping and pasting on the bottom of the pages to which they refer.

# FREQUENT GERMAN ABBREVIATIONS AND TERMS.

|                               |  |
|-------------------------------|--|
| <u>Abwehr</u>                 | Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence Section of OKW.  |
| <u>BdE</u>                    | Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres - C in C of the Replacement Army, i.e. the home organization of the Field Army, inducting and training replacements, activating new Divs., etc.  |
| <u>BvTO</u>                   | Bevollmaechtigter Transportoffizier - RTO at Corps or Army level.  |
| <u>Central Branch</u>         | Zentralabteilung (GZ), Personnel Office of the Gen. Staff.   |
| <u>General</u> (German ranks) | In order to avoid confusion, the German designations for general officers were used. (In a number of instances equivalent U.S. ranks were used by oversight. No one, however, will mistake, e.g., Lt. Gen. for Gen. Lt.) |
| Gen. Maj.                     | U.S. equivalent Brig. Gen.   |
| Gen. Lt.                      | Maj. Gen.  |
| Gen. (der Inf., Arty., etc.)  | Lt. Gen.   |
| Gen. Obst.                    | Gen. (full)  |
| <u>Gen. Qu</u>                | Chief Supply and Administration Officer in the General Staff, with two main Sections:<br>a) Supply;<br>b) Military Administration of Occupied Territories.   |
| <u>Gen. Stb. San.</u>         | Medical Corps Officer of rank of Major General.  |
| <u>Gen. Stb. Vet.</u>         | Veterinary Corps Officer of rank of Major General.   |
| <u>Gen. Vet.</u>              | Veterinary Corps Officer of Brigadier rank.  |

Geschwader

Largest mobile, homogeneous formation in the Air Force, normally consisting of about 100 aircraft, organized into three Gruppen (q.v.).

Gruppe

Basic combat unit of the Air Force, mostly with a T/O strength of 27 aircraft, in the case of single-engine Fighter Gruppen with 36 aircraft.

Ia

Operations Officer (roughly corresponding to G 3).

Ib

Supply Officer, mostly referred to as OQu or Qu (roughly corresponding to G 4).

Ic

Intelligence Officer (corresponding to G 2).

IIa

Personnel Officer (Officers).

Kette

Consists of three aircraft.

Landesschuetzen

Consistently translated as "Regional Defense units". They are local security units, normally composed of infantry men drawn from the Landwehr (q.v.) and Landsturm (trained and untrained men between 45 and 55) or younger men unfit for service.

Landwehr

Two categories of Reserve Troops are covered by this designation:

- 1) Landwehr I: Trained men between 35 and 45.
- 2) Landwehr II: Untrained men between 35 and 45 (usually identical with Third Draft, q.v.).

ObdH

Oberbefehlshaber des Heeres -  
C in C of the Army (von Brauchitsch).  
id.

OB

OKH

Oberkommando des Heeres - Army High Command.

Its main components were:

- I. Army General Staff (Chief Gen. Obst. Halder).
- II. Army Personnel Div. (for officer replacements).
- III. Chief of Army Equipment (Chef der Heeresruestung - Ch H Ruest) and Commander of the Replacement Army (Befehlshaber des Ersatzheeres - BdE), comprizing among others: General Army Office (Allgemeines Heeresamt - AHA), in charge of NCO and EM replacements; Army Ordnance Office (Waffenamt - WA).

The components of the Army General Staff were: OQu I, II, III, IV, V, Gen Qu and Central Branch (q.v.).

Attached to the Army General Staff were the Arms Chiefs (Waffengeneraele), who represented the respective arms and services and included the Generals on special assignment (zbV), e.g. for legal matters.

OKW

Oberkommando der Wehrmacht - Armed Forces High Command.

Chief: Gen. Obst., later Field Marshal Keitel, directly under Hitler. (Appears in Diary as "Keitel OKW", to distinguish him from his brother "Keitel (Personnel Div.)", head of OKH Personnel Div.)

Its operational Section was the Armed Forces Operations Staff (Wehrmachtsfuehrungsstab - WFSt), which constituted the main advisory body to Hitler on strategy and planning, and was headed by Gen. Obst. Jodl. Other Sections included the Armed Forces Central Office (Wehrmachtzentralamt - WZA), and the General Armed Forces Office (Allgemeines Wehrmachtamt - AWA), etc.; all PW matters were handled through these two Sections.

Political matters were the exclusive domain of OKW.

OQu I

Oberquartiermeister I - First Senior Gen. Staff Officer: Operations, including the Operations Section (Op. Sec.).

OQu II

Oberquartiermeister II - Second Senior Gen. Staff Officer: Field Army Training, including the Training Section (Tng. Sec.).

OQu III

Oberquartiermeister III - Third Senior Gen. Staff Officer: Organization, including the Organization Section (Org. Sec.).

OQu IV

Oberquartiermeister IV - Fourth Senior Gen. Staff Officer: Operational Intelligence, with Sections Foreign Armies East and Foreign Armies West.

OQu V

Oberquartiermeister V - Fifth Senior Gen. Staff Officer: Military History.

Reichsbahn

German State Railroad system.

Sofortfall

Operation "Emergency", i.e. if enemy attacks first, all restrictions on offensive action in the West are automatically removed.

Staffel

Smallest Air Force operational unit. T/O strength 9 aircraft.

z.b.V.

For all tasks where the Table of Organization provided no permanent agencies, Officers z.b.V. (on special assignment) were appointed.

"Draft" is a translation of the German term "Welle".

First Draft : Active Divs.  
Second Draft: Reserve Divs.  
Third Draft : Limited Employment Divs., consisted of age-groups 1900 - 1913 with short-term training.  
Fourth Draft: Divs. with active cadre and personnel with short-term training.  
Fifth and Sixth Draft (only in winter 1939-1940), had Czech equipment,

The other abbreviations follow the standard U.S. terminology (Rcn. Bn., Btry. etc.).

## MILITARY DISTRICTS.

(Note: In order to avoid confusion with Corps combat sectors the conventional designation of Corps Area was dropped for Military District.)

- I East Prussia - Koenigsberg.
- II Mecklenburg and Pomerania - Stettin.
- III Brandenburg - Berlin.
- IV Saxony, Eastern Thuringia - Dresden.
- V Baden, Wuerttemberg, Alsace - Stuttgart.
- VI Northern Rhineland, Westfalia - Muenster.
- VII Southern Bavaria - Munich.
- VIII Silesia - Breslau.
- IX Hesse, Western Thuringia - Kassel.
- X Schleswig-Holstein, Hamburg, Oldenburg,  
Bremen - Hamburg.
- XI Hannover, Braunschweig, Anhalt - Hannover.
- XII Palatinate, Southern Rhineland, Lorraine -  
Wiesbaden.
- XIII Northern Bavaria - Nuernberg.
- XIV Non-territorial - Magdeburg, for mot. Divs.
- XV Non-territorial - Jena, for light Divs.
- XVI Non-territorial - Berlin, for Armd. Divs.
- XVII Upper and Lower Austria - Vienna.
- XVIII Rest of Austria - Salzburg.
- XIX Non-territorial - Vienna, for Austrian Armd.  
and light Divs.
- XX West Prussia - Danzig.
- XXI Wartheland - Posen.
- Bohemia and Moravia.
- Government-General.



Notes on flyleaf opposite page 1:

"Weseruebung"    / According to Gen. Halder, this was the designation of a yearly Eng. Corps field exercise, usually named after river where held.    /

Party Rally?    / The question was, whether Party Rally would be held.    /

Advance notice Reichsbahn    16 / August    / 1200.

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Historical Division, SSUSA. 11 Sep - 6 Dec  
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## Volume II

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- Volume IX:** Maps

VOLUME II.

THE POLISH CAMPAIGN, PART II.

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

11 September 1939 - 6 December 1939.

\* \* \* \* \*

11 September 1939.

ObdH: 1.) Bydgoszcz: Himmler's special mission.

2.) Lost reported on the south wing\*.

3.) Order regarding arms:\*\*

a) Area behind the front "Non-combat zone". Narew -  
Vistula - San line, effective 12 Sept. Matter  
for legal expert!

b) Disposition by Summary Court-Martial.

c) Report by Jaenicke. (Tomorrow morning Fuehrer).

d) Directive for Military Government Agencies.  
Wagner, Gen Qu.

4.) OCu IV:

a) Political indoctrination and cultural activities in  
Army. Suggestions, demands and requests to OKW  
(approach indirectly). etc. Central Branch.

b) Organization.

1050. Sodenstern on phone: Todt projects now in progress:

In Fifth Army sector: In the front line.

In First Army sector: Construction work, construction material  
and machinery in air defense zone. Some sections now being  
shipped to Dutch frontier.

Seventh Army: Black Forest position on edge of range.

OCu IV: Enemy propaganda campaign on German atrocities in Poland.  
How can we counter it? (Wedel?) Reply: 1.) We must get  
details of the accusations, then dispatch an officer by

plane to investigate the facts. 2.) Put Propaganda Companies to work.

Organized Polish units have begun crossing the border into Tomania.

- OQu IV: Telegram: a) Molotov cannot keep what he promised. Russia wants to help the Ukrainians.
- b) Hungarians will not allow use of their railroads by our troops. Is being worked on.

Sodenstern:

- a) Trucks requisitioned only for 1462 construction projects, all in rear positions. Air defense zone, Pruem, Holland, Black Forest positions sites surveyed. Work can start at once. Truck columns from evacuation organization and Armies. Troops must help.
- b) Todt organization cannot do the artillery emplacements. 700,000 tons of construction material. Report in writing to Op. Sec.

Giessen! Central Branch.

12 September 1939.

Notes for ObdH:

- a) Leave Eighth Army in Lodz.
- b) Leeb's report on situation. Operations in the West -- very great depth!
- c) Decoration for Bock.

Development of the situation in Eighth Army.

Order to place III Corps under Eighth Army.

Reallocation of the area of Army Hq. 4.

Hungary: Railroads.

Lithuania: Hesitating.

Mt. Div. for Leeb; 62nd Div.

Propaganda Organization: Radke?

Grosscurth: Gradually expand organization.

1115. Leeb calls up.

1530. Count Brockdorf (Report on Warsaw).

1600. General Becker (On Mines, Majot Voss).

ObdH comes from Fuehrer: Russians probably do not want to start anything. Wants to try to form a Ukrainian State (to keep out the French).

Thinks it likely that Poles want peace.

Il Duce is forming block of Neutrals. (ObdH: Work fast!)

Oslo Conference. Romania does not want to offer Polish Government asylum; close frontier. He is thinking of limiting his demands to Upper Silesia and Corridor, if the West stays out. Clearing up of war damage. — Executive Power!!

Fuehrer will let us know his ideas on the subject.

13 September 1939.

Notes for ObdH:

- a) Part of Bock's eastern wing must drive on Luck, the other on Bialystok-Slonim.
- b) Stop movement of 228th Inf. Div. Area must not be completely denuded of troops.
- c) Eighth Army: Push ahead III Corps.
- d) Take out Third Mt. Div., 62nd Inf. Div.!
- e) West. Continue construction work! Upper Rhine. — 30 in line, 15 in reserve.

List of available forces — Calculation of forces in the West, OQu I.

Report on reorganization of West — Buhle.

Training instructions for new informations.

Fortress manual; form Staff to work out revision.

Build mock position system on troop training grounds. Discussed with Training Section.

Uniformity of instructions.

General Army Office. Activation of one Cavalry Division.

Gercke: Narrow gauge railway West. Adjutant.

Org. Sec.: Recruit depots behind the front.

Gen Qu: Decontamination behind the front in position warfare. Adjutant.

Hemmerich: Map printing on Army level. Adjutant.

Discuss with Bogatsch: AA defense for Seventh Army.

Inspectors in GHq: Artillery, Engineers, Infantry??

1230. Hierl on phone:

- a) Supply auxiliaries: Identification by arm band.
- b) Use Labor Service grades as Special Missions specialists (East). Prepare list. Gen Qu. Buhle.

1400. Etscheit on phone.

1700. Wagner: ideas on setup for Eastern territory.

Evening: Pappenheim.

14 September 1939. (Receive Iron Cross, second Class through ObdH).

Conference with Leeb on 13 September:

- a) Leeb's impression: Good Divisions at Saarbruecken. Fighter protection for reconnaissance planes. Air Reconnaissance organization. } Bogatsch
- b) ObdH:
  - 1.) Additional forces.
  - 2.) Recommendation on Command setup forthcoming seen.
  - 3.) XXX Corps inserted in front.
  - 4.) Tactical disposition of two-thirds of 22nd Div. on the Luxembourg frontier. Reserves to the front.
  - 5.) Wanden corner. Reconnaissance units and advance combat teams will enter Luxembourg territory if French march into Luxembourg.
  - 6.) He approves plans for line of rear positions. -- New positions in First Army sector. Type of positions. Throughout skeleton of permanent type, remainder field type.
  - 7.) Gas discipline.
  - 8.) Maps for the front must not be sent forward of specified lines.
  - 9.) Demolition of Rhine bridges. Order to Leeb.
  - 10.) Reinforcements for the Staff of Army Group: Engineers not necessary, only junior personnel. No Senior artillery officer of General rank necessary.



but we need a Staff Officer for the allocation and moving up of artillery. Corps Hq. static in position warfare, have no artillery specialists! (ObdH promises artillery staffs from Fourth Draft).- Engineers, Construction Staffs, Maps/

11.) Organizational questions: Reorientation to position warfare. Recruit depots in West.

12.) Directives.

Notes for ObdH: 1.) Gdynia.  
2.) Fourteenth Army: XXII Corps is moving too far northward. One Division must be directed to the East.  
3.) Transfer of Gen. Staff to the West.  
4.) Pacification in the East.

Giessen: Operations Staff: What is the minimum? Bulk here.  
Central Branch.  
Trains: How many? Terminus, select station.

Bogatsch: a) Between Basel and Lauterburg, 15 Btrys\*; some of these are in operations in the East. Necessary number will be moved up toward the Rhine. -- One Medium Bn. arriving now.  
b) Preparations to keep Air Reconnaissance in the West up to required strength.

Notes for ObdH: Cracow, interim occupation.  
Plonsk.  
Army Hq. 1, von Pfeffer, Civil Affairs Officer.

Buhle: Thirtieth Inf. Div.

ObdH: Directives: on the whole no changes necessary.

We need more riflemen, more men carrying the service rifle! \*\*

Marksmanship is good.

Highly satisfied with mortar.

Combat reconnaissance deficient. Training for combat reconnaissance, safeguarding measures when troops are tired.

Get rid of "defense in place".

Reconnaissance units for Corps. Cyclists.

Labor Service: Labor Service Officers low caliber, units don't get anything done. -- Todt Labor troops excellent.

Traffic control: Police ineffective. Staffs etc. for West!

Camouflage against air attack very bad (Infantry bunches up.).

Trouble with MG 34. Easily dirtied by dust and mud, workmanship too delicate. Protection. Ordnance Office (ObdH).

Commanders: XIII Corps excellent. X Corps not aggressive enough; his Ia not so hot either. 24th Inf. Div. very good, Covenhausen very good.

XI Corps slow. Central Branch.

Exaggerations in the description of combat impressions and in the reports.

Medium Inf. gun gets much praise.

Observation Bn. proved its worth. Polish artillery with light guns highly mobile.

Lessons of Eastern Campaign for West: Polish positions have fox-holes with lids. Soldiers come out after the first enemy wave has passed over them.

Infantry needs the best obtainable as replacements. The good officer material is tied up in the SS: Buhle.

Fieseler Storch/planes\* not plainly marked, are shot at by own Infantry. Bogatsch.

Gen Qu: a) Tremendous stream of returning refugees.

Food situation: Agriculture must be restarted at once. Food shortage in the towns. Report to OKW? Commanders of rear areas. First, refugees must be given food, after that registered by the police. Keep in small groups. Restart Lodz industry. Food! Work! Special commissioner for Lodz. Send a Special Commissioner.

Must be appointed as soon as possible under Reich Commissar.

b) All German workers behind the front must be armed, Also those of civilian contractors.

c) Report to OKW: If we want to secure this year's crop and organize sowing for the next year, we cannot take away the people. If the towns are to be fed, people in the country must have a chance to work. If quiet cannot be restored in the countryside, labor camps!

d) Provisions for shipping out and feeding prisoners (also captured horses), Kutno. Horses might go to farms!

e) Divisions should soon be freed.

Sixteenth Regt. has arrived in good shape.

Op. Sec.: No field kitchens. Service elements must be moved up behind units.

15 September 1939.

0915. Staff:

- 1.) Leaflets will be dropped this afternoon between 1400 and 1500. Deadline 12 hours. Civilian population (not liable to military service, women and children). 12 hours after dropping of leaflets.  
Direction Siedlce and Garbolin. Tomorrow morning massed air attack.
- 2.) Enemy radio message: Enemy at Wyzogrod must break through to the north. Intercepted.

Enemy movements from Kutno to Plock, this morning. Air observation Air Fleet 4.

1245: Departure by air for Lodz, Hq. Eighth Army.

Situation:

- a) Front firm. Left wing is being reinforced.
- b) Communications with III Corps and Third Army only by radio.
- c) Troops very tired.
- d) Situation map.
- e) Ruffled that Army Group and Army Hq. 10 are now also on their front.

Intention: Will attack north on 16 September.  
Left shoulder in the lead; link up with III Corps.

Enemy: Situation map. Enemy plan to break through to the East and then push on across the Narew river.

Quartermaster service: All right. Interim government at Lodz takes care of feeding of the population. Field offices are taking charge of distribution of refugees over the countryside. Ethnic Germans could be used to advantage by this organization.

My impressions: Exchange of information between us and Eighth Army regarding situation on the left wing was not always perfect. Also communications between Eighth and Fourth Armies evidently were not always sufficient to give a clear picture of the enemy.

2000. Phone talk with Salmuth: I instruct him to prepare against an attempt by the enemy to break through in northern direction at Modlin. Order to AGp. South through OQuI to clean up the area between Warsaw and Modlin.

2030. Jodl calls up: We must now come to a decision as to what to do about the Polish capital. Asks for an appraisal of the ground situation. Reply: Complete encirclement of Warsaw

in the West is in process. I am against an attack into the city. Must be starved into capitulation! We are in no hurry and don't need the forces now outside Warsaw anywhere else.

16 September 1939.

0800 Phone talk between von Brauchitsch and von Bock: Modlin, Praga, XIX Corps.

1200: Report that Warsaw parlementaire was not accepted. Phone talk with Salmuth: No attack on Warsaw!

Afternoon Baron von Funck (Spain) calls - suggests change of Attache now. Frontline soldier!

Becker (Slovakia) reports on participation of the Slovak Army, and on relations between Slovakia and Hungary.

Von Ilseman (Switzerland) reports.

Krebs: Reorganization of the Training Section (BdE and General Staff). -- Training Manual for position warfare.

2000. Order of AGp South: New forces must be committed to mop up the forest area north of Lezno and to block the Bzura river where it flows into the Vistula.

2030. Col. Gen. von Bock: 23rd Div. has been released for AGp North.

2130. Gercke: Railroad situation.

2400. The Fuehrer has ordered to cancel the ground and air attack on Warsaw scheduled for 17 September. Planes will attack enemy group at Kutno.

17 September 1939.

0200. Report that Russia has started moving forces across the frontier.

0700. Our troops must halt on the line Skole-Lwow-Wlodzimierz-Brest Litowsk-Bialystok.

Morning: Exchange of views with OKW on future demarcation line.

Buhle - Krebs: Basic data on the organization of troops for position warfare in the West.

Wagner: Basic data for position warfare; current matters.

von der Chevallerie: Transfer of GHq. to the West.

Noon: Warsaw asks us to receive a parlementaire to make arrangements for evacuation of the population. Reply by Deutschlandsender Radio Station. Soon after, Warsaw asks us to receive parlementaire to make arrangements for evacuation of Diplomatic Corps.

1530: From Fuehrer's train: Reject evacuation request, time limit has expired. Procedure: Radio message, Deutschlandsender, willingness to receive parlementaire.

Parlementaires from Warsaw.

18 September 1939.

Instruction to Fourteenth Army.-- Request report from Hq. AGp. North concerning bridge.

0800: Phone talk with Sodenstern: Move up reserves in the Pfaelzer Wald.

ObdH : Stop 56th Div. for reshipment.  
Stop VII Corps.  
23rd (later Third) to Corps Hq. III.  
30th.

Kempf-Conversion of Light Div. to Armd. Div.

Report of Sixteenth Inf. Regt. on experiences with equipment. - Buhle, OQu I.

Wagner: Witzleben -Buerkel. Executive Power. To Fuehrer's train.

Jodl: 1550: Fuehrer will speak at Danzig tomorrow. Wants statistics on military successes. Prisoners: numbers, officers, generals, guns, tanks, planes, etc. by 2200. OQu IV with Gen Qu and Op. Sec.

von Ondarza - Hasse - Lewiez. -- 16th Inf. Regt.

From Fuehrer's train:

- 1.) Warsaw. Warsaw broadcasts indicate conflicting political parties. Main reason: Communist government in Warsaw -- already reflected in Polish reports. Fuehrer would not like to negotiate with Russia on Warsaw. Sacrifice no more lives than absolutely necessary. Leaflets over Warsaw and over the Radio Stations. Result of Kutno battle will make an impression. So would Russian advance. Open up with artillery fire.

ObdH: Preparation for eastern bank. If there is an opportunity, have Infantry make assault on the eastern part of the city. First off systematic artillery barrage; if possible blast electric power stations and water works out of existence. We must find out where we can effect a surprise penetration from the north after the Lezo corner has been dealt with.

Day after tomorrow: Eastern part. Kinzel, Brockdorf to Fuehrer.

No battle for center of city, if avoidable.

2.) ObdH wants a few days in the present line; only question of days' marches to demarcation line.

Erfurth: War history OKW.

19 September 1939.

Morning reports: No unnecessary movements to the East now! Regrouping toward Warsaw! Free Kinzel for Warsaw!\*

ObdH: Unauthorized activations ("Senior artillery Commander", interference with organization of replacements). Change in the top figures.

Heydrich (Wagner):

- a) Missions must be known to the Army. Liaison Officers. Himmler/ObdH.
- b) House cleaning: Jews, intelligentsia, clergy, nobility.
- c) Army insists that "house cleaning" be deferred until Army has withdrawn and the country has been turned over to civil administration. Early December.

Stapf: Bomber groups must be increased from 30 to 45, by 15, that is, 50%.

ObdH (West): Mortars for the West. -- Artillery Commanders. Observation Bns. -- Petzel -- Grouping of Artillery. -- Very much rolling stock on the lines.

20 September 1939.

Frictions with Russia: Lwow.

Jodl (Talk with Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch): Jointly with Russians. Joint settlement of question on the spot! If Russians insist on their territorial claims, we evacuate.

Decision: Russians "Liberators of Lwow". — German troops withdraw from Lwow. — Definitive demarcation line; points of dispute left for later settlement. No political tension must develop. "San line final". Keep distance of 10 kilometers. von Br.

Russians do not advance (Keitel!). Final evacuation step by step.

Jaroslav — Przemysl to the south — Turka — Four nations corner.

A day of disgrace for German political leadership!

von Vormann: Upon urgings by Voroshilov, the Fuehrer has decided on the following final demarcation line, which is to be officially announced today: Pisia — Narew — Vistula — San(Przemysl), Railroad line from Chyrow up to the Pass — not clear.  
Wish of Fuehrer that we must not lose another man east of this line.

von Weizsaecker: What is now the final line?

von Bock: Russian leaflets dropped on Bialystok. Warsaw counter-thrust to the southeast.

von Weizsaecker: Procedure: Through military channels. "Does not want to break his word", "Not a soldier must be sacrificed."

1710: Krebs: Negotiations concluded on amicable note. Obdk.

Russian movements will start tonight. Demarcation line will not be reached before 23 September, morning. It is not known whether this line will be reached at all points.  
Order to advance cautiously.

Also: There will be no fixed special zones of evacuation. Movements must be carried out at 25 km distance. 30 September has been agreed on as the date when the Russian troops will reach the line; this date will serve as reference date for regulating our troop movements. On 3 October, evening, the final demarcation line must be cleared by the German troops. The political negotiations on the exact line are still in progress.

Great emphasis is put on handing over of all important objects directly by the German to the Russian units (airdromes, large cities, RR stations, all objects of economic value, to prevent destruction by bandits). Agreement by Liaison Officers who will settle details depending on the size of the object. Russians have offered armed help against local Polish resistance. Final text now being drafted. Liaison Officers between Corps Hqs.

Col. Aschenbrenner: Inform Jeschonneck.

Text for OKW and OKH!

Von Vormann (from ObdH): After receiving report by ObdH, the Fuehrer has agreed to the following ruling: Purely military reasons compel us to withdraw German troops behind the demarcation line in eight stages. Time needed two weeks, since actions partly still in progress must be broken off or carried through to conclusion.

Russians can move into German forward lines (Black Line) including the towns of Bialystok, Brest, Chelm, 10 km west of Lwow, Drohobycz, Borislav by 22, noon. Further westward movements from this line not until 25 September, 0600 hrs., and in stages marked on maps to be transmitted in time.

Withdrawal of all troops behind the demarcation line will be completed by 4 October. There must always be half a day's march between German and Russian troops.

Jodl: What needs to be done?      Stipulate 25 September.

ObdH: 1.) Agreement with Russians on withdrawal,

2.) Warsaw. Eight days' softening-up attack, then air attacks; (water system, smashing of Artillery; AAA out of action.)

3.) Executive Power:

- I. a) Fuehrer will inform ObdH on all decisions.  
b) Reichsfuehrer SS will do the same.  
c) So will Chief of the Security Police.  
d) Police Commanders have to notify the competent Military Commanders.

II. Large-scale resettlement. Former German territory will be cleared of those who moved in after 1918.

III. For every German moving into these territories, two people will be expelled to Poland.

- IV. a) Ghetto plan exists in broad outline, details are not yet settled; economic needs are prime consideration.  
b) While operations are still in progress, which includes redeployment of bulk of troops, there will be no major movements and resettlement of populations.  
c) What could be done at present is a survey and study as to what population groups must be resettled and where.  
d) Nothing must occur which would afford foreign countries an opportunity to launch any sort of atrocity propaganda based on such incidents. Catholic clergy! Impractical at this time.



Action to be taken: Army Hqs. must be informed on the special instructions which will be issued to the Armies. The instructions will be officially announced. Local Commanders will report before anything is done. Summary Police Courts. Reviewing authority is Reichsfuehrer-SS.  
See Himmler 23 September.

V. High Command East soon.\* — Central agency for the "House cleaning". Draft of organizational set-up will be submitted to us for scrutiny.

Fortifications in the West — Organization.

21 September 1939.

Krebs, 0801:

- 1.) Negotiations were resumed, in Russian, on 21 September, 0200 hrs.
- 2.) Russian text of agreement fixed at 0400 hrs. Idea of provisional intermediate line has been dropped, since the Russians attach overriding importance to reaching the demarcation line, if in any way possible, at an even earlier date.
- 3.) Dates fixed for the withdrawal of German troops behind the demarcation line: Pisia, 27 September, evening.  
Narew at Ostrolenka, 29 September, evening.  
Narew at Pultusk, 1 October, evening.  
Vistula at Warsaw, 3 October, evening.  
Vistula at Deblin, 2 October, evening.  
San at Przemysl, 26 September, evening.  
San at Sanck and to the South, 28 September, evening.

(Southern frontier — Compensation at Suwalki!)

Russians will reach the cited sectors 24 hours later.  
German text will be announced this afternoon after signing at 1600, Russian time.

Weizsaecker: Confirms information on the political situation. Compensation on the southern wing (Ukraine) and on the northern wing (Suwalki).

ObdH: is still going to talk to Krebs.

Notes for ObdH: Computation of strength in the West. — Exchange for Reserve Divisions. — Artillery allocation.  
Artillery position warfare. Training of Staffs.  
Divisional Artillery Commanders to the West. Talk over with Busse, 22 September.

ObdH: Personnel matters: Artillery — Brand? Infantry — Ott.  
Engineers — Jacob. — AT: Schell?

Everhard: Brigade turned over to Police.\* (Buhle.

22 September 1939. (Iron Cross First Class).

Gen Qu: Talk with Thomas: In Posse's office.

Industrial manpower: No difficulties, even in the more distant future.

Raw materials question: Iron from Sweden up to now 9 million, will drop to 6 million. Thomas steel 1.3 million instead of 1.9 million now. Peace-time consumption 1.9; additional wartime requirements 0.4, total 2.3 million tons. Definite figures in 3 - 4 days, then we shall decide on priorities.

Gercke: Railroad situation. Confusion in the civilian economy; 80 % of railroad capacity for civilian economy.

Lwow taken.

23 September 1939.

ObdH: Central Branch. — 30 Corps Artillery Commanders: 17 available. The good ones must go to difficult sectors. — General Staff Officers. Central Branch.

Schell: Directive on AT defense; together with Puttkamer, who must be trained for the job.

OQu IV: Talk with Weizsaecker. — Foreign news.

Bogatsch: Western front.

24 September 1939.

Morning: von Bock:

1.) Worries about Brigade Eberhard\* — Visband? (no!).

- 2.) Should Corps Wodrig\* be given Table of Organization?  
No, must be incorporated in some other unit).
- 3.) Had to modify his impressions after long conferences with Commanders: Infantry is far below 1914 caliber. The impetus given by the first line of attackers is lacking, all depends on the initiative of the Commanders, hence high officer casualties. The light machine gun in the advanced lines are silent for fear of giving themselves away.

ObdH / Brand: Main points on position warfare. Directives; first inform of instructional pamphlet.  
Schall: AT defense.

von Manstein: Masses of refugees streaming westward toward our lines. Order to shoot has been given for the night. If the refugees are allowed to leave, it would be impossible to starve out the city. Moreover, the city's garrison would be enabled to take full advantage of the opportunities for street fightings, with all its uncalculable complications. A decision must be made.

25 September 1939.

0715: Leave by plane for the airdrome of AGp. South. Meet the Fuehrer on his way to the battlefield on the Bzura river. Conferences in Army Hq. 8 Corps Hq. XIII, 31st Div. Corps Hq. X, Nineteenth Div. Subsequently by air over the Bzura battlefield, return 2015 to Rangsdorf.

von Stuelpnagel: Warlimont brought word on Fuehrer's plan of the attack in the West. Notes: Racial Germans must be discharged! over up regimental insignia? Org. Sec.  
Kewisch.\* Central Branch.  
Collect tactical experiences from the front. OCu I.  
Training Sec.

26 September 1939.

Becker\*\*: Muna East\*\*\* (160)#. 600 tons per month, starting 1 October 1940. Trials on spreading from air! Effect over large areas?

Gelan harmful to lungs. Instantaneous effect, horrible convulsions. Factory under construction (capacity 2,000 tons monthly).

Animal tests have been made, Large-scale employment possible as of October 1940.

Peenemuende long-range rocket in 3 - 4 years. One ton explosive charge. Maximum range as far as London. Intermediate target 350 km.

60 cm gun as of May 1940, 6 pieces (one piece every two months); 6 pieces till May 1941, gun for use in massed concentrations\*.

Research: (Research Council) people from the closed universities.

Smoke on 50 km front; daily 1 mill. Field How. projectiles\*\* under most favorable conditions. 2,700 light Field Howitzers.

Radio direction beams in fog, possible:

- a) Bottleneck: Projectors. 6 - 7 m range (electronic).
- b) Ultra-red (does not penetrate natural fog).
- c) Decimeter wave sets. Experiments in progress. Passes through fog.

Alarm instruments: Electric alarm instruments completed. Accessories (bottleneck) will take at least another year.

Gen. Gruen: Training of artillery for position warfare. Artillery Commanders in three waves: West, new activations, East.

Grosscurth: Lithuania and the other Baltic States will be sold down to Russia (Finland not yet clear).

von Bock, 1840: Parlementaire Warsaw. Letter from Rommel. Twenty-four hour truce to spare population - turned down. Officer for surrender negotiations promised. - Shelling continues, will even be stepped up.

Army Hq. 8, Felber: Leaflets with text agreed on yesterday dropped at 0930 hrs. Men will be discharged home. Officers will keep their swords. (Fuehrer agrees).

Order: Step up fire! Air attack will start tomorrow 0630 hrs.

von Bock, 2015: Makes a vow about alleged discrimination against Third Army. Settled by telephone to Third and Eighth Armies and to Army Group.

27 September 1939.

0900: Surrender of Warsaw. Also of Modlin.

Rommel with Third Army. Eighth Army turns over operations. Talk with Felber.

Jeschonneck: Reports on Warsaw.

1700: Fuehrer Conference: / No entries in space left for the purpose. - Ed./

28 September 1939.

Schell: Must find out promptly within what time mot. forces will be ready again for operations. Reply Saturday morning. Tank production to be stepped up to maximum. Demotorization must be stopped until further notice. Fuel problem reported solved. (For Diesel engines: gasoline mixed with oil.)

Jacob reports on fortifications on the Upper Rhine. Steel situation.

1300: Conference of Chiefs.

von Weizsaecker: Evening: Role of the neutral powers. — Distrust of Russia. — Fuehrer sidesteps Italian peace efforts.

von Brauchitsch: Evening, talk regarding our stand on the subject set forth at the Fuehrer Conference of 27 September.

29 September 1939.

Thomas: Demands of the three services by far exceed our productive capacity. ObdH must make clearcut demands in the economic field Not only military and political demands, also economic demands. Air Force in the East has used up fuel equivalent to production of one-half month. Major increase of powder production not before 1941. Germany has monthly steel deficit of 600,000 tons. Clearly defined priorities within the military demands!

Ordnance Offices must make full use of existing factories.

Within the Army quotas ammunition production would be difficult to increase, even if we had the steel. If we start an offensive, production for the Air Force would have to be cut down. Improvement may be expected within six to nine months. — Supply of fuel and iron depends on decision regarding the West.

ObdH: Conference with Keitel on offensive in the West.

Stapf: Conference on offensive in the West, and instruction to inform Jodl on our plans and ideas.

Afternoon: ObdH ; Conference on report for Fuehrer:

I. We must explain to him our ideas:

- a) Protection of the Ruhr.
- b) Preparations in the event of a French offensive.  
Ground forces available.  
Air forces to attack enemy road movements.
- c) French and British will reinforce their defenses against air and tank attacks. Counterargument.
- d) Techniques of Polish campaign no recipe for the West.  
No good against a well-knit Army.

New arms: Gas: 100 etc.\*

50 mm tank\*\* 41/42.

Superheavy tanks.

Chemical warfare projectors. Delivery of the first hundred six barrelled projectors May 1940. (range 6,500).

Lighter version of rocket in 1942.

- e) Season of the year. Days in November very short; fog, air support cannot be depended on.

II. a) Recommendation on how we can stay by behind Dutch and Belgian fortifications\*\*\* ready to go out to meet the enemy. We must resign ourselves to the existence of the fortifications. Declaration to Belgium! In the meantime joint naval and air action against British naval forces. -- India.

Enemy situation. -- How can the enemy react? Effect on balance of forces and ammunition stocks.

If we want to make a really valuable gain on the political chessboard, we must risk a daring move.

Our aim is to make the Army an instrument of maximum suppleness.

Keitel (OKW): History three times.#

Political pressure on France by means of a demonstration.

"Belgians are facing the wrong way. We shall surprise them".

We must start out from having the Army stand by against the event of a violation of neutrality, and remain flexible to meet possible political developments: What could possibly happen in the next few weeks? Possible developments resulting from our "preparedness assembly".

30 September 1939.

Mueller/Wagner: Logistic preparations for the operation.

ObdH: Condition reports of Divisions. Tabulation by General Army Office for Fuehrer.

Take all dispositions for preparedness assembly.

Schell's recommendation must be talked over once more with ObdH.

Army Hq. 4 not to be used Army Hq. 10 administration.

Army Hq numbers must be changed on transfer. Op.

1600: Fuehrer conference. (Thanks for our achievements) He is prepared for peace. Utmost determination.

Evening: Prolonged conference with ObdH on how we stand on the Fuehrer's plans in the West.

1 October 1939.

Afternoon Ochsner with Quartermaster General.

Otherwise only current reports throughout the day.

Talk with Stuelpnagel on the situation created by low estimation of General Staff work on top level.

Draft of a letter to ObdH on position of the Chief of the General Staff.

2 October 1939.

Jeschonneck: AAA Division! -- Delimitation of Air Force Administrative Districts in the East. Freeze AAA ammunition.\*

Protection for Reconnaissance. -- Long-range reconnaissance. Sodenstern -- Additional 8 - 9 short-range reconnaissance Staff and 50 AA Bns.

Lost: Preparations for use would take four months.

Buhle: Armd. troops for training purposes under mot. Corps Hqs. BdE? One Corps Hq. to control one Armd. Div., one Light Div. and one mot. Div.

ObdH: Sodenstern's report on how pillboxes stand up under fire. Also his talk on Koppelberg's program (Training Bn). -- Giessen.

3 October 1939.

High Command East (Rundstedt) takes over command of the entire Eastern front. AGp. North will be withdrawn. Artillery Commanders.

Afternoon von Leeb (Frankfurt): Third Draft suitable for position warfare only under quiet conditions. Fourth Draft suited for position warfare only after further training in defensive warfare.

Appraisal of Hammerstein (Artillery!).  
Breaking up of concentration must be put off as long as possible.

Complaints: a) Handling of dependents' care (by the Party!).  
b) Construction Bn. (wages mark) versus Todt Organization workers (highest paid workers).  
This applies to drivers (Construction Bns.).

Sodenstern wants to know soon what artillery he is going to keep. Whether he can manage with 25 Divs. will depend on what he can keep. French Artillery excellent. Own Artillery greatly inferior. Own Infantry better.

Observation Bns.

Mortars?

Mines: First Army 12 killed, 26 wounded in 24 - 30 September period. Enemy had 14 killed, 46 wounded. Mines must be prohibited in areas where offensives are planned. Marking of lanes.

Morale of the troops good, but rests on reliance on fortifications. "There will be no further operations." Peace will come soon. "It is the Generals that push the war."

Fieldpost: Relaxation of rigid number system.

Notes for Op. Sec.:

- a) Mines must be prohibited where attacks are intended.
- b) AGp. C wants to know what artillery they will keep. Observation Bns. Senior Artillery Commanders.
- c) After fixing of order of battle:  
Plan of local distribution of forces. Fire plan.  
Time schedule: Filling in of Fire plan. Overlapping to First Army.  
Factors to be remembered in this connection: Readiness for jump-off in the event of an enemy advance must be constantly improved. Keep continuously informed on state of preparedness of Armd. units, so that Armd. elements could be swiftly brought up when needed.  
(Görcke) — Bluff.



Central Branch: von Gebattel.

Gen Ou: a) Field Post.  
b) Evacuation.  
c) Handling of dependents' care.  
d) Wage scale differential "Construction Troops/Todt Organization (One worker gets 1 M, the other one maximum wages). Todt Construction Organization must be militarized (construction workers and drivers).

von Etzdorf: German help for Belgium and Holland.\*  
Turkey - Russia.

Buhle: I want to be kept informed on improvements in the tank position. (A job for Schell!) Fuehrer demands increase in the number of Divisions.  
In the East binary Divisions of the Third Draft; 30 Regional Defense Divisions.

ObdH: Belgium - Holland. Bluff? (as part of the peace offensive).

4 October 1939.

ObdH: Leaflets for the East: "Peace on earth". Arms must be laid down. (Whoever is found carrying arms will be put before a Court-martial).

Radio: Same line.

Bock and Leeb. Establish contact. (He has all the material.)\*\*  
Bock - Saturday/Sunday.  
Will take over on Monday, as agreed with Leeb.  
Also Army Hq. 10 and 4.  
New man for Liebmann.  
New man for Bockelberg.

Equipment of the "counteroffensive wave" with medium artillery, AT guns, aviation.  
Draw up directives for cooperation with air. (Action against roads.) Mot. Advance Combat Team.

von Stuelpnagel: ObdL has ordered activation of AA divisions. These two AA divisions will be at the qualified disposal of AGp.B. Allocation to the Armies to suit the Army Group. Our wishes concerning AAA for the troops have been met.

Stapf: ObdL states that attack could not be launched now. Reasons: Time unfavorable because of the weather. Tanks are not ready for operations. Political repercussions. Other date: next spring (not 1941 or 1942).

von Etzdorf: 1.) No undue importance.\* Italy at the moment still noncommittal. Price offered not yet high enough.  
2.) France ready to negotiate. Conditions. Political? Subject of discussion.  
3.) Fate of Poland.  
4.) Belgium.

Schniewind: Increase in number of submarines cannot be materialized before 1941. Additional 30 submarines per month, starting early in 1941. End summer 1941. Then there will be 100 submarines at the front (enough for decisive effect) (100 en route, 100 in port).

Pappenheir calls.

Jodl: Very severe crisis is in the making.  
Report has been submitted to the Fuehrer on status of armaments. Schell (He will not receive him). Recommendations Fromm. Jointly for Navy, Army. — No confidence in the Czech 42 cm gun. —  
Bitter because soldiers do not obey him. ObdH.

5 October 1939.

Notes for ObdH: Order on Training: Covering letter — Experiences - Courses. Troop Training Centers under BdE.

Chappuis: Findings on inspection:

- a) Shortcomings in the intermediate and lower ranks of officers' corps. Lethargy.
- b) Infantry does not attack vigorously enough. Preparations for fire cover too elaborate. Good opportunities are being missed. Heavy Inf. weapons are often not used. Instead, Inf. keeps clamoring for artillery. Utilization of AT Artillery.
- c) Camouflage against air attack very poor.
- d) Motorized forces: 1.) In traffic jams, everybody just settles down and waits. Officers sit around instead of doing something to clear the jam.  
2.) Everything not needed in battle should stay at least 8 km behind the front, otherwise unnecessary congestion behind the combat line.
- e) Jewish massacres. — discipline!

6 October 1939.

ObdH: Divisional Arty Commanders. 150 Admin. Divisional Staffs.

Buhle: Three Divisional Arty Commanders.

Central Branch. Personnel — Field Officers.

Buhle. Gen Qu: Admin. Divisional Staffs for Regional Defense Divs.  
No 300 up.

Temporary duty of frontline Commanders with replacement units.

7 October 1939.

Wagner: Hey(-drich) has seen the Fuehrer. Complaint about Mlawa.  
Treatment of Jews. Prueter comes here by air.

Order to Bock on assumption of Command.

1500: Report to Fuehrer on northwestern operation. Keeps material submitted.

Fuehrer emphasizes:

- a) The Belgians will call the French to come to their aid.  
We must not wait for that. France will do that in the period of the autumn fogs.
- b) We must forestall this with an operation designed to gain a decision, even if we fall short of the original objectives and attain only a line which would afford better protection for the Ruhr.
- c) Deception on fronts where we do not attack.

8 October 1939.

Gen Qu: Ammunition: We have enough for an operation with about one third of our Divisions, for fourteen combat days; then we shall have left a reserve of fourteen more combat days. Current production of ammunition: one combat day for one-third of our Divs.

State Secretary: Discussion of situation, — Neurath, — King Albert.

9 October 1939.

ObdH: Mine warfare in the West.

- a) Order on mine detectors through regular chain of command.\*-- Jacob.
- b) Attention must be drawn to possible application also to combat outposts.

Conference with von Bock 1100. Operational intentions.

Fromm, 1430:

- 1.) Dispatch Schell and Gotsche to find out by what means mot. units could be readied for operations at an earlier date.
- 2.) If what Keitel says is true, viz. that tank repairs are to be given priority (priority number, etc.) and if 29th mot. and Fourth Light Inf. Divs. are stripped, then we can send to the front by 10 November:  
Five Armd. Divs.  
Two Light Divs.  
Three Mot. Divs.

Schell, 1600: Discussion of possibilities for improving facilities for mot. units.

Ready by 10 November:

Not ready:

First, Second, Third, Fourth,  
Fifth Armd. Divs., each reinforced by one Rifle Bn.

First (Armd.), Second Light Divs.  
Second, Thirteenth, Twentieth  
(two Regts. each) Divs. mot.

Tenth (2-3 weeks later)  
Third, Fourth Light (2-3 weeks). 29th mot. must perhaps be stripped to refit other Divisions.

Artillery in Leeb's AGp: Prime movers must be freed. Get good prime movers for worn-out ones.

Buhle: Bridge columns must be changed from Corps troops to GHq. troops.

von Stuelpnagel/Warlimont:

- 1.) Date for offensive: 25 November.
- 2.) Must be put off in case of bad flying weather.
- 3.) Must under no circumstances bog down.
- 4.) Memorandum for approval.
- 5.) Points to stress: Establish contact between Fuehrer and Army leaders of proved worth. -- Combat value of the individual Divs. varies.

24th Sec.:\* Maps available for 40 Divs.  
Rest of maps by 25 October, will be sent to AGp. B for distribution.

Air Force ready for operations in 10 days, at the expense of replacements.

ObdH : Show ObdH list of Regimental Numbers of permanent occupation units in the East.

10 October 1939.

ObdH : Blaskowitz )  
von Rundstedt ) Looting -- general pardon.

"Das Frontschwein ist da.  
Wo bleibt die SS und die SA? ".\*

Brand: Discipline behind the front. Divisional commanders.

Bock has inaugurated his "reign".

Experiences by Hoeppner and Reinhardt.

1100. Fuehrer Conference:

- 1.) He reads us a Memorandum giving the reasons for his decision to strike a swift and shattering blow in the West in case he is compelled to continue hostilities.
- 2.) The possibility must be preserved to extend the safety zone of the Ruhr to the West, in the event of an enemy movement into Belgium.
- 3.) "Directive" will be issued still today.
- 4.) Mobilize everything to the last and as quickly as possible! Transfer from the East.  
Fortress Divs. must be taken out and brought up to full Divisional strength. Captured enemy material must at once be utilized for the Forces in the East!
- 5.) Aims of the operation: We must make the French and British give battle and beat them. Only in this way can our superiority in leadership, training and materiel be applied to full advantage.  
It is unlikely that the French would stop at their northern frontier. But if they do so it does not matter; we shall then have an air base against England.
- 6.) He is convinced that Belgium will collapse "in doublequick time".
- 7.) Attack on such a wide front that the French and British would not be in a position to build up a solid front.

We must not form a massive front.

Split up the enemy front! Concentrated attacks against single sectors by a continuous flow of troops from the rear. This enables us to bring to bear our superiority in generalship.

- 8.) Even if we do not gain a decisive victory, we have still an opportunity to gain ground. In this event there would be little danger that we fritter away our strength in defensive warfare.
- 9.) We must free all units suited for attack, including Fortress Brigades. The French Fortress Brigades will be of no use to them if they take the offensive.
- 10.) He is convinced that we can force a decision if we are determined to bring to bear all our strength. (Compares our situation with the much greater difficulties faced by Frederick the Great.)
- 11.) East. No change in the Russian attitude need be anticipated in the near future. Later on perhaps doubtful. In any event, Russia needs Germany's friendship to achieve her aims. 15 Divs. in the East instead of 20?
- 12.) No deluge of new activations. Number of Divisions must remain limited so that we can keep them replenished.
- 13.) Date of the offensive: Through delays in the transfer of units and in the build-up of the Western front, the Army may cause the political leadership to miss the best date of the offensive.
- 14.) No offensive with inadequate forces. We cannot be too strong for the offensive. Any unit capable of moving is better than nothing. Fortress Divs. must be brought up to full strength!
- 15.) Improvement of frontier must be omitted in case of previous enemy advance.
- 16.) We can start the offensive only with sufficient armor and mot. elements, and Air Force (1.? !).\* Our aim must be to advance the date as far as possible.
- 17.) In case the Air Force cannot strike at all, we shall not launch an offensive. Air Force must make preparations for launching coordinated counter-offensive.
- 18.) The operation will have been planned right if from the outset it aims at a wide front.  
In the North we must interrupt as soon as possible the communication between Antwerp and the British Expeditionary Corps. British landing at Antwerp unlikely.  
Attack on Antwerp from the West makes fall of the city a foregone conclusion.

- 19.) It makes no difference to us whether a besieged city holds out a month or two. In the East political reasons compelled us to reduce fortresses swiftly; but such reasons do not apply here. In the West our actions must exclusively be guided by entirely matter-of-fact calculations. Second and third rate troops are quite suitable for siege operations. "Every rifleman in an encircling front is a loss."
- 20.) It is particularly important that our Air Force should harass the French counter-movements and counter-offensive.
- 21.) Save ammunition! No medium calibers, where light calibers can do the job! Must be thought through and borne in mind in drafting orders.
- 22.) Armd. units must not be used against cities. They attain their maximum effect in the open field, in massive surprise attacks. He fears they may be scattered hopelessly in Belgian cities, above all in the mazes of the industrial areas.
- 23.) Of paramount importance is the will to beat the enemy. Enemy forces are limited. The French cannot replace losses after reverses. It is easier for them to replace their losses in materiel, but manpower losses pose a difficult problem for them.
- 24.) He expects manifestations of defeatism in France. Question of blame for new blood sacrifices. Pacifist opposition. The French people can be expected to suffer irreparable losses.
- 25.) An offensive is the only way to sweep Italy into action on our side. Italy now no longer interested in peace. Il Duce is eagerly waiting for the suitable moment to take the plunge. That is why he is not now making any offers of mediation. His armaments are increasing; very serious efforts. There is no reason to doubt the sincerity of his statement to Mackensen. 165,000 men in Libya; more reinforcements are going there. Fuel situation has improved. Oil consumption controlled. Various measures indicate that war production is getting under way. As long as we are sitting idle behind the Westwall, Italy will not enter the war.
- 26.) At the moment there is no need to fear any unrest on the Balkans.

Fromm: a) Allocation of steel (in accordance with Buhle's recommendation).

b) Replacements Bns. from the West to the East. Buhle.  
In their place, larger units will go to the West.

211th, 212th, 217th, 225th Inf. Divs. stopped in the West, (AGp.B).  
ObdH.

ObdH: Reorganization of the Infantry squad. Issuance of the additional MGs. -- Sixth Draft till 1 January 1940. -- Reequipping of Divs. for Poland.

Fromm: Transfer of Replacement units to the East.

Buhle for report to ObdH: What do our Armd. Divs. look like? Recon. Bn. mot.

|                               |                              |
|-------------------------------|------------------------------|
| Reichenau - Hoth - Hoeppner ) | Kluge - Guderian?            |
| Schmidt )                     | Geyer von Schweppenburg with |
| Reinhardt)                    | Guderian won't do.           |

First Light Inf. Div. Kempf. -- Schaal Tenth Armd. Div.

Signal Officer for OKH!

Demand on Air Force! Navy: Coast protection.

11 October 1939.

Op. Sec.:

- 1.) C-in-C East reports that he cannot do without 29th (mot.) and Fourth Light Inf. Divs. (Envisaged as next wave are: XIV Corps, 29th mot. Fourth Light).  
Mission: Pacification and security of lines of communication. Heusinger to the East? ObdH.
- 2.) Direct reporting by the Armies. Morning, noon, evening. We need a picture of developments by 15 hrs. to be able to issue orders for the following day. Hours to be fixed, ObdH.
- 3.) Planning work for West must be wound up so as to be completed by 8 November, and troops could be assembled by 15 November.
- 4.) Command setup East. a) Kaupisch for Heitz. Heitz CG of Corps (reduced) as relief of a regular Corps.  
b) Beckelberg does not want to relinquish Executive Power.  
c) 1 November.
- 5.) Fuehrer Memorandum.\*

ObdH: a) Camouflage of troops in the West. Maintain.  
Reserve Divisions in the East released. Yes. --

b) von Bock to Berlin for several days. Part a) ready. Part b) will be delayed.

c) Corps Artillery Officers. Leeb 4, free 26. Allocate to Corps. Brand.



- d) Newly arriving Divs. in Beck's Group at the disposal of OKH?
- e) Map trouble.
- f) 100 8.3 cm AA ) Czech have 17 km range  
20 9 cm AA ) 2000 rounds per piece.
- g) Training directives.

Plan of fire for ObdH.

12 October 1939.

ObdH must get to the Fuehrer to let him know what we are doing. Activations, etc.: Manpower for the Fifth and Sixth Drafts. Utilization of captured Polish materiel, etc. Leeb's Memorandum.

Heitz.

ObdH: Not pacified yet. Sabotage attempt. Uprising possible. (Prisoners from Warsaw). Home Defense (Alvensleben)\* is not duly authorized. Gauleiter knows about it.

Dr. Waltmann: Medical service at the front, in the Z.I., in PoW camps. Organization, Statistics.

Conference with State Secretary on 13 October.

13 October 1939.

ObdH: New C of S for Kuechler (Stapf). -- Boeckmann will get a Division (Eleventh). -- Corps Petzel - Olbricht. -- Raschik - Schmidt (?).

Army Cs of S:

Model or Stapf (?) for Boeckmann. -- Konrad. -- Marcks, possibly Felber. -- For Manstein possibly Felber. -- Schmidt younger than Manstein. -- Vietinghoff. -- Obstfelder. -- Schubert. -- ObdH.

ObdH (In reply to inquiry by AGp. C in daily report, 12 October.): Enemy fire must not be drawn unnecessarily by our own fire. Retaliation fire as far as necessary.

Armored Divisions:

First, Second, Third, Sixth (First Light) Armd. Divs. have: one Rifle Brigade Staff, one Rifle Regt. of three Bns., one motorcycle Rifle Bn.

Fourth, Fifth, Seventh (Second Light) Tenth Armd. Divs. have: two Rifle Regts. of two Bns., no Brigade Staff.

Fourth Light has: two Rifle Regts. of two Bns., no Brigade Staff.

Third Light Inf. Div. has: one Rifle Regt. of three Bns., one motorcycle Rifle Bn.

14 October 1939.

Prolonged conference with ObdH on overall situation: ObdH: Three possibilities: Attack: wait and see, fundamental changes.\* None of these three possibilities offers prospects of decisive success, least of all the last, since it is essentially negative and tends to render us vulnerable. Quite apart of all this it is our duty to set forth military prospects soberly and to promote every possibility to make peace.

Stapf. Travel report.

Instructions for assembly of troops ready.

15 October 1939.

ObdH: a) Date for Fuehrer report? Dependent on completion of program "Panzer".\*\*  
b) Map maneuvers.  
c) Tours to the Front.  
d) von Rundstedt is telling ObdH has asked him to talk the Fuehrer out of his plans.  
e) Steel allocation for ammunition factory construction out of our 80,000 ton ammunition quota.

ObdH: Materials for Fuehrer report: Map and distribution of forces on front.-- Distribution of all forces. -- Computation of forces and distribution, French, British, Belgians, Dutch. - Earliest date (Schell).  
Alerting period before X-Day is seven days. When is deadline for last stopping of movements!

Try a peaceful settlement with Holland.

Armeeabteilung H.\*\*

More artillery reserves from Witzleben's Group.

ObdH / Bock: Training of Army Group reserves. GHq Reserves won't start coming in before 5 October.\*

Exchange of the frontline <sup>D</sup>ivisions temporarily stopped, can now be resumed, since assembly plans have been decided on.

Jodl: a) Motorized forces not where there are many lines, but at junctions of lines.  
b) Defensive front: Mt. Div.  
c) Holland: Letter to the Prince -- Reserve for us.  
d) Enemy. ObdH.

French Defeatism is nothing but propaganda to have a respite until Spring.

Norway.

Air Force: Must husband Ju 88 resources.

Jacob: 14 bridge trains for 70 Divisions.

/No entry on 16 October 1939. - Ec.7

17 October 1939.

ObdH: Preparation for Fuehrer report.

Canaris: /No entry - Ed.7 Raeder.

Summary of Conference ObdH - Fuehrer: Hopeless. The British will be ready to talk only after a beating. We must get at them as quickly as possible. No use swinging out too far. He does not believe that the French can get there fast enough. French Infantry not as hard as ours; use divebombers against artillery. Date: Between 15 and 20 November at the earliest. Exact date cannot yet be fixed. Preliminary notice seven days.

18 October 1939.

Wagner: Points in Conference with Fuehrer on Poland:

We have no intention of rebuilding Poland. Precautions against .  
..... /Omission. - Ed.7  
Assembly area for future German operations.

Poland is to have its own administration. Is not to be turned into a model State by German standards. Polish intelligentsia must be prevented from establishing itself as a new governing class. Low standard of living must be conserved. Cheap slaves. All undesirable elements must be thrown out of German territory.

The administration in Poland will have complete authority except on military matters.

Only one supreme authority: Governor-General.

Total disorganization must be created! No cooperation of Reich Government Agencies!

The Reich will give the Governor-General the means to carry out this devilish plan.

Military demands Roads -- Railroads. Garrisons as "Ordensburgen" \* on the security line or forward of it.

West Prussia and Province of Posen are to built up an internal administration under Military Government.

1200: Conference with all departments concerned on new set-up of High Command East.

1700: Dankwerts, Gause etc.

Evening: Foreign Office. -- Wilhelm \*\* calls on me.

19 October 1939.

ObdH: a) Talk with Foreign Office. (Belgium. -- Reporting of the war in French Press. Defeatism. Reports from France).

b) Army Hq. 3 - High Command Northeastern sector. Corps Hq. of its own under BdE. Executive Power.

c) Organization of the East: Continuous tank-ditch, posts of platoon strength.

d) (Stapf) Model -- quiet Ia. \*\*\*

e) 25 October 2400 hrs. transfer High Command East.

Strictly military appraisal of the situation. #

Blaskowitz will take over on 23 October.

Ziehlberg: Organization of the Staffs.

Rundstedt: New Staff C-in-C East.

Quartermaster Staff for Blaskowitz. Motor vehicles for Landwehr Divisions ## for communication with advanced outposts. Wood supply,

light, water, motor sledges. Rail-trolleys, ski Bns.

Becker: 1.) Mine detection and mine clearance in enemy territory and noman's land.

- a) Detector will be tried out on S-mines.\*
- b) Development in box-frame mine detector. \*\*
- c) Portable mine detector. (Divining rod.)
- d) Remote-controlled mine demolition vehicle of concrete, driven across minefields to cause detonation of the mines. "Fire-rafts" against positions. \*\*\* Remote control device on underside of tanks.
- e) Hammer vehicles. #

2.) Bridge-laying vehicles; production must be started. Chassis of tank IV; 50 have been ordered.

Org. Sec.: Schell reports that First through Eighth Armd. Divs., Tenth Armd. Div., Second, Thirteenth, Twentieth Divs. mot. ready for operations as of 10 November.

20 October 1939.

Bockelberg commendation. Letter of thanks through Personnel Division. Iron Cross.

Heitz.

Danzig, Bock.

Posen Petzel.

Blaskowitz sees ObdH and myself. Briefing. Will relieve Rundstedt on 23 October.

Hoeppner calls on me.

Jodl sees OQu I

21 October 1939.

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Transfer of GHq.
- 2.) Fuehrer's ideas: Possibly only with assault groups.  
Reichenau. Eben Emael 50 gliders.
- 3.) Fuehrer report, Jodl's inquiry.

4.) Leeb - OQu.

5.) Grossdeutschland: Mot. Regt. or airborne. Decision:  
mot. Op. Sec.

Must be done as quick as possible; order will be forthcoming  
for Divisions of the Third Draft.

Org. Sec. Wait for order. BdE and field army will not be done  
in the Third wave until order is given.\*

Tour to the front as soon as possible. Itinerary. Inquiries.  
Termination 5 Nov.

Rhine pillboxes: Find out what can be done against French  
pillboxes. Buhle.

Position on the flood dam must be reconnoitered. Op. Sec.  
Report and move up before onset of winter. }

Seventh Section\*\*

8.35 Batteries.

8.8 cm: 8.35; 10.5 guns.

Prepare AA guns from rear positions.

8.3 Czech; crews to be trained.

Urgent. -- Set  
deadline (5 November)  
Op. Sec.

40 Jueterbog 8.8 cm AA \*\*\* are with Kluge and Reichenau. Op. Sec

OQu IV: # Krebs ## -- What is the Commission doing? ### It is very  
important to us that work should be completed at an early date.  
OQu IV.

If date is cancelled, troops will be dispersed.

How much time must we stipulate for restarting of machinery?  
Op. Sec. Greiffenberg.

Flame throwers, talk over with Eng. Off.

Telescopic sight (snipers) Ott. Training Sec.

AT Rifles. Org. Sec.

Equipment with antitank mines. Discuss with Eng. Off.

Allocation of Divisional Artillery Commanders and Observation Bns. --  
Brand.

Distribution of maps showing enemy dispositions. Liss.

Preparation of plans through map maneuvers. OQu I.

Smoke ammunition and special ammunition. Wagner.

Recommendations on defense of East Prussia.

Recommendation on organization of High Command East.

Leeb's deception plan.

Buhle: Signal Sec., Stapf.

- a) 100 Watt armored reconnaissance car \* for Air Force Liaison Officer.
- b) Twelve 12 ton prime movers for 8.8 AA guns reported available.  
Fourty 8 ton prime movers (trailers) for 8.8 cm AT guns reported in factories for dismantling.

22 October 1939.

Keitel: There seem to be new difficulties about assembly order. —  
Jodl.

Blaskowitz: Rundstedt should leave altogether. One man too many.  
Blaskowitz tomorrow noon.

When Transportation Officer has left - Teilacker - Passed on  
Telegram? to Central Branch. Eng. Off.  
Liebmann Radom.

Memo: Trip to the West Tuesday morning.  
Buerkner, Mann for Belgium. — Papen. — East Prussia.

Chevallerie (after talk with Hollidt): Blumentritt still there;  
hands over business to Gerlach. Langhaeuser (Ic) is transferred to Staff West. Also Jaehnicke. Teilacker stopped in Berlin on his way to the West. -- Not fault of Army Group! Three Officers there.  
Request will be made for Eng. Off.  
Burkhardt, Chief of Signal Communications, is there.  
Subordinate personnel still lacking. (BdE announces arrival 24)  
Rundstedt's Staff apparently has not taken with anything unnecessary.

Col. Gen. Keitel, with Jodl:

- 1.) a) Conference with ObdH.
  - b) Conference with Bock, Kluge, Reichenau Wednesday. It will be left up to him to decide whether he wants it on Wednesday before the general conference, or on Tuesday; and whether he wants it alone or together with the Generals; perhaps also same time. (Decision: 1200 - 1400.)
- 2.) Re: Directive for assembly:  
Armeeabteilung North: IJssel inundation area will be first obstacle. Attempt not worthwhile. Troops will be cut off! (Objections denied.) Group too strong (two Divs).

Second Army: one more Division. Antwerp must be cut off from the north. Navy cannot cut off communications to Vlissingen. Second Army is given mission to encircle the fortress from the north, north-east and east.

Sixth Army:

- a) From which Army does OKH expect greater things, Sixth or Fourth?  
A tangle.
- b) After breakthrough the ratio of motorized forces must be enlarged. Sixth Army must look after its flanks.
- c) Army Groups Reserve.

Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies: no comments.

AAA: / No entry in space allotted. - Ed.7

Main effort: In Sixth or Fourth Army. Army Group Reserve within reach.

Could we infer the following development from these intentions?

- a) Infantry Divisions are apparently depended on to force the breakthrough. (Five crossings, two siege operations).
- b) Has it been taken into account that Sixth Army must be divided after the obstacles have been overcome? Independent "GHq. Cavalry Group".

Details: a) 45 Gliders (Task force Udet), total of 400 men. Junker planes will be made available for this purpose.  
Airborne operation against bridges (from an altitude of 4000 - 5000 m, 50 - 100)\*. Combined with coups de main.  
b) Eben Emael. Groups with flame throwers. Railway guns: 28 cm. Smoke?  
c) Airborne operation against Ghent. (Where is 22nd Div.?)  
d) Fuehrer wants to attack on 12 November (Sunday). Twelfth Army to the West.

Fuehrer wants to leave at the end of the week. Saarbruecken.

23 October 1939.

Note for ObdH : Strategic analysis of Polish Campaign, by Christmas.

24 October 1939.

Op. Sec. (Schell):

- a) Wheeled vehicles not before 7 Nov., evening. Tanks not before



7 Nov, evening. -- Fourth Light Div. (needs three days.)  
Ready 16 Nov, evening, -- 29th Div. (needs five days.)

SS Adolf Hitler? \*

ObdH :

Bring up what is needed at the front in three days (by road and rail); on 12 Nov, during day.

Kunzen (Third Light Div.) and Geyer (Third Armd. Div.) must change. Geyer to Reichenau.

b) Personnel replacements said to be feasible. Last Div. due what date? Probably not all AA guns will be ready in time. (Three one-third Bns.)

c) Signal Regt., Sixteenth Army, not yet ready.

Officers. Not Twelfth. Replacements.

Fellgiebel: a) Three telephone and twelve teletype lines behind each Army. (Eight wires), from the rear to Army Hqs., not exceeding 200 km.  
b) Ready by 12 November to connect with postal and air network.  
c) Army and Navy systems safe. Air Force radio communications not protected against interception.

ObdH. - Observations on his tour in the West:

Witzleben wants us to tell Fuehrer about troubles with mines.

First Army has had its 10 cm Btrys taken away. Distress calls!

Gercke: Should materials for Eng. Corps be shipped under regular bills of lading!

ObdH: a) Goering feels insulted by our "demands", and by Rundstedt's letter. Op. Sec. must find out how Goering got to it.  
Answer: Was turned over at request of Air Force Gen.Staf:

b) Swastika marking for air -ground identification (Order of the Fuehrer). (Bogatsch). Op.Sec.

c) Tanks must be marked on top. Signal flares. (Bogatsch).  
Op. Sec.

Leave painted markings. Hoods of tanks. Dust! \*\*

Memo for ObdH: Ambassador Ritter (Negotiations with Moscow on economic questions).

Ready to submit report this week (Foreign Office).

Reports on frontline observations for Fuehrer, in order of the Armies visited (Fourth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Eighth). Warlimont.

25 October 1939.

Salmuth: We have not enough bridge columns. Bock -- Tresckow.

Buhle: Machine guns etc. will be all right.  
Truck situation will not be straightened out.) Obstruction  
Corps Signal Bns. for Corps impossible. ) by Schell.  
Divisional Columns. ) ObdH.

Troop movements.

Albert Canal, air reconnaissance of slopes of southern bank  
(Liss). Mincs.

Fuehrer Conference 25 October 1200 - 1800:

- a) Still more from the East.\*
- b) 10 Divisions from AGp. C.
- c) No more movements after start of offensive.
- d) Offensive will be broadened later on.
- e) For attack move to front AT Companies of other Divisions, medium and light AAA. No need to tie ourselves rigidly to the order of battle.

Army North: By what means are inundations produced, by locks or by dams? Would blowing up of locks serve any purpose?

ObdH: Areenorth of the Meuse not needed? Islands.  
Kluge on Charleroi. Reichenau on Ghent.  
In between, a new Army which must be able to withstand heavy blows. Covering of southern flank. If possible, List should also participate in the offensive. Groups on both wings very strong. Catastrophe similar to that on the Vistula bend. Plan of operation: Wants main effort south of Liège, to the west, but still unwilling to stake all on one card.  
Mountain Arty. for airborne operation.

26 October 1939.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) a) Tour in the West? Cancel.
- b) Let preparations in the field run on for time being.  
Signal communications?  
Gen Qu?  
Railroad no change. OQu I.  
Air etc., no notifications yet.

Fuehrer tomorrow evening, 27 October. Op. Sec.

- 2.) Notes for report.

3.) Report on Albert Canal.

4.) Fuehrer should be given reports on experiences of the campaign (our wishes). Reports based on Polish Campaign, which show performance of Infantry, importance of Officers Corps, training, changeover from the West to the East.

OQu I, Org. Sec.

Before 1300:

Kuechler in place of Weichs. Op. Sec.

Krebs -- Marcks. Central Branch.

Heitz VIII Corps.

Fuehrer, 26 Oct., Training, lighting\*.

New Army Hqs. Central Branch and through Ziehlberg.  
Op. Sec., Org. Sec.  
Gen. Qu.

Take our central sector, Blaskowitz with Fuehrer,  
Kuechler -- Bockelberg.

Jodl: Fuehrer wants report.

Important change from original plans: Attempt to break through everywhere.

Hollidt: Himmler calls up in Warsaw.

Negotiations with Moscow on exchange of Germans in Volhynia (Galicia) for settlement in German territories, against Ukrainians and Jews.

400 German officials will go to Russia, 1,000 Russian Officials will come to the area of High Command East. Will stay in country for four weeks, will be watched by Himmler's men (espionage). Inquiry whether we have any objections. Reply: None. ObdH.

27 October 1939. Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross.

1245. Meeting at the Fuehrer's. Award of decorations.

Subsequently Lunch.

Afterwards Fuehrer Conference: Formation of two mot. assault groups (Ghent and southwest of Namur). Date 12 November. Final order on operations tomorrow!

After return: Reports by Central Branch, Buhle, Chief of Transportation.

In the evening, conference with ObdH alone (he is tired and dejected).

Activation of new Army Hq.: No signal troops. Only in two months, when it will perhaps be possible to form a Signal Regt.

Merger of organizations in the East. High Command East and Sector Command Center. Must be postponed until final decision on the West

Hierl wants to revive the Labor Service now during the war.  
Three months' service, wants to take Labor Service Officers  
out of Army, young people from industry.

28 October 1939.

0900, Conference with OQu I and Op. Sec. Recommendation on operation  
south of Liège.

1000, Fuehrer Conference.

Outline of the dissimilar conditions obtaining north and  
south of Liège. North of Liège the difficulty is to overcome  
the first obstacles, south of Liège the problems are those  
of distance and the barrier of the Meuse river.

Conclusions: We must do the one thing without excluding the  
other. In Reichenau's sector the mot. Group must be held up  
until we can see whether crossing of the river can be made.

1400, Conference with OQu I and Op. Sec. on outcome of Fuehrer  
Conference.

1400, Buhle: 10 cm guns instead of medium Field Howitzers. 14 Bns.?  
ObdH's wish.

1400, Roehricht: Talk on artillery instruction pamphlets by Wandel.

Notes for ObdH: 1.) 10 cm Batteries must be ready to move on 5 Nov.  
Two Bns. can be converted for sure (by 3 November)  
Ask for numbers?  
2.) Protectorate Division stopped.  
3.) Artillery 50% ready. Remainder will be completed  
in time with the exception of two heavy Bns.  
(604th and 605th). (Heavy Howitzers and 15 cm guns)  
B.\*

29 October 1939.

Conference Buhle -- Brand. Greiffenberg.

Report to ObdH on new assembly order.

1600, Stappf: Airborne troops. Intentions?

Memo for ObdH: Front tour OQu I ? \*\* Rundstedt and Leeb, orientation  
on reasons for the change. Talk to Commanding Generals; orient  
on intentions.  
Reichenau -- Stuelpnagel.  
Transfer to H. \*\*\*

30 October 1939.

ObdH: Camouflage preparations so that the program can start running as of 5 November.  
Friday, Saturday to the Fuehrer -- Trip on 2 and 3 November. --  
Going out one half, returning three-quarters.  
Armd. troops must at all events be ready to roll.

Has the Fuehrer got our reports on campaign experiences? Check points for stopping of movement.\* Last signals eight hours before jump-off; after that there is no stopping.

Buttlar: a) Preparations for trip on 2 and 3 November.  
b) Preparations for transfer of GHq. to H.

Jacob: a) Railroad gun emplacement for the Fuehrer (Request of AGp. C).  
b) Control of iron allocations.  
c) Use of Engineer troops for deception maneuvers on the Saar and Moselle rivers.  
Army Hq. 18 5 November Cologne.

31 October 1939.

ObdH: Mechanical equipment for position construction.  
Officer appointments in Rear Services.\*\*  
Haseloff\*\*\*, BdE.  
Representative of the Personnel Div.  
Pappenheim.

1 November 1939.

Note for ObdH:

- a) Railroad accidents; railroads are taxed to breaking point (damaged cars, late trains, nervousness). New fronts impossible! Railroad maps showing critical points for ObdH.
- b) Difficulties in supply by rail.
- c) Deterioration of ordinary good manners observable in furlough traffic.
- d) Recommendations to Fuehrer: 256th Div., 255th Div. (Protectorate Staff Brand should be attached to XXXIII Corps.
- e) Ahr Valley Railroad.
- f) Pressure of time. Logistic preparations.

Program: For Commanding Generals of Army Groups only!

Report from AGp. A. Lacks positive aspects. Reduction of forces. Surprise attack in spring. Southeast Europe. Should initiative be left to the enemy? (General popular mood.) OCu IV caution in reporting to OKW.

- 1.) First talk with Bock: Only operational and tactical questions, Salmuth, Greiffenberg.
- 2.) Next, Reichenau.

Time schedule for the three hours.

Trip to front set for 2 and 3 Nov.

2 November, AGp. B. Morning, Sixth Army (Duesseldorf), afternoon, Fourth Army and Second Army (Cologne). Overnight at Niedermendig.

3 November, AGp. A. Morning, Twelfth Army (Mayen), afternoon Sixteenth Army (Bad Bertrich).

The points of discussion are detailed in the prepared program for ObdH and in the protocols of Op. Sec., Org. Sec., Gen Qu. Other participants: Artillery Officer, Engineer Corps Officer, Air Officer, Chief of Transportation.

Salient points:

- 1.) At the moment we cannot launch an offensive with a distant objective.
  - a) Personnel replacements have on the whole been received, but they have not yet been integrated into real teams. In some cases we are short of some officers.
  - b) Level of training: Among the Western Divs., even Regular Army troops have suffered from the long period of defensive warfare. The Eastern Divisions must get at least two weeks' intensive training to prepare them for the wholly different situation in the West. We must have these two uninterrupted weeks before the assembling movements are started.
  - c) Materiel. Some of the Divisions are obliged to pick up their deficiencies directly at the depots in the Z I (will take 10 days). Much of the damage cannot be repaired, e.g. broken axles of AT guns. Trucks of the supply services also show faulty materiel. Spare parts for MG 34 and trucks. Horse replacements will not arrive in time. Ammunition rations, fuel sufficient on hand including current consumption.

- d) Some Divisions will be absent from the line-up for the time being. E.g., Second and Third Mt. Divs. and in 34th and 72nd Inf. Divs. are still one-third under-strength.
- 2.) None of the Higher Hqs. think that the offensive ordered by OKW has any prospect of success. No decisive success can be expected on ground operations.
- 3.) On the whole appraisal of enemy parallels that of OKH. Naturally, every Army Group feels it will have to bear the brunt of enemy counter-measures. I do not share AGp. A's anticipation that the enemy will become active outside the Maginot line soon, staging a strong counter-offensive, with distant objectives (right wing on the Moselle river).
- 4.) Details:
- a) Notify OKW that Todt must temporarily suspend operations. Op. Sec.
  - b) Border Control Service can remain. Customs questions must receive more attention. Org. Sec. Gen. Qu.
  - c) Army Hqs. 18 and 2 will remain, as planned by OKH.
  - d) Another job for Prager. Central Branch.
  - e) Fixed schedule for reporting, new procedure for Op. Sec. reports (noon reports)! Op. Sec.
  - f) Arm'd. Divs. from AGp. B to right wing of Twelfth Army as far as Bastogne, Grossdeutschland to Twelfth Army, SS Adolf Hitler to Eighteenth Army. Op. Sec.
  - g) Chart showing distribution of traffic control Bns., Gen Qu.
  - h) Distribution of Com Zone units? Gen Qu.
  - i) Replacements: Gen Qu-BdE. Sources of mistakes and delays. Proposals for changes (in major shifts of troops, in minor shifts). Gen Qu.
  - k) P-Day\* system must be clarified by order. Op. Sec. Road movements when there is no danger of air attacks. By order of the Armies also during the day. Order! Op. Sec.
  - l) Check: What can still be moved up to AGp. A. Observation BN. (XXIII Corps) Medium Artillery.. MG. BN. Op. Sec.
  - m) Airborne Division nonsense! Better to jump on bridges in Belgium (Fourth, Twelfth, Sixteenth Armies). Op. Sec. and Air Officer.

4 November 1939.

Notes for ObdH:

- a) Strategic analysis of the Polish Campaign. Interference by Fuehrer.
- b) Transfer of GHq. possible in 24 hours. (Signal Center 48 hours)
- c) Fuehrer wants airborne troops. Two more in addition to Sixteenth Regt. Details must be settled between Sixth Army\* and Student.
- d) In the event of an offensive, Gercke will not be able for a considerable time to move any civilian goods.
- e) Todt has been given orders for a new West Wall. Hannecken has to allocate steel for the new West Wall.
- f) Work completed on road movements of mot. units. (Maps of 7 Nov., time schedule 9/10).

1100, Col. Gen. von Bock:

- 1.) Reichenau again back in Berlin. In the course of today (Savoy Hotel).
- 2.) Goebbels will inspect the West Wall on 7 and 8 November, then go to the offensive wing.

Talk with ObdH on future measures.

1530, Thomas (Keitel not notified)!

- a) Effects of a violation of neutrality on sources of supply: Repercussions in Sweden (iron ore); U.S. wants to get it; in Romania: (fuel, food); Yugoslavia: (copper).
- b) If we hold the Flanders coast, there will be continuous fighting in that sector.  
Will absorb large proportion of our supply. Cannot be done by Air Force and Navy.
- c) Belgium: Needs 50% food imports. Will be very short on food next year (sowing)\*\*.

5 November 1939. (Report to the Fuehrer by ObdH.)

Op. Sec.: Warlimont outlines the ideas of the Fuehrer!

- 1.) Armd. units in Twelfth Army (Schell's recommendation).
- 2.) How can tanks be camouflaged in transit? (Change silhouette, cover with tarpaulins!) Time needed for loading!



- 3.) Radio deception in connection with operation "Student" \*  
(Throw enemy command into confusion! But care must be  
taken that this deception does not cause disorganization  
of our ~~own operations~~.)

Long-range reconnaissance authorized over France.

22nd Div., 7 and 8 November, Muenster.

Bork (on Keitel's inquiry): Once transport movements have been stopped, they cannot be restarted before 48 hours. If unloading points are changed, resumption of movement would take even 72 hours.

ObdH's report to the Fuehrer:

Condition of the troops.

Memorandum - Countermemorandum.\*\*

Stand taken: Questions can be solved only by military measures. Impossible in bad weather. (Yes, but also the enemy suffers under bad weather.)

He goes into a rage when told that front shows the same symptoms as in 1917/1918. Wants data: In what units have there been any cases of indiscipline? What happened? Wants to fly there himself tomorrow.\*\*\*

As regards the level of training, what is argued now would still hold good four weeks from now.

Weather unfavorable also in spring. -- Any other method to protect the Ruhr is ~~undebatable~~.#

Any sober discussion of these things is impossible with him.

Army did not want to fight, and so build-up of armament was slow and lagging.

"Instance of insubordination occurred, such as we knew in 1917/1918". What troops? What action has been taken? (Death sentence, West, East.)## Gen Qu has full data. -- Railroads. ###

Refer to Gen Qu, Chief of Transportation, BdE, Personnel Division.

6 November 1939.

Note for ObdH: a) Talk with Keitel.  
b) Transfer of Gen. Staff Tuesday night. ObdH  
Wednesday night. Bulk Wednesday, during the day.

Keitel (Personnel Division): Prager - Waeger.

Bock: Personnel and materiel replacements: Two Divisions in Poland (Eighth and Twenty-eighth Divs.) wanting replacements had their requisitions returned after several days because the wrong forms had been used. Two weeks have now gone by. - Army Hq. 14, VIII Corps Hq.  
Army Clothing Depots and Army Ordnance Depots are issuing supplies normally.

Reichenau only "acknowledged an orientation received." Stated his views.  
Time will be set by top level.

Fellgiebel: a) Air landing at Ghent. Spread radio rumors of landings at Antwerp, Brussels, Ghent, Brugge.  
b) Embargo on border traffic Belgium-Holland. Order will be forthcoming (OKW). Check with Gen Qu. ObdH.

7 November 1939.

ObdH: a) Student - Zero Hour 0715.  
b) Ghent. One-third of 22nd Div. Two-thirds of Div. at Muenster.  
c) Wishes concerning equipment have been met. No wishes received concerning training. 22nd Div.  
d) Fuehrer Hq will be transferred to Nauheim within the next few days.  
e) Proclamation to Belgian and Dutch population: Signed: "The High Command of the Army". - Yes. New version. No Army Order of the Day. Fuehrer must give the word. (Is being worked on). Text of the proclamation must be submitted to the Fuehrer. Gen Qu.  
f) Cause: "French march into Belgium".  
g) Equipment: Normally Gen Qu. In special cases BdE (Ib).

Gen Qu: Ammunition build-up will be completed in time (including special ammunition). Engineer equipment. Shortages in bridge equipment, vehicles and prime movers.  
Richter!

Notes for ObdH: Erfurth, Yes.  
Sandbags. Gen Qu.  
Execution of the offensive; how far should it go?  
Must be thought over. Op. Sec.  
Form a reserve out of Bock's units.

1300 . OKW order to stop the mot. movements is received.

1600 Jodl: a) Restart in any event not before 9 November, evening.  
b) Transfer of GHq undesirable now.

Fuehrer will not be in tomorrow and the following day; afterwards conference with ObdH.

Transfer of GHq cancelled at the request of ObdH.

Gercke back from Fuehrer: Start of offensive not before 15 November (if later, 19).

8 November 1939.

Wagner: Note on Geib report for ObdH.  
Currency for Belgium: Reich treasury notes.

Blaskowitz - Hollidt: Probable distribution of troops as of 1 December (Map!). Remounts -- Improvement and training of Reserve Divs. Divisions will be called up in the sequence: 218th, 223rd (each has one Arty. Bn.), 228th (full strength).

Etzdorf: Démarche treated with sarcasm and sneering.\* They must be crushed! Instruction to Dietrich is: Give news a very inconspicuous spot (second page). He \*\* is leaving on a trip, will not be in for anyone .

Instruction for Ribbentrop on line to be taken on inquiries:

- 1.) Any steps the sovereigns may wish to take have already been answered by Britain through Halifax.  
Speech held last night: (War aims are : Building of a new world that knows no armed rivalry; collaboration with all nations on the basis of mutual tolerance; ways must be found to prevent the use of force, damage done by Germany must be repaired as far as possible).
- 2.) Fuehrer away.  
Foreign Minister's instruction: Material to prove discriminatory pro-French attitude of Belgium now and also in past. ("Give free rein to your imagination").

Belgian Ambassador saw Weizsaecker: Expressed his indignation at the treatment accorded the King's journey in our press. Asks whether we want to pick a quarrel. Weizsaecker has been instructed to tell the Belga \*\*\* correspondent, who made a comment on aggressive intentions: Blaskowitz still in Warsaw, No armor on the Belgian border.

Buelow-Schwante/Spaak: Spaak: The way in which we are treating the King's journey is arousing great anxiety. In Belgian public opinion, the King's journey is sign of imminent danger.

Air reconnaissance Northern France.

Wagner: AGp. B reported to motorize its Border Guards, and to occupy national frontier with Regional Defense units.

Hasse: AGp. has issued orders on 28 October with a view to motorize the Border Guard. Later order: On transfer of Border Guard, function will be taken over by Regional Defense units.  
On receipt of order of ObdH: Decision deferred.

Schell (through Greiffenberg): 29th Div. ready 16 November. Will move 19 November. Fourth Light Div. (Officer on way) probably one Armd. Bn.: two light (Vienna), one heavy Co. (Putlos). Number of complete Btrys? Schell will report 9 November, 1000.

9 November 1939.

Greiffenberg (Keitel-Jodl):

- a) Intention not to start off before 19 November (Keitel).
- b) Air Force must participate, even if only in the first three days.
- c) 29th mot. Div. and Fourth Lt. Inf. Div. must be completed according to plan (formerly 18). ObdH
- d) Fuehrer insists that Armd. Divs. must under all circumstances strike in the direction Arlon - Tintigny. ObdH wants to speak to Busch!
- e) Reinhardt, Fourth Armd. Div.; Kempf, Sixth Armd. Div., XV Corps.
- f) Possible tour to the Western front!

ObdL?

Telegram to Fuehrer.

Study defense line in Sixteenth Army sector. Reflections on operations.

Schell: Heavy Armd. Co.

Reply to AGp. A.

ObdH: a) The existing Armd. units are all we have. No more reserves on hand.

As soon as Fourth Light Div. is ready for operations, the units must be combined under higher Hqs. Fourth Light Div. and 29th mot. Div. under XIX Corps Hq, which would then have to be taken away from other missions.

Fuehrer stresses concentration, as against stretching.

It takes two days to move up Sixth or Fourth.

Reserved road\* to Twelfth Army sector!

- b) AGp. A — Follow up Sedan.\*\*

Wagner: Jaehnicke's report.

Schell: 29th Div. All elements ready to leave on 15. Nov., morning (Erfurt). In field on 19.

Fourth Lt. Div. will not be ready before the end of the month.

Armd. Bn. ready 16 Nov., morning, at St. Poelten:  
2 Lt. Cos. (St. Poelten) ) 25 Tanks I  
1 Hv. Co. (Putlos) ) 33 Tanks II  
4 Tanks III  
4 Tanks IV  
6 Armd. Command Cars.

Cannot be in field before 20.

On 15 Nov., evening, 1800: Armd. Bn. 33 with Bn. Hq, one Armd. Rcn. Troop.

One Bn. of Tenth Armd. Div., Regtl. Hq Landgraf.

|                              |              |                |
|------------------------------|--------------|----------------|
| Armd. Regt. Landgraf.        | )            |                |
| SS Adolf Hitler.             | ) Hq. Fourth | )              |
| Armd. Rcn. Troop.            | ) Lt. Div.   | ) for Guderian |
| Eng. Co.                     | )            | )              |
| Signal Co.                   | )            | )              |
| Artillery of Fourth Lt. Div. | )            | )              |
| Add 29th mot. Div.           | Op. Sec.     |                |

On 15 November. Armd. Regt. of Tenth Armd. Div. -- Twentieth Div.

ObdH: Directive to AGp: Take advantage of movement\*, if after 15 November (19). Troops must get as much rest and training time as possible. Op. Sec.  
Grouping too near the enemy (lets the enemy draw his own conclusions!).

ObdH: Closing of frontier. Movement of goods.

Stapf: Report on accusations levelled against the Army and General Staff.

ObdH: Not before 19 November.

Guderian gets one mot. Div., one Armd. Div. Schell will remain.

10 November 1939.

Wagner: Police behind the front.

ObdH: Report Schwetz\*\*.

Stapf: Reconnaissance.

Jacob: Bridge Column AGp. B.)  
Flame thrower ) Will be straightened out.  
6 Columns B\*\*\* (materiel is ready).

Mueller, Ia Army Hq 1. Leeb: Readiness.

Leeb - Witzleben.

ObdH: Exchange Raschik (XXXVII)/Gienanth (XXXVI). Free IX. OGu I.  
Reserved roads.  
Reserves.  
Wagner notes on rehabilitation of Field Army.  
Southern front of Eighteenth Army.  
Keitel: Build up has no depth.  
Wagner: BdE has big stocks.

Date of offensive. Discussed with ObdH 11 November. / Subsequent entr.  
- Ed./

11 November 1939.

Note for ObdH: AT gun on self-propelled mounts will not go with Regt.  
Grossdeutschland.  
Shelling of Rhine pillboxes: No reconnaissance reports yet. —  
Engel.

ObdH wants to speak to Bock.

ObdH: After talk with Keitel OKW: Op. remains as is! Pcu. Bn. mot. to Guderian. Brand for X Corps. Guderian is moving, Staff is on the move, Guderian in front! One Corps Hq. (IX) must be freed and will be replaced from the East.

Exchange: XIX/XXII Corps, XXII/X Corps, X/XXXIII Corps. Report on compliance! IX not for the time being.

Give Raschik possibly assignment behind the Western front. east of the Rhine.

Yes,

"Sponeck". Action taken! \*

12 November 1939.

Sunday: French operational study communicated to Group West.

Talk with Staff.

Wagner: Build-up of a Gen Cu supply base for Guderian's Corps.

ObdH: Erfurth.

13 November 1939.

ObdH: OQu IV. Roatta picture. -- Fortifications. -- Desertion case (flyer - motorcyclist). \*\*

Chief of Transportation: Operational accident rate: in peacetime - in war.

Own mine casualties in the past 10 days: 88 men. Adjutant.

Jodl: Holland. Directive will follow.

Paper war: OKH inspectors to the front, have spot checks made!

Evening farewell to Roatta at Guards Cavalry Officers' Club.

14 November 1939.

Memo for ObdH: Change in the directive on border assembly.

Witzleben wants to talk to me.

Postponement to 22 November. Itinerary for OKH.

Roatta sends his greetings. — Talk with Seiffert: Men on leave, own circles.\*

Wahle (Bucharest).

Chevallerie - Roehricht: Study courses on Sedan.\*\*

Jodl regarding new "directive":

- a) "Dutch islands" not yet clear. (Texel?)
- b) No preformed ideas on how mission should be accomplished.
- c) What can be done to bring up more troops yet?  
Units available: 1. Cav. Div. SS Deathhead as of 20 November.  
Police Div., 1 December.
- d) What do we have to rush reinforcements to Guderian in case of a breakthrough? (World War I shows that many opportunities for success remained unexploited because of lack of forces to consolidate initial success).

ObdH. Conference 1730: One Division from High Command East.

OKW. If we understand them correctly, the plan provides for occupation by the Navy and Air Force. Paratroops.

Fuehrer: A job for Air Force and Navy.

15 November 1939.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) Preliminary order issued to AGp. B. (For preliminary work they can call on personnel of Army Hq 18.).
- 2.) Order can be issued as soon as we have a definition of what the term "Fortress Holland" comprises. (Jodl)
- 3.) Staff: Request to Air Force to make its intentions clear, as regards manpower commitment and zone of action.
- 4.) Navy: Intimated that order came as a complete surprise to them.



5.) Gen Qu, Air Force Officer, Eng. Corps Off. have been put on the job. —  
Buhler: Regional Defense units. Orientation policy in Holland for Gen Qu.

6.) Report OKW.

7.) Transfer of OKH in event of attack now perhaps best on A-1 or A-Day; Gen. Staff on A-Day; ObdH A-Day morning. Then remain at the front.

8.) Nine pillboxes.  
Reconnaissance in all directions necessary for pillboxes.  
Dispatch officers. Czech 8.35 cm gun not before January 1940.

9.) List of Artillery available (in excess of 1st Bn.):  
Three Regimental Staffs. Six Light Bns. Two medium Bns.  
High Command East. Polish materiel. Six gun Batteries.  
Training of crews.

AAA Bn. — Short-range Reconnaissance Staffel. — Individual long-range reconnaissance planes for Signal Co. (field long-distance cable).

Op: ObdH concerned lest Bock starts attacking also south of the Waal river without order.\*

Can Guderian read also our signals?\* Fellgiebel.

Conference of Army A-in-Cs.

Guderian. F.(ellgiebel).

Stapf: Air Force not satisfied with half-way solution; wants to include Holland. If only half-way solution, then the most important targets are south of the Meuse up to the river mouths.

ObdH: Giessen: Decision on what must remain behind to have an effective working Staff. OQu I, Central Branch.

Intelligence Officers to Armies (must come along to the conference with ObdH). Central Branch. Op.Sec.

Bock: Mot. Div. Mixed Regt. Engel. Op. Sec.

Fromm: a) XX and XXI Corps area good!  
b) New activations: 14 Brigades, 15 December. Org. Sec.  
c) Youngest age group not yet taken out of Construction Bns. Org. Sec.

Gen Qu: Horses in Poland.

Notes for ObdH:

a) Twentieth mot. Div. for Bock (X Corps and reinforced 207th and (208th Divs. Arty, Eng., bridges 1 Airborne troops. Report on compliance.

- b) Fromm: 14 Brigades, SS Deathhead mot. Problem of columns.
- c) State Secretary.

16 November 1939.

Bock: Matter initiated two weeks ago.

ObdH: Starting second half of December, about 10 Divisions of reinforced Brigade strength for occupation duty, sieges, etc. Doubtful whether strength can be maintained for a long time. Report to Fuehrer on action taken.

20 November, 1500. Reich Chancellery: Reichenau and Reinhard and local Air Force Commanders (Reich Chancellery).

Get statements of Air Force and AGp. B on best time for start.

(Evening new graduates from Gen. Staff Course,)

17 November 1939.

Guderian: Two questions on his mind:

- 1.) "On both sides" of Arlon.
- 2.) Suggests Zero Hour at midnight.

Jodl: a) Hope has been given up to capture the bridges across the Albert Canal in surprise attacks. Attempts to prevent blowing up by destroying cables. Dive bombers attack (Monday), followed up by parachutists.

Plan to use gliders against bridges dropped, but Eben Emael project remains. CbdH.

If we fail to get across the Albert Canal, withdraw mot. forces. Chances better on southern wing. (Enemy expects attack on Holland, bulk of his operational forces in the North. Make all necessary preparations!).

- b) Utilize.\*
- c) Under no circumstances without Air Force. An organization should therefore be set up that would enable us to hold off start of operation until receipt of a last-minute code-word (2300 at OKH).

Conference: Goering (?), Student, Richthofen. Monday (20th), 1500.  
Reichenau, Reinhard, ObdH.

Fourth Light Div. lacking only one Rifle Regt., one Artillery Bn.

All points taken up with ObdH.

OCu I: How many Construction Troops, materials, Surveying Staffs for rear lines.

Jodl: Deadline for stopping attacking units; zero hour for attack. — Naval Liaison Staff. — Fortress Holland. — Coast protection a job for the Navy. — Coast defense area.

Liaison Officers: Fourth Army, Gehlen. Sixth Army, Kinzel. Twelfth Army, Sixt. Sixteenth Army, Maier-Ricks (Foreign Armies West). XIX Corps, Krebs.

18 November 1939.

Dankwerts: Internal administration. Evacuation.

ObdH: a) Conference, Koblenz, Tuesday, 21 November, 1200. All Cs-in-C.  
b) Deadline for calling off offensive: 2400 hrs, at unit level.

19 November 1939. (Sunday).

Conference with Salmuth on Holland.

Reports by Wagner (Holland) and Mueller (Replacement situation — Sodensterr

20 November 1939.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) AGp. B. Plan of attack Holland, distribution of forces.
- 2.) AGp. A. Plan of attack for Guderian.
- 3.) Reserved roads.
- 4.) Air and AAA map.
- 5.) Deadline for stop: Armies see no difficulties if "check points" are used. Rundstedt wants to talk about it on Tuesday. Bock on return.
- 6.) Report of Gen Qu.
- 7.) "Broken word".\*

- 8.) OKW Liaison Officer at High Command East (Glaise von Horstenau)  
Foreign Office Liaison Officer at Army Groups Hqs.  
Bader's letter.

Will leave for Koblenz in the evening.

1500 - 1900, Fuehrer Conference (Goering, Jeschonneck, Student, ObdH, myself, Reichenau, Reinhard);

Air operations in the sector of Sixth Army, and Sixth Army intentions are discussed in detail.

- Notes: 1.) Next issue of orders 27 November.  
2.) Conduct tests with gliders in the units (Op.Sec.).  
3.) Blasting tests on Canal emplacements (Eng.).  
4.) Holland and Belgium as one operation.  
5.) Armd. units must be moved closer to the front.  
If possible all stagings should be so arranged that operations could be started on three days' notice (weather report).

Evening leave for Koblenz.

21 November 1939. (Koblenz).

Conference with Cs-in-C of the Army Groups and Armies, and Guderian.

Summary: Sixth Army: a) Takes out First Armd. Div.; forms combat team in Third Armd. Div. for surprise thrusts against Meuse bridges and Tournhout Canal. b) Should Corps Hq XVI be kept as reserve?? (Disapproved)

Fourth Army: a) Two river barrages? OQu IV. b) Claims not to have enough bridge-building equipment to cross the Meuse at both Huy and Givet.

Guderian: Fortifications at Martelange? Arlon?  
Cooperation with Sixteenth Army and Luxemburg still being studied.

Twelfth Army: No comments.

Sixteenth Army: 72nd and 34th Divisions want to get their third Regiments as soon as possible.

22 November 1939.

Morning. Arrival at Berlin.

0900: Phone talk with OKW/Keitel: What is shortest possible period of preparation? For Inf. not under five days, since otherwise troops would have to be billeted in villages and towns. (OKW order to this effect will arrive during the day.)  
Conferences on moving of Armd. Divs. closer to the front: By period 27 November/3 December only two Armd. Divs. and two mot. Divs. can be moved.

Notes for ObdH:

- a) Moving up of two Armd. Divs. and of two Mot. Divs. For the present the others remain where they are until the next change of date.
- b) Either fill up Cav. Div. or send Rcn. Bn. (Senne)\* to the Div. Form Regiments!
- c) Hossbach wants 82nd Regt. (perhaps also 59th and 72nd).
- d) Field Regiments. 72 and 34. can join their Divisions by the beginning of December (5 December). Must be moved up as soon as possible. Should Regiments be taken from other Divisions? (No!)
- e) Request to OKW that Zero Hour be advanced to pre-dawn.

23 November 1939.

1200: Fuehrer's address to Commanding Generals, Army Cs in C etc. (including General Staff): Appraisal of the situation, necessity for taking the offensive.\*\*

1430: Fuehrer's address to Division Commanders on the planned operation. Again the purpose is to rouse enthusiasm for the offensive.

1800: ObdH and myself "Spirit of Zossen"; (Day of crisis!)\*

Preparations must allow launching of offensive with a three days' alert.

Operation: Objectives. -- Possible enemy reaction. -- Further plans (cooperation of Italy). French frontiers of 1540!.#

24 November 1939.

ObdH: Officers' shoulderstraps for administrative officials for duration of the war. Staffs must be reduced. Talk over with Section Chiefs.

Air Force wants no glider exercise.  
Afternoon Schniewind.  
Administration of justice in the entire Army.

Op. Sec.: Order issued to Army Hqs to submit new reports on what  
GHq reserves are east of the Rhine.

Buhle reports on organization.

Schniewind discussion of intentions.

Etzdorf: Italy: Naval blockade. "We fully understand the political  
implications of the problems". Population exodus from southern  
Italy. Difficulties! Military reinforcements. Bastianini  
(London) two weeks ago: Every possibility still open, evacuation  
of Poland no prerequisite. ObdH.

Gercke reports to Keitel on moving up of Armd. units to staging and  
jump-off areas.

25 November 1939.

Grouping of reserves east of the Rhine under XXXVII Corps. Hq.

Arrange for talk with ObdH.

Had a serious talk with ObdH about his wishes for drafts on operations  
in all corners of the world.

26 November 1939. (Sunday)

Picked out a thoroughbred at Mariendorf\* for myself.

Operational studies for Turkey and Persia. Nonsense!

27 November 1939.

Notes for ObdH:

- a) Remainders of 72nd and 34th Regts. will leave for their  
Divs. on 28 November.
- b) Guderian. For Paulus: Watch right wing.

- c) Field Marshal has stopped all individual air reconnaissance missions. (Frontwide reconnaissance occasionally.)

Paulus: Air!

- d) XVII Corps: 44th, 46th, 256th Divs. }  
XXXIII Corps: 10th, 57th (MT), 45th Divs. } Training  
First Army: 73rd, 52nd, 71st, 36th, 25th Divs. }  
XIV Corps: 13th, 26th, 7th Armd., 8th Armd. Divs.)

- e) High Command East has alerted 218th Div. 72 hours.

Inspect SS Deathhead, Waffen SS.

Buhle: Cav. Div. — Horses from Eastern Divs. BdE cannot give any.

Krebs.

Memorandum Balkans (9th Branch), maps.

OQu I, Fourth Section\*: Artillery range practice }  
Popitz, Schacht, Thomas. } ObdH  
Reder, Thurner, Dankwarts. Talk them out of it!\*\*

28 November 1939.

Osterkamp:

- a) Uniform of the Special Missions Officers in Higher Administration. Reder, Thurner.  
b) Belgium-Holland, prepare ration coupons system. Food, Clothing, Work.

29 November 1939.

Memo for ObdH:

- a) 255th Inf. Div.  
b) Seventh Air Div.  
c) Toussaint — Bodenschatz. Rumors in Belgrade; the matter will not be followed up any further. — Goering: short talk to Generals before Fuehrer address.

- d) Defeatism in Air Force: Curtis versus Messerschmitt.\*  
Training in blind flying.
- e) Goering's order on use of AA troops against ground targets.
- f) Conference with Regierungspraesidents\*\* Reder - Thurner.
  - 1.) Basic principles, food, currency.
  - 2.) Expansion of Staffs preparing occupation administration.
  - 3.) Directive to troops to practice economy. Gen Qui
- g) Goebbels wants to visit AGp. Bc on 6,7, and 8 December.
- h) Police Division and 50th Div. not ready before 15 December;  
60th Div. 1 December.

Evening: Chevallerie says good-bye.

Training Section: Submit program! Training in one or two waves.  
Armor exercises: Take out of front, camouflage movements. —  
Fieldpost.

Irak: Consul Otto Wolf (Dahlem).  
OQu IV. Put men at his disposal. Schickfuss.

30 November 1939. Start of the Russo-Finnish  
Conflict.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) Problems of the right wing (5):
  - a) Liège-Antwerp.
  - b) Arrangements with Air Force and AAA for attack on Maastricht.
  - c) Advance in direction of Tournhout - right wing, 254th Div., on the Meuse: (Prepare data.)
  - d) X Corps must tackle their job more energetically.
  - e) Army Gp and GHq reserves/  
All items to be discussed on trip. If not, call in Bock and Reichenau for conference.
- 2.) Road movements on schedule; some trains late (large areas flooded; First Armd. Div. was stranded for a night).
- 3.) French mcz. Div. at Sedan.
- 4.) 255th Div. Dresden - Bautzen - Hoyerswerda (optional, no bridge) - Z I. Departure 1 December. Arrival by 8 December.



5.) Training and regrouping program in the event of a prolonged waiting period is being prepared.

6.) Own reserves. Words are struck out. - Ed. 7 Goebbels' visit.

Buhle: Reich Labor service. Directive for C in C East.

Liss: Floods in the Maginot Line. -- Mcz. Div. at Sedan. -- Belgian rolling stock standing on southern Belgian border.

von Etzdorf: Balkans situation. -- Italy. -- Russia/Finland. -- France.

1 December 1939.

(ObdH is visiting Seventh Army.)

von Greiff, Schreiber report as COs of Area Hqs (Oberfeldkommandanten).

Stapf: New directive on air support of ground operations is in preparation. Substantial increase in air support; AAA against ground targets, but not on very large scale.

2 December 1939.

Fellgiebel: Varna radio monitoring post.\*

Salmuth, after conference with ObdH:

1.) Richthofen Air Corps is up to things out of line with what Army Hq wants him to do. (Draft prepared by Army Group, now at Air Force Hq)

2.) Commitment of AAA at Dessloch, AA Corps stays with Sixth Army.

Remains in Sixth Army sector (objectives specified by AGp). Some elements in Fourth Army sector.

Monday morning at Goering's office.

3.) It is necessary to have dive bomber missions against Canal bridges clarified. (Reported change of former plans by OKW.)  
Absolutely!

4.) Mission of Special Detachment K (Police) must also be clarified, Hq Sixth Army protests against earlier frontier crossing.  
Will be cleared by Jodl with Reichsau.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) Christmas furloughs: 5 - 10%, replacement troops 50%.  
Reduction of frontline strength. — Training — General  
Inspectorate of Fortifications. Tour of the Gen. Staff  
to the front.
- 2.) AGp. A: Operational question.
- 3.) Busch. Two drafts submitted. Gen Qu.
- 4.) OKW directive on operations of AGp. C.
- 5.) Personal remarks by Bock (on Fuehrer speech).

(All points taken up with ObdH.)

3 December 1939.

(Sunday, Berlin.)

4 December 1939.

von Toppelskirch: von Leeb protests against SS decree.\*

Mueller: 1.) GHq reserves, etc. do not receive our instructions and orders.

2.) Standard forms for requisitions needed. Different forms  
for BdE and Field Army. Gen Qu.

3.) a) Security Regts. mot. or bicycle mounted) Must be sent to  
b) Guards Bn. (Bicycle mounted), ) the front for  
allocation. Gen Qu  
(Op.Sec., Training  
Sec., Org.Sec.).

4.) Officers' wives in rear areas.

Schmundt: Todt can be recalled from "Eifel".

Op, Sec.

Land

Fortifications

Wagner, Dankwerts report on Holland/Belgium: What has been done by the  
Reich Ministry of Food about setting up food stores? Gen Qu.

I want to see the tables submitted to ObdH.

Adjutant.

Leaves (Roehricht).

Evening. Celebration of the Feast of St. Barbara.\*\*

5 December 1939.

Y-Day postponed by two days. (Field Marshal)

Notes for ObdH: a) Lettes Busch. Gen Qu.

b) Operational report AGp. A. No.

c) Denmark.

d) Sixth Army: 1.) Group Koop straightened out.  
Reichenau withdraws objections.  
2.) Ruling on AAA question will come today.

e) Talk with Army Cs of S: Troops strong enough. —  
Progress in training. Jump-off: No trouble expected.

a) Trucks for Cav. Corps. OQu I for Navy elements.\*

b) AA protection and air warning service; in X Corps all is clear.

Phone talks with all Army Cs of S or Cs in E on weather and ground conditions in the West: Even if the weather should improve, it will take 8 to 10 days for the ground to dry.

6 December 1939.

Mackensen's 90th Birthday.

Paulus: Short report on possibilities for attack. Talked over with Jodl.

Ziehlberg: Medal of Merit awards.

Hemmerich: Maps of Military Geographic Center for future planning.  
Order: Balkans, Denmark, England, Anatolia.

Notes for ObdH: Fuehrer has summoned the two AAA Generals, because he wants to brief them himself (no details known). Fuehrer is uncertain whether it should be Gheut or Dixant (Walcheren or Carignan). — Ground and flood difficulties talked over with Jodl (Paulus: Meuse 300 m wide instead of 150).

Xylander: Report on impression at the front.

Next decision on 12 December (earliest date of attack 17).

Effects on Organization.

On Training: Troops training center. — Question of leaves. —  
Gas training courses. —  
Gen. Staff Training course.





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# WAR JOURNAL

OF

FRANZ HALDER

War journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder,  
Chief of the General Staff of Supreme  
Command of the German Army (OKH), Vol III.  
Historical Division, SSUSA. 7 Dec 39 -  
9 May 40.

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## Volume III

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**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL**  
**OF**  
**GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER**

Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)

14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942

**VOLUME III**

## CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

*Relis.*

VOLUME III.

Winter 1939/1940

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

First entry: 7 December 1939.

Last entry : 9 May 1940.

\* \* \* \* \*

7 December 1939.

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Fuehrer has summoned both AAA Corps Commanders to his Hq, in order to brief them himself (details unknown).
- 2.) Fuehrer is undecided between Ghent and Dinant; Walcheren and Carignan have been dropped.

AGp. A reiterates proposal to apply main effort on the southern wing from the start.

8 December 1939.

0909 Demonstration arranged by General Ott. New Infantry squad, semi-automatic rifle. Infantry cart.\* -- Close cooperation. BdE and Gen Qu. Camouflage by Fieldpost number.

Shifting of troops. Report by Gen Qu.

Fieldpost difficulties:

There are still some double numbers. And the whole Number-system! Lack of supervisory personnel at collecting centers. Shorten process of sorting. Speed up transit from collecting centers to sorting centers.

Troop movements! Have Gen Qu report!

Proposed Changes:

- a) Collecting centers might be increased to speed collection of letters. Railroad facilities ample.



- b) Run mail trains as special through-trains. Mail loading facilities must be developed.
- c) Mail to be loaded in freight yards, not in passenger stations.
- d) Reduce total of Fieldpost numbers! End of January.

Blaskowitz:

- a) Hoefl very good, also Schaede (521 Border Guard Bn.).  
Both North.  
Courbière Center.  
239th Div. Neuling, Pflugbeil.  
  
Not so good: Corps Hq Buex (reduced) must go. Replace with Boehm-Tettelbach Military Administration Hq 581. Stengel 209 Saxon.\* (Could be replaced with Schaede.) Ulex!
- b) Two functions held by one man impossible in the long run.  
  
Exchange Rupp against Dohna?  
  
High Command Center at Radom (good accommodation).
- c) Help Hollidt! Gerlach not so good. Langhaeuser very excitable.
- d) Decent Junker plane for Blaskowitz.

9 December 1939.

Notes for ObdH: a) Ammunition asked by Sixteenth Army: 10 Divisional issues.  
b) Sponeck.  
c) Christmas leave.

10 December 1939.

Sunday (Berlin). All quiet everywhere.

11 December 1939.

Kinzel: Report on Romanian operation from the north.\*\*

Note for ObdH:

- a) More soldiers! New activations (Expand Brigades to Divisions!).

Officer replacements. — Captured Polish material. — Training of staff officers, etc. — Expansion of Replacement Army. Report by Chief Org. Sec.

- b) Inf. Training Manual — Still in need of revision!

- c) No decision today.

12 December 1939.

Roehricht: Measures to be taken in event of a prolonged waiting period. Instructions by Chief Inf. Officer concerning defense in place. Attack against fortified fronts: Use of smoke, Large-scale demonstration. Instructional Pamphlet for seaborne transports. — Amphibious Engineers.

Buhle: Report to ObdH on expansion of the Replacement Army. New activations.

13 December 1939.

- Notes for ObdH:
- 1.) Ghent.
  - 2.) Appointments in the Gen. Army Office (Sodenstern — Buhle).  
Corps Hq (February): Manstein — Stuelpnagel.
  - 3.) Training directive.
  - 4.) Transport situation (OKW order).
  - 5.) Anonymous letters.\*

Salmuth, 1640:

- a) Withdraw 263rd Div. across the Rhine, to the south of Twelfth. Extend sectors of 87th and 62nd Div. This puts 62nd Div. into assembly area.
- b) 267th Div. must be exchanged against 28th. In this way the latter will come into the assembly area.
- c) Exchange V Corps for II Corps (remains in the case of offensive).
- d) Remove GHq Artillery from Wahn!\*\*\* (Waldbroel!). Wahn for AGp. B.

14 December 1939.

1000 Meeting in ObdH's office: Gen. Army Office,  
Personnel Div. Gen. Staff.

Fromm: Trained men: 170,000 by end of January, plus  
250,000 = 420,000.

1 March 620,000

1 April 150,000 half-trained

770,000

445/320,000

Anticipated losses 150,000 a month, less returnees  
from hospitals 115,000 a month.

100,000 available to relieve older age-groups.

We must ask for 1,000,000. That would take an  
endless time.

Right away: Age-group 12/11 for the front.

Age-group 06/07 for Regional Defense  
units etc.

For fall: Age-groups 19 and 20.

Conclusion: Combat casualties can be replaced.

Old age-groups can be exchanged only  
at very slow rate.

New activations impossible without  
further slowing down tempo of exchange.

Length of training period: As long as possible.

Organization: More Cos. in the Bns., e.g., 6. Each for  
definite groups, i.e. two-weeks', four weeks',  
eight weeks' soldiers, etc.

Keitel (Personnel Div.):

Old officers: 50,000 Reserve officers (less those  
unfit for service) used up.  
Bulk in Replacement Army,  
1000 perhaps to be had still.

Young officers: 5,000 trained young replacements.  
5,000 in officers' training.  
2,000 three years' enlistments.  
12,000

1,500 to 2,000 men ready for promotion each month.  
Difficulty to activate Hqs. (Replacement Army!)

Training of Bn. Cos. in Replacement Transfer ) Ing.  
Divisions (If possible one for each Army Gp.) ) Sec.  
Many of them are Reserve Officers. ) and

) Personnel  
) Div.  
)



7  
Officers' Corps, peacetime strength 3,700 (1934),  
was expanded to 99,000 (beginning of 1939).  
Refer to Tng. Sec.

Training period for Reserve Officer candidates  
must not be shortened. Refer to Tng. Sec.

Hqs must be combed out. Central Branch.

Program:

- 1.) Reactivation of the Replacement units used  
up for Replacement Transfer Divs., by end  
of December 1939, without Artillery. Also  
available for that purpose some Bns. in  
Mil. Districts XVII and XVIII.  
Activation with own cadres.  
Training of the newly activated units to  
begin on 1 Jan.
- 2.) Ideal aim: A replacement reserve of at  
least 50% should be activated for each Btry.  
and Co. (Replacement Transfer units) which  
would take in those with advanced training.
- 3.) Question: At what dates and rate can we  
activate Field Recruit Depots? Into these  
will be taken eight-week men of the Replace-  
ment Army.
- 4.) Measure introduced by High Command East for  
units which cannot be regarded as first-line  
Combat Divisions: One Recruit Bn. per Regt.  
Renewal from within.
- 5.) Field Recruit Depots must be activated with  
field troops.
- 6.) Replacement Transfer Divs: Fourteenth mot.  
Div. must be made ready for operations as  
soon as possible, Middle of January.--  
Equipment with Artillery. Org. Sec.
- 7.) Remainder of the Replacement Transfer Brigs.  
must be changed to Infantry Regts. Field  
Army must help out.  
Can we take out Field Replacement Bns?  
(Field Army replaces its own losses.)  
Infantry guns.-- AT guns. (Field Army must  
help out.)-- Signal troops.-- Engineers.--  
Artillery from GHq Artillery.
- 8.) Fourteenth Landwehr Div. Extend sectors?  
Fourth Bns. must be taken out. Org./Op.

- 9.) Replacements for depleted artillery in the East.
- 10.) Expansion of Replacement Transfer Divs. to fill Divs. measures in detail.-- Question of Field Replacement Bns.
- 11.) Surplus of Officers in Replacement formations. Personnel Div.
- 12.) Combing out of Hqs. Central Branch.
- 13.) Training courses for Inf. and Arty. Bn. Cos. Take one Replacement Transfer Brigade. Instructors from the front. Tng. Sec.
- 14.) Industry can produce 25% of the trucks demanded by Armed Forces and by the civilian economy. Question of tires. Steps must be taken to safeguard army requirements.
- 15.) Activation of Corps Hqs. How many Corps Hqs can be activated, and when? Problem of officers (Gen. Staff Officers) and Corps Troops (Signal Bns.) Central Branch.
- 16.) Check-up of Div. Supply Serv.: Cut down? Ratio of Div. Clms. to Army Clms.-- Replacements. Report by Gen Qu. Administrative Hqs which are still hanging around in Reich.
- 17.) C O Mil. District acting as Post C O.\* Org. Sec.

OQu I:

- a) (Preventive action\*\* (Reich Chancellery\*\*))  
Question of Norway; Public sentiment; leading personalities in Berlin.-  
Combined operation Navy - Army.  
Simultaneous with operation against Denmark.  
(Information file Denmark and Norway)  
Maps through Hemmerich \*\*\*OQu IV

Russia is viewed calmly.

Finnish War pushes Russia into the anti-British front.

Balkans. Russia is supposed to have no intentions in this quarter. Apparently certain Russian promises concerning Romania have been received.

Fuehrer thinks he has a free back in the East and Southeast.

Italy: Ley in Rome: Il Duce would like to strike soon. His policy meets opposition, also in the Royal Family. Slow pace of armament. "Mortified" that he cannot make his country keep pace with Germany

Belgian question: Il Duce disinterested. Ciano: Italy will not change her policy, on Belgium's account, even though the Royal Families are related. They are surprised that we are not yet in Holland.

We are now supposed to have so much oil, that we supply Italy!

- b) SS Luetzow sold to Russia (Said to be faulty design!)
- c) Spain will send ships in convoys, if Italy does the same, similar as Japan.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) Urge all Hqs to practice strictest economy. (Wagner says, some Arty. Btrys. have 5 MGs.)\*
- 2.) Jodl: a) Road construction, road blocks, preparations for mot. units, good.
  - b) Traffic on Dutch border.
  - c) Draft plan of AGp.B regarding Air Force.

15 December 1939.

- 1.) Talk with Siewert on deficient cooperation with BdE. (Prompted by conference on 14 Dec.)
- 2.) Talk with Gercke on complaint by Keitel OKW that contact between OKW and Army is not close enough.
- 3.) Witzleben reports in Commandant War Academy Training Course.
- 4.) Material for map maneuver given to OQu I.

ObdH: Training directive also for BdE.  
Courses: Give them the latest (order on signals for attack!). --- Machinegun belts!\*\*



Cipher codes at the front (officer candidates in Signal Corps). Friesner in charge. Ing. Sec.  
Officer candidates who have not yet thrown handgrenades. Ing. Sec.

16 December 1939.

Buhle and Wagner: Care of service component in the ZI.  
"Our war-time Army."

Jacob: Steel only for ammunition, not for fortifications. Fuehrer now wants only: Fischbach Valley, Remich, Spicherer Heights\*, gun emplacements; 4.7 AT guns (100); 8.35 AT guns (80).

Jodl: Fuehrer is taking an interest in the shifting of our reserves. (OQu I).

Note for ObdH: a) Fuehrer has taken an interest in the

a) Fuehrer has taken an interest in the disposition of our reserves.

b) Etzdorf.

1.) British Empire: a) Ibn Saud, b) Iran.  
c) Afghanistan, d) Tibet-Nepal, e) South China.

2.) Balkans: Reply to Romania: Should come to some arrangement with Russia. To Bulgaria: Evasive.  
Apprehensions: 1.) Yugoslavia's attitude.  
2.) Hungary cannot be trusted.

3.) Our attitude toward Denmark and Norway similar to Russia's attitude toward Finland.

c) My appraisal of the Balkans' situation.

d) Our Map maneuver

e) War pay.

17 December 1939. (Sunday, Berlin).

18 December 1939.

0930 Conference with the Arms Chiefs on the new plan of chains of command.

Evening: Christmas celebration in office of Transp. Chief, afterwards in Central Branch.

19 December 1939.

Buhle: brings idiotic proposal by AGp.A.

Weizsaecker: North.

Southeast. --- Appraisal of Italy's wait and see policy.

20 December 1939.

ObdH: a) K 12\* (120 km) ready after Christmas (Will go to AGp.C). 120 rounds (tubes will last 30 - 40 rounds).

b) Conference Fuehrer/Rundstedt: Strength must be conserved for main effort in AGp.A. "Has AGp. A a double mission?"  
"Rundstedt" Friday he e, possibly Thursday.- Central Branch.

Conference: Operational intention, divergencies. Guderian at Sedan will not be strong enough for major operation. Arrangements must be made to assure follow-up of troops on roads, (Wietersheim's map).

c) Have several Gen. Staff Officers tour the front to find out what the Divisions really are doing.

d) Combat experiences of First Army with French?  
OQu IV. (Artillery, Infantry, no over-rating!)



21 December 1939.

1030 Reception of the Russian Military Attaché,  
General (Commanding General) Bu.\*\*\*

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Deception (men on leave to Reich). a) GHq. troops. b) Men on leave in Reich. c) East of the Rhine.
- 2.) Five new Corps Hqs (Stuepnagel, Manstein),  
15 new Divs.  
Fifth Draft: 5 Divs.  
On 1 Feb.: Sixth Draft: 4 Divs.  
13 Repl. Transf. Divs.  
On 1 March: One Mot. Div. (14th Transf. Divs.)  
Police Div.  
SS  
2 Divs. (55th and 60th)  
Total 29  
No Hqs.  
No Clms (for 25% of wartime  
Army) Gen Qu.
- 3.) "New chemical warfare agent". 100\*\* sprayed from aircraft. In production not before fall 1940. Ready for use not until the spring 1941.
- 4.) Chemical smoke exercise.
- 5.) Directives for Chief of Army Equipment.  
(Back to ObdH).
- 6.) Periodicals, Inf., Arty.
- 7.) Telegrams from AGp. 3 on Dimmler's plans for Belgium.
- 8.) Officer strength, Chief Arty Off., etc.

23 December 1939.

Railroad accident at Genthin.

Letter from Col. Gen. von Leeb.

Conference with Col. Gen. von Rundstedt:

- 1.) Proposal regarding shortening of period for assembly.
- 2.) Plan of operation: Full and limited objectives. von Rundstedt claims that the bulk of Fourth Army is aimed at May, only a small fraction at Givet. Attack on Rethel (?) to keep enemy from attacking from the south. An entirely different operation!

Ott: 1.) How does Inf. handle S mines?\*

2.) When will training manuals be ready?

von Bock: Salmuth will bring a letter on the conduct of the operation? Contents of this letter in agreement with Bock's views, but he did not want to throw the weight of his personality against Obdm's decision.

23 December 1939. /sic.- Ea/.

Buhle: Definition of jurisdictions as between Chief of Army Equipment and Gen. Staff.

von Tippelskirch/von Loebell: Directives for Bucharest.

24 December 1939. Sunday.

25 December 1939. Holiday.

- Notes: a) Role of tanks in the opening battle. )  
western direction of the central ) Map  
wedge. ) Maneuver  
Air support (timing and targets))
- b) Propaganda among the population of occupied territories in their native language (Russian pattern). OQuIV - Gen Qu.

26 December 1939.

Morning: At Zossen. Nothing of consequence. Only current mail.

Afternoon: At home.

27 December 1939.

0900 Map maneuver conducted by von Stuelpnagel. The three possibilities of the offensive in the West are worked out.

Fellgiebel: Ground-air identification. Panels will be tried. ObdH.

Sound locators will be tested starting middle of January. ObdH.

"Next decision 9 January, 1800 hrs. at the latest". (Perhaps a few days earlier).

Gercke: Material needed for "Immediate offensive" released.

Memo for ObdH:

- a) Horse-drawn transport units. (Young age-groups must be taken out! But not all active officers. (60%). Officer candidates get peacetime training; dangers of the Rear Area!
- b) Bock's proposal on re-disposition of the troops assembled at frontier.
- c) Manstein's plan of operations. Battle of Kutno. ObdH.
- d) Proposal of AGP.B: Regrouping on the baseline. (Map Op. Sec.)
- e) Stuelpnagel and von Manstein to Commanding Generals.
- f) Report of a First Army order prohibiting fire.



28 December 1939.

General Keitel, (Personnel Div.) Report on personnel situation in general.

ObdH: First Army:

- a) Fire only if the French attack. Own patrol effort hindered. No attempt must be made by outposts to draw fire.
- b) ObdH does not want training to be pushed entirely into the background. Some elements must continue training activities even in the terrain forward of fortification lines. No matter if progress is slower.

75th Division, Austrian. Assign a Gen. Staff Officer to off-set the Austrian (Helmdach).

Notes for ObdH:

- a) Cav. Brig., activation completed 6 Jan.
- b) Tanks for Fourth Light Brig. will not be ready before 7 Jan.
- c) Tests with ground-air identification panels. -- Sound locators in fog; trials.

29 December 1939.

- Buhle:
- a) Activation ordered of Inf. Eng. Platoons in GHq Reserves (60 men).
  - b) 8 Jan. Departure of Tenth Armd. Regt. (Czech) to Eighth Armd. Div.
  - c) Cav. Brig. ready 6 Jan., evening. Goes to First Cav. Div., leaves 7 Jan., will join Div. before 9 Jan.

Central Branch: OQu I -- Felber -- Stever (?) Army Hq (mot.) -- Sponeck. Manstein -- Mackensen -- Hilpert -- Kewisch.\*

Fourth Light Div. converted to Ninth Armd. Div. Tracked vehicles will arrive in the Limburg area on A -3.

My tour! (From 2, evening to 7, morning.)

30 December 1939.

Rupp calls: C of S, Corps Hq XXXII (reduced), Lublin.

Gercke: Makes proposal about getting "State Secretary"\*

31 December. Sunday, Berlin.

Talk with Gercke on the "State Secretary" idea. The danger is that the Transp. Chief might neglect work of his original department in the new job.

Evening: The children come to see us.

Memo for tour:

- a) Fourth and Sixth Armies. Prepare shifting of med. Artillery within Army Group. Shifting of Bridge Clns.
- b) Sixth Army. 602nd MT Regt. (GHq) has been allocated for supply movements. Must therefore be free for the job as soon as supply routes start lengthening. Use for other assignments only with the approval of OKH.
- c) AGp. B. Shifting of AAA. Back to a conference!
- d) First Army: 1.) Proposal on Spicherer Heights.  
2.) Deception.  
3.) Use of armd. and mot. units for surprise missions.
- e) Status of preparations for winter?
- f) Training. Marksmanship-- Target ranges
- g) Fuel? of total issue  
About one-half ~~quota~~ was consumed in three days (500 km)\*\* Restrict consumption. Clamp down on private trips! Road checks!
- h) Undesirable practice of having families near front.
- i) AGp. B. Senfft von Pilsach. OQu 1; Capt. von Kessel.  
Salmuth: Jodl "decrees".

1 January 1940.

1000 Conference with Heitel OKW:

- 1.) Reasons for tensions. Annoyance caused by obituary for Fritsch. Too level distrusts everybody, including Navy and Four-Year Plan.
- 2.) I point out the difficulties in the conduct of operations. Interference in command a grave danger.  
Promise that there will be no interference in such matters. Book to come to AAA conference! (OQu I. Send for Jodl to discuss with him our objective. Dinant.)
- 3.) a) What happens if the offensive is postponed for a prolonged period, say 6 to 8 weeks, i.e., middle of March?  
Directives are prepared for Navy (stepping up of sinkings) and Air Force (attack on England).

Army: Preparedness must be maintained:

Moving up of Armor. (Op. Sec.)  
Training (Tng. Sec.)  
Activations. (Every postponement raises the question how the loss can be made up.) Replacement Army now has fully trained men; losses can already be covered by men now in training.  
Oldest Arty. pieces must be brought in to use: Heavy Artillery must be manned by old men. Potential must be increased. (Org. Sec.) (Check all points relating to Army with OQu I.)

- ObdH: a) Airborne operations on a large scale. Airborne troops (paratroopers attached to Ground Forces as Assault Bns.).
- b) Armd. Div. to the outpost area in First Army sector. Divs. of First Army back for training.  
Motorcycle Rifle Bn. to the outpost area (Regt. Grossdeutschland).  
SS units to the outpost area.
- c) Deception movements also with tanks, e.g. practise advance movements, shifting, etc. within Army sectors.
- (3.) b) Scandinavia: Russia will limit herself to Finland (1914 frontier); agreement Ribbentrop - Molotov.....



Sweden and Norway strictly neutral. General Quisling, Norway, (one of Rosenberg's acquisitions) has no followers. It is in our interest to keep Norway neutral. In case England threatens Norway's neutrality, our policy will change. Memorandum OKW. Fuehrer has stopped the memorandum (Jodl). OQu I must get it!

- c) Bessarabia. Dangerous game!  
It is in our interest that the Balkans remain quiet under all circumstances.  
"Military diversion" would be most embarrassing for us. We are trying to arrange a compromise between Russia and Romania (1914 frontier) (Ribbentrop himself has been put on the job for this); we have also got in touch with the Italians to reach a common formula. It is our aim to divert the Russians from the Bosphorus to Afghanistan and India. Stalin reportedly not averse.
- d) Progress of trade negotiations with Russia has improved due to our aggressiveness. (Russian demands very far-reaching.) Romania satisfactory progress.
- e) Italy: Mussolini has sent word that he will approach the Fuehrer with proposals by middle of January.  
Use of Italians in German operations in the West: The Fuehrer is thinking of independent missions: Southern France, through Savoy, to the southwest. Even our promise to Switzerland would be no real obstacle. OQu I.
- f) Decision based on weather situation possibly will be made as early as 3 Jan.; this would mean start of offensive as early as 11 or 12 Jan. Op. Sec., Transp. Chief, OQu I.

1130 ObdH:

- a) Spicherer Heights: 1.) We must hear the views of First Army! -- Check with Land Fortifications Sec. -- No tank obstacles. "Advance Group" will be the solution. No tank obstacles. Recommendation to OKW.
- b) Gercke: 1.) Solution must be prepared along lines of Schell's proposal (special mission dictatorial powers for Transp. Chief). Must start right after 5 Jan.

- 2.) Then we must reorganize our Transp. Sec. Transp. Chief  
Bork as deputy to Gercke.  
Kaiser must be changed, if necessary  
(to new Corps Hq?). Central Branch.
- c) Personnel changes in key Staff posts only in the event of a prolonged waiting period. Central Branch.

3. January 1940.

Reports and preparations for the trip.

Matters to be attended to:

- a) Vietinghoff - Kleist new mot. Corps Hqs.
- b) Temporary deputy for Helmich in Hq. AGp. B. (Senfft von Pilsach, OQu 1 Kessel).
- c) Reply from Fromm regarding signature\*.
- d) SS and Police in the West.-- Gen Qu.
- e) Organization of supply from central depots.
- f) Down-grading of horse-drawn transport units (take their active officers, active soldiers, no officer candidates, etc.). Talk over with Pers. Div.!
- g) OQu IV. Intelligence on enemy forces: British.-- Book for Bruckmann.
- h) Operational study Romania.

(Turn over items c) through g) to OQuI)

3 January to 6 January 1940.

Tour of the western front. See travel orders and travel notes.



7 January 1940 (Sunday).

0740 Return to Berlin (Charlottenburg).

1000 Keitel OKW: 1.) Jump-off date known to enemy.

2.) Preparations of the Gestapo and Police.

3.) Spicherer Heights.

1100 von Salmuth: a) Says it makes no difference; period for closing up to border might as well be set at two days.

b) Armor must be placed under Army Gp. Op. Sec.

1130 von Stuelpnagel (at my home): Summarizes business during my absence.

1630 ObdH: Report on tour and review of pending questions.

1820 Keitel OKW: a) Fuehrer is aware that the jump-off date is known to the enemy.

b) Question of Gestapo and Police for the West not yet discussed with the Fuehrer. An understanding will be arranged with the Minister of the Interior.

c) Data on Spicherer Heights wanted soon. Land Fortifications Sec.

d) Concerning offensive everything is still in the balance.

8 January 1940.

Gen Qu Map exercise: Comments:

1.) Build-up for "Battle of the Meuse". Problems of organization and of road communications. Very difficult. Could be eased by cutting out return traffic.--Advancing of railheads.--Maximum utilization of railroads.

2.) Traffic control basically a command function. It does not make any difference who is in charge of the mechanics of control.

- 7) Fuel supply and Truck situation must be handled by a central agency. Exchange of horses (heavy and light horses).

- Op. Sec.:
- 1.) X-hour! three hours before jump-off.
  - 2.) Time needed by mot. troops in AGp.A equals time needed by foot troops (to reach Arlon).
  - 3.) How waiting-period could best be put to use.

Saluth: Speidel and Sponeck state that tactical air support will not be available for several days (fourth day). Elements with great striking power, effectiveness of action.

von Etzdorf:

- a) France and England: Assistance to Finland under their League of Nations obligations. Land route via Narvik. Agreement of Norway and Sweden. Are we going to be informed? Prerequisite would be British promise of aid to Norway and Sweden in the event of a war with Russia. Iron deposits in Northern Lapland. No indications that the Fuehrer is demanding bases.
- b) Csaky - Ciano.
- c) Kerkhove's telegram (Belgium).
- d) Caucasus British objective.
- e) Debate in the French Chamber. Gamelin attacked.
- f) Trade talks with Russia are not getting to any start.
- Romania: Very much in arrears with oil deliveries.-- Railroad cars.
- g) Bulgaro-Russian Trade Treaty...
- h) Peace questions. Dutch Premier Colijn not received by Il Duce.-- Roosevelt?
- i) Visit to the Pope.
- k) Today meeting at Fuehrer Hq.

Thiele: Fortress signal communications net. --Training of radio operators.-- Messenger dogs.

OQu IV: Review of material accumulated during my absence.--  
Grosscurth.-- Confidential information on Goering's  
peace feeler.

Inf.-Org. - Op: Joint report on withdrawal of troops etc.  
to training centers in the event of prolonged post-  
ponement.

9 January 1940.

Jacob - Gehlen: -----.

Scheff:

Deliveries in the immediate future will not allow  
any improvements.

Buhle: Organizational matters.

Gericke: Railroad situation very difficult. Backlog of  
657 trains. Personnel reduced by sickness. We are  
having trouble with coal supply. For shifting of  
troops in eight-week period we need 520 and 570  
trains. Readied about 335 trains (in addition to  
over 100 trains in transit). Enough trains are  
readied for tanks. For Inf. Divs. we need 370  
trains over and above the 335 trains standing by.  
Feasible if passenger traffic is restricted.  
We won't find out about the effects on the economy  
before conference with Goering on 10 Jan. (Gericke)

Conference with ObdH (at his home), present also Fromm  
and Buhle, 1700 to 2030.

Wagner: Coal problem.--

Building up of truck reserve can not start before  
1 March. GHq Reserve will have to be formed by  
drawing on resources of Armies.

Op. Sec.: "Museum" Leeb - also Sixteenth Army.\*

Org. Sec.: Balance tank types.\*\* Settle question of Brig.  
and Regtl. COs.

Ott: Med. Inf. gun SPM? Self-propelled or with traction?  
Trials.

Org. Sec.: Airborne troops. Should striking power be in-  
creased? Rocket-firing guns? (Sponeck's wishes)  
Set aside equipment for two additional Divs:



10 January 1940.

Jacob Gehlen: Leeb's report on Starbruecken Bulding.  
Recommendation to OKW.

OQu IV (Grosscurth):

- 1.) Il Duce. Warns against Russia. Continuation of present course means separation from us. Asks not to attack.  
Peace guaranties (Polish buffer state).  
Italy cannot enter the war now (Armed Forces not ready!); will join us only at the very last moment. ("Do not believe in my victory.")
- 2.) Instruction to call meeting of the Ic Officers in the West (to warn them against representatives of the Foreign Office).
- 3.) SS Decree.

OQu IV: British.

1500 - 1730: Fuehrer conference:

- a) Target date: Wednesday, 17 Jan is A-Day.  
(A - 4: Saturday, 13 Jan.  
A - 3: Sunday, 14 Jan.  
A - 2: Monday, 15 Jan.  
A - 1: Tuesday, 16 Jan.)

Zero-Hour: 15 minutes before sunrise at Aachen (0816 hrs on 17 Jan.) Reasons for selecting this date: A high of rare intensity and permanence; clouds from the East perhaps on 12 and 13 January, then again clear winter weather with 10 to 15 degrees below freezing in Belgium and Holland for 12 to 14 days. Op. Sec.  
Get information on thickness of ice.

Embargo on flying: Air Force specifications.

OKW order tomorrow. Should the weather deteriorate in the meantime, date will be put up.

- b) 13 Jan. perhaps even 12 Jan. Big bombing attack by Air Force against airfields along the entire northern border. Also air attacks against pilot schools (70% of enemy fighter strength in the zone of attack). Then own Air Force will be withdrawn; dummies on airfields. (Have OQu IV ascertain effectiveness!) Pounce again just before jump-off.

Op. Sec.: Army Gps. must now establish close contact with their air formations. Air defense against enemy retaliation.

Chief Air Officer calls on ObdH.

- c) Dinant -- Ghent -- Amsterdam. New supplementary instructions of OKW for Ground Armies are coming.

Op. Sec. Study implications! Make most of opportunities. Notes for report.

- d) Original preparations for Eben Emael stand.--  
Op. Sec., AGp. B.

Keitel (on phone):

- a) Memorandum on Norway. Planning staff at OKW. Through Denmark. Winter? One Division.--  
Op. Sec.
- b) Special directives on Civil Administration. "Simultaneously Fuehrer decree will order closing of the frontier." New version.--  
Gen Qu.
- c) Wagner proclamation redrafted; now in Fuehrer's desk. Gen Qu.
- d) Our directives for Military Government approved by ObdH. Soon to OKW.
- e) Conference of Ic officers. Foreign Office representatives.-- Propaganda. OQu IV.
- f) Set-up for last-minute stoppage of attacking forces must be maintained. Prepare re-dispersal. Op. Sec.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Organizational measures: what can we do until start of the offensive? Org. Sec.
- b) Training. Chemical smoke exercise, etc.
- c) Mine clearing. Remote-controlled roller.  
Detonation by flamethrowers.  
Dropping of 5 Kg bombs.
- d) Transfer of OKH must be prepared for any time after 15 Jan., evening (Monday).  
Recommendations. Central Branch.

Matters to attend:

OQu IV: Elzdorf, Target date!

Op. Sec.: Possibilities for stopping troops before start of attack, day by day.  
Information on thickness of ice to troops.

Gehlen -- Jacob: Saarbruecken.

Op. Sec.: Notify Bogatsch.

(All points discussed with Sec. Chiefs at 2200.)

11 January 1940.

Gehlen: Orientation on Fuehrer conference (Saarbruecken). -- Report on completion of defense position in AGp.C.

Piekenbrock: White Book.

Fellgiebel: Target date for offensive and transfer of G Hq.

Bogatsch: Target date for offensive, transfer. Air attack before start of offensive and its effects.

Buhle: Possibilities for organization in case of the offensive.

Gercke: Road-building program in Reich and East.  
Expansion of railroad construction program 1940.

Stapf: Air landing in Holland.

OQu IV: Il Duce's letter:

- 1.) Proposal to seek ways to reach a peace.  
Restoration of Poland. Question of frontiers left open.
- 2.) Warns against offensive in the West. Military successes are possible, but all the greater then the danger that the war may spread.  
U.S.A.
- 3.) Go slow with pro-Bolshevist policy. As recently as six months ago Public Enemy No.1. Now, a friend.  
"As an old revolutionary I know that it is impossible to change ideologies to suit the exigencies of day-to-day politics".



Asks us to revert to struggle against Bolshevism. Conviction that fight against the Western Powers is possible only after Bolshevism has been smashed. Remember common graves! \* Great sympathies for the Finns, although Finland stood in the enemy camp when sanctions were imposed. Possibilities of military participation are being studied by experts. Similar as in Spain.

"If you go on step farther in your present Russian policy, a terrible situation may arise, which would compel Italy to make her position clear."

Afghanistan: Nothing possible without Russian support.

Report on Military Attachés who came in while I was on tour in the West.

Greiffenberg - Heusinger: Order has been issued for 17 Jan. OKW. Order for Saarbruecken. OKW.

12 January 1940.

Greiffenberg: Case of the flyers landed in Belgium (on 11 January).

It must be assumed that at least part of the documents is in the hands of the Belgians. What material did they get? Fuehrer has reserved decision.

Should location of Hqs be changed?

What has been divulged; Location of Hqs; no armed units; Hq of Seventh Air Div.; airfields of Air Gp. 2.

Report of Air Force to Fuehrer; ObdL wants to do the air attack on 15. (Offsets danger.)

Fuehrer himself will give signal for attack.

Wagner: Fifth Armd. Div. reports about damages suffered en route. Must get help!

Gen. Student (Christ): Air landing Holland.

OQu V: Obkircher. Writing of books by Army personnel on the Polish Campaign.

Admiral Schniewind: General review of the situation.

Gercke: Transport order communicated to Railroad offices.  
Kleinmann claims he will swing it.

13 January 1940 (Saturday).

Gercke: Meeting at the Reich Ministry of Transportation.

Erlseer: Report on border protection in the South: Border Guard now set up. Can be doubled by summer, 1940, quadrupled by summer, 1941. Special defense detachments\* are integrated with Border Guard. Training in progress.

Mt. Div. out of replacement units, activation in progress.

Col Oliva -- Col. Wagner.

Jodl calls 1345: Stop movement. Postponement probably two days. Chief Op. Sec. and Deputy Transp. Chief to Chancellery not later than 1430 hrs.

Greiffenberg 1545: Air attack, 14 Jan. Ground offensive, 20 Jan. Conference at Fuehrer office.

ObdH: Brauner - Hilpert.

Corps activations, 1 Feb. Signal components completed 15 Feb. Hqs must be activated by 10 Feb.

Sodenstern for General Army Office?

Mittelberger: Operational study Southeast.

14 January 1940 (Sunday, Berlin).

Conference with ObdH, 1130 to 1315.

1.) Take up with OKW:

- a) The repeated extension of the date for the offensive is undermining confidence.
- b) Effects of the last cancellation. (Some of the troops were already entrained and en route to front.



- 2.) K 3 and K 5\* Becker claims the responsible factors are the cold temperature and the steel manufacturing process. (Only high-class refined steel can be used!). Art. Sec.
- 3.) Countermeasures Holland. Belgium: Time interval and speed of reaction? OQu IV.
- 4.) Personnel matters.
  - a) In the event of an offensive: Sodenstern to my Staff, Hilpert to Leeb's Staff, as temporary assignments.  
If no offensive: Manstein and Stuelpnagel, Commanding Generals. Olbricht, General Army Office. Central Branch.  
Sodenstern to my Staff as OQu I; Felber goes to AGp. A. In what way does it affect others?
  - b) Mittelberger possibly C in C Upper Rhine. Schindler??
  - c) Obkircher case must be taken up. OQu V.
  - d) On principle no objections to Drauner. Kewisch's efficiency rating must be submitted! Central Branch.
  - e) Should Hollidt be relieved in the East? Who in his place? (Someone very stern.)
- 5.) Propaganda among Moroccan and African troops in Southern France across Spanish border(?)  
OQu IV.

von Salmuth (2000): C in C Agp. B wants to talk to me and ObdH on Tuesday 1000 hrs.

Ziehlberg (OQu I):

- a) Sodenstern -- Mieth -- Konrad -- Lanz (C of S. for Home Mil. Distr. V?)
- b) Assignment of Hilpert (1.1. 39) might be arranged despite Mieth's seniority (1.3. 38), by calling it temporary duty.
- c) AGp. A: Felber. -- Behind Felber, Hilpert, Army Hq 2 (possibly Hollidt).
- d) Behind Hollidt -- Hansen (Op. Sec.) Keep an eye on Jaehnicke.

Buhle: When operations start: One Replacement Transfer Bn. must be activated for each Division of the First, Second, Third, Fourth and Fifth Drafts;

three Inf. Cos; rifles for signal, artillery and engineer components. Activation to be initiated on issuance of order for attack.

1245 -- 1800, Fuehrer conference:

- a) Weather uncertain because of penetration of a center of low pressure. Impossible to forecast weather for a 8 to 10 day period.
- b) Minimum needed, eight days; battle at the Meuse on the fourth day at the earliest.
- ) Air landing inside Fortress Holland. New orders!

Reichberg's letter.\*

16 January 1940.

Col. Gen. von Bock. von B. Kesslring instead of Bock.\*\*

- 1.) Decision not at Maastricht, but on the Meuse river. Von Br. expects that the Fuehrer will leave us freedom to decide.  
Clear picture not before late afternoon of first day at the earliest.
- 2.) Operation against islands. Kesselring wants to help.
- 3.) Supply of materiel: Spare parts. Sixth Army:  
1 recuperator spring,\*\*\* 1 / one word illegible Ed./
- 4.) SS Decree ("Stab in the back").  
Officers' Corps in a "nasty" mood.

Women are "shirkers". #

Article in "Schwarzes Korps".##

von Br. We stick to our stand.-- Adverse effect of the period of inactivity.

ObdH: Bridge launchers on Tank IV chassis: 9 m long, for water depth of 2 m, End of March: two units. 2 Krupp, 10 Magirus. Tank bridges. Four Divs. will get 3 units each.

Footbridge for Infantry: two ready in Feb.  
Tank IV chassis needed.

60-ton tanks in 1943: Two types, with 80 mm all-round armor.

Conference with Thomas.      Conference with Bock.

Conference with Bock.

Grossarth: Conference in Canaris' office: a) OKW order on measures to insure secrecy.-- b) SS Decree.-- c) Report from the East.

17 January 1940.

Op. Sec. et al.: Disposition of battle forces on the Western border.-- Need to make the most of any waiting-period.

Roehricht: Training courses for Co and Btry Cos on Army level, etc. Training ammunition.-- Miscellaneous questions.

Liss: Belgians alert troops around Eben Emael district and west of Maastricht.  
Demolitions being prepared by Dutch in Maastricht.

Talk with Salmuth on repercussions of these Belgian measures; also on Fortress Holland.  
Passed on to Chief Op. Sec. for transmittal to Air Force.      OKW.

Langhaeuser: Situation in the East.

Mueller: a) Sand sprinkling and other preparations for icy roads.  
b) von Bock: Materiel casualties must be replaced now!  
c) Reduction of fuel consumption! (50%).  
d) Instruction on Field Post.

von Bock: a) Inquires whether Sponeck's proposal is known here.  
b) Plan of attack IV Corps (Maastricht?)  
Reply: OKW and Air Force have been informed of Belgian measures; I shall reply to him myself.

Gercke: Repercussions of the paralysis of railroads in consequence of short alert notices: Assembly of trains might easily give clues to target date. Concentration and direction of offensive might be recognized several days before the attack.



To counter these hazards: "Flying start".\* This, however, puts the railroad under a continuous high strain.

Greiffenberg: (Jodl):

- 1.) Decision: Jump-off with troops echeloned in great depth. No surprise (neither operational, nor tactical.) Weather uncertain. Troops must be poised to strike instantaneously. No previous notification of Zero-Hour. At any moment! Complete readiness must be assured at all times. (24 hours). Inf. and Armor west of the Rhine. During these 24 hours no railroad movements, no return movements etc.; resumption only after frontier has been crossed. Missions and objectives remain the same. Possible slight variation (main effort south of Liège preferable).  
  
Holland in its entirety.  
  
Not tied to a fixed time schedule: Seventh Air Div.  
  
Time needed for grouping. (Easter?).
- 2.) In future the Fuehrer will divulge his plans only to a very few.
- .) Deception measures: Old deception plan, tanks, staff exercises, etc. Plan of operations -- Battle only against British!
  - a) Closure of frontiers with Holland and Belgium.
  - b) GHq? (1 Feb.)

18 January 1940.

ObdH: (1200): No fixed date. Not 24 hours.

Vehicles must not be left standing in the open.\* \*

Orders must be submitted after issue.

Report to Fuehrer: Assembly.-- Disposition --  
Training -- Target dates.

Abwehr: von Blaskowitz.-- Officers too weak; do not stand up for unjustly persecuted.

Reinecke -- Grosscurth -- Ulex -- OQu IV.  
Pickenb. Bentivegni.

Personnel Div.:

- a) Olbricht, Gen. Army Office.  
Felber/Manstein  
Sodenstern/Stuelpnagel.  
  
Heinrici/Stunne/Reinhard/Brockdorff etc.  
Commanding Generals.
- b) Mittelberger.
- c) Leeb. (Frau von Leeb's pessimistic remarks:)  
Weak spots in the West wall.  
Groppe's promotion to Major General (Landwehr  
Div. in von Witzleben's Group).
- d) Himmler decree. OQu. Mobilize Personnel Div.

OKW: No surprise. In contrast to 18.\*

Changed method: Keep them on edge.-- Abandonment  
of plan must not be openly stated. Fiction must  
be preserved that we may start off any day.\* No  
massive build-up, a flowing assembly. Start of  
attack sets flowing assembly in motion. Preceded  
by Air Force action. Strategic surprise as in  
invasion of Czecho-Slovakia.

Air Force.

Smoothly running on third day. Assembly of units  
in the rear must be telescoped.

Railroads will remain at the disposal of the Army  
until further notice (Fuehrer).

Conference with Chiefs Op., Org., Transp. Secs. and GenQu:

- 1.) In view of the fact that the enemy in the  
past reacted drastically and with promptness  
to our successive attack alarms, the Fuehrer  
has come to the conclusion that the original  
system of assembly no longer affords surprise.  
Our policy must be changed:
- 2.) The new method will be characterized by the  
following features:
  - a) At the frontier and directly behind it,  
only the forces necessary to attain the  
first objectives. That is, Inf. Divs. as  
far as required for initial jump-off;  
engineers and roadblock clearing organiza-  
tion, to clear the path for Armor. (Air  
cover and AAA for potential road bottle-  
necks.)

Build-up such that operations could be started at shortest notice (24 hours).

- b) All battleforces and supply destined for the follow-up, must be echeloned in the rear in a manner that enables them to catch up during the inevitable stops due to roads jams, border battles etc., and so have closed up when the initial offensive wave has reached the first objective.
- c) Railroad shipments, large-scale road movements, transfer of Hqs will be initiated only after the frontier has been crossed.

3.) Our job now is:

- a) To decide on "first objectives" )  
To allocate forces needed ) Op. Sec.  
Specify missions for Air Force.
- b) It is necessary to think out carefully, what effects all this will have on the work of other Staff Sections:  
Transport not affected!  
Supply. Trains scheduled to run on the first day must stand by.  
Tomorrow I shall be at the disposal of the Section Chiefs to talk over their ideas.

4.) In working out our plans we must bear in mind:

- a) Holland.
- b) Deception.
- c) Readiness to strike any time in response to enemy offensive.

5.) There will be no "let-up period". Readiness to initiate operations in conformity with the present plan must be maintained until the new plan has entered into force. (Op. Sec. -- Reply to Bock.)

6.) Organizational program will go on during regrouping.

7.) Training program will go on.

8.) Transfer of OKH Hq. Camouflage and security.

Wagner: Reorganization of Columns: Three 30-ton MT Clms and three horse-drawn Clms for every Div.

Buhle: Organization orders.



19 January 1940.

Grosscurth:

a) We are insufficiently informed on political matters. -- Ulex decree. -- Eastern questions.

b) Close check to prevent leaks in OKH.

Reehricht: a) Training program: Five Divisions to be sent to Training Centers. Tank Demonstration unit to Wuensdorf.  
b) Staff Manual for Staffs of SS and Police Divs.  
c) Chemical smoke experimental exercise.

Personnel matters:

a) In new Corps Hq: Geyer, Manstein. For Geyer, Stuelphagen. (IX Corps will soon be relieved).

b) OQu I: von Sodenstern.

c) AGp. Cs of S: von Salmuth, AGp. B; Felber, AGp. A; Mieth, AGp. C; Hansen AGp. East.

d) Army Cs of S: Paulus, Sixth Army; Brennecke, Fourth Army; Hilpert, Second Army; Marcks, Eighteenth Army; Fischer, Seventh Army; Mackensen, Twelfth Army; Model, Sixteenth Army; Konrad, First Army.

e) Corps Cs of S: Siewert. / No others named. -Ed./

von Etzdorf: Italy: Coal. -- War materials. -- Public sentiment increasingly succumbing to Allied propaganda (Graf Spee)\*

Ciano-Csaky: Hungary will make no territorial demands if Romania successfully resists any attack by a third party and makes no territorial concessions to third parties (Dobru-dsha, Bessarabia).

Russia:

Negotiations turning sour. Ritter still in Berlin. Fuehrer annoyed. (Naval gun turrets, machine tools, airplane models.)

Fuehrer wants to undertake nothing in the Russo-Finnish conflict.

Finnish suggestion that we take action before League of Nation intervenes.

Molotov: Time very late! Schulenburg has not left in consequence of Tanner's offer.\*\*

Fuehrer wants no mediation.

Swedish-German Friendship Banquet.

Commercial Treaty with Hungary: Open part -  
secret part (on war economy).  
Bessarabia.

Japan: New Cabinet is believed not to be favorable to us. Interim Cabinet. Japan politically disunited. Not yet committed to new course (pending liquidation of the Chinese question, restoration of good relations with U.S.).

Memo for ObdH: Talk with OKW, 18 Jan., afternoon (see yesterday's notes).

- 1.) Breakdown of confidence in East: Personnel change (Jansen for Hollidt). Tour to the East to look after troops.
- 2.) Siewert a personal liability.
- 3.) Instruction on Organization set in operation. (Must take it with me.) Order issued on reorganization of MG Bns., Cav.Div., Inf. Eng. Plats.
- 4.) Training: Divisions must be withdrawn for training. Training course and Demonstrate unit for Tank Commanders at Wuensdorf. Chemical smoke exercise, 28 Jan.
- 5.) Personnel matters (see above).
- 6.) Recommendation for reorganization in the West (Greiffenberg). -- Conference as soon as possible.
- 7.) Reorganization of columns (Wagner).
- 8.) Protest by Ott.
- 9.) Etzdorf
- 10.) 60,000 armaments workers from the Army (release in several stages). We hear that replacements for them are assured before they are relieved. Talk it over with ObdH

von Greiffenberg:

- 1.) First objective: Holland in its entirety (which will require at the least all forces so far assigned).  
South of Namur-Meuse.  
In central sector: Get across Canal, then Antwerp and Namur.



2.) Army Cp. Holland: Tanks? Three Inf., one Armd. and one Cav. Div.

3.) Sixth Army: In frontline seven Inf. and two Armd. Divs. (Armd. Divs. (A - 2).

Fourth Army: A - 1

Twelfth Army: A - 1

Sixteenth Army: A - 1

Total time lost due to increased depth. of assembly: one day's march.

Armor strength as before, but allocations changed. No reinforcement of Fourth Army.

Distinctive band on cuff for Armd. Troops.

Six Divisions. On A plus 1, morning, if material is ready.

Gercke: Stipulations by State Railroads, if they have to transport five Divs. which were withdrawn to Training Centers:

- a) Furlough traffic must be reduced 50% (for about two weeks).
- b) Restriction of passenger traffic to skeleton schedule.

ObdH approves. Reduction of furlough traffic must not extend to short-distance passes. -- OKW approves.

Buhle: Artillery program:

- a) Present program in force until end of February.
- b) Starting end of January there will be available for allocation;

Fully mobile (mot.):

4 Bns. 21 cm Hv. How. = 10 Btrys.

3 Bns. 15 cm Med. Fd. How. (Czech) = 9 Btrys.

(2 of these to be converted to Lt. Fd. How. mot.)

2 Bns. 15 cm Guns = 5 Btrys.

In fixed emplacements:

7 Bns. 8.3 cm Czech AA Artillery in AGp. C (including 2 Bns. of limited mobility) = 21 Btrys.

- c) As of March:

Polish guns for AGp. C:

60 Btrys. of 4 Polish Field Guns each = 240 guns.  
Of these 24 Btrys. of 6 guns each = 144 guns,  
50 to Army Hq 7 (static).

Remaining 96 guns -12 Bns. (left wing of First Army).

Full complement of Artillery (horse-drawn)  
for 10 new Divs.:

30 Bns. Lt. Fd. How. 18  
10 Bns. Med. Fd. How. (Polish)  
For time being third Btrys. will be  
equipped with Fd. Gun 16.

As of March:

Mot. Med. Artillery: (materiel only; question  
of traction still unsolved):

|                                    |      |         |
|------------------------------------|------|---------|
| 8 Bns. (Czech) Med. Fd. How. mot.  | 3000 | 1 March |
|                                    | 3 "  | 1 May   |
|                                    | 2 "  | 1 July  |
| 1 Btry. 30.5 (Czech) Hv. How. mot. |      | 1 March |
| 1 Btry. 24 cm Gun (Czech) mot.     |      | 1 March |
| 4 Btrys. 21 cm Gun (Turkish Skoda) |      | 1 April |
|                                    |      | 1 May   |
|                                    |      | 1 June  |
|                                    |      | 1 July. |

Beginning April: each month, 2 Bns. = 6 Btrys. Hv.  
How. 18 (3 per Btry.).

Beginning Middle of May: each month, 1 Btry.  
(3 pieces) 15 cm Guns 18.  
18.

End of May: 3 Btrys. (3 pieces each) 22 cm Pol  
Polish (only once).

1 June )

1 July ): 4 Btrys. (2 pieces each) 24 cm  
(Turkish) How. Skoda (mot.)

1 June: 6 Btrys. (4 pieces each) 10 cm Gun  
(Czech) mot.

1 July: 1 Btry. K 12 Gun\*.

15 July: 8 Bns. (2 Btrys each) Med. Fd. How.  
15 cm (Polish) horse-drawn. (Constitute  
Replacement Transfer Div. for 8 Divs.)

15 July: 14 Btrys. Med. Fd. How. (Czech). Of these,  
4 Bns. (2 Btrys. each) as Replacement  
Transfer Div. for Seventh Draft; 2  
Bns. (2 Btrys. each) for GHq Artillery.

1 Aug.: 1 42 cm How. (Czech).

1 Aug.: 20 Btrys. 10 cm Fd. How. (Czech), horse-  
drawn; (allocation open).

- ObdH: 1.) New Fuehrer order on weapons: Med. Fd. How., naval guns etc. Buhle.
- 2.) Org. Order 7/40 GK, of 18 Jan. Who gave it to Engel? -- Buhle must withdraw it. Op. Sec.
- 3.) Gercke: Cut in long-distance traffic: Front 5%. Roehricht.  
Replacement Army embargo for two weeks. Not two. Not two weeks.\* Short-distance traffic as before. Beginning 22 January. Chief of Transp.
- 4.) Army Gp.: New Corps Hq? Must be talked over with AGp. (Buhle).
- 5.) Who looks after Divisions taken out of line? (Five). Roehricht.  
13 new Divs., 10 Divs. scheduled for activation and Demonstration Div. have no bridging equipment. Eng. Sec.
- 6.) Brand to southern wing of Seventh Army. Buhle.  
Kuntzen must be freed once field operations have started. -- Geyer XXIV Corps.

Fuehrer directive: "Inexpedient". "Operational objectives". "New method of attack". 36 hours.

Reich Chancellery 1500 hrs.

20 January 1940.

Buhle: Organizational matters.

Gehlen: Construction Bns.

Grosscurth: Maintenance of security.

Fuehrer conference 1500 hrs:

Situation compels us to adopt new methods. Reasons:

- 1.) Enemy has a fair idea of our plans.---
- 2.) That plane accident has made everything very clear to the enemy.



Takes the gravest view: Is convinced that we shall win the war, but are bound to lose it unless we learn to maintain secrecy. Carelessness may lose us the war.

We must have the fanatical determination to keep operational matters absolutely secret and to act swiftly in the case of an alert. ("Offensive through Sedan", date known.)

Careless talk, faulty organization or keen observation of many separate facts (unusual occurrences.) Means must be found to eliminate all these factors. Number of those initiated into operational plans must be kept to an absolute minimum. And within this group, each individual must be told only what is essential for his function; no over-all picture. Information must be given out at the latest possible moment.

In giving instructions purpose must not be revealed.

An order need not give away the underlying intention. Execution requires a large number of workers; intentions must be known only to a very small group.  
(departure dates, girl typists).

No one must be told that we have abandoned system of four-day alert. Everything will be done out of hand. (Wants report on measures taken to implement new system!) Enemy must not become aware of change in procedure.

Air effort to destroy enemy aviation is of prime importance. Present clear weather spell is not long enough. Better chances not before March.

- 1.) Hence: Air Force must deliver first blow; orders not until the night before.
- 2.) Other missions: Enemy command organization must be smashed. Headquarters. All must be attacked at the same minute, and with heaviest bombs. Other points of strategic importance.

Maastricht bridges must be captured intact: Occupation of Holland. Offensive must attain maximum penetration of enemy territory: Ju 88\* England thus will not be attacked from the air in the first days. From third day onward, small groups of Ju 88 can attack England.

Target for the first days: Immediate action on limited number of especially important objectives. More may be expected from a attack with small forces, using maximum surprise, than with larger forces, but against an enemy poised for defense.

Clearing of road blocks. Fieseler Storch planes to drop Commandos and transport ammunition and men.

Orders will be issued in the afternoon. Movement during night. Attack in the morning. "Leap from stand."

Our change of method must not become known to troops. Enemy must be left in belief that we still follow original method.  
Essential prerequisite of success.-- Wants list of officers who have to be in the know.

Secret must be guarded in issuing orders. Divide orders! Don't say anything about intentions, just pass down the order!

Total of "immediate" actions. Leap from stand! Desirable to include in "immediate" actions: Holland on full scale.\*

Operation Maastricht. Passage through the Ardenn Ardennes. Prevent demolitions. Figure out in advance at what points we might have to repair demolition damage.

Timing: October would have been best. Enemy cannot do much construction work during period of frost. Frozen Holland affords great advantages.

Weather always keeps one guessing. Even now we must take advantage of any period of good weather. Making the most of opportunities offered is better than waiting for the "perfect" weather. Accordingly, every opportunity must be seized. Not Not likely before March. We must stand by prepared at all hours!

Transfer of GHq by plane.

Idea that we keep alert period must be fostered also on the railroads. Block telephones!

Fellgiebel.

Spread rumors. (Marras\*)

Order to all participants at the conference on observing secrecy.

Order to first attack echelon: Start off with two-thirds; improvisations. Make arrangements for elements left behind.

21 January 1940

- 1200 (with ObdH) at Fuehrer conference: We submit the recommendations of the Army. He wants maintenance of instant readiness so as to be able to take advantage of any favorable weather period..
- 1530 von Greiffenberg: Security at OKH. Sealing against outside.  
Postponement to end of January.  
Army Hq. 18 - 2 \*  
Leave out Regt. Grossdeutschland.
- 1800 Fuehrer (with ObdH):
- a) Disposition of troops generally approved. Wants arrival of Divs. from the rear planned so that they can be immediately committed.
  - b) To be carried out first off: Original plan called for smashing of enemy air force; Ghent; Maastricht. Now, Maastricht, Ghent (and Dinant) have been dropped, leaving only smashing of enemy air force (on which, as a result, all weight can be thrown).
  - c) Holland "now in first line. The whole country." country.\* Employment of sufficiently strong forces to preclude any setback. He wants a build-up that ensures full success.
  - d) Maastricht not yet completely ruled out (no air leak). Strong forces would be needed to exploit success; tanks on Hasselt and Maastricht. If action impracticable, tanks can be withdrawn from sector.
  - a) /sic/ Fourth Army: Cooperation of Air Force to blast obstacles. No tanks in the lead (mines). At the head of column. Inf. and Eng. with assault guns. Tanks will be held up at Meuse (Givet). In this sector, therefore, tanks are not the primary weapon; come in second line.



Gliders for assault detachments against tank obstacles.

- e) AGp. A. Things will be much easier because now they will have no enemy opposition in cutting through Luxembourg.\* Held by comparatively weak forces with large gaps. Cargo gliders to Bastogne, etc.  
Sowing of mines by planes in southern Luxembourg.\*\*  
Difficulties to be coped with in a battle on the Meuse.  
Assembly of Artillery will take 5 to 6 days.
- f) Importance of Armor: Holland (including Maa Maastricht corner): Army Hq one Armd. Div. with mot. Div. (also tanks).  
AGp. H  
Maastricht still open. Initially, keep back Armor, using only some elements with others standing by. Fourth Army impossible. Blast road blocks with Med. Inf. guns etc.  
Armor, whose strength is in the attack must be closely followed by Inf.
- g) Start so that Armor is available at all critical points from the start.
- h) Disposition of battle forces about as originally planned.
- i) Air Force for Holland.  
Air Force (on a small scale!) in AGp. A for mine sowing.  
Fieseler Storch.

2200: Conference with von Greiffenberg on developments of the day.

22 January 1940.

Meeting of Sec. Chiefs: Security. Internal, in charge of Central Branch, Special Security Officer.  
External: Special Missions Staff.  
Red tape, excessive paper work, distribution lists.

0900: Meeting of the Ia Officers of Army Gp. and Armies, on new plans.

- 1500: Jacob. Noise control in fortifications:  
 corrugated slag plates can be used; cost, 3 M  
 per square meter. Earcaps, 5 M a pair.  
 Searchlights for fortifications: 1875 on hand.  
 Loophole searchlights: 50 ordered for trials;  
 commercial product at 150 - 200 M a piece.  
 Put Ordnance Office also on the job.  
 New ventilation system in B-type fortifications.  
 Ventilating hoods over cooking stoves.
- 1630: Op. Sec. Outcome of the morning conference --  
 Draft orders.
- 1700: Training Sec; Training in Replacement Army again  
 suspended for eight weeks.
- 1800 Org. Sec: Trucks? - Save trucks by de-motoriza-  
 tion.  
 Organization of Divisions in the East.
- 2100 OQu IV: 1.) Case Groppe/Himmler.  
 2.) Report on tour.  
 3.) Security among troops -- at Hqs.  
 4.) Enemy Headquarters.

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Operational planning.
- \* a) 2.) Conference with AGp. and Army Hqs Questions.
- b) 3.) Truck problem ( 400 instead of 4,000).
  - a) Rundstedt's letter.
  - b) Wagner.
- d) 4.) Organization of High Command East.
- f) 5.) Security. Measures in the Rhineland. --  
 Closing of frontier.
- 6.) Personnel changes:
  - a) Manstein? We must get Rundstedt's opinion  
 opinion.
  - b) Stuelpnagel. Siewert, Corps C of S?
  - c) Hilpert and Hollidt to Weichs, Army Hq 2  
 For Hollidt - Konrad.)
  - d) Selection of Gen. Staff Officers for  
 new Div. and Corps Hqs on 5 Feb.
  - e) 2 Corps Hqs (mot.) Personnel Div.-5 Feb.



g) 7.) Conference with Himmler:

- a) Question of Corps troops etc. for SS Corps.
- b) Withdrawal of all SS men from Ground Forces. (AGp. B).

8.) Breakdown of confidence in the East. Tour in the East Visit of units necessary.

/ 9.) Fifth Armd. Div. Deficient preparations and execution.

/ 10.) Doorn.

/ 11.) Responsibility for training:

- a) of the Divisions in Training centers;
- b) of the Demonstration Div. (Inspection going easy).

/ 12.) SS Division leaves 24 Jan. Arrives 26 Jan. at Muenster.

13.) Bogatsch: Security. General effects of the "standing start".

/ 14.) Order issued regarding reorganization of Truck Clms.

/ 15.) Tank Spare Parts Depot Cologne, 29 Jan. Another one at Koblenz.

c) 16.) Fuel quota system.

/ 17.) Representative to Chemical Smoke exercise.

e) 18.) Staffs and Aides.  
/ Special points.

23 January 1940.

Liege, Antwerp, Meuse!

Grosscurth (OQu IV): Dispute with Himmler.

Chief, Op. Sec.: Go over with him the points discussed with ObdH.

Gen. Brand: Artillery preparation for the offensive.  
For every linear km of front, 10 light Btrys.  
and 10 med. Btrys for close support; 8 - 10  
Btrys. for counter-battery fire, as against  
about 30 Btrys. per km.\*  
Liège & Meuse -- Artillery of the static front.

Gen. Ott: Med. Inf. gun.

Gen Qu: a) Question of detachment of 250 Veterinary  
Officers.  
b) Directive for Service Chiefs in Gen Qu  
Sec.  
c) Truck situation disastrous. -- Tank treads.  
-- Rubber blocks.  
c) /sic/ Ammunition and weapons situation  
slightly improved. Reserves increasing.  
d) Fuel quota system. OKW order.  
e) Tanktreads. Monthly production 3,000. We  
are 22,000 short.

ObdH 1.) Liège: Command set-up. Op. Sec.  
2.) Border guard East Prussia must be taken out.  
Possibly one Div. less in south. Org. Sec.  
Op. Sec.  
3.) 50% authorized. Gen Qu.  
4.) Gen. Staff assignments, 5 Feb. (Central  
Branch and Personnel Div.).-- Central  
Branch.  
5.) Doorn. Write letter to Keitel or call up  
Jodl. Chief\*\*  
6.) Responsibility for training of Divisions  
in Training Centers.--Demonstration Div.  
Tng. Sec.  
7.) Whom for Grosscurth? Central Branch.

Calender Org. Op.

24 January 1940.

Central Branch: Talk on likely candidates for assign-  
ments.-- Possibly Speidel for Grosscurth.

Gercke: a) 69th Div. has left; four more Div. left late.  
Train schedule has dropped from 36 to 24  
trains per day.

b) Day before yesterday (22 Jan.) Reich Railroads  
placed a general embargo on all freight move-  
ments (excl. coal, but incl. iron ores).

Ziehlberg: In place of Grosscurth: Speidel.-- Steffler,  
First Div.-- (Henke)  
Pfuhlstein.

25 January 1940. (Koblenz-Bonn, in  
accordance with itinerary)

Conference at Hq AGC. A. Sources of information? Should  
allocation of be decentralized trucks??  
(Manstein).

Sixteenth Army will need six days for regrouping:

|           |     |    |
|-----------|-----|----|
| Thursday  | 25. |    |
| Friday    | 26. | 1. |
| Saturday  | 27. | 2. |
| Sunday    | 28. | 3. |
| Monday    | 29. | 4. |
| Tuesday   | 30. | 5. |
| Wednesday |     |    |

Armd. Div. can arrive on the morning of the fourth  
day (morning of the fifth!)  
Wants a Corps Hq.  
Replacement for Training Div. turned over by  
Sixteenth Army.

Twelfth Army. Disposition of Infantry Divs., will  
be completed within three days.  
Detraining of tanks as of Monday morning.-- One  
day's march.  
Tenth Div. not before third day of offensive  
(Pruem- Gerolstein).  
Desirable, third day of offensive, evening.  
Question of XIV Corps next to XIX Corps.



Armies will have their orders at: 1300

Army wants to key all preparations to "Emergency" \*  
"Emergency". \*

No difference between "Emergency" and "Attack". \*\*  
Also XIX Corps to the front if technically possible.

Air Force: Largest proportion of Air Force will be committed in tactical support. Air units for Armd. Corps.

Draft missions and discuss them with units.  
More to forward fields A-Day.

AAA.

Ninth Armd. Div.  
Jan.

Can be introduced Tuesday 30

Narrow-gauge railways!

Busche: \*\* Submit Defamation Decree#draft once more

AGp. B wants a Corps (Regular Army) behind its right wing, because of Holland.

26 January 1940. (Arrive Berlin about 0800)

von Ziehlberg: Manstein, Commanding General.  
Felber to Leeb? (Letter).  
Hilpert to Weichs.

OQu IV: 1.) Grosscurth affair.  
2.) Tischowitz.  
3.) Enemy situation. French Second Army reported reinforced.  
4.) Instructions for Sappenheim## (French-Belgian agreements. Do French and British plans embrace Dutch territory?).

Col. Krueger, Ia, Police Division, reports. Difficulties in combined arms training (Artillery with Infantry).  
Equine pneumonia epidemic in one Artillery Bn.

Gen. Bogatsch: Role of Air Reconnaissance in reorganization of Western front.

ObdH: 1.) Air, 10 Feb. Formation of a fleet of transport planes.

2.) Order on former Ruling Houses. Need not be circulated (since we make all appointments to key posts connected with operations###).

- 3.) Narrow gauge railway material is said to be available in Reich. 180 km in Reich Labor Service, 300 km in Todt organization. Can be gotten at only through Fuehrer.  
Narrow gauge railway lines: 300 km under construction in sector of First Army. Civilian economy now has no more than 300-400 km left.
- 4.) Railroads 26 Jan.  
Backlog: 916 trains, 49,400 cars.  
Shipments for training will be completed on 27 Jan., noon.  
Tank shipments as of 28 Jan. as scheduled.  
Coal supply. Improvement in sight.  
Passenger traffic: New curtailments. Deliveries to Russia.
- 5.) Order on former Ruling Houses.
- 6.) Grosscurth: Speidel? heim? Zeitzler?  
Younger prospects: Schwatlo-Gesterding. Schniewind - no!
- 7.) Mieth?
- 8.) Report by Claus.

27 January 1940.

Conference with ObdH, Tirpitzufer: \* Part I

Raw material demands of ObdH:

|                                    |                 |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|
| <u>Steel</u> : Annual requirements | 6,800, 000 tons |
| Allotted                           | 3,600, 000 tons |
| Deficit                            | 3,200, 000 tons |

|                                     |             |
|-------------------------------------|-------------|
| <u>Copper</u> : Annual requirements | 97,000 tons |
| Deficit                             | 46,000 tons |

|                                       |              |
|---------------------------------------|--------------|
| <u>Aluminum</u> : Annual requirements | 110,000 tons |
| Deficit                               | 66,000 tons. |

Machinery and manpower. We need 35,000 machines.

~~Non-essential~~ factories are still running; and we are supposed to discharge skilled workers from Army!

The situation relating to raw, machines and manpower ought to be straightened out before OKW gives orders.

Thomas: Steel for 1 to 2 quarter-year periods. Non-ferrous metals for one quarter-year period.

Recommendation: Deter all projects which would not produce results before 1941. Non-ferrous metals are the bottlenecks. Ratio of industrial requirements for machine tools, etc. to deliveries is 4 : 1.

ObdH declares he will accept no more orders, which are not matched with allocations. In future he alone will draw up the progra.

Becker: Second quarter - first quarter, but this purely on a mathematical basis. Uncertain. We must have proper balance of workers, machinery and raw materials. 14 hour workdays?!

Thomas thinks he can deliver in the second quarter 30,000 tons of steel over and above the first quarter. In the third quarter 50,000 tons more. \* Non-ferrous metals no clear picture. Heavy drop already in the second quarter, more severe in third quarter. Molybdenum from Finland.

Becker: We need 70,000 machines.

ObdH demands that deliveries be stepped up to maximum to assure utilization of our full capacity.

Thomas: Between 600,000 and 700,000 tons.

Becker, Thomas: Man power question. Thomas wants to kill all projects which would not produce for 1940.

ObdH: How many workers do we need at full capacity, if we can get the maximum of raw materials that can practically be expected?

Thomas: We do not have a sufficient number of skilled workers. Retraining program short of requirements.



Fats program: 1941\*

Part II. Truck situation.

Fromm: Rubber is current bottleneck. Monthly production has dropped to 1,000 t.

Schell describes organization of truck producing industry. 1,700 trucks for civilian economy per quarter-year.

Filling of Field and Replacement Armies requires 16,000 new trucks (not counting reconditioning of old ones).

Believes that current short deliveries, due to lack of non-ferrous metals, could eventually be made up (after the first quarter).

Schell proposes to have a separate steel quota set aside for trucks.

Fromm: Requirements 5,200 trucks. Order of priority: Seventh Draft, Eighth Draft, (Rear Bns.), and only then Sixth Draft (four Divs.). Monthly deliveries 1,000. Up to 1 April, 3,000 from Schell. Deficit 1,000 in Artillery; 1,200 in the Divisions. We could economize 1,000 trucks, if ammunition carried by GHq Artillery is reduced.

OQu IV: Report on current foreign relations and on conference Abwehr/OQu IV on 26 Jan.

Woehler. Chemical Smoke demonstration.-- Liege.

28 January 1940.

Hoepfner, 1030 - 1200 : Discussion on situation.

1210, von Brauchitsch, von Puttkamer: Four German Officers, Capt. von Karo one First Lt. 2 Second Lts. crossed the frontier at Emmerich, while drunk. AGp. B is trying to straighten out the matter.

1220, Salmuth. Ic officer of Army Gp requests to set matters right with the Border Guard. Result will be reported (Report to ObdH.)

1230: Gen Staff Officer of 207th Div. has been dispatched. Automobile has been returned to German territory. Officers in Herrenberg customs station.

1400: Report from AGp. B: Officers have arrived on German territory. (Emmerich); are being interrogated by Gen. Staff Officer of 207th Div. (ObdH has been informed.)

29 January 1940.

1000 : Demonstration of Hv. Inf. Gun mounted on chassis of Tank I, accompanied by a 1-ton ammunition carrier. Good technical solution, but tactically only a compromise solution.

Roehricht: Preliminary report on chemical smoke demonstration: The thing has possibilities for development. Density and blanketing effect still in need of improvement. Orientation in blanketed area by means of signal flares did not work; radio direction beams made out well.

Mirow. Liaison Off. to Inspector General of Todt Road Construction Organization.

OQu IV: Disposition of French forces, Armd. Division. Current matters.

Transp. Chief: Railroad situation.-- Bridges in the East.-- Narrow-gauge and field railroad equipment.

Op. Sec.: Draft orders: Operations "Gelb" and "Emergency." Operation Southeast. Eastern questions. (Draft by High Command East). Current matters.

Gehlen: Border fortifications in the East. Chemical smoke demonstration. Smoke effect was thin.

30 January 1940.

Conference with ObdH (1000):

Production: 1 Feb. 1,300  
1 July 2,060  
1 Oct. 3,700  
1 Apr. 1941 7,400, if steel quota  
is cut, 13,000 with full steel quota.\*



Filling installations: Just barely adequate. Present capacity 200 tons a month. Will be expanded by 1<sup>st</sup> March, 1940, to a capacity of 400 tons a month; by fall 400 more in Sagendorf, giving a total of 800 tons a month. 700 tons a month can be worked up in spray containers; will be increased to 1,400 tons a month (spring, 1940).

What quantities of chemical warfare agents can be supplied.

Gen. Staff: What quantities of ammunition do we need? Current requirement, first reserve. Filling machines. How many are needed to handle the monthly output? Data will be supplied by the end of the coming week.

In view of the expansion of the ammunition production program, the Gen. Staff ought to have taken up this question earlier. Op. Org.

Arty.

#### Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Report on Hv. Inf. Gun on Tank chassis I; trials under war conditions necessary (Inf. School). Allocation to Infantry.-- Observer Staff. Turned over to Inf. School, allocation to Inf., Arty. (Assault guns)
- 2.) Chemical smoke demonstration.
- 3.) Operational orders: operation "Gelb" (Assembly orders) Operation "Emergency". Op. Sec.
- 4.) Study by High Command East.-- Personnel change in High Command East? Op. Sec.
- 5.) Study Romania /entry crossed out.-Ed./ Op. Sec.
- 6.) Border fortifications in area of High Command East. Land Fort. Inspect.
- 7.) Gen Qu. Defamation Decree.-- Busch.--
- 8.) Deathhead Division does not want to go to Muensingen. SS units must be inspected after their return from the East. /entry crossed out./ XIV\*
- 9.) Reported new activations of SS units. Implications for arms production SS men program are pulled out of Army units. Letter to Keitel?

- 10.) Talk with Hoepfner. Morale! - Trips!
- 11.) Wage scales in the East (Recommendation by Blaskowitz).
- 12.) AGp. C: Draft plan for attack on Maginot line.
- 13.) Brand for Army Hq 1. -- Raschik for IX Corps on left wing of First Army.  
Pers. Div. Ask Chief of Staff Sta
- 14.) Cossmann back from the East. -- Report.
- 15.) Tabulation of transport data.
- 16.) Truck situation. -- Only radical remedies.  
Will be further clarified with Chief of Army Equipment.
- 17.) Himmler decree -- Groppe.

Preparations for construction of fortifications South:

Materials requirements. -- Transport requirements.  
Reconnaissance Partie.  
Talk with Todt.  
Where will the stuff come from (Antwerp) in enemy country? (Steel, cement, gravel.)

Org. Sec.: Mortars for AGp. C.

Letter -- Werlimont, Organization.  
Hv. Mortars for Infantry. Org. Sec.

Gelan: Fatal within a few minutes. Mask affords protection.

Eschenbach smudge producing agent\*\*\* Test.  
Allogen.  
Production capacity now 150 tons per month.  
Mask affords no protection.

Evening: Italian Generals Carboni and Marras.

31 January 1940.

0930 - 1100 : Conference with the Chief of Air Force  
Gen. Staff at Wildpark.  
Holland: Cooperation with Seventh Air Division.

Concentration of weight in the different phases of the offensive.  
Distribution of Air Force and Air objectives.  
Operation "Emergency".  
Timing (Assembly completed on 2 Feb.).  
Identification of friendly planes. Identification of friendly marching columns.

Fellgiebel can at any time supply personnel (without trucks) for two Corps Hqs on special assignment by making use of GHq Reserves.  
Also Hq IX Corps.

Ziehlberg: Filling of vacancies in the new ten Divs. (Ia).

von Greiffenberg: Current questions.-- Deception.--  
Map maneuvers in AGp. A,

Notes: / All underlined entries under this heading were added by Gen. Waldner on 1 Feb., after his conference with ObdH./

1.) Himmler decree. Handling of the Groppe case. Unrest in army about the decree considerably antedates the Groppe incident.

2.) OQu IV's draft reports on a) points at issue with the SS, and b) spreading of rumors.

3.) Reported new activations and re-equipment of SS. -- Material to Keitel? Grosscurth.

4.) What has become of the question "Wage scales in the East"? Fromm.

5.) Defamation Decree.-- Busch: what has become of it? Sign!

6.) Personnel matters:

a) AGp. A, Sodenstern. Must go there at once.

AGp. C Mieth.-- First Army, Konrad.-- XVIII Corps, Lanz. Felber at the disposal of OKH (later OQu I).--

Hilpert.-- Can be started, except:  
Konrad, Second Army, and Hilpert, First Army.

b) For Grosscurth: Heim, C of S, XVI Corps (to be replaced by Beaulieux). Does Hoeppner agree?

Buschenhagen, C of S, XXI Corps? Ia just changed! Speidel.

Ia IX Corps. When is this to come off?



Liaison with party agencies not any more through  
OKW/? Put on Abwehr Officer.

7.) "Retrenchments". OKW order.

8.) Deception. (Effect of the Landraete conference called at this time.) Must be done on big scale (complete switch in plans, announcement on extensive traffic control preparations, intention of all-out attack on Maginot Line.)\*

..)\*Air defense and cooperation with Air Force. Make preparations for railroad movements. Fuehrer inquiries have been answered in writing. What has the Fuehrer been told regarding the prospects of the attacks planned in the several zones of attack? Goering: Main effort at Sedan battle at Brussels.- we must be prepared to handle Belgium as a fortress.

Bock must have sufficient forces to feel sure that we need not wait. It does not matter too much when they arrive.

9.) Talk with Jeschonnek:

- a) Protection of our own planes against fire from friendly ground troops.
- b) Friendly troops must display distinctive identifications also behind the front.

10.) List of Operations codes will be submitted; must be requested also from Air Force.  
Siebert\*\*\*

11.) Reichenau again is a good deal in Berlin.

12.) Railroad troops.

Personnel Div. must travel around more.

1 February 1940.

6900 Buhle: Railroad engineers and other matters of his Sec.

1030 - 1330 Conference with ObdH: Political situation.- Operations.-- Organization.-- Personnel matters. Notes on the subject.

von Ziehlberg / no entry /

von Greiffenberg: Deceptive. -- Border traffic and border control. -- Movement largely completed.

Warlimont: 1.) Holland. "Armed protection of Dutch neutrality". Kiewitz.

2.) Supervision after surrender of arms.

3.) Doorn. "Courtesy visit must be paid to the Emperor; he is to be informed that nothing will change".

4.) Removal of GHq to H\*. ObdH is to inform Fuehrer when he is going to move (Fuehrer wants to conform his own move to that of Army's). Perhaps not expedient on first day ObdH.

5.) Re-equipment of tanks with 4.7 cm Guns.

Vossmain: Observations in Poland.

Wagner: Organization of Supply Services for Eighteenth Army. -- Current matters. --

OQu IV: Current matters.

2 February 1940.

von Montigny Ia, SS Deathhead Div. Makes a decent impression. Combined arms operations will be difficult for this Division.

Gehler-Jacob: Preparations for construction of fortifications in conquered territory; in conjunction with Organization Todt.

Buhle: Homogenous materiel \* in Artillery units. \*\* --

: Labor Service and Construction Bns. and other current matters.

Gercke: Transport situation.

Greiffenberg: Build-up of front.

Keitel (Personnel Div.) Personnel situation.

Evening, at Cavalry Club. Minister von Bluecher, Finland. (See George of Saxony \*).

3 February 1940.

von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters. (Call up CG First Army.)

von Greiffenberg: Planning material for conference with Manstein. -- SS Div. in AGp. B too far in the rear.

Gen. von Manstein: Ninth Armd. Div. Role assigned to Armor on the Meuse. Heavy Artillery. Chemical smoke. Mine defense. Strengthening of fighter protection.

von Schell: Instructional Pamphlet on care of automotive vehicles. -- Rubber is the bottleneck. -- Wartime program has been in operation since 1 Jan. -- Army needs 18,000 tons of steel a month, 5% nonferrous metals.

16,000 trucks mobilized in the civilian economy.  
3,200 to supply shortages in Army.  
5,000 to replace trucks in repair.  
5,000 for new activations.  
2,800 trucks for Replacement Army and minor new activations.  
No reserve.

New production: with total capacity being 12,000 trucks per quarter year, 4,000 per month could go to entire Armed Forces, including 2,500 - 2,600 for Ground Forces.

Actually Ground Forces get 1,000 trucks per month. (This is not even 1% of its entire park, which means that we are not replacing normal losses through wear, let alone keep anything to cover losses in operations and combat.)

Maintenance Services: Improve by assigning additional trained personnel in the ZI Motor Transport Districts \*\* (2,000 mechanics), and on unit level (1,080 mechanics), as well as mechanical equipment. Transfer of civilian workshops to the West (has not worked out). Transfer of new military workshops to the West.

Scheduled delivery: 85 Tank III chassis.



Buhle: Conference on demotorization. -- Forest Guard Regt.!

Wagner: Truck situation. -- Kewisch.

Notes:

- a) Conference with Manstein.  
Two-thirds of SS Division in AGp. B too far to the rear.
- b) Tour to Army Hq 18. Go to Koblenz, leave Tuesday. -- Back Friday morning.
- c) Organizational matters:
  - 1.) Single-model Arty. Bns.: 10 cm Gun and med. Fd. How. Hv. how. -- 15 cm guns.
  - 2.) Forest Guards and Industrial Guards. -- (See additional notes.)\*
  - 3.) 4.7 cm Gun on Tank I chassis: GHq Troops.
  - 4.) Inf. Regt. mot. (See additional notes.)
  - 5.) Condition report. (See additional notes.))
- d) Truck situation. Reorganization also after regrouping.
- e) Cover addresses by fieldpost numbers.
- f) Construction of rear positions.
- g) Deception.
- h) Military police patrols. -- Air Force. \*\*\*

4 February 1940 (Sunday).

The truck situation:

1.) Conference with Schell:

We have now about 120,000 trucks.  
Monthly new production for Army not more than 1,000, i.e. less than 1%. No reserve.

Shortages reported by troops 2,668 (trucks), i.e. more than 2%; actually, if trucks in repair are included, the true figure is about 5,000, or 4%. Material in the units is quite old. (That way we cannot pull through in any operation.)

2.) If we allow a 2% for the normal monthly loss (not counting combat casualties), which is the normal rate, new production will cover only half that loss. The consequence is a continuous drain on our truck strength, impairing the operational efficiency of our forces.

3.) Remedy 1 would be to increase production. Rubber bottleneck (von Schell) restricts new production to a maximum of 4,000 per month (over-all capacity for production for the Armed Forces.) Prerequisites for an increase in the Army allotment are a) larger steel allocation from Army quota (which can be done only by either restricting other projects or increasing the total quota); or b) curtailing of new production for other branches of Armed Services. (At the outbreak of the war Air Forces had 80% peacetime vehicles, we at most 40%.)

Any change would require a ruling by the Fuhrer, for which we must prepare accurate data.

4.) Remedy 2: Requisition of 16,000 trucks from domestic economy now under consideration.

5.) Remedy 3: This is one we can apply ourselves. That is, drastic and ruthless restriction of motor vehicles in existing and newly activated units. This would reduce the total number of trucks in use and so the losses due to wear, so that, viewed in terms of total strength, the proportion of trucks available on the present level of production would increase \*. For the various possibilities see tabulation supplied by Org. Sec.

The prerequisite is sufficient replacement by horse-drawn vehicles and horses. This, in turn, raises the question of raw materials (steel, lumber, leather) and forage. (Army horses need more oats and fodder than civilian horses.) See Org. Sec. tabulation: 33,000 vehicles, 67,000 horses.

There is no doubt that by dipping once (and only that time) into the resources of the domestic economy, we can supply the present shortage and perhaps even set aside a small reserve, but this backlog would be absorbed within seven months by the normal wear of at least 2% a month (excluding combat losses). (How fast it would go with combat losses is beyond our power to estimate.)

After deducting 5,000 trucks to supply the unit shortage of about 5,000, we would have 11,000 left, not counting new production. If we assume the loss of 1,500 trucks per month, which cannot be supplied by new production, the new addition to our park would be exhausted, if there is no operation, in about half a year (seven months).

These measures, then, would not solve our problem. They would have to be supplemented by a concurrent demotorization program on a big scale, which entails the procurement of horses, vehicles and harnesses. That decision must be taken immediately to make sure that it would take effect in time to carry us on when the present single addition to our park will have been exhausted.

The best thing would be to appoint a special committee (Gen. Staff and Chief of Army Equipment) to deal with details of the demotorization program and to determine its scope by exploring all the various possibilities in consultation with representative bodies of farming, small business, etc.

The most important thing, however, is to start at once with procuring vehicles, harness etc., without wasting a long time for computations and conferences.

- 6.) Remedy 4: Equalization of truck strength (supply trains) between Army and Air Force. A suggestion to this effect has been made to BdE. The decision lies in hands of the Fuehrer.
- 7.) Remedy 5: Improvement of truck maintenance.  
Possible methods :
  - a) Workshop personnel must be assigned to the Field Army.  
This move is already on. See Report Gen Qu (altogether about 1,800 men).
  - b) Special trains from base motor parks of the Armies to the ZI industrial centers, e.g. Cologne - Saxony (shipments now take four weeks!). Plan is under study.
  - c) Trucks in need of repair may be turned over to the civilian economy in exchange for good ones. The new owners would look after having them repaired in small shops. Proposal is being examined by Schell.

/sic/ 7.) The development of the situation has the following consequences for the conduct of ground operations:

a) At the present high level of motorization, starting of an operation with a distant objective is advisable only if a minimum truck reserve is available or the possibility of prompt replacement by horse-drawn vehicles is assured.

/Marginal note/: List: "The positive advantage over the enemy, due to our superior generalship, would be obliterated".

b) When operations have continued for a certain time, (the length of which would vary with road conditions, supply and combat losses,) it would be necessary to call a pause in operations in view of the impossibility to obtain replacement for all materiel losses. The pause after the Polish Campaign lasted about four weeks. We found that it was not long enough. After a new operation, the pause would have to be considerably extended, in proportion to the lessened operational value of our trucks.

8.) The preceding analysis does not include our position in special vehicles (tanks, tracked vehicles of the artillery, etc.). Separate measures must be considered to deal with that situation.

5 February 1940.

ObdH: a) 1 : 1,000,000 maps (also East) for selected Divisions.

b) Establishment of new Corps Hqs. New locations for Corps Hqs. Op. Sec.

c) Roehricht: Training Div. -- Volkmann to ObdH. Personnel and materiel. Tng. Sec.

d) Eastern frontier at Ostrolenka. Attend-  
ed to.

e) Fieldpost cover addresses. See that they use some common sense. Gen Qu



Running-time of letters - statistics:  
20 - 23 outgoing  
29 - 3 evening incoming  
Gen Qu.

- f) ObdH wants to wait for exact findings on extension of range of med. Fd. How. before ordering modification applied everywhere.  
-----As far as necessary now: Single
- g) 4.7 cm Guns to GdQ. Troops or Armd. <sup>model</sup> Divs: ?--  
Let us first see the design of mount. --  
First demonstration 10 or 14 Feb. Assault guns!
- h) Forest Guards. Industrial Guards: Officer-ed by SS: 16,000 in Poland, Rural Police, SS, Secret Field Police. Details are still being worked out. Org. Sec.
- i) Components of Armd. Divs.: Armd. units -- "Rifle Regts." and Mot. Divs. No changes for the time being.
- k) Solution of truck problem. Three methods: Domestic economy. -- Increased production. --- horse-drawn vehicles. Org. Sec.
- l) Time in operation equals time necessary for reconditioning. What are all-around consequences? Get in touch again with Schell after conference with ObdH. Regrouping of models, spare parts situation. Op.
- m) Attack to deceive enemy. Op. Sec.
- n) Conference with Himmler on 2 Feb., 1600 to 1900. OQu IV.
- 1.) Decree on birth rate: Agreement obtained. Reichsfuehrer himself is going to publish the decree, with explanatory commentary.
  - 2.) Groppe case. Himmler feels insulted. If not dismissed, Groppe must get a "punitive" transfer.
  - 3.) Leeb affair.
  - 4.) Decree on channelling of complaints. "Safety valve" question \*.
  - 5.) Himmler denies that SS men are pledged to inform on Army.



6.) Mil. Hq Prague. Cooperation with Fridenrici difficult. Austrian officer who has relations with Czechs.

7.) High Command East. Force of 16,000. Mission is to carry out ethnical policy. A difficult mission. Mistakes have been made. Has learnt of five cases from report of High Command East, and asks for information on all other cases. His intention is to carry out his complex task in as considerate manner as possible and with a minimum of bloodshed. He wants good relations with the Army. Denies any intention whatever to set up an Army beside the Army.

Tank ditch along the frontier is work project for two and a half million Jews. ObdH promises to look into the plan.

Himmler claimed that our troops get additional food by slaughtering cattle. ObdH asked for details on instances.

Himmler also asserted that some officers took their meals with Polish landowners every day. ObdH asked for details.

1500 Buhle: Organizational matters, incl. question whether Army Judges should be accorded disciplinary power of officers.

1630 Brand: Artillery build-up AGp. B.

Antwerp East: 4 med. Bns. and 3 Divs. \*

Antwerp - Namur: 10 Divs. and 10 med. Bns. and Special Btrys.

Liege: 2 lt. and 2 med. Bns., in addition to 5 - 6 Divs. \*\*

Leaves for Meuse front: 15 mixed med. Bns.  
5 Hv. How. and 15 cm Gun Bns.  
20 Bns.

GHq Reserve: 10 Bns. (4 med. Fd. How. and 6 10 cm Gun) by 1 April, together with 1 med. Fd. How. and 2 10 cm Gun from BdE.  
8 Bns. (6 med. Fd. How. and 2 10 cm Guns) from AGp. C.

Taking the 194 Btrys. of GHq Artillery, and assuming AGp. B comm its everything and AGp. A keeps what it has, we get a density of 15 Btrys. (incl. 6 from Div.) per kilometer on a 16 km

front, and of 12 or 13 Btrys. (incl. 6 from Div.) on an additional 20 km front. There would be a total of 25 Divs. \* on this 36 km frontage.

Ammunition for preparation of attack: 1.33 issues.

CQu IV: Current matters. -- Orientation for Etzdorf. -- "Safety valve" decree. -- Publication of the incidents in the East.

Gen Qu: Tilling of fields in the evacuation zone. -- Current Gen Qu matters.

6 February 1940.

Brand - Buhle: Re-equipment of Arty. Bns. with single-model Guns. Data for the conference with the Army Hqs.

von Greiffenberg: Map maneuver to develop planning data for our strategy on the Meuse.

Jacob: For construction of 350 km of fortifications he needs:  
30,000 tons of steel a month, beginning next May.  
3,000 trucks (2,500 from Todt \*\*), beginning July.  
40 railroad trains, daily, beginning July.  
120,000 workers, " "

7 February 1940.

Through the night on train to Koblenz. Arrival 0900.

Map maneuver at Hq AGp. A: Notable points:

Red Army: Northern wing does not advance beyond line Antwerp - Namur. Southern wing proceeding from the area of French First and Second Armies, enters Belgium in the Ardennes with mechanized forces and advances to the Semois river with Mt. troops; Ren. elements from (French) AGp. A enter Luxembourg for reconnaissance (Stop at the Alzette river). Plans to attack on A plus 7 (or 8) with about 40 Divs. on front Diedenhofen - Sedan, striking in direction of Walmedy-Liège.

Blue Army follows out our ideas. Ninth Armd. Div. not under its command. XIV Corps not yet

set in motion.

Guderian insists on Ninth Arm. Div. on the right wing for "tank battle forward of the Meuse river". (NB: This is impossible for reasons of camouflage, possibility of transferring of Ninth Arm. Div. to the left wing is being studied by AGp.)

Rundstedt: "Ninth Arm. Div. on the wrong wing".

Direction of operation (very good!) Operation is developed so that XIV Corps reaches the bank of the Meuse at Charleville-Sedan on A plus 2; XIV Corps follows closely behind XIX Corps (two Divs.).

Guderian wants to force crossing of the Meuse alone with XIX and XIV Corps on A plus 4.

AGp. Command (Blumentritt) disapproves. (Suggests to have XIV Corps strike northward.)

Red wants to launch its Arm. Div. on the eastern bank of the Meuse for an attack from the north on A plus 4.

AGp. Command wants to attack across the Meuse according to plan on A plus 8 (15.). Asks for seven med. artillery Bns. with requisite Hqs.

#### Results:

attacking force: armor assault echelon must be reinforced by Ninth Arm. Div., which in any event could not be committed in time anywhere else! Behind it, Second mot. Div. and mot. Regimental Groups, followed by XIV Corps, which must start off on A-Day and closely follow behind the mot. formations.

Inf. assault echelon is handicapped by its depth. The follow-up movement, as originally planned, worked better. There is danger that steady flow might be disrupted on approaching the Meuse. Special steps to avert this are necessary, such as having Inf. Divs. leave behind their trains and moving up the combat troops on side roads.

#### Timing:

a) XIV Corps must start at once.

b) I think there is no sense in the Arm. Corps attacking alone across the Meuse on A plus 4. Not later than A plus 2, OKH must be able to decide whether it wants to launch a concerted attack across



the Meuse or let the Army Gps. slug it out on their own.

- c) A concerted attack across the Meuse would be impossible before the ninth or tenth day of the offensive.
- d) Red may at the same time start a heavy attack against the left flank. It would run into a defensive front of nearly sufficient strength (half that of the attack).
- e) GHq Reserves must be brought up in very close succession.
- f) Air force thinks it will be able to fly across the frontier not earlier than 70 minutes after the Army has started off (state of training). (Rundstedt expects that it will take at least 90 minutes for the alarm to get through to the enemy Air Force.)

Conference at Hdq. B, 1800:

- 1.) British capabilities. Can move up four mot. columns against the Hasselt-Tilburg line as a first echelon, with a second echelon following directly behind. Belgian left wing can swing over to Tilburg. OQu IV.
- 2.) Antwerp Tunnel; are there other bridges or preparations for such?
- 3.) Timetable:  
The British can move four columns into the area Waal - Belgian frontier on A plus 1.  
Eighteenth Army can commit eight Armd. Divs. and two-thirds of SS Div. against this force on A plus 2, and 254th Div. on A plus 3.
- 4.) Regular Army Divs. for Eighteenth Army must be moved up via Guenster (208th Div. then remains GHq Reserve). approved. Op. Sec.
- 5.) Missions for 22nd and Seventh Air Div. \* still in need of clarification. Air Force.
- 6.) Follow-up of AGp. reserves in the present disposition is very slow (especially Sixth Army).

- 7.) Proclamation for air landing in Holland.  
Air Force.
- 8.) Air Force is reported to have given order to bomb everything not positively identifiable as German forces.
- 9.) Transfer of officers is believed liable to cause serious complications.
- 10.) SS is reported to have started large-scale recruiting drive, including age group 23 (several age groups ahead of us). Party circulates recruiting leaflets promising early registrants exemption from army service and assignments in Poland. (Fromm is said to have had them a week ago.) If this is allowed to go on, age groups 20, 21, 22 would be bespoken and stripped of their best material before we had a chance at them. Allegedly no deferment applications for SS. Weitzel \* boasts of recruiting drive for 100,000 men for the SS. Fromm/Org. Sec.
- 11.) Applications for deferments: Use method adopted in France. \*\* Fromm/Org. Sec.
- 12.) Hesse \*\*\*. Propaganda extolling the ethical ideals of the German soldier. OQu IV.

8 February 1940.

(Spend night at Viersen, after arrival by train.)

Third Armd. Div. Also Cs of 8, XI, XVI Corps and Sixth Army.

- a) Third Armd. Div. has difficulties getting everything together, especially its Bridge Clns. after its own Bridge Clns. was taken away for Eighteenth Army.
- b) Personnel changes in Third Armd. Div. -- Gen. Staff Officer.
- c) Air Force order on swastika flags and panels.
- d) Armored car for Division Commander.



- e) Fuel allocations for training exercises. -- Radio embargo and fuel shortage in Armd. units.

Hq Eighteenth Army (Hq XXVI Corps):

- a) Support by Air Force and Canaris' organization in surprise attacks to capture bridges. Op. Dec.
- b) Timetable: First day as far as Peel position. Second day to southern "ilhelmina Canal. Third day at bridge site.
- c) Bridging equipment and med. Artillery of 22nd Div. must go to Eighteenth Army.
- d) Northward extension of zone of attack.
- e) Wants to transfer Hq to Wesel.

254th Div: Talk with Ia produces nothing new. The Div. seems to be making good progress in its training program. Truck problem not acute. Nothing special concerning age or type of equipment.

Eighth Armd. Div. On the whole, good. Only minor operational casualties. Have got through latest movements in good shape. The opinion seems to prevail that the present alert for instant striking will last four weeks. ObdH.

Hq X Corps (207th and 227th Div., SS Deathhead Div.)

- a) Preparations of the Corps thorough to last detail. Lots of drive! Breaking up of Corps into a number of Advance Combat Teams seems to be safe. Much use is made of bicycles and what appear to be requisitioned vehicles.
- b) Timetable:  
 First day: Arnheim - Ijssel. Attempt will be made to break through Grebbe Line with Advance Combat Teams and Armd. Train.  
 Second day: If surprise attack has failed, main body will be moved up to Grebbe Line, with weight concentrated on right wing.  
 Third day: Continue movement to Grebbe Line.  
 Fourth day: Attack, with main effort in direction of Utrecht.

Op. Sec., ObdH: Don't we put too much into the Groningen area by committing the whole Cav. Div.?

- c) Personnel matters:  
Bickwolf (227th Div.) does not look very fresh, is said to have diabetes. Will have to be replaced. Personnel Div.  
Brand (25th Div.?). Central Branch.  
He does not seem to be quite to the liking of Corps.
- d) Waffen SS seems to have difficulties finding suitable replacements for COs going to newly activated units.  
Radio cars are lacking for Armd. Rgn. Bn.

Evening, back via Muenster-Hamm-Dannover in special car attached to express train.

9 February 1940.

Gen Qu: Report on current matters.  
ObdH is annoyed over the manner in which the matter of Goering's letter (Reichenau) was handled by Lattmann.  
Concentrated forage for horses.

Org. Sec.:

- a) 4.7 cm guns. 132 tank destroyers (4.7 Skoda); of these 120 to Armd. Divs., leaving 12 for GHq Troops! This gives each Anti-tank Bn. in Armd. Divs. one Co. of SPM; remainder into materiel reserve. ObdH!
- b) Artillery: Three Hvy. How. Bns., totalling 8 Btrys.  
One 15 cm Gun Bn. of 2 Btrys.  
ready for operation as of 25 Feb.  
To Arty. Reserve.  
Two lt. Fd. How. Bns. not become med. Fd. How. Bns. not effective 20 Feb.
- c) Chemical warfare units:  
As of 1 April we shall have materiel for 3 - 4 more Chem. Mortar Bns., for which we need cadre from heavy and Field Artillery.  
Motorization would take about one month.

Chemical mortar ammunition:  
 110,000 filled shells, on hand  
 in front  
 107,000 in the ZI Ordnance de-  
 pots.  
 180,000 empty shells.  
 60,000 rounds coming from pro-  
 duction each month.

Beginning 1 May new material for  
 one Bn. will be delivered each  
 month.

First deliveries of Do Projec-  
 tors \* as of July.

500 till fall: No order for  
 smoke ammunition yet \*\*. ObdH.

- d) Order on Reich Labor Service.
- e) Military Railway Police instead of Civilian  
 Railroad Police. Change-over will take six  
 weeks.
- f) Strengthening of the Reinforced Border Guard  
 Service against Denmark. (About 1 Mar.; re-  
 inforcement will be effective 1 Apr. after  
 abolition of the customs border with Czecho-  
 slovakia.)
- g) Ready for assignment 25 Feb : XXXVIII and  
 XXXX Corps  
 15 March: XXXIX, XXXXI,  
 XXXXII Corps.
- h) Moving up of Mountain Corps. Org. Sec.
- i) Gas Defense Officers for Corps Hq. Org.  
 Sec.

- OQu IV:
- a) Russia - Romania - Carol Line.
  - b) Scandinavian countries.
  - c) "Safety valve" question put aside for  
 time being.. Personnel Divisions will  
 continue to study the matter in conjunc-  
 tion with OQu IV.

Transport Chief: Reich Railroad makes official admis-  
 sion that they would not be in a position at the  
 present to see us through in any large-scale of-  
 fensive operation.

Signals Chief:

- a) "Festa" cable \*\*\* is available in sufficient



quantity for new fortress front; 6,500 km on hand. 1,000 multiple (20) twin cables.

- b) Artillery pack radio sets will be supplied to Divs. of First to Sixth Drafts by middle of March, thereafter Seventh to Eighth Drafts.

10 February 1940.

Roehricht: Chemical smoke demonstration at Grafenwoehr. Briefing on cooperation with Air Force in regard to identification.

Volttmann: Commander of Training Div. at Koenigsbrueck. Comes in for talk on tasks of his Div.

Witzleben: War Academy Courses.

1230 - 1400: Fuehrer inspected 4.7 cm Czech Skoda gun on Tank chassis I; had good impression. Gun for close Infantry support, not for Armd. Divs.

Talk about one-ton, three-ton, five-ton prime movers. Prefers the three-ton trucks.

Start of air operations during night. ObdH.

Economize rubber by reducing driving speeds. Gen Qu.

Todt Organization reported to have run out of steel (30,000). Eng. Chief.

Army Veterinary Office: Contagious anemia. ObdH.

Turnover and replacement of horses.  
Detachment of Veterinary Officers for duty in ZI. ObdH.

Wagner - Weinknecht: Supply organization for fortified front on Upper Rhine.

Tippelskirch II\* reports on transfer to Supply Sec. at OKW. Is to work only with Op. Sec.

OQu IV and Major Radke are deeply distressed because ObdH is not shown in the Polish Campaign film. Is to be remedied by addition of suitable shots. Letter to OKW? ObdH.

von Etzdorf 2100: Italy - Britain, question of coal.  
Coal shortage. ObdH.  
Question whether he should take over Section Al-  
sace-Lorraine in the Foreign Office.

11 February 1940.

Hermann\* comes to take photographs for the Leipziger  
Illustrierte Zeitung.

Gercke: Conference with Keitel on 10 Feb.  
OKW does not want to put the railroad problem  
before the Fuehrer. Everyone tries to hide  
behind the Field Marshal \*\*. OKW yesterday  
sent him a letter on the situation drawn up  
by Gercke with documentation on the truck si-  
tuation supplied by Jodl. Keitel warns  
against putting the question directly to the  
Fuehrer. But he is also afraid of handling  
the matter himself. ObdH.  
Field Marshal in Berlin on 12 Feb., will  
probably visit the Fuehrer.

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Map maneuver AGp. A.
- 2.) Conference with von Bock.
- 3.) Eighteenth Army.
- 4.) Smoke: More Chemical Warfare Bns. (3 - 4)  
(see 9 Feb. 1940 \*\*\*).
- 5.) Fuehrer conference.
- 6.) Strategy for presentation of facts to Fueh-  
rer.
- 7.) Military demands on Holland.
- 8.) My trip to map maneuver at List's Hq.
- 9.) Transfer of OKH Hq. (What about Fuehrer!)

12 February 1940.

ObdH: Action to be taken when time is up. Re-  
port. Holland?  
Report of Kiewitz to ObdH. Op. Sec.

4.7 cm guns: Six pieces for each Armd. Div., or  
perhaps to new Divs.  
Organize eight Companies with 72nd as GHq  
Troops.



Delivery in May.

Must be earmarked for XIX Corps! Next for Fourth Army; then for Sixth Army. Six per Company in GHq AT Bns.; equivalent elements may be taken out for new Divs.

Boehler \*: In GHq AT Bns. How many? 20 each month. Production of 5 cm Guns should be started in the meantime.

Veterinary Service: "Auxiliary Veterinary Officers". Put them only on furlough status. Gen. Qu.

Report on chemical smoke to ObdH,

Instructional Pamphlet on employment of, and training of crews for, 4.7 cm (also Boehler!). Employment as assault guns. Ing. Sec.

Planning for Holland: Railroads and transportation. Op. Sec.

Buhle: Trucks and horses. Todt and Speer: 9,000 trucks (Organized as Column!). Production 1,000 - 1,200 per month. (Reserve of 3,000 by March). Later 2,500 - 3,000. Casualty rate anticipated during operations about 6,000 a month.

180,000 horses? 65,000 for new activations. 90,000 for operation. 30,000 to replace current losses.

Trucks must be pulled out of the units! We shall meet at ObdH for decision end of the week. Org. Sec.

About Stapf. Central Branch.

Wedel. (Attend to it myself.)

1300 Roehricht: Briefing on report to ObdH regarding smoke screen laying, and drafting of Instructional Pamphlet regarding smoke.

Air Force (Report by Lt. Col. Vorwald, Chief, Air Force Org. Sec.): Reconnaissance, 30 Staffeln. Henschel 126! (Me 109). Me 110? 1941 Me 210.

Planes: Long-range reconnaissance 10 Staffeln, Do 17 P \*\*. Ju 88, one chain \*\*\* per month.

Fighters: 26 Gruppen. 1 April, 29 Gruppen (42 Gruppen!) 28 are Me 109 E! Endurance one hour.

One Night-Fighter Gruppe (Arado 68); coast protection.

Long-range fighters: 8 Gruppen Me 110. More than doubled (21 Groups!). 2 Gruppen Me 109 will be re-equipped with Me 110. Monthly rate of losses: 20%. Wider range as of April.

Bombers: 44 Groups. By 1 April, 3 more. (No change!)

Of these, 13 Gruppen are He 111 (longer range).

Bombs up to 500 kg.

11 Gruppen\* P (range 500 km less).

Bombs up to 500 kg.

2 Groups for sowing air mines.

12 Groups Do 17/Z (good for ground support).

8 (at present 3) Ju 88, partly suitable for sowing mines; also 1,000 Kg bombs.

1 Condor Gruppe\*\*: heavy cargos, big mines.

Dive bombers. 10 Gruppen, Ju 87. No change.

In 1941 this type will be supplanted by Me 210.

Range of craft in two Gruppen extended by jettisonable wing tanks. Screaming attachment.

Close-support Gruppe: 1 (123) former dive-bombers.

Air transport: 6 Gruppen, Ju 52; available at any time, but must be brought together from schools.

(In addition two Gruppen are available on short advance notice).

Increase possible only at the expense of bombers.

Total in existence 1,100, in Transport Staffeln of Corps and in Flying Schools.

Navy: 20 Staffeln (six also suitable for over-land flying).

AAA: 1 12.8 cm Btry. (trial Btry.). Will not go into production before fall. 1941, Muzzle velocity 905 m, ceiling 14,000 m, horizontal range 21,000 m.

19 10.5 cm Btrys. and 2 Replacements Btrys. By 1 Apr., 6 more, by 1 Oct. 21 more Btrys.

622 8.8 cm Btrys. (including 717 Czechs will be discarded 1 Apr.). Between April and October more Btrys. will be delivered. 1 October 662 Btrys. and 15 Replacement Transfer Btrys.

94 3.7 cm Btrys., later 9 more (1 Apr.), plus 20 Btrys. by 1 Oct.

391 2 cm \* Btrys., plus 14 single-barrel Btrys,  
11 more on 1 Apr., plus 20 more by 1 Oct.  
150 cm searchlight: 181 Btrys., plus 4 more on 1  
Apr. and 21 more by 1 Oct.

Barrage Balloon Btrys.: 9, plus 3 by 1 Apr., plus  
12 more by 1 Oct.

Op. Sec.: a) MG Bns. from AGp. C for A (12), from B  
for A 18.

b) 256th Div. to AGp. B. 217th Div. from  
the East as GHq Reserve. 256th Div.  
ObdH.

Assemble at Muenster on A - 1, afternoon:  
4 Railroad Transport Groups for 22nd Div.  
3 Railroad Transport Groups for Seventh  
Air Div, and  
at Hagenow: 2 Railroad Transport Groups  
for Seventh Air Div.

One Parachute Bn. in 22nd Div. 3 Para-  
chute Bns. in Seventh Div.

c) Fuehrer has authorized launching of at-  
tack on French Air installations 45 mi-  
nutes before X-Hour. (One-third of en-  
tire operational Air Force, Waldau.)  
ObdH.

Foreign Office \*\*:

1.) Sumner Welles. Rome, Berlin, Paris, London.

Mission: a) Information. b) Groundwork for  
mediation proposal.

Restoration of a Polish State. Restoration of  
Czechoslovakia on the lines of the Munich  
Agreement. No interference in the internal  
affairs of Germany. No limitless reparations.  
American contribution: Gold backing for  
European currencies, to rehabilitate European  
economy.

Reasons: a) Surprise and confusion about  
the course of the war to date.

b) It is anticipated that the U.S. would not  
be able to keep out of the conflict. -- Col-  
lapse of Finland. -- Military action on the  
Balkans and in the Near East. Repercussions  
on the U.S.

c) Domestic politics: Elections! Angel of  
Peace!

Perhaps English initiative to draw in Roose-  
velt.



- 2.) Hull: Peace proposals to neutral powers. Formation of a front of neutrals. Peaceful restoration of international trade. World-wide disarmament. Pope's help is sought!

Our reaction cannot yet be predicted. Welles will arrive in Italy on 1 Mar.

- 3.) Italy. Increasing strain between Italy and England. Tightening up of Navycert system. Time of Italy's entry into the war must not be allowed to hinge on any accidental clash over exercise of sea control.

Prince of Hesse: Il Duce wants to enter the war at any time when doing so helps, and adds no burden on Germany. The British are convinced that Il Duce is still following his old line. New phase of British-Italian relations. Any further deterioration of the situation would result in open rupture.

- 4.) Russo-German Agreement will be signed tonight.

OQu IV: a) Demolition of bridges in Belgium probably only local measures (after completion of civilian evacuation). Op. Sec.  
b) Situation map for Piepenbrock. Op. Sec.

Gen Qu: a) Fieldpost. b) General Staff Training Courses. c) Computation of the gas ammunition requirements. d) Truck situation. e) Feeding of Belgium and Holland.

13 February 1940.

Wandel: We need 22 more Div. Arty. Commanders, 8 more Arty. Regt. Commanders. Op. Sec. ObdH.

Buhle: Ammunition position satisfactory. No ammunition crisis is to be anticipated this year. Arms Crisis at the end of three months. Truck position.

Canaris: Grosscurth. -- Pessimism. -- Oster. Liss.

Gercke: Suspension of all military shipments (Columns, Labor Service, Ens.).\* 150 trains per day.

Gen Qu (Mueller): Conversion of Supply Clms. - Traffic control. -- Truck position. -- Organize ZI Motor Transport Districts! \*

Gehlen: Data on construction of fortifications in the East. -- Plan for trip to the West. -- Questions of tank obstacle materials.

Evening: Leave for Mayen, map maneuvers at Hq Twelfth Army.

14 February 1940.

0900 to 1500: Map maneuver, Hq Twelfth Army.

- a) Most vulnerable spots of Red: Carignan and on both sides of Sedan (especially to the West). Mezières bridgehead is being held.
- b) Blue's using of XIX Corps in line at the outset of operations indicates that they did not have enough Inf. Divs. up yet. This employment of large Armd. units in a coordinated offensive must be organized in different fashion: 1.) A tactical echelon distributed through the first wave of the assault force without regard to order of battle, and behind it 2.) an operational echelon, to be formed during the assembly of troops, which has the mission to follow up in exploiting the breakthrough. Details of disposition of units, see map.

XIX Corps strikes for Sedan with Second mot. Div. (Second Armd. Div. in Corps reserve) and for Mouzon, with Regt. Grossdeutschland (Tenth Armd. Div. in Corps reserve).

- c) A plus 8 is the earliest possible date for the front-wide attack. Technically it will not be possible before A plus 9. Transport for ammunition: two Truck Bns!
- d) The wheeling movement of Twelfth Army, which is feeling pinned down on its left wing, would cause a splitting of the Army when the northern wing continues to advance to the west. On the other hand, if the Army keeps contact with the left while swinging the entire army southward, our entire front would



be split on the AGp. boundary line.

e) The gap in our air defense system, in the Luxembourg area, must be closed by moving in AAA from the Home Air Districts.

f) Shortage in bridging equipment.

Conference with List: He is endeavoring to find new patterns for teamwork between Armor, Air Force, and the conventional arms.

Guderian and Wietersheim plainly show lack of confidence in success.

Guderian: Has lost confidence. -- The whole tank operation is planned wrong!  
XIV Corps thinks it need not be alerted before the morning of A-Day.

Conference with AGp. A (1500 - 1600):

- a) We review the resources for rapid closing up of Inf. Divs. from the depth.
- b) It would be possible to bring Ninth Armd. Div. to the left wing of XIX Corps. Best to commit the Div. in the Second echelon.

Leave for Bad Kreuznach.

Conference with C in C First Army:

- a) Political matters. Attitude toward the SS. His own ideas on the subject. Directions from a central point. \*
- b) Groppe case has gone wrong.
- c) Witzleben thinks that Raschik has not been much good since his accident. Does not want him in First Army. ObdH.
- d) Heavy Artillery will be kept in readiness for concentration on right wing.
- e) AGp. A will have to determine the sector for Ninth Armd. Div.

2145: Return to Berlin.

/All matters of the day subsequently taken up with ObdH. /

15 February 1940.

Arrival Grunewald 0930.

Talk with Jacob on role of Engineer troops in removal of the obstacles on Luxembourg bridges.

- Ott:
- a) Revision of the new Inf. Training Instructions: Delete diagram showing only one Co. in line.
  - b) Assault detachments for attacks on pillboxes.
  - c) Purpose underlying reorganization of Infantry units.
  - d) Training of Inf. in teamwork with tanks.
  - e) Inf. hand-carts \*. I would rather allocate 15,000 tons of steel for them than for weapons.

Winter: Results of Kluge map maneuver. Immediate effects of mission of Army Gp: attack on Huy. Chances are poor on the Meuse south of Namur, but good at Huy. Mission "on both sides of Namur". OKH will help out at the crossing of the Ourthe. Second Army.  
Points of concern: Direction Huy! -- Keeping closed up to the front! ObdH.

Buhle: Truck position: "etrenchments in the units would yield about 2,000 trucks. Further proposals cannot be made until we know the results of the Goering's conferences with von Schell.  
If we use 4,500 horses and 2,000 vehicles instead of trucks in the Div. Supply Clms. and Combat Trains, we are sure to have a severe shortage in horses by 1941 at the latest. Parallel measures to economize horses in the units must be initiated.

Gercke: Field Marshal is forming a compact committee headed by himself. He has full authority from the Fuehrer to issue orders.

Technical reporter: someone of the Ministry of Transport (Kleinmann). New State Secretary for Shipping, Krieg, also new State Secretary for Motor Transport, Brandenburg. New blood in other Sections!

Members: Gercke (Railroads and Waterways). Schell (Motor Transport). Economic experts in an advisory function: Thomas, Hannecken, Todt, Huehnlein (executive member for the civilian economy). Representative of the Minister of Post whenever needed. Koerner representing the Four Year Plan. Gercke permanent representative with full power. Recommendations for organization and operation. All work must be completed within a few weeks.

Decisions cannot be retold even by top level. ObdH.

16 February 1940.

Talk with Salmuth: Substantially the same as the letter to ObdH. Danger of splitting of the front.

Ziehlberg: Raschik for Upper Rhine front. Mueller (Landwehr) will be replaced by Krischer middle of March and in turn will take Fretter-Pico's place (XXIV Corps). To Field Marshal in place of Stapf: Duewert, weiss? Matzky (Kinzel), Hauffe.

von Etzdorf, 1145: Medal for Kawabe \*. Meeting with State Secretary.

von Greiffenberg: Operation, situation map.

Roehricht: Gen. Staff Training Course (visit). -- Training Course for re-activated Gen. Staff Officers. -- Tanks and Infantry. -- Standard designations for battles \*\*. (Op. Sec.).

OQu IV: Visit to 58th Div. \*\*\*. Rifle barrel liners for training ammunition. Rations (rather a little less for the front) #. Gen Qu.

Rumors about Baldur ##: Has volunteered for service in the AAA...

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) Written report on change of assembly plan. Change in disposition of forces: Questions asked by Fuehrer. Have report returned.
- 2.) Report on List map maneuver. (Talk with Guderian, Wietersheim)



- 3.) von Kluge map maneuver. - Talked over with Salmuth.
- 4.) Result of the two maneuvers:
  - a) Problem complex of tank operations.
  - b) Disadvantages deriving from starting the operations before process of closing up is completed.
  - c) Inner doubts on prospects of ultimate success.
- 5.) Abwehr report on plane landing.
- 6.) Air Force materiel.
  - a) Ju 88 are coming off the line very slowly.
  - b) Transport planes only at the expense of bombers.
  - c) Monthly rate of losses computed at 20%.
- 7.) Air operations: Attack on enemy Air Force; attacking force will cross the border 45 minutes before X-Hour (one-third of entire Air Force).
- 8.) Div. Artillery Commanders. Artillery Chief wants 22 new Div. Artillery Commanders and 8 Regimental Commanders (one for every four Bns.). 15 are enough!
- 9.) Ammunitions position: a) Present stocks will last six months. b) Drop next January.
- 10.) Forecast for organization and materiel.
- 11.) Truck position.
- 12.) Miscellaneous:
  - a) Raschik (Rating given by C. in C. First Army). To Upper Rhine as of 25 February, stand for IX Corps. C of S IX, who should have gone to Training, in place of Raschik.
  - b) Gercke: Reorganization.
  - c) Visit to Gen. Staff Training Course in Dresden, Thursday.
  - d) Fieldpost.
  - e) Decisions on XXXVIII and XXXX mot. Corps Hq. 25 Feb. XXXIX, XXXXII, XXXXI (mot.), middle of March.

17 February 1940.

Weinknecht: Reorganization of Division Clms. \*

- a) Divs. of First, Second, and Fourth Draft have given up their truck Clms. for horse-drawn Clms. Conversion still in progress, will be completed by 20 Feb. Two collecting areas: Hamm - Schweinfurt: 81 30-ton Clms. and five 60-ton Clms.
- b) A total of 136 30-ton and five 60-ton Clms. have been withdrawn. Replenishing of other Divs. was accomplished with the trucks of about 30-ton Clms. Surprisingly good.
- c) By way of compensation, ten 30-ton Clms. will be left in each Army (four more in Eighteenth Army = 54 Clms.).
- d) Five 60-ton Clms. and withdrawals from Seventh Army make up a new MT Bn.
- e) With the first instalment filled, we can proceed to replenishing of the Clms. now at the front.

ObdH: 1.) East: Troop training centers in area South. (Air?)\* \* Gehlen, Tng. Sec. Blaskowitz wants to set up the Industrial and Forest Guard himself, using Regional Defense units. Himmler wants to take over the Forest Guard after four weeks. Claims he has not yet got his 40,000 men; wants to use his men only to fill gaps. Also wants to activate Artillery of the Police Division with his own men.

2.) 1200 Report to Fuehrer.

Changed situation. -- Armor in Eighteenth Army. -- Closing up within a day. -- Operation "Emergency". -- Transfer of Hq.

Leave memorandum as it is.  
Call Army Commanders for conference. Map maneuvers.

Armd. Divs. must be overhauled once more (March).

Attend to Himmler business at the same time. (Army Commanders including those in the East.)

3.) Heinrich.

- 4.) Assignment of Corps Hq? As soon as cadre is completed, transfer XXXX to the West, to have it at hand.



5.) Goering. 16,000 trucks. Refused.

6.) Trucks:

|                       |  |
|-----------------------|--|
| Withdrawn from export | 4,000 new by 20 March.                         |
| From Protectorate     | 1,500 new.                                     |
| From Skoda (exports)  | 1,000 (equip units completely with this type.) |
| Production to April   | 3,000 (but then we have nothing in reserve.)   |
|                       | <u>9,500</u> instead of 16,000.                |

Must get under way! See what we can get out of Todt (BdE, Schell).

7.) Raschik remains until further notice - ask Chief of Staff \*.  
Brand to Seventh Army.

8.) Fieldpost: work up backlog, starting from the rear. Gen Qu.

9.) Footway bridges, not yet. Armd. Divs. at present 3, later 4 trestle bridges \*\*; eventually perhaps completion as roadway bridges. --  
Allocation? (Prepare timber for subsequent decking) \*\*\*. Org. Sec.

10.) Smoke: If possible not by sectors! Instructional Pamphlet. Tanks. Tng. Sec.

Night exercises as a substitute for exercises in blanketing fog. Recruits must get used to night operations from the first day.  
Roehricht, BdE.

18 February 1940.

Fuehrer conference, 1200:

Introductory: Original plan was to break through the enemy front between Liège and the Maginot Line. Drawback was constriction between "Fortress Belgium" and Maginot Line. Extension of the attack northward of the Liège area was considered so as to obtain wider frontage. The central feature of that plan was to concentrate the main weight in the south and to use Antwerp instead of Liège as the pivot of the great wheeling movement.

Now we have reverted to the original scheme.

Discussion:

- 1.) Surprise may now be regarded as assured. It took the enemy ten to fourteen days to learn about some of our regrouping movements, which proves that the earlier leaks were in Berlin. Enemy will find means to watch the border area more closely.
- 2.) Enemy offensive: We have no definite idea as to
  - a) whether the enemy will advance automatically in reaction to our crossing of the frontier;
  - b) whether the French High Command will give the starting signal for the offensive which assuredly has been carefully prepared; or
  - c) whether this signal will be given by the French Government.

It may be taken for granted that the operational details of the offensive have been formulated and drafted, but that the commanders in the field have no liberty of action. Most likely the French High Command or the Cabinet will make the decision. This means that the French will lose at least 12 hours.

Some people believe that the French plan is for the Germans to spend their strength in Belgium, and then have them run head-on against the strong French northern front.

- 3.) Our plan, therefore, must aim at getting behind the fortifications line in Northern France at the very start. This calls for:
- 4.) Sixteenth Army to get to the border in southern Luxembourg with the utmost speed. Advance Combat Teams! Mot. elements. Obstacle Removal Detachments. Planes sowing land mines, etc. Purpose: To seize the terrain needed for the defense as quickly as possible, and organize it for sustained defensive warfare. The enemy would be able to launch a strong counterattack in this sector after three to four days, covered by his fortress system (Camp of Châlons, etc.).

It would thus be five or six days, before the main body of Sixteenth Army arrives and takes up positions, and the critical stage is overcome. Sixteenth Army will then be placed under AGp. C.

AGp. C must closely watch this operation in the meantime. Question of rear positions. Question of Artillery reinforcements. Supply route network (including field railroads) and signal communications network. Op. Sec. with Gen Qu, Transp. and Signal Chiefs. Think through implications.

- 5.) Twelfth Army will become an offensive extension of the defensive front.
- 6.) Fourth Army: Is now poised for attack with whole weight in western direction. This will not do, all the more so, as it is still doubtful that Fourth Army will be able to make a frontal breakthrough on the Meuse.
- 7.) We need one more Army. The weak link in the entire operation is the moment when List is locked with the enemy and Kluge reaches the Meuse. This weakness can be rectified only
  - a) by strengthening the assault wedge, or
  - b) by having another Army ready when needed.
- 8.) Allocation of Armor in detail:
  - a) We must not adhere too closely to the order of battle. Form mixed commands.
  - b) Tanks allocated to any sector must be of the type best adapted for the specific tasks.
  - c) Holland will oppose our Armor only with anti-tank defenses (4.7 cm Boehler), not with tanks; therefore, all we need on that front are about 14 Tanks IV and 30 Tanks III, with the rest Tanks I and II, for anti-tank defense at Antwerp. (Eighteenth Army).
  - d) In Belgium we shall have to expect enemy tanks north of the Meuse-Sambre line; accordingly there will be no change in original allocations. Guns on SPMs are a good weapon. (Sixth Army).



- e) In Belgium, south of the Meuse-Sambre line, we need only a few Tanks III and IV (7.5 cm) but all the more Infantry and Engineer troops (Fourth Army). Bulk of Tanks IV and III, together with some II, should be in the Assault Group (Twelfth Army). With it go AT units, heavy Inf. guns mot., etc.

9.) General evaluation of tank types.

Tank I can be employed only against a weak and demoralized enemy.  
 Tank II is but little stronger; not good against tanks.  
 Tank III effective against enemy tanks. Relatively ineffective against Infantry (Czech III).  
 Tank IV effective against enemy tanks. Good effect also against enemy Infantry.  
 Sixth and Eighth Armd. Divs., which have Czech tanks, are considered outstanding.

10.) Heaviest flat-trajectory fire.

- a) Against Aachen forts, older railroad guns will do.
- b) K 5 Gun \* and good 28 cm Gun at the earliest to the Assault Group or Defense Group in Luxembourg.
- c) 38 cm and 40.6 cm Gun. Available when?
- d) New naval guns? Emplacements? OKW will let us know.

Points to be taken up

- 1.) Assignment of new missions and assembly orders. Urgent.
- 2.) Allocation of tanks and other forces. Urgent.  
 ObdH has halted shifting of tanks.
- 3.) Preliminary Ia conference (?).
- 4.) Conference with C in Cs and Cs of S on Saturday?
- 5.) Timetable for shifting and equalization of forces.
- 6.) Monday, 0930, conference with Buhle and Greiffenberg at ObdH.

1930 Conference with Greiffenberg, Winter, Sixt, Mieth.

2145 We could set up:

Luxembourg frontier: Four K 5 Guns (56 km) \*.  
Five Bruno 28 cm Guns  
(36 km) \*\*.

Eben Emael:

Five Bruno.

Up to now

in Fourth Army:

Four 24 cm Theodor; mobile  
reserve for Luxembourg.  
(Still under consideration.)

Five 36 cm Guns.

Three 40,6 cm Guns.

(Fixed emplacements, one  
year. Question of mov-  
ing in divided loads not  
yet solved.)

K 12 Gun (20 rounds, range 120 km). What  
against? \*\*\*

Chief Op. Sec.: Changes called for by the new plans:

Fourth and 27th Div. to AGp. A. Hq for second  
Armd. echelon (Reinhard XXXXI Corps) must be ready  
by 1 March.

Conference with AGp. B, if possible to be held by  
ObdH, Wednesday. Subsequently AGp. A.

19 February 1940.

0930 ObdH:

- a) Shifting of Tanks III and IV stopped.  
First, Second, and Tenth Divs. will be rein-  
forced with Tanks III.  
Czech tanks for Seventh Div. (Tanks III will  
be taken out instead).  
To Sixth and Eighth Divs., Tanks IV.  
Demonstration Bn. remains at disposal of GHq #.
- b) Tank destroyers by May (seven Bns.). First  
conversions in March, one Co. in each Bn.
- c) Boehler: Conversion to 5 cm guns not feasible.  
Bns. on both wings must be reorganized. 1 Mar.;  
70 pieces. Where is the Co. of 12 Tank Destroy-  
ers (First Army)?



- 1.) Objective: Two Boehler, one 3.7 cm (three Sns.).
  - 2.) Objective: Recall all Boehler from AGp. so that we can reinforce all GHq AT Sns. with one Boehler. Will be made up from current production.
- c) /sic/ Assault Guns: Deliveries slow. 4, 6, 10 \*. activate units! Combat assignments undecided!. Use mild steel. \*\* One ready. To Training Div. For training in Seventh Army., Artillery Training Group.
  - d) Med. Inf. Gun. Middle of March, six Cos. of 6 each.
  - e) Flamethrowers: From end of March until June incl., one Co. of 3 platoons, each with four flamethrowers, every month.
  - f) Armored personnel carrier: Five Eng. Cos. One for each Rifle Regt. of Group A (five).
  - g) Eleventh Brig. mot.?
  - h) Activation of Chemical Mortar Sns. must be speeded up. Light trucks or prime movers?
  - i) From: 1.) 14,000 replacements to Mil. District XA \*\*\*. 2.) Replacements for seven Divs. still in the Home Districts.

1230 State Secretary von Weizsaecker:

Situation in the North. Views mediation proposal the same as we do. Very cautious in assessment of Norwegian possibilities.

Belgium: He sees no likelihood of closer voluntary cooperation with France.

Balkans: no signs of any disturbance.

Italy: Uncertain. They would really prefer doing business with us, but they remain willing to do business with the other side, too.

1330 Luncheon at the Japanese Embassy. Farewell to Kawabe.

1830 Gercke: Report on revised planning for railroads. Operational and repairs position.

20 February 1940.

Col. Heim reports as Chief on special assignment (zbV).

Guderian:

- a) Ninth Armd. Div. 400 cars \* in repair. Will be finished soon. Are for the first to remain at present stations. Attended to.
- b) 4.7 cm gun on Tank Ib chassis can operate only in units with organic tank repair shops. If detached, it would need special repair facilities. This makes it necessary to mount the 4.7 cm assigned to Inf. units on ordinary gun carriages. Org. Sec.
- c) Keep Wahn \*\* free for units of Armd. wedge. Op. Sec., Tng. Sec.
- d) Chief of Inspectorate 6.\*\*\* In place of Balck: Thoma, Konze, Gotsche. Org. Sec. Balck would be appointed Armd. Forces Chief in OKH. ObdH, Pers. Div.

Gen Qu: Military Criminal Justice.  
Disciplinary power of officers for Army Judges.  
Disapproved for this isolated category; question must be settled for Army officials as a whole.  
Confirmation of individual sentences.

Central Branch informs us that the Fuehrer wants to talk to General von Falkenhorst, as an expert on Finland #.

Felber: Leeb wants Brand. Raschik's case will be talked over once more on Saturday.

Roehricht: Order on supervision of Training activities by newly activated Corps Hqs. Night Training as a preliminary to training in smoke blanketed areas.

Wagner: Report on tour. Truck position of Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies. Gen Qu map exercises.  
Supply position of First Army. -- Deception mission for First Army.  
Effects of the shifting of the boundary between AGps. B and A. Talk over with Op. Sec.

Roehricht: New Corps Hqs.

Op. Sec.: a) Allocation of bridging material.

- b) Has XVI Corps Hq still any useful function up north? Who commands the Second Echelon?  
XXXXIV Corps ##

- c) Blumentritt: "projected course of operation".
- d) Op. Sec. "Study on prospects of the operation".
- e) Deception measures must be intensified.
- f) Sixteenth Army: Projected course of operations (map study) covering period from the start until the crisis is over.
- g) Map maneuver in AGp. B?
- h) What reserves have been earmarked? )  
 What reserves are really free? )  
 How must they be grouped? )  
 How move them up? ) Ch. \*  
 Reserves for Norway? )
- i) Liaison Officers to AGps. B, A, and Fourth, Twelfth, and Sixteenth Armies; later also for AGp. C. (Six in all.)

Central Branch: When do we release Grosscurth? --  
 Liaison Officers.

21 February 1940.

Morning: My own work on new assembly orders and on order for feint attack by AGp. C.

Gen. Obst. Keitel sends directive of Fuehrer concerning Heavy Artillery.

Winter: Reply to Leeb on attacks "Falke", "Geier", "Habbicht". \*\*

Blumentritt: Review of the new intentions.

Organization of the First and Second Armcd. Echelons under Guderian. Third Echelon will follow up under Army Gp.

Conclusion of the regrouping movements about 8 March.

C in C AGp. A believes that spearheading of offensive by armor is no longer justified under present circumstances.

Sixt: a) Stepping up of striking power of Armcd. Divs.  
 Allocation of armored personnel carriers.  
 Armcd. Eng. Co.



First off, two Boehler Tank Destroyer Bns  
(two Btrys. of 12 each, and one of 12) and  
2 Bns. 4.7 cm Skoda (three Btrys. of 6 each).

- b) Corps, etc. Artillery Hqs. -- Pers. Div. has  
no one. General Branch must help.
- c) Replacement units for Fortress Troops in AGp.  
C.
- d) Post of Armd. Forces Chief.

Gen. Mieth: Operation "Gelb".

- OQu IV:
- a) "Safety valve" question. ObdH.
  - b) Staff of officers with writing experience  
for Press Sec. 5 \*.
  - c) French fortifications on the northern bank  
of the Meuse and at Mézières.
  - d) Siegburg. Idea of "sécurité" in France \*\*.

Wandel: Employment of K5 and Siegfried Guns \*\*\* in com-  
pliance with the Fuehrer's wishes.

Heusinger: Operation "weseruebung":

Falkenhorst saw the Fuehrer. Fuehrer put him in  
charge of preparations for the Norway operation.

Hq XXI Corps will be placed under OKW, in order to  
avert trouble with the Air Force.

Planning Group will soon go to Berlin (Corps Hq  
to Luebeck?).

Reinforce Falkenhorst's Hq.

Troops: Seventh Air Div., 22nd Div.  
One Regt. of First Mt. Div.  
Two Divs. with assault equipment (Seventh  
Draft). Selection of Commanders.  
Eighteenth Rifle Brigade, reinforced with  
tanks.

Maps!

Denmark. Air Force wants Denmark #. Troops must  
be readied.

Timing: Shortly after substantial conclusion of  
offensive in the West. Then as quickly  
as possible! (All points taken up  
with ObdH.)

/Marginal entry, presumably 2 March: / Not a single word  
has passed between the Fuehrer and ObdH on this matter;

this must be put on record for the history of the war. I shall make a point of noting down the first time the subject is broached. Nothing to date (2 March).

Evening, 2245. Leave for Dresden.

22 February 1940.

arrive at Dresden in special car at 0400.

0830 Classes start in the lecture rooms.

0830 - 1030: Lecture room B, Lt. Col. Hermann  
(The "Fire Brigade" Division) \*.

1045 - 1240: Lecture room C, Major Wagener  
(The mot. Div.).

1245 Call on Commanding General Mil. District IV:  
Population exhausted! -- Spring sowing! --  
Railroad movements sometimes unnecessary. \*\* --  
Early thaw. ObdH.

1400 - 1700: Lecture room A, Lt. Col. Rasp (Map ma-  
neuver: Meeting engagement).

1930 - 2300: Party at the Officers' Club (afterwards  
back to Berlin in special car).

Impression of instructors: Very good. Courses are bu-  
sinesslike. ObdH.

Impression of the participants: Quite gratifying. Some  
outstanding officers, such as Trotha, Philippi,  
Steinsdorff, Grewenitz, Uebelhack.

23 February 1940.

0724 Arrival at Anhalter Station. On to Zossen.

0930 von Greiffenberg. Exchange XXXX Corps for XXI  
Corps. Order! ObdH.

Mieth: Alleged complaint by Todt on lack of cooperation  
by Felber's troops on the Spicherer Heights.  
Thirty-three emplacements are now under construc-  
tion. Casualties. 900 shellhits! ObdH.  
Containing attack by C (Cadenbronn).



Wagner: Tank wedge. 18,000 vehicles.  
A total of 45,000 vehicles in the sectors of  
Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies!

Winter: Approval of draft plans for attack "Falke"  
(Leeb) and for individual missions. ObdH.

Memo for ObdH:

- 1.) New directive for operation "Gelb".
- 2.) Points for conference 24 Feb.
- 3.) Corps Hq Falkenhorst (XXI Corps) will leave  
(25 Feb.).  
In his place Stumme (XXXX Corps) (as of 25  
Feb.). Orders issued.
- 4.) Falkenhorst's mission (Operation "Weserue-  
bung").
- 5.) Leeb does not want Raschik.
- 6.) Inspectors General and Troop Inspectors  
(Dollmann, Raschik). Not yet.
- 7.) Armd. Forces Chief at OKH. Not yet.  
Not Balck at General Army Office \*.
- 8.) Two letters from Seitel. a) Finding mission  
for K5 Gun on southern wing. b) Construc-  
tion on Siegfried Line, Jacob's report.
- 9.) Todt is said to be again at stirring up the  
Fuehrer against us, this time over Saar-  
bruecken. Fuehrer is reported to wish con-  
tinuation of work on extension of the front!  
(Steel is supposed to be available again.)  
We shall have to wait for confirmation. For  
the time being Saarbruecken is under Artille-  
ry fire.
- 10.) AGp. C. Draft plans for operations "Falke"  
etc. -- Reply.
- 11.) Summing up of observations at Gen. Staff  
Training Course, Dresden, Dresden Corps Hq.
- 12.) "Safety valve" question.
- 13.) Note for conference with Gehlen.
- 14.) Intensification of the "Containing attack"  
by AGp. C.
- 15.) Progress in construction of border fortifica-  
tions in territory of High Command East.

Chemical smoke demonstration, under Kuntze.

Muenstereifel \*.

Keitel.

24 February 1940.

Report to ObdH: ObdH. -- Tank ditch. -- Jews in territory of High Command East. Gehlen.  
We must hear Blaskowitz on the subject. -- Reply to Himmler.

High Command East Divs. as of May! Should they be replenished at once or one after the other? (Op. Sec.). Buhle.  
Sequence in which they are to be released by High Command East.

Industrial Guards will be organized by High Command East itself.

1100: Conference with the AGp. and Army Cs in C (simultaneously conference of Ia officers), Tirpitz-ufer.

Points discussed:

New assembly order to meet the changed situation.  
Regrouping and disposition of forces. Date for the completion of regrouping (7 Mar.).  
Training programs.  
Truck position.  
Subjects relating to Political Liaison Section.

C in C AGp. A is skeptical about the effectiveness of the Armd. wedge. Is afraid that the Second and Third Echelons would not be able to catch up.

Particulars:

- 1.) Command of the Armd. wedge: Form Group Manstein with small OQu Staff.  
Mot. Signal units for assault wedge?
- 2.) New Hq AGp. B probably at Duesseldorf.  
Op. Sec.
- 3.) Preparations must be made for construction of bridges. Jacob, Gercke.  
Busch thinks the bridges at Luxembourg border will be blown up. Military bridges with Construction Cims. must be readied.

- What is needed for these preparations? Check assembly. Op. Sec.
- 4.) Uniform leave regulations for spring sowing.  
Tng. Sec. with BdE. --
  - 5.) Horses in Hqs. \* Org. Sec. Central Branch  
Branch, Hq Comm.
  - 6.) Leeb: Draft plan for "containing attack" has  
been requested. Perhaps two Divs. needed.  
Artillery? Op. Sec.
  - 7.) Fuel insufficient for training program. Kuech-  
ler wants 400 cubic meter. \*\* Gen Qu. Tng.  
Sec.
  - 8.) Student: Cooperation in the preparation of  
the offensive not yet as it should be.  
Op. Sec.  
Kuechler has not yet been able to get hold of  
the man. \*\*\*
  - 9.) Divisions: Busch wants 58th again.  
Will in return send 72nd to Training Center.  
Op. Sec. Tng. Sec.  
Weichs wants to leave 87th in the Training  
Center a little longer (four weeks).
  - 10.) Personnel Div.: Siebert (Weichs) cannot get  
along with Austrians. Must be given a differ-  
ent Division. Weichs must get some German  
Officers for his Austrian Div. (Reserve Offi-  
cers). # Personnel Div.
  - 11.) 44th Div. is behind in its training program.  
Tng. Sec.
  - 12.) Air Support. We must specify our requirements  
to Air Force! (Get wishes of Army Gps.).  
Op. Sec.

New OKH Hq Fellgiebel:

- a) Fuehrer needs five lines for his Staff, Air  
Force also needs five. In all only 15 lines  
can be handled at Muenstereifel. It is  
simply impossible for OKH to direct opera-  
tions with only five lines.
- b) It would take eight weeks to prepare switch-  
over to a better signals network.
- c) Our recommendation: Advance along the cable  
of Pruem. Initial operations might be direct-  
ed from Giessen. Liaison Staff to Muenster-  
eifel.



1.) Op. Sec.: Check together with Signals Sec. on what we need for operations, and for Transp. Chief, and Gen Qu.

2.) Talk with Keitel.

3.) Give ObdH documentation for talk with Fuehrer.

Spicherer Heights: Reputed wishes of the Fuehrer? Materials and manpower requirements. Jacob - Gehlen. Talk with Keitel. -- Conference ObdH/Fuehrer.

Air-Ground identification? Progress made. Tng. Sec.  
Result of the conference Roehricht/Keitel. Material for Conference ObdH/Fuehrer.

Tng. Section: Organization of supervision of training programs. -- Question of Inspectorate General still open.

Wahn - Senne \*. Must be settled!

Chemical smoke demonstration by Kuntze.

Tng.  
Sec.

Political Liaison Sec.: A BdE order on church attendance is said to have been issued 10 days ago.  
"Safety valve" question not yet discussed.

OQu IV.

Org. Sec.: Question of creation of rank of "General der Panzertruppe" \*\* not yet decided. Org. Sec.

25 February 1940.

1015 Nolte calls up: Engel has told Siebert: Todt will fly to Euskirchen tomorrow, to look over the site.

1030 Appointment with E. Hermann (painter), Berlin W 35, Elsholzstrasse 16. Adjutant (Central Branch). Very good portrait of Ludendorff for General Staff. Mark 350. Portrait of Moltke (for Gen.Obst. Beck) not yet finished.

1130 Gen.Obst. Keitel: Euskirchen Hunting Lodge will serve as ~~Hq~~ Forward, eliminating the drawbacks of the Main Hq, which was organized on too large a scale (and moreover was not completed in time). Todt and Schmudt went to Felsennest \*\*\* the day before yesterday, to hear Fuehrer's wishes. Night before last Todt received orders in Munich to speed up work at Hunting Lodge so as to get the

house ready for the Fuehrer and his entourage (without Bormann, Foreign Minister etc.). The main house is to be supplemented by wooden barracks in the woods to ObdH's specifications. Todt will go there tomorrow to inspect the place. Wants an OKH representative to come along. OKH representative should specify number, kind and size of the accommodations (also what is needed for visitors, cars, telephones). Central Branch.

von Bock: 1230, at his home. Worries:

- 1.) Reichenau's Army is too weak to take advantage of its opportunities. In particular it needs more Armd. Divs. so as to be able to exploit a success at Maasticht or Maaseik.

Reply: Cannot be done. Giving R. the Armor would break up the concentration of the Armd. Echelon, as now planned; Armor would then have to be committed teamed up with Infantry.

Training: Combined exercises of Infantry and Armor.

Available immediately for close support, Twentieth Div. (mot.) and those elements for which Kuechler has no room at his front.

- 2.) Engineers and Artillery cannot be released without jeopardizing Reichenau's mission. (Op. Sec. must check whether and when new forces become available. Jacob: More needs to be done for construction of improvised bridges.)

- 3.) Replacements necessary for canceled two Divs. Bock now also wants to close up more compactly to the front and so make room in the rear for two additional Divs.

(Op. Sec. These two Divs. must be brought up. Consult with Eng. Sec. on locations. Divisions may remain GHq Reserve.)

von Brauchitsch 1300:

- 1.) Hq Forward: Purpose: To provide temporary accommodations for ObdH, Adjutant and Chief of the Gen. Staff with requisite staffs, (of about the strength planned for our Forward Echelon in two railroad trains), together with motor vehicles, and servicing facilities. Needed also such landing facilities and signal communications, that would ensure dependable liaison between Hq Forward and Transp. Chief, through Giessen. Central Branch.



2.) Preparations must be made for a Hq in the Pruem area, since Muenstereifel will be useful only for a short time.

3.) Sodenstern:

- a) Keep a tight rein on Kluge! He wants to be "out of reach" for his Army Gp.
- b) Location of next GHq.
- c) Who is to command the Armor wedge: Manstein, Kleist, Weichs?? Ch.

4.) Fuel: We must be a little less stringent now. Gen Qu.

armd. Divs. have been reassigned and must be broken in. New Div. Commanders! Hoepfner and Guderian must make sure that Div. Commanders conduct exercises on Div. level. Tng. Sec.

5.) Something must be done about reconnaissance on the AGp. boundaries. It must not occur again that the AGps. lack a unified view of the situation. Op. Sec. OQu I.

6.) Viebahn - Witzleben. 257th Inf. Div. (III Corps) against 263rd (Kuehne) or 216th (Boettcher) or 211th (Renner). Ch.

1530 Lt. Col. von Ziehlberg, briefing on his scouting job at Muenstereifel.

26 February 1940.

Roehricht: Training questions.

Greiffenberg:

- 1.) a) 350 to 400 men are standing by in two groups at Graillsheim \*. Will go to Pittsburg on A - 1 Day. Their mission is to open the way for XIX Corps west of Bastogne. Fieseler Storch \*\* planes \*\*\*! Talk with Waldau. ObdH.
- b) Sixteenth Army wants to take care of its flank cover itself, with Advance Combat Team, but the Fuehrer wants Storch planes to be employed also in that sector.

2.) Missions of Operational Air Force on A-Day.

X-Hour - 20 to X-Hour over enemy air force targets (operational airfields).

One-third of our entire Force will be committed as previously announced. From X-Hour to X plus 120 minutes, German AAA will hold fire (returning planes).

X-Hour plus 180 minutes, a second large-scale effort possible, in direct support of ground operations (against British!).

Group Richthofen, cooperating with Sixth Army, will not be included in this plan.

X-Hour to X plus 60 minutes, all German fighter planes over Luxembourg, to provide escort for the returning first wave of bombers and to repel attacks on Guderian.

Buhle: a) Training program in the East has been started; date set for termination much too late. Number of recruits too small to justify such a long training schedule. ObdH wants termination end of April. BdE has been informed.

b) Reorganization of the Landwehr Divs. \* on the whole completed.

c) Transfers of the Regional Defense Div. will last into April.

d) Austrian Regional Defense units! Officers must be switched.

e) Regional Defense Regts. must be grouped according to the Corps Hqs which activate them.

f) Polish Peasant Cart Clms. -- Local assignments, to Landwehr Divs.

g) Offensive front: Officers position bad, save in First Draft Divs. Few new officer candidates. Officer candidates for Infantry and Artillery \*\*! ObdH.

General Mieth: a) Bridges across Our and Saar rivers.  
b) Forward shift to Mayen.  
c) Order to revise plans for Southeast and Caucasus.

Falkenhorst (Buschenhagen): Reports on mission (operation "Weseruebung"). He wants Mt. Troops.  
ObdH.

I request early specifications on a) Strength, b) assembly area, c) time when the troops are needed.

One report is that the troops should be readied immediately. (That is different from what Greifenberg told me.) Op. Sec.

Marginal note: presumably entered 1 March: /  
Promise to get in touch with us before drawing up of requisition was not kept. 1 March.

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) 15 Corps Artillery Commanders, 8 Regimental Staffs.
- 2.) Armd. Forces Chief. Thoma. Keitel: -  
Yes.
- 3.) "Inspectors" (Maschik, Schwandner, Koch, Biegeleben).
- 4.) Maschik. For Maschik: Boehm-Tettelbach.
- 5.) Special training program for officers replacements (men with three years' service). --  
New school.
- 6.) Bridges across Our river (Mieth, drawing).  
Pictures!
- 7.) Deliveries of equipment to foreign countries (56 pack radio transmitters). Must be taken from frontline troops.
- 8.) New OKH Hq.
- 9.) 40 cm and 38 cm Guns between Saar and Moselle.
- 10.) Supply organization for attached Air Force units.
- 11.) Commander of Armd. wedge.
- 12.) Spicherer heights.

Map of Divisions. Check list of Divisions.

Southeast study.

Fellgiebel:

- 1.) ObdH, with Liaison Staff, must be near the Fuehrer. Fuehrer's decision.
- 2.) "Promotes" Mayen for OQu I, OQu IV, Signals, Central branch. (Wittlich for AGp. A: Bad Bertrich for Second Air Fleet.) Claims it could be done in two weeks.



Says he has: 4 telephone and 2 teletype lines, to each AGp.  
 4 telephone and 2 teletype lines, to each Army.  
 12 telephone and 6 teletype lines, to the rear.  
 4 telephone and 2 teletype lines, to Muenstereifel.

3.) Pruem.

4.) Hq Forward: 5 trunk lines to Giessen for us, several connections with local network.

5.) Italy was given French cipher code by Canaris; in return we must demand intelligence material from the Mediterranean.

von Greiffenberg: Set-up of an Armd. Command Hq could be constituted as follows:

One Corps Hq (with Signal Bn.): Special Radio Cos. from several GHq units, for radio and field trunk cable.

XXII Corps (Kleist)? Behind it only I Corps. -- Reinhard (XXXX Corps) main Echelon, Schmidt (XXXIX Corps). Guderian in command.\* ObdH.

Goettke: Metz! Who has asked for that?

2,500 workers must now be put to work in our own territory, which was evacuated at the request of AGp. A.

Goettke - Jacob - Toholte - Gehlen:

1.) 40 cm and 38 cm Guns between the Saar and Moselle (Metz). 38 cm Guns northeast of Saarbruecken. For action in central sector of our front.

2.) Construction work for the time being only on ammunition storage and gun platforms. 60 cm thick, 8 m long.

First gun emplacement ready by middle of August, then one more each half month.

Jacob: 1.) Saarbruecken - Spicherer Heights.

2.) Bridges over our river. Military bridges. - Improvised bridges. (Have them checked up front).

3.) Readyng of Bridge Clms.: three horse-drawn, six no traction, three more coming.

Keitel OKW on phone: Confusion about Spicherer Heights, caused by phone talk Jodl with AGp. C. Bad business \*.

Gehlen: Spicherer Heights. -- Anti-tank ditch in the East. -- Allocation of the Construction Bns.

OQu IV: Welles wants to form a block of neutrals if his peace mission fails.

Papen: France wants to relieve Finland by an attack on Baku (!) Turks will not agree.

Bruns: Spanish report on alleged low morale in France.

Question of the exchange of codes with Italy.

Exchange of material on Yugoslavia with Hungary disapproved.

Bircher - Kylander. German - Swiss doctors on our Western front.

Notes:

Gen Qu: If mission of Sixth Army is altered, could they do without some of their Supply Clms.?

Org. Sec. 15 Corps Artillery Commanders, 8 Regtl. Artillery Commanders. At what time intervals?

Tng. Sec.: Officer candidate Schools for three year NCOs.

Org. Sec.: XXXVII Corps Hq (reduced) (Raschik) will get new CG, will relieve IX Corps. ObdH.

Schwandner and Raschik, Generals on special assignment, for Training. Get them an Adjutant and a clerk each!

27 February 1940.

Chief of Tng. Sec.: / No entry. /

ObdH: 1.) Falkenhorst.  
2.) Timetable OKW.  
3.) Hq Forward Muenstereifel.  
3.) /sic/ Artillery: Start at once with "Blau", collect new data for "Rot". \*\*



- 4.) Air Reconnaissance. Not for Fuehrer report.  
5.) von Rundstedt. Guderian or Kleist?  
Schmidt must get ready soon.  
6.) Air-ground identification.  
1.) Zone where Air Force will fire )  
on anything. ) Tng.  
2.) Zone where troops must identify ) Sec.  
themselves. )  
7.) Raschik/Boehm-Tettelbach. IX Corps must be  
freed for other duties.  
8.) Raschik free for Training. ) Fixed loca-  
tions! \*  
Schwandner for Training. ) Ask Fromm  
whether he  
wants to give  
us Divisions  
Heinrich for Training. ) now in process  
of acti-  
vation.  
Tng. Sec.  
9.) Officer replacements: Start program in  
Seventh Army. /Two words illegible/ \*\*  
High Command East. Personnel Div. Has orders.  
Tng. Sec.  
10.) Sketch of the Meuse position.  
11.) Zossen Troop Training Center? Tng. Sec.  
BdE.  
12.) Decree on horses. Has no implementation  
annex.

Buhle: Olbricht.

more Chem. Mortar Bns.; one more by 1 June. In their place we must defer the two Decontamination Bns., which will not be ready before August, unless they also become Chem. Mortar Bns.

- 4.) Mt. Artillery. Recommendation of XVIII Corps. Two lt. Fd. How. for each Mt. Arty. Bn.

Sodenstern: Hq with many Signal Bns. and large OQu Section (Specialist for Kleist).

Greiffenberg: Armd. Wedge. -- Follow up Echelon (accommodations). -- Demands on Air Force.

Salmuth (Mieth):

- a) Difficulties about Liège. No change!  
XVII Corps Hq under Army Gp.? No!
- b) Map maneuvers, with observers from the Armies.

Sodenstern: Solution for Kleist (Zeitzler). ObdH.

Jacob: Todt has been boasting about 500 tons of steel. Fuehrer "100% behind him".  
Jodl will speak to the Fuehrer again and explain the situation. Should the Fuehrer persist, Jodl will consult us before anything is done.  
ObdH.

28 February 1940.

Wagner: Hq for Armd. Wedge.  
Allocation of supply units for the Assault Forces.  
Reduction of Clms., and other current matters.

Smoke!

Liège XVII Corps?  
Engineer Siege Park.

OQu IV: Disposition of French Forces. -- Position north of the Meuse. -- French invite Swiss for an inspection tour of the Maginot Line.

Matschinsky: Golden service anniversary.

Kahlden: Consultation with Jauer brings out that activating the 15 Corps Artillery Hqs will be no trouble at all, if some personnel is transferred from the Dresden Training Courses.  
Org. Sec.

Report from AGps. B and A that Goering has requested the two Cs in C to see him in his special train at Koblenz on Wednesday night. ObdH is getting in touch with the Adjutant's Office of ObdL about this matter.

Greiffenberg, Roehricht, Buhle: Air - Ground identification. Supervision of training outside the Army area. Chemical smoke exercise. -- Horses and truck problems. -- Industrial Guards East.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

29 February 1940.

Keitel (Pers. Div.) on phone: Regarding Commander of the Armd. Wedge.

Konrad: Length of training periods. -- 46th Div./Siebert. Hq XVII Corps opposes Weichs' viewpoint.

Siewert: a) Fuehrer agrees to Kleist. Are we going to be ready by 7 March?  
b) Felber has called up Jodl about Spicherer Heights.

Salmuth wants two Divs. and one Corps Hq behind his front on the second day at the latest for the thrust to Breda.

Notes for ObdH:

- 1.) Felsenest. Godesberg instead of Mayen.
- 2.) Projected disposition of forces; material Op. Sec.

AGp. B. To Duesseldorf.

Orders: Twentieth mot. Div. in place of First Armd. Div. (4 March).  
225th Div. (Senne) into area of Twentieth mot. Div.; Dortmund (4 March).  
Two Divs. of GHq Reserve around Luedenscheid, Hagen and to the east. (225th Div., Bautzen, 223rd Div., Posen.)  
Ninth Armd. Div. for Eighth Div. 7 March noon.  
SS Regt. Adolf Hitler goes to SS Div.

AGp. A: First Armd. Div. into area of Second mot.:  
First Echelon: 4 March, evening.



Sixth Armd. Div. into area of Thirteenth  
 mot.: Second Echelon. 3 March  
 Second mot. Div. into area of 29th mot.:  
 Second Echelon. 3 March  
 Thirteenth mot. Div. and 29th mot. Div.:  
 Third Echelon. Ready 1 March  
 Swap Ninth Armd. Div. for Eighth Armd. Div.  
 Completed 7 March  
 noon.

- 3.) What are the subjects of the Koblenz talks?  
 Sodenstern plans map maneuver. (Advance  
 movement.)  
 Subsequently Mieth (Meuse crossing).
- 4.) Beyer's letter. -- Coordination of studies on  
 means of attack against permanent fortifica-  
 tions. Is anxious to tell us about his obser-  
 vations on troops in the Westerwald. Inform  
 Weichs!
- 5.) New man in place of Siebert, 46th Div. Krie-  
 bel recommended by Pers. Div., is better!
- 6.) Report that Fieldmarshal has ordered the  
 Custom Guards on the Luxembourg frontier to  
 remove the road blocks. \*
- 7.) Raschik - Geyer - Kleist. See Appendix \*\*.   
 Will be signed before 5 March, noon.
- 8.) AGp. B. Gripes about  
 a) Liège and XVII Corps.  
 b) the two Divs. (are already there)  
 and Corps Hq.  
  
AGp. A. Gripes about  
 a) Armd. Wedge.  
 b) XVIII Corps does not want to go  
 up front.
- 9.) Railroad position has improved: Train back-  
 log less than 200. Car backlog.
- 10.) Spicherer Heights - Todt (OKH will be consult-  
 ed before Fuehrer issues order). Gehlen.
- 11.) Tng. Course for Btry. and Co. COs. Submit ta-  
 bulation. See Appendix \*\*\*
- 12.) Hq for Kleist. Kretschmer, OQu for Kleist.  
 Successor for Pamberg (replaced by Spitzer,  
 Ib, 33rd Div.).
- 13.) Glaise-Horstenau?

14.) Liaison Officers.

15.) Operation "Weseruebung".

Osterkamp, 1 March, 1300 at office, Luetzowuefer 7.  
1 - 1½ hours.

1 March 1940.

von Greiffenberg: Received from OKW: Order to contribute for Operation "Weseruebung": One Corps Hq (reduced), one Mt. Div. (of two Regts.), four Divs., two AA Bns.. (mot), 10 med. Btrys., etc.

Go to Berlin:

Canaris: a) Radke - SD? \*  
b) /Entry in longhand (two names?) rendered thoroughly illegible. - Ed. \_/

Jacob: a) Nobody is interested any more in heavy Artillery emplacement constructions.  
Construction takes 2½ months, mounting of guns also 2 ½ months.  
b) Spicherer Heights.

Rabenau: Danzig: 80 carloads. \*\*

ObdH: 1.) Suggest Felsennest to Godesberg and Godesberg to Felsennest. \*\*\*  
Pruem quite apart.

2.) Scandinavia.

3.) Request SS for Arnheim, unless there are reasons which preclude inclusion in line-up.

4.) Wants report from Army Gps. why his orders are not carried out.

5.) Goering. No action taken.

6.) Voelklingen.

7.) Kretschmer.

8.) Glaise -- Take him over from OKW --.

9.) Roving inspectors (combing out of horses):  
Job for Bn. Commanders not needed elsewhere.



Order to Zieger: Order on training courses conducted by Div. Vet. Officers.  
Courses in the Divisions: Vet. Officers, on feeding of horses: all the rest, by officers. The same in Replacement Army.

- a) OQu cannot issue any training orders.
- b) Vet. Officers would be put in charge of matters which were always kept out of their hands.

Greiffenberg: "Weseruebung".

Proposed: Kaupisch with part of the Hq. (Replacements must be found.)  
SS Deathhead Division (instead of Pol. Div., plus 2 AA Bns. mot. and one Eng. mot. and MT Regt.).  
No! Fuehrer wants ordinary Division.  
Three Czech Armd. Trains.  
Eleventh mot. Brig. (ready 5 March).  
Divisions: Third Mt. Div., two-thirds of 22nd Div., 69th Div., 212th Div., 196th Div. (Danzig) will be ready later.  
Message from Fuehrer Chancellery: Fuehrer does not want to take 22nd Div. away from the Dutch front.  
Does not want the Deathhead Div. in Holland. \*

Mueller - Weinknecht: Order on training of horses.  
(Zieger). Talk with ObdH on the subject.

2 March 1940.

Ott: Reports on his promotion to Gen. Lt.  
Submits Training Instruction: "Manual for Training in Permanent Combat Installations".  
Ammunition carriers for heavy Inf. Gun SPM.

Wuestefeld: Ruling on demarcation and jurisdiction of "Hq Lower Rhine" in operation "Gelb".

von Etzdorf: Scandinavian questions.

Buhle / Schell:

- a) By end of March, trucks for all newly activated units. (How about Eighth Draft?)
- b) By end of April, 10,000 - 12,000 trucks for the Army, so that in April about 2,000 can be turned over to the Field Army.  
Subsequent development cannot be calculated.

Status reports:

- a) Complaints about trucks are growing less.
- b) AGp. C is complaining about gaps in personnel replacements.
- c) High Command East will organize Industrial Guards in the East.
- d) First bridge launchers \* for First Armd. Div.
- e) Two GHq 4.7 cm AT \*\* have received no travelling trolleys. \*\*\*
- f) Static troops for the Upper Rhine cannot arrive before end of March.

Personnel of OKH Sections:

Sixt. -- Buhle wants to become C of S #. -- Haas, Corps Ia? -- Foertsch, II Corps? -- Petzold, substitute 4 - 6 weeks. Central Branch.

Radke.

- Gen Qu:
- a) AGp. A. Everything ready as regards stockpiles and transport. Ammunition, fuel, traffic control, food, medical service, MT service: will be controlled by the Armies themselves.
  - b) Operation "Weseruebung": Mountain equipment. -- Supply.
  - c) At present not fit for movement: 207th Div., two lt. Artillery Bns. (Osnabrueck), stranglers (Substitute prepared for movement). One med. Artillery Bn., Senne, also stranglers (but apparently will be all right soon).
  - d) Fieldpost Collecting Centers.

- OQu IV:
- a) Wahle. Frictions with Envoy.
  - b) Sumner Welles: Economic peace.
  - c) Roessing in need of a rest.

Canaris: 1800, today or tomorrow.

von Brauchitsch - Keitel: Keitel wants good troops. Has doubts about SS Deathhead. von Brauchitsch does not want to release SS Regt. ## Points out that 20% of our GHq Reserves are tied down, as it is. ###

Decision by ObdH:

- a) Denmark: Kaupisch and one Radio Co. Hamburg. 170th Div. (now in Muenster) Jutland. Muenster.

Transportation for one Regt. Muenster. Mot.  
MG. Bn.

Eleventh mot. Brig. Fuenen (now in Altengrabow) and 1 MG Bn. ready to start from Altengrabow 5 March.

Mixed Armd. Group (one Co. of Ninth Armd. Div., one Co. of Seventh Armd. Div., one Co. of Armor Training School, School Hq).

163rd Div. (Doeberitz) Zealand. Remains at Doeberitz.

Three (new) Armd. Trains. Railroad District Hamburg.  
Field-Signal Hq.

Naval Hq, Wesermuende.  
Kaupisch, Hamburg.  
Falkenhorst, Luebeck.  
Air Hq, Hamburg.

- b) Norway. Third Mt. Div. must move into Nauen area, Hq at Doeberitz.

69th Div. (Oslo) Gross-Born. Remains at Gross-Born.

196th Reserve Div. remains at Danzig. Danzig.

Six med. Btrys., 10 cm Czech. (729th and 730th Bns., Asch, will become ready this month) for coast defense.

Field Signal Commander.  
Radio Co.  
Supply Services.

Rcn. Staffel. No decision yet.

Ground-air identification: Fuehrer makes positive air identification of ground troops mandatory at all times.

Boundaries of "identification Zone" must be defined by OKH in consultation with Air Force.

Kriebel reports impressions on his tour in Holland.



# WAR JOURNAL

Instructors Reading this Document  
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OF

FRANZ HALDER

War journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder,  
Chief of the General Staff of Supreme  
Command of the German Army (OKH), Vol IV.  
Historical Division, SSUSA. 10 May 40 -  
30 Oct 40.

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## Volume IV

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**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL**  
**OF**  
**GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER**

**Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

**14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942**

**VOLUME IV**



# CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

VOLUME IV.

THE CAMPAIGN IN FRANCE.

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

First entry: 10 May 1940

Last entry : 30 October 1940

\* \* \* \* \*

10 May 1940.

9 May 1940, 1800: Leaving Zossen by special train for Godesberg. Accompanied by Greiffenberg, Heusinger, Liss, Thiele, Nolte, and the advance party.

2215 Nordhausen: Telephone signal "Danzig",\* Nothing else happens.

10 May, about 0500: Arrived at Godesberg; about 0600, at Felsennest; overtook marching columns, good marching discipline.

About 0700: First reports:

- a) "Trojan Horse" did not succeed; Nijmegen bridge destroyed,\*\* Gennep bridge undamaged.
- b) Roermond and Maasijk bridges destroyed. Bridges at Lanaeken and Canne (north and south of Maastricht) destroyed. Status of bridges at Veldwezelt and Vroenhoven still uncertain.
- c) XXVII Corps reports: Belgians were alerted around 0300, telephone warning net in operation shortly after 0500. Dutch apparently were taken by surprise.
- d) Sixteenth Army reports: Border bridges were captured by 0535, according to plan. Only slight resistance. Detonations can be heard from further inland.

About 0800: Maerdiijk bridge reported in our hands.

About 1000 Report that Luxembourg RR station was seized at 0815; line serviceable on two tracks. Group Kleist apparently continues advance according to plan. Fourth Army advancing according to plan. Road blocks numerous, but unmanned.

Maastricht, all bridges blown up. Order to Sixth Army to force crossing. Attacks against our paratroops at canal bridges. Airborne landings in Fortress Holland seem to proceed according to plan.

About 1100: Message from Sperrle\*: Guderian, with advance elements, reported near Bastogne. No troop movements have been observed in Belgium, neither in northern nor eastern direction.

1300 Roehricht instructed to ascertain whereabouts of First Mt. Div.

1400 Good progress of Eighteenth Army, satisfactory progress of Sixth and Fourth Armies. Group Kleist seems to be getting on well.

1800 OQu IV confirms earlier reports. Some Belgian units along Meuse raising white flags. Meuse reported crossed south of Eben-Emael.

1830 ObdH. I ask him to see the Fuehrer to get Air Force support.

1845 Talk with Waldau: AGp. B has contacted Kesselring requesting night air interdictions of enemy motorized movements. Not the business of OKW! Night reconnaissance has been provided over roads leading to front.  
AGp. A: Sperrle has moved most of his fighters to forward fields enabling him to operate beyond Meuse. Intention to pound the roads leading from Châlons area westward toward Meuse river tomorrow.

Airborne landing in Holland: Center of operation Rotterdam-Moerdijk, two regiments landed.

Dijon as well as Lyon purely Air Force targets.

1900 Roehricht: First Mt. Div. resting near Pruem during afternoon, continues movement in direction of Houffalize at 2000, scheduled to arrive at right wing of III Corps by tomorrow. In continuous contact with Corps to insure uninterrupted flow of movement.

2000 OQu IV reports (Op. Off. and ObdH present): OQu IV must find out what enemy is moving into Belgium. Have any troop movements started?

Reports of Op. Sec. show that all Corps of AGp. A have fairly well closed to Kleist. Excellent marching! 269th Div. has crossed Meuse and Canal south of Eben-Emael. Success of Sixth Army thus gains satisfactory width at decisive point.

Important: Keep pushing left wing of Sixth Army! Enemy retreating from Liège must be cut off. Get on with right wing of Fourth Army. Don't wheel on Liège too soon.

Decisions: Eleventh Mot. Brig. into area west of Dillenburg. 32nd Div. to proceed westward after arrival near Frankfurt.

No decision yet: Attacks "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau"\*\*, probably A plus 2.

Fuehrer (through ObdH): Il Duce reacted very warmly to news of attack. Promises intensified step-up of mobilization and arms production. Navy will move by the end of this month. Everything else to be speeded up.

2000 Bogatsch: Digest of air observations: Enemy massing motorized forces between Valenciennes and Hirson on both sides of Sambre river. This may be interpreted as preparation for a drive on both sides of Sambre. Particularly strong concentration near Maubeuge; tanks.

Enemy intelligence: Only Dutch Fifth and Sixth Divs. and Brig. B. in reported areas. In the evening, mot. movement of enemy from Douai toward Brussels.

11 May 1940.

Evening and morning reports on the whole corroborate satisfactory picture developing yesterday.

Moot points: Eighteenth Army: Why have tanks not been committed? Why has SS Deathhead been kept so far in rear? Why is Army Hq way back in Wesel?

Kleist: Behavior of left wing of Tenth Armd. Div. Probably due to anxieties about left flank.

Gratifying: Forward surge of Inf., in particular marching and fighting of III Corps. Sixteenth Army moving fast into line; offensive intentions against enemy forward of Maginot Line.

Unclear: Situation of 22nd Airborne Div.

Conference with ObdH: Wants to put steam behind AGp.A. (AGp. reports: advance very difficult on account of numerous road demolitions.) I am prodding Eighteenth Army. (Army reports that Peel Line was breached at 0830; Ninth Armd. Div. is heading for Breda after crossing Gennep bridge at 0800; SS Div. following behind.)

Chief Air Officer again requested to get us clear picture of situation of 22nd Div. All we know is that two reinf. Bns. of 22nd Div., put down north of Rotterdam, are encircled by enemy. Have radio contact. Ammunition and reinforcements are being dropped continuously. No clear picture of situation south of Rotterdam.

Chief Eng. Officer is instructed to relieve tight bridge situation in AGp. B sector at the earliest and to give all possible help.

About 1100 Enemy moving toward line Libramont - Neufchateau - Tintigny opposite our XIX Corps, also in direction of Ypres - Tournai (apparently Second Wave).

Wilke: Situation of airborne troops: On landing grounds Katwyk, Kijkduin and Ieppenburg the following units have landed in first echelon:

47th Inf. Regt.: Hqs 13th, 14th Cos., III Bn. (less one Co.).  
65th Inf. Regt.: Hqs 1st, 4th Cos. (parts), II Bn. (without 7th Co.).  
(46th Inf. Div.) 72nd Inf. Regt.: 2 Cos.  
21 Art. Regt.: Hq.

22 Eng. Bn.: 1 Platoon.  
22nd Sig. Bn.: Hq.  
22nd Rcn. Bn., 2 Troops.

In addition: 2nd Bn., 2nd Parachute Regt., and 1 Co. of 1st Bn.

Have radio contact. Second Air Fleet assisted by Putzier (z.b.V.).  
"Dispatching of additional elements is under consideration".  
(Condition of landing fields?)

1500 Sizable British troop movement through Antwerp reported in direction of Breda and Tilburg.

1545 von Salmuth talked to ObdH; Enemy columns at Breda and Tilburg, and east of Turnhout, at 1400.

Eighteenth Army:

Ninth Armd. Div. at Vechel (on Canal), Marcks hopes to get through. SS at Gennep.  
XXVI Corps drives on to Wilhelmina Canal; eleven bridges across Meuse!

Sixth Army:

Fourth Armd. Div. at Tongeren, 1200.  
Third Armd. Div. crossing at Maastricht, 1600.  
IV Corps, with 35th, Eighteenth, Seventh Divs. will attack across Canal 1600 - 1700.  
XI Corps advancing toward Hasselt - Hechtel Highway. No bridging equipment!  
IX Corps, right wing at Asten, left wing has passed through Weert.  
Air Force in action against British.

1600 Corps Schmidt placed under Eighteenth Army.

1630: a) Reports of British movements in direction Fortress Holland have not been confirmed. Positive reports on columns moving toward Roosendaal which were attacked from the air.

b) Bogatsch (through Mieth): Concentration north of Moerdijk dispersed by air action. Moerdijk. securely in our hands. Situation stabilized with exception of direction Antwerp; protected by Canal position.

c) 22nd Div. in dunes west of Leiden, southwest of The Hague, west and southwest of Delft. Area Delft - Rotterdam: attempt will be made to put down additional troops this afternoon.

1740 Fuehrer visit at GHq. Review of situation until 2000. Pleased with success, expects attack from south.

2230: Gen Qu: reports good development. Losses slight. Supply situation good. Luxembourg and Alzette Valley railroads in operation with eighteen trains. Luxembourg taken over by German Administration. Expenditure of ammunition low, fuel consumption normal.

2300 Gehlen reports on Sixteenth Army.



2330 Reports of British landings in Schelde estuary and at Den Helder.  
(At Den Helder apparently evacuation of refugees.)

12 May 1940. (Whitsunday)

Morning reports show further extension of objectives attained. Picture of enemy movements: Enemy moving troops out of Holland in direction of Broda, apparently on account of damage in Antwerp Tunnel, east of Antwerp. Since Tilburg is already in our hands, these forces will not accomplish a great deal.

East of French border we assume presence of between 12 and 15 British and French Divs., which are probably approaching Dyle and Meuse positions.

No major railroad movements have been observed. Enemy Air Force shows surprising lack of activity.

Orders: SS Deathhead forward to Cologne. All available Corps Hqs. closer to the front.

1100 Talk with Jodl: Movements of AA Corps must come under control of AGp. Hqs.

1200 Gereke: Railroad plan discussed. Speeding up of movement \*Zigarre!

Felber: Which Corps Hq can AGp. offer for relief? Felber states: XXX Corps.

Wagner: Supply situation in Sixth Army. I release MT. Bn. (GHq Reserve) for Sixth Army.

von Gyldenfeldt: Reports that Tenth Armd. Div., contrary to orders by Group Kleist, has swerved northward, possibly shying away from enemy tanks reported to the south. Present location behind First and Second Armd. Divs. interferes with their movements.

Group Kleist believes that tanks could have advanced faster if they had not had to wait for Inf. to close up. Attacks should have been accompanied by Armd. Inf. Brigs.

Buhle: Order regarding activation of new Parachute Regt. for Air Force.

Six Btrys. of 163rd Div. (equipment only) will be released from Norway. Will be allocated to 197th and 168th Divs. (Seventh Draft) in order to bring Bn. strength up to three Btrys. (25 May)

Light Inf. Columns and Arty. Ammo. Columns to BdE for new activations. Supply Service will be left to Gen Qu. Twenty-five Regional Defense Bns. will be ready on 25 May.

Fellgiebel: Report on signal communications.

1740 Jakob: Bridge position in AGp. B:

Eighteenth Army according to plan.

Sixth Army is across Albert Canal. Each Corps has several bridges: IV Corps, 3 bridges; XI Corps, two bridges; IX Corps, all they need.

Waeger has lost much bridging equipment. Scheduled to proceed toward Namur; has only two ferries left; will get help from Bonn Equipment Reserve Depot. (Can keep until Friday, then returns equipment.)

Improvised bridges across Meuse will be ready by Monday evening. Beginning Tuesday, Army Hq bridging equipment will again be available for reassignment.

Maastricht: Heavy damage by enemy air action. Large ponton bridge not at Maastricht but Visé.

Evening Conference with ObdH: Situation. -- Moving up of reserves. -- Railroads -- Bridge position at Meuse. -- Thoma's mission. -- Brand's mission.

von Salmuth (through OQu IV): Reports that contact has been established at Libramont, at 1904. Movements from Metz and northwest toward Charleville. Seventh Armd. Div. reached Dinant; Bioul on west side of Meuse, western bridge in Godinne reported in our hands. Fourth Armd. Div. reported to have reached Andenne.

von Salmuth 2130:

a) No decision yet on direction of new drive of Ninth Armd. Div. Depends on situation estimate of CG. Eighteenth Army. von Bock contemplates ordering Ninth Armd. Div. to turn and drive in direction Antwerp, etc., with flank covered by SS Div. This would enable three Divs. to follow penetration of Armd. Div. into Fortress Holland. Three Divs., SS included, could move toward the Schelde estuary and cover flank against Antwerp.

b) Noordwijk reached at 1825; Armd. Bn. sent as reinforcement.

c) Unconfirmed reports of landing of naval vessels at Noordwijk.

d) Reichenau has clashed with French tanks (First Mcz. Div.) near Hannut; intends driving on Gembloux tomorrow.

e) Four thousand prisoners taken.

2245 Wagner: Supplies moving smoothly. Not worried either about tanks; XVI Corps has received 30 tons of fuel by air.

Casualties: 7 officers and 74 men killed, 419 wounded, 19 missing.

Expenditure of ammunition: Light. Consumption of fuel: 1 fuel quota.

Prisoners: About 4,000.

Military Administration: Establishment of Mil. Government: Regional Hq Schreiber, Groningen area; five Regional Defense Bns., 14 May.

Regional Hq v. Claer, South Holland, 14 May.

Attitude of population varies. Most mayors accept situation.

15 May Military Government Luxembourg; Regional Hq, Commandant Guthmann. Secretary General Wehrer (formerly envoy to Berlin) has taken over civil administration.

v. Brauchitsch - v. Bock: Decision has been taken to attack Fortress Holland from the south. Attacking force: Ninth Armd. Div. plus two Inf. Divs.; flank cover against Antwerp: SS Div. plus two Inf. Divs.

AGp. C has scored gains in attacks near Saarbruecken and southwest of Zweibruecken, but suffered about 800 casualties. About 600 prisoners taken from three different Divs.

13 May 1940.

Morning reports: Most important: Elements of the Seventh French Army, identified northeast of Antwerp, are reported to have mission of keeping areas open for slowly arriving bulk of army. It may be assumed that Seventh Army includes also the British elements around Antwerp.

Reports of railroad movements from the direction of Charleroi toward the Wavre - Mons Gap seem to confirm reported nearing of French First Army.

That would indicate that French Ninth Army has the mission of holding Meuse south of Namur, between First and Second Armies.

Our movements are developing as planned. It remains to be clarified how Fourth Army will carry out its mission to reduce Fortress Holland. First, they would have to enter Rotterdam and then best follow up with Amsterdam - Utrecht.

There is nothing to worry about from direction Antwerp. Here Eighteenth Div. has enough depth against the unlikely contingency of a counter-offensive at this time. Right wing of Sixth Army can be safely stretched a little by extending it southward toward left wing.

Report of crossing at Yvoir, south of Namur, has not been confirmed. On the other hand, Seventh Army has got across near Dinant. Bridge destroyed. Left wing of Fourth Army still weak (32nd Div.). <sup>18</sup>

Right flank of Twelfth Army somewhat dangling in the air. Gap to Fourth Army still open, XVIII Corps has not yet moved in. Group Kleist bunched together near Sedan, intends attacking at 1600. Plan of attack rather complicated.

Sixteenth Army has made very good advance; right wing is already at Meuse river with sufficient depth.

Of our reserves, Eleventh Mot. Brig. and 94th Div. are being moved more closely behind AGp. A.

German flag reported to be flying over Liège citadel.

OQu IV: Allied pressure on Ankara to induce Turkey to break off relations with us. Allied Fleet put out from Alexandria on 10 May, with northern course. British Government demands cession of Spanish territory in order to be able to close Mediterranean (20 km on Mediterranean, 10 km on Atlantic side).

Gen Qu: Expenditure of ammunition moderate; fuel: one quota per day. Combat casualties light, but large number of march casualties.

Animal diseases: 216th Div. fit to move; 96th Div. same; 78th Div. (equine influenza) immobilized until 18 May.

Transport Colms.: Weingart Columns: 35 will be ready by 20 May. Send ready portions ahead. (Order!) Additional formations by end of month.

Administration in Holland and Luxembourg beginning to function. No guerrilla activities.

von Brauchitsch calling from AGp. A: Exchange of information; nothing of importance.

AGp. A: Patrol activities have had little success. British very tough. We have impression that French denuded Maginot Line of most of artillery, now firing from line far to the rear.

1330 Paulus reports: First French Mcz. Div. south of Turnhout. In Diest - Tirlemont area several British artillery groups. Heavy flooding. Orders: concentrate XI Corps at Diest; Thirty-first Div. joins drive of IV Corps on Tirlemont; XVI Corps (Third Armd. Div., Fourth Armd. Div., 35th Inf. Div. and 30th mot. Div.) to the south of IV Corps as directed, and 269th Div. to the south of XVI.  
Liège: situation fine. 223rd Div. is already fighting within outer defense belt.

von Greiffenberg: Situation of Eighteenth Army developing according to plan. Parts of Army moving to the west, south of Waal river, others, to the north, through Rotterdam.

OQu IV: Air reports received throughout day, some delayed, show:

- a) Prearranged troop and supply movements of the Seventh French Army and at least parts of the British Army in the Brussels - Antwerp area started Friday night, continued through Saturday and Sunday. Upon arrival of the bulk of these armies, estimated to have strength of about sixteen mot. Divs., Mcz. Divs. will be moved forward on the Antwerp - Namur line. Identified: three French Mcz. Divs. and one British group, the latter east of Louvain.
- b) First French Div. has been moving toward line Namur - Brussels since Saturday - Sunday; this movement for the most part will be completed by today.
- c) Toward line Namur-Sedan-Carignan only local closing movements reported; they may represent build-up of some reserves behind Meuse.
- d) In area Dijon-Troyes-Nancy, preparations reported allow various interpretations. Rolling stock for two to three divisions.

My estimate of the situation: In the area north of Namur we are now confronted with a completed build-up, comprising approximately 24 British and French, and about 15 Belgian Divs. Against these forces we can put up 15 Divs. in line and six Divs. in reserve, a total of 21 (which, if necessary, can be reinforced from the depth of Eighteenth Army). M plus 3! We are strong enough to fight off any enemy attack. No need to bring up any more forces.

An offensive mounted by us now would not produce anything apart from gaining ground for Hoepfner.

South of Namur we are faced with a weaker enemy, about half our strength. Outcome of Meuse drive will decide, if, when, and where we would be able to take advantage of this superiority. The enemy has no substantial mobile forces in the rear of this front, no more than three Armd. Divs. at best, but he does have a very well-integrated railroad system.

Goth (Liaison Off., Fourth Army) reports on Fourth Army situation. Moving up of III and II Corps to Meuse is the only development to be expected on 14 May; resumption of drive west of Meuse not before 15 May.

Evening situation: Left wing of AGp. A makes only slow headway against partly mcz. French forces north of Namur. VIII Corps of AGp. A has reached Meuse south of Namur; XV Corps has secured lodgement on west bank of river near Yvoir and Givet, XXXXI Corps has crossed Meuse near Monthermé; XVI Corps has passed to west bank north and south of Sedan. Later in the evening Second Armd. Div, also reports to have pushed across Meuse.

14 May 1940.

Computation of enemy strength clearly shows that the area between Antwerp - Dyle Line - Namur contains about 25 British and French Divs., mostly mot. or mcz. Outposts of advance elements were holding Turnhout Canal and Gheel Line until this morning; as a result of gains by Third and Fourth Armd. Divs. they are now falling back to the main line.

French Ninth Army, opposing our breakthrough wedge which now has gained a small bridgehead across Meuse, is weak.

Nor have Second and Third French Armies any real strength. Second Army apparently cannot stand up to our onslaught. This is evident from northward movements from Metz and Verdun, which have been going on since 14 May, morning.

The important thing now is to have AGp. B liquidate Holland speedily. Here, following our capture of Rotterdam, enemy seems to be giving up the Grebbe Line and retreating in direction of Fortress Antwerp. It is also imperative that AGp. A should throw to left wing everything not needed elsewhere in order to push on



to the south of Brussels and contain enemy strength.

The breakthrough wedge of AGp. B\* must be aimed in such a way that:

Fourth Army will push on westward along the boundary line Charleroi - Mons - Peruwelz - Tournai on either side of the French Border Defense Line, which it will roll up;

Second Army (newly committed) will advance to the south of line Cambrai - Arras, in general direction of Amiens;

Twelfth Army will push through Signy-le-Petit - Signy l'Abbaye gain line La Fère - Rethel;

Sixteenth Army must turn out right wing into line Montmédy-Rethel.

At the same time, Group Kleist in massive formation, must drive toward the sea at St. Omer along the boundary line of Fourth and Second Armies. The important point for AGp. B\* in this is to concentrate strong forces on southern wing soon, which should not be difficult once Holland has been eliminated. The moving up of troops behind AGp. A has already been organized, partly by railroad (one Div. with Truck Transp. Regt.), partly by foot marches, through Sixteenth Army sector (coming from First Army sector).

ObdL: Reports dense motorized movements from Verdun and Metz, in northern direction, since 0700. Air Fleet has already been briefed for mission. Probably reserves of AGp. 2 (French) moving up behind Second and Third Armies.

Fellgiebel: Conference on forward move of GHq to Philippeville area.

v. Salmuth (on phone): Discuss advance of Sixth Army with strong left wing. Intentions of AGp. are in accord with our ideas.

Railroad mobilization of French GHq. Reserves seems to have started. Heavy movements from area around and west of Paris to Belgium, and from direction Soissons and Metz toward Sedan.

1800 von Salmuth (AGp. B) Long columns of mixed arms, including tanks, reported moving southwest from Brussels, between 1300 and 1400. Withdrawals from area northwest of Charleroi in western and south-western direction.

Own troops: Advance elements of IV Corps enter Wavre without opposition. Spearhead of XVI Corps reached Sambrelle river at 1540.

First indications of change in enemy's plan of operation. Will they give up Belgium entirely or in part? Regrouping in order to stop us or perhaps counter-attack on French soil.

Buhle: Available troops:

- a) 5 Regional Defense Regtl. Hqs.
  - 25 " " Bns. (including three already in Denmark)  
by 20 May,

- b) 9 Regional Defense Divs. High Command East, static, by 1 June,  
partly mobile by 1 July,  
fully mobile (two Arty Bns.) by 15 July.

As occupation troops without service units, available as of June :

- c) 5 Divs. of Third Draft (High Command East) 206th, 213rd, 218th,  
221st, 239th, 1 June,  
d) 4 Divs. of Third Draft (High Command East) 209th, 228th, 231st,  
311th, 15 June,  
Corps Hqs XXVIII and XXIX 15 June,  
Corps Hqs XXXXVI and XXXXVII 15 July,  
Corps Hqs XXXXVIII and XXXXIX 15 August.  
e) 10 Replacement Divs.\* (incl. one Mt. Div.) ready for activation.  
Activation requires 10 days 20 June.

Gen. Brand: Reports favorably on defense position of Sixteenth Army.  
No Army Arty. Officer required.

von Brauchitsch/von Bock:

- 1.) Fighting in Holland has ceased (except in Zeeland province).
- 2.) Pull out mot. forces at earliest.
- 3.) Eighteenth Army could possibly be reassigned to right wing.
- 4.) Third Armd. Div. not yet pushed through. Enemy still holding line Wavre - Namur.
- 5.) Liège: three forts in eastern sector holding out and still firing; likewise some forts in southern and northern sectors on western bank. All bridges destroyed. Military Admin. Hq set up at Liège.

von Salmuth: Takes back his report of this afternoon, on withdrawal of enemy around Brussels and Dyle Line.  
Sharp discussion over order to all ground forces issued this afternoon. AGp. has not taken the trouble of trying to understand it.

v. Kahliden: Reports on operations of Eighteenth Army and situation in Holland.

Afternoon: Final orders for continuance of operation by AGps. A and B, dictated by myself, go out on teletype.

15 May 1940.

Morning reports bring no confirmation of enemy withdrawal from Dyle - Namur Line; instead, they indicate that enemy is still holding this position. Success near Charleville gaining in width and depth. The enemy defense position on the Meuse can now be considered definitely breached. This bears out the premises on which Order No. 234, of 14 May, is based.

AGp. A, contrary to our orders, wants to insert Second Army between Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies. Disapproved.

AGp. B in a huff again, because no special mention was made in my order of 14 May.

Gen Qu prepares a base for airborne supply at Charleville.

AGp. C. expects withdrawal of enemy lines opposite 93rd, 268th, 262nd, and 246th Divs.

Enemy apparently pulls out field troops, relying on Fortress Brigs. Blasting of Kehl bridge would point in same direction. Consequence for us: We can reduce strength of AGp. C.

OQu IV: Tension between England and Italy increasing. British residents leave Italy, Italians, Egypt. Allied Embassies in Switzerland sending families home. British troops in Egypt at Libyan frontier. Ambassadors are called to Rome by Mussolini for meeting.

England: Beaverbrook is Minister for Aircraft Production.

Tokyo: England will not intervene in Dutch East Indies, where independence movements have developed.

L'Oeuvre\*: Possibility of defeat must be faced. Concern about Italy.

Vatican: Italy's entry into war imminent. (24 May, a historic date.) \*\*

von Rundstedt: "Cannot accept responsibility" if Twelfth Army should now be ordered to move south, after initially pointing west. Hopeless chaos would result.

1550 ObdH: Gives his approval to Rundstedt's recommendation.

Wagner: Supply running smoothly; temporary fuel shortage in Hoepfner's Group.

Railroads : As far as Bastogne, 15 May; Libramont, 17 May.

Kleist: Arrangements for fuel supply:

- a) by air,
- b) by road transport: one Transp. Bn. (1,800 tons) today at Bastogne.

Ammunition: Expenditure low to date. Supply of ammunition seems assured. Collecting of dumps at border should be responsibility of Admin. Hqs Lower Rhine and Eifel. (I agree.)

MT Regts.: Available for OKH, about 2,000 tons. Additional, beginning 22 May, 49 30-ton Transport Columns; 10 more later.

Military Government: Holland, later Belgium. Problems of organization.

- Qu I: a) Conference with Hungarian Military Attaché.  
b) Operation "Braun": Free bridges for Braun. Experiences.

von Bock:

- a) Airborne troops will be relieved soon; freeing of Waffen SS and SS Adolf Hitler will be speeded! Everything possible will be done to make Armd. formations available again for OKH at earliest.
- b) Fortress Holland: Two Divs. considered necessary. On northern front of Antwerp: Two Divs. in line, one in reserve. Can free one Div.
- c) Kuechler will take over zone of action of IX Corps. Two Landwehr Divs. could be employed here.
- d) Hoeppner (XVI Corps) should be relieved by Waeger.
- e) Reports on withdrawal from Dyle - Line require checking.

Tel. Call from OKW: British agents in civilian clothes are setting fires to British warehouses in Amsterdam. Want us to prevent it.

16 May 1940.

Our breakthrough wedge is developing in a positively classic manner. West of the Meuse our advance is sweeping on, smashing tank counterattacks in its path. Superb marching performance of the Inf. (Fifth Div., First Mt. Div.).

It is now essential to organize a feeder line through Visé or Maastricht so that we can move reinforcements to the right wing of the wedge through Sixth Army sector; to the left wing, through Sixteenth Army sector; and at the same time get reinforcements to the central sector from our prepared unloading points directly behind. Three Corps Hqs have been added to breakthrough wedge; one additional Army Hq and three more Corps Hqs will stand by.\*

The French seem to move reinforcements from their reserves in the Dijon and Belfort areas toward the left flank of our wedge. Reinforcements moving up from the Charleroi area toward the right flank have been cut off. The large general Reserve has not yet been drawn upon, nor are there any indications that they will be committed now. New reserves are apparently being formed from elements assigned to the fortified front of the Second French AGp.

If the French accept the decisive battle now, they would be able to move about 30 Divs. against our breakthrough wedge.

We can free additional reserves from AGp. C for the left wing of AGp. A. The overall picture of the situation and the balance

of strength consequently appears to be quite in our favor.

During the morning, the reports coming in for yesterday and today make it evident that the French are moving up an Army of about three Corps against the southern flank of our breakthrough wedge, partly from the direction of their fortified front (western edge of the Vosges Mountains), partly from their reserve pool around Dijon. At the same time they are concentrating opposite our breakthrough front with troops moved in through Laon and St. Quentin, in all probability from GHQ Reserve.

The front facing von Bock is reported softening south of Louvain since this morning.

1540 Talk with von Bock (on phone):

a) Proclamation of the Commanding General in Holland;

b) Keitel visited Bock: Communicated Fuehrer's urgent wish that mot. forces be moved to the front.

"von Bock accepts personal responsibility that mot. units will be in line at the earliest." Following withdrawal of enemy before Sixth Army, XVI Corps has again been committed on Bock's direct orders. "XV and XVI Corps form a single operational movement." Twentieth mot. Div. will be used only in extreme need.

von Waldau / Gen Stapp: Discussion on air-ground cooperation. I develop my view of the general situation and request blocking of roads on which enemy reinforcements are moving against southern flank, and destruction of that enemy. Particular attention should be given to enemy attempts to build up a defensive front at the breakthrough gap. Blockade of line Laon - La Fere - Chaulnes - Amiens - Abbeville. Watch enemy regrouping from Belgium to Northern France.

2200 Evening report to Fuehrer after phone talk with Brauchitsch, who is at AGp. A. Enemy is holding out at Antwerp and Louvain, while giving way at Wavre and to the south, toward Brussels. Spearheads of AGp. B have reached Franco-Belgian frontier near Beaumont - Hirson; Rethel, on the Aisne, reached. On southern flank counter-attack has been beaten off, and contact has been established with fortified line at Carignan. In sector of this AGp., VIII, II, XVIII, and IV Corps are standing with two divisions each on southern and western banks of Meuse. Regrouping for continuance of drive westward offers no difficulties. The follow-up Divs. are following closely.

2030 Talk with Mueller and Wagner on supply situation:

Supply for Fourth and Twelfth Armies and Group Kleist flowing smoothly. Transport Colms. have been brought into use to the last truck.

Traffic control and repair of the severely damaged roads develop satisfactorily.

Continuous flow of ammunition and rations.



Wagner will set up fuel dump for Kleist on Meuse with 150 planes tomorrow. Establishment of repair shop base Namur - Charleville has been initiated. Two-thousand skilled workers will be brought in by plane.

I release OKH MT. Reserve (Truck Transp. Regt.) for building up of Meuse supply base. Additionally, thousand trucks are being requisitioned in Holland and taken to Wesel for assisting in build-up of base.

Transportation Chief hopes to get through thirty supply trains per day to Libramont, by 22 May, and to Givet, by 23 May.

Transloading to watercraft at Liège is being prepared. Administration office for Military Railroads in Belgium instituted under Mittermaier.

Other decisions:

- a) Send officers to Eighteenth Army to collect experiences made in operation.
- b) Establishment of Military Government in Holland (von Falkenhäusen).
- c) Preparations for forward move of Hq to Avesnes.
- d) Shift of boundary line between AGps C and A by width of one Division sector. Three Divs. and one Corps Hq will be taken out of First Army.

17 May 1940.

The morning picture clearly indicates that enemy has not taken any serious steps to close the breakthrough gap. North of the Sambre river he is bending back his southern wing, giving up Brussels and Charleroi, while holding on to Antwerp.

South of the Sambre, where we have reached Avesnes, Guise, and Rethel, the enemy may at best succeed in holding the canal line Valenciennes-Cambrai-St. Quentin-Channy, with an extension to the Aisne along the Aisne - Oise Canal. Sporadic movements, disrupted by our air activities, are pointing in this direction.

On the southern flank of our breakthrough, the enemy has moved up at least six divisions and tries to bolster his front. We have no intention of attacking in this area, and enemy is not strong enough to attack us.

The overall situation has reached a stage where we can now turn our minds to continuing our operation in a southwestern direction.

Final reduction of the Seventh French, the British and the First French Armies may be left to AGp., which is following up in staggered formation and will pivot toward the coast at Lille. In carrying out this maneuver, AGp. B will have to take over Fourth Army. Since the enemy is not likely to attack from Antwerp, AGp. B will be able to put its weight on the left wing, accepting the risk of having its flank attacked by the enemy from his Canal positions. That would be quite desirable.

Continuance of our drive in southwestern direction is based on the condition that AGp. A does not tie up any of its strength on the southern flank, but keeps pushing westward in echelon formation. This involves no risk, as the enemy here is too weak to attack at this time.

The main effort of the southwestern drive would have to be aimed at Compiègne, with the possibility of subsequently wheeling the right wing in southeastern direction past Paris left open.

A great decision must be taken now!

1130 Talk with AGp. A (Sodenstern): No halt on Oise. Push ahead in direction Valenciennes - Cambrai - St. Quentin. Seize canal crossings. Secure southern flank only with echeloned forces.

1150 Talk with AGp. B: Brief reference to plans sketched above. Transfer XVI Corps to Fourth Army through Mons! No change in AGp. boundary yet; depends on major decision now being contemplated; Keep open reserved road for SS Deathhead to Fourth Army through Huy.

Noon: Meeting Fuehrer with GbdH: Apparently little mutual understanding. The Fuehrer insists that main threat is from the south. (I see no threat at all at present!) For that reason, Inf. Divs. should be moved up at the earliest for protecting of south flank; the Armd. Divs. by themselves would be sufficient to extend breakthrough in northwestern direction. GbdH discusses matter with Rundstedt, whom Fuehrer intends visiting in afternoon, and they agree on turning off XVIII, III and VII Corps in southwestern direction.

1440 Talk with Sodenstern on same subject. Teletype orders on transfer of XVI Corps (Third Armd. Div., Fourth Armd. Div., Twentieth mot. Div.) to area west of Charleroi, and of XXXIX Corps together with Waffen SS Div., Ninth Armd. Div., and SS Adolf Hitler to AGp. A's Fourth Army sector, through Huy.

1630 Conference with Geh. von Falkenhausen, Comm. Gen. of German Forces in Holland. Others present: Col. von Bock, Regierungspraesident Reeder, Vizepraesident v. Kraushaar\*, Legation Councillor Werkmeister.

a) Kraushaar details his impressions. Dutch officials cooperative. It would be desirable to put a generally respected Dutchman at the head of the Dutch administration (van Vlissingen). Trust in German Army. Emphasizes need to assure permanency of the established Military Administration.

b) Brief discussion on tasks of Military Government. Demobilization. -- Keep economy going. -- Restore communications. -- Cooperation with Navy and Air Force.

Jacob: Bridge situation:

Fourth Army, available:

9 Bridge Columns (including 2 from Reserve).

5 Columns will be freed after 23/24 May by replacement of pre-fabricated bridges.

Twelfth Army, available;  
None (3 from Reserve\*).  
10 - 12 Columns will become available by 20 May.

Sixteenth Army: Available none.  
3 will become available by 20 May.

Lost: Only 1 Bridge Column (A T-type Bridge Column).

Engineers have done excellently.

Col. Wagner: Report on supply situation. Land and air transport facilities taxed to maximum. Using AGp. A as a link, supply will make it. Build-up of supply base on Meuse developing well.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff assignments.

2005 Gen. OBst. von Bock calls up: A telephone conference between Gen. OBst. Keitel and Reichenau has caused some confusion. K. mentioned that the Fuehrer did not want XVI Corps to expend itself. Reichenau has our orders to shift this Corps to Fourth Army, through Mons, which could be accomplished only by an attack. Now he does not know what to do.

2100 Answer: Stop XVI Corps and move it to Fourth Army by shortest route, in direction Beaumont.

2200 Talk ObdH / Rundstedt (on phone): Seize Le Cateau - St. Quentin with strong Advance Combat Teams. Protect left flank.

2130 Talk ObdH with Keitel: Set-up in Holland to be the same as in Norway. No elaborate administrative machinery of our own, as Seyss-Inquart<sup>xx</sup> will be put in charge. We are to furnish personnel and equipment. ObdH insists on forthright definition of jurisdictions for military and civilian chiefs.

Rather unpleasant day. The Fuehrer is terribly nervous. Frightened by his own success, he is afraid to take any chance and so would rather pull the reins on us. Puts forward the excuse that it is all because of his concern for the left flank! Keitel's telephone calls to AGps, on behalf of Fuehrer, and Fuehrer's personal visit to AGp. B have caused only bewilderment and doubts.

Action in the question of Military Administration in Holland has demonstrated once more the utter dishonesty of our top leaders in relation to OKH.

18 May 1940.

The morning situation shows the enemy making an orderly withdrawal north of Sambre river while apparently shifting major forces from Belgium to the western front of our breakthrough. At the Aisne river, the enemy is building up strength for a defensive front, with troops brought from the Paris area and, for line between Aisne and Meuse, from his AGp. B. No concentrations foreshadowing a counter drive can be discerned, nor would one be practicable in the time and with the railroad capacity available.

French GHq Reserves have been committed only on a small scale to date.

The fact that the Allies are evacuating Belgium by degrees (The German flag is flying from the city hall of Antwerp), and that they are frantically trying to improvise a front to block our advance, proves that I was correct in yesterday's conclusion that the operation must be continued in a southwestern direction (with the main effort south of the Somme) without the least delay. Every hour is precious.

Fuehrer Hq sees it differently. The Fuehrer unaccountably keeps worrying about the south flank. He rages and screams that we are on the best way to ruin the whole campaign and that we are leading up to a defeat. He won't have any part of continuing the operation in westward direction, let alone to the southwest, and still clings to the plan of a northwestern drive.

This is the subject of a most unpleasant discussion at Fuehrer Hq between the Fuehrer on the one side, and ObdH and myself on the other (1000).

While there, we are handed a directive soon followed by the written summary of the conference.

ObdH talks with Gen. Obst. von Rundstedt, and I with Salmuth to communicate the Fuehrer's concept: Turn spearhead Divs. hard to southwest to protect the south flank, while holding bulk of mot. forces in readiness for a drive to the west.

Teletype order to AGp. A and B regarding grouping, boundaries, and follow-up of reinforcements.

Noon: Antwerp has fallen, Cambrai reached 1130, St. Quentin 0900.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the enemy is taking back the Belgian front, apparently establishing an intermediate line somewhere north of the French border, and trying to cover this movement against the advancing Fourth Army by tenacious opposition in the Maubeuge - Valenciennes area. Apart from this, he is attempting, with elements from Belgium and from the South, to organize a line of resistance facing roughly the line Valenciennes - Cambrai - St. Quentin - La Fere.

We must punch through this new line before it has a chance to consolidate. Additionally, we must keep open the possibility of crossing the Somme at Péronne and Ham later on.

Accordingly an order is issued at 1530 directing main arm'd. force to advance on line Cambrai - St. Quentin, while securing the south flank. Advance elements are to take Ham and Péronne. Arm'd. formations still hanging back must be brought up speedily. Minimum of forces against Maubeuge and Valenciennes.

Afternoon: Picture of enemy withdrawing before AGp. B is confirmed. Antwerp and Brussels in our hands. The measures instituted by AGps. A and B pursuant to our orders are showing results; southern front of AGp. A is beginning to consolidate. Our tanks are now in line and ready to attack.

1800 Report to Fuehrer: I outline situation and request permission to start drive, which is granted. So the right thing is being done after all, but in an atmosphere of bad feeling and in a form calculated to give the outside world the impression that it is a plan conceived by OKW. The logistical program is reviewed and approved as adequate.

Personal reports during afternoon and evening:

Thoma: Pictures the tank battle of XIX Corps. His description of the lack of fighting heart in the French is very striking.

Gercke: Progress achieved in, and plans for, operation of railroads in occupied territories.

Mieth: Organizational matters.

19 May 1940.

The breakthrough wedge is developing in a satisfactory manner. Follow-up proceeds as planned. Bulk of enemy forces lately operating in Belgium probably straddle Belgian border. Our big tank drive in direction Arras (starting 0700) consequently will squarely hit the bulk of the retreating enemy. It will be a big battle lasting several days, in which we have the advantage of the initiative, while the enemy has that of heavy concentration. But since all psychological factors work in our favor and we have the benefit of a superior and tremendously effective air force, I am certain of success. Perhaps it will become necessary in the course of the battle to shift the main effort to the south of Arras.

1100 Talk Bock / ObdH: Nothing of special importance. Difficulties in passing XVI Corps across Sambre arose partly from failure of Fourth Army to take over the Corps immediately, partly in method of command in re-routing it. Problem of a direct supply line to Fourth Army through Sixth Army sector.

Reports received at noon bear out the conclusion that we still have before us sizable enemy forces, which supposedly are withdrawing south across the Somme to the shelter of a hastily prepared defense line. Some enemy elements are vigorously attacking the line Mons - Valenciennes, while others, which have been drawn together from Belgium and France, are attempting to organize a holding line Valenciennes - Cambrai - Péronne - Noyon, behind which the withdrawal from Belgium is to be completed.

Opposite the gap in our front near Laon, French forces are cautiously feeling their way from Soissons. Further east, on the Aisne, all is quiet. It is possible that the enemy may attempt a counter-drive over a narrow front close to the still intact Maginot Line, i.e. between Le Chesne and Montmédy.

The reports of enemy attacks in direction of Mons - Valenciennes are worrying OKW. The Air Force has been ordered to concentrate its effort against this attack. Fortunately, Jeschonnek first asks our opinion. I tell him that as a matter of fact I welcome



these attacks, since north of them, the left wing of the Sixth Army is already driving into the rear of the attacking force. I ask him to adhere to our previous arrangement to concentrate air strength against the enemy's north-south movements toward the lower Somme, together with providing cover for the left flank at Laon.

Afternoon: Report by Stuelpnagel: Preparations for operation "Braun". His conference with Leeb, AGp. C, and negotiations with Italy. All goes as anticipated.

von Etzdorf reports to me on political situation. Of real importance are only Italy and USA. Italy is not expected to enter war at a very early date. "It is not a matter of days" (Ciano), although eventual entry into war is a foregone conclusion; perhaps within a few weeks. It is hoped that Italy will choose a method of warfare on the sea and in the air which will allow the Balkans to remain quiet. Yugoslavia probably is a weighty factor in the shaping of policy. Occupation of Greek islands, including Crete, is a growing possibility. Attitude of USA toward Italy is considered mere bluffing, a view that is shared by us. Attitude of President dictated by domestic political considerations.

Fellgiebel reports on observations at Eighteenth and Sixth Armies. Holland very friendly toward us, little fighting; fighting in eastern part of Belgium apparently heavy. Enemy severely beaten. Trunk cables are being extended past Liège and Valenciennes to Amiens and through St. Vith - Jemelle - Hirson to St. Quentin. Further north a line must be put through Brussels to Amiens.

Wagner: Gen Qu reports smooth flow of supplies today and promises same for tomorrow. Plans to build up a large supply base around Brussels or Valenciennes with long-distance truck hauls from Krefeld; the whole is to be operated by Chief of Armament. Agreed.

Evening news: France puts Weygand in command of Armies -- Our tank drive has overwhelmed the obstacle of the Canal du Nord. -- Unconfirmed report that French plan attack along Ham - Chateau Porcien. Let them come! We are strong enough and have sufficient depth.

20 May 1940.

Morning situation shows rapid advance of left wing of Bock north of the armored wedge in his sector. Between this strong left wing of Bock and the right shoulder of Fourth Army, French forces have apparently been pinched in and are attacking desperately in a southwestern direction. In view of the proximity of the two wedges pushing on side by side, we are likely to see similar situations develop from time to time.

The question now to be decided is whether Kleist, who must move closer to the Somme and may even have to swing out southward across the Somme, will still be able to effect a large envelopment movement from the south on Bock's flank, or whether Bock is not already driving the game away, as it were, past Kleist. In view of Bock's ambition to dash out in front such a development seems entirely possible. As a result, our attempt to force the enemy to accept a battle with inverted front north of the Somme, is likely to eventuate in a conventional envelopment, in which Bock would turn up at the extreme wing next to Rundstedt. With this development taking shape, Armd. Corps Kleist is bound to be compelled to turn increasingly in a southwestern direction.

Analysis of the operational drafts of AGp. C for an offensive on the Upper Rhine front plainly shows that von Leeb is unable to free himself from the concepts of position warfare in 1918. Accordingly, Stuelpnagel is given instructions to see to it that Leeb and the men around him assimilate the lessons of the drive across the Meuse. (Visits to Hqs AGp. B and Sixth Army.)

Instructions to Mieth: Ascertain minimum strength required for First Army front. Make Hq First Army available for Upper Rhine front. The Divs. taken out from rear of First Army must be acquainted with experiences gained at the Meuse, the same should be done for Busse's Divisions which will be ready by 15 June. Discuss with Buhle release of Hq First Army and replacement by Kaupisch.

Noon: Air Force reports that our armd. and mot. forces have reached St. Pol and Amiens.

Afternoon: Final Conference with ObdH on continuance of operation after coast has been reached. What I have been preaching for the past three days has finally been adopted. The operation in southwestern direction will be conducted in the following order:

Under AGp. A (from left to right):

Twelfth Army, attacking west of the Argennes in direction of St. Dizier.

Second Army, closing to the west, striking from area west of Laon, in direction Brienne-le-Chateau.

Ninth Army, to the west of Second, pushing from the area between Ham and Moreuil in direction of Forêt d'Oth, with right wing bypassing Paris to the east.

Under AGp. B:

Bulk of Armor, under Reichenau, followed by Fourth Army, under AGp. B, will operate across the lower Seine, bypassing Paris to the west. It is unnecessary to decide now whether this force, after crossing the Seine, should provide flank cover for the envelopment maneuver of AGp. A, or else be given special mission to drive along the coast to the Bay of Biscay.

Coordinated with the drive of AGp. A, an offensive with fifteen Divs. will be initiated from the Upper Rhine in direction Langres, with perhaps a concurrent drive of eight Divs. from the Saarbruecken area toward Sarrebourg. This would leave us with sufficient reserves to see the operation through.

Following this in the evening, conferences with OQ II\* and Op. Sec. on execution of this operation and regrouping of Armies for the new offensive.

Afternoon: Planning conference with Gen Qu at OmdH, who concurs with my proposals. Establishment of large supply base for our field forces in the area Brussels - Tournai - Charleroi, calling for development of a large-scale motor truck hauling system from the Ruhr to this area pending restoration of railroads. This plan requires forming transport groups comprising several thousand civilian trucks mobilized in Belgium and Holland. With this organization to be set up in cooperation with BdE, who will later take over, supply bases must be built up for Twelfth Army in Charleville area, for Second Army around Avesnes - Le Cateau, for Ninth Army in Cambrai - Arras area, and for Armd. Gp. Reichenau and Fourth Army north of line Amiens - Abbeville. Eighteenth Army can be directly supplied from Main Ground Forces Base.

Other subjects discussed: Prisoner-of-war problems and drafting of laws needed for Administration instituted by Hq Falkenhausen.

Wuestefeld: Regulation of allocation of Construction Bns. and construction orders for preparation of positions in sectors of Sixteenth and Twelfth Armies as well as in areas of Hqs Lower Rhine and Eifel.

Fellgiebel and Bogatsch are briefed on new plans. Several AA Bns. will be released to ObdL.

Buhle: Current organizational problems, including activation of new Mt. Div.

Eupen - Malmedy German again!

21 May 1940.

Day begins in a rather tense atmosphere. Incoming reports indicate serious pressure on north flank of Fourth Army. No detailed reports yet on advance of our armd. and mot. forces.

1100 Report to Fuehrer: Plans worked out yesterday are approved. With regard to timing, it has been decided that drive against Lower Seine will start as soon as possible, independent of progress in build-up of offensive front. Start of southeastern drive, east of Paris, is contingent on outcome of

battle which only now is reaching full strength.

Once this drive is rolling, we shall launch the Upper Rhine offensive, which in any case could not come off before mid-June, and with it our offensive from the Saarbruecken area, as the final push against the wall, as it were.

A report is submitted on the logistical preparations for the operation.

After return, conference with OQ II and Chief Op. on execution of planned operation. Preparations for conference tomorrow.

1630 Stuelpnagel reports on talks with Keitel OKW, concerning the conversations with Italy. We are not going to urge them any longer, but let them come to us, especially as it is now certain that we are going to mount the Upper Rhine offensive with our own fifteen Divs. alone, without the Italians.

1700 Kimzel in from Hq Sixth Army: Army has come up against solid front. Would like to shift main effort to right wing, which is believed to afford better tactical conditions. I make it very plain to him that the important thing is to keep going on the left wing in order to help along Fourth Army. The decision will fall on the high ground of Arras. That is the place that the Inf. of Fourth Army must reach as soon as possible. If left wing of Sixth Army lags behind, Fourth Army will be compelled to tie up forces at Valenciennes. The same problem was hinted at in an obscurely worded teletype message from AGp. at noon, without stating it plainly. My reply seems to have failed to clarify the matter.

1700 Wagner (Gen Qu) reports:

- a) Hq Jaehnicke (OQu Belgium) will be ready for operations in Brussels by 22 May, 1900. Gets 22 Reich Labor Service Bns.

Truck tonnage:

- 12,000 tons, within three days:
  - 6,000 from Schell (mobilized from private industry)
  - 4,000 from State Railroads,
  - 2,000 from Holland (Weingart)

Weingart gets Trauch with Special Staff.

Gercke believes he can get through to Antwerp with fifteen trains per day, beginning 24 May. Ten steamers have been captured in Rotterdam. Rotterdam-Brussels Canal heavily mined; is being cleared. Wagner believes that transport system will be operating as of 24 May. Immediate target 60,000 tons of ammunition, 90 fuel trains.

- b) Forward move of Army Supply bases has been initiated.
- c) Prisoners must be taken back by individual Armies as far as Reich frontier.
- d) Emergency Aid Train "Bavaria", now in Kassel, ordered to Brussels.



- a) Italy: No concrete commitments of military or political character. Recent exchange of letters contained boastful reports of successes by Fuehrer and applause by Il Duce. Last letter of Il Duce hints that state of non-belligerency will not last much longer.

Inquiry regarding military aid expected from Il Duce was answered: We are not going to give any. He has been informed of the view held by us now that no Italian soldier would be needed in German theaters.

Greece may remain passive in face of Italian strong-arm methods. Earlier assumption that Greece would immediately react by entry into war is no longer fully maintained, even if Gulf of Patras and Crete should be affected. Key to Greece's attitude is in Britain's hand.

Turkey has changed her tune. Inclination to remain passive is increasing.

It is quite probable that Italy would occupy Adriatic coast. Political structure of Yugoslavia rotten and Cabinet probably incapable of decision to make war. This is how Italy views the situation. It remains to be seen if it proves to be correct.

In the over-all picture, some minor differences begin to stand out between Italy and ourselves. Italy's chief enemy now is Britain, whereas Enemy No. 1 for us is France. We are seeking to arrive at an understanding with Britain on the basis of a division of the world.

Internal Italian resistance against war is dwindling. Crown Prince reported to be enthusiastically pro-war. Mussolini has a free hand. He is also becoming active against the Vatican.

- b) Hungary: Letter to Teleki. Italy and Germany do not want the peace and harmony on the Balkans disturbed. Russia's interest is the same. Germany desires good relations with all Balkan States. Hungary's interest ought to be the same: peace. A Three Power Conference undesirable now. Would excite public. Csaki's visit would be welcome. My talk with Hungarian Military Attache has caused unnecessary stir.

1930 Heim: Recognition for units without mentioning of names. Morale boosters for battle-worn troops.

2100 Wagner has called on Todt Organization for reconstruction of roads and bridges on Meuse (Namur - Mézières). Todt has set up field office on Meuse, 20 km north of Mézières. I call attention to necessity for cooperation between Todt and OQu 2.



2400 Telephone call by von Bock regarding our teletype order indicating ObdH's emphasis on need for pushing on with left wing of Fourth Army. He complains that my Liaison Off. had talked about "holding back". In the end he gets the idea why left wing of Sixth Army must not get stalled and promises to take action accordingly.

Over-all picture of the day, which has been substantiated by visit of ObdH to Rundstedt and by his talks with Kleist and List, shows that the big battle is in full swing. Constant pressure will be necessary to keep the Infantry moving close behind Armor. Only when we have seized the high ground of Arras shall we have won the battle.

0030 von Bock calls again: Situation on Kluge's right wing cannot be so serious. Only local actions. Reichenau has taken prisoners from four different Divs. von Bock now adds 269th Div. of the GHQ Reserve to his left wing.

22 May 1940.

Morning situation indicates that the probably unnecessary delay of VIII and perhaps also XVI Corps around Maubeuge, and the southwestern detouring of rear Corps might jeopardize an early advance of Inf. Divs. into the Arras area, where our Armor, fighting south of Arras, has met a strong enemy who is pushing south. The Armor drive on Calais, ordered by us, has been temporarily halted by AGp. A on the line St. Pol - Etaples, and will not be resumed until the situation at Arras is clear.

This estimate of the situation sets off the following reasoning:

AGp. A:

- a) The detouring of I Corps to the south as well as the delay of VIII and II Corps are incomprehensible.
- b) II Corps must advance on Beaurain - Bapaume. V Corps on Albert, XXXX Corps on St. Quentin - Ham.
- c) Tanks west of Arras must be started off as soon as situation at Arras has been consolidated.

Above all it is important for Infantry to get to Arras and westward as quickly as possible.

AGp. B:

Eighteenth Army must secure its north flank and not attack into the water line.\*

Left wing of Sixth Army must push on; transfer 227th Div. from Holland.

In order to translate these ideas into action, ObdH flies to Hq Fourth Army. I talk them over with Sodenstern (1045).

1100 Conference CQu I, Chief Arty Off. (Wandel), Chief Eng. Off.,  
Op. Sec.:

Orientation on intentions for next phase of operations.  
Data needed for strength estimate and troop disposition are requested.

1230 Heusinger:

- a) Today no decision on resumption of halted railroad movements.
- b) Set-up of daily reports must be changed. Intentions must be specified.
- c) Jodl's call: Fuehrer is worried about following points:
  - 1.) Main effort of Sixth Army is directed not nearly enough to the south. (We have been plugging this line for the last 24 hours!)
  - 2.) Sixteenth Army has too many casualties and is attacking needlessly; also troops may be held back in this area. (Pater noster!)\*
  - 3.) I Corps has not closed up yet. (That is the fault of the interference from the top.)

1300 Talk with von Rundstedt: Has moved II Corps toward Bapaume, on its right Eighth Div., west of Valenciennes. V Corps moved into Péronne area, since everything further north is congested with mot. troops. One Div. of XXXX Corps directed toward St. Quentin. Nothing else can be gotten through. I Corps slated to go to Le Cateau (will take time, as all roads are taken up by Twentieth mot. Div.).

Heusinger: Air Force activities: Sperrle was to attack enemy movements near Paris, but could not do so on account of bad weather. Kesselring is attacking Calais and Boulogne; afterwards will give close support to our Armor at and west of Arras. It is most important that planes no longer needed over Paris area should cooperate with Armd. Corps. Kesselring is to support drive of Sixth Army.

Over-all situation around noon indicates a let-up of tension:

The enemy is giving way at Arras, and west of Arras our tanks face only a comparatively weak enemy; area south of Lower Somme apparently cleared of enemy as far as Bresle river.

AGp. A is vigorously pushing Inf. in westward direction.

1345 AGp. B states that AGp and Sixteenth Army consider capture of high ground of Stonne an absolute necessity.

1435 von Salmuth reports on situation in VIII Corps sector. I talk with him about the need to hold down to minimum employment of troops on northern wing. 225th Div. will be moved in, perhaps by water transport.

1530 Geth (Liaison Off. Fourth Army) brings report on situation. Situation is much better than we thought.

On right wing, 28th Div. is still busy cleaning up around Fortress Maubeuge, where fortress troops reinforced by remnants of field units apparently put up a gallant defense. They must be eliminated before we can use the roads. Eighth Div. now moving toward Valenciennes should close this pocket west of Valenciennes by passing through Denain. II Corps, with 12th and 32nd Divs., is already east of Arras.

Hoth is attacking with Fifth Armd. Div. east, with Seventh Armd. Div. west of Arras, and is in frontal attack from the south with Eleventh Rifle Brig. and Waffen SS Div. since 1200.

Also since 1200, Kleist is attacking west of the line Avesnes-le-Comte - Houdain - Ath - St. Omer, pushing with XXXXI Corps on the right and XIX Corps on the left wing northward between St. Pol and the sea.

At the Lower Somme, Second and Thirteenth mot. Divs. are providing cover for the operation and hold open the bridgeheads, which are not seriously threatened. In the event of increasing pressure, only the bridgeheads of Amiens and Abbeville will be defended.

Directly east of Thirteenth mot. Div. is 29th mot Div. To relieve them, V Corps is being moved from Péronne, and portions of XXXX Corps from St. Quentin.

1700 Koerner: Railroad situation is developing satisfactorily.

Forty-eight trains will get through to Antwerp via Gennepe today. Waterways must be utilized more extensively. From Maastricht, cargoes are transferred to Gembloux. Liège - Namur totally unusable. To Dinant and northward, 24 trains are now running daily. Are reloaded on trucks for transfer across Meuse, and then by rail to Hirson. At Bertrix reloading on trucks for Charleville and thence by rail in direction Cambrai. Luxembourg supplies Sixteenth Army.

Translations:\*

a) Letter from Churchill to Il Duce:

Having taken over the office of the Prime Minister I feel strongly impelled to send you, the leader of the Italian Nation, a message of good will across that gap which seems to be widening so rapidly.

Is it too late to prevent the shedding of blood between the British and Italian peoples? Of course, we could annihilate each other and redden the Mediterranean with our blood. If this should be your will, then it must be. But I wish to say that I have never been an enemy of the Italian people, nor have I in my heart ever been opposed to the man who rules Italy.



It is futile to predict the course of the great battles which are now being joined in Europe, yet I am certain that no matter what may happen on the continent, Britain will hold out to the last, even if she should stand alone, as she has done in the past.

I believe with some degree of assurance that the United States, nay, the whole of the American continent will come to our aid on an ever increasing scale.

I beg you to believe me that it is not out of a spirit of weakness or fear that I am addressing to you this solemn appeal which will be entered upon the annals of history.

It is above all imperative that the heirs of Latin and Christian civilization should not enter into a deadly conflict with each other. In the name of honor I implore you to heed my words before the fearful signal is sounded. Never will it be sounded by us.

b) Answer of Il Duce to Churchill:

I reply to the message which you sent me to say to you that you must certainly be aware of the momentous and grave considerations of historical and compelling nature, which have forced our two countries into opposing camps. Without going back too far, let me remind you of the initiative which was taken by your Government in Geneva in 1935 in organizing the sanctions against Italy, when we were about to secure for ourselves a small portion of African soil, without causing the slightest injury to your or any other interests or territories. I furthermore remind you of the actual and virtual state of slavery in which Italy is finding herself in her own native sea.

As your Government declared war on Germany in order to uphold its word, you will appreciate that the same sense of honor and respect for the obligations undertaken under the terms of the German - Italian Treaty will today and in the future determine the policy of Italy in the face of every development. (18 May 1940.)

c) Personal message of Il Duce to the President of the United States:

In reply to your message which was handed me at midnight of 14 May; I fully understand the motives that have prompted you and I consider them to be honorable and worthy of the highest respect. Yet two basic aspects of the present position of Italy cannot have escaped your sense of political reality, namely, that it is the intention of Italy to remain an ally of Germany and, furthermore, that Italy cannot stand aloof at a moment when the future of Europe is in the balance. I therefore cannot but reaffirm what I have said in my first message. (18 May 1940.)

1900 General Fromm: Data on activations:

- a) High Command East: 1st instalment will be ready by 1 June,  
2nd " " " " " by 15 June.

- b) Police Div. will give up 2 Arty Bns. in favor of 228th Reserve Div./Replacement on 1 July.
- c) Regional Defense Divs. in Eastern theater:  
3 Divs., ready by 10 Jun, without Arty, but with transport, for occupation duty,  
6 Divs. by 20 June.
- d) 526th Div. goes from Mil. District VI to Belgium for PW guard duty. Take away their AT guns!
- e) Fortress Divs. will have transport by 15 June.
- f) Activation of new Mt. Div. (6th) will be completed by 6 June, at Heuberg.
- g) Special equipment for operations in hill country (for 4 x 2 Regts.) will be ready by 10 June.
- h) Mobile Replacement Divs.\* ready by 1 July (perhaps 20 June), (9 Inf. Divs. and 1 Mt. Div.)
- i) Ready for shipment: 42 Bns. immediately, 100 Bns. by 1 June.  
This would be sufficient to cover current losses, but not for establishing field recruit depots.
- j) Hermann-Goering-Works have hoarded much river tonnage in Ruhr, where it is now lying idle.
- k) Replacement units have been garrisoned in Denmark. I agree to BdE assuming control of them.
- l) If necessary, 14 Repl. Bns. could be transferred to High Command East from various Mil. Districts on withdrawal of Regional Defense formations. The question has political implications and should be put before the Fuehrer.
- m) Regional Defense Bns. ready.
- n) 6 med. Fd. How. Bns. (model 03), with harness, etc., captured in Holland. Will be allocated to Seventh Draft.
- o) Steel available for production program: Increase of ammunition production by 40%, arms production on lesser scale, at small sacrifice of light and med. Fd. How. and siege guns. I concur.
- p) Hoover's relief project for Belgium. Why don't we buy in Belgium? Changes in our dispositions.
- q) Demobilization matters.

ObdH returns during evening, satisfied with results. According to Greiffenberg (who went with him) and his own account, Goth's report is substantially correct. At Conference in Fuehrer Hq, ObdH raised the question of Russian attitude. Fuehrer believes that Russia, following his advice, will limit claims to Bessarabia. (2300)



Issuance of orders to Armies in the field on next intentions  
(wheeling northward with protection of south flank).

2330 Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) 2,000 tons of river shipping secured in Ruhr.
- b) Tank Spare Parts Depot Mons-Maubeuge ready 27 May, 0000 .  
Motor Transport District Brussels operational on 27 May.  
" " " Charleville " " 22 May.

A second Tank Base will be established around Armentieres-Lille, as soon as area is in our hands. Personnel is now being sent to Mons.

Spare Parts Depot Duisburg will be transferred to Antwerp by rail and thence by road.

- c) Fuel problems. Little has been found in the country. Tremendous stocks were deliberately spoiled; Brussels-Antwerp.
- d) Container shortage. OKH order needed.

23 May 1940.

Morning situation: The situation continues to develop in a satisfactory manner. The left wing of our armored forces is approaching Calais. In the central sector, west of Arras, strong armored forces are pushing toward Bethune.

The situation at the AGP boundary line still is somewhat uncomfortable. The right wing of Fourth Army in the area of Valenciennes is still a little thin. The gap between Valenciennes and Cambrai is being "secured" by Eighth Div., which has not even arrived in full strength. Very inconveniently, 28th Div. is still engaged in mopping-up operations way back at Maubeuge. By directing First Div. on Bavay instead of Valenciennes, more time has been lost for our westward drive.

In the Condé area Waeger's Corps, on the left wing of Sixth Army, is advancing too slowly. Instead of the whole of 217th Div., as was promised, only the Arty. of the Div. has been committed in the sector of 269th Div. On the other hand, Reichenau is still fighting his private battle in the area of Audenarde, which probably will cause bloody losses without a return of operational advantage. The attacks of XXVI Corps north of Ghent likewise serve no operational purpose. Moving of troops through Second Army sector seems to be well under way, but it will be days before a strong Inf. force is assembled in the Arras area.

The southern front is quiet.

The developments of the past few days show that AGp. A is indeed experiencing considerable difficulties in managing this unwieldy mass of 71 Divs. I have a good idea its staff has not been energetic and active enough. OKH must take the organization of liaison with the several Armies in hand in order to insure execution of its orders up front. (More Liaison officers, Aides for them, and establishment of Forward Message Center at Chimay,)

1100 von Witzleben, Gen. Staff Off. Tng. Course: Reports on second course (only three flunked) and suggests moving school to the West.

Tng. Sec.: Field Grade Officers School will be suspended on conclusion of current courses. 164th Div. will be released for other duties.

Org. Sec. (Schmidt):

- a) Artillery for 288th Div. will be drawn from Police Div. or Artillery resources in Norway.
- b) 526th Div. to be released from duty on Dutch frontier. AT Artillery and other complements will be assigned elsewhere (BdE).
- c) Preparations for cleaning-up operation in the large pocket which will result from encirclement of the 45 enemy Divs.
- d) Move up 40 Regional Defense Bns. during present transportation lull.

von Ziehlberg:

- a) Exchange Roehricht/Busse, Liaison Officer Twelfth Army.
- b) Our Liaison Officers must get Aides.
- c) Liaison Officers for Second and Ninth Armies.
- d) Officer Aides for Liaison Officers AGp. A to facilitate liaison between AGp. Hq. and Armies.
- e) Forward Message Center at Chimay.
- f) Zerbel and Richert are available from Tng. Sec.

1230 von Salmuth (on phone): Has impression that enemy is giving up or at least decreases resistance on the Escaut river.

Sixth Army reports that XI Corps is making headway in direction of Courtrai and that IV Corps is gaining ground south of Courtrai. (The reports are passed on by radio to Hqs Fourth Army and AGp.)

1300: Resumption of phone talk: 269th Div., on left wing of XXVII Corps, has reached Escautpont, south of Conde, and is advancing in direction of St. Amand. At Thulins, a Bn. of 269th Div. has beaten back a breakout attempt of the enemy and taken many prisoners. — Complaints about slow rate of advance of VIII Corps, their neighbor on the left.\*

v. Greiffenberg: Aides for our Liaison Officers. -- Liaison Officers to Army Hq 9. -- Forward CP Chimay will be operational within two days.

1300 von Sodenstern: OKH thinks it desirable to commit Army Hq 9 next to Twelfth Army. Its sector will extend only to Péronne, so as not to crowd area needed for movement of armed forces. Army Hq 9 assigned to AGp.

1400 von Salmuth claims that SS Adolf Hitler and First MG Bn. had to go over to the defensive southeast of Valenciennes, and complains about failure of Fourth Army to attack with its right wing.

A. AGp. 'A' contends that the unit referred to could not possibly be SS Adolf Hitler, but perhaps is the Advance Combat team of First Div.

1600 Maj. Gen. Brand reports on his visit to Twelfth Army sector. Conditions for initiating a drive would be favorable around Laon and Rethel, less favorable in between these points. For a defensive-offensive operation, conditions also are favorable. Surveying has been well prepared. Method of employment of Observation Bns. still in need of improvement.

von Ziehlberg: Organization of improved signal communications for OKW. -- Forward Message Center at Chimay. -- Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

1730 von Gyldenfeldt communicates Kleist's anxieties. He feels he cannot tackle his task as long as the crisis at Arras remains unresolved. Tank losses are as high as 50%. -- I point out to him that crisis will be over within 48 hours. I am aware of the magnitude of his task. He will have to hold on until then. No danger on the Somme.

Notre Dame de Lorette - the destiny of France - is in our hands.

1800 Blaskowitz offers for immediate employment:

|                       |            |                     |
|-----------------------|------------|---------------------|
| Regional Defense Div. | von Flotho | (386th)             |
| "                     | "          | " v.d.Lippe (372nd) |
| "                     | "          | " Pilz (358th)      |

Corps Hq XXXV (reduced) von Schenkendorff.

Eimannsberger, CO Arty Rcn. Staff, suitable as Army Arty. Officer, should stay where he is for the time being.

To make up for them: Two Divs. made up of Replacement Bns. under Keyser and Leyen (the latter would at the same time get his training). The 15% overstrength of the transferred units will stay behind for local assignments. Later, 14 Replacement Bns. from BdE, if and when needed.

1900 Keitel (Personnel Div.): Iron Cross awards. -- Corps and Div. assignments. -- Transfer of Personnel Div. to Aachen.

Political Note: The Fuehrer has become more sceptical about Italy's policy toward Yugoslavia, but believes that he still has the situation under control.



Evening situation: If enemy brings in all available Divs., we may expect arrival of 3 Divs. from North Africa and 5 Divs. from Syria.

Evening. Upon instruction of ObdH, orders are issued to AGps. A and B regarding change-over of tactical control of Fourth Army and attached units to AGp. B on 24 May, 2000 hrs.

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports that Ammunition Base Mons - Maubeuge has begun to operate; functions also as Supply Base for Motor Transport. I direct him to set up a tank repair base in Arras - St. Pol area.

Org. Sec.: The recently requested 40 Regional-Defense Bns. will not be ready before 10 June.

The stated desire of ObdH to unify direction of operations under AGp. B for the last phase of the encircling battle will get us into serious trouble owing to the personalities of C in C Agp. B and his staff, and the difficulties for von Bock to get through to all commanders at a point of the battle when to do so would be difficult even through well-established communications.

ObdH's insistence of unification of command looks to me like a device to sidestep responsibility. He keeps arguing that he has no choice but coordinate the efforts of the various elements converging on the pocket, under his own command or under that of von Beck. The first alternative, which I should think he would accept as the logical and manly one, he feels unsure about. He seems to be glad to let someone else take the responsibility. But with that he also foregoes the honors of victory.

Operational Order 5852/40 GK\* goes out without my signature to signify my disapproval of the order and its timing.

24 May 1940.

The situation continues to develop in an entirely satisfactory manner, even though it takes quite a while for Inf. to get to the Arras area. Since there is no threat south of the Somme at the moment, the delay is not too serious. The enemy's fighting power probably does not amount to much more than local resistance. So, events will take their due course; all we need is patience to let them come to a head.

For the first time now, enemy air superiority has been reported by Kleist.

1100 Gen. Mieth dispatched to Fourth Army to communicate the following ideas:

- a) Straighten out situation at Béthune. Once high ground is secured, continuation of tank drive should be considered across line Estaires - Cassel, on Ypres, with a view to linking up with the wedge pushed by Sixth Army across the Lys river in direction of Roulers.
- b) Bring up long-range Arty. for defense of Coast against naval shelling or any landing attempts by the British.
- c) Use motor transport of Thirteenth mot. Div. to bring in Sixth Div. for its relief.

Zerbel: Demonstration Div. (164th) will wind up its course by 8 June and be ready to move as of 10 June. Experiences are to be compiled in a manner permitting continuation where they left off, at some future date.

Hemmerich: Substitution of good French 1 : 200,000 maps for our 1 : 300,000 maps of the area south of Seine. Organize map distribution center which will be attached to new Supply Base in Brussels area.

1530 The Fuehrer arrived at Rundstedt's Hq this morning.

- a) He orders that new boundary line is not to go into effect today. Wants to talk to ObdH.
- b) ObdH summoned to Fuehrer.

1600 Talk this over on phone with ObdH, who is at Hq Sixth Army. Orders to comply with Fuehrer's wishes are issued to AGp. A by myself, to AGp. B by ObdH.

1600 von Salmuth reports on counterattacks by mcz. enemy forces in Abbeville and Amiens area, which are especially vigorous at Corbie and Péronne; thinks it is a British Tank Corps.

1630 Order issued to 164th Div. to stop Field Grade Officer training courses by 8 June. Div. must be ready for new assignment on 10 June.

1720 von Stuelpnagel: Experiences with pillboxes have been effectively applied by the officers briefed on them.

200 assault boats ready for operation "Braun" (6 boats for crossing points of 8 Divs.) /sic\_/

24 Hv. mortars from Doeberitz.

Jacob thinks he would be able to get together for "Braun":

23 Columns Bridge Equipment B.

8 " Light Austrian Bridge Equipment,

9 " Bridge Equipment C

Total: 5 prefabricated bridges, that is, 2 heavy, 3 light bridges and a small reserve.

1,000 large pneumatic floats (600 issued, 400 in reserve).



36 Eng. Bns., including the organic Div. Eng. Bns. (21 new, Bns.), with 20 Bns. set aside for Operation "Tiger".

Improvised bridge equipment better than military bridges for "Tiger".

Logistical preparations will be completed for 15 July\*. Probably no more than 12 med. Arty. Bns. will be required for Operation "Braun".

2000 ObdH returns from OKW: Apparently again a very unpleasant interview with Fuehrer. At 2020 a new order is issued, cancelling yesterday's order and directing encirclement to be effected in area Dunkirk-Estaires-Lille-Roubaix-Ostend. The left wing, consisting of Armor and mot. forces, which has no enemy before it, will so be stopped dead in its tracks upon direct orders of the Fuehrer! Finishing off the encircled enemy army is to be left to Air Force!!

25 May 1940.

The day starts off with one of those painful wrangles between ObdH and the Fuehrer on the next moves in the encircling battle. The battle plan I had drafted called for AGp. A, by heavy frontal attacks, merely to hold the enemy, who is making a planned withdrawal, while AGp. B, dealing with an enemy already whipped, cuts into his rear and delivers the decisive blow. This was to be accomplished by our Armor. Now political command has formed the fixed idea that the battle of decision must not be fought on Flemish soil, but rather in Northern France. To camouflage this political move, the assertion is made that Flanders, criss-crossed by a multitude of waterways, is unsuited for tank warfare. Accordingly, all tanks and mot. troops will have to be brought up short on reaching the line St. Omer - Bethune.

This is a complete reversal of the elements of the plan. I wanted to make AGp. A the hammer and AGp. B the anvil in this operation. - Now B will be the hammer and A the anvil. As AGp. B is confronted with a consolidated front, progress will be slow and casualties high. The Air Force, on which all hopes are pinned, is dependent on the weather.

This divergence of views results in a tug-of-war which costs more nerves than does the actual conduct of the operations. However, the battle will be won, this way or that.

For the rest of the morning I am not in for anyone. - I only see von Sponeck for a minute to congratulate him on receiving the Knight's Cross, and work on the regrouping of our forces for the next phase of the campaign.

In the afternoon, conference with von Brauchitsch who approves my recommendations without comment.

1830 Conference at Fuehrer Hq: As usual, he receives me in a cool, almost hostile manner. No major changes in my plans for regrouping, in which I stress the objectives of the armored forces and the terrain problems involved. The following points stand out from his, at times agitated, analysis:

- a) The group forming the western wing must be made strong (about 12 - 15 Divs.). Infantry must attack vigorously from the east on the line Peronne - La Fere. A strong tank force will assist this attack by a flank thrust from the direction of Amiens. Immediately following, some portions of this group will drive directly on Le Havre - Rouen and establish a bridgehead across the lower Seine, while others will join the main drive further to the east. The objectives selected for this first phase of the operation are approved.
- b) Decision on continuance of drive by the Seine Group west of Paris must be deferred. Longwinded recapitulation of all the dangers presented by a city like Paris, from which 400 - 500,000 soldiers could burst out at any time. (If the enemy has any left!)

Continuance of the drive west of Paris can be considered only after the main drive on both sides of Reims has made substantial ground gains.

- c) Drive east of Paris must be carried through with strong right wing. A strong armored force must be held in readiness for a quick thrust into Paris in the event of internal disorder. Left wing of main attacking force must capture Verdun.
- d) Speed is of the essence. The main thing is to seize the various key positions within the shortest time. This is as important on the right wing as it is on the left.
- e) Preparations for "Tiger" should be advanced to the point where the operation could start on 24 hours' notice.
- f) Diversion of the drive west of Paris toward Bay of Biscay is left open.
- g) Timetable: Submit as soon as possible!

Evening report: Resistance continues strong in front of AGp. A and in Douai pocket. Transport movements of enemy to lower Somme seem to continue. Now we have built up such strength that we have nothing to fear. However, in our next moves we must reckon with stiff opposition there.

26 May 1940.

No significant change in situation. von Bock, suffering losses, is pushing slowly ahead between inner wings of Eighteenth and Sixth Armies; Kluge's II Corps gains some ground around La Bassée. Our armored and mot. forces have stopped as if paralyzed on the high ground between Bethune and St. Omer in compliance with top level orders, and must not attack. In this way, cleaning out the pocket may take weeks, very much to the detriment of our prestige and our future plans.

All through the morning, ObdH is very nervous. I can fully sympathize with him, for these orders from the top just make no sense. In one area they call for a head-on attack against a front retiring in orderly fashion and still possessing its striking power, and elsewhere they freeze the troops to the spot when the enemy rear could be cut into anytime you wanted to attack. von Rundstedt, too, apparently could not stand it any longer and went up front to Hoth and Kleist, to get the lay of the land for the next moves of his armor.

Around noon, a telephone call notifies us that the Fuehrer has authorized the left wing to be moved within Arty. firing range of Dunkirk in order to cut off, from the landside, the continuous flow of transport (evacuations and arrivals).

1330 ObdH summoned to Fuehrer. Returns beaming at 1430. At last the Fuehrer has given permission to move on Dunkirk in order to prevent further evacuations. Farther south, Inf. will advance to a point where the road Bailleul-Cassel-Bergues can be taken under Arty. fire. Another drive, with 2 or 3 Armd. Divs. and the requisite number of mot. Divs. aiming at Ypres is to be put on between Bailleul and Armentières, in order to link up with AGp. B. After effecting junction, this group comes under control of AGp. B and then pushes on to Ostend; to prevent evacuations from that port; and encircle the Belgian Army wing. Another force of about two Armd. Divs. will attack on the axis Seclin - Tournai in order to pinch off the enemy forces south of Lille and link up with AGp. B. Orders to this effect are issued at 1510.

In afternoon, talk with Heusinger on drafting of regrouping directives.

1700 Wagner (Gen Qu): Setting up of Supply Base for drive to the south. -- Railroad difficulties in Luxembourg. -- Evacuation of prisoners. -- Military Administration in Belgium and Northern France.

Evening: A report on foreign situation\*. The political developments on Balkans are of particular interest. Hungary begins to get cocky. Our political command is confident it has Russia on a short enough rein to keep her from reaching out beyond Bessarabia. If Hungary does not fall in line she will be turned into a protectorate.

The attitude of the political command toward Holland is also interesting. The policy is to prevent formation of a responsible government, so as to avoid the issue of the Dutch East Indies.

Any revolutionary change in France would be undesirable. It could only result in creation of a Popular Front, and peace offers from such a source would be difficult to reject. A refusal would bring about a fusion of the Popular Front with Nationalist elements.

Transport difficulties in Twelfth Army and apparently also in Sixteenth Army.

Later in the evening, final formulation of the plans for the next phase of the campaign, which is to follow conclusion of fighting in Flanders.

27 May 1940.

Early morning reports only confirm start of attack against encircled enemy. On left wing, Kleist seems to encounter stronger resistance than expected.

By noon, the attack has made very slow progress in the pocket at Douai, done somewhat better in the area of Béthune, while considerably more headway seems to have been made between Bailleul and the coast.

Sixth Army, too, seems to be getting ahead in the direction of Ypres. The enemy is beginning to break, but it is a slow process. We must bear in mind that a total of four enemy armies are packed into this pocket and that there is nothing left for them but to fight back as long as there is any ammunition; it must give out eventually.

0930 After morning conference with ObdH: Drive to Euskirchen airfield. From there in our Ju\* to Mézières-Charleville for conference at Hq AGp. A with the Ia and OQu officers regarding continuance of operation ("Rot").

After this conference, which takes about an hour and a quarter, Greiffenberg speaks on operational details, and Wagner discusses re-direction of supplies. Following a quick luncheon with C in C Agp. A and a short drive to the Meuse, I start for the return flight over the Meuse Valley, Namur, Liège, Maastricht.

Outstanding points of the conference:

- 1.) AGp. wants a different alignment of Armies from that specified by us. They would like to have them in the following order, beginning from the right wing: Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and Second Armies.

- 2.) Concern about possible enemy offensive in the Somme - Oise sector. Blaskowitz anticipates an attack by 12 enemy Divs. and is worried. Such an attack is most unlikely, also in Rundstedt's opinion.
- 3.) Certain difficulties in replenishing ammunition. Fourth Army has used up a great deal and had to draw on the resources of newly arrived Divs. of Second Army. As a result, some Divs. are arriving in the front line without their full ammunition issue. This is awkward, but it is a temporary situation and will soon remedy itself.

After return at 1630, conference with ObdH about my findings.

Mieth: Current matters accumulated in my absence.

v. Zichlberg: Current personnel matters.

Central Branch. -- Communications Chief -- OQu II: GHq will be transferred not to Chimay, but to the wooded area to the south. Danger of air attacks.

2045 Report from AGp. B that a Belgian general has come to Sixth Army Hq on behalf of his King to ask for surrender terms for the Belgian Army. Inquiry to Fuehrer. Answer: Unconditional surrender. No other stipulations! (2055)

More reports are coming in on landings of paratroop detachments in Rear Area around Charleville during night. Countermeasures are time-consuming and a nuisance but will have to be attended to.

Capt. Gaedke reports on his tour to the Somme and the bridgehead at Amiens and Péronne.

Kossmann: Administration of Holland turned over to Seyss-Inquart. Fuehrer orders 28 May. Reason: Mussert.\*

28 May 1940.

The surrender negotiations of the Belgian Army initiated last night have been concluded. At 1045, Gen.Obst. von Pock informs ObdH that the surrender document has been signed. According to the Belgians, the surrender will affect about half a million men.

0930 - 1100: Lengthy conference with ObdH, who is rather restless for want of something to keep him busy, and can hardly wait until the detailed regrouping orders have been worked out. He wants regrouping of AGp. A planned in such a way that Divs., which will be freed in the St. Amand area could be shifted to the northern wing at the earliest, to relieve the Armd. Divs. which then could be taken back immediately for refitting.



I bring up the subject of Belgium, which in the impending operations must be treated differently from Holland. The Fuehrer must be advised of this.

ObdH sees Fuehrer during morning and returns with the following results at 1300:

- a) The proposed change in alignment of Armies has been approved. Blaskowitz will be replaced by Strauss, the latter by von Stuelpnagel.
- b) Guderian will be given command of an Armd. Group. This can best be accomplished by transferring Hoth to Fourth Army, Kleist to AGp. B (with XIV Corps going with him), and Guderian to AGp. A.
- c) Six Regional Defense Divs. are to remain in the East (in addition to 2 Replacement Divs. under Oven and Kayser, plus 14 Regional Defense Bns. from Fromm).
- d) Liquidation of Belgian Campaign:

Step 1: Disarming; feeding; prisoners from pocket to be dispersed in direction Antwerp - Brussels, leaving industrial areas free for time being. Status of King not yet decided.

Step 2: Separate Flemings from Walloons. Release Flemings. Walloons will probably be evacuated to Reich as labor force.

- e) Coast: Demands on Navy. They must take charge of coastal defense. Crews for fortress guns will be drawn from AGp. C.

- f) Operations:

1.) At long last my idea has penetrated that for this operation we must concentrate our Armor in front of our left wing, with direction on Bar-le-Duc (A) - St. Dizier (B). With this base, we can establish a strong grouping in front of the more slowly following Inf. Divs., which will drive to the eastern bank of the Moselle on the axis St. Mihiel - Pont-à-Mousson, to form an inner ring and through the area south of Nancy, to form an outer ring; an inward thrust from the inner ring will aim at Verdun from the rear.

2.) Operation "Tiger" is deferred until such time when effect of operations from the northwest makes itself felt on eastern bank of Moselle.

3.) Draw a ring around Paris, then go in with Infantry, not with Armor. Accordingly, von Bock's right wing must have great depth; MG and AT.

- g) Projected peacetime Army:

24 Armd. Divs.,  
12 mot. Divs.,  
30 - 40 other Divs.

Problem of greater mobility of tanks may be solved by putting dollies powered by tank engines under them on railroad tracks.

h) Airborne troops: Marne, Moselle, in front of First Army. Not available at time being.

1500 Talk with Wagner (Gen Qu): Impression that setting up of Brussels Base needed some energetic prodding. Seems to be under way now.

Orientation on intentions regarding Belgian prisoners of war.

von Hasse on phone (for v. Salmuth): Orientation on intentions of Fuehrer concerning Belgian PWs.

Buhle reports on replacement matters. Measures to assure prompt arrival of the most urgently needed replacements.

Future occupation force in the East (see above, under c).

Projected peacetime organization of Army (see above, under g).

CQu I: Upper Rhine:

Offers no problems to Eng. Corps.

Arty. can be supplied from June allocation (10 June):

|                            |           |
|----------------------------|-----------|
| 1 med Fd. How. Bn.         |           |
| 2 10 cm gun Bns.           |           |
| 3 Czech med. Fd. How. Bns. |           |
| 1 Hv. How. Bn.             | 2         |
| Total:                     | 21 Btrys. |

Engineers: 2 Eng. Bns. for each Div.

Operation "Tiger": Reinforcements of Arty.: 23 Bns. -- AGp. C must study new offensive tactics.

Memorandum on "Leitervorschriften", 200 copies b. 10 June.

Evening conference at ObdH: Agenda for conference in Charleville on 29 May: Regrouping for new operation. -- Film and Propaganda matters. -- Demobilization: Must be handled by a special Commissar.

Gercke reports on railroads: The great picture is nothing spectacular, but will do. Hard to get personnel for civilian railroad administration as Reich railroads had to send personnel also to the East. Operation of lines satisfactory. Ample rolling stock captured in Belgium.

29 May 1940.

The enemy pocket has again shrunk. It will indeed be interesting to see how much of the enemy did get caught in this pocket, 45 km in length and 30 km in width. Even now, with Lille, Roubaix, Tourcoing in our hands, the enemy is still fighting desperately against our troops pressing on his flanks.

ObdH receives Blaskowitz and informs him about the Fuehrer's decision to relieve him of his command.

Conference with ObdH regarding agenda for conference with the CGs in Charleville this afternoon.

Jeschonneck wants return of AAA. Asks for 4 million liters of aviation gasoline, captured by us at Chievre, southeast of Laon.

1400 - 1600 Conference in Charleville. Present ObdH, myself, accompanying staff officers, CS in C of AGps. and Armies (without AGp. C and First and Seventh Armies)!

Supplementary to the Ia conference of 27 May, the basic ideas underlying the operation are reviewed and the details of execution discussed. (For particulars see agenda notes on conference.) No queries of any importance, no fundamental disagreements.

Afterwards, Wagner speaks briefly on supply, and Fellgiebel on signal communications.

1600 Return flight, on which we take several wounded soldiers with us. Arrival Euskirchen at 1630, back at Hq, 1800.

1830 Stapp: Proposals for expansion of the Airborne Forces of the Air Marshal. We are asked to release Sixteenth Inf. Regt. I have no objections.

2100 Fellgiebel: Communications network for Quartermaster Services. -- Assignment of Signal troops to Armd. Divs. -- New GHq.

2200 Bogatsch: Long-range reconnaissance. Proposals. Air Force is intriguing again to get long-range Staffeln away from OKH and AGps. They say they would organize a "Joint Reconnaissance Service" for the entire Armd. Forces. Dissension over missions assigned to Ground Forces AA units. They were the ones that wanted to be committed in the front line. Now Air Force AA wants to be up front, and would like to leave AA defense in the Rear Areas to the Ground Forces AA Bns. \*

30 May 1940.

Disintegration of the bottled-up enemy forces is continuing. Some of British units in there are still fighting stubbornly and with determination, others are streaming back to the coast and try to get across the sea in anything that floats. Le Débarcle.\*\*

On the southern front, the French are making local attacks to eliminate our bridgehead across the Somme, and so put the river between us and themselves. This would be an indication that they are bent on defense only, which need not surprise us. With the balance of strength being what it is, they could not even dream of staging a coordinated drive calculated to turn the outcome of the campaign, but must do everything possible to stretch their forces.

Among the pinched-off French elements we have captured another Commanding General of an Army.

Morning conference with CbdH: He is angry, and the reason is that the effects of the blunders forced upon us by OKW (detour in direction Laon and holding back the tanks at St. Omer) are beginning to be felt now. We lost time and so the pocket with the French and British in it was sealed later than it could have been. Worse, the pocket would have been closed at the coast if only our Armor had not been held back. As it is, the bad weather has grounded our Air Force and now we must stand by and watch how countless thousands of the enemy are getting away to England right under our noses.

Gercke reports on railroads in occupied territories: Brussels will be operational by 1 June, Ath by 5 June, etc.

Railroad situation in ZI satisfactory.

Preparations for extension of railroad lines: Since existing railroad lines on the right wing of our new drive all converge on Paris and do not run in the direction of our movements, AGp. B will have to be supplied by rail mainly through sector of AGp. A. (On either side of Reims, then spur line in direction Paris for supplies to Armies of AGp. A.)\*

Morning Conference: Forces available for regrouping:

OKH Reserve 20 Divs.

|                               |                |                       |
|-------------------------------|----------------|-----------------------|
| Western pocket around Lille   | 8 Divs.        | plus 1 Armd. Div. (SS |
| Eastern pocket, around Hirson | 6 Divs.        | Deathhead)            |
| In training centers in ZI     | <u>5 Divs.</u> |                       |

Total 20 Divs. \*\*

Talk with Wagner on reorganization of entire supply system for switch of drive to south. Preparations can be completed by 3 June.

Conference with von Greiffenberg and Stieff on disposition of forces for the regrouping orders, and drafting of the orders.

Evening: Regroupin order "Rot" goes out.

31 May 1940.

The morning reports do not give a substantially changed picture of the situation. The ring around Dunkirk has further contracted. However, the British who are continuing the evacuation under the most difficult conditions, are still fighting desperately. The situation must be attacked with all the resources of a full-scale operation.

The Lille pocket seems to contain substantial enemy forces.

On the southern front, the enemy is making forceful attempts to wipe out our bridgeheads, but has made only trifling local gains to date. Meanwhile, our position there has been materially improved by the arrival of Inf. Divs.

Regrouping of our forces has started. AHq 18 has formally taken over command, but apparently has not yet been able to reach all units now under its control.

Later in the morning, drive to AGp. C in Bad Schwalbach. En route I stop for an hour on Reich Motor Highway near Limburg, where Wagner (Gen Qu) submits his order for the reorganization of rear communications in the impending drive. The logistical arrangements will be completed by 3 June, and first issues can be made on 4 June.

Conference at AGp. C: ObdH reviews our plan in broad outline.

C in C Agp. and CGs of Armies state their intentions. ObdH emphasizes that efforts to achieve breakthrough must not be restrained by preoccupation for flanks.

The conference produces no new viewpoints, but holding it was necessary to give an extra lift to the commanders of this front, which has been left more or less untouched by the events of the last weeks.

Return via Bad Ems.- Rhine valley - Ahr valley. Back at 1900.

The reports received during the day confirm the picture given by the morning reports. Lacking unified leadership (Army Hq 18 could not get through to all Hqs in time), our attack resolved itself into individual actions against an enemy stubbornly defending himself behind the canals, and so achieved only slight local successes. An intercepted radio signal would indicate that the enemy is going to resume evacuation operations during the night. It will be difficult to stop him. We are now paying for our failure, due to interference from above, to cut off the coast.

Effectiveness of our Artillery against the enemy is greatly reduced in the sand dunes, where neither ricochets nor impact fuzes produce the desired effect. (Fuehrer suggests use of AA explosive train fuzes.)

Regrouping is making good strides. Fourth, Sixth, Ninth and Second Armies will take over their sectors by noon tomorrow, next to Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies, which were there before. AGp. B will then assume command on 2 June, 1200, completing the build-up of our front.

A number of long-distance calls are made during the evening to make sure that our new offensive front is set up as planned and that 5 June will be adhered to as target date for the attack.



Goth (Liaison Off., Fourth Army) gives an account of the situation on the Somme. The enemy tanks attacks turn out to have been quite serious. He reports also on the condition of our Armd. units. The latest strength reports are cheering. They show that 50% of our tanks are ready for immediate commitment; within a few days (about five) required for minor repairs, fighting strength will be up to 70%. The tanks which have been brought up as loss replacements are ready for issue. It is well to remember, however, that the useful life of a tank is limited. We may expect a substantial number to be out of the running after about another 300 km. This would do nicely for our purposes. Besides, we could make use of some of the many tanks captured from the enemy.

1 June 1940.

Operations have produced no significant developments. The small coastal strip still held by the enemy has again been narrowed, but our attacks are making only slow progress. The remnants of the enemy are fighting gallantly, but demoralization is beginning to show in some places. We must reckon with another evacuation attempt during the night. Apart from this, the operation started on 10 May is now concluded.

This fact will have its outward expression also by the Fuehrer's visit to Hqs AGp. B. today, and AGp. A, tomorrow, to express his thanks and appreciation. It will further be marked by the decoration of OKH and Gen. Staff Officers.

The efforts of all Commands and OKH now are bent on assuring the opening of the new drive on 5 June. Regrouping by AGps. A and B must be effected substantially along the lines of our orders. The Army Hqs will take over their sectors on the new front today in the following order: Fourth, Sixth, Ninth, Second; Twelfth and Sixteenth Armies will adjoin them in their old sectors.

Roehricht: Instructions regarding compilation of campaign experiences Staff for special tasks. --- Furlough matters.

Mueller Gen Qu reports on progress in setting up of Supply Base Belgium. On the whole satisfactory. Transport situation shows marked improvements. 36 trains are running via Antwerp, 24 via Gembloux.

Col. Thomas returns after some delay. Reports on condition of armd. troops. Over-all picture very satisfactory. Fighting strength still at 70%. Further improvement by arrival of new tanks. Order is issued on allocation of overhauled tanks.

Grabbe, Mil.Att. Budapest, brings congratulations of Werth. I explain to him what should be understood by the term "concerted action" which apparently is misinterpreted by Homlock.

Gen. Ott (Chief Inf. Off.) reports on Assault Btrys. -- Med. Inf. Guns. -- Wants front commitment for Inf. Tng. Regt. (can be done in operation "Tiger"). -- Wants to have command of an Inf. Div. in the field. (Cannot be done.)

Jacob reports on becoming Chief Eng. Off. Points discussed with him: Bridges in sector of AGp. B (improvised equipment) and reassignment of available Eng. Hqs.

ObdH has been informed by the Fuehrer that Italy will enter the war within coming weeks. The Fuehrer does not want 5 June so as not to compromise secrecy of our plans.

On 4 June, a large-scale attack will be launched against enemy (French) Air Force. In other respects, Fuehrer conference with Cs in C and Cs of S of Armies did not produce anything of importance.

The following Liaison Offs. have been assigned:

|                       |                                     |
|-----------------------|-------------------------------------|
| Goth                  | Fourth Army (incl. Armd. Gp. Hoth), |
| Lt. Col. Tschirdewahn | Sixth Army,                         |
| Lt. Col. Busse        | Armd. Gp. Kleist,                   |
| Maj. Meyer-Ricks      | Ninth Army,                         |
| Maj. Gehlen           | Armd. Gp. Guderian.                 |

Evening: Buhle on peacetime organization. Specifications of Gen. Staff.

v. Ziehlberg: Removal to Chimay.

2 June 1940.

The over-all situation is unchanged. It is quite obvious that the enemy is getting a little nervous. He cannot but realize that we have considerable forces available for new operations, but he will not have a clear picture of our new offensive plans. He is probably considering these three possibilities:

- a) Rolling up of the Maginot Line,
- b) Thrust on Paris via Reims,
- c) Drive against the Lower Seine with a strong right wing.

Accordingly he will group his reserves around Paris and will reinforce the corner buttress, the Maginot Line.

An estimate of enemy losses at the end of the first phase of the campaign indicates that the enemy has lost about 1,5 million men and equipment equivalent to that of about 70 Divs.

ObdH flies to Berlin.

Iron Crosses: After presenting the Iron Cross, First Class, to Greiffenberg and Thiele yesterday, I shall decorate a considerable number of officers in the three Head-quarter Sections with Iron Crosses today. To do this I have to drive to Godesberg and take a plane to Giessen.

During the afternoon valuable intelligence extracted from captured enemy transport orders is received. It appears that we still have to reckon with a strong group south of the Somme, comprising 15 to 18 Divs., including several Divs. of GHq Reserve.

The great picture accordingly presents a front between the sea and the Meuse river, for the most part held only by moderately strong forces, and, behind it, a reserve divided into two groups, north and northeast of Paris, respectively. Another reserve group probably is inside the fortress triangle.

Paris in all likelihood is guarded by Third Draft Divs.\*

Regrouping and shifting of our forces is making progress.

Naturally this result is not brought about without some frictions. I would not be surprised if tomorrow and the day after tomorrow we see some people try to get us to extend the target date (5 June).

3 June 1940.

- Move to Forges -

No material changes in the situation. Everything is on the move for regrouping.

In working out our plans, special stress must be laid on the need for making the right wing strong and keep our reserves close up to the line.

As far as numbers are concerned we have all that would be needed for a strong right wing. The difficulty will be to move our forces up quickly enough to obviate drawing on Army troops for covering the flank facing Paris.

We must let today and tomorrow go by without interfering in current movements. Afterwards it may become necessary to revise the grouping of the reserves.

ObdH brings nothing of consequence from Berlin. Inf. Tng. Regt. is not yet ready.

Canaris tells me about activities and achievements of his organization. I thank him. — Wahle, Attaché Bucarest.

1230 Departure for Hangelar, via Godesberg. (Call on Baroness Dyker\*\*to thank her for her hospitality.) By plane to new GHq. Arrival 1630.

The layout of the new GHq is badly arranged. Op. Sec. is 20 minutes away from my office. On the other hand, ObdH is wall-to-wall with Op. Sec. The internal telephone system still functions very spottily. The outside lines seem to be working fairly well. Facilities for directing major operation are not nearly as good as those in our former GHq.

1700 Col. Gen. von Brauchitsch on phone:

- a) AGp. Bock has shown him that they cannot move up their reserves, especially Eighteenth and 61st Divs., which are still engaged in heavy fighting at Dunkirk. X Corps also is still tied up in that sector, but IV Corps is now free.
- b) Arians bridgehead seems to be too narrow for tank jump-off. Accordingly XVI Corps will start drive via Peronne and link up with XIV Corps in direction of Montdidier.
- c) He says that only parts of the GHq Arty. and Engs. have arrived so far, and he is also worried that Ninth Armd. Div. might not come up in time. Nor have replacements reached the Divs. All this adds up to a request for postponement of our offensive.

Now this is what I think:

Re a) Switching AGp. Reserves for OKH Reserves is a mere bookkeeping matter. For all we care, the Divs. can follow up as OKH Reserves. IV Corps can be substituted for X Corps.

Re b) Is an operational matter of AGp.

Re c) A one-day postponement won't do much good, and to get away from improvisations it would be necessary to allow several days.

1200 von Salmuth also brings up question of Eighteenth and 61st Divs. Wants IV Corps released to take place of X.

Approved.

2200 Gen Qu reports on hospitals:

Fourth Army hospitals will be evacuated by end of this week.

Twelfth Army hospitals, 50% evacuated, rest will be cleared by end of week.

Sixteenth Army, 75% of beds still occupied.

Sixth Army hospitals have been evacuated; patients were transferred to Eighteenth Army installations.

Second and Ninth Army hospitals still entirely free.

2300 Evening conference with ObdH: Reviews his findings. The movements of foot troops and mot. elements are crisscrossing pretty badly, and road jams and delays are unavoidable.

Another factor is that the troops are in need of rest. It will be difficult to keep the 5 June dateline. To me, on the contrary, it seems both necessary and important to stick to that date.

Fourth Army has reported British units at their front.

4 June 1940.

The enemy situation at the front has not changed materially.

Still, the continual reports about enemy concentrations around Paris and the appearance in Fourth Army sector, of British troops, believed to be newly landed, are something to think about.

The strength of the enemy is limited. We can continue operating on our assumption that the Allies have about 60 Divs. in France. This would be enough for a weakly held front and some reserve groups. The disposition of these reserve groups will be dictated by our threat to Paris. We may assume that the enemy is expecting our attack to come from the direction of Laon and that he reckons with a strong German right wing, from both the clues furnished by the development of the campaign and our obvious aim to threaten England from the air. For this reason he will keep substantial forces also between lower Somme and lower Seine. Behind the concentrations around Villers-Cotterets and Beauvais we may reckon with a group around Paris. From behind this triangle the enemy could take his dispositions against the grouping of German forces as it is actually developing now.

Such a policy necessarily weakens the French eastern front. The enemy will try to mask this weakness, or mitigate its consequences, by heavily reinforcing the northern wing of the Maginot Line. All this, however, would not affect massing of large forces in the wider Paris area, which, in the course of the developing German attack and perhaps also of an Italian drive, might become the pivotal point of a strategy backing against the sea. Such a solution certainly must be seriously considered by a military command which would have only the Atlantic route left to get to its manpower reserves in North Africa if an Italian drive should cut it off from the Mediterranean; and, an even weightier reason is that it must ultimately look to America for aid.

Another factor in favor of such a solution is that for a France, deprived of her industrial North and depending largely on overseas imports to maintain her production, holding her seaports and the lines of communications to them is a matter of life and death.

If these conclusions prove correct, our drive will at first gain ground in the Somme and Aisne sector (owing to the tactical weakness of the French forces strung out over a sprawling front), but eventually come up against stronger forces north and northeast of Paris.



Accordingly, our organization in depth must be so as to enable us to shift the main effort to AGp. A and wheel this group in the Champagne toward the west. Massing of Armor on this wing must be prepared now. It still has to be decided whether or not to shift some of the Armor to the Moselle in order to assist the jump-off of operation "Tiger". In any event, "Tiger" must not be lacking in punch, for if the contemplated wheeling movement is carried out, the "Tiger" Group, as wing echelon following AGp. A in southwestern direction, may yet play a decisive part.

At the morning conference, these schemes of thought are put to discussion.

ObdH goes out to AGp. A, and Sixteenth, Twelfth, Second and Ninth Armies.

Gen. Mieth flies to Eighteenth Army in order to initiate withdrawal and transfer of the Reserves now committed with the Dunkirk Group.

Op. Sec. issues orders on regrouping of GHq Reserves.

Wilke is put on the job of restoring liaison with Air Force, slackened by removal of GHq.

Gen Qu is prodded to speed movement of Regional Defense Divs. in Belgium to the coast in order to insure earliest possible release of line units still tied up in the area.

1200 von Salmuth:

- a) Dunkirk taken. Coast has been reached. French are gone.
- b) Bayer, XVIII Corps, sick. Replaced by Boehme, 32nd Div. 32nd Div. will be taken over by Gen. Bohnstedt, of the Eighteenth Div.
- c) Attack set for 5 June, 0500 hrs.

von Greiffenberg:

- a) Jodl rings up: Fuhrer wants to send Mt. Div. to Italy.
- b) Seventh and 67th Divs. will be transferred from AGp. A Reserves to western GHq reserve pool. In their place AGp. A will get three other Divs. to be combed out of Sixteenth Army.

Liss: French and British have begun attack of bridgehead Abbeville with tanks at 0445. One heavy tank put out of action. Our position substantially intact. British 51st Div. identified.

Felber: a) Attacks in First Army sector were in violation of Leeb's instructions. After discussion of matter clear-cut orders are issued to keep quiet and push reconnaissance only.

- b) Seventh Army believes that training of Eng. troops has not yet reached requisite level, and as a result will not be able to attack before 19 June. Postponement cannot be granted, but I promise to send Jacob out to them.

1500 von Salmuth: Two French Divisional Commanders (25th and 68th) have been captured at Dunkirk. Several other generals are claimed together with 40,000 men and immense quantities of materiel.

1745 Liss: Air coverage of area south of Somme to Seine and Marne shows absence of enemy movements. AA defense at Rouen; especially heavy AA between Soissons and Fismes.

Radio intelligence locates an Army Hq at Beauvais. This means that we have to count with two Armies between the Oise river and the sea.

Koerner:

- a) Enemy bombing attacks on Neuss railroad station and Rotterdam. Service interrupted only for 24 hours. Neuss railroad station a total loss.
- b) At present, 48 trains are running on line Gennep - Roosendaal - Brussels, 24 trains on line Venlo - Hasselt - Ottignies.

As long as only line Mons - Valenciennes is available from Ottignies, we cannot make full use of the 72 incoming trains. Line Ottignies - Charleroi - Fourmies is under reconstruction and will soon relieve situation.

Sixteen trains are now coming into Dinant where freight is taken to western bank of Meuse by truck. On the other side we have only five trains. I insist on a sixteen train schedule pending completion of Dinant bridge. The additional sixteen trains arriving via Luxembourg are being transloaded on trucks and routed to Rethel area by way of Sedan.

Irregular runs to Etaples, Peronne, St. Quentin, Laon, Rethel. Water route to Antwerp via Rotterdam. I want also Ghent included.

In the evening I join ObdH for a glass of wine at his country estate billet. Wonderful eventide peace. Harmonious atmosphere.

Gen Qu reports that all logistical arrangements are completed for operation.

Signal Chief reports that communications net is all set for operation.

Reports are received that our Air Force has apparently made a very successful attack against the enemy fighter base at Paris on 4 June. Defense was weak. A big success. One of the men states: "It was like parade formation flying at the Nuernberg Party Rally."

5 June 1940.

Our offensive has started at 0500. Early reports seem to indicate that the enemy in the open country south of the Somme has made things easy for us on the first forward bound.

The days to come will show if the enemy is really accepting a battle of decision at the Somme and Aisne. It is hard to say what would be the best course of action for him. Withdrawal to his fortifications belt along the Seine north of Paris and Marne would enable him to maintain contact with his frontier fortifications in the east. Yet doing so would overextend his front and he would no longer be strong in any place. He will be beaten on this line which will be breached probably east of Reims and perhaps simultaneously also in the direction of the lower Seine. It remains to be seen whether this will lead to an encirclement of the remaining enemy in the northeastern sector - as envisaged and ordered by us - or to an encirclement in the wider Paris area. It is important for us so to dispose our reserves as to have them available for either contingency.

Morning conference with ObdH is unproductive of any important viewpoints. Steps must be initiated for Blaskowitz' assignment to an administrative post in Northern France.

Wagner: Each of our Armies has more than 1 basic ammunition issue. 40,000 tons of ammunition have reached the theater up to 4 June, afternoon. -- Fuel supply on hand, ample. -- Bread and oats are arriving in sufficient quantities. -- We are now running 1<sup>st</sup> trains via Brussels and 12 via Hasselt. Waterways are being utilized with a schedule of 8 ships of 400 tons each.

Thoma reports on his tour to Group Guderian. As expected, everything is in good shape; only a few motor casualties in the course of the regrouping movement. A mobile spare part depot has been reactivated for the Group. Apart from the usual difficulties with rubber track blocks, everything is in best order.

Conference with ObdH about new phase of campaign: We must bear in mind that the enemy, on the one hand, cannot afford to give up his communication lines with the coast, but, on the other, cannot afford to lose contact with his fortified northeastern front, and that if for no other reason than national morale. The Maginot Line represents everything that stands for security in the French people's mind. The Line cannot be given up without risking the moral collapse of France. These considerations will compel the enemy so to group the bulk of his forces in the region protected by the Maginot Line and the fortresses on the one side and the sea on the other, as to have a defensive front facing the frontal attack of the German Army from the north. This means we shall find up to 20 Divs. of the GHq reserves under AGP. 1 generally along the Châlons - Paris line; a smaller group perhaps in the fortress triangle, and a third one as a reserve group south of St. Dizier.

If these assumptions are correct, it would be against every concept of generalship to direct the striking power of our Armies against empty or nearly empty fortifications. It is the living fighting forces of the enemy that we must aim at in the operation.

In following ~~up~~ ~~to this reasoning~~ it will be necessary to exploit the ground gains at the inner wings of AGps. A and B so as to effect a large-scale wheeling movement to the right. This maneuver would move the boundary line of the two AGps. from the area west of Reims toward the confluence of Yonne and Seine, and carry the left wing of AGp. A, which would give up Sixteenth Army to AGp. C, toward Auxerre. The Armd. Divs. would have to be massed in front of left wing of AGp. at the earliest and placed under Kleist, whose Hq has been organized for such a task from the first.

As Group Guderian is sweeping forward it is desirable to detach a reinforced Armd. Div. for a surprise attack on Verdun from the south. This Div. would follow Guderian as soon as it is relieved by arrival of the right wing of Busch.

Accordingly, Leeb would have to advance <sup>the</sup> date of start of First Army drive to 9 June, take over Sixteenth Army, already committed, and have Dollmann start his drive on 11 June. It would be his mission to reduce the French forces east of the Meuse and, as soon as possible, follow with everything he can spare in echelon formation behind Rundstedt's left wing in the general direction of Dijon.

OCu IV: I impress upon the Sec. the need for having a clear picture of the disposition of enemy strength by 7 June, noon.

Etzdorf will be oriented on our estimate of the situation, the possibilities of a new political reorganization of Holland and Belgium, and on the impending entrance of Italy into the war.

von Greiffenberg: Outline of operational intentions. Current matters.

Wagner: a) Employment of Regional Defense Units in Belgium and Holland. I have to bear down a little to get them released for coastal defense.

b) Future administration of Northern France.

Mieth: Sixteenth Inf. Regt. — Air reconnaissance.

Late into the night at work on plans for wheeling of offensive toward southwest.

Liss rings up informing us he has reliable information that the Army of 10 - 12 Divs. strength, which had been standing in Dijon area, has been shifted to area of Montmedy - Reims.

6 June 1940.

Morning conference: I outline to ObdH my conception of the next moves in the campaign, as well as proposals regarding Military Administration in Northern France and the former Reich territories, which will soon be occupied by us.

Gen. Brand (Arty): reports on Fourth Army and its Arty. support. Concentration is in right place. I send him off to Ninth and Sixth Armies.

1130 Wagner: Discussion on ammunition situation and supply of horses (transfer from the north to southern wing).

1200 ObdH agrees to activation of two Divs. of Tenth Draft in order to release Regional Defense Divs. They are to be used for coastal defense. Gen Qu is informed. — Org. Sec. will receive instructions.

Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance. Personnel losses of Air Staffeln are 30%, plane losses 25%.

Up to noon, the developing offensive gives the following picture:

Fourth Army has made relatively good progress. It has v apparently broken through the enemy defense zone, reached the lower Brosle and taken the area north of Paix.

Sixth Army has split into three widely separated offensive wedges.

XIV Corps, south of Amiens. Organized opposition supported by Arty. is expected on road Conty-Moreuil, and the intention is to take out XIV Corps and put VIII Corps in its place.

XVI Corps, south of Péronne, where the armored spearhead is approaching Roye. XXXX Corps, to the west, is battle-worn; V Corps, to the east, seems to have spread itself too far.

South of the Oise, where one Regt. of 263rd Div. apparently hit upon an unprotected boundary line, 263rd Div., together with 98th Div., took advantage of this opening and quickly gained ground; counterattacks were repelled.

Immediately to the east, XXXXIV Corps, which is making slow but steady headway toward the Aisne.

Ninth Army is moving steadily toward the Aisne.

1500 ObdH at Fuehrer Hq: The interview, as we may gather from his rather weary account on returning, developed as follows:



The Fuehrer thinks that changing the direction of the offensive, as proposed by me, is still too hazardous at this time. He wants to play absolutely safe. First he would like to have a sure hold of the Lorraine iron ore basin, so as to deprive France of her armament resources. After that he believes it would be time to consider a drive in westerly direction, probably having in mind a strong wing at the coast (Fourth Army).

There we have the same old story again. On top, there just isn't a spark of the spirit that would dare putting high stakes on a single throw. Instead, everything is done in cheap piecemeal fashion, but with the air that we don't have to rush at all. However, we can be pretty sure that before 36 or 48 hours are over, the ideas proposed by us today will be served right back to us in the form of a top-level directive.

The following points of his argumentation should be noted: The present campaign is calculated to deny the enemy possession of his iron ore resources in Lorraine. With them gone, it's all over with his armament industry. And meanwhile our political command is in no hurry. We can take our time cleaning out the Northeast, and when this is done turn either south or southwest, with a strong western wing (Fourth Army) playing an important part in the operation. For the time being we should watch how the current operation develops and in a day or two decide what we should do after Kleist has forced the Oise.

Air power is to be concentrated in front of Fourth and Sixth Armies.

With regard to Norway we learn that a new operation has been planned, for which additional forces will have to be furnished by OKH. Detailed directives may be expected soon.

1800 von Salmuth: von Bock wants to take out XIV Corps and combine it with XVI in the latter's offensive sector under Kleist. Movements to this effect have been initiated, but it is not expected that Group Kleist will be complete before 8 June.

In addition to AGp. Reserves, VIII Corps will be committed between Amiens and XXXX Corps sector. Jump-off 8 June.

The success of XIV Corps, according to AGp., represents a major victory. The enemy fronting XVI Corps has been smashed. Now there is a hole!

We have no objections against taking XIV Corps out of sector where the enemy is putting up strong resistance, and committing it in sector of offensive wedge of XVI Corps. This fits into the situation and promises success.

Evening. Talk with ObdH turns mainly about Bock's decision to withdraw XIV Corps and transfer it to sector of XVI Corps, instead of concentrating Group Kleist more forward.

2100 Inquiry at AGp. B shows that situation has developed much more favorably than was expected in the afternoon.

In fact, Fourth Army has made good strides and reached the Aumale - Poix - Conty road. Signs of demoralization are reported in this sector. To the right, in XIV Corps sector, the situation has also eased in such a degree that a determined stand of the enemy along the Moreuil - Conty road may well be discounted. The plan to shift XIV Corps has been dropped, and Thirteenth mot. Div. has been brought up as reinforcement.

XVI Corps also has gained ground and is now around Roye.

South of the Oise, First Mt. Div. has reached the Aisne and has put across advance elements. Similar reports from 25th Div., east of Soissons.

Instructions are issued for the reserves to follow, so that they will be directly behind AGp. B.

Lt. Col. Speidel, assigned to AGp. B for special functions in Paris, reports in.  
von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters.

2400 Transp. Chief reports on rail situation.

7 June 1940.

The morning reports round out last night's picture: Several powerful wedges of AGp. B have broken through the enemy defense line just west of the Oise. We are now confronted with two important questions:

- 1.) When should AGp. A start its drive?
- 2.) Would it not be advisable already now to gear everything to the southwestern drive? We'll have to make this shift as surely as night follows day, even if the Fuehrer has vetoed the plan for the moment just because it was our idea.

As to 1.) Kluge's forces must have beaten an enemy of superior strength, or else he could not be dominating the country between the Bresle and the Aumale - Conty road. There are now two alternatives: Either a). the enemy will throw against him the forces which we surmise to be concentrated north of Paris, or, b) Kluge will keep a free hand. Some signs are pointing to the former alternative. In that case, there will be fighting today in the Breteuil - Montdidier area, which will open the way toward Creil.

On this basis we can expect that Bock's right wing will have pushed to Creil by 9 June, and that Kluge will be able to open his drive to the Lower Seine from the Formerie - Mar-seille area on the same day.

In that way, the front-wide drive would get under way on 10 June, that is, Rundstedt would join in the offensive on that date. When Ninth Army and left wing of Sixth Army have crossed the Alsne, they will have to be temporarily halted until that time.

As to 2.). Following out the thoughts developed under a), we need not orient ourselves in accordance with my proposed turning movement toward the southwest before 9 June, and orders to this effect need not be issued before 10 June, i. e., the day Rundstedt, with Gp. Guderian, will have gained freedom of movement in the Champagne.

On 10 June Operation "Tiger" also can be started. This, however, depends on the timely arrival of the eleven med. Arty. Bns. which are needed as mobile reserve for the jump-off. Right now they are still with AGps. A and B, and it will take three days to shift them. It is all right if "Kleiner Baer"\* can be set in operation a few days later. A day more or less won't make any difference here.

These ideas are discussed with ObdH at the morning conference.

1030 QQu IV reports that the schools in Paris have been ordered closed and that preparations are being made for defending Paris in case of an attack.

1100 Report from AGp. C (through Op. Sec.): "Tiger" can start as soon as Arty. and mot. Engs. elements, which were promised for the operation, have arrived. Depending on their arrival the attack could start even before 10 June.

Twenty-four hours warning requested. we are hard pressed, receipt of order not later than 1400 would do!

Operation "Baer". Earliest date 13 June. Orders must be issued 48 hours in advance.

AGp. A: Orders for jump-off must reach AGp. Hq by 1600 or, on the outside, 1800 hrs.

1230 Phone talk with Felber, AGp. C: Our inquiry seems to have made those people nervous. He calms down when I explain that our inquiry regarding earliest possible date for attacks was only by way of general information. Dollmann grumbles again that the Div. sent to him would have to be trained yet.

Heusinger: Phone talk with AGp. A. They are worried that Twelfth Army is working too methodically and therefore will be too late in sending off its tanks.

1500 - 1600 Buhle:

a) Norway: We must first ascertain what stuff could be moved, then take what is needed from Sixth Mt. Div.

- b) Future peacetime Army: 22 armd. and 11 mot. Divs., 6 Mt. Divs., 24 Inf. Divs. (some as skeleton units), including 6 Inf. and 3 Mt. Divs. equipped for airborne operations.
- c) Two Replacement Divs. will not be ready before 22 June. I want one or two more Divs. activated, provided it can be done without reducing cadres below activation requirements.
- d) Combing out of ZI for traffic control and police personnel (Paris).
- e) Coastal defense: Five Btrys. will be activated with captured materiel and vehicles. Personnel will be drawn from static Btrys. of AGp. C.
- f) Col. Cranz (AGp. A) and Col. Dietfurt (AGp. B) (special assignments) report in. Will be in charge of moving up replacements.
- g) 900 AT guns from West Wall, all new deliveries, etc. have been earmarked for replacements.

Count Brockdorf and Vormann report on condition of their Divs.

von Trotha reports on SS Deathhead Div.

Ziehlberg: On personnel assignments for Paris and Blaskowitz' Staff.

Jodl a) Wants to know what we think about jump-off date for AGp. A.  
 Answer: If present operational plans stand we need not hurry, but if new plans recommended by us are accepted, attack should commence soon. (It's too late now for anything before 8 June.)  
 There are rumors of an agreement to consider our plan, but with the modification of having AGp. B attack in southwestern and AGp. A in southeastern direction. Very dangerous!

- b) There will be no new Divs. from ZI. Apparently the idea is to leave more manpower for the economy.

I inform Jodl of the activation of two Replacement Divs. and also emphasize the requirements for controlling large areas. We don't want to increase number of Divs.

- c) Background stories with the names of higher Commanders, to supplement the Wehrmacht Communiqués, are not wanted, but reports on individual feats, which give no clue to the operations involved, are acceptable.

Evening conference with ObdH: He tells me what he found at XVI and XIV Corps. Their attacks make slow progress. At times they seem to be short on ammunition. In XVI Corps 30% of the tanks are reported total losses. Rifle and Motorcycle Rifle elements of the armd. Divs. seem to be much weakened by combat losses. All are begging for replacements. (Arrival of replacements seems to have been delayed by regrouping movements and railroad difficulties!) Drinking water is a problem in combat area. Danger of epidemics! (Put prisoners to work!)

Wagner (Gen Ou) reports on difficulties in delivering ammunition and rations owing to railroad accident (derailment) and congestions caused by troop transports (replacements).

2200 An interesting situation. Gen.Obst. von Bock, calls up to develop the following three points:

- a) Hoth has reached Forges-les-Eaux and Saumont. He has no enemy before him, "is in the rear area". II Corps behind him is still fighting at Bresle and Léger rivers.

It is still a question whether XVI and XIV Corps can quickly effect planned junction through St. Just and Méry. Possibly the enemy may not make a stand, but we cannot be sure.

As right wing of Sixth Army continues to advance on Creil and Fourth Army, as ordered, drives toward Lower Seine, (left wing on Vernon) a gap begins to show up at Beauvais. This is precisely where the enemy is bringing in forces from Paris. The question now arises whether Hoth should not be turned on Gisors.

I express my doubts on the advisability of departing from the basic plan set out in the operational orders and stress the effect that a surprise seizure of Rouen would have, but yet I must admit that ObdH, in our conference earlier this evening, expressed misgivings about a premature turning of Hoth's forces toward the Lower Seine.

Bock also refers to disembarkments at Le Havre and mentions reports of British movements in northeast-ern direction. Le Havre is said to be full of enemy warships. That is the first thing I hear about it. But there is no hurry about Le Havre and, besides, we cannot attack before Rouen is securely in our hands.

- b) The ridge Luzarches - Dammartin dominates the country to the south, way beyond Paris, as well as to the north. Bock must have control of this ridge. For this purpose he wants to move strong reserves behind the right wing of Reichenau and requests us to get Eighteenth Army Hq ready for immediate commitment in that area.



- c) Everything is being done to effect the link-up of Group Kleist, but completion may still take some time. Junction is planned on line St. Just - Méry.

Immediately afterwards I consult with ObdH. He is worried that Hoth might make a raid, away from the main battle field; that he is not moving up his supplies and that he does not have sufficient Inf. strength. For the present he is mainly interested in seeing right wing of Sixth Army get ahead. The push toward the Lower Seine will have to be shelved until then.

Right after conference I call von Bock: He intends to instruct Hoth to seize Rouen with strong forces and organize reconnaissance in strength against the line Beauvais - Gisors. By doing so he thinks he will be in a position to hold Rouen and turn south at the same time.

Second mot. Div. has moved close to armd. Div. Bock will try to move up more mot. forces (SS Adolf Hitler).

ObdH is being informed of this decision.

8 June 1940.

This is another day of nervous tension, which is the usual thing when decisions are in the making in which top level also wants to have its say,

Hoth apparently closed up at the front of Fourth Army and, after getting the necessary fuel, has struck out for Rouen. North of him, the British are still hanging on behind the Bresle river, south of him the French. It is one of those typical breakthrough situations which first look quite critical but after a while turn into a picture of complete success. The precariousness of such a situation dominates the morning conference with ObdH.

1100. C of S. Gen. Bock on phone: Informs that he has decided to issue the following orders:

Fourth Army will take Rouen, cover its flanks on both sides of Rouen and drive with strong eastern wing across line Gournay - Grèvecœur in direction of Lower Oise.

Sixth Army will contain the enemy north of the Oise. Left wing (pivot) will advance to the general line Crépy-en-Valois - Villers-Cotterets and wooded terrain to the east.

Ninth Army, with weight chiefly on right wing and with left flank covered, will seize ground toward the Ourcq river.

The boundary line between Fourth and Sixth Armies is being changed. XIV Corps (without Ninth Div.) will be transferred to Fourth Army. Fourth Army moreover will have at its disposal I Corps with First, Eleventh, and 217th Divs., and Brig. Senger.

These measures are taken on the strength of reports that the enemy west of the Oise has been reinforced and apparently wants to accept the battle here. — Frontal attack against a strong enemy is pure waste of Armor without any prospect of success.

as to  
The question when this regrouping will make itself felt cannot be answered with any certainty now.

After that, some rush work to compile material on enemy disposition, etc. for Fuehrer conference.

1430 Report to Fuehrer:

- 1.) First, I outline the principles of employment of Armor. Tanks are operational assets only where they have open country to maneuver in. In slow-moving battles they only burn themselves out. Such fighting is the department of the Infantry, with which we are amply supplied. Armd. Divs. which have gained a free field of movement must be followed up by mot. Divs. (shaft of the spear-head).
- 2.) Critical review of development of situation in area north of Beauvais. The tanks have been in frontal attacks too long, but since von Bock has just committed them again, nothing can be done about it now. It would have been more desirable to launch the armd. forces in the area of Laon east of the Oise.
- 3.) For the time being, operations will continue in the original direction set out in our operational orders, until the Marne has been crossed. The Fuehrer still counts on the possibility of delivering a decisive blow against strong enemy forces in the fortified area of northeastern France. The following moves are considered necessary:
  - a) Gp. Hoepfner (XVI Corps) must be brought to bear east of the Oise in direction Chateau Thierry, at the earliest.
  - b) Reserves must be introduced so as to sustain the advance of Ninth Army, which has now become the right wing of our offensive front, with a continuous flow of forces. Sixth Army, at variance with our original plan, will thus be echeloned off this new right wing of our attacking front.
  - c) Our efforts to extend and expand bridgehead of Ninth Army south of Aisne must be kept up.

- d) AGp. A will launch drive on 9 June, morning.
- e) Grouping of forces in drive of AGp. A will be such that the armd. wedge will be driven forward not at the inner wing, but as close as possible in direction of Reims.
- f) After crossing the Vitry-le-François - St. Menould road, an armd. Div. and a mot. Div. will make a thrust against Verdun from the south and so break into the fortress by surprise.

After return from Fuehrer Hq: Orders are issued for re-disposing Gp. Hoepfner and moving up reserves.

ObdH to Rundstedt's Hq to go over with him plans for tomorrow's offensive once more.

During afternoon:

- a) Thoma is sent to Gp. Hoepfner to assist in regrouping and arranging for supplies.
- b) Service Chiefs (Veterinary, Rations, Fieldpost, Administration) come in to report. Over-all picture of situation quite satisfactory.
- c) Gen. von Bockelberg reports as prospective Military Commander of Paris.
- d) Gen Gu complains about clogging of all roads by our troop movements and about irregular service of railroads.

2000 von Bock calls up: Hoth has not advanced as far as was expected. Around Beauvais, the enemy is falling back and calls in his outlying troops which had been fighting Hoepfner stubbornly.

XV Corps which, driving south, reached the Breteuil - St. Just road is now standing in the rear of this enemy.

His intention is to launch Fourth Army against original objectives specified in operational orders, but put off Le Havre for time being. Sixth Army will drive in direction Creil, as set forth in our orders. Approved!q

von Ziehlberg: Decorations and other current personnel matters.

Successes scored by our Navy in the North.

9 June 1940.

During the night we received report that King Haakon of Norway has left the country, directing one of his generals to enter negotiations with the German Army.

The drive of AGp. A has started according to plan. All along the front our troops have crossed the Aisne in the first bound. A superb achievement, in which the exemplary work of the Gen. Staff officers in this Group has a substantial share. Naturally, enemy resistance will stiffen after we have reached the southern bank of the Aisne, and we shall especially feel the effect of the enemy's artillery before long. But by then our tanks will be coming.

In AGp. B, developments have moved at great speed. Hoth keeps on pushing westward. At noon a report comes in that he has battered his way into Rouen. All bridges in Rouen are down, as are also some bridges further west. However, the bridges at Vernon and Les Andelys are still intact. Moves have been initiated to secure them.

Von Wietersheim is pressing on behind the rapidly withdrawing enemy and has reached the Clermont - Compiègne road during the morning. In front of center of Sixth Army, where enemy forces from Montdidier area are screaming back in disorder, a major disaster is in the making. It would be good if XV Corps could thrust quickly across the Oise at Verberie and link up with the elements of left wing, Sixth Army, which have advanced as far as Villers-Cotterets from the north. Then the Forest of Compiègne, into which also the famous French Eleventh Div. (Iron Div.) has been driven, would become a large pocket where half a dozen French Divs. would meet their end.

Morning rather quiet. Talk with Felber who is not sure he will have First Army ready for 12 June, and is very doubtful that he could be ready on the Upper Rhine on 13 June, owing to the difficulties experienced there. He would like a postponement of several days. I make it very clear to him that he will have to be ready on time.

1530 Talk with von Witzleben, to whom I show that a few Btrys. more or less won't make much of a difference and that in the light of recent experience an attack against fortifications is a matter of surprise and efficient Combat Eng. work, rather than of massed artillery.

Schroth, who has come back again, is not to take over command now from Heinrici.

Talk with Olbricht (General Army Office): He will endeavor to scrape together a few more mobile units from his schools and get them ready for 15 June: Two armd. Rcn. Plats., one Motorcycle Rifle Co., one Co. light and one Co. med. Tanks, one Flamethrower Co., one Bn. from Training Regt. (two Rifle Cos., one MG Co., one Plat. of Inf. Guns), one AT Co., one Bn. of light Fd. How., mot.; one Signal Co., one Eng. Co.

I stipulate that nothing more is to be sent to Norway.  
Sixth Mt. Div. must be made ready for Dollmann!

Replacement Divs.: Two will be ready by 22 June, two more by 25 June.

Gen. v. Rocques, former Inf. Commander of Sixth Div.\*, reports in.  
Special assignment as CG of OKH Reserves.

In the afternoon I have an hour out for some private letters.

Talk with von Witzleben: Get ready for 12 June! He need not wait for the rest of the Arty. No mass attacks!  
v.W. claims he needs more troops! Will get them!  
Schroth is not to take over command now.

Mueller (AGp. C): I give him the gist of talk with von Witzleben (also as regards Schroth)

Meyer-Ricks comes from Ninth Army and reports on situation.  
In some places fighting has been very heavy, Now everything is on the move. Performance of 50th Div. on the poor side.

OQu IV: Reports on transport movements. About three Divs. were moved from the area Epinal - Belfort - Vesoul in direction Paris yesterday and today (destination undetermined; possibly Paris, Lower Seine, or area northeast of Paris).

Gen. Mieth brings reports on situation from Group Kleist and AGp. A. He discussed with them our ideas, namely to avoid any unnecessary build-up of forces on the Oise, near Creil and Verberie, and to concentrate Gp. Kleist in front of left wing, Sixth Army, at the earliest.  
These views have penetrated.

AGp. B has intention to put whole left wing of Sixth Army under Kleist's command and to set it off in such direction as to a) enable XVI Corps, which seems to have been a little weakened, to cross the Seine in the morning of 11 June, with its western wing via La Ferté Milon, and its eastern wing along the road Soissons - Chateau-Thierry, and b) get XIV Corps to the Oise at the earliest, without fighting.

Fourth Army Hq considers leadership of II Corps not very distinguished, C-in-C AGp did not want to interfere in command of Army. Against Le Havre, only reconnaissance activities for the present.

2400 Gerecke reports on railroad situation in area of OQu Belgium which needs a strong hand to get it straightened out.



10 June 1940.

The morning picture (situation map) shows some very cheering developments in Fourth Army sector. Under very good leadership, it has established itself firmly in the part of Rouen north of the Seine (bridges were destroyed by the enemy), has seized Les Andelys with forces under Manstein's command (bridgehead), and is covering its left wing with First Cav. Div. Its right wing, pressing on in direction of Dieppe is attacking from the rear the British group which is still holding out on the coast. The bulk of its armd. forces is pushing on Le Havre.

In Sixth Army sector, the enemy, apparently under efficient leadership, has been extricated from the pocket which was developing yesterday. On right wing of Sixth Army, XIV and XXXX Corps are crowded together northwest of the Oise between Creil and Verberie and apparently are still confronted with units covering the enemy's withdrawal across the Oise. IV Corps from the north is pushing toward the western bank of the Oise.

Progress has been made east of the Oise. It is becoming doubtful that the enemy will make a stand in the Forest of Compiègne.

Left wing of Sixth Army, east of Villers-Cotterets, is advancing south, and further to the east, Ninth Army has already reached the Marne east of Chateau-Thierry.

Second and Twelfth Armies are also advancing. In Twelfth Army sector, Group Guderian came into line this morning and has already reached the area of Joinville. (2 armd. Divs., First and Second Div. in front.) Sixteenth Army reports that enemy seems to be softening.

At morning conference with ObdH decision was taken to issue order to have XIV Corps moved ahead of left wing of Sixth Army, through Noyon or possibly Compiègne, since it would be pointless to have them make a frontal assault against the Oise between Creil and Verberie. (ObdH telephones this decision as an order to von Bock.)

The insertion of AHq 18 in the front is also discussed. By doing this we want to make it possible to push left wing of Sixth Army, which will also include Gp. Kleist, to the Marne without having to worry about the northern front of Paris. It is yet to be decided whether AHq 18 will take command of the right wing or of the left wing of Sixth Army.

Afterwards, conference with Chief Op. Sec.: Send Ia of Eighteenth Army immediately to Agp. B to establish liaison and to make preparations for commitment. Concentrate reserves behind left wing of Sixth Army and right half of AGp. A!

Wagner (Gen Qu): Study logistical problems arising from transfer of Eighteenth Army and make necessary preparations.

1050 von Bock (on phone): Transfer of XIV Corps has been initiated. -- Calls attention to difficulties caused by road conditions in V and XXXIV Corps areas. Complains that V Corps, now all bunched together, will first have to be disentangled by detouring it through Villers-Cotterets before it can be put on the move in southern direction. Stresses his endeavors to push left wing of Sixth Army to the Marne. Is unenthusiastic about commitment of Eighteenth Army, claiming he does not need them.

1100 ObdH talked to Fuehrer on the phone: Has not yet got approval for commitment of AHq 18. -- Goes to see Fuehrer. I inform von Bock.

The over-all picture shows that the entire enemy front is now moving backwards. The fact that the enemy has lost little artillery proves that he is now effecting an orderly and well-planned withdrawal. It is still an open question whether the enemy is merely going behind the Marne, or whether he is at the end of his resources. It is also uncertain whether he is giving up contact with the Fortress Zone in the Northeast.

I believe the time has come for going back to my plan to push south through the Champagne and continue westward south of Paris. As a result, the Fortress Zone will have to be reduced from the depth of Twelfth Army and by operation "Tiger" and "Baer".

1200 Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance shows that railroad movements from the Belfort-Vesoul-Langres area to Paris have been going on for the past two days and three nights. (There is also some traffic in the opposite direction, but we can probably dismiss the theory that this represents a movement toward Vesoul.) Detraining areas unknown (Paris? Marne?). Minor transport movements in direction Sarrebourg are perhaps in reaction to Witzleben.

1245 ObdH returns from Fuehrer. "One could cry if it were not such a farce." What I recommended a few days ago is now being dispensed piecemeal and haltingly as the products of his supreme generalship. For results of conference, see the following telephone conversations.

1330 Telephone talk with von Salmuth:

- 1.) Eighteenth Army is made available to AGp. for commitment; written order follows.
- 2.) ObdH thinks of employing Eighteenth Army between Fourth and Sixth Armies for the purpose of safeguarding inner wings of the Armies (which will be by-passing Paris) and of moving up reinforcements behind Fourth Army, as they are becoming available.

Drive by Fourth Army across Lower Seine in general direction of Alençon must be prepared. I Corps and Cav. Div. will be kept ready for this purpose. If possible prepare base for Fourth Army on Lower Seine (Mantes).

- 3.) Left wing of Sixth Army, east of the Oise, and Ninth Army will continue in direction laid down by operational orders. Gp. Kleist, whose concentration in front of inner wings of Fourth and Sixth Armies is of overriding importance, will have to drive in direction Sézanne and, later, Troyes.

1345 Phone talk with Blumentritt:

I outline our plans as developed in talk with Salmuth. Guderian must push into area Vitry-le-François - St. Dizier - Bar-Le-Duc.

A "Battle of Cannae" is in the making. -- One Armd. and one mot. Div. will move on Verdun as originally ordered. Bulk of Gp. Guderian will continue drive in direction of Troyes, his right wing on Arcis-sur-Aube for junction with Kleist. Agp. C is set for operation "Tiger" on 12 June. Exact time of jump-off still open.

During afternoon order is issued to AGp. B on insertion of AHq 18, together with orders to Supply Service on same subject. Difficulties in maintaining supply of Czech ammunition.

A lot of friction developed in the railroad organization servicing Supply Base Belgium in the past week. Through intervention of Gercke and the continuous efforts of Gen Qu, things are now beginning to straighten out.

- 1545 A radio signal from Guderian to Air Force claims he has reached Mourmelon-le-Grand. Confirmation has yet to come.  
(/ Later entry:/ Not confirmed!)

Reports received during the evening indicate that western wing (Fourth Army) has reached St. Valéry on the Channel Coast with Seventh Armd. Div., and that Fifth Armd. Div. and Second mot. Div. are driving into the rear of the British forces which are still holding out in front of II Corps. Manstein's Corps is said to have gained ground west of the Lower Seine between Louviers and Bonnières without meeting any strong resistance on the southern bank of the river.

It is becoming increasingly evident that the successes of the Sixth Army on the Lower Oise constitute a major defeat of the enemy. The enemy is fleeing in disorder toward Paris. Not clear is the situation of IV and V Corps in the Forest south of Compiègne. To the east, the Marne has been reached at Châlons-Thierry. Further to the east, around Reims, the enemy is fighting back desperately. Here we are opposed by good French regular army Divs. South of Reims, Corps Schmidt (Gp. Guderian) has pushed into the wooded country northeast of Reims; Corps Reinhardt will move through Chateau Porcien and be committed to the east of Corps Schmidt tomorrow. Sixteenth Army has gained its limited objectives.

The great picture shows that the enemy is fighting desperately along the entire front. Nor are there any indications of a voluntary withdrawal by the enemy in front of Twelfth Army. The enemy Inf. keeps on fighting after our tanks have broken through their lines. Again and again the

enemy launches counter-attacks supported by tanks.

Under these circumstances we must, for the time being, at least, dismiss the thought that the enemy might give up his Fortress Zone without a fight. Operation "Tiger" had better be postponed until Twelfth Army has smashed the enemy fronting it. Operation "Baer" could then follow at a few days' interval.

2400 won Bock (on phone); Gives his picture of the situation as of this evening: Concentration of rolling stock at Le Mans, Tours, Orleans. Transport movements from Rennes to the east, and from Tours toward Orleans. New British radio station located at Granville. Air fields at Caen, Tours, Saumur, Oucques; 435 planes counted SW of Paris. Heavy AA defenses at Paris, Dieux, Evreux.

Yesterday's and today's ship movements to Le Havre and Cherbourg, together with the railroad movements of the past two days from the general direction of Vesoul to Paris, seem to point to the build-up of a major grouping of forces southwest of Paris. We cannot make out yet whether this move is in reaction to Kluge's drive across the Lower Seine or to our threat to Paris, or finally, whether it represents a last attempt of the enemy to mount an offensive. Under these circumstances we shall have to be careful about pushing Kluge's drive across the Lower Seine, continuation of which in any case is not in our plans for the time being, and better look after protecting the right wing of the Group (V and XXXIV Corps) advancing east of the Oise.

Accordingly, I have Sixth Army reminded to bring up 255th Div. and, for myself, do some prodding about moving our GHQ Reserves to the front.

11 June 1940. ( It enters the war )

The morning situation indicates that the enemy, who previously offered stiff resistance to the west wing of Sixteenth Army, now is falling back. The fact that, to the west, the enemy is still holding out on the left wing front of Twelfth Army has only local significance. Our Divs. are advancing on both sides of Reims in the direction ordered. Guderian can start his drive on Vitry-le-François today at noon. So, toward evening, the question will become acute as to whether final orders should be issued to Guderian to continue his drive in the direction of Troyes.

ObdH has gone to AGp, A and Twelfth Army.

AGp. C stands by to strike on 13 June.

Moving the reserves will be organized in such manner that some Divs. could follow Fourth Army across the Somme, while the bulk would be moved along both sides of the AGp. boundary.

1500 Meyer-Ricks (Liaison Off., Twelfth Army) reports successful crossing of Marne east of Chateau-Thierry. Difficulties are encountered in channeling Wietersheim through Ninth Army.

1600 Warlimont comes to talk over some points causing concern at OKW:

- a) Fourth Army is to establish a bridgehead across Lower Seine of sufficient depth to allow staging of a large assault force south of the river. OKW is afraid that Fourth Army might not be strong enough for their subsequent missions.
- b) It is essential that the Armd. Divs. of XVI Corps, newly committed on the AGp. boundary, in cooperation with Gp. Guderian, should destroy the enemy around Reims on and close to the Marne.
- c) Target date for offensive in Saarbruecken area: Not before strong forces are standing south of the Argonnes.
- d) GHq Reserves behind Sixth and Ninth Armies still seem to be too far off for prompt commitment in the breakthrough to the south when we wheel on Paris.

1700 Thoma reports on condition of Armd. troops. At least 60% of the tanks are operational in the Regts. of Corps Hoepfner. Resupply of tools and spare parts is functioning. The repair shops are working fine. Not one of the Armd. Div. has dropped below 60% in tank strength.

1800 von Etzdorf: Political situation. Foreign Office is perturbed by the idea that a situation might arise where France would be without a Government in a position to negotiate.

ObdH returns from AGp. A, Twelfth and Second Armies. Everything moving smoothly. No supply difficulties. Gp. Guderian had some delay at the Suippe river. Heavy losses in bridging equipment. In some places enemy is putting up a vigorous defense. In one instance, the enemy launched a counter attack with as many as 50 tanks, half of which were knocked out. I discuss questions put by Warlimont with ObdH, who then settles these matters in a telephone talk with Fuehrer.

2030 Leeb reports that AGp. C is ready for action. We agree on 1500 hrs. of day preceding attack as deadline for final attack signal. If possible, operation "Baer" should follow three days later allow time for transfer of Eng. troops and Arty. It would be desirable to leave choice of date to AGp. C.

2200 - 2300 Reports by various officers who were sent to the front:

General Mieth, on sectors of Ninth Army and XXXIV Corps  
(Chateau-Thierry area),

Col. v. Greiffenberg, on Second and Twelfth Armies (Reims area),

Lt. Col. Heusinger, Marne, on sector of Ninth Army,

Lt. Col. Stieff, on XIV Corps (withdrawn to area north of  
Noyon).



All reports agree that the enemy is fighting tenaciously all along the front, but that his strength is already beginning to give out.

Some of the troops are conglomerates of the most diverse units. The enemy Arty has lost a great number of its guns and makes itself felt only sporadically. Grateful acknowledgment of Air Force support, which the enemy apparently cannot counter with anything even approaching in strength.

Special mention is made of the battle performance of 25th Div., which has been weakened, however, by heavy losses, as well as of the inspiration given his troops by von Speck, CG XXXXIII Corps, who is constantly in the front line.

The terrain is extremely difficult in some places. In the extensive woods, snipers firing from trees (especially colored troops) are a great nuisance. The bridge situation is not always easy, though generally bridging equipment seems to arrive in time. Traffic discipline on the roads appears to be good, except in AA units, which are pushing themselves into moving columns everywhere.

Reports from XIV Corps state that it now is down to only 35% of its tank strength on 10 May. Worst off is Ninth Armd. Div., which has suffered heavily through mines. The tank situation is better in Tenth Armd. Div., for which there is much praise (100 tanks).

The troops are said to have reached the limits of physical endurance. They are fit now only for pursuit fighting, but not for heavy attacks (battle fatigue). Striking power of the rifle units of the Divs. is down to 50%. The losses in Ninth Armd. Div. could be made up by two Repl. Transfer Bns., which are on hand; those in Tenth Armd. Div. (1600) from overstrength of Thirteenth mot. Div. . . . Corps / Corps No. is missing. - Ed. / will not reach staging area north of Noyon before 12 June.

2300 Gellien reports on Armd. Gp. Guderian. Difficulties on right wing at the Suippe river. Its left wing (Corps Reinhardt) has been attacked from the Argennes by French Third mcz. and Third Armd. Divs. During afternoon Gp. Guderian has apparently resumed advance on free roads.

12 June 1940.

The view that the enemy front before Guderian is just about to break, is not borne out by developments. A teletype message from Guderian received during the night again stresses that he is up against several enemy Divs. (though three of them are Divs. which he yesterday reported destroyed), and states that Armor is tangled up with Inf. and has not yet gained an open road to move ahead. Perhaps the situation of the Armd. Forces will change for the better during the day.

The over-all picture based on reports received during the night shows that the enemy has not yet consolidated his front on the Lower Seine and so cannot do anything to keep us from expanding our bridgehead. The elements which were thrown back on Paris seem to be badly crowded together in the "Paris defense position"; the ring around this area has been closed in the north, the left wing of the Sixth Army is closing it on the east, only temporarily slowed by mopping-up operations in the Forest of Compiègne. The western sector of Sixth Army has now been taken over by AHq 18. The soft spot in the enemy's position is the sector on both sides of Chateau-Thierry. Here we are holding the southern bank as far as Dormans. Further to the east the enemy is retreating on both sides of Reims under cover of rear guard action. Frontal resistance in the Champagne has not yet been broken. The enemy still has contact with the forces falling back step by step in the Argennes.

As to the continuation of the operation, the situation would indicate that it is still too early to divide the front and swing to the east and the west. First we must press on southward from the line Chateau-Thierry - Suippes east of Paris until the stretched back of the enemy front snaps; only then will it be possible to fan out, as planned.

1130 Felber repeats yesterday's agreement between ObdH and von Leeb. Would like to start drive on 13 June, and not before. Enemy fire has decreased since yesterday. Today's weather very bad, improvement expected tomorrow afternoon.

ObdH has talked to AGp. B: Fourth Army is expanding and deepening its sector on left bank of Seine between Rouen and Mantes for the coming drive. Eleventh Rifle Brig. is to take Le Havre (probably 13 June). I Corps will remain AGp. Reserve but stand by to follow up behind Fourth Army.

VIII Corps is to attack the defense block south of Creil in order to get at the line Luzarches - Dammartin. In sector of IV and V Corps, the enemy is still resisting stubbornly. Apparently it has not yet been possible to effect the link-up south of the Forest of Compiègne. The gap between IV and V Corps seems to be closed.\*

Kleist has taken over command and will start out with XVI Corps as soon as the bridges at Chateau-Thierry are completed (two 16 ton bridges). The SS units then follow automatically.

I discuss with him my plans for reserves to AGp. B to be moved in such a way that two Divs. will come behind Ninth and Sixth Armies, and three Divs. behind Fourth Army. This leaves our western Reserve Group with only three Divs., and so additional forces must be moved from the eastern Reserve Group toward the AGp. boundary.

1200 Buhle:

- a) Discussion on strategy in presenting our "demands" to BdE.
- b) Replacements: Repl. Transfer Bns. for AGp. A all arrived; for AGp. B partly received, the remainder still being detrained at Aachen. Whether channeling down to Divs. is functioning properly is hard to say, but is in process. 20 Bns. for AGp. B are being shipped to Antwerp. On the whole, Corps and Armies are arranging replacement of losses among themselves by drawing on Transfer Bns.
- c) Arms production generally satisfactory. MGs and AT position is tight, but requisitions can still be filled. Production has fallen off in light and med. Field guns. It will be impossible to meet requisitions for horse-drawn Light Fd. How. 18 in the long run; production will not be resumed before late summer.
- d) Method to be employed in reducing Army from 160 to 120 Divs., when manpower is to be poured back into the civilian economy after victory in France. I propose: Deactivation of Regional Defense Divs., Third Draft Divs., and Divs. equipped with Czech materiel. Older men throughout Army will be discharged and replaced by men from deactivated Divs.

1230 Report that Guderian did break through and is now advancing  
1230 on axis Châlons-s.-M. - Vitry-le-François with Second Armd. Divs., 29th mot. Div., and First Armd. Div. XXXXI Corps still held up by fighting in Somme-Py area. "demands" to BdE.

1300 Châlons-sur-Marne has been reached. for AGp. A all arrived; for AGp. B partly received, the remainder still

1330 Decision that operation "Tiger" (offensive of First Army) is to start on 14 June; issue of orders. hard to say, but is in process. 20 Bns. for AGp. B are being shipped to Ant-

1345 Staff comes with complaints of Air Marshal about a report circulated by Busse to various Hqs, in which the undigested experiences of Div. Sponeck\* are presented together with comments on the Air Force.

1400 Warlimont communicates wishes of the Fuehrer: 1.) Drive on Le Havre (filled warehouse). 2.) Bridgehead desirable west of Rouen.

1.) Drive on Le Havre (filled warehouse). 2.) Bridgehead desirable west of Rouen.

2.) Bridgehead desirable west of Rouen.

3.) Is Paris going to be cut off from the west? If the enemy has no substantial forces left behind the Seine, we must look into whether we are strong enough there for that purpose. Regional Defense Divs., Third Draft Divs., and Divs. equipped with Czech materiel. Older men throughout

4.) It would be a great advantage if we could push the enemy out of his defense positions north of Paris past the wooded areas to the south, in order to have these woods

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5.) Coast between Etaples and Le Havre must be protected.

6.) SS Adolf Hitler is to take part in Hoepfner's operations.

Reports received during the afternoon show advances in our drive across the Marne in Ninth Army sector and at the extreme left wing of Sixth Army, and progress of Gp. Guderian in direction Châlons-sur-Marne. The bridge which we succeeded to secure intact unfortunately was demolished by a delayed action charge later on. In the course of the evening, French forces breaking out of the Argonne, apparently in a southwestern direction, have been attacking the left shoulder of List. Guderian, who had already reached Châlons-sur-Marne with Corps Schmidt, while Reinhard was still standing echeloned out to Suippes, has now been compelled to turn his front toward the east and southeast! The Inf. Divs. are now moving into line between the Armor, especially in Reinhard's sector. The battle has taken an interesting turn which offers a good chance of success against an enemy, who seems to be withdrawing in a southwestern direction from the Fortress Zone. Inasmuch as Sixteenth Army, east of the Argonne, reports finding deserted pill-boxes in the Maginot Line, it would appear that the attack from the Argonne is not a coordinated assault on List's left shoulder by troops especially assembled for such an operation, but rather a break-out attempt by these forces from an area which they have been ordered to evacuate. There are signs of slackening of the enemy also in the sector of First Army.

1700 Report received that IX French Corps, which was cut off on the coast near St. Valéry, has surrendered after heavy fighting. Together with their troops were captured the CG of IX Corps and the Commanders of the French 40th, 31st Mt., Second and Fifth Light Divs., as well as a British general. Bloody casualties of the enemy are very high. 20,000 prisoners have been counted up to noon; immense booty.

2230 Talk with von Bock: He thinks he has evidence that enemy withdrawing in front of Second, Ninth, and Twelfth Armies is trying to escape in southwestern direction. -- AGp. has ordered Fourth Army to start assault of Le Havre. -- Discussion about direction to be given to Kleist's drive (Sézanne - Troyes).

During evening: Report of von Salmuth on Fourth Army. He thinks that enemy fronting the Army is not capable of putting up any serious resistance, and therefore presses for attack (14 June). Wants instructions on direction of drive.

Chevallerie's son killed in action.

13 June 1940.

A day of restlessness. The tension that can always be felt when portentous decisions are maturing, is beginning to tell.

The morning situation report brings nothing of importance. A satisfying development is that II Corps of Fourth Army has gained a bridgehead west of Rouen, while its bulk has closed up to Rouen. Another pleasant note is the report from VIII Corps that the enemy at Beaumont-sur-Oise is softening.

1100 Liaison Off. to Guderian comes to complain about the muddle in Twelfth Army sector where the closely packed Inf. Divs. have got tangled up with Armor. Guderian wants the Inf. to stay put and let him through, but Inf. is pushing ahead on the road.

The whole situation illustrates the sort of tensions which the development of events has long resolved before one comes to hear about them. A subsequent call to Blumentritt brings out that Sixth and Eighth Armd. Divs. have meanwhile reached the road Châlons - St. Menesould, and the question of road priority thus has been settled.

ObdH goes to the Fuehrer for a conference on the situation.

The result is again pathetic. Gracious consent has been given to start offensive of First Army (Operation "Tiger") on 14 June. Seventh Army is to follow up at the earliest date (wish of ObdH; apparently no date fixed with Fuehrer). The rest of the interview seems to have dealt exclusively with details of local situations, such as encirclement of some minor enemy groups. It is impossible to form a broad operational picture from that sort of talk. So I'll have to figure things out for myself and see how I can get on.

Radio intelligence fortunately clarifies the situation. By noon it has become evident that French AHqs have been taken back toward the south; the farthest now is French Second Army, which has withdrawn toward Chaumont. The command organization of the French Army is thus shown to be in frontwide retreat before our troops. It remains to be seen whether the Hqs still can fully control their troops.

In addition we learn through diplomatic channels, via the American Ambassador, that the French Government has declared Paris an open city. All troops are being withdrawn from the vicinity of the city, and only the Commandant of Paris is left behind with the Police and the Fire Dept.

This now gives us a clear idea of what we have to do: Pursue Fourth Army as quickly as possible between the French Army retreat ag south-southwest, and the coast. The remainder of AGp. B must pursue that enemy by passing through and east of Paris. AGp. A, together with AGp. C, will have the



mission of liquidating the enemy still in the northeastern Fortress Zone. What is yet to be decided is whether Second Army is needed by AGp. A for this purpose, or may be transferred to Bock.

Movements from the northeastern Fortress Zone in southwest direction can now be made out distinctly. They indicate that at least all mobile commands are to be taken out of the Fortress Zone by the withdrawing French Army. Blocking their path will be a rewarding mission for Gp. Guderian.

All through the afternoon there is a great deal of telephoning to have these ideas approved by OKW and accepted by AGp. B.

von Bock, on his own initiative, has ordered Eighteenth Army to send the first available complete Div. into Paris at the earliest possible moment. By doing so he is accommodating the Fuehrer who, for political reasons (Turkey's attitude), wants, as soon as possible, concrete tokens to demonstrate to the whole world that France's power of resistance has been broken.

My efforts to have the two SS Divs. follow behind Kluge for quick reinforcement of this now so very important wing have failed. The Fuehrer wants them to follow up behind Kleist's tanks instead. On the other hand, the Fuehrer did not get Ninth and Tenth Armd. Divs., which he so wanted in Paris, because they are already on the Marne.

Fuehrer Hq now is slowly seeing the point of the recommendation made by me as early as 5 June, to the effect that the swing to the southwest should be made in the area east of Paris. Now we are going to get a "directive" to this end. One would laugh about all this if that system did not always obstruct efficient work.

Fourth Army is pressing forward and intends to push beyond the Seine tomorrow. After having made sure that this will not be opposed by OKW, I issue instructions for the left wing to move in direction Chartres, and arrange with Salmuth that the Seine bridgehead will be expanded to such an extent on 14 June that Fourth Army can start a full-scale drive on 15. As a matter of fact, this is the beginning of our offensive, in camouflage.

Behind Fourth Army, I move three more GHq Reserve Divs., together with a Corps Hq, from the area of Péronne.

2000 Reception of Marras, Italian Attaché. Exchange of generalities. The only interesting point is his frank statement that Italy intends starting operations on the Alpine front only if we open it up from the rear.

Evening. Return of ObdH, who went to see the Fuehrer upon my request. He obtained authority for me to start off Fourth Army at last. Paris is to be kept under control by five Divs. South of Paris I am now allowed to move in the direction of the Loire and direct Twelfth and Sixteenth, co-operating with First and Seventh Armies, against the enemy withdrawing from the Fortress Zone.

As interim order I give verbal instructions to AGp. A to move up Second Army south of the Upper Marne, with central sector on Brienne.  
AGp. boundary: From Epernay along a line running midway between Fère Champenoise and Sommesous to the road junction 12 km northwest of Troyes (on western bank of Seine).

Verbal instructions to AGp. B:

Order Fourth Army to start offensive tomorrow.

Secure Paris with strong forces (five Divs.).

Left wing of Fourth Army must push through to Chartres in order to prevent escape of enemy to the coast.

Eighteenth Army will advance through and on both sides of Paris.

Sixth Army will advance with central sector on Montereau.

Ninth Army will advance with center on Romilly.

AGp. C receives verbal instructions not to spend too much time on Artillery preparations, but rather keep itself ready for immediate pursuit if the enemy should try to withdraw; Seventh Army would also join in the pursuit.

In the evening I draft the formal orders for turning the entire front in southwestern direction and for the simultaneous reduction of the enemy in the Northeast.

14 June 1940.

A great day in the history of the German Army. German troops have been marching into Paris since 0900.

The over-all picture of the situation shows that the enemy is falling back along the entire front, apparently with a view to building up another defensive front far to the rear, presumably along the Loire. It remains to be seen if he will succeed. At the moment we are in danger of losing contact with him.

Fourth Army, which was visited by ObdH today, is advancing toward the Avre river against slight opposition, and has ordered Hoth to move up from Le Havre. For the time being, left wing of Fourth Army has been directed by ObdH to strike for Chartres and Tours. A "directive" which has meanwhile been received from OKW states that right wing of Army is to push toward the Loire Estuary and occupy the sea ports in the area. Orders to this effect will later be issued as supplements to our teletype orders of this morning. We shall also have to arrange for the follow-up of reserves.

Eighteenth Army is busy with Paris today. I hope they won't be delayed too long, as the enemy on their front is now on the run. Kleist, spearheading Ninth and Second Armies, has likewise pushed into empty space. The enemy here is trying to evade him by going southwest. We are capturing only rear guard elements. Kleist is now crossing the Seine in direction of Troyes.

In the Northeast, the enemy received orders to withdraw apparently three days ago. Also in that area we are capturing now mainly rear guard elements. It is therefore necessary to order Guderian to make a swing deep to the South from south of Nancy through Joinville and Neufchateau and to direct Kleist to strike for Dijon, in order to block the route between the Plateau de Langres and the Swiss border. In doing this, we would dispose of what enemy troops are left in the Northeast and then could concentrate on the Loire. Our Armor committed in northeastern France would then form a comfortably strong left wing, which could seize the French armament center of Le Creuzot and, after crossing the Upper Loire, crack the last French redoubt.

Among the several interviews during the day stand out: a) Report by Thomas, which presents quite a favorable picture of both striking and presumptive staying powers of Armd. forces in the present theaters of operations. b) Report by Jacob on bridge situation. Naturally it is tight but need not at present cause any concern. Manpower now becoming free on position construction projects in Sixteenth Army sector, can be reassigned to reinforce the road and bridge building organizations. For bridge construction at Amiens and Laon we could use a few trainloads of materiel from Brussels, but owing to the tight railroad situation it is not possible to deliver any substantial quantities by rail.

The problem of highway traffic control is still a little troublesome, especially in those areas through which several Armd. Divs. are moving to the front. The importance of traffic control evidently has not yet been fully recognized everywhere as a command function. Something will have to be done about that.

Drive of First Army (operation "Tiger") has started with some delay owing to bad weather; Air Force apparently has given effective support. Although enemy artillery defense has not been very strong, it will probably take quite some time to overwhelm the resistance in the prepared fortification zone offered by the garrisons, now probably only the rear guards of the Fortress Brigs. In some places the drive has penetrated to the terrain under direct fire of the fortress guns.

The offensive on the Upper Rhine has been ordered to start on 15 June.

15 June 1940.

Another important day in military history. Verdun, scene of the heroic struggle in World War I, is in our hands.

Yesterday's drive against the French northeastern corner pushed by Twelfth Army and Corps Guderian from the west, and by First Army from the east, is completing the collapse of the French northeastern front. Seventh Army, which started its drive across the Upper Rhine this morning, and has thrown three Divs. across the river in the first wave, has surprised the enemy asleep in some bunkers. My effort to get the attack launched without preparation has paid off handsomely.

The situation presents in broad outline the picture of a running fight all along the front, with the enemy offering local resistance on the western wing (Fourth Army), while signs of demoralization are becoming apparent on the front south and east of Paris. Once the fighting forces of the enemy in the Northeast will have been disposed of by the drives of Armd. Gp. Guderian on Vesoul, and of Armd. Gp. Kleist on Pontarlier, through Dijon, the enemy will no longer be in a position to build up any systematic defensive front on the Loire.

In the morning a Fuehrer "directive" comes in. It directs immediate initiation of measures to lay the foundations for a reduction of Ground Forces to 120 Divs., including 20 of Armor and 10 of mot. Inf. The directive is based on the assumption that with the now imminent final collapse of the enemy, the Army would have fulfilled its mission and so, while still in enemy country, could comfortably start on work to prepare the projected peacetime organization. Air Force and Navy alone would be carrying on the war against Britain.

Later in the morning, reports are presented by Wagner and Buhle on subordination of OQu Belgium\* under von Falkenhausen\*\*. This step has proven necessary owing to the highhandedness and independence abundantly displayed by Jaehnicke.

Phone talk with Borck: I am dissatisfied with the way the railroads are being run in Belgium. Although restoration of tracks and bridges is proceeding at a good rate, resumption of operation by Reichsbahn personnel is lagging.

von Greiffenberg: Organization of coastal defense and re-disposition of our reserves.

Gen. Ott reports on his tour to the front.

1900 Report that Hermann von Speck (CG XXXXIII Corps, acting CG in XVIII Corps) has been killed in action.

Evening reports indicate no important changes in the situation. The collapse of the enemy in the central sector of the front appears to be a positive fact. The eastern wing of the enemy will cave in under the relentless pressure by First and Seventh Armies.

16 June 1940.

The development of the situation prompts the following conclusions:

For our right wing, the important thing will be to reach the Lower Loire rapidly with the bulk of Fourth Army; capture of the coastal town of Cherbourg, Avranches, Brest, Lorient, St. Nazaire will then follow automatically. I do not think the British will risk any major fighting once we are approaching the Lower Loire. They will evacuate their precious manpower and make every effort to secure for themselves the French Navy and French merchant shipping.

The symptoms of enemy collapse are most marked in the central sector of our front. Here we shall be able to push to and across the Loire bend at Orleans without much trouble.

On the left wing, the encirclement of the enemy forces withdrawing from the Northeast is proceeding speedily and smoothly. Guderian who has at last freed and moved up Corps Reinhardt (which had been frontally impacted in the Argonne) is now heading full speed for Besançon, and will get to the Swiss frontier still today. List, driving from St. Dizier, and Busch, coming from Bar-le-Duc, are overtaking the pursued enemy, while Witzleben has punched through the Maginot line in direction of Lunéville, and Dollmann has crossed the Rhine in direction of Colmar. Developments will have to be watched for the right moment to turn List in a southwestern direction and coordinate Sixteenth, Seventh, First Armies, and Gp. Guderian under Leeb in order to liquidate the large enemy pocket in Lorraine and Alsace.

Kleist has departed from his instructions in that he has straightaway pushed some of his forces to the Loire, above Gien, in order to secure bridgeheads in this area; otherwise he is striking for Dijon and Chalon-sur-Saône in order to be ready if he should be needed to drive in southern direction. Once he is no longer required as a second line behind Guderian, he will have to be directed toward the Lyon area for a drive either down the Rhône Valley or across the headwaters of the Loire, in southwestern direction, to match Hoth's drive advancing to the Lower Loire. In either case, Kleist will have the mission of capturing the French armament center of Le Creuzot.



After morning conference with ObdH, at which armistice and demobilization problems also were discussed, Gen. Mieth comes for a conference on the basic conditions of an armistice: Entire coast line must be occupied by us; French Army will surrender arms, and be concentrated in the hill country between Rhône and Bay of Biscay (excluding Biscay); industrial areas; schedules for movements of disarmed troops; demobilization in "reservation", beginning with farmers, followed by other categories. Inventory and surrender of all arms, stocks, ammunition dumps, and armament factories; roads, railroads, waterways, and transport materiel.

Organize defenses of coast with mobile reserves. Fifteen Divs. to the East, five Inf. Divs. to Norway, in addition to the seven Divs. already there, plus two or three Armd. Divs. (in order to facilitate negotiations with Sweden about Narvik road and railroad). Denmark one Div. Of the 120 Divs. (including Armor) which are to be formed by contraction of 160 Divs., about 85, incl. 65 of Inf., would be left in France. In addition to the 120 Divs. immediately available, equipment for additional 45 Divs. is to be stocked at troop training centers to assure speedy activation of that number of Divs.

1045 Telephone talk with von Bock. He does not want to direct his Armd. Gp. (Hoth) against coastal points; he wants it to operate against the Lower Loire in order to settle accounts with the enemy Ground Army first. Complains about increasing enemy air activity.

1500 Conference with Gericke and Wagner about advancing railheads into Somme-Aisne area; railroad line Amiens - Laon - Reims will be operating as of 18 June, morning.

1700 Wagner: Rearward boundary line of zone of operations. -- Situation in Paris: Large stocks, also fuel. -- Return of population in Saar up to the main battle area.

2200 ObdH returns. Brings nothing substantially new from First Army, XXX and XII Corps.

Guderian has reached Besançon; Advance Combat Teams of 33rd Div. have pushed to Orleans. French Government has resigned. Formation of new Government under Pétain; Minister of War, Colzon.

17 June 1940.

The picture of the enemy situation is still the same. Apart from apparently slight resistance encountered by right wing of Fourth Army, possibly by British troops covering their retreat rather than new concentrations, the enemy is retreating along the entire front in a state of complete disorganization and under constant bombing by our Air Force. Enemy AA defense is almost completely absent, perhaps because of the withdrawal of the French Air Force, now under way.

Guderian is at the Swiss frontier and Kleist, south of him, has arrived at the Upper Loire and in the Dijon area.

We are now faced with two major decisions:

- a) To continue without delay operations against the remnants of the enemy in the Loire area, so as to keep them on the move.
- b) To bring operations against the enemy forces encircled in northeastern France to the earliest possible conclusion.

As to a) Fourth Army must get a little more active, and take the ports of Cherbourg and Brest, and generally advance at greatest possible speed on Lower Loire. Second and Ninth Armies, together with Gp. Kleist, will have to push on to the Upper Loire in order to envelop the French mountain redoubt east of the Rhone with a strong left wing. Twelfth Army will follow in same direction (toward line Dijon - Besancon) as soon as it has been squeezed out of the tightening ring in the Northeast.

Boundary line between the two AGps. must be extended from Gien through Issoudun and Ruffec to the Bay of Biscay.

As to b) Guderian must swing his right wing northward to join Sixteenth, First, and Seventh Armies in closing the ring. To this end, he must bring his right wing to Mulhouse and, on securely sealing the ring, immediately make a thrust on Epinal. Sixteenth Army and Gp. Guderian (the latter only tactically) will for this purpose come under the control of AGp. C. Twelfth Army will follow Gp. Kleist in southern direction (toward line Dijon - Besancon) as soon as it is freed by the link-up between the inner wings of Sixteenth Army and Guderian.

Orders to this effect will be issued in the course of the day.

Assumption of control of Sixteenth Army and tactical control of Gp. Guderian by AGp. C will be effective as of 18 June, 0000 hrs.

The major work of the day is concerned with armistice problems, which are taken over by Mieth. Work on this subject matter, which is a little unfamiliar to us soldiers, is going rather slow. I recommend a demarcation line which would include the mountain area of Southern France and so would give us the Rhone Valley and the coast all the way to Spain. All French Army units still in existence then, would have to be transferred to the zone behind the demarcation line for demobilization. OKH puts these proposals before OKW.

During the day I have several talks with Ziehlberg on current personnel matters and the prospective change of GHq. Reims has been abandoned as a new location, and Fontainebleau is being considered in its place.

Wagner receives instructions regarding evacuation to Saar and Baden of the approximately 200,000 PWs which we expect to take in northeastern France.

I discuss with Buhle program for reduction of Ground Forces to 120 Divs.

Political command announces at noon that the French Government, through the good services of the Spanish Government, has approached Germany for armistice terms.

The Fuehrer is now going to Munich to meet Mussolini. Reply will be withheld until then. Nothing is known as yet about Britain's reaction.

18 June 1940.

The Fuehrer has left for consultation with Mussolini. For a day and a half we will so be our own masters. We are going to make the most of this time and push our drives in the pre-arranged directions, so as to establish a basis for armistice negotiations. The morning picture shows nothing specifically new, just the gradual evolution of the situation.

1100 Conference with Fromm and Olbricht in ObdH's office. The basic features of the shrinking process by which the Army will be reduced from 165 to 120 Divs., and distribution in ZI are discussed. Plans produced:

1.) Activation of new Armd. Divs.:

|   |    |               |       |
|---|----|---------------|-------|
| 1 | in | Mil. District | I,    |
| 2 | "  | "             | IV,   |
| 1 | "  | "             | V,    |
| 1 | "  | "             | VI,   |
| 1 | "  | "             | VII,  |
| 1 | "  | "             | VIII, |
| 1 | "  | "             | X,    |
| 2 | "  | "             | XII.  |

8 - 10 MG Bns., 1/3 of 60th Div.\*, and elements of Security Regts. must be used for the purpose. Where light mot. Arty. is not available, med. Arty. must be taken for the time being. Difficult problem of Motorcycle Rifle units. These activations would give us a total of 13 Armd. Divs. of 3 Tank Bns. each, and 7 Armd. Divs. of 2 Tank Bns. each, as basis for a subsequent build-up.

Nine existing Armd. Divs. halved and filled up with First Draft Divs. make a total of 18 Divs., the Nineteenth can then be formed by expansion of Rifle Brig., the Twentieth from Armd. Troops Training Schools. The Divs. thus obtained by a process of "cell division" will then have to be grouped under a Corps Hq. Reorganization will be effected under responsibility of Corps Hqs (mot.). Officer fillers will be assigned to them.

2.) Reorganization of Inf. Divs.:

First Draft Divs. will get Arty. Commander, med. Arty. Regt. (mot.); and med. Inf. guns to full authorized strength, and so on.

2nd, 3rd, 4th, 7th, 8th Draft Divs. will be brought up to strength within present T.O.

3.) Shrinking process: 159 Divs. must be reduced to 120; by deactivation of 39 Divs.

|                              |                |
|------------------------------|----------------|
| 4 Divs.                      | of 10th Draft, |
| 9 Regional Defense Divs.     | " Ninth " ,    |
| 4 Fortress Divs.             | " " ,          |
| 4 Divs. with Czech equipment | " Sixth " ,    |
| 5 Divs. " " "                | " Fifth " ,    |
| 13 Divs.                     | " Third " ,    |

Total of 39 Divs.

4.) Procedure: In case of early demobilization, these 39 Divs. will be moved from East and West to the ZI in the first wave.

Otherwise we should aim to get home first the Divs. formed in Mil. Districts I, VIII, XXI and XXII. Re-deployment trains arriving from the East should immediately be used to transport troops back from the West.

To Government-General mostly Reserve Divs. from eastern Mil. Districts. Occupation of eastern territories must be reorganized prior to demobilization of Ninth Draft.

5.) Denmark: Put in one regular Div. and take out Replacement troops (Reserve Divs. of X Corps).

6.) In demobilization greatest possible number of GHq troops must be released in deactivating Ninth Draft. Older age group.

7.) Demobilization: If, as is to be expected, demobilization is ordered soon, send home peacetime Divs. first.

Age group 1920 should not be taken over into Replacement units, which will be deactivated. Instead give the young age groups normal training in peacetime garrisons.

Replacement Army must be deactivated by the time Front Divs. return. Two weeks needed for deactivation.

1400 Thoma presents report on Fifth and Seventh Armd. Divs.: Seventh Armd. Div. has a total of 90 operational tanks. Fifth Armd. Div. has 90 in 31st Regt. and 90 in Fifteenth Regt., a total of 180 operational tanks, which is quite a good showing. Resupply of spare parts and repair-shops are running smoothly. Fuel is taken from stocks in the country. Replacement transports have arrived with the assistance of Org. Todt.

v. Thoma relates appalling details of the effect of dive-bomber attacks on refugee columns on the Lower Seine, between Les Andelys and Pontoise.

1600 Fromm and his Chief of Staff come in. First step will be redeploying of Replacement units in the East. He wants more Gen. Staff Officers for General Army Office and Military District Hqs (Ib)\*.

His story on the political situation shows the extent to which the rule of the Gestapo controls life at home. Gauleiter and SA seem to seek closer contact with Army. The Deputy of the Fuehrer is as colorless as is the Chief of OKW.

1700 Completion of my draft plan for our future military boundary in the West.

Evening talk with Wagner on future organization of Military Administration in France. Things have not yet ripened to the discussion stage.

After supper Consultation with Gehlen on future German fortification system. Basic policy: Only the minimum! Everything we have should be used for offensive action.

Defense:

- a) A system of tank obstacles laid out along river lines.
- b) Organization permitting instant employment of all forces.
- c) First-class net of roads and railroads to move these forces.
- d) Strategic placing of special defense groups which would canalize enemy invasion operationally (not tactically!).
- e) Maximum use of minefields.

Reports on our advances received during the evening are incomplete. The lively rate of the offensive makes itself felt.

19 June 1940.

The advance continues according to plan. New victories are reported: The German flag is flying from the Cathedral of Strasbourg. Toul is in our hands. Belfort was taken yesterday. On the Channel Coast we have reached Cherbourg. The front of our Armies has almost everywhere reached the Loire and in some places even passed across it.

Notwithstanding this continuous succession of victories following one another with extraordinary speed, ObdH seems to have been called down quite roughly by the Fuehrer on his return from the talks in Munich, and all that just because there are still a few French soldiers left fighting us in the Northeast.



Various talks and reports during the day:

With ObdH: Projected peacetime organization of the Army and the transitional phases leading to it:

Future Army:

|                  |                 |                   |
|------------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| 20 Armd. Divs. ) | 10 Corps Hqs. } | 4 Gp. Hqs.        |
| 10 mot. Divs. )  |                 |                   |
| 6 Mt. Divs. )    |                 |                   |
| 26 Inf. Divs. )  | 13 Corps Hqs. } | <u>6 Gp. Hqs.</u> |
|                  |                 | 10 Gp. Hqs.       |

Holland and Belgium as well as Norway: occupation in rotation. Government-General still undecided.

The Hqs of Mil. Districts should only control the Inf. Corps, not also the other Branches of Armed Forces in their territories. Groupings should be so that mot. Divs. would be stationed all over the country behind a ring of Inf. Divs. along the border.

Colonial troops.

Cavalry will not be abolished. Question of how to utilize the horses.

Buhle: Over-all proposal on future strength and geographical distribution of our forces. Schedule for reduction of Army from 165 to 120 Divs.

Wagner: Refugee problems. (Order issued.) New boundary line for AGp. Rear Areas. (Order issued.)

During the evening we receive an OKW "directive" setting forth a boundary line which must not be crossed by us (in the main it follows the Cher river) as well as a line east of the Atlantic Coast. It also directs that we push parts of Gp. Kleist across the Lower Loire in AGp. B sector, to occupy the Atlantic Coast, while other parts of the Gp. are to drive on Lyon to get into the rear of the Italian front.

The latter move has already been prepared and will be effected. The former requires a movement across the entire width of the front and so will not become effective at the desired time. Some days ago I tried desperately hard to get permission to commit the Armor and mot. Divs. on Kleist's right wing. At that time the plan was directly vetoed on top level. Now, after these forces have been racing off in southeastern direction for several days and not meeting any organized resistance, they have to be reversed and ordered in northwestern direction.

It is indeed an effort to keep calm in the face of such amateurish tinkering with the business of directing military operations.

We learn that the Italians are going to start their offensive on the Alpine front in two or three days. By that time we are expected to have gotten through the Rhône Valley into the rear of the French front. I believe it probably cannot be done within that time.

The orders necessitated by these "directives" are completed at midnight.

Among today's callers was Col. von Witzleben, who reported conclusion of the Second War Academy Course.

20 June 1940.

The day starts with a rather sharp-worded telephone conversation with ObdH. Yesterday's meddling by the Great Master has thrown him off balance. ObdH now wants right wing Twelfth Army (XVII Corps, including 86th Div.) to be transferred to AGp. C to assist in completing the encirclement. I object to this entirely illogical order, but in the end I yield because it doesn't really matter where these four Divs. are. They are no longer needed in Twelfth Army sector, where the enemy has been smashed. In another two days at the latest they will be redundant also in AGp. C and then can be employed as OKH Reserve in the Rear Area.

The morning reports, in the way of important news, announce the capture of Lyon and of Mantes on the Loire Estuary (with bridges intact). I just cannot comprehend what more the political command could want of us, and which of its wishes have remained unfulfilled. But as an underling, one has to bear with the frayed nerves of those in high position.

Following the morning conference with ObdH, orders are issued regarding organization of a Group for Lyon, under C in C Twelfth Army, for a special mission in the Chambéry and Grenoble areas. In addition to XVI Corps it is to comprise Combat Teams made up of all improvised mot. commands in AGp. A and as large a portion as possible of First Mt. Div., on trucks, furnished by AGp. B.

In my estimate, such Advance Combat Teams would be ready to start from the Lyon area on 21 June; if teamed with foot Inf., not before 25 June. Corps Hoepfner, of course, could start right away, if required.

By 21 June, evening, likewise, the elements of Gp. Kleist, which were moved to AGp. B sector, will be ready on the Lower Loire to start the drive on Bordeaux; I would say, they could reach that city on 25 June.

1025 We receive word from Fuehrer Hq that French armistice emissaries are expected to reach Tours from Poitiers at 1700. I send Gen. von Tippelskirch to meet the French representatives at our front line and accompany them to Tours, where OKW apparently will take over. The armistice terms will be handed them at a formal ceremony at Compiègne tomorrow morning (21 June). Subsequently an Armistice Commission is to be formed, which will have its seat at Wiesbaden. Specific OKW instructions on this matter will be forthcoming.

Afternoon: Auleb (C of S, Blaskowitz) reports on refugee movements. He estimates that between seven and eight million people are on the move and asks us to help out by assigning to the Hq of Military Commander France more staff personnel, transport columns, traffic control detachments and technical units.

The following policy is established;

- a) Refugee care concerns not only us, but, mainly, is the business of the French Government; contact to that end must be established. (Fuehrer rules that this will not be done until the armistice document has been signed.)
- b) First of all, we must halt the flow of refugees. This is to be effected by the Armies in their respective sectors and by Blaskowitz' organization in the Rear Areas. It would be advisable to set up several stopping lines.
- c) The best way to stop the movement would be to establish feeding points in certain collecting areas. There the refugees could be screened by home districts. Repatriation would follow only after roads have been assigned and transit billets prepared.
- d) In the final relocation of refugees, the areas which we are to take over, must be kept free from returning refugees. These refugees could be settled in the relatively unaffected areas, e.g. the communication zones of Fourth and Twelfth Armies.

1700 Stappf, upon instruction of ObdL, asks that AA Bns., long-range Rcn, Staffeln and Air Force signal units be returned after conclusion of ground operations.

There is no objection to releasing these elements in view of the new missions of Air Force.

With von Greiffenberg: Drafting of orders for Gp. List (drive from area of Lyon on Grenoble and Chambéry in rear of French Alpine front). Planning of allocation of troops to coastal defense and Rear Areas.

French Armistice Delegation, which left on schedule, had not got through to our lines yet, apparently on account of their totally choked railroad system. By 2200 they had not yet arrived in Tours.

Formal presentation of the Armistice terms, which is to take place at Compiègne tomorrow (21 June) at 1100, probably will have to be postponed for that reason.

Evening: A very disagreeable telephone talk with Gen. Obst. von Rundstedt, who regards OKH orders of 20 June as interference in his command functions. He uses a language which one would not think possible between German generals. Objectively, his anger has been roused by ObdH's continual meddling in little details, against which I have been fighting all along.

21 June 1940.

The French Armistice Delegation did not cross our lines until late last night. Without stopping for sleep, they could reach Compiègne by 1130; presentation of armistice terms has therefore been postponed to 1500.

The Italians claim they would start their offensive at and south of the Little St. Bernard today. The weather is so bad that the Air Force cannot take part. It is therefore safe to assume that these attacks will be limited to some patrol activities. Starting our drive from the Lyon area is out of the question before the Italian drive has seriously gotten under way, i.e. not before 22 June. Whether we shall start this drive at all can be decided only after conclusion of the armistice negotiations. From a purely practical viewpoint, 23 June would be the earliest date.

Our troop movements are proceeding according to plan. Wherever the Demarcation Line has been reached, the troops close up and the Armies regroup. Kleist's Gp., ordered to the Lower Loire, is now on its way. Hoth, with his Armor now no longer needed at the coast, is moving toward the Lower Loire. In sector of AGp. C, sizeable enemy groups, though tightly surrounded, are still putting up a stout fight; there seem to be some aggressive leaders left in these troops, which have suffered less in the recent fighting than those in the Champagne. The Fortress Troops in the Maginot Line too, are holding out.

Air reconnaissance and the picture of the enemy situation confirm my views expressed a long time ago. The enemy fronting our right wing, after the battle with Fourth Army between Somme and Seine, was never again able to regroup for effective action. Operations in Normandy and Brittany now amount merely to a cleaning-up job. On Eighteenth Army front, south of Paris, too, the enemy has not been able to organize any opposition. Sixth and Ninth Armies have only

sporadic engagements with rear guards. Second Army has lost contact with the enemy altogether. Group Kleist has no longer any enemy before it near Lyon. This shows that the broken remnants of the beaten French Army are streaming back across the Loire bend in a southwestern direction. East of the line Troyes - Moulins a wide gap is left open. We may assume that it was the intention of the French Command to close this gap with forces shifted from the Northeast. This plan was frustrated by our armored thrust to the Swiss border. As a result, the right wing of the enemy in the Clermont-Ferrand area now is dangling in the air and has no contact with the Alpine front built up against Italy. The French Army as a whole has only one intact front, the Alpine front, but the road into its rear is already open to us.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on his force and the work of his command. He bemoans the ambiguous position of his Staff and personnel between Air Force and Army, not being accepted as belonging to either.

Wagner and Kossmann: Conference on refugee problems.

Afternoon: Showing of newsreel at Chimay Castle. Visits by Gen. von Stuelpnagel and Col. Baentsch.

2000 ObdH returns from Compiègne. He is deeply stirred. The French (the most likeable of whom was the Army representative) had no warning that they would be handed the terms at the very site of the negotiations in 1918. They were apparently shaken by this arrangement and at first inclined to be sullen.

The Fuehrer and ObdH were present only at the reading of the preamble. In the following negotiations, presided over by Keitel, there seems to have been a great deal of wrangling and ObdH is worried that the French might not accept.

I don't understand his apprehension. The French must accept and, with Pétain at the helm, will do so. Moreover, our terms are so moderate that sheer common sense ought to make them accept.

French attempts to have our terms bracketed with those of the Italians and to make acceptance of our terms contingent on what the Italians demand, has of course been rejected by us. They have been given until tomorrow noon to accept. Aerial assault of Bordeaux has been authorized.

The Italians have asked us to set 22 June as date for the start of our drive in support of their attack across the Little St. Bernard Pass. We are not going to do this, List's Group will not be ready before 23 June. Apart from this, we must first see whether this so-called attack of the Italians will be anything more than a patrol skirmish.

von Stuelpnagel for supper. We had a very pleasant chat.



22 June 1940.

The dominant event of the day is the conclusion of the Armistice with the French.

The Armistice instrument will be signed at Compiègne, at 1850. Throughout the day, exchange of telegrams with Italian Gen. Staff urging us to push from Lyon to Grenoble and Chambéry to open the way through the Alps for them. These requests are given dilatory treatment, since Gp. List would not be ready to start before 23 June. Moreover, the Fuehrer has made it known that the word for the start of this operation would be given by him. Orders to this effect for List are being drafted.

Noon: Gercke reports on railroad situation. General Directorate of Belgian Railroads at last shows willingness to cooperate in restoration and operation of railroads. Some pressure had to be applied. Railroad capacity will be considerably increased by end of this month, so that we can then start with troop movements by rail. The railroad line in Lorraine will thereby be linked with the German railroad network within a relatively short time. We discuss modifications of plans for impending regrouping of troops in the light of the railroad situation.

Afternoon: Conference with Buhle, Wagner, and von Greiffenberg on regrouping program from standpoint of operational requirements (coastal defense, preparations against England), the reduction in number of Divs. and the reorganization of the Army set-up.

The difficult question in this connection is how to insure the unified administration of France without impairing the authority of Military Command.

A formula must be found for establishing OKH as the central authority also on administrative matters, without burdening us directly with the whole governmental machinery.

One way of doing this would be to leave AGp. Hqs continue in their command functions and to set up under OKH supervision a Military Administration which would be exclusively concerned with establishing uniform administration policies, making use to the greatest extent of the existing French civil administration.

This is a political matter and decision must therefore be left to the Fuehrer.

I put the matter before ObdH.

After return from ObdH I find at my office Freiherr von Enzberg, my former aide in the East in 1917, who has come to call. Soon afterwards, Rohowsky drops in.

In the evening, the decision is announced that List will attack on 23 June, but must not advance beyond Grenoble-Chambéry. In the drive along the coast toward the south, AGp. B must not advance beyond the line going through Cognac.

The raids of the British Air Force at home are becoming bothersome. Now they are extending their attacks to Berlin, and ObdL therefore wants us to transfer Army AA units. Lengthy discussion of the subject over the phone. There is nothing to be said against the principle of the request.

The near future will show whether Britain will do the reasonable thing in the light of our victories, or will try to carry on the war singlehanded. In the latter case, the war will lead to Britian's destruction, and may last a long time.

23 June 1940.

Today's operations are confined to further advances of the right wing (Fourth and Eighteenth Armies) and the drive of Group List. The latter started on schedule and at noon was reported to have reached the area northeast of Valence, northwest of Grenoble and Chambéry, and northeast of Aix-les-Bains. They have before them defense positions equipped with AT guns and manned by Mt. troops. In reply to an inquiry during the evening, AGp. A is told that any increase in pressure involving major German casualties would not be in line with intentions of OKH.

The whole day is filled with conferences with Org. Sec. and Gen Qu.

Gen Qu: The problem of organizing the administration in France is causing quite a headache. I object to the term "Military Commander" and ask for a "Chief of Military Administration", who would act on behalf and under the responsibility of ObdH. In these circumstances the incumbent would not be Commander of a fighting Army, as proposed. Blaskowitz and Bockelberg must either be employed elsewhere or step out of the picture. The matter will be put before the Fuehrer for decision.

Org. Sec.: Problem of Army reorganization has been essentially clarified. The question of the future Military District Organization still needs to be studied. One thing is certain: The Fuehrer does not want any change in the present set-up of Military Districts pending clarification of the new national frontiers.

Greiffenberg reports on arrangements for Paris Victory Parade.

Afternoon: Fuehrer Conference. The following points were dealt with:

- a) PWs: Break up PW concentrations. Colored PWs are to be put in special Bns., receive good treatment, and will not be taken to Germany. Separate labor detachments will be formed for farming and industry. PWs of German ancestry to be screened out. - PWs will be shipped to Germany as needed. Darre will be consulted on matters of interest to agriculture.
  - b) Repatriation of refugees: In addition to the boundary line previously announced, on which returning refugees are to be halted, it would be desirable to throw cordons around Strasbourg and other German towns in order to prevent return of the French elements of the population.
  - c) Setting up of Military Administration France has been recognized as necessary. Similarly as in Belgium, it should make most extensive use of the existing civil administration. (Proposals to this end should be awaited from French quarters.) Whether French Government will be allowed to return to Paris later on is still uncertain; certainly not now.
  - d) Mission for Ninth Army: Wants us to think it through. List with Kuebler, Bergmann, Fahrnbacher, Schoerner.
  - e) Captured enemy materiel: AA Guns for Home Air Defense! Release everything that can be used for this purpose. Take Czech guns out of Rhine Valley. French 7.5 cm guns will be taken to ZI, with ammunition, and offered to Air Force. Naval guns for coastal defense (from West Wall and booty). French long-barrelled guns.
- Preparations for protecting flank of Ninth Army. Fuehrer has reserved decision on what may be given to others.
- f) Ammunition columns for K 5 and L 12 guns to be employed against England.
  - g) Tankers are wanted to keep fuel stocks at home mobile, as a precaution against air attacks.

24 June 1940.

Morning reports show a piquant note. The Italians have been stalled by the French fortifications and cannot make any headway. But as they want to present themselves at the Armistice negotiations with as large a chunk of French territory as they could occupy in a hurry, they have approached us with a scheme to transport Italian Bns. behind List's front, partly by air via Munich, partly directly to the Lyon area, so as to get them to the points which include the area on which they want to make occupation claims. The whole thing is the cheapest kind of a fraud. I have made it plain I will not have my name connected with that sort of trickery.

In the end the whole thing turns out to have been a plan hatched out by Roatta, and disapproved by Marshal Badoglio. The people in OKW will have to swallow it that they allowed themselves to be hooked by a scheme proposed by a subordinate, which the responsible Italian Marshal (who seems to be the only respectable soldier in the lot) has rejected as dishonorable.

ObdH flies to Seventh Army. His anxieties move him to make some preparations against the contingency of a failure of the Italian armistice negotiations. In that event it would be necessary to launch a major drive into the rear of the French Alpine fortifications, with a thrust to the Mediterranean coast as a secondary effort.

Such an operations requires coordination and employment of Mt. troops, and must be properly prepared. It cannot be improvised out of hand with hurriedly introduced Mt. Bns.

It is again the same frustrating game that we had in making contact with the Russians in the Polish Campaign. The political command wants the direct connection between Switzerland and France severed, and would like to have this political expediency dressed up as a military necessity. This is sure to have some unpleasant consequences.

1020 Talk with Tresckow (AGp. A): I sketch out for him the political background and the resulting fluctuations in military requirements. AGp. A should draw up a timetable for preparations of a major operation against the Savoie front and continuance of operations against the French Army, with strong left wing.

1100 Col. Warlimont (OKW): I explain my ideas about establishing the post of a "Chief of Military Administration of France" to him. He thinks that such an arrangement would be agreeable to the Fuehrer. The only problem is whom to put into the job. Posse and Sarow are ruled out. Burand is considered suitable, but only as an assistant, not as chief. A chief has still to be found. (Consult with Goering and Keitel.)

1200 OQu IV reports on British efforts to continue war by enlisting support of the French Colonies and Frenchmen abroad.

Situation report on Baltic countries etc.

von Greiffenberg: Drafting of preliminary orders relative to reorganization after armistice.

Wagner: Organization of Military Administration France. -- Personnel matters. -- New supply base.

Fellgiebel: Release of Army Signal units for Air and Naval operations in connection with change-over to war against Britain.

Bogatsch: Report on activities of Air Force units attached to Army. Release of AA, Reconnaissance, and Air Signal units.

Buhle and Rochricht: Future set-up of Military Districts - Reorganization of training program. -- Organization of OKH.

von Neufville drops in. He tells me of the disappointment of his organization, the 78th Div., which did not get into the fighting.

von Greiffenberg: Parade plans.

2100 Word received that Armistice between Italy and France has been concluded. OKW issues cease-fire order, effective 25 June, 0135 hrs. Advances and withdrawals are to be stopped. Will be settled by Armistice Commission.

In the evening ObdH returns from Seventh Army, much impressed by the effect produced by our great victory. Dollmann, Witzleben, and Leeb have received the Knight's Cross.

25 June 1940.

0135 The fighting has ceased, now the paper work begins.

Morning. Disagreement with ObdH: The political command wanted to have railroad connection severed between Switzerland and France. To this end List had been given orders to do a thoroughgoing wrecking job on the railroad line La Roche - Annécy. Owing to the course taken by events, this order was not executed any more. Now ObdH wants that, with Armistice in force, destruction of the line should be carried out by patrol action. I object. Once a truce has been declared any such military undertaking is ruled out. If at all, this could be done only by Canaris. After consultation with Keitel, I issue instructions to this effect to Canaris.

Otherwise, the day is filled with sometimes strenuous conferences about matters that have to be arranged now.

Wagner: Food situation in France. Structure of Military Administration France.

Bogatsch: Army can depend on protection of important installations also after transfer of AA units. -- Air defense tasks of the Air Force Districts Hqs. -- Loaned AA Bns. will remain intact and will be available to Army if needed for new operations. -- Captured materiel. -- Long-range Reconnaissance Staffeln except Staffel for Long-range Arty. Calais, will be returned. Of the Close-range Staffeln, 20 Staffeln remain with Armd. Divs., and 5 more at the disposal of OKH; the rest reverts to ObdL, but would remain intact. --



All Air Force Signal troops attached to Army will be assigned as units to various Air Force organizations. -- Corps Air Officer staffs will not be broken up.

von Ziehlberg expresses in a very charming way the satisfaction and admiration inspired in him by the conduct of the campaign.

Move to Fontainebleau 2 July.

Peacetime organization of General Staff.

von Greiffenberg, Buhle, Hoehricht, Weinknecht: Organization and reorganization orders are being discussed. New consideration: Striking power in the East (15 Inf., 6 Armd., 3 mot. Divs.)

Afterwards conference with ObdH in which these plans are talked over and approved.

Review of peacetime organization: Military Districts etc. Control of Inf. and Armd. units will be exercised by Corps Hqs of the same branch of service, with expediency determining which of the Corps Commanders will head the Military District.

Eight Gp. Hqs will be established as top echelons. The result will be that any one front would be made up of several AGps (AHqs). A way has therefore to be found to insure coordination in theaters, for instance East, West, or South. From a personnel point of view it is impossible to establish a higher command echelon above the AHqs, and so theater AHqs will have to be established to coordinate work on matters affecting a larger front.

COu IV: Russia wants Bessarabia. We are not interested in Bessarabia. The issue of the Bukowina raised by Russia is new and goes beyond our agreements with the Russians. In any event, it is imperative for our interests that there should be no war on the Balkans.

In the evening, ObdH gives a very successful party in his quarters. In warm words he pays tribute to his staff and to my work.

26 June 1940.

Front reports of course have lost all importance. Movements for occupation of the coast will now be carried out with increased speed, while the withdrawal from places inside the Green Boundary Line will not start until later on; orders to this effect are issued.

In the foreign field, Russia's attitude stands in the foreground.  
The opinion prevails that it will be possible to solve the Bessarabian question without war.

Kossmann: Issue of orders on refugee matters and establishment of Military Administration.

Minister Schmidt, who is to take over Administration France was among the callers of the day.

Orders for reorganization are being worked on.

Gen Qu (Gen. Mueller) reports after consultation with AGp. C and AHqs 1 and 7, that the difficulties in connection with the movements of refugees and the provisioning of PWs are on the decline. As usual the crisis has already been passed when the commotion reaches its peak.

In the evening I have a long talk with von Salmuth which at times becomes very warm. He is apparently the troublemaker in AGp. B. It was just like him to tell Bock that our regrouping plans were an insult to him as C in C, and that he had better go on furlough and let the AGp. veterinary take over his job.

This sort of touchiness is becoming a bother. He has no rational arguments to offer against our arrangements, but from sheer ego wants a strip of the Channel Coast. The contention that the new dispositions, as ordered, would not form a sufficient threat against England is childish. The threat to England is in the number of Divs. drawn up opposite her coast, and not in the boundary line between AGps.

27 June 1940.

Conference at Versailles.

Greiffenberg: Reorganization orders.

Hemmerich: Maps. Future organization of his section.

Wagner and Kossmann: Changes to be effected in impending reorganization.

1230 - 2100 By plane to Lyon. Drive to XVI Corps and Third Armd. Div. in area north of Grenoble (Voreppe).

During evening issuance of orders on reorganization.

Russia is marching into Bessarabia without opposition!

28 June 1940.

Morning conference with ObdH:

- 1.) Interim phase between "Military Commander France" and "Military Administration France".  
Jaehnecke approved for Paris, now Military Administration, later City Commandant.
- 2.) Refugees. Pfeffer does not seem to have impressed ObdH as a very forceful executive.
- 3.) Draft telephone and telegraph system of French railroad for our use. Armistice Commission.
- 4.) Early evacuation of Lyon tip.
- 5.) Coastal defense.

1945 Leave for Versailles via Paris: Conference with Ia Officers and OQs of AGps. and Armies.

After opening with a general review of events:

- 1.) Expression of thanks to officers of Gen. Staff and my close associates.
- 2.) New tasks arising from new situation.
- 3.) Regrouping in West and East.  
Deactivations and new structure of Army. Chiefs of Op. and Org. Secs. speak briefly on the subject.

Afterwards talks of Chief Op. Sec. with Ia Officers, and Gen Qu with OQs.

After return, report by OQu IV on European situation and by von Etzdorf on views of Foreign Office.

Before retiring, a lengthy conference with ObdH on current problems. He has nothing to keep him busy and so seems unhappy.

29 June 1940.

In the morning conference with ObdH, Greiffenberg.

Ziehlberg, Kienzel and Roehricht receive Iron Cross, First Class.

1430 Leave by plane for Tempelhof. Uneventful trip.  
After landing, to dentist, then home - Berlin - .

30 June 1940.

My birthday. Many affecting congratulations. From ObdH, a photo with cordial dedication.

1100 Conference with Weizsäcker:

- a) We can preserve the victories of this campaign only with the means with which they were achieved, that is, with military power.
- b) No concrete basis for any peace treaty yet.
- c) We shall keep a steady eye on the East.
- d) Britain probably still needs one more demonstration of our military might before she gives in and leaves us a free hand in the East.

On the whole, satisfaction about the self-restraint shown by Russia and the surrender of military units in French colonies. The problems are not lying in our present situation, but in future developments, for in seeking to preserve the gains of our victories with military power we shall eventually overstrain ourselves.

Gradual elimination of "old School" diplomats by the political command (Foreign Minister) has begun in the posts in Eastern countries.

1 July 1940.

Schniewind (Naval Operations Staff): Discussion of basis for warfare against England.

- a) Prerequisite is air superiority. (Then perhaps we can dispense with land warfare.) — Smooth sailing!
- b) Fog after middle of October.
- c) Line of departure for invasion: coast from Ostend to Le Havre.
- d) A large number of small steamers (1,600) could be assembled. Camouflage, air protection! 1,000,000 men in one wave. Only small coastal craft suitable.
- e) Arty. cover for second half of stretch across water and on beaches must be furnished by Air Force.

- f) Underwater threats can be neutralized by net barrages. Surface threats can be minimized by mines and submarines supplementing land-based Arty. and planes.
- g) Cliffs are at Dover, Dungeness, Beachy Head. Rest of coast suitable for beach assault. Firm bottom.
- h) Dr. Feder type concrete barges are now being tested. Production in sufficient numbers held possible in July. In addition to these we want railroad ferries (Todt's proposal) for transporting tanks.

Leeb (Ordnance Office): He was told all along that invasion of England was not being considered. I tell him that possibilities have to be examined, for, if political command demands a landing, they will want everything done at top speed.

Ordnance enumerates the following capabilities:

- 1.) About 100 Tanks III and 20 Tanks IV can be fitted for amphibious operations.
- 2.) As many as 40 tanks can be carried by one railroad ferry. Unloading on special landing tracks.
- 3.) Persistent smoke screens can be produced by new smoke bombs.

It is necessary to set up special experimental teams soon in order to get Tank, Engineer, and Naval experts together for practical tests on a broad basis. Problem of direction of such teams and part to be played by each Branch of Armed Forces in it must be clarified soon.

Erfurth: Discussion of the following subjects:

- a) Collecting of war records of the now terminated campaign.
- b) Closing and bringing up-to-date of records of units slated for deactivation.
- c) Militaer-Wochenblatt.\*
- d) Propaganda. Underscore contribution of Army in relation to Air Force and Navy, and of conventional weapons in relation to tanks. Part played by CGs and Gen. Staff.\*\*
- e) OKW must be given space in future writing of history of the war, to show its contribution, (including propaganda, economic warfare, etc.). Generally, however, separate accounts by the individual Branches of Armed Forces. Commission: (Stuelpnagel jun.?)
- f) Army Library system: Creation of a Chief of Army Libraries necessary.
- g) Russo-Polish War (1919/20): Inquiry to be made at OKW if book can be released for publication.



Fromm: Conference on pending matters. No major difficulties seem to develop. Specific items:

- a) Activation of new Armd. units requires so many motor vehicles that Mot. Transp. Clms. of Inf. Divs. will have to be cut down further. (If that is done Army Mot. Transp. Clms. must be retained.)
- b) Commanding Generals will not be needed for Home Military Districts at first. Deputy CGs will do for time being.
- c) Wants as much time as possible for completion of demobilization and deactivation. Thinks that deactivations will not give any large boost to production. He is apparently reluctant to have Eastern units deactivated.
- d) Control of eastern and western Fortified Zones in ZI will be taken over by BdE.

Buerkner\* : Order for destruction of railroads has meanwhile been cancelled by OKW. Will be carried out nevertheless.

1630 Return by plane from Tempelhof. Arrive at 1900.

2100 Conference with Mueller, Wagner, Kossmann on necessity to define jurisdiction of Armistice Commission. Problems keep cropping up which are far beyond the scope of the Armistice Commission and will probably require setting up an authority under direct Reich jurisdiction for their solution.\*\* At the beginning we discussed administrative matters pertaining to refugee problem.

2 July 1940.

(Move to Fontainebleau.)

Morning: Conference with ObdH:

- a) Current Op. Sec. matters.
- b) Results of my trip to Berlin. Basis for campaign against England.
- c) (With Wagner and Kossmann) Basis of cooperation with French Government on reconstruction.

Afterwards journey via Laon, Soissons, Compiègne, St. Denis, Paris, to new GHq at Fontainebleau. Everything is very well prepared. Friendly welcome at my billets.

ObdH has flown to Berlin\*\*\*.

3 July 1940

von Greiffenberg: Matters discussed:

- a) Operational questions. Britain, which must be dealt with separately, and the East are the primary problems now. The latter must be viewed chiefly with reference to the requirements of a military intervention which will compel Russia to recognize Germany's dominant position in Europe. Special issues, such as the Baltic and Balkan countries may introduce some variants.
- b) Organization of OKH Staff. Greiffenberg must take over OQu I\*.

Wagner:

- a) Wolff-Metternich, art historian\*\*.
- b) Respective jurisdictions of Civil Administration and Military Command in France.
- c) Paris Military Headquarters.
- d) Cuts in Staff.
- e) Build-up of supply base France. Railroad difficulties! Setting-up of separate supply base for England unnecessary; is already taken care of by base set-up for southward drive of right wing\*\*\*.

von der Chevallerie reports on his Div. Problems of officer and Gen. Staff training.

von Greiffenberg - Buhle: Operations against England.

- 1.) Paramount factors: Weather -- Air superiority.
- 2.) Method: Similar to large-scale river crossing, on line Ostend - Le Havre.
- 3.) Potential beachheads: Cliffs at Dover, Dungeness, and Beachy Head. Elsewhere many good landing spots, even if beaches rise at steep angles.
- 4.) First wave: six Divs. (picked units reinforced by four Armd. Bns.)
- 5.) Technical means: amphibious tanks, rafts, flamethrowing tanks, assault boats from the Rhine. -- Six-barreled rocket projectors not before October. -- Use of chemical smoke. -- Airborne landings. -- Amphibious Engineers.
- 6.) Preparations:

- a) Special Staff Reinhard. (Must be replaced in his unit.)
  - b) Joint exercises and trials at Putlos or, better, on North Sea Coast.
  - c) Selection of units; strength requirements, reinforcements for them.
  - d) Air photographs of fortifications and defense preparations (Urgent!).
  - e) Canaris.
  - f) Signal communications.
  - g) In our Hq: planning staff under Greiffenberg, in addition Buhle and a representative of Navy; also Thoma, Jacoby, Brand, Thiele, Liss, Ziehlberg, Roehricht.
- 7.) Deception: Diversion by spreading of rumors. Mask actual width of jump-off frontage by propaganda and actual preparations.
- 8.) Training must be geared to the special tasks ahead.
- 9.) Appointed time: August. - Fog from middle of October onwards.
- 10.) Draft operational plans: At the earliest.

von Greiffenberg (on conference with Loyke): Navy preparations for coastal defense: Coastal Arty. will arrive very late (takes three months). Org. Todt should be called in to do their construction work. -- Liaison necessary with Admiral France (Schuster). -- Plans to be drawn up will embrace coast only as far as Le Havre; further south everything will be improvisation.

Air build-up against England: AA precautions in area of AGps. B and C are insufficient.

Buhle: Some of the specifications of the OKW directive on demobilization are utterly impracticable. Continued availability of discharged men assured only on furlough basis, not if demobilized.

Report of British-French naval action at Oran.

Final OKW communiqué on campaign does not mention Gen. Staff with a single word. Significant!

4 July 1940.

The reports of a sea battle between the French and the British at Oran are confirmed. The British tried to prevent the French ships from leaving port. Battleship "Strasbourg" and one submarine did get through. The remainder of the ships were put out of action at their anchorages.

The Fuehrer has ordered that armistice clauses relating to decommissioning of French Navy are to be suspended. Personnel of French Navy Ministry interned near Rochefort will be released.

0930 Kuechler and Marcks\*: Orientation on mission of AHq 18 with regard to control of troops, fortifications and administration in the East. Kinzel reviews disposition of Russian forces.

Wuestefeld: Transfer of fortifications in West to control of BdE. Administration of Western fortifications. — Dismantling of obstacles.

Stapf:

- a) Air plans. Primary objective: destruction of enemy Air Force and of supporting installations and means of production. The two targets cannot be sharply separated from each other. Secondary objective: Enemy Navy. Every opportunity must be used to attack the enemy in the air and on the ground. But a prime consideration is to preserve own strength for the long-range execution of these tasks. Enemy air warning and signal networks seem to be good. Enemy apparently received several successive warnings prior to our attacks. Our planes must vary routes to and from targets. Cover by long-range fighters and fighters.

Plans for interim period: Hit-and-run attacks similar to those by the British. Disruption of production and attacks on airfields.

Ready to change over to large-scale attacks by end of this week, when air build-up will be completed. Will have four issues of ammunition and four fuel quotas.

- b) Air Force now has total strength of

45 Bomber Gruppen,  
12 Divebomber " ,  
10 Long-range Fighter Gruppen,  
19 Fighter Gruppen in Air Fleet,  
13 Fighter Gruppen in Air Force Districts.

At beginning of war we had 1,200 bombers. Present strength: Crews 1,100 planes; 900 machines. British strength is about one-half ours.

- c) Air Force requests release of the following number of short-range Rcn. Staffeln:

|                                      |             |
|--------------------------------------|-------------|
| To Second Air Fleet                  | 3 Staffeln  |
| To Third Air Fleet                   | 9 Staffeln  |
| For coast guard and AAA air training | 6 Staffeln  |
| For Navy coastal patrols             | 3 Staffeln  |
| Total:                               | 21 Staffeln |

Since we have 35, this would leave us with 14 Staffeln.

- d) Staffeln which previously worked with individual Corps will remain on call for Army.
- e) Goering wants to keep Army Liaison Officer in any case; if Stapf should be needed elsewhere, a substitute must be assigned.
- f) Fuehrer said to have issued order directing Army to assign its AA formations to defense of airfields (in support of ground organization).

1230 von Stuelpnagel:

- a) Fuehrer has ordered that, with armistice in force, requisitions in areas that will not remain occupied must not exceed day-to-day requirements of troops.
- b) Armistice Commission does not want to exercise any control over Military Administration. Goering demands setting up of an Economic Commission, paralleling Armistice Commission, to deal with all phases of French economic life (coal, foreign exchange, confiscations etc.).

von Stuelpnagel will be representative of OKW in the Commission.

We must also get representatives of the Military Administration France into that Commission. Ministry Councillor von Maas, Chairman: Privy Councillor Hemmen, from the Foreign Office. Composition: representatives of Foreign Office, Four Year Plan, Reich Government, Transport Ministry.

In this manner we attain what I recommended to ObdH right from the start: Separation of economic policy-making from its practical implementation. The latter will be in hands of Military Administration.

Ruoff, afterwards Weise, personal calls.

1300 Gercke:

- a) Progress report on French railroads. Difficulties in operation of Belgian railroads with our personnel. Clear distinction drawn between military and civilian railroads in Belgium.
- b) Transportation schedules; Armor starts movements to the East as of 18 July.
- c) Road network France: Draft of regulations for long-distance hauls.
- d) Waterways. Canal system still much in arrears owing to demolition of bridges and disruption of water supply system.
- e) Intensification of expansion program on eastern railroads.



1100 von Bock (on phone):

- a) Crops: Holding up return of refugees impedes completion of crop collection. At least farming population should be allowed to return. PW labor would arrive too late. This view is shared by the individual Army Commanders. Wants lifting of restrictions for return of farmers at least at Cher-Loire line.

Bockelberg is worried about return of refugees to Paris.

- b) Crops at home: Leaves must be granted for farm labor, tractor drivers, etc. No fuel reduction, so that leave personnel could be taken to railroad stations.

Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. Internal Gen. Staff routine.

Wagner (Weinknecht) on future organization of Supply Service. For time being no supply collecting districts, but through-routing right from shipping point. Within ten days through shipment will be possible as far as Paris. The practicability of this system will have to be tested, but it seems questionable that it can be kept up in the long run.

Fieldpost service for Armies on Atlantic Coast is not running well. Mail takes twelve days.

In the evening return of ObdH. Lengthy talk on political and current matters.

5 July 1940.

Morning Conference with ObdH:

- 1.) Reinhard: Will have Hq in Berlin for time being; later Putlos; main body of his Staff goes to Putlos ahead of him.

First part of his assignment will be to establish team work with BdE, Navy and Org. Todt, and develop all resources within his limited scope. The larger set-up must be organized by us.

Get down to practical work as soon as possible.

Schniewind, Fromm, Leeb, Jacob and others must send Liaison Officers to Reinhard; also Thoma.

- 2.) England:

- a) Locations for seaborne landings, (jump-off also from Cherbourg), for airborne landings?

- b) What is available for airborne landings? (Stapf)
- c) Size of units to be especially equipped for airborne landings will be adapted accordingly. (Buhle's job, may have to arrange it with Air Force.)
- d) Jump-off: Put across Armor (seaborne) initially from both sides of Calais; another echelon later also from Cherbourg. Transport of airborne forces to follow at the earliest to give them mobility.
- e) Amphibious tanks available on 1 Aug 1940:
  - 90 Tanks III with 3.7 cm guns,
  - 14 " III " 5 cm " ,
  - 28 " IV " ,
  - 12 med. tank destroyers, SPM

ObdH wants 180 amphibious tanks.

Present bottom, maximum 7 m (we need 15 m); speed between 5 and 7 km, Interference of buoyancy.
- f) Transport plan by Todt: Communicate to Reinhard.
- g) Thoma and Reinhard: Suction effect at low tide; tests at Sylt.
- h) Armament, equipment: BdE has been instructed to make all suitable arms available to give maximum striking power to air and seaborne forces of first assault wave. (Mt. howitzers, Cav. guns, etc.). Speed production. Has also been directed to make every effort to help along production of six-barreled rocket projectors.
- i) Smoke laying tests by Air Force? How far progressed? Possibilities for application?
- k) Target date: 15 Aug.
- l) Resources for gas warfare: Status on 1 Aug. Have Wagner look into it. What about type 100 gas? Have Liss find out about British resources for gas warfare.
- m) Jacob: Speed boats, assault boats, outboard motors for lighters.
- n) Arty.: How much Arty. will be available? Assembly of Arty. and AA defense for assembly. Ammunition supplies.
- o) What is maximum distance for detection of sound of moving surface craft and underwater movements of tanks? (Check with Navy on British sound location devices.)
- p) Draw up list of Div. and Corps Hqs for assault. Must be picked!

- q) Establish training facilities/ Ground training centers in area north of Somme under Strauss (AHq 9).
- r) Demands on Navy and Air Force. How much time does Navy need?
- s) Deception measures.
- 3.) Colonial Troops: ObdH has given orders in Berlin for activation of Colonial Regt., of two Bns., of four Cos. each. Post: Bergen. Personnel will be drawn from Divs. slated for deactivation and from Replacement Army. Dept. for colonial questions will be organized at General Army Office. Canvas automotive firms to collect data on type of automobiles best adapted to use in colonies (effect of sand?)\*.
- 4.) ObdH wants OKH in Berlin.
- 5.) Guarding of PWs in ZI: 25 Bns. will be formed with personnel from deactivated Divs.
- 6.) Reichstag Session in Berlin: Outstanding/Troop Commanders (decorated with Knight's Cross) up to rank of Corps Commanders will attend. Corps Commanders retained by urgent business must send deputies (only General Officers). Afterwards they can go on leave for several days.
- 7.) Meeting in Berlin must be anticipated after Reichstag Session; prepare for it.
- 8.) Reorganization of OKH: Fromm has been instructed to prepare transfer of Inspectorate of Schooling and Education to Inspector of Training, and of Political Liaison Section from Gen. Staff to General Army Office under a new head.

Liss: Intelligence report on England.

OQu IV: Romania: Situation in relation to Russia, calm; in relation to Hungary, tense: Troop movements on both sides of border.  
Estonia: New Russian demands?  
Mediterranean Theater: Italian offensive into Egypt is prepared for second half of July.

Jacob: Fortifications in East, West, and South. -- England.

von Ziehlberg: Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Brand: Invasion of Britain. Arty. build-up (K 12 down to 15 cm gun.) Effect on enemy coast and inland. Arty. cover for flanks of crossing lane before and after landing on English coast.

6 July 1940.

Heim: Creation of a Political Sec. in projected peacetime set-up of OKH.

Callers: Hauser (Waffen SS) and Sepp Dietrich (both have Knight's Cross).

1030 Wagner, etc. on refugee matters. Report by Kossmann.

1100 Canaris: Presents information on Spain; employment of Intelligence Service.

1130 Conference with Gen. Streccius, Minister Schmidt and their Aides. Report on objectives and plans of Military Administration. (Afterwards lunch with both.) Area Hqs have been set up, establishment of Sub-Area Hqs will take until middle of next week. This will substantially complete the setting up of Military Administration. Difficulties in obtaining personnel.

Other reports are on coastal defense and regrouping of troops.

Refugee matters (pertinent instructions have been issued today).

Demands will be presented to French at initial session of Commission this afternoon with regard to refugees, administration, labor recruitment, transport, and coal and food supplies. (France is to feed her population with own resources!) Electric power supply is good.

Transport matters.

Currency and credit system.

It has been agreed that problems affecting the entire French economy (Massif Central included) especially food and currency matters, can only be settled on an interim basis so as not to hinder the work of the Economic Commission which, we hear, is going to be transferred to Paris.

1600 Conference with General Reinhard (in presence of Greiffenberg) about his tasks. Returns to Wuerzburg tonight.

1700 Gen. von Bockelberg: Paris needs strong personality because many high-ranking representatives of government agencies are setting up shop there (Sperrle, branches of Reich Government agencies, etc.).

Only very best Divs. needed for Paris. (Regional Defense Troops are said to have been seen drunk in public.)

Workers in suburbs cut and cut Communists.

1745 Rabenau reports on his activities in Holland, Belgium, and France. Status of Military Archives in these countries. Various recommendations on personnel. The problem is whether to employ military or civilian personnel in Archives.

1800 Thoma reports on amphibious tanks and other preparations for invasion of England. Ordinance Dept., Sec. VI\*, coordinates activities. Tests in Hamburg, water-proofing trials in Aachen. Intensive trials in North Sea required. To date only isolated tests, no "large scale trial", as reported by Tedt to Fuehrer.

Conference with von Greiffenberg, Buhle, and Thoma: Method of a landing in England and resulting requirements in organization, equipment and grouping of troops are discussed.

von Greiffenberg and Buhle: Organization of Paris Headquarters.

von Greiffenberg:

- a) Military-political data bearing on future tasks of Gen. Staff must be compiled now. Special study group is to be set up for this purpose in Op. Sec.
- b) Briefing of Mieth on reporting on work of Armistice Commission. Demobilization of French is to be concluded by 1 Aug. Also disarming and establishing of arms depots. System of controls.

7 July 1940.

0930 Buhle reports on:

- a) Fuel requirements for new motorization program.
- b) French tanks probably cannot be brought into use at an early date. (At best three or four Bns. will be available in three months.)
- c) Demobilization.
- d) Furlough questions.
- e) Armament and ammunitions program.

1130 von Greiffenberg: Current matters. Occupation of Channel Islands.

1200 Roechricht:



- a) French Army Training Centers.
- b) Application of combat experiences.
- c) Request for reports on individual actions.
- d) Orientation on intended operations against Britain.

1300 Bogatsch: Distribution of Air units attached to Army on completion of all current transfers:

2 Long-range Rcn. Staffeln (1 allocated to Arty. Calais,  
1 to AHq 18).

14 Short-range Rcn. Staffeln:

7 with Armies

5 with armored Divs. in area of AHq 2 (parts can be sent  
to ZI later on).

2 in ZI for training and rehabilitation.

Corps Air Officers will be withdrawn from Corps Hq. Skeleton Staffs remain consisting of representatives of Secs. Ia, Ib, Ic under Staff Officer, and Staff Photo Sec. Special group under Col. Gnam will remain at Second Army Hq to compile experiences on Inf./Armor teamwork.

1900 von Ziehlberg: Future Gen. Staff appointments.

8 July 1940.

1100 von Stuelpnagel:

- 1.) Postponement of Reichstag Session because of probable reshuffle of British Cabinet.
- 2.) C in Cs of the three Branches of Service appear to have received verbal instructions on further plans for the war, yesterday\*.
- 3.) Stuelpnagel has instructions to approach French on granting air bases in North Africa.
- 4.) French Commission intimates its desire to move to Paris soon.  
I recommend dilatory treatment of this request. At present it would be better to have merely a branch of the French Government in Paris. If the Commission shows understanding for our wishes, the Government might be allowed to return, but not to Paris, only to Versailles.
- 5.) French Government wants to appoint a Chief to head its Paris branch.
- 6.) Brittany: Lemelsen reports on alleged separatist movement.
- 7.) Wagner must get a representative on the Armistice Commission soon.

Visit by von Manstein.

ObdH returns. Long talk on operations against England.

In the evening: Greiffenberg submits plan on re-allocation of GHq Reserves; approved. Operation against Britain.

Wagner: Current matters of Military Administration.  
Area Hqs: Poitiers, Rouen, Troyes.

9 July 1940.

von Wietersheim: Talk on part to be played by XIV Corps.  
Personal matters.

CQu IV: a) Italian war: Offensive in Libya on 15 July.

- b) Southeast: Delicate situation in Romania. Attitude of Russia obscure. Might have designs on Danube Delta. Repercussions on Bulgaria and Hungary.

Romania is trying to get chummy with us on the military end, with a view to creating the impression on the outside that she is being taken under German wings.

Caution!

Reports on evacuation of Southern Dobrudsha by Romania. Iron Guard has become active again!

- c) Northeast: Development in Baltic countries; Finland's position appears to be reassuring.

- d) Russia - Britain.

Lt. Col. Winter (Armistice Commission) reports on general atmosphere at Armistice Commission meetings. France obliging, almost pleading for moral support. Dependence on changing Government policies necessitates almost daily reporting to Fuehrer for determination of course of Commission.

Detailed report on work of the several Sections of the Commission.

Gen. Maj. Foltmann (164th Div.) drops in.

Buhle: a) Reorganization of Armd. Divs. will take four weeks; will then be ready for commitment within 72 hours.

- b) Mt. Divs.: One new Div. will be activated immediately by taking one Regt. each from 10th and 25th Divs. (are being motorized).

- c) Of the pre-war activated Corps Hqs, XI and XVII will not be needed in peacetime organization; eliminated Inf. Corps become surplus.

- d) Basic features of the mot. and the non-mot. AGp.
- e) Organizational matters regarding assault troops for invasion of Britain.
- f) Relation between Town Commandants and Post Troop Commanders.\*
- g) Furlough transports start 20 July (within five months all troops of western Armies will have had 21 days of furlough).
- h) Secret Field Police: System of allocations of Field Police units.
- i) Future set-up of Org. Sec.

During afternoon: Work on draft operational plans for invasion of Britain.

Evening. Wagner: Problem of close liaison between Economic Commission and Military Administration. Specific problems of Military Administration.

10 July 1940.

0930 von Greiffenberg: Operation against England. Methods of attack; strength estimate: demands on other Branches of Armed Forces.

1000 - 1100 von Ziehlberg: Appointments in Gen. Staff after war. Peacetime organization of Gen. Staff.

1130 - 1230 Fellgiebel: Demands by Air Force and Navy. We have transferred to date:

To Navy: 5 Telephone Cos.

To Air Force: 15 Telephone Cos. Now Air Force asks for additional 15 Telephone Cos.

I insist that mot. units destined for the East and for England must not be affected by these withdrawals. Otherwise I agree to transfers, inasmuch as units will remain under control of Signal Chief.

Supervision of French telecommunications now and in case of transfer of French Government to Paris.

Ott: Order of battle of Inf.:

- a) Utilization of vehicles (unloaded combat trains) to carry Infantry. I disapprove the plan to have remainder of Inf. ride on bicycles in order to speed up movement. That could be done with individual Bns., but not with whole Divs.

b) Assault Badge. The fact that badges cannot be awarded retroactively causes discrimination.

c) Teaching Staff for Inf. School.

Confer with von Greiffenberg during afternoon. Afterwards report to ObdH on plan for operation against England.

Following this, report by Gen. Mueller on slow progress in setting up Military Administration and steps contemplated to speed it up; also on refugee matters.

In the evening I talk over the same subject with Wagner.

Also in the evening we receive a letter from Navy requesting various data on cross-Channel transports of troops. This is not the way to do it. Centralized handling will delay everything. We must decentralize.

11 July 1940.

Morning Conference with ObdH: He approves operational draft. A number of the usual minor modifications are settled.

Wagner: Report on refugee organization (Kossmann), economic reconstruction in France, collecting of captured materiel, coordination between Military Command and Civil Administration with a view to restoring orderly conditions in France at the earliest (definition of jurisdiction). -- Definition of jurisdiction in Paris.

Gercke: Railroads: Current capacity of lines between Germany and occupied territories will approach peacetime level by 20 Aug.

East: Preparations for improving the detraining net, which I have stipulated, will be completed by end of July; we can then begin to move Construction Troops to the East.

In ZI, work on current improvements is in progress.

Roads: Putting up of German road signs has been completed in Belgium; France will take another three or four weeks.

Canals: Repairs are progressing slowly; first Belgian canals and connection Lille - Paris.

Peacetime organization: Railroad Construction Troops:

|                          |                  |
|--------------------------|------------------|
| 6 Regts. of 2 Bns., in ) |                  |
| 3 (initially 2) Brigs. ) | under Railroad   |
| Training Bn. )           | Troop Commanders |
| Railroad Troops School ) |                  |

Operating Groups: Railroad Operating Regt. (6 Cos.) with railroad operation training lines.

Section in OKH: OQu, with Transport and Planning Depts.

Staff :

a) Air Force once more requests change in control of Army units supporting Air Force defenses of air fields. I object to changing anything in the established set-up; besides, the matter has already been settled, and can be laid down in written orders.

b) Invasion of England:

Airborne Troops will be ready by 15 Aug;  
400 transport planes carrying 20 men each, a total of 8,000 men.  
110 cargo gliders in Gruppen of 12 each.

Air transport only within limits of above mentioned numbers.

c) General orientation on line of our policy for invasion of England.

d) Britain has now about 600 bombers, we have also 600.

British operational procedure to move bombers from dispersal areas to take-off areas and back again makes it difficult to bring our air superiority to bear in concentrated attacks. It will take between a fortnight and a month to smash enemy Air Force.

von Greiffenberg brings in maps for report to Fuehrer.

Discussion of operational disposition of forces for assault of England. -- Organizational measures for the two-thirds\* of the 13 Divs.\*\* of first wave must be prepared (Buhle). -- Organization of the Arty. fire plan for the coast. -- Dispositions regarding coastal defense, safeguarding of Green Boundary, air defense.

von Etzdorf: Internal situation of Britian: „Discord between Churchill and Halifax. Churchill has prevailed: War to the finish“.

Britain and Russia are both seeking a rapprochement. Possibility of an understanding on Iran is not out of question and could provide basis for an over-all understanding between "the bear and the whale" as in 1908.

Balkans: Dobrudsha is apparently being evacuated for the Bulgarians. Hungary has been advised to mind its own business. How long this policy can be maintained remains to be seen.



The danger that Rumania and in her train the whole Balkans will be convulsed by domestic crisis cannot be discounted. Such a development would serve British interests.

America by and large is held under the spell of coming elections. It appears that Roosevelt's position is no longer undisputed.

East Asia: Japan seems to get busy in French Indo-China. Naval demonstration. Commission in Annam. Additional Japanese advances in this area are not particularly desirable for us. Settlement of Chinese question does not make any progress.

12 July 1940.

OQu IV: Border traffic at Spanish frontier. Estimate of foreign political situation.

1100 von Stumme reports briefly on his Divs., particularly 46th Div.

1130 Reception of Commanders of Area Hqs, Neumann-Neurode, I. von Reiss, von Rothberg.

During morning and afternoon, work on report for Fuehrer on invasion of Britain.

Buhle and Stieff: Disposition of GHq troops as of 15 July. Some deactivations. Discussion of questions regarding future set-up of Mil. Districts.

Greiffenberg - (Cpt. Loyke, Navy): Report on crossing and landing conditions from Navy viewpoint.

Maps for report to Fuehrer.

Dispositions regarding coastal defense and safeguarding of demarcation line.

13 July 1940

(Berghof)

0730 Departure from Fontainebleau. 0800 Take off from air field. Travelling with strong tail wind, we arrive in Salzburg at 1015; drive to Berghof, 1100.

1200 Report to Fuehrer on invasion of Britain.

Introductory remarks on over-all objective of Armed Forces. Initial mission of Army. General basis for their attainment. Prerequisite conditions, time factors, strength.

Execution of attack:

- I) Enemy: Land army, coastal defenses, disposition of forces and probable defense tactics.
- II) Own development: Configurations of coast, terrain in England, jump-off base; disposition and strength requirements for jump-off; subsequent phases of operations.
- III) Our organization and technical preparations.
- IV) Our method: "River crossing" - Landing. -- Next steps in operation. -- Strength requirements. -- Order of battle.
- V) Summing up of proposals and demands on other services.
- VI) Time Schedule and preparations to date.

Recommendations are approved as basis for practical preparations. Order has been issued for immediate start of invasion preparations.

The following suggestions are made in this connection:

- a) Separate raids on Isle of Wight and Cornwall in order to impair morale and undermine will of resistance.
- b) Artillery cover of water lanes under unified command of Navy. For this purpose all available guns (also railroad guns) will be concentrated, first on our coast, later on enemy coast in order to protect our water lanes against enemy surface action. Underwater protection will be provided by Navy through submarines and mines.

Subsequently, review of political situation from military angle.

- a) It would be desirable not to deactivate 20 of the 35 Divs. slated for deactivation in the Zi. Instead, the personnel of these Divs. should merely be discharged on a furlough basis, thus maintaining prompt availability of the Divs.

(Must tell Buhle to study possible effect of this plan and to submit list of Divs. to be definitely deactivated.)

- b) Political analysis.

- 1.) The Fuehrer wants to draw Spain into the game in order to build up a front against Britain extending from the North Cap to Morocco. Ribbentrop will go to Spain.
- 2.) Russia's interest not to let us grow too big is recognized. Russian aspirations to Bosphorus are inconvenient for Italy.

- 3.) Romania will have to foot the bill. Hungary has to get a slice, Bulgaria is taking the Dobrudsha anyhow and looks for access to the Mediterranean at the expense of Greece. No difficulty is seen in that direction. The King of Romania has addressed a letter to the Fuehrer, quasi putting himself under his protection. Answer: He can afford to cede some territory to Hungary and Bulgaria.
- 4.) Italy seems to want some Greek islands in the Ionian Sea. The attempts of the Fuehrer at interesting Italy in Crete and Cyprus have not been successful. Italy's aspirations moreover are directed toward obtaining a corridor from her North-African possessions to Abyssinia.
- 5.) In Africa we are claiming the coast (apparently together with Spain), Italy wants the hinterland. We also claim French and Belgian Congo for us.

The Fuehrer is greatly puzzled by Britain's persisting unwillingness to make peace. He sees the answer (as we do) in Britain's hope on Russia, and therefore counts on having to compel her by main force to agree to peace. Actually that is much against his grain. The reason is that a military defeat of Britain will bring about the disintegration of the British Empire. This would not be of any benefit to Germany. German blood would be shed to accomplish something that would benefit only Japan, the United States and others.

1900 Return. Left Berghof 1300, took off by plane from Salzburg 1345. Later: Instructions to Org. Sec. regarding reduction of number of Divs. slated for deactivation. Discussion with Op. Sec. on results of conference. Preparations for conference with Section Chiefs on Sunday, 1100.

14 July 1940.

1100 Conference with representatives of all Sections on planning data for operation against Britain, on proposed method of execution, and the assignments for the individual sections in the preparation for it.

Buhle: a) Divs. to be deactivated:

4 Divs. of Third Draft: 209th, 228th, 231st, 311th.  
 9 Regional Defense Divs.  
 4 Fortress Divs.: 554th through 557th.  
17 Divs.

This leaves:

9 Divs. Fifth and Sixth Draft (all Czech equipment)  
 9 Divs. of Third Draft.  
18 Divs.

- b) Projected "rejuvenation"\* unpracticable.
- c) Filling up Arty. of Divs. of Third, Seventh and Eighth Draft to authorized strength only partly feasible.  
Activations of more Arty. units necessary.
- d) Preparations for invasion of Britain; tanks.
- e) Norway.
- f) 20 Armd. Divs. can be re-equipped every four years without straining national economy, according to Schell. Motor transport budget; Cost of equipment for Army alone would then run to one-half billion.\*\*
- g) Liaison between projected "Chief of Training Dept." with General Army Office.

von Ziehlberg: Paris Parade. Current Gen. Staff personnel matters/

Wagner (Gen Qu): Report on discussions with Armistice Commission. - Hemmen (Special Commission for Economic Affairs). - Report on rumored threat to German Parade by British Air Force. - Various subjects relating to agenda of Armistice Commission.

15 July 1940.

1030 von Greiffenberg: Disposition of Divs. for build-up against England. Organization of command set-up. New boundary line between AGps. B and A.

Minister Hemmen (Head of Economic Commission in the Armistice Commission): Discussion on tasks of Economic Commission and of Military Administration. -- Policy basis of activities of Economic Commission.

Afterwards we have luncheon together. Present: Ministry Councillor Sarnow, of Military Administration France, Herr von Maltzahn.

Afternoon: Maier, a friend of Artillery School days, now CO of a Foot Arty. Bn., drops in.

1700 Buhle, Greiffenberg, Roettiger: Conference on progress in work of Staff Reinhard. Organization of first assault wave for Channel crossing. Subsequently at ObdH's office.

2100 Gen. Brand: Employment of our Heavy Arty. for coastal defense.

2200 Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

16 July 1940.

0900 Conference with ObdH. Various problems relating to preparations for invasion of England.

Buhle:

a) Shipment of additional equipment to Divs. begins 29 July. Will arrive beginning 7 Aug.

b) ZI Divs.: BdE is instructed to make arrangements to have

8 Divs. ready to march within 6 days

5 " " " " 8 "

5 " " " " 10 "

c) C in C East. Divs. Hqs to be reorganized as Sub-Area Hqs. (Gen Qu!)\*

d) Sixty Chem. Mortars with 8,000 rounds of HE ammunition will be turned over to Air Force.

e) Fuehrer's suggestion regarding Assault Guns (for Inf.!).

f) Guderian's experiences on organization and armament of Armd. Divs.

g) Basic data on transitional organization and mobilization in conversion to final peacetime organization of Army (not before 1941).

von Greiffenberg brings in drafts of first orders for regrouping against Britain. Must be redrafted in several points.

The decision on the Paris Parade is still hanging fire. This situation is growing intolerable.

von Thoma reports on amphibious tank trials and progress in rehabilitation of Armd. Divs. Most convenient period for refitting goes to waste because nearly all type III and IV Tanks were sent to Paris for the parade.

von Greiffenberg: Consultation on command organization for invasion of England. I give him the data on which map exercise for clarification of organizational questions is to be based.

According to Air Force we have available:  
1,000 transport planes, 75% operational;  
150 cargo gliders.

According to Navy we have available:  
2,000 river barges (but not before end of 2 months).



# WAR JOURNAL

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## FRANZ HALDER

War journal of Generaloberst Franz Halder,  
Chief of General Staff of Supreme Command  
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## Volume V

MAR 5 1950

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**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL**  
**OF**  
**GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER**

**Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

**14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942**

**VOLUME V**

# CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

VOLUME V.

31. October 1940.

Morning 1030 hrs. Arrival at Zossen. Staff ready for work.  
Accommodations very well prepared.

von Stuelpnagel (Armistice Commission):

- a) Conference with Laval and Huntzinger in Abetz' office this afternoon. French proposals, based on the Fuehrer/Pétain conference. Speidel will be there. Abetz will immediately take the French proposals to Berlin.
- b) Greece: Progress seems to be very slow.
- c) Chemical warfare documents: The matter is getting under way. Lt. Col. von Horn has been detached to the French Laboratory at Bourges. According to the French specialists, they have no new gas, nor have the British.

von Ziehlberg: Progress report on construction work on Ghd. East.  
Baurat Henne\* waits trucks from us. (Have not got any!) von Ziehlberg will go there himself.

Heusinger:

- a) Fuehrer wants to talk to von Thoma.
- b) Organizations requested by us for Spain: At the moment the Reichsmarschall won't let us have the Reconnaissance Staffel and AA Bn., which were to participate in our exercises; he wants to speak to the Fuehrer first.
- c) Army Hq. 1, Fontainebleau.
- d) Capt. Koch (Navy) will be in charge of loading operations at Naples: "39 German ships available in the Mediterranean, 21 of them have been put in dock by the Navy." One ship ready on 10 November.
- e) Greek situation: Little progress.
- f) Preparations for Spain: Readyng of the reconnaissance parties in civilian clothes with camouflaged (French) cars and a truck column for supplies and fuel. Assembly at Bordeaux is being prepared. Application of "gas explosion"\*\*\* still requires further study on the spot.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Huntzinger at the Paris conference submitted a Memorandum containing demands concerning the Army, Air Force and Navy. Huntzinger is pressing. The French seem to be genuinely anxious to fight England and De Gaulle. At this conference the following questions were raised: POWs, Demarcation line, question of the Northern Departments. These questions cannot be handled by the Armistice Commission and the OKW alone, the Army must be called in. In the following

phone talk with Jodl. I make it clear that an Army representative must participate in negotiations dealing with questions and demands affecting Army interests. The Armistice Commission is not in a position to understand all implications. (ObdH has been informed.)

Oou IV: 10 - 15 November: Conference with Italy in Innsbruck with the Military Attachés of both countries present. (Not the Military Commanders).  
Question of sending an Armd. Div. to Libya will be deferred till then. Badoglio suggests we should send larger forces to Romania. (Nonsense! He probably wants to have us ready for "Bulgaria"). Greece expects from England only material aid for the time being. Bulgaria is quiet.

- ObdH: a) Florence Conference went off smoothly. Mussolini is not opposed to our relationship to France. Greek question was not even touched upon; only mention was made of the "Note", which has been sent to Greece(!). Extension of the war on the Balkans is to be avoided.
- b) Talk on future assignment for von Stuelpnagel. ObdH wants to keep II Corps open only till 1 December. If by that time von Stuelpnagel has not been released from the Armistice Commission, he will get IX Corps; should peace be concluded, he becomes Chief of Army Equipment.

1 November 1940.

Talk with von Stuelpnagel (Armistice Commission) on OKH participation in studying Huntziger's proposals.

Radke: Party Propaganda speakers to the troops during winter. -- Langemark celebration. -- Current matters.

Capt. Buerkner (Navy): Information on situation in Europe. Adds nothing new of any importance. Our impressions on the conversations with Franco and Petain are confirmed. Apparently our views on what is and is not possible in Egypt seem to be new to OKW. Admiral Canaris wants to be the go-between in initiating negotiations with Spain. (Gathering of information).

- Buhle: a) Czech-equipped Division. Exchange of trucks already ordered. Drawbacks of any changes introduced now outweigh benefits.
- b) Allocation of tanks to Armd. Div. Tanks from Fourth Armd. Div. to Fourteenth Armd. Div. Amphibian tanks: Four weak Bns. to Eighteenth Armd. Div.\*  
Conversion of mot. Inf. Div. to Armd. Div.  
Personnel Replacement Transfer Bns.
- c) Reports back from leave.



Heusinger: Order regarding Gibraltar reconnaissance is being prepared.

Qu IV: Buzzings from the Reich Chancellery (Engel).\*

- a) Conference with Laval was a success. The Fuehrer wanted the French to state officially that England is the trouble maker. The sooner this Power is removed, the quicker will peace be restored in Europe.
- b) Conferences with Franco did not satisfy. "Jesuit swine", "misplaced Spanish pride".  
Fuehrer's line of argument: Joining the Tripartite Pact is not primarily adhesion to the Anticomintern Pact, but joining a combination to overthrow Britain's preponderance. Germany wants base on the Canary Islands and the Azores; the latter should be arranged with Portugal by Spain. This demand apparently has severely disillusioned the Spaniards, who are out only to gain their own ends without making any sacrifices. Spanish desire for active participation is very weak. Regaining Gibraltar is one of their national aspirations, but the material chances to do so are slight. They are still carrying on a brisk trade with England, e.g. ore against fuel. If we want Spain to come over to our side, we would have to supply her with all her needs. Navy (Doenitz) demands Spanish ports for submarine warfare.  
In consideration of Spanish participation in the war the following stipulation has been made: Gibraltar will be captured by us and turned over to Spain, together with a part of French Morocco "provided France can be compensated elsewhere."  
We have not succeeded in inducing Franco to enter the war right away.
- c) Pétain. The personality of the old Marshal has made a strong impression on the Fuehrer. Both Pétain and Laval are trusted by him. The Fuehrer has handed Pétain a Memorandum defining Germany's claims. It is very moderate as far as colonial and economic demands are concerned. France will retain her Colonial Empire. We need France in the fight against England. Pétain needs time for re-adjustment. Even the cooperation of the French Fleet against England appears possible eventually.  
French attitude toward Italian demands: They are prepared to cede Tunis. Corsica still opposed; Nice was not discussed.
- d) Conference with Leopold\*\* on Obersalzberg scheduled for the near future.
- e) Molotov has accepted the invitation for conversations in Berlin. (This is still not definite!) Fuehrer hopes he can bring Russia into the anti-British front.
- f) Il Duce: After the conferences with the French, Il Duce wrote an excited letter to the Fuehrer, in which he expressed alarm over a premature recovery of France (Dis-trusts military measures in her Colonies, etc.). The result was the Florence conference, where Il Duce became fully convinced that the Fuehrer is following the right policy toward France.

Il Duce: Italian Monarchy is playing a double game (keeps up its sleeve the possibility of going over to the other side); Italy has no outstanding Generals!

- g) Fuehrer very much annoyed at Italian maneuvers in Greece. Right now he is in a mood not to send anything to Libya and to Albania. Let the Italians do it by themselves! Diplomatic relations between Italy and Greece have not yet been broken off. A rupture of diplomatic relations between Greece and Germany is out of the question.

Evening to Berlin. (Air raid alarm).

2 November 1940. (Berlin).

Several talks with Admiral Canaris. Apparently he feels hurt that we thought he wanted to meddle in the business of the OKH. At my request he recalled Major Kautschke from Algiers. I call a joint conference with Op. Sec. Arty. Off. and Abwehr.

1600. Conference at OKH (Berlin) with Canaris, Heusinger, Ehlfeldt and Kautschke. The following arrangements were made:

- 1.) Kautschke turns over to Op. Sec. and Arty. Off. his material on Gibraltar (on Monday) and then goes to Kuebler, where he will receive additional detailed instructions. (Steinbauer).\*
- 2.) Canaris will be at our disposal to get the necessary intelligence work under way and to make arrangements with Vigon and Franco for the shipment of our troops. His organization will also provide cover for our reconnaissance work against British intelligence. Overall impression on Spain: They are afraid of a conflict with England, and so are very much worried about a possible British landing in Spain or Portugal and an occupation of the Canary Islands by the British.  
The internal administrative machinery has completely broken down: They are wholly dependent on England for food and fuel and deliver ore in return. Franco's position difficult, as he has nothing left to bolster him up and so cannot afford to take risks. His position is weakened rather than strengthened by Sener who is easily the best-hated man in Spain. Mutual understanding is handicapped by unwarranted hauteur and their morbid sensitiveness. To this must be added Franco's shyness. Canaris' conference with the Reichsmarschall: He has an impression of absolute lack of planning in the air operations against England.

3 November 1940.

(Berlin, Sunday).

Von Thoma saw the Fuehrer. Described his impressions in Libya.  
Fuehrer stated that he has "written off" the Libyan affair.

Max, Gerti and Ruth for noon dinner.\*

Reports are coming in from Paris on Huntzinger's demands which are calculated to prepare France for defense against England. (Conference of 31 October). The demands are grouped under the headings "Army" - "Navy" - "Air Force". Demands relating to the Army are quite moderate: Permission to carry on recruiting for the transitional Army \*\* also in the Occupied Zone. Increase in the strength of the North African Army by 20,000 men, to 120,000. Release of Officers and NCO's with North African experience from PoW camps. Permission to activate one reinforced Inf. Regt. with MG unit, Artillery, Engineers and Transport.

4 November 1940.

(Monday, Berlin).

1415. Meet ObdH at the Reich Chancellery. I outline to him my ideas on Spain. The Rock alone won't do it. The following questions present themselves:  
Spain is exposed to a British attack and therefore relies on constant support. Economically she is on the verge of collapse and therefore also needs continuous economic assistance. Internally she is racked by the gravest tensions. We might as a result be forced to take sides in internal disputes.

Portugal: Military and economic dependence the same as Spain's.

North West Africa: Tangier, Morocco together with the Canary Islands may become British objectives (later perhaps in conjunction with U.S.). Northwest Africa together with Equatorial Africa may become the object of a great struggle between the European and Anglo-Saxon Powers.

1420. Fuehrer (present Keitel, Jodl, Deyle, Schmundt, Engel, ObdH and myself):

1.) Libya: Fuehrer has formed for himself the following picture:

a) More time is needed than was thought at first. We can no longer count on the Italians to start their thrust on Mersa Matruh before the end of December. This will be again followed by a delay for preparing the water supply, road building, etc. (Three months). Then comes the hot season. Nothing can be done before fall 1941.

b) Italy has informed us that she needs Tripolis herself as a supply base and would like us to take Tunis as our supply base.

- c) He has little confidence in Italian Generals. Italy wants us only "to save the blood of her own soldiers".
  - d) From the operational standpoint it is dangerous to use German troops in operations across seas which we do not control, and with an Ally who does not put in his last ounce to keep these seas open.
- 2.) Spain: Franco has promised in a letter to the Fuehrer that he would faithfully uphold the verbal agreements, viz. that he would enter the war on our side. Fuehrer now wants to hasten Spain's entry into the war.

Possible British reactions: The British might establish a foothold on the West African coast, or make landings in Morocco or on the Spanish or Portuguese Islands.

France has the will and the power to defend her territories unaided.

If necessary, Spain will have to be supported in defending her Islands.

- 3.) Question of the Islands: At present OKW is still weighing the question which islands are to be occupied and with what forces this should be done. OKH representative must be called in! (Heusinger).

4.) Gibraltar.

- a) At the same moment as we cross the Spanish frontier, our planes must be attacking the British Fleet in Gibraltar. An air base must be prepared in advance.
- b) Troops must be kept standing by to march into Portugal.
- c) Artillery must be shipped over to the southern shore of the Strait as soon as feasible.

5.) Greece:

- a) British attempts to establish air bases at Lemnos and Saloniki. Air defense service \* has been advanced to the southern border of Bulgaria. Turkey's attitude probably noncommittal. (Attempt to mobilize Russia against Turkey).
- b) German Army must make preparations to support a swift march into Turkish Thrace.\*\* Recommendations to OKW (Strength, time required).
- c) Air Force must make preparations for smashing the bases on Greek Islands.

- 6.) Turkey: This brings up the problem of Russia. The question cannot be tackled before Russia has been eliminated. With Bulgaria pressing in the South, Turkey can be kept quiet with the help of Russia.

- 7.) Russia remains the great problem of Europe. We must do our utmost to be prepared when the great showdown comes.
- 8.) U.S. If at all, not before 1942.
- 9.) "Seeloewe". Not before next spring. Preparedness must be maintained. (We seize this opportunity to stress the "improvements" achieved.)
- 10.) France: Will be helped to the extent of her contribution. Details of the new agreements which the Foreign Minister is going to conclude with Laval. First off the internees in Switzerland will be returned.\*

Engel: 1.) French 7.5 cm guns. Air Force must get only as many of them as they can actually use. Org. Sec. What can we use them for? Several hundred are reported still unallocated.

2.) Population transfers in the East:

Danzig-West Prussia 50,000 - 60,000 Bessarabia Germans.

District of Zichenau 40,000 Lithuania Germans.

Warthegau - Posen 10,000 Bessarabia Germans.

Additional 150,000 - 160,000 Poles and Jews from the liberated Eastern territories will be transferred to the Government-General.

Our troops should have nothing to do with these movements, but should know what is going on. Nor must they be used for evacuations. Officers should be made aware that these movements have to be completed before the end of the war. Chief of Transportation.

1630: Conference with ObdH on the results of Fuehrer Conference:

a) Preparations in the East continue.

b) Preparations for "Seeloewe" continue.

c) Preparations for Spain:

1.) Heusinger must get in touch with Jodl for a conference regarding the Islands.

2.) Against Portugal: Corps Schmidt, consisting of Fourth Armd. Division and SS Deathhead..

3.) Over Schmidt and Kuebler: Command Staff Reichenau.

4.) Find out whether the Spaniards themselves will take care of coastal defenses. (OKW/Op. Sec.).

5.) If additional forces are needed for Northwest Africa: Third Armd. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler.

d) Bulgaria/Greece.

1.) Ascertain what forces are needed. Two Armd. Divs. (Second, Ninth) under XXXX Corps.

2.) Mt. or Inf. Divs. under another Corps, plus Engineers, Artillery, Signal troops.

3.) Over these two Corps: Group Kleist (Org. Sec. make arrangements).



e) Sponeck: Must get ready for air transport by the beginning of December.

f) Artillery: Captured enemy guns with personnel batteries from 13th Draft for Spanish and North African coast.

Spain: Get ready 15 cm and 10 cm guns; initially we may lend them some mobile batteries. Org. Sec.

Islands: Some captured enemy guns, with crews.

g) Explore methods for crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar.

h) Operations in the East: ObdH wants to put off presenting ~~plan~~ until 18/20 November. (Would that leave enough time?)

1800 Conference with General von Salmuth:

- 1.) Information on situation and movements in the East.
- 2.) Hasse to Kuechler, Tresckow for Hasse. Central Branch.

5 November 1940 (Zossen).

Took Ruth\* to the station.

0930 at Zossen.

1100. Conference with OQu IV, Bogatsch, Gercke, Buhle, Heusinger, Baentsch and Kahlden.

Orientation on the Fuehrer Conference. Assignments (see notes of 4 November.)

1200 Heusinger:

- a) Makes report on his conference with Abwehr and Kautschke on 4 November.
- b) Facilities for Lahousen in Gibraltar must still be created.
- c) Mieth's report on French demands.
- d) Various current matters.

1300 Baentsch: Readying of rear services for special mission. Guards needed for Air Force installations in the West (AGp.A). Various current matters.

Reports from Bucharest:

- a) Russian Odessa Fleet has sailed for Batum. Russian officers in Istanbul.
- b) British troops have landed at three points in the Gulf of Saloniki.

OQu I reports back from Fontainebleau. Informs me on how the situation is viewed in Paris.

- Buhle: a) Third Armd. Div. also made available for use in colonial theaters. 25% of trucks are released for other uses. Release of 250 trucks for drinking water supply will be decided only after talk with Gotsche.
- b) Supply organization: Examination of supply columns personnel for fitness for tropical service will be dispensed with.
- c) Readying of Armd. units for Portugal: Sixteenth Armd. Div., Sixteenth mot. Div. not yet ready; investigate.
- d) Coastal artillery for Spain: About 40 Btrys needed.
- e) Heavy mortars, allocated for operation "Seelowe" above T/O requirements, will now be taken away for training of the Eastern Divisions (66 platoons)
- f) Fifth and Sixth Drafts must be equipped with German Field How. 18, instead of Czech guns!

OQu IV: Appointment of a Military Attaché to Portugal .

Current information: It seems that Mussolini is now prodding Graziani into action (Letter!) .

Gercke: Data about Bulgaria (Can at first only be done through Romania). -- Transportation situation difficult: Backlog of 650 trains. The trouble is mainly in the East, especially in the Government-General. (State within the State!). -- Trouble with French materiel taken over by us (Locomotives). Only 35 - 45% of the cars ordered for coal, potatoes and turnips can be furnished. -- The 3,000 locomotives and 100,000 cars, turned over by us to the State Railroads, cannot be returned.

6 November 1940.

von Bernuth: Discussion of the General Staff Training program during winter. A training Manual for Mountain warfare must be compiled. Current training questions. (Subjects for lectures during winter)

Heusinger:

- a) Next week conference Fuehrer/Mussolini.
- b) Gibraltar: Preparations for Lahousen's mission have been initiated. Twentysecond Div. fit for operations (also signal communications). Furlough restrictions in the units earmarked for Gibraltar.

Units for Portugal: XXXIX Corps Hq )  
 Sixteenth Armd. Div. ) Complementary  
 Sixteenth Div. mot. ) units still to  
 SS Deathhead Div. ) be allocated.

Army Command Reichenau (C of S Funk).

- c) Libya: Third Armd. Div. must be notified. No cancellation of Air Force. Shipping space to Italy.
- d) Balkans: XXXX Corps Hq.: Second Armd. Div., Ninth Armd. Div. 60th Div. (must start moving!)  
 SS Adolf Hitler.  
 Sixth Mt. Div. (can give up its cadre, recruits can be trained somewhere else).  
 164th Div. (Foltmann) and 100th Inf. Regt. (Reinforced) of Fifth Mt. Div. (in place of 78th Div., Gollenkamp) will be temporarily converted into Light Dibs.--

XXX Corps Hq. (must be talked over with AGp. B).

- e) General questions: Cut in activation of close range reconnaissance Staffeln (10 less). Complications in long-range reconnaissance.--  
 Units ready to move 20 December or sooner.  
 Apart from Armd. units only Furlough Divisions or "Light Division".

Talk with ObdH: a) For Spain Reichenau (with Funk) as representative of the Armed Forces. von Stuelpnagel gets Army Hq. 12.  
 b) 18 ton flatbed trailers: - 86

Afternoon: Lt. Col. Rasp, Ia, Army Hq. 7, reports for briefing on operation Spain.

von Ziehlberg:

Report on East Prussia.  
 Question of papers of the late Gen. Groener finally settled.  
 Personnel matters (Tresckow, Hasse; Hasse to Kuechler - Kemmerich - Schoch).  
 Library, etc. Organization in the future peacetime Army.  
 Result of talk with OQu V.

7 November 1940

LOOO Ulex: Fortifications Section:

- a) Has a force of 28,000 laborers; also Guard Bns. (from deactivated Divisions) and Engineers working. In addition, 50 Reich Labor Service Bns.
- b) Narew bridgehead: Only local defences.
- c) Tank ditch continuous Ostrołka, Narew, Pisa, Suwałki.  
"Chord" position\* to Ostfluss river, but excluding Suwałki salient position.
- d) 120 completed pillboxes; Majority pillboxes (3 and 6 loopholes) over casemates. Internal furnishings still lacking; also arms.

Memel: Naval fortress. -- Submarine port. -- Direct inquiry from OKW about defenses against land attack.

Agriculture: Crop only 42%; horses badly fed.

Col. Ochsner: Army-Gas Defense Training Schools are now running. (Sixteenth Army: Lille, Sixth Army: Rennes). Two classes of 40 men -- one week.

Report on Army Gas Defense Depots. (All right!)

Report on French Chemical Warfare Center at Bourges (Stop Gas experiments).

Mortar fired Adamsite shells\*\* Ready in spring. Our gasmask gives full protection.

Use of smoke against Gibraltar. (AA batteries and fire direction centers will be blinded by the Air Force at outset.)

Housing: Gohlen presents plan of operations against Northeastern Greece from Bulgaria. Time required for preparations: Movement of troops to the Theater and assembly. If railroad through Yugoslavia (Nish) available, six weeks. If railroad through Yugoslavia not available, ten weeks. XXX Corps Hq. can be freed in AGrp. B.

Demands on Air Force: The Reichsmarschall will see the Fuehrer on Tuesday to discuss our demands. We have asked the Air Force to see to it that ObdH at the least gets a reply from the Reich Marshal.

Gibraltar: Richthofen, Two divebomber wings, each of three Staffeln, total six Staffeln. One fighter wing of three Staffeln, total three Staffeln. XXXIX Corps will get two close-range Reconnaissance Staffeln, one medium and two Light AAA Bns.

Points to be discussed with OKW: "Seeloe", Eighth and 28th Div. must not be taken away now.-- Bulgaria Rowehl, long-range reconnaissance.-- German ships in Italy must be set aside for crossing of the Strait of Gibraltar!

Hauser: We discuss the manner in which\* the work of the General Staff in preparation and conduct of this war, should be presented. Stop to lunch.

1500 - 1630 Fromm, Chief of Army Equipment (with deputy) and Chief Personnel Branch. Orientation on situation and plans.

1700 Buhle:

- a) For Spain: Sixteenth Armd. Div. Ready 25 November. Sixteenth mot. Div. Ready 5 December.
- b) For Southeast: Signal Regt. for Kleist ready 5 December.  
Sixth Mt. Div. immediately.  
164th Div. (Foltmann) immediately. (Detached elements must be stopped.)  
Reinforced Mt. Inf. Regt. 100 (from fifth Mt. Div.) immediately, but this precludes detaching of Rifle Bn. for Romania.  
Fifth Mt. Div. will be ready late in December.  
Might be sent after the other units.
- c) Final designation: "Armd. Group 1, 2, 3".
- d) First, Second, Fourth and Eighth Drafts could be equipped with medium Field.  
How. 18. Will be standard equipment for Eleventh and Twelfth Drafts.  
For six Divs. of Seventh Draft we also have medium Fd. How. 18.  
For four Divs. of Seventh Draft we must take Czech How.

Baentsch: We can dispense with "fitness for desert service" in the rear services earmarked for Libya.-- Drinking water columns will at first be limited to four. -- Southeast questions. (Men who served on the Balkans in World War I should be canvassed on their experiences.)

Wagner: East: We have stocked one-half of a First ammunition issue for the combat elements of the build-up in the East. To stockpile an entire issue, we require additional 46 ammunition trains stockpiling of a second issue would take 170 trains.  
In addition we need 68 trains to set up fuel depots, and 600 trains for the supply build-up.



Fuel dumps cannot be set up now (shortage of drums); 50 trains can run now to set up ration dumps.

"Directive No. 18", digest of Fuehrer Conference on 4 November.

von Thoma reports on tank situation. At present we have 3,000 tanks, by Spring they will have increased to 5,000.

Amphibian tanks:

at Eutin, Putlos, Bremen, Hamburg.  
Bulk to Eighteenth Armd. Div.

Some amphibian tanks will remain in each Bn. To convert a tank for amphibious use up to 12-14 m depth, takes four weeks. If a depth of only 6 m is required, which is sufficient for river crossing, waterproofing takes only a few days.

Experiments are in progress. It will be possible to convert tanks into field workshops.

Ruling on arm, to which the Riflemen of the Armd. Divs. belong. (Green color patch).\*

Ehlfeldt: The Observation Bns. will be divided into light detachments and wire detachments. In the Campaign in the West Observation Bns. located 3,528 enemy batteries and adjusted 1,235 artillery barrages.

Divl. Artillery Commander 131 (Mueller, Angelo) will make a tour of inspection to all Observation Bns.

Report on results of trials with R-projectiles\*\* fired from medium Field How. Recoil trouble, limited burst effect base of the projectile drops out; dispersion pattern satisfactory.

8 November 1940

Jacob: a) Reallocation of Eng. Regimental Commanders:  
- One Eng. Regimental Commander will be left for each Army Hq. and Corps of AGp. A.  
Elsewhere, one for each Army Hq.

b) Organize 60 Auxiliary Eng. Bns. and 30 Bridge-construction Bns. from existing.

c) SS, Herbert and LZ bridge equipment.\*\*\*

d) Questions of organization and armament.

Wagner: a) Army doctors. -- Organization of the Medical Officers Corps.

b) Map exercises on supply for operations: Middle of December theoretical phase, January

practical phase.

- c) Supplies for the Spanish operation in the event that we must provide for flank protection against Portugal.  
Jaehnicke will be detailed to Reichenau's Staff.
- d) Field Police; Requirements, replacements from the Police Force.
- e) Don't get entangled in Military Government France!

Ogu I; Long-range air reconnaissance.

Work program for the Eastern project: Definite objectives\*

Major Seiderer\*\* comes in and stays for lunch.

Housinger: Talk with Jodl:

- 1) "Seeloewe": We must draw on earmarked units for other projects. Deadline is being put off. -- Navy does not take "Seeloewe" seriously.
- 2) Twenty-eighth and Eighth Div. must not be taken away now.
- 3) Gibraltar: Fuehrer wants to meet Franco once more before the order is issued.  
Protection for Lrun during assembly for the Spanish operation.
- 4) Bulgaria: German High Command. -- An Armd. Div. will be sent to Rumania as a preparatory measure. -- Air reconnaissance over Bulgaria now authorized.
- 5) Air Force proposals on long-range reconnaissance.
- 6) Conference Badoglio-Keitel 14 November (Third Armd. Div. snatched away again, Greek-Italian war); pressure on Egypt must not let up 12 November, Molotov in Berlin, afterwards Molotov will have a meeting with the Japanese.

\*  
Fricke on phone: Tangier-Ceuta not a possible alternative base for England if Gibraltar is lost. British Fleet will probably want to use the Atlantic Islands as base.  
Coastal defense#: Battery Gneisenau, together with some Army batteries.

Seeloewe: Navy thinks conditions will be unfavorable in spring. --

200 new flat-bottom barges (45 m long, 3 engines, 12 km per hour) are now under construction.

General Gericke:

- a) Roadbuilding section of program not fully assured. Stockpiling of roadbuilding materiel compromised by constructions for Askania.\*
- b) Train backlog (East).--- Overall transportation situation difficult, tasks are enormous.
- c) Romania: Development on the whole satisfactory. 50 troop trains can be run daily for buildup of troops on the Romanian border against Russia.
- d) Extension of the                   ian and Romanian railroad networks.
- e) Christmas traffic                   ave traffic will not be changed.
- f) Meuse Valley Rail                   interrupted by bridge washout. --Flood                   ew bridge will be built two weeks after subs                   f floods.
- g) Cut in trains standing                   y for "Seeloewe".
- h) Trains with captured enemy materiel cannot go to the Z.I.\*\*
- i) Assembly of troops in Bulgaria (If Nish railroad not available, it will take one day longer, since troops must be unloaded on the Danube; this means a very long march)\*\*\*
- k) Technical questions: New Henschel locomotives, road-rail trucks, locomotives with adjustable gauge for armored trains (six now under construction for the Baltic States, would suffice for our six Armored trains).

von Bernuth:

- a) Order on training of General Staff Officers.
- b) Training manual for Mt. troops; order to Dietl to compile draft.
- c) Miscellaneous current questions (reconnaissance fliers without missions) Participation of Replacement Army in Training Courses for Company Cos. on Field Army, etc.

9 November 1940

Bruckmann (Attache at Sofia): Report on Bulgarian Army, terrain, railroads and road and weather conditions: On the whole confirmation of the picture we have: Important points: Narrow roads which make traffic control indispensable, turn-outs.

OQu IV: Antonescu's situation not easy. Danger presented by Legionaire movement. Food shortages, high prices. Internal dissensions within the Embassy: Fabrizius hostile to the Iron Guard, Neubacher is Democrat, Hansen gets along with everybody.

von Ziehlberg: Heim's letter on the Knight's Cross question.--Attache Portugal. Appointments in the Thirteenth and Fourteenth draft.

Thiele: Signal Regt. for Kuebler is ready, that for Kleist will be by 1 December. Women Signal Corps auxiliaries have done a good job in West and East.-- Organization.

Phone talk with ObdH: Approves disposition of troops in Southeast and South.--Brief orientation on current business.-- Model and Third Armd. Div.

10 November 1940

(Sunday, Berlin)

Nothing of consequence. Current business. Correspondence. Roh and Baron von H-Gelting call.\*

11 November 1940

(Monday, Zossen)

Heusinger:

- a) Recommendation of AGp. B on reorganization to meet the increase in number of Divisions main lines approved.
- b) Comments on "Directive No.18".
- c) Gibraltar: OKW notified that three weeks' alert notice will be needed.

Air Force is again balking and does not want to place its organization (including short-range reconnaissance and AAA) under Army Command.

When should Reichenau take over?

Additional Artillery and Signal units will be assigned to the Artillery Groups.

Order for Reconnaissance Party (Assembly, camouflage etc.).

Eleventh Armd. Div. will come under AGp.B (Schweidnitz).\*

Kinzel: Trip to Romania and Bulgaria. Missions for Hansen and for Bulgaria\*\* (in Romania in particular he has to arrange for exchange of information on Russia).

Capt. Koch (Navy), formerly assigned to Op. Sec.

Canaris with Piepenbrock and Buerkner. Discusses his impending trip to Spain.

Nothing new. (Heusinger present).

ObdH on phone: Model (Third Armd. Div.), in his place Wuthmann by 15 November.

Stumpf Twentieth Div.

von Greiff will be Haase's deputy. Army Hq.1 will select his deputy in his section.

Exchange of 26th against Sixth Div. is not approved.

Conference with Ziehlberg on these personnel matters.

Col. Gen. Strauss 206th/Sixth Div. Keep an eye on replacement in 206th Div.

Something must be done to cover Foerster.\*\*\*

von Stuelpnagel: Personalities.-- No further progress in our relations with France; the Italians are making difficulties.

Gauleiter of Lorraine evacuates 2,000 Lorrainers to France daily.

12 November 1940

Schulze-Hinrichs reports out.

Heusinger: Guard Bns.-- Rundstedt's request. Third Armd. Div. under AGp. C (Vieltinghoff).

New Flame-thrower Tank Bn. to XVI Corps.

Kuebler will get 30 concrete mine detonating wagons (in the Assault Eng. Bns.).

Romania: Fuehrer reported planning to allocate up to 10 Divs.



This raises difficult questions for non-motorized units.

Konrad reports as Liaison Officer with ObdH. Briefing on general situation and on his mission.

Gen Qu presents statistics on supply organization for the event of a campaign in the East. (Lt. Col. Wagner).

Organization of "Supply-Districts" for 2 Million men, 300,000 horses, 500,000 trucks. Establishing of quantities; setting up of dumps. Maintenance of motor vehicles, fuel supply for 700 - 800 km.

Ammunition: Two issues per Division. (Three for Arm'd. Divs.); enough for ten days on the basis of an expenditure of one-fifth, and in Arm'd. Divs. for 10 more days, on the basis of an expenditure of one third.

In addition a GHq. reserve for 20 Divs. Part of the ammunition will be in static\*.

Rations: 20 days.

Trains needed: For all shipments: 960 trains.  
So far dispatched: 180 trains.  
To reach the intermediate target additional 330 trains must be run.  
To reach the final target additional 748 trains must be run.

Motor vehicle supply; equipment, parks.

Gen Qu will start on an inspection tour of the East on 24 November to check up on dumps.

Personnel: Weingart-Trauch; Ott-Holm.

Personnel policy in the Army Medical Officers Corps.

Constructions in "Military Administration", reduction of personnel on the intermediate level.

OQu IV: Reports latest news from the East. -- Italo-Greek theater of operations.

Evening (Kaiserhof): Banquet in honor of Molotov (Talk with Ritter, Schnurre, Weizsäcker).

Overnight in Berlin.

13 November 1940

In the morning return to Zossen.

OQu V: He submits the draft on "The General Staff of the Army in the British War".  
Publication of studies on the Polish-Russian war.  
Release of war documents for processing copies.  
Archive for Captured Documents (Hannover).

Ambassador von Papen: Review of the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean and strategic objectives of our war policy.

Meyer-Ricks: Spain:

Army: 27 Divisions of 9,000; peacetime strength, each.

Warstrength of Army 500,000; armament on hand.

Lacking AAA.--- Armor consists of a great variety of models, as does aviation.

Armaments industry: Meets only peacetime requirements; coastal artillery.

Ammunition stocks very low.

Officers Corps severely depleted: 50% were massacred.

Morocco:

Border has only field fortifications; Ceuta obsolete harbor fortifications: 2-3 24cm Btrs. Tangier open roadstead.

Canary Islands:

25,000 men. Little is known about artillery defenses. No air defense.

Rio de Ore: Only weak police force.

Army not free from political tensions. The men to be looked to as leader personalities are: Franco, Varela, Martinos-Campos (deaf), Viana (Under-Secretary of State in the War Ministry), Vigon (Minister of Aviation, former Chief of General Staff), Assentio (Morocco).

Morocco:

Seven Divisions (including five crack Divs.) with full complement of Divisional Artillery Regiments, plus three Corps Artillery Regiments of six Bns. (10.5cm and 15.5 cm.)

Portugal:

Five very weak Divisions in the home country.

Azores: 3 - 0 - 3\* and a few 15 cm guns.

Madeira: One Bn., one Btry.

Cape Verde Islands: One Company (completely insufficient.)

Paper strength of Wartime Army is 100,000.

Time needed for mobilization cannot be estimated.

Army deliberately neglected.

Coastline; The Army is not in a position to defend the home country, the islands and the colonies. Intention to defend them against Britain at least doubtful. Porto and Lisbon are fortified. Obsolete installations, projected modernization has not been carried out.

No Officers Corps in our sense of the word. Officers have part-time civilian jobs. Armament being modernized, but process interrupted by the war. (Our deliveries, too, were stopped.)

Armament industry practically non-existent.

Lt. Col. Siewert: Program for Fuehrer tour:

- 14, Evening, arrival on the Obersalzberg.
- 15, Reception of King of Bulgaria.
- 16, -18, Serrano Suner.
- 19, King of the Belgians.
- 19, evening, Vienna: Teleki - Csaky.
- 21, noon, return to Berlin. (Perhaps opportunity for presenting report)
- 22/23. Antonescu. (Place undetermined.)
- 24. Tuka.
- 25. Bulgarians.

OQuI: Basic data for Eastern operation; notes for Fuehrer report.  
Planned objectives in the Eastern operation.

Org. Sec.:

- a) OKW reply on activation of SS Divisions; trucks could be obtained by cutting down on ammunition vehicles.
- b) AGp. A.: 10,500 men are now detailed for guard duty.  
10,000 men can be freed by Guard Bns, including 6,000 in AGp.A.
- c) The 250,000 men with two months training set out in the General Army Office estimate actually do not exist.  
(170,000 men have been inducted, X and III Mil. Districts have not called up enough recruits.)
- d) Deadline for completion of training of recruits must be postponed to 15 March.  
Alert groups,\* (one-third) Op. Sec.
- e) Section "Study of fortifications in foreign countries" under the Eng. Corps Officer.  
Good idea!

f) Release Schmitt for.../ Omission.- Ea.7

Gen. Mueller: Dr. Lattmann: Various juridical problems; e.g. of sentences which must be confirmed by the Fuehrer, clemency appeals. Mueller will go on a tour to look into the guard situation (requests of AGps A and D.) On way back he will visit XXXIX Corps\* to check on progress of the training program.

14 November 1940

Work on the draft submitted by OQu V and for radio broadcast on the military science work of the Army during the war.

OQu V's paper once again shows up the gulf between the formal academic point of view and the hard facts of practical military leadership.

Housing: (Gehlen): Operation Southeast -- Basic data.

"Directive No. 18" is now in our hand. Third Armd. Div. will continue to stand by for Libya. About 10 Divisions are set down for Southeast. Preliminary phase: German troops in Rumania will be reinforced.

Hoeppner: Report on units: 60th Div. has turned in trucks. Sixth Armd. Div. is all right. First Armd. Div. will be completed later.

Difficulties: Delivery of spare parts too slow.-- Maintenance NCO's and technicians lacking.-- No tire replacements.-- Troops are overburdened with construction of lean-tos and shelters. (Will not be ready before 1 December.) Moving to new quarters makes much work.

Housing:

- a) Air Force declines envisaged mission against Cape Verde, the Canary Islands and the Azores. (Goering.)-- Fuehrer has turned down Goering's demand to give Richthofen full control of the entire Spanish operation. Goering's proposal to the Fuehrer regarding an airborne Corps.

b) Gehlen -- Romania.

von Bernuth:

- a) Letter of AGn.B. Reply to the inquiry concerning Division for Company CO Training Course (von Salmuth).
- b) Winter refresher program for sections of Arms Chiefs.
- c) Lessons of the campaign in the West.

Gericke: Coal runs smoothly.-- East makes very high demands on construction workers and railroads.-- Coal shipments in the West are on the whole running well.-- Difficulties in the German West. Deliveries of raw materials are not coming in right: reasons not yet clear.-- Shipments of industrial materials must be treated as military shipments.

OQu IV: Molotov: No binding agreement. Fuehrer not dissatisfied. Tripartite Pact: Statement of concurrence is not equivalent to joining. Inclusion of Italy and Japan in the discussions for the present opposed.  
Molotov: What is the Greater Asiatic Area?  
Molotov: What is Germany's attitude on a Russian guarantee of Bulgaria? (Romania called us in).  
New statute offered for the Straits-Privileges, but no bases. No such offer was made on our part.  
Evasive answer to suggestion of a Non-Agression Pact with Japan.  
Heavy Russian demands for machinery.--  
Can be met.  
The Fuehrer apparently has talked the Russians out of Finland.

Program: 18 November, Ribbentrop with Ciano and Suner.  
Sometime around 18 November, Leopold.  
20 November, Csaky (Vienna).  
22/23. State visit Antonescu to Berlin.  
25/26 Boris on Obersalzberg.  
? Tuka (Tiso?)

Accessions to the Tripartite Pact: Romania, Hungary certain, Bulgaria uncertain.

Greece: They are looking for the culprit in Italy and Germany.\*



15 November 1940

0900 -- 1200 : Presentation of report by Gen Qu on supply organization for the Eastern operation (Balutsch, Rueckert):

The operation will be directed by the Army Groups. Accordingly they must also control the supply services. The question remains, to what extent this control should be delimited. The alternatives are limiting the role of the Army Groups to the issuing of orders for supply, or, limiting them in this way but letting them determine the allocation of transportation in the daily movements or in overall planning, which, in turn, would mean that Army Groups take over Army functions.

Another question to be cleared is whether the Armd. Groups should be made independent, like Armies, or whether they should be tied to Armies: the latter would be the desirable alternative.--- Getting the utmost out of engine capacity by using trucks only for long hauls, while keeping storage on immobilized trucks to a minimum, is a sound idea. Basic consideration: The organization must be supple and should not attempt to deal by rigid rules with situations which call for broad policy decisions.

The problems will be worked out in a Map Exercise conducted by Gen Qu, to start on 15 December.

Supply of the occupation troops in France will be taken over by static organizations.

Col. Wuthmann: reports as C of S, Sixteenth Army.

Buhle: Priority scale for the activation of GHq. troops in three stages, is needed in view of fact that activation by 1 April is impossible due to shortage of trucks in consequence of activation of a new SS Division. Current matters.

Hauser: We review the work assignments for the history of "The General Staff of the Army in Preparation and Conduct of the War".

von Ziehlberg: New man to replace Wuthmann (C of S, Sixteenth Army) in Army Hq. 4, and other current matters.

Phone talk with ObdH on general political situation and progress of work.

Will come here on 19 November to hear reports.

Heusinger: Report to OKW on Spain and Bulgaria, to give the political leadership the overall timetable.-- Also various current matters.

16 November 1940

Keitel (Personnel Div.):

- a) Appointments in Divisions and Corps coming out next (Twelfth Draft).
- b) II Corps, Brockdorf; XXVIII Corps, Viktorin; LI Corps, Reinhardt; II Corps, Brueckner.
- c) An Army Officer as Personnel Chief for the SS.
- d) Out-of-turn seniority promotion also for captains.
- e) Medical Officer Corps.-- Young medical officers.-- Promotion of outstanding civilian physicians.
- f) E-Officers Corps\* -- Promotions.

von Etzdorf:

- a) Molotov -- Fuehrer: Second conversation with the Fuehrer: Finland.  
No new shipments scheduled. Finland must not, however, become the subject of a conflict. Danger of British air operations, new theater of war. We maintain a hands-off attitude, economic interests only. Remains within the Russian sphere of interest.

Molotov, third phase: Repercussions of German successes in the West on Russia. Germany has given no reply to various questions. Mariampol. (We shall presumably let the Russians have Mariampol for 14 millions.)

Fuehrer: Wants peace in the Baltic area!  
"The Baltic Sea is the last area left where we can move freely."  
We are engaged in a life-and-death struggle and expect Russian understanding for our situation. A war in the Baltic is ruled out.  
We must come to a decision, whether we want to stand back to back or breast against breast.  
Historic decision! Concepts on the big scale!

Molotov: Complains about Finnish provocation and about German-Finnish relations.

Fuehrer: A war to conquer Finland would put a severe strain on German-Russian relations.

Molotov: Russia demands the same freedom in her dealings with Finland as in her dealings with the Baltic States. (Moscow Agreements).

Fuehrer: Britain must be crushed; divide up the left-over pieces.

Anything that distracts from the crushing of the British Empire is undesirable. This includes question of Saloniki.-- Powers intested in division: Italy, Russia, Japan, Germany.

Molotov: German-Russian relations in the first place; Japan and Italy after that.

Fuehrer: Turko - Russian relations. Greater Asiatic Area - purely Asiatic territory.

Molotov: Russian dissatisfaction about our Romanian guaranty. "It is in fact directed only against us."-- Revocation!

Straits: England has twice succeeded in penetrating into the Black Sea. Now the situation is more menacing. Suggests to give the Bulgarians a Russian guaranty.

Fuehrer: Projected revision of the Montreux Agreement concerning the Straits.

Molotov: In giving a guaranty to Bulgaria, we would not alter the internal order of the country by one hair's breadth. "Tangible guaranties for our key position on the Straits." Russia will come to a direct understanding with Turkey. Requests provisional reply: "Would you let us put Bulgaria under our protection?"

Fuehrer: Fuehrer sidesteps with reference to Il Duce. "If we ever want any frictions, we won't have to bring up the issue of the Straits."

Molotov: Relations between Russia and Japan have improved. Quicker pace possible. Concern about China. Ought to be shared by Germany!

Fuehrer: Settlement of the Sino-Japanese conflict.

Molotov: Not averse. Peace with honor necessary for China. Japan is reaching out for Indonesia, and so might be willing.

Result: Constructive note; Russia has no intention of breaking with us. Impression on the rest of the world.

Finland: Any further Russian action *casus belli*. Accent on economic interests. The Russians will do the Straits alone. They are pursuing a policy of their own toward Turkey. Readiness to come to an understanding with Japan.

As regards the Tripartite Pact it is clear that Russia wants to be a partner, not its object. Pact must be reframed!

- b)\* Straits question: British efforts to support Russian claims.
- c) Thailand raises claims on Indochina. Not until after the war.
- d) Spain's entry into the war?
- e) Laval's talk with the Axis partners postponed.
- f) Csaky will be requested to grant transit for 8 to 10 Divisions (20 Nov).

Gen Qu: Cantonments in the East. (Intendant) By 1. January prefabricated stables for 34,000 plus 12,000 ready for shipment in training centers. Cannot be set up before 1 February, at the earliest. Cantonments for men are less difficult.

Wagner: Promotion for Dankwerts. War Service Cross for Military Government personnel.-- Simplification of Military Government set-up. Transfer of POWs from France to Germany.

Evening: Conference with State Secretary von Weizsaecker. No important new points. Noteworthy:

- 1.) His appraisal of the effects of our operations against the British Isles is not very optimistic. Von Weizsaecker was evidently surprised by information on our production losses and the presumable production losses on enemy side; he had not been aware of these facts before.
- 2.) His views on the prospects of an operation in Spain are similar to ours. The implications of an extension of operations to North Africa were likewise new to him.

- 3.) On the Balkans he expects Turkey to maintain neutrality, even in the event of German intervention against Greece.
- 4.) It is hoped that an understanding with Belgium will be achieved which insures her inclusion in a German dominated Central European Union.  
Policy toward Holland will be equally circumspect because of her colonies, which are moreover believed to be reasonably safe because of the mutual distrust of the powers interested in them (U.S., Japan).

17 November 1940. (Sunday, Berlin)

No official conferences. Desk work. Gerti comes with the children.

18 November 1940.

Heusinger: Report on his talk with OKW (Saturday, 16 November).

- 1.) Portugal will be included in operation Felix only if absolutely necessary.
- 2.) The Islands must be taken in hand by the Navy. They hope that Raeder would be able to do that, since the Air Force has declined. We are mainly interested in the Spanish Canaries. But the Fuehrer is also eyeing the Portuguese Islands.
- 3.) Shipping for the crossing of the Strait has been set aside.  
Coastal artillery prepared:  
One Btry each of 28 cm and 15 cm guns for the European shore.  
One Btry each of 24 cm and 15 cm guns for the African shore.
- 4.) We have notified OKW of the time restrictions imposed on the Spanish and Bulgarian projects by the Eastern operation.
- 5.) Restrictions reported imposed on General Hansen by a direct Fuehrer order will be clarified.



- 6.) Innsbruck Conference: Was evidently in an atmosphere of great frankness. Attack on Egypt is ruled out entirely at this time. The plan is to take Mersa Matruh and later to attack Alexandria and the Suez Canal with the Air Force. For this purpose they have asked us for Ju 88s and Ju 87s. The Italian High Command expects to attack Mersa Matruh early in December.
- 7.) Albania: There had been two opposing conceptions. Badoglio wanted to wait until he had 20 Divisions in Albania. The Governor of Albania on the other hand, expected with certainty a political movement favoring Italian aims in the part of Greece inhabited by Albanians. Ciano forced through the latter view, which turned out to be wrong. Badoglio is very incensed. Now they will commit a total of 20 Divisions. Beginning of the offensive set for latter half of February.
- 8.) The Italians would like us to attack from Bulgaria. Could the two offensives be synchronized?
- 9.) Italy was informed of our intentions in Gibraltar; Also of the fact, that they will be carried out without Italy's cooperation. Badoglio does not seem to be interested to join, in any event.
- 10.) France: Badoglio keeps emphasizing that we must be very careful in our dealings with France, if we want to avoid serious trouble in North Africa. The Italians are very suspicious of Weygand and Nogués. Italy promised that no demands will be made on France without prior consultation with us. However, they are interested in a speedy demobilization in Tunisia. Early clearcut agreements with Laval are necessary. (Can not be expected before 10 days.)
- 11.) Yugoslavia: Germany is asked to exert pressure to relieve Italy. (Scared rabbits!) The OKW has not yet considered the question of getting Yugoslavia interested in Saloniki.
- 12.) The Hqs slated for Bulgaria will not yet be briefed. OKW has no objections against transfer of the earmarked Divisions to start training.

von Stueelpnagel (Wiesbaden):

- a) Originally the Fuehrer had an idea to negotiate an understanding with England at the expense of France.--

Did not come off!

- b) Italian economic demands on France without our knowledge. 50% of the raw material shipped from North Africa. A 250 mill. Francs credit for Italy.
- c) Realization that the situation is not yet ripe for the final defeat of England produced a new European conception.  
This led up to the conference with Mussolini, which was interpreted very differently on the German and on the Italian side. The report that Mussolini concurred with the Fuehrer's ideas is probably only a subjective impression on our part.  
Conferences with Spain (Serrano Suner) did not go well.
- d) The Brenner Conferences resulted in a welter of confusion in the two Foreign Offices. Report of the Forschungs-Institut.\* Italy wants to keep France as weak as possible, especially in North Africa. Italy is annoyed at our measures in Romania. They are looking for ways to demonstrate that they still retain full freedom of decision. Hence the Greek adventure.
- e) Italy's attitude gave a new turn to the Fuehrer's thinking. The result was the order to go slow on France.
- f) Eventually, the conviction that Italy is an unreliable partner became the determining factor in the decision to continue in our original policy toward France.  
We will continue our efforts to coax Spain into the Axis orbit. Up to now she has been treated rather coolly, but with this objective in mind we shall have to be more friendly. Result is anyone's guess.
- g) Innsbruck Conferences did not result in any binding agreements. Abyssinian situation apparently less difficult than expected. (Import of rubber from the Dutch East Indies, fuel stocks will last till spring).--  
Offensive against Greece will not be resumed before the end of three months.
- h) Italy has no interest in preserving France's economy. A contraction would not be welcome.
- i) Partial military solutions must be worked out with France (base in Northwest Africa), before the conferences with Laval on the bigger issues can be continued.

Raeder also wants bases. ObdH!

- k) Fuehrer is handicapped in his policy toward France by the attitude of the Party.
- l) The expulsions of Lorrainers by Buerkel had in the end to be swallowed by the French.
- m) Documents on gas warfare will be surrendered to us. ObdH!
- n) Personnel matters: Mieth must be released. von Stuelpnagel will be free in late December. Hermann as Ia for Stuelpnagel. If Hermann goes, Boehme must stay. Warlimont wants to go to the front. (Boehme cannot be considered as replacement).  
Central Branch.

Radke: a) Langemark Celebration. Report.

- b) Lectures at the Infantry Training Division (71st).
- c) Ideological training in the Army. Rosenberg indoctrination course. Has been given the assignment by the Fuehrer.
- d) Satisfactory result of an inspection tour in the East. (Coal supply to the units all right; Field Post works well; newspapers; films; Strength through Joy theater troupes are doing good work; (general cleanliness, good).
- e) Question of officers' food rations. (Reports that Officers get better food than men).
- f) Question of rural resettlement. Finding civilian jobs for veterans. (Campaign to counteract movement of rural populations to cities).

OQu IV: a) Situation Italy - Greece. British reinforcements in Greece. Italy's difficult situation.

- b) General gloominess in Italy about the military reverses.
- c) Spain: Assentio: Suñer is opposed by Army, police and officials. General Muños Grande, also against Suñer! The new Falange is a caricature of the old! Is Suñer's main support. War unpopular among the people; also among Generals!
- d) U.S. ambassadors and Navy are imperialist. Career diplomats and the General Staff are against war.

- e) Fuehrer is opposed to any sort of special courtesies for the U.S. and Switzerland, but approves accommodating treatment of Finland, Bulgaria, Romania.

Sarnow: Orders to Military Commander Belgium regarding transfer of Belgian gold to the Reichsbank for Belgium's account. (A disguised extortion which is difficult for a soldier to cover with his signature).

Paulus: (OQu I): Report on the Russian operation.-- General Staff Training during winter 1940/41.

von Ziehlberg: Ia officers to act as deputies for Cs. of S.-- Efficiency ratings.-- Disciplinary matters.-- Matters concerning official correspondence.-- Future organization of OKH.

Heusinger: has talked to Jodl once more. (Instructions from the Berghof).  
We are to send another Armd. Div. to Romania, which will not be used against Macedonia. We have to keep 12 Divisions ready for Macedonia. (Apparently the Russian operation has been pushed in the background).  
Bulgarians assert that the terrain prohibits any action before the end of February.

Gercke: Railroad situation still tight. Backlog of 547 trains in the East and in Berlin.  
Coal: Running well in the West. (Lorraine mines damaged during war not yet back in production). In the East, output is still lagging.

19. November 1940

ObdH: Zossen.

0900 - 1200 : Report on Russian operation. Afterwards review of current matters. Nothing important to note.

von Bernuth:

- a) Reports on training difficulties in AGps. A and D relative to future unit training. (Too heavy strain on the troops; lack of training centers). These difficulties can be overcome if we equalize the areas of A and D for training purposes.

- b) Variations between Divisions in the allocation of recruits (trained and untrained).

Buhle: Conference with ObdH.

- a) All GHq troops before the last five Divs. of the Twelfth Draft.\* The last five Divisions of the Twelfth Draft will have to get horse-drawn trains.  
(Occupation troops in the East).  
Report of Chief of Army Equipment to OKW.
- b) Coast Defense Artillery for Spain.  
Available immediately: 10 Btrys 10 cm guns, Polish  
9 Btrys 10.5cm guns, Czech  
Material available by 15 January: 500 rounds per piece.  
Also 21 15 cm guns, French, will be coming in.  
As an interim measure we could take 10 cm gun 18 in the required number.  
Personnel: For every three Btrys, one Btry will be released from the Divs. of the Third Draft\*\*
- c) Divisions which have received trained replacements and will be ready earlier;
- |  |                                     |   |
|--|-------------------------------------|---|
| 50th Div. (Hollidt)                        | 1 Jan.                              | } for South   |
| 72nd Div. (Paris, Mattenklott)             | (Must be promptly relieved!) 1 Jan. |   |
| 73rd Div. (Biehler)                        |                                     | } 15 Jan.   |
| 294th Div. (Eighth Draft) (von Gabke)      | (Must be relieved!)                 |   |
| 56th Div. (East) (von Oven)                |                                     | } (Demarcation line)  |
| 198th Div. (Seventh Draft) (Roettig)       |                                     |   |
| 183rd Div. (Seventh Draft) (Diepold)       |                                     | } Have no heavy mortars<br>Must be converted to lt. Ed. How. 18 |
| 76th Div. (East) (Angelis) by 1 February   |                                     |   |
| 46th Div. (South) (Kriebel) by 15 January. |                                     |   |

CQu IV: Serrano Suñer, 17 and 18 November. Conference said to have gone well.  
King of the Belgians, 19 November.-- Teloki and Csaki 20 November.

Heusinger: Conference on "Felix" with ObdH: Infantry cover for Artillery?-- Flatbed trailers for Sixteenth Armd. Div.-- Shortening of transit?  
Balkans: Approves recommendations.  
Training: No transfer of Divisions till the situation is clearer.

Fellgiebel:

- a) Armd. Bns. 18 and 20 have activation troubles. 35% must be replaced by recruits.
- b) Radio equipment program will be completed by spring; cable program will go on into summer.
- c) Return to their units of personnel furloughed to industry may run into snags because of continuing shortage in skilled workers.

20 November 1940

Model: (Ex C of S Sixteenth Army) reports as Commander of Third Armd. Div.

Hoeffner, Stange, Treske report transferred to Chief of Transportation.

Baentsch, Deyle, Zimmermann: Stockpiling of chemical warfare agents and projectiles. First stock 1.3 mill. Lt Fd How and med Fd How will be completed 1 April.

Three months after start of gas warfare, a new supply of the equal volume could be ready (including filling). Hereafter, same quantity every three months.

Total capacity of chemical warfare depots 10,000 tons. Of these 3,000 are for us, 7,000 for Air Force.

Ratio of attack lost to defense lost 4:1 should be kept. T9 - Uplost odorless makes up 10% of the total production.

Paulus-Bogatsch: Reply to Air Force statement on long-range reconnaissance. We reply with an inquiry designed to clarify the situation once for all.

Heusinger: Coastal Arty (personnel and materiel)

- a) By 15 January, 19 Btrys Czech and Polish 10 cm guns.  
By 15 February, 10 Btrys French 15 cm guns.

b) Shipping in the Mediterranean ready by 15 December (about 20 ships, we need about 14 to cross over to Tangier).

c) Expulsion of Lorrainers stopped. 40,000 have been expelled, 200,000 remain.

Gehlen: reports on assembly of forces and dispositions for Bulgaria.



- OQu IV: a) Situation report. Morale in Italy was good till 28 October (Florence). Since that time marked depression.
- b) Report on conversation with Marras. Italy wants from us 3,000 trucks via Yugoslavia.
- c) Conference with Bulgaria in Berlin on 25 and 26 November. Antonescu 22 Nov.

Baentsch: OKW demands 5,000, later perhaps additional 10,000 tons of truck capacity for air shelter construction in Berlin. (5,000 immediately, 10,000 perhaps by 1 Dec.)

von Bernuth: We discuss the draft of the manual on deployment and operational control of the Armd. Div.

21 November 1940. Trip to Munich to visit my mother.  
21 November leave from Zossen. 0700, arrival Berlin 0830., Munich 1700.

22 November 1940. Spend day in Munich.

23 November 1940 Return. Leave 0030., arrival 1630.  
(Stop over at Pottenst.)

24 November 1940 (Sunday, Berlin).

Work on the more important papers accumulated during my absence. Interesting points:

- 1.) Again liaison between OKW and us is deficient, this time relative to the Balkan question. The matter seems to be developing further, i.e. in the direction of a possible German attack on Turkey. This of course changes radically the picture. We must not lose sight of the fact, that our chances against Russia diminish if we commit forces against Turkey. At the last conference I was told by the Fuehrer: "we can do the Straits only after Russia has been beaten". This idea necessarily implies another one: We must avoid war against Turkey as long as Russia is not beaten. For this reason we have based all our planning on the assumption that our political leadership is doing its utmost to avoid a conflict with Turkey at this time. If this viewpoint has now been abandoned for another, namely, that we can afford the risks of an attack on Turkey, and that we would throw her out of Europe if she does not keep still while we attack Greece -- then we must postpone the Russian project!

- 2.) An intercepted British radio signal speaks of a transfer of "Headquarters" to Ireland on 22 November. It is doubtful whether this means that the British High Command agencies are pulling out. For my party I do not believe it. It probably refers to a British Expeditionary Corps which will use Ulster as a base for the occupation of the whole of Ireland, in order to open the ports on the West Coast of Ireland to the British Fleet. In any case the report warrants our attention.
- 3.) A report by the French General Staff on conduct of the campaign of the French Army from the beginning of the war through to the conclusion of our Western operation. The absence of any big conception is striking. Total inability to get away from the concepts of position warfare, which on the one hand led them to allocate enormous forces to the fortress front, and on the other hand confined their operational thinking within purely defensive lines after entering Belgium (first middle course of Scheldt river, later line Antwerp - Namur).

25 November 1940

Berlin: 1000: Conference with Ambassador Abetz:

Review of the political situation in France.  
Laval, Weygand. -- Situation in North Africa. --  
Conference with Laval end of this week. --  
Demarcation Line. -- Northern provinces.

1100 • Conference with Admiral Canaris:

He reports on the outcome of his trip to Spain and of his conference with Vigon. Warns about Etscheit, who seems to have been talking nonsense again in Switzerland (Richthofen).

Return to Zossen:

Altenstadt: Question of guard personnel in the West.  
Division of responsibility between Military Government and Army Hq.  
"Tourist parties". Complaint by the Military Governor.

Baentsch:

- 1.) BdE's report to Fuehrer.

- 2.) a) 600 Italian Benz trucks with Italian drivers to Villach, where we put on German drivers and take them to Skutari.
- b) We must furnish also additional 800 more trucks with drivers, to go to Skutari via Bulgaria. One-third 5 ton, two-thirds 3 ton, total 3,000 tons. Trying to get Army off from making any contribution.
- 3.) Cuts in transportation furnished for routine business. (Order).
- 4.) Turn in vehicles to OKW.
- 5.) Spain.

Gehlen: Draft of assembly plan for the Southeastern operation. This draft must be revised, because the political command will demand stronger security against Greece. It is based on the assumption that we detain in Romania and group for operations after that.

Preparation: 7 - 25 December.  
 First echelon: 26 December - 15 January.  
 Start of March: 16 January.  
 Mot. unit on the southern border: 23 January.  
 Two Inf. and two Mt. Divs. on the southern border: 4 February.  
 Start of offensive: 11 February. (Bear in mind Eastern operation!)

Heusinger:

- a) 72nd and 73rd Divs. will be assembled in the Vosges Mountains by 29 November, 164th Div. can arrive in the Vosges Mountain by 3 December, Sixth Mt. Div. on the Semmering by 7 December.
- b) If replacement is needed for XXX Corps Hq. in the East, we could take XXXXIII Corps Hq. (Henrici).
- c) Training Divisions for Romania: Sixth Armd. Div., possibly Sixteenth Armd. Div. in exchange for Third Armd. Div.
- d) Gibraltar: 15 German ships are being readied in Venice, Trieste, Livorno; this means that the larger part of them must first sail round Italy (Strait of Otranto!). Scheduled to assemble at Genoa by middle of December.
- e) Coastal artillery in the Biarritz area to protect the assembly of troops for "Felix".

f) Flatbed trailers available: 28 20-ton.

86 10-ton (distributed among all Armd.Divs.)  
For Sixteenth Armd. Div. we need 67 20-ton.,  
4 10-ton trailers. Prime movers are more  
critical and are harder to replace than tracks  
(except for the rubber).

The flatbed trailers are organic equipment of  
the repair columns of the Armd.Divs!

g) 22nd Div. will be converted into an Airborne  
Corps of the Air Force.

h) Miscellaneous: Substitute for 44th Eng.Bn. in  
"Felix" disapproved.-- Iron bridge, no decision  
yet\*. Our personnel is standing by.--  
Construction Bns. for Todt? (No!).--  
Waffen SS Div. detaches one-third for new SS Div.

Sarnow: Gauleiter Wagner's telegram to ObdH about two  
trainloads of house furnishings from France pro-  
mised to him by ObdH. Obviously this promise  
cannot be kept, since the allocation of these  
articles is subject to the regulations of the  
Four Year Plan.

Taken as a whole this day shows again the vast amount  
of unnecessary work imposed on the General Staff  
in consequence of the failure of OKW to furnish  
any positive leadership. No directives have been  
forthcoming on what they really want in Bulgaria,  
but there is endless talk about troop strength,  
even about individual units.

Any way we look at this Bulgarian business, it is  
nothing that would really hurt Britain. But that  
after all is the only thing that should count.

In this connection it is heartening to see that the  
Fuehrer is again taking an interest in "Seelowe".  
That is the surest way to hit England. But then  
again, the Spanish question does not seem to be  
getting anywhere. Neither Bulgaria nor Spain are  
to let themselves be dragged into the war. They  
know that they would have to pay the piper even  
after German victories.--  
England's plans against Ireland seem to be near  
realization.

26 November 1940.

General Buhle:

a) Cav.Div. Horses for AT guns (two requested for  
each Regt.)

Have we got any tanks? Light Inf. guns available only for two Regts. -- motorized. Other requests fulfilled.

- b) Hq for Armd. Group:\* Command authority; judicial powers.
- c) Estimates of motor transport experts: Capable of operations with distant objectives if good care is taken during this winter.
- d) 150,000 PWs, plus Engineer and Construction Bns. requisitioned for air shelter construction work.

Divisional Engineers are out of the question. We have a total of 31 GHq. Engineers Bns. Of these, 8 are detailed for special projects. Of the 23 remaining, 12 must furnish cadres for six new Bns. That leaves seven mot. and four horse-drawn Bns. -- Of the Construction Bns, 28 are working for Air Force, 20 for Navy. Altogether we have 115.
- e) Mountain equipment for Bulgaria will not be possible.
- f) "Chief of Army Library", as of 5 December.
- h) Military-Geographical Institute will be activated in Warsaw during of December.

Kinzel: Bulgaria.

Troubles:

- a) Are afraid Turkey will attack)
- b) Fear air raids ) Their demands are put aside.--AAA!\*\*) )
- c) Russian landings at Burgas and Varna; say they have reports; want heavy artillery.
- d) Country is poor. Could not stand a prolonged war.

Road network: Five practicable roads across the Balkan Mountains leading to the South. One-way roads; narrow; many curves. Bridges partly very weak. Only wide enough for one vehicle, sharp curves at bridges!

Weather: From 15 December to the middle of April, snowdrifts.-- No snowploughs!

Frontier: Runs on foothills. East of the Struma river. May be compared with Garmisch.

Fortifications: Reported to have some pillboxes, light MG emplacements, otherwise field fortifications.

Food: For cash they would feed 100,000 men for four weeks. No gasoline, no repair facilities.

Housing: Very difficult. Staffs can be accommodated, but not troops.

Bulgarian General Staff: Ponderous, antiquated, unimaginative.

Romania: Hanson, Enemy propaganda. Size of his Staff. Party agencies with women (Party, SS) have made an embarrassing impression. Officers Corps partly in opposition. General Staff makes good impression.

- Juchacz \*\* a) Start of postwar training only on approval by ObdH.  
b) Wants us to stress to OKW importance of premilitary training. Training Sec. ObdH. Specialists, such as radio operators, etc.  
c) Knight's Cross SA. (Mantey) ObdH?  
d) Service in Feldherrnhalle\*\* to be credited as military service! Buhle --von Bernuth.  
e) Recognition for SA. Knight's Cross, War Service Cross for SA leaders. ObdH.

OQu IV: Roenne: Roads and trails in the Sahara. Conclusion: large-scale operation impossible, at worst harassing raids by a few Bns., striking in northern direction, from Central Africa, against French and Italian North Africa.

- von Toppelskirch: a) Albania: So far Italians have at most 15 Divs.  
b) Our Foreign Office is now striking a very friendly note in dealing with Yugoslavia. Apparently they are playing with the idea of selling the Yugoslavs on Saloniki, in return keeping their hands off the Adriatic (Vienna).  
c) Also Hungary is receiving very friendly treatment at the moment.  
d) Molotov: Talk with Bulgarian envoy. Offers guaranty provided the Axis does the same.--



Help in extension of the frontiers!

- e) At the moment, Bulgaria declines guaranties from any side. Joining of the Axis is under consideration.
- f) Leopold: Friendly mood toward Belgium. The possibility is left open that the country would retain its sovereignty.
- g) Antonescu has served notice that he will demand revision of the Vienna Decisions.
- h) England's difficult situation is becoming increasingly apparent. Roosevelt reported to have stated that England will be finished within six months and that there is no sense in dragging the U.S. into the war for England.
- i) Spain under heavy German pressure to join us against England; Fuehrer thinks the military problem is simple and expects complications only in the Canary Islands. Economic difficulties. War unpopular. English propaganda is strong! Morocco question is left open. No decision yet on Spain's participation. Decisions up to France. On the economic side they want 60,000 tons of grain.
- k) Reported landing of Canadians in Greece. I doubt that. Probably only Air Force.

General Mueller: Report on tour to AGp. A.

- a) Army Gp has resigned itself to strength reductions.
- b) Coast Defense is a greater burden than is the Demarcation Line. The bulk of the troops are assigned to Coast Defense. Recruits are being trained in the dunes. Unit training above Bn. level not possible while troops are in Coast Defense assignments.
- c) In some Divs. no replacements can be found for armament workers.\*Occasionally the assertion is voiced that armament workers will not return even next spring.
- d) Replacements for detached cadres have not yet arrived; every delay in their arrival postpones completion of recruit training.

- e) "Seelbore" program is pursued with great energy, as though operations might start any time.
- f) Training program is overdone in the Regional Defense Bns as many as one-third of men engaged in training.
- g) Personnel detached for guard duty: Complaints by High Command West are true only for a few Divisions, in the others the situation is much better. Much nonsense! (e.g. lines of sentries round coastal towns; guards outside soldiers' clubs). Continually changing demands make things more difficult. Blocking off of big cities cannot be kept up. Busch has rescinded the order.

Report on Corps Hq Kuebler: Satisfied with training facilities. No complaints or suggestions. They need a Liaison Officer for Air Force and the Spanish High Command.

- Gorcke:
- a) Report on meeting of advisory board at the office of the Director General of the State Railroads, 26 November. Minister of Transportation admits that the State Railroads will in future be unable to meet our requirements on the level of present demands.
  - b) Bridge Hendaye - Irun: Matter is under "friendly consideration" by Madrid Foreign Office.
  - c) Mining of railroad bridges in Franco.\*
  - d) 2419 m of military bridges tied up in bridges, 2990 m available for use. New production to 1 January: 207 m, to 1 April 666 m, so that we would have 3,860 m on hand, plus built-in bridges, total is about 5000 m. 15,800 m steel girders for temporary bridges (bridge launchers), 9,500 bridge piles.
  - e) Officer Corps of Railway Troops will be built up by bringing in university-trained men; Provision for out-of-turn seniority promotion; will be taken into the active Officers Corps during war.
  - f) Railroad bridges under construction. Progress made.

Sarnow: New basis for the negotiations on the question of Belgian gold: Gold will be placed into a custodial deposit at the Reichsbank.

Reeder is to continue negotiations on this basis (acceptable!). Hemmen, Neumann and Sarnow will go to Brussels.

Major General Mueller: Confirmation of a number of sentences (death sentences):  
Desertion, attack against the occupying power.  
Statistics of military offenses during October.

27 November 1940

Col. Breith (Thoma's deputy) reports. Mission to inspect the Armd. Divs. earmarked for early commitment.

von Bernuth:

- a) Training of recruits.
- b) Revision of training manuals. Manuals for Regiments must be issued before those for Divs.
- c) Officer candidates: There are still 20,000 peacetime candidates who have not yet been commissioned. One training course turns out over 4,000. It is therefore useless to start new training courses, since the Personnel Division could not process their graduates. What matters alone at present is that the remaining trained candidates in the units get their commission.
- d) Miscellaneous: Tour by the War Academy. - Visit to the Training Divs.

General Ott: a) "Lessons of the Infantry in the Western Campaign". (Must be put into the hands of troops).  
b) Doerberitz Training Exercise.-- Results must be put on maps for mass distributions to troops.  
c) Koenigsbrueck Training Div.-- Too much theory!  
d) Rifle Regts. in Armd. Divs. must be led by Inf.-trained officers.  
e) Organization of the Infantry squad.

Housing:

- a) (Gehlen) Result of the map exercise on the Bulgarian operation:

From the start the weight must be on the western wing. The central group is of no importance. The eastern group is important, but will not be effective operationally.

- b) About six Divs. may be used as a defense screen for the march to the South. As against our original plans, the movement will take no more than four days longer. Additional forces for current requirements may follow behind, at a rate of one Division every two days.
- c) Effects of possible operations in Spain and on the Balkans on the Russian problem. The diversion of strength to these operations would compel us to give up "Seelöwe" and to confine ourselves to reaching the first objectives in the Russian offensive. They would certainly give us a jump-off base for a pincer operation, but such an operation does not look promising in these immense spaces.

Rhode: a) Increased anxiety in Turkey.

- b) Demonstrative rejection of a break with England and of transit for our troops through Anatolia.
- c) State of siege in Thrace.-- Condition of the troops in Thrace.
- d) Turkish Army and Air Force.-- Defense.-- Arms.-- Morale.-- War industry.

von Ziehlberg: a) Report of tour in the East. Heartening impressions of the General Staff work.  
b) Current General Staff Personnel matters.

28 November 1940.

Sarnow: We agree that there are two ways: a) through Brussels, or b) through France.

- a) Alternative is possible only if we make concessions (Restrict scope of order and negotiate on an equal basis.)
- b) Alternative, to talk to Hemmen and the Governor of the Bank of France, which would put the gold of the Belgian National Bank at our disposal. (Same evening): Hemmen will see Laval. Power to dispose of gold will be vested in Becker by an order of Military Government Belgium. It is thought that Laval must honor such a signature as legal and turn over the gold.
- c) The whole affair, of course, is nothing but a legal form of extortion. Still the form is tolerably acceptable.

The Governor of the Belgian National Bank will probably resign. This we can put up with, unless also the Belgian General-Secretary of Finances resigns; he is really irreplaceable. Moreover, France seeing what happened to Belgium's gold will of course draw her conclusions on what she may expect for her own gold.

Pomsl, C of S XVIII Corps, reports. Wants our help in getting replacements for officers with mountain experience.

Chief Personnel Division: New man for Weingart (Trauch ? Gutzeit).

Medical Officer Corps: Two-thirds of civilian doctors and one-fourth of hospital doctors are still in the Reich.

Representative of ObdH to Frank (Governor-General)? Officer replacements?

The following CGs have Balkans experience: von Stuelpnagel (Armistice Commission), Manstein (XXXVIII Corps), Kienitz (! XVII Corps), Lindemann (L Corps), Hartmann (XXXX Corps), Brand (XXXIII Corps), Fahrmbacher (VII Corps), Kortzfleisch (XI Corps), Kuntze (XXXXII Corps).

Divs. available for assignment: 46th, 56th, 183rd, 198th, 294th (15 January), 76th (1 February).

Buhle:a) Replacements are now being speeded to the "Seelowe" Divisions; in the other Divisions they have already arrived.

b) Impossible to use recruits to replace the armament workers on furlough, as doing so would preclude forming Field Replacement Bns.

c) Calling up of armament workers takes 20 days. (10 days to get them out of the factories, 10 days to return them to their units).

d) Carts and horses for Infantry (Five for each Company).

e) To get Amphibian tanks (Eighteenth Armd. Divs.) ready for amphibious operations takes 3 to 10 weeks.

f) Report on truck situation. CGs of First and Eighth Armd. Brigade fairly satisfactory.

g) ObdH wants to supply only the trucks for the 20 short-range Ren Staffeln.

Heusinger:

a) Guard troops problem in AGp.A.

- b) More Divisions for Romania.
- c) Two-thirds of the ships in the Mediterranean (10) will get 50 ton loading cranes, one-third (5) 12 ton cranes.

von Etzdorf:

- a) Conferences of the Reich Foreign Minister with the Yugoslav Foreign Minister (Berghof and Fuschl). Mussolini approves. No results so far. Prince Paul must be called in. Yugoslavia to get Saloniki and a guaranty of her frontiers. Demilitarization of the Adriatic coast.
- b) Italy: Anxiety whether Albania can be held. Shift blame on the Army.\*
- c) Codreanu-Day. Anniversary of assassination (Morossow). Romania.
- d) Papen to the Turkish Foreign Minister: Axis is willing to respect the territory and the sovereignty of Turkey and to offer guaranties, provided Turkey is willing to cooperate in the new Order of Europe.  
"Formation of a British front on the Balkans would be intolerable for Germany".
- e) Bulgaria is becoming the center of interest. Russia has asked Bulgaria about her attitude toward a guaranty pact; "If it is accepted, Russia would draw closer to the Tripartite Pact."
- f) Russia: Conditions for joining a Quadripartite Pact: Finland "Russian sphere of interest", but will not be invaded. Guaranty of Bulgaria; interest in the Straits. Bulgaria is evasive.
- g) Ireland: Show of will to resist. Our Minister will talk with De Valera.
- h) Spain: Reported agreement among the leading Generals that Suñer must be fired.
- i) Japan: New ambassador in Washington, one-time head of a friendship mission. Cutting back of political objectives!



29 November 1940

Morning: Part I of Paulus' map maneuver (Study of the Eastern operation).

Afternoon: Zerbel comes in on completion of his work with Hauser.

Ochsner: Reports on his tours in the West:

- a) Kuebler's Smoke Battalion is continuing training in the Jura Mountains.
- b) Development in the oil flame process.
- c) Must get some publicity for the Smoke Troops.
- d) Service Manual for gas officers.

Phone talk with Sodenstern about reported plan of transferring the French Government to Paris.

Phone talk with von Stuelnegel: it is correct that the French Government would like to move to Paris. So far the Fuehrer has not authorized such a move. Armistice Commission has orders to defer the matter until after the Ribbentrop-Laval conferences. Fuehrer will decide then. Conference Huntzinger/Warlimont. French plans in Africa outlined.

30 November 1940.

Phone talk with ObdH on progress on current matters.

von Ziehlberg: Preparation of the conference with Cs of S of Armies, etc.

Visit to the War Academy (9 December)

Correspondence routine.-- Current personnel matters.

Schmidt-Altenstadt: Abetz' position as "Ambassador".

Will become independent of the Military Government.

Far-reaching implications for the position of

ObdH and of Military Government France.

Jewish question in France.

Propaganda in France. Disbanding of the Propaganda Section.

Evening 1700 Long Conference with ObdH. I report on

important matters that came up during his leave.

We have heard that the political leadership wants to drop its plans for the Spanish and Portuguese Islands. Instead, an effort is to be made to bring Portugal into the German camp.

Guest at supper in Berlin; Boehm-Tettelbach.

1 December 1940. (Sunday, Berlin).

No new official business. Work on current matters.

2 December 1940.

Major Dingler reports out.

Capt. Simon (Ib, 246th Div.) transferred to Sec. Foreign Armies West.

General Wagner: Report on his tour in the East.

Current questions in Gen Qu Section: Dihm to replace Weingart? Traffic control.

France: New set-up following the change in Abetz' position.

Noon: Lunch with the Danish Mission headed by Chief of Gen. Staff, General Goertz, which will tour the Maginot Line (Guards Cavalry Club).

Col. Mueller (Angelo) reports.

Heusinger:

- a) Report on OKW Conference on "Felix":
  - 1.) Friday arrival of "Small Reconnaissance Party" at Bordeaux: Lanz, Grosse, Roschmann, Inf., Lucht, Lankau, Artillery; Geiger, Eng., Stahmer, Sig.
  - 2.) 18 trains will be prepared before the start of operations, but otherwise the French Railroad Administration must be kept out of the preparations.
- b) Talk with Schmudt:

Albania/Greece: Duce in low spirits. No leading Generals. Dream of Empire is dreamed out. Guaranty to Yugoslavia, transit of troops, but Saloniki will be taken by us and then turned over to Yugoslavia!  
Turkey has been informed, and is getting soft in consequence.  
"e shall be in Leningrad in three weeks!!

Ireland: Heinkel planes wanted for four Armd. Divs.\*

Gibraltar: Siege guns, gas explosion.\*\*

- c) Romania: A new Armd. Div., 14 December. Will be preceded by Advance Party. For 16 December!
- d) Size of the Reconnaissance Party for Bulgaria. Best in two successive groups.
- e) Creation of a new Armd. Group (Hoepfner): That means, we must recall Hansen from Romania to have him for the Eastern operation.

Gen Brand: (Arty):

- a) "Felix" : Biarritz coast defense: Two batteries from Channel Coast defense.-- Navy preparations for Spain: Eight 17 cm guns to close the Strait of Gibraltar. (will be shipped by sea.), together with light batteries. It takes eight weeks from arrival to get them ready for action! Our contribution for coast defense for Spain: To supplement the supposedly existing 29 Spanish Btrys. with 150 guns (excluding Ceuta and the Islands), which may be in dubious condition, the Naval Operations Staff wants from us: Two 10 cm Btrys., one each for Malaga and Cadiz. Must be taken from our flank!\*

Two Bns., = six Btrys; one Bn. of three Btrys for Vigo and for Barcelona. (Must be taken from coast defense against England.)

Two Bns., = six Btrys; one Bn. of three Btrys. for Porto and for Lisbon. (Can for the time be taken out of the artillery earmarked for Portugal!)

Four Btrys. for the defense of the Canary Islands. (Must be taken from the French coast defenses, where they will be temporarily replaced by mobile batteries; later by newly activated coastal artillery units).

- b) Firing efficiency of Artillery pretty poor.
- c) Surveying in the East (Difference of views between the Chief Artillery Officer and Ninth\*\* Section regarding assignment of surveying missions).

OQu IV:

- a) Cinkar Markowitch and Fuehrer: Come over to the Axis now! In three months conditions will be less favorable.
- b) Romania: Nothing new. Romanian Army will be ready by spring. Nothing promised.

- c) Leopold: The closer Belgium's ties with Germany the greater the amount of internal independence she will retain. No objections against the continued rule of the dynasty. Different from Holland and Norway.
- d) Russians have talked with the Bulgarians. If Bulgaria accepts an Assistance pact, Russia will support her revision claims. Then Russia will also join the Tripartite Pact. Open pact, two secret protocols. (Determination of the spheres of interest. The three powers must grant Russia a privileged position in the Straits according to a formula still to be arrived at.)  
Five conditions:
- No more German troops to Finland (peaceful settlement!) Bulgaria concludes Pact of Mutual Assistance with Russia; must join the Tripartite Pact.
- Russia will lease bases on the Straits. If Turkey is not agreeable, satisfaction of claims will be forced by German, Italian and Russian military action against Turkey.)
- Japan must renounce her claims to Northern Sakhalin.
- Russians are interested in the region south of Batum-Baku.
- e) Spain has said that two months are too short for preparation; Franco can accept no deadline.
- f) Huntziger-Warlimont: Against Nigeria, through Sahara.\*

OQu I: Distribution of Russian forces; fortifications on the Russian side. Review of operational possibilities after the first objectives have been gained.

3 December 1940

Morning: OQu I map maneuver (Eastern operation). Part II of the operation, bringing us to the line Minsk-Kiev.

OQu IV: Romania: Internal situation still very tense:

Antonescu: Illegal movement was armed by Germany (stated in the presence of the Generals). Number of political assassinations exceeds 200.

Truce with Sima will not last. Further disturbances must be expected. His only hope is the German Army.

Romania: Romanian Gen. Staff states in daily situation report: Russians have moved four Divisions nearer to the Romanian border near Cernauti.

Heusinger: Jodl, \* Rasp, Baentsch, Bork:

Report on schedule of movements in "Felix": Our Reconnaissance Party (15 strong) goes to Spain on 6 December. They will be followed by a group of Reconnaissance planes, then SS Deathhead, then Artillery etc. An interval 32 - 38 days will elapse between the crossing of the frontier by the planes and the start of the operation. This is plenty long and anything but a lightning war. But the need for rigorous camouflage necessitate this long delay.

1800 : Conference with ObdH: On political situation, "Felix", "Marita" and Eastern operations. No new viewpoints.

Gercke: Steel quotas allocated to State Railroads and Chief of Field Transportation approximately meet our demands.

"Otto Program" \*\* can be carried out in full.

Wagner: a) Fuehrer directive on "Ambassador in France". "Military Governor" will remain for the time being.

b) 800 trucks for Italy.  
Suggests: First instalment: 250, by 1 January,  
Second instalment: perhaps 100, by  
1 March,  
Third instalment: remainder, by 1 May,  
Drivers from Furlough Divs.

c) Truck situation. Spare parts quota must be increased. New workshop platoons (16 will be ready). A "Fourth Echelon Maintenance workshop" for each Army.  
One-half of new truck production will go to the Field Army (1,600 by 1 February).

d) Fuel situation bad. Tire situation very bad.

von Etzdorf: Report on recent conferences:

- a) Fuehrer/Cinkar Markowitch, 28 November:  
Yugoslavia's existence important for us, for economic reasons. We want a strong Yugoslavia. We have no interest in the Balkans.

Fuehrer: "Nothing has ever changed between us. It is our partner who was wavering. Typical example of how a big State can underrate the power of resistance of a small State. Criminal folly".

Unique opportunity for Yugoslavia.

We shall drive England out of Greece with 20 Divisions, but willing to use 180 Divisions, if need be. In connection with this operation, frontier readjustments possible in favor of Bulgaria.

Hungary: boa constrictor. Indigestion.

Russians have offered assistance Pact to Bulgaria and have promised treaty revisions also with respect to Yugoslavia.

If Yugoslavia joins the German combination she would obtain a guaranty for her existence, plus Saloniki. In return she would only have to demilitarize Dalmatia.

Il Duce too, would be glad to confront his hotheads with accomplished facts.

"Events permit us to bring influence to bear in the Italian sphere".

"Three months from now, the situation might be less favorable for Yugoslavia".

Neither Bulgaria nor Yugoslavia need take part in any military action. Naturally, Germany will use its discretion in distributing what is conquered by German arms.

Stalin wants to do business along the lines of traditional Russian policy. If he finds no field for his activities on the Balkans, he will turn elsewhere.

Germany will buy Yugoslavia's production over a long period and at fixed prices.

- b) Fuehrer/Ciano, end of November:

A campaign against Greece is a liability. Fuehrer will attack only with sufficient forces.



In pursuing his policies, he will deal also with countries for which he has little sympathy (Yugoslavia). Insists that Italian Air Force operate over the Mediterranean day and night.

Program for next spring: Gibraltar, Mersa Matruh, Greece.

Program for fall 1941: Egypt.

- c) Franco more unpredictable than ever. Sets no date for his entry into the war. "Completion of preparations cannot yet be predicted". Wants experts also for economic organization of country. Franco demands that operation in Eastern Mediterranean coincide with the Western operation.
- d) Schnurre/Molotov: "Russians want to send us one million tons of grain. ("From reserve stocks.") They expect bigger counter-deliveries. Balance must be settled!
- e) Turks very suspicious about "Personnel policy in the Kremlin".
- f) Laval, Huntziger, Darlan, Abetz, Warlimont: Fight De Gaulle through Nigeria; not before November, 1941. Requires careful preparations; there must be no reverses. Want fewer restrictions for their Navy.
- g) Our proposal to Molotov: An open and two secret agreements, to run for ten years. Russia would join the Tripartite Pact if five secret protocols are accepted:
  - 1.) Concerning Finland, with whom they want to come to terms without force of arms.
  - 2.) Concerning Bulgaria, with whom Russia wants to conclude an Assistance Pact. In return Bulgaria would be allowed to join the Tripartite Pact.
  - 3.) Lease of bases on the Bosphorus.
  - 4.) Turkey must be requested to join the Tripartite Pact; then give a guaranty. In the event of a refusal "diplomatic and military enforcements by Germany, Italy and Russia."Japan must renounce her Sakhalin concession.

5.) Russian sphere of interest south of the line Batum-Baku.

We have not yet replied to these proposals.

- h) Fuehrer/King Leopold: Reception friendly. Internal independence of Belgium will be greater the closer she ties herself to Germany. Germany will do nothing against the Royal House, as contrasted with the policy toward Holland and Norway.  
We shall not let Belgium starve. "Individual treatment" promised. "Statement" refused.
- i) Antonescu: Instead of 45 Divisions he wants to activate only 29, including 10 with double cadre.  
Antonescu/Fuehrer: Antonescu serves notice of a demand for revision after the war. Romanian Army ready in spring.
- k) Fuehrer/Teleki: We must not trust the Russians.-- England already beaten.-- Germany's superiority.

4 December 1940.

Morning: Preparation for the Fuehrer Conference.  
(Conference is then called off and postponed to 5 December).

von Stueelpnagel (Armistice Commission):

- a) Transfer of the French Government to Versailles.  
Fuehrer has ruled, that for the time being this question should be given dilatory treatment. Probably it will be some time before they are allowed to return. First we must wait for the outcome of the conferences with Laval; perhaps also, whether any practical results will follow from them. AGp A notified.
- b) Fuehrer views favorably prospects for cooperation with the French. Has a positive attitude in this question. The French will need time, however. (Foreign Office directive on "line" is different).
- c) Armistice Commission has been instructed to work on the Italians to make them to accept the French requests: 120,000 men in North Africa, easing of restrictions on the Navy.

- d) Troubles: Expulsion of Lorrainers (Himmler is behind that), and in Bordeaux. 267 Jews from Luxembourg.

Chief Signal Officer:

- a) Signal communications for Air Force in "Felix", Vigo, Cadiz, Malaga for Naval Operations Staff.
- b) Raw materials for Signal Communications. Air Force demands four times more from us!! Will have to learn to manage things differently.
- c) Signal communications through Hungary and Romania for "Otto." Authorized by OKW.
- d) Once Marita is getting under way, signal officers to Belgrade and Sofia.
- e) Direct communications with Ireland, Air Attaché.
- f) Japanese Attaché wants to exchange with us Russian cryptographic material.
- g) Foreign Office, Forschungs-Institut and we are doing radio intelligence. Fellgiebel was supposed to coordinate these activities, but has not gotten anywhere.

- Jodl: a) Fuehrer conference on 5 December. 1) Camouflage must not be overdone. The matter must be speeded up.-- 2) Too little Artillery.
- b) Fuehrer report on 7 December, afternoon: Kuebler with Artillery specialist (1500 hrs). Richthofen, Weichenau? Representative of OKH. Subject: Details of the operation.

5 December 1940

Gercke: Assignments for Mittermaier.  
ObdH's reply to recommendation concerning Strobl.

- Buhle: a) Trucks for Italy: French trucks, 250 in January, 250 in March. Drivers from Eastern Furlough Divisions.
- b) Reich Labor Service.-- 50 Bns. for the East in March.

- c) Field Replacement Bns. (70 to begin with).
  - d) New Armd. Group: Signal units from the Divisions of the Third Draft; Sixth Draft etc. (February).
  - e) More Rocket projector regiments by reducing the number of projectors from eight to six.
- Approved!!

von Rintelen: a) Progress in the Italian war. He specially stresses the passivity of the Italian Navy.

b) Possible developments and prospects.

Ambassador Ritter: Cooperation between Foreign Office Depts. and the Army.

1500 - 1900 Fuehrer conference (ObdH and myself; part of the time, General Brand):

- 1) He outlines the political situation and his plans. Details see note on the conference. Summary: "Felix" as soon as possible. Latest date for F-day, 10 January, 1941. He wants shortest possible interval between the first air attack and the start of the artillery bombardment. The decision to do "Felix" is final.

"Marita": Preparations must be carried out to the full in accordance with the recommendation, and in such a manner that we can march into enemy territory early in March. The decision whether Marita will be done is still left open.

"Otto": Preparations must get fully under way in accordance with our basic plans. Proposed date: End of May.

"Seeloewe": Can be left out of our considerations.

Libya: No longer contemplated.

## 2) Details on "Felix":

- a) Tactics: Every inch of English territory must be pulverized. To do this we need much siege gun ammunition. Unlimited expenditure of ammunition; 20-30 ammunition trains through France, or by sea to Malaga. Negotiations with French authorities on transit of these shipments not before X-Day. Workers through Spain.
- b) Insure installation of Coastal Artillery in Tarifa and Ceuta through a sales arrangement with Spain. Must be set up in time to prevent escape of British ships.

- c) Preparations must be completed for ferrying troops to Morocco.
- d) Heaviest tanks; new heaviest type carrying 27 rounds of ammunition.

3) Details on "Otto":

- a) What matters most is to prevent the enemy from falling back before our onslaught.
- b) Maximum objective: Occupation of an area which will render the Z I safe from air attacks. After attainment of this objective combined operations to destroy the sources of enemy war potential (Armaments industries, mines, oil fields).
- c) Aim of the campaign: Crushing of Russian manpower; no groups capable of recuperation must be allowed to escape.
- d) Allies: Finns, Romanians, but not Hungarians.
- e) One Division will be brought up from Narvik by train through Sweden and will strike on the northern wing together with Dietl's two Mt. Divs. Objective: Polar Sea.
- f) Make the Southern Group strong! The Russians must be beaten this side the Dnieper. Concentrate Air Force against Dnieper crossings! All Russian forces this side the Dnieper must be destroyed.
- g) Cut off Baltic area! The rest can be done by Landwehr Divs.
- h) By striking with strong wings north and south of the Pripet marshes we must split the Russian front and encircle the enemy in separate pockets. (Similar to Poland). These two outer wings must be fast and strong!
- i) Moscow of no great importance.

After return in the evening, review of the outcome of the conference with Heusinger.  
 Resumé of the conference put to paper.

6 December 1940.

von Stuelpnagel calls up: Negotiations regarding the Demarcation Lines which were at the point of conclusion have suddenly reached a deadlock, because the French now link this question with the question of the Northeastern frontier. Stiffening attitude! They demand easing of restrictions in the Occupied Zone. December instalment of occupation costs has not been paid!

+ inform Stuelpnagel of the outcome of yesterday's conference.

General Paulus: Review of operational problems in "Otto", in the light of yesterday's Fuehrer conference.

von Ziehlberg: Filling of posts (Fourteenth Draft), and current matters.

ObdH (1700 - 1900):

- a) M 60\* (Result of today's trial firing at Hillersleben)\*\*: range 4,200 m --- Self-propelled mount. --- weight of projectile: 2,100 kg; explosive charge 280 kg; Muzzle velocity 220 m. --- Blast and flash slight. --- Penetrates 150 cm concrete. Can be shipped by rail. --- On roads in divided loads. Assembly by crane. Shops finished by 10 January, in time to be shipped by rail. Road speed 4 km per hour. Dispersion: 15 x 15 m. --- Effective range: 2700 - 4100 m. --- Ammunition forthwith: 30 rounds; impact fuze.
- b) Rochling projectile for 15 cm guns and 21 cm heavy howitzers. Penetrates 3 m concrete. --- Test firing in the Jura Mountains. Let us hope that ammunition will be ready in time.
- c) "Felix":  
Order of movement: send Artillery ahead at the earliest to give a flat-trajectory fire against British Fleet. --- Infantry security.  
Remainder of First Mt. Div. will follow.  
High explosives for blasting the Rock; by sea from Genoa. Small craft.  
Loading crews at Genoa. Men must not be shipped on same vessels with ammunition.  
Assault tanks: Thoma, latest model with reinforced front armor.  
Replacements for assault troops must be readied.  
Rehabilitation after completion of operations, in Paris.



Third Armd. Div. No change!

d) "Otto": List will command the right wing. In that case he can also do Marita. Review of the dispositions and missions of the several Army Hqs.

e) "Marita": Advance Party to prepare accommodations in Romania.

General Konrad (Liaison Officer in Goering's Hq ).

a) Strategy of aerial warfare.

b) Details.

c) Operations against England: Britain did not sacrifice her fighter strength over London; is sacrificing London instead. Our fighters have only limited range over England, extending not much beyond London. This enabled Britain to conserve and increase her fighter planes. We were forced to change over to night attack. Selection of targets: emphasis on armaments industry (especially aviation). Next in order, critical port installations. London is under constant day and night attack in order to destroy the city. Defense organization is tied down there. Special missions: Destruction of specified plants of critical industrial importance (Also by day, through clouds). Attack on selected night airdromes (Night attacks). Targets of opportunity: Individual ships and convoys.

At present we do not emphasize attack on supply movements. These operations will be concentrated on only when the main task (destruction of armaments industry) is nearing completion. The attack on supplies will be launched in Spring, in conjunction with submarine warfare.

Determining factors in the selection of targets for daylight sorties: Weather, effectiveness of direction beams, taking-off facilities. In dark nights only flying by instruments possible (direction beams, direction finding). This precludes extension of operations beyond the parallel of Birmingham or at most Liverpool. Farther objectives, e.g. Glasgow, where the British are taking all their valuable stuff for safekeeping, can be reached only on bright nights.

- d) Operations control: Centralized: ObdL selects the targets for the following night and decides what has to be done the day after.
- e) Strength: At present 3,000 - 4,000 planes in operation, including 1,800 bombers. Bombers can go out on missions every fourth night.
- f) Appraisal of overall situation: Personnel show occasional signs of fatigue because no conclusive results have as yet been achieved. If operations are carried on consistently and with sufficient weight, our blows will one day pass the limits of human endurance. At present we have only few positive indications of cracking morale. "One day the bow will break". Fighter opposition is weakening already.
- g) Organization: No new units will be activated, but existing units will be reinforced to 15 planes each.

Heusinger:

- a) Preparations for "Felix".
- b) Preparations for "Marita".
- c) Navy will furnish four coastal Btrys. of three 15 cm guns each, for Gran Canaria and Teneriffe. In addition, they want from us 4 mot. 10 cm gun Btrys. (No!)
- d) Preparations must be made now for the relief of troops in Portugal and Spain after the conclusion of operation "Felix".
- e) Preparations must now be made for the rehabilitation of the Armd. units returning from "Felix"; also of mot. medium Artillery.

- Buhle:
- a) Preparations for "Felix" and "Marita": Recall men on furlough!
  - b) Current activation questions. (AGp. E will not be needed!)

7 December 1940

Morning: Part III of Paulus map maneuver.

Noon: Col. Gen. von Falkenhorst calls: Reports on Norway:

- 1.) Preparation for Dietl's offensive with four Divs. from Norway through Finland: 163rd, Engelbrecht; 199th, Kempf (three Regts.); Second Mt. Div., Feuerstein; Third Mt. Div., Kreysing. Time required for assembly in Finland or on the Finnish border: 6 - 8 weeks. One Mt. Div. will go by road to Petsamo (Second Mt. Div.). One Mt. Div. will move up by rail from Narvik (Third Mt. Div.). One Div. from Central Norway by rail through Sweden (163rd Div.). One Div. from the coast of Central Norway by rail through Sweden (199th Div.). Movements possible as of 1 April.
- 2.) Waffen SS on coast of Polar Sea and in Southern Norway (Oslo) under a Brigade Commander. Cooperation good.

Evening Gehlen: Assembly order for "Marita" (Berlin)

8 December 1940. (Sunday, Berlin)

Afternoon 1800: I see Keitel (OKW) at his home.

- a) Albania: Last night Alfieri informed Rintelen, later the Fuehrer, of critical situation in Albania. The Italian Army has again fallen back 30 km. Fuehrer holds that this time it is not a matter of poor leadership, but rather of bad troop morale.
- b) Spain: Caudillo told Canaris point blank that entry into the war at the time proposed by us is impossible, since no preparations have been made. The reasons are mainly of an economic nature: food etc. The transportation problem defies solution.-- Canary Islands and Spanish overseas possessions would be lost (also the Portuguese Islands would be occupied by the enemy). The Islands would simply starve to death.

Nevertheless Spain will carry on with her preparations. . . Camouflage must be fully maintained. OKW has telegraphed Canaris, instructing him to find out the earliest possible date.

- c) Fuehrer is now examining the extreme consequences: If Caudillo refuses to cooperate, we could not get into Morocco; disaffection would spread in North Africa; Weygand would set up counter-government.  
Conclusion: If anything happens in North Africa; we must at once occupy the remainder of France.

Trip to see Il Duce planned for tomorrow noon.

- d) 1 outline a tentative operational plan (Attila)\* and stipulate a ten-day alert period.

2200 (Zossen). Keitel (OKW) on phone:

- a) Trip put off for several days. Il Duce does not view situation as particularly dangerous. Wants to await developments.
- b) Fuehrer approves my operational plan.\*\*  
Thinks, that not many troops would be needed. Waffen SS and SS Adolf Hitler will be available for this purpose, as will be all units destined for "Felix".  
Preparations for "Marita" will go on. The troops assigned to that operation must not be used for "Attila". This conversation was preceded by conference with Op. Sec. (Pistorius) and Sec. Foreign Armies\*\*\* on capabilities for assembly of troops, and situation in Albania.

Midnight: Conference with Pistorius, Stauffenberg, etc. on "Attila".

9 December 1940. (Monday).

1000 Heusinger-Pistorius - Draft of plan for operation "Attila".

My estimate that ten days will be needed to get the troops ready to strike is concurred in. If transportation is firmly planned and the Divisions

set up an organization which will allow instant departure of all available forces, the interval between issuance of orders and start of operations can be cut to six days. Should this interval be too long for the political Command, we must immediately start sending the troops to the jump-off areas. It is doubtful whether these movements could be successfully disguised.-

At noon report to Fuehrer:

The Fuehrer approves the proposed plan of operation. The political Command wants a shorter assembly period than six days. This will make it necessary to send the troops to the staging areas now.

Detailed review of the political situation: Spain has finally declined. The Fuehrer is now weighing the possibility of regarding existing agreements voided by Spain's withdrawal; this would give him greater freedom of action in his dealings with the French, with a view to winning their support for his policy by promising to keep their African possessions intact. Italy need not be considered overmuch in all this.

I took the opportunity to draw the Fuehrer's attention to two points: 1) The necessity to continue the attack on the British Isles with every means. 2) The threat from British reinforcements in the Eastern Mediterranean in view of existing Italian capabilities in Libya, and the possibility of a British front on the Balkans. Fuehrer concurs. He will advise the Italians not to advance beyond Sidi Barrani, and to limit themselves to defensive operations in Libya. (Luncheon with the Fuehrer.)

1700 : Heusinger receives instructions based on conference with Fuehrer. Also current matters.

Evening: Hauptamtsleiter Dr. Gross reads a paper on racial policy.

10 December 1940. (Tuesday)

OQu IV: a) Interpreters for Russia.

b) England: Report on strength. Five new Divs. Reorganization: Artillery reduced to spread over more Divs.

c) Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce.-- Milch in Rome. (Divebombers).

d) Mintelen has been given three missions by the Fuehrer: 1.) Go immediately to Albania. 2.) Bring military influence to bear on operations in Albania. 3.) Study question of transport, to see if effective help could be furnished.

e) Bulgaria's reply to Russia: They want peaceful revision. Any other method would lead to complications with Turkey. Bulgaria is not interested in the Straits. Acceptance of an Assistance Pact with Russia would necessarily be interpreted as insincerity toward Germany. In their reply, the Russians offer to guarantee the Bulgarian frontiers. Bulgarian reply still outstanding.

f) Papen has offered Turkey a German guaranty of her frontiers if Turkey joins the Tripartite Pact.

g) Yugoslavia is evasive, but would conclude a Non-aggression Pact with us. No reply on Prince Paul.

h) In Hungary, Italy's military prestige has touched zero. There is a great deal of talk about the necessity for Gibraltar.-- German forces needed in the Southeast. Hungaria-Yugoslav Pact was concluded upon instigation of the Fuehrer.  
"Zone of communications Hungary." \*

General von Mackensen, C l. Hauffe, Kuebler: Briefing on "Marita".



Buhle: Timetable for "Marita". Recall of men on furlough at specified intervals. Current questions of organization.

Radke: Party will be by-passed in notifying next of kin of deaths of relatives in Army. Other current questions.

Jacob: a) Air shelter construction.-- Manpower.  
b) "Seeloewe" improvements. Speeding of unloading.  
c) Crossing of Danube in Romania: Construction of bridges and ferries will take two weeks from arrival of troops. Bridge constructed with Danube barges will take even three weeks. 70 -100 trainloads of bridge-building equipment necessary.  
d) Gibraltar demolitions -- purpose?  
e) Report from the East on construction of roads, housing and border fortifications.

Heusinger: Orders for "Attila".-- Dispatch of reconnaissance teams for "Marita".

von Stuelpnagel:(on phone):

- 1.) Differences between Military Governor France and Railroad Chief.--
- 2.) Demarcation Line: Quite suddenly the French consider the proposed control of the national frontiers intolerable.

Wagner-Handloser:

- a) Conference with Handloser on the question "Chief Army Surgeon".
- b) Preparations for "Marita".-- Pipe-line.

11 December 1940.

Visit War Academy in Berlin..

Morning: Attend classes conducted by Doerr and Reinhard.--

Luncheon with the instructors. Afternoon:  
Attend class by Hax.  
Afterwards address to the officer participants.  
Short conference with the instructors.

1700 - 1830 Conference with Schniewind (Naval Operations Staff):

- a) Personnel difficulties make it impossible to meet our wishes for Liaison Officers.
- b) Review of the entire war situation. Our views are largely in agreement.
- c) War in the Atlantic very effective; SS Scheer in Southern Atlantic, SS Hipper in Northern Atlantic. Numerous auxiliary cruisers also in Asiatic waters and in the South Sea.
- d) Two new capital ships (Bismarck) will be commissioned in April and May. England has nothing to match them. In addition two heavy cruisers are going to be returned to active service; as a result, Britain's situation will become increasingly difficult beginning next May at the latest.
- e) Plans for the submarine campaign call for construction of 18 - 20 submarines each month next year, starting about June. It is still uncertain whether this goal can be reached.
- f) Constant improvement in mine warfare by new types. Acoustic mines.

2200 General Bogatsch: Report on activation of new short-range reconnaissance Staffeln. 20 new Staffeln will be added to the existing 36: 20 for Armd. Divs., 10 for mot. Corps, one for Cav. Div., two for Mountain Corps, 23 for Inf. Corps. bringing the total to 56.

Those earmarked for special missions are not included in the activation plan, viz.:

Four for Attila  
Two for Romania  
Eight for Macedonia  
Five for Armd. Div. in Africa.

Timetable: Organizational preparations run until 15 January; activation to 15 March; assignment to Ground Force Hqs to 15 May.

Distributed at present in three Groups: AGps. A, D (strongest with 15 Staffeln), and B.

Training with Tenth Armd. Div.-- Retraining on Focke-Wulf planes.-- Night flight training at Prieg.\*

Material: Plane strength just sufficient. By May, each Staffel will have 7 or 8 planes. Truck situation.

General Gercke reports on phone:

- a) Fuel supply of East Prussia. Reich Marshal intervenes. Everything else will have to wait, including Askania.
- b) Shipping priorities: Coal to Italy, coal to Russia, coal supply for the Eastern program.
- c) Distribution difficulties in East Prussia. Relief by seaborne shipments.

12 December 1940

von Ziehlberg: Next War Academy class will have roll of 110. -- agenda for the C of S Conference.-- Current matters.

OQu IV: Oestermann\*\*-- Conferences held by Warlimont in Paris. Release of colonial experts\*\*\*  
Fuel question. Existing orders are to be modified as not to apply to North Africa. Syria reassuring statements for the benefit of Turkey.

German Military Mission to visit Russian armaments industry. Article for the American Press: "Campaign Experiences with Cavalry and Tanks".--

Japan apparently willing to renounce her Sakhalin concession (condition for the Tripartite Pact).

Chief Op. Sec:

- a) Start of troop movements to Romania: Four Eng. Bns., five Bridge Construction Bns.,

two Construction Pns. additional to the two already provided.

- b) Reconnaissance Team Bulgaria:  
Vienna, 13 December, Bucharest. Will enter Bulgaria across Danube.  
Cross-country motor vehicles will be provided by us. Camouflaged as automobile sales outfit.
- c) Corps Arty. Commanders for XXXX and XIV Corps.
- d) Activation of Army Hq 17? Working Staff Mackensen in Vienna as of 21 December.
- e) 1941 program for border fortifications in East. Target for 1940 will not be reached.  
Inquiry about targets for 1941.-- Reply: East Prussia, light permanent fortifications, rest field fortifications.

- Gen Qu:
- a) Baentsch (with Hanstein): Organization of Romanian supply base for "Marita". Supply services during the operation.
  - b) Build-up of supply basis for Eastern Campaign: Send more stocks to dumps in the East.-- Road construction questions.
  - c) Preparations for "Attila".
  - d) Negro PW's will be concentrated in Southern France.

General Mueller: Court-Martial. questions.-- Review of the points to be discussed with the Army Cs of S.

- Heusinger:
- a) Operation "Felix" cancelled.
  - b) Order to Army Hq 17 to take over troops of Twelfth Army by 1 January.
  - c) Preparations for the C of S Conference.

von Stuelpnagel: (on phone):

- a) Pétain will visit Paris to attend the re-burial of the Duke of Reichstadt (5 December). This journey has no bearing on the decision regarding transfer of the French Government.

- b) Conference Fuehrer/Duce.
- c) Italians suddenly are very accommodating about French military wishes in North Africa. Raeder will go to Italy to look after Naval operations there.
- d) Conference Huntzinger/Warlimont. New proposals indicate French intention to start operations against De Gaulle in Africa by spring.
- e) Laval conferences, which originally were not to take place till after Christmas, will be held now.
- f) Udet's promise that the targets of the aircraft production program will be reached, was based on utilization of the entire French armaments industry, including plants in the unoccupied zone. We have not got so far yet.

- Gercke: a) How will Goering's demands for East Prussia affect the "Otto" program? (at least two weeks).\*
- Jodl states that even four weeks would not matter.
- b) Road construction: Plans of the Transportation Chief must be coordinated with plans of the Armies. Conference!
  - c) "Fritz": OKW will issue a new directive.

13 December 1940.

Conference with Cs of S of Army Groups and Armies.

Morning: Conference on Eastern operation held by Paulus.

Noon: Luncheon.

Afternoon: Military political situation. — Reports by Op. Sec., Org. Sec. Konrad, Loyke, Tng. Sec. Central Branch.

14 December 1940

Conclusion of the Conference with Cs of S of Army Groups and Armies.

Reports by Chief Air Officer, Chief of Transportation, Chief Signal Officer, Foreign Armies West, Foreign Armies East.

1300 Buschenhagen:

- a) Report on situation in Norway: Political structure; finances; Quisling. Executive Power for all practical purposes, is exercised by the Military Hqs; formally it is in the hands of Terboven. We have very big debts in Norway (several billion Kroner).
- b) Build-up against Russia:
  - 1.) In the northernmost sector  $1\frac{1}{2}$  Mt. Divs. (Part of the other Mt. Div. must remain for border protection duty). From Central Norway: two Inf. Divs. plus one SS Brigade mot., with some additions. That makes something more than four Divisions.
  - 2.) The Swedes can concentrate north of the Gulf of Bothnia: Three Divs. (Douglas).
  - 3.) It would take our Divisions at least six weeks to become operationally effective.

OQu IV : Change Laval/Flandin.

- Heusinger:
- a) Romania: Training Staff I --- Training Staff II.
  - b) "Marita".
  - c) A Corps for XXX Corps.
  - d) Maps for Romania: Map center attached to Military Mission.

1800 ‡ see ObdH at his home:

Concise report on the decisions and orders issued during the past eight days (especially "Attila", "Marita"). ObdH is tense, evidently tired out by the Eastern tour and hard-pressed for time because of the impending family celebration (his son's engagement).



As a result our conversation is somewhat on edge at times. No technical objections. Overall impression in the East: Housing fair.-- Trainings in arrears, because troops were resting until a short while ago.-- Morale good, troops eager to go. Requests from the East mainly concern allocation of labor.

15 December 1940. (Sunday, Berlin)

von Toppelskirch: Petain has assumed now also the Vice-presidency.-- Abetz goes to Vichy. Demands that Laval be taken back into the Government. Landin acceptable as Foreign Minister, Peyrouton rejected as Minister of the Interior. Laval in protective custody.-- Brinon was arrested, but later released. Abetz demands that General de Laurencie resign.

Speidel (Paris):

Anxieties about "Attila".-- Transfer of the remains of Duke of Reichstadt to Paris passed without incident. The gesture had no echo in the French public.-- Weygand will be recalled to France.

Extract from Huntziger's report on intentions against England:

- 1.) Wants additional reinforcements of veteran colonial soldiers.
- 2.) Thinks that attacks against the British are possible at the following points:
  - a) Kano (Nigeria), by air.
  - b) Bathurst, by direct assault.
  - c) Freetown (of particular importance for Britain!). Plan will be submitted. Preparations completed by the end of February. (By that time SS Provence will also be ready).
  - d) Gibraltar.

- 3.) Complains about petty and contradictory demands by the Italians.
- 4.) Britain has informed France that action against De Gaulle "almost inevitably" must lead to a conflict. France, however, would reconquer her colonies even at the cost of a war with Britain.
- 5.) He wants a German statement disclaiming any intention to take French colonial possessions. That would take the wind out of De Gaulle's sails.  
De Gaulle "Agent of Britain" to protect the British route to Egypt.

16 December 1940 (Monday, Berlin,  
later in day,  
Zossen).

Finnish General Talvela with Attache Horn:

Outlines the political situation in his country.--  
Finland threatened by Communist propaganda.

Summary of the military situation: Aaland - Petsamo-  
- Salla; no long-range guns and planes.

Sweden's attitude depends on that of Germany.  
Sweden can make available five Divs. to aid  
Finland.

Personal union Sweden - Finland: we are  
asked to help.

I want to know how much time would be needed  
to make quiet preparations for an offensive  
to the Southeast.\*

General Schickfuss: wants a different assignment  
for himself and Mittelberger.

1230 - 1430, von Ziehlberg: --- Current Gen. Staff  
personnel matters.

Heusinger: a) GHq troops for "Attila".  
b) Army Hq 17 to replace Army Hq 12;  
Kluge will temporarily take von  
Bock's place.

- c) Alerting of first echelon of "Marita" Divs.
- d) Third Armd. Div. will be transferred to the area of 50th Div. (Posen)

von Rabenau brings me Part II of Seeckt's "Aus meinem Leben" \* with personal dedication.

Conference with ObdH: General situation.-- Policy toward France.-- "Attila". -- "Marita". Authority of the Army Hqs in the East with respect to the Commanders of Mil. Districts. Eastern studies prepared by Army Cs of S.

Wagner, von Altenstadt:

- a) Questions of Military Administration in connection with "Attila".
- b) Questions of Military Administration in connection with "Marita". (Build-up in Romania.)
- c) Review of Eastern questions.

von Stuelpnagel, Armistice Commission (on phone):

Pétain's letter to the Fuehrer stating that Laval is unpopular, his methods questionable. Great excitement at the Berghof. Abetz has left for Vichy: We are ready to work with you, but Laval must be taken back into the Government, in one form or the other. If this demand is not met, we are through with the policy of collaboration.

Huntziger, on his own accord, officially assured von Stuelpnagel that no change is intended in the plans for a collaboration between France and Germany. He also wants us to realize that one of the reasons for Laval's downfall was the fact that as a result of our own vacillating attitude. Laval was unable to show any tangible results.

17 December 1940.

Buhle: a) Current matters.

- b) "Marita": 125 rubber-tired and 75 regular mountain carts for 50th, 164th, 72nd and 73rd Divs. (First echelon "Marita".)  
100 MG carts, with horses.  
100 pair skis.\*  
20 cross-country passenger cars.
- c) A T Cos. (Inf.) of Eleventh and Twelfth Drafts will get Chenillettes\*\* (700 of the existing 1,200.)
- d) Activation of short-range reconnaissance Staffeln. We help out with motor transport (450 trucks, etc.)
- e) Trucks for Italy cancelled.
- f) Administrative control of 22nd Div. Judicial authority? (No!)\*\*\*. Motorization? (No!)
- g) By next March 50 Bridge Columns B will be on hand for new Eng. Bns. (Div. troops) and Armd. Corps (Corps troops) Exchange in AGp. C (First Draft).

Keitel: Personnel Div.:

- a) Waldmann resigns, (hospital, Munich).
- b) Question of the "Chief Army Surgeon".
- c) Raschik. Function will be abolished.
- d) E-Officers will be taken over in several stages: First troops, then staffs; assignments till the end of the war (Fuehrer directive).
- e) Conferment of titular officer ranks will be stopped. (Fuehrer directive).  
No order in writing.

- Gercke:
- a) Complaints of the Armistice Commission.
  - b) Work on the Iron bridge must be discontinued.
  - c) Railway troops for Romania. (Some troops for the main supply lines with first echelon; attached to Training Div.)
  - d) Strengthening of bridges in Romania and Bulgaria.
  - e) Ships for Danube crossings (120 barges and 10 towing vessels).
  - f) During November 1940: 300 troop trains plus 15,000 carloads, daily.

1400 to 1800 Map exercise (East) in Gen Qu's office. (Worked out for zone of action of Fourth Army; theoretical considerations.)

von Etzdorf:

- a) The Laval affair is viewed by Foreign Office as a dangerous embarrassing incident.
- b) Turkey-Bulgaria: Talks on issuance of declaration of non-aggression and withdrawal of troops from both sides of frontier.
- c) Italy: Rumors about Ciano's resignation denied. "Il Duce is still strong enough to be able to afford Ciano." Rift between Army and political command: The situation in Cyrenaica is really not the fault of the political command.
- d) Friendship Pact Yugoslavia-Hungary.
- e) Ill feeling as a result of tardy presentation of credentials by the new Russian Ambassador.
- f) Orientation on talks with Talvela, orientation on plans in the East.

Heusinger: a) Captured enemy tanks are ready for action in Paris.  
b) Armored trains for "Attila"?  
c) Eastern questions: Armored trains.-- 32% of Russian armaments industry in the Ukraine; 28% (especially aircraft industry) in the Moscow-Gorki area; 16% in the Leningrad area; remainder in the Ural and the Far East.

18 December 1940.

Radke: Current matters, which have already been ruled on by ObdH.

Wagner, Gen Qu : Reports from Paris:

Laurencie supplanted by Brinon.  
Laval, Minister of the Interior, on condition that he can clear himself of the charge that he was planning a coup d'état.  
Directorate: Darlan, Huntziger, Laval, Flandin.  
Additional confirmation that Huntziger's statements on the preparations for the war against England were made with the full approval of the Cabinet.

Gehlen: Request by the Armed Forces Plenipotentiary in Romania to notify the Romanian Government without delay on forthcoming troop arrivals.

von Stuelpnagel (on phone):

- a) Confirms reports about Laval. The accusations against Laval evidently refer to attempts to squeeze out Pétain.
- b) Ribbentrop not yet satisfied. He wants every means of pressure applied until Laval is again in the saddle; (no French Minister is allowed to go to Paris ).
- c) At the moment Laval has taken over Laurencie's job in Paris (as Liaison to Abetz). Final composition of French Cabinet still uncertain.
- d) Fuehrer now has doubts whether he still needs France. He is always thinking of making peace with England at the expense of France.
- e) In the Armistice Commission everything is at a standstill. No progress in the question of the Demarcation Line.
- f) Darlan, straightforward, honest old tar, has much influence on Pétain. No politician.
- g) Reich Marshal's demands to France (stock majority of the entire aircraft industry).

Gercke: a) Communications problems in the East and road construction. Uniform regulation necessary. Report on conference in Posen.  
b) "Marita". Maximum railroad schedule necessary when our shipments start. OKW has made no preparations for that.  
(Romanians to be informed through diplomatic channels.)



19 December 1940.

Hemmerich: Military Geographical Institute.  
Organization of surveying service.--  
Subordination of the War Maps and Surveying  
Section. Business procedure.

Heusinger, Buhle, Stiff:

- a) Program for replacement of the Western Divisions and assembly in the East. Of the Furlough Divs., a few will be called up before 1 February, 1941, the majority only later.  
Railroad schedules are kept extremely low as a precaution. At the start of the movement 12 trains; later 24 trains, eventually 36 trains. More cannot be expected from the railroads today. Of course, such a slow assembly affords all sorts of opportunities to the enemy.
- b) All responsibility for road construction will be placed in the hands of the Chief of Transportation. Problem! Would facilitate concentration of effort in any given area and promote uniformity.
- c) Border Defense Position Tilsit - Memel; Fortress Memel.  
Noon: Luncheon with the Officers of the Quartermaster Service, who have come to a Conference in Gen Qu's Office.

Buhle:

- a) OGDH wants to have granting of leaves to France stopped.
- b) Five Light Road Construction Bns. from the Reich Labor Service will be formed by 1 April, 1941, each Bn. with three Companies.
- c) "Lightweight," guns, i.e. recoilless guns, for tanks and for Mountain Artillery.
- d) 35,000 men in our Furlough Divisions are armaments workers.
- e) Map depots. Trucks for Army map depots, not for home map depots. The Army map depots will become part of the supply depots and will be moved as far forward as possible.
- f) Recall of men on furlough (armaments workers): Second echelon of "Marita" necessary early in January, unless further preparations for "Marita" are expressly cancelled.

- von Thoma:
- a) Bernhard truck: three-axle truck for road transport of medium tanks.
  - b) Troubles in production of 5 cm AT guns-- will be ironed out.
  - c) 4.7. cm Skoda AT gun -- activation of a sixth Bn.
  - d) Report on Armd. Divs., physical condition and lack of material (rubber, snow cleats).

Evening: Christmas celebration at Central Branch.

20 December 1940.

- von Ziehlberg:
- a) Complaint about paymaster Hoffmann and Canteen girls.\*
  - b) Reorganization of OKH.
  - c) 22 April 1941 -- 75th birthday of von Seeckt.
  - d) Current reassignments.

- Radke:
- a) Hesse's\*\* relation to ObdH. This personal propaganda and promotion department of ObdH is having an increasingly disruptive effect on cooperation in the OKH.
  - b) Leaves to France must be stopped. Formulation of the order, however, must give due consideration to the fact that it is the German soldier who conquered France, and consequently is entitled to at least the treatment accorded to Party people.
  - c) Propaganda maps on "the victorious campaign" of the individual Divisions are contrary to our orders on war reporting.

- Heusinger:
- a) Current minor questions.
  - b) Timetable "Marita". We have five days' delay so far. First echelon will start on 5 January; will cross Danube not before 30 January, and Greek frontier on 6 March.
  - c) Housing problems in connection with assembly in the East.

- OQu IV:
- a) Yugoslavia.
  - b) Pétain's letter to the Fuehrer.
  - c) Nogués in Vichy, reported to have brought material against Weygand.

1630 , Conference in ObdH's office (with Heusinger):

- a) "Marita" (Mackensen's assembly map). (Time-tables, ships for bridge constructions),
- b) Recall of Furlough Divisions. Assembly in the East. -
- c) Allocation of staging areas and preparation of quarters for build-up in the East.
- d) 22nd Div. put under control of ObdL.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Linking with our lines requested by the French.
- b) Plenipotentiary Signal Officer Sofia will later be attached to Hist.
- c) Current questions of signal communications (also material).

21 December 1940.

Gericke: Technical developments:

- a) Light Z bridge.\* Can be extended to 52.5 m. Not enough for rivers. Difficulties with pier foundations not yet solved.
- b) Experiments on re-spiking of railroad trucks to standard gauge are making good progress.
- c) One mot. En. can re-lay 25 km of intact track a day.

Gen Qu: (with Baentsch and Wagner):\*\*

- a) Administrative orders for the execution and preparation of "Marita".
- b) (with Gericke;) Standardization of road construction program in the East. Creation of a central control agency for the utilization of railroads by Armed Forces, civilian economy, etc.
- c) Current supply questions:  
Rubber blocks and tracks give no trouble at the moment. -- Report to OKW on truck situation, replacements and stockpiling of tires. -- Other current questions.

Radke; Current matters of his section.

A telegram is received from von Rintelen stating that four Italian Divisions are encircled at Bardia; this means that the Italian Tenth Army is virtually wiped out. Only two to three Italian Divisions are left. Distress calls for German tanks!

In Albania there is greatest concern for the southern wing, in view of Greek regrouping from the right to the left wing.

22 December 1940. (Sunday, at Berlin).

Nothing of importance. Work at home. Visit by the Leyherrs.\*

23 December 1940.

Communication from Etzdorf:

At the moment Pétain does not see his way to receive Laval back into his Cabinet.

The projected Directorate would accordingly consist of three persons only: Huntziger, Darlan, Flandin.

The Foreign Minister claims to have learned from a secret source that Pétain had remarked he would hold out until he could be sure, whether Germany was genuinely willing to continue the policy of cooperation.

Conference with Fromm (0930 to 1130):

Supply situation: Horses are available in sufficient numbers; new age-class still unallocated.

Steel quota for the Army has been drastically reduced. Present production figures can be kept up till beginning or middle of March, then will drop.

T N T is mainly used for the Air Force. A portion of Arty. projectile production must be stocked as empty shells.

Non-ferrous metals: Stocks seized in occupied territories will carry us to about the end of 1941.

Rubber: Difficult. New Buna factories. Absorbs steel.

Food: Reasonably assured for 1941, but not beyond that. "We'll swindle ourselves through 1941".

Manpower situation: Fuehrer order: All personnel measures must be subordinated to the operational requirements of Air Force and Navy. No drafting of armament workers before 30 June. Dates for recall of men on furlough, 1 February and 1 April; Furlough Divisions as of 1 February. Men furloughed to industry must be left at their jobs until 31 March. OKW must be notified four weeks in advance of any plans for earlier recall of men. Org. Sec. The age group which normally would be called up in fall, will be called up already next spring.

GHq troops: Negotiations between Org. Sec. and General Army Office are still in progress.

Field Replacement Bns.: Claims he has not got the men to form any; perhaps set up Field Recruit Depots.

What Chief of Army Equipment\* seems to be aiming at is an arrangement whereby 15% would be attached to field units. Org. Sec.

Peacetime organization of OKH: Would like to have my draft plan soon. Recommendation regarding Inspector of Training also desired.\*\* -- Central Branch.

Personnel matters: Haschik, Ulex, Mittermeier, Haseloff, Boehler, Olbricht wants Kuehne (older than Reinhard).

ObdH's decision: Boehler and Reinhard for BdE.

Traffic Control Detachments: In peacetime that was the function of the National Socialist Motor Corps. Now it has been taken over by the Police. The Police must get their motor transport from us, whereas the National Socialist Motor Corps had their own. Danger that new Police units are formed. Chief of Transportation.

Italy wants raw materials and arms for 10 Divs. (Captured enemy weapons).

Replacement units from Mil. District VIII\*\*\* not yet in Alsace. Not before Christmas. Op. Sec.

von Stuelpnagel (Armistice Commission): Frenchmen describe Laval crisis as a purely internal affair. There are probably also some political reasons behind that. Laval played with the idea of increasing his personal power. Pétain's visit to Paris for the re-burial ceremony was to furnish the stage. Abetz all of a sudden asserts that Laval is representative of the French public-sentiment and that opposition comes only from certain circles. (This is incorrect!) For that reason we ought to bring strong influence to bear on the internal affairs of France. Police force for Laval.

Heusinger: a) Greiffenberg in Vienna.  
 b) OKW apparently wants List to act in an entirely official capacity in Romania.  
 c) Reconnaissance Team Bulgaria. Zeitzler will return to Vienna on 28 or 29 December.  
 d) Two out of 15 German steamers cancelled; 13 German Steamers in Italy (Genoa).

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

von Thoma:

- a) Scanty information on Russian tanks. Inferior to ours in armor and speed. Maximum thickness of armor 30 mm.  
 4.5 cm Ehrhard gun penetrates our tanks at range of 300 m; effective range 500 m; safe at over 800 m. Optical sights very bad; dim, limited range of vision. Radio control equipment bad.
- b) Total of captured enemy tanks: 4,930, including ammunition carriers. 20th Regiment will get captured enemy tanks (are now at Gin\*). The entire number will have been taken over by the end of January. French driving instructors. Driving classes in progress all the time. Another Regiment will be activated in February.
- c) Spare parts depot: German spare parts depot in Paris;  
French in Gin.  
East: Magdeburg.  
Southeast: New depot to Romania. Location undecided.
- d) 4.7 cm AT gun on Renault: 35 instead of our tank I chassis (800 units).



24 December 1940.

Gercke: Transportation situation in Romania. The maximum railroad schedule provides for 52 trains.\* German freight trains are included. The Romanians are left with one train daily on each line for civilian economy needs. That sounds very little, but the essential needs of the population are assured. The weather situation is a gravely dubious factor (abnormally heavy snowstorms, which may jeopardize maintenance of the maximum railroad schedule!), as is the possible adverse effect of restrictions on the morale of the population (which may affect Antonescu's political position at home!)

Col. Ochsner:

- 1.) Returns with good impression from inspection tour in the East. Training on heavy howitzer M\*\*completed by Christmas.
- 2.) As for January, new rocket projectors (range 6,000 m instead of 3,000).
- 3.) Organizational difficulties due to fact that Rocket Projector Troops have grown to ten times their peace-time strength.
- 4.) Gas Defense School Rembertow and Kurow\*\* (the former could serve as model).
- 5.) Gas Defense Equipment Parks at Warsaw and Cracow (the former excellent).
- 6.) Training questions. (Issue of a training manual on inspection procedures in Gas Defense Service)

General Paulus:

- a) Report on Tank Training Division. (Good performance; mediocre instructors).
- b) Ten Armd. Divs. had 10% operational losses due to tire and truck failure. On an average 10% in repair. (Average of unserviceable vehicles is 20%).
- c) Turn over ~~all~~ business to him before going on leave. #

- OQu IV:
- a) Insane-Italian demands for arms.
  - b) von Rintelen's report; criticizes Il Duce.
  - c) Just's situation report from Romania.  
Difficulties between Movement and Party\*
  - d) Uthmann's\*\*report.
  - e) Situation report from Slovakia.

- Buhle:
- a) Replacements in Field Replacement Bns. must be supplied out of the February draft of recruits. Here is where General Army Office fell down on the job!
  - b) Alleged Fuehrer order specifying materiel (including captured enemy materiel) for 10 Divs. turned over to Italy.
  - c) Demonstration on firing from personnel carriers was successful. (Hoepfner).  
Still a question whether ammunition can be carried.
  - d) We shall not be able to complete truck exchange program, it will probably be necessary to equip third Draft Divisions (from the East) and four Divisions of the Seventh Draft with French trucks.

Gehlen: Transportation difficulties in Romania.  
Maximum railroad schedule impracticable according to Antonescu.  
Conference of the Transportation departments on 27 Dec. Outcome will determine whether shipments must be delayed.  
Such a measure may have far-reaching consequences for the entire course of operation "Marita", as well as grave repercussions on "Barbarossa".

25 December 1940 to 15 January 1941 away on leave.

16 January 1941.

OQu I: Fuehrer conference 8 and 9 January at the Berghof:

Appraisal of the situation based on industrial capacities. The British are trying unconvincingly to show a good industrial picture. Germany is the biggest industrial nation of the world.

European situation: Norway is now safe. English demonstration, however, not unlikely.

West: France: Only danger from the air. Occupied Zone peace-minded. -- Some circles in the Unoccupied Zone are dreaming of a possible change. Definitely hostile elements in the Colonies. There is a difference in the attitude toward us and toward Italy! Weygand is a German-hater. Laval's overthrow engineered by him! France as a whole observes a wait and see attitude. "We are no longer bound by any obligations toward France."

Spain must be written off as a potential ally.

Russia is making demands, which did not occur to them before: Finland -- Balkans -- Mariampol.

Balkans: Romania is on our side (Antonescu in Obersalzberg, 15 Jan., 1941.)

Hungary makes no difficulties.

Yugoslavia leaves everything open.

Bulgaria very cautious. King intelligent, but very cautious! Does not want to risk the dynasty.

Specific points: What is Britain's war aim? Britain wants to dominate the Continent. To achieve this she would have to defeat us on the Continent. This means that I must be so strong on the Continent that this aim will never be attained.

British hopes: U.S. -- Russia.  
We cannot knock out England with a landing operation (Air Force, Navy). Accordingly our position on the Continent must be so consolidated by 1941 that we may with confidence face continued war with England (and U.S.).  
(Eden is advocate of collaboration with Russia.)

Russia: Stalin: Intelligent and shrewd; his demands will become bigger and bigger. German victory incompatible with Russian ideology.  
Decision: Russia must be smashed as soon as possible. The British might easily have 40 Divisions within two years. This might induce Russia to side with Britain and U.S.

Japan: ready for serious cooperation. By tackling the Russian problem, we give Japan a free hand against Britain in the East.

Decision: Force a radical settlement of the Continental issue as soon as possible.

Russian Armaments: Obsolete materiel; what is new, is copied from foreign nations. Command mechanical! Lack intellectual caliber.

Operations:

The war in Africa need not bother us very much. Even as it is, the Military situation is still better than a year ago, but we must not risk the internal collapse of Italy. Italy must be saved from that. It will be necessary to send some help. Reverses are due to lack of modern materiel in Africa (AT guns).

Decision: A force must be sent embracing the lacking arms. We must shake them out of their tank scare! Protection! (The force must combine mobility with a certain amount of offensive strength.)

Libya: Difficulties about armored Ren. cars. As soon as possible. (Will not be ready before 10 February.)

Albania: A Corps for the left wing. Question still pending. First Mt. Div. ready as of 20 January. Fourth Mt. Div. ready as of 10 Feb.

"Marita": One Arm. Div. on the ground on 26 Jan. Then order will be given to cross over to Bulgaria.

1200 to 1430 Conference with ObdH:

- 1.) Review of the general situation.
- 2.) ObdH's conference with Falkenhorst. He has been directed to submit report on:
  - a) Coastal Btrys. on Norwegian coast.
  - b) Strategic points in the coastal defense system and their Artillery.
  - c) What can he man with his own troops if he gets more materiel?
  - d) Petsamo - Murmansk. (Mosquito nuisance in May).  
He must draw up an operational plan for a joint Finnish-German thrust Lake Ladoga/Lake Onega. (Neutralization of Hangoe.)
  - e) Supply problems in this operation. Establish dumps in the Rovanjemi area. (Proposes three months. Order: one month.)
  - f) Can the Mt. Div. be relieved and another Div. take its place in Norway?
  - g) Question of Command in a Finnish-German war against Russia. Ruling by High Command in Norway.

- OQu I: a) Regulations concerning financial operations in Romania. The German soldier must not be able to spend any money. For economic reasons it is impossible to give soldiers more than a decade's pay; \* balance will be credited. Parallel order has not yet been issued for Demonstration Div. Purchases made by troops must be paid in cash.
- b) Hq at Predeal. \*\*
- c) Long-range reconnaissance: ObdH allocates four long-range reconnaissance Staffeln to the Army Groups and OKH, and nine to Armies and Armd. Groups; total 13.
- d) Organic Ground Forces AAA Bns: Total 40. Specialists yet to be trained. Impractical before fall, Crews from GHq. Artillery.
- e) Mt. Div. in Norway. Org. Sec. Op. Sec.
- f) Cut out six Divs. in West in favor of "Barbarossa". Op.

Op. Sec.: "Seeloewe": Improvement projects and planning in OKH will be suspended.

"Attila": Fifth Inf. Div., will replace First Mt. Div. -- Assignment of Naval experts to the Ground Forces also if gliders are used against Toulon-Marseille!

If number of Divs. is increased, 15 Western Divs. must be left mobile.

"Marita": Extraordinary contingencies discussed with ObdH (Russian invasion, \*\*\*, etc.)

Mediterranean: Tripoli harbor has facilities for unloading four ships in four days (six German, six Italian vessels). Durazzo, at most three ships at a time (including Italian vessels). Shipping Second Mt. Div. by sea will take at least 40 days. Unloaded middle of March!!  
Valona wholly uncertain.

Barbarossa: Work on assembly orders in progress.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

17 January 1941.

von Bernuth: a) Training Manuals.

- b) Restriction of fuel consumption to 2.5 quotas per month. (Adjustments in individual cases!)
- c) von Priesen's theories. Test firing under Ott.\*
- d) Current minor matters of his Section.

Toussaint: Report on Yugoslavia.

Rintelen: Report on Albania and Libya.

- OQu IV:
- a) Intensification of reconnaissance effort in Russia and the Near East.
  - b) Heinrichs,\*\* late January or early February.
  - c) Current matters.

Org. Sec.: Organization of the peacetime Army. --  
 Organization of Fifth light Division (Libya). --  
 Motor transport for them. Replacement for Schell?  
 Norway: Four Divisions! Condition -- replacement.  
 Disbanding of the special Engineer organization for "Seeloewe".  
 Various other current matters.

- Op. Sec.:
- a) Coast protection for Constanza.
  - b) List authorized to open negotiations with Bulgaria.

Evening: Lecture on the effects of military events on German war economy, given by Ministerial Director Sarnow as part of the Gen Staff Training Program. (Gen Qu Officers' Club)

18 January 1941.

von Altenstadt:

- a) Reorganization of Military Administration France. Elimination of intermediate level.
- b) Transfer of Jews and Poles in Poland (at least 569,000 as of 1 February 1941\*\*\*).
- c) Guard Bns. in Belgium enough for needs. (Have 10, 3 of them for "Marita".)

- Wagner:
- a) Training Course for Army Supply Officers.
  - b) Gen Qu manpower requirements for "Marita".
  - c) Additional 20,000 required in order to reach 15,000 strength estimated for Eastern operation. 10,000 have been promised by General Army Office.



- d) Roads are a matter concerning not only the Army Supply Chiefs.
- e) Fuel allocation (2.7 quotas).

von Etzdorf: Orientation on the political situation.  
Interesting points:

- 1.) Conversations on Spain and Gibraltar are coming up again. This means that operation "Felix" may one of these days become again acute.
- 2.) The Foreign Office is talking about the possibility that Russia may react to our march into Bulgaria by attacking Finland.
- 3.) Visit of the Japanese Foreign Minister: Apparently the question of Indochina and the Dutch East Indies is going to come up for discussion. If we want Japan to take an active part on our side we must throw the Dutch East Indies to them. For my person I consider such a decision justified, for we have no means for holding that territory and only would complicate our policy in Holland if we attempted to keep these possessions a part of the Dutch State.--
- 4.) France: Cooperation at the moment improving and more promising for the future.

Radke: a) Tondok case (in Government-General). (Frictions with Gienanth, Capt. Krull.)  
b) Army Chaplains.-- Liaison Officers.  
c) Rosenberg in charge of ideological indoctrination!

General Brand: a) Coast protection Norway.  
b) Campaign lessons in Artillery.  
c) New Inventions in the field of artillery surveying.

von Ziehlberg: Presentation of books on the birthday of Frederick the Great.\*  
Current personnel matters.

19 January 1941.

Work on assembly order for "Barbarossa".

Doering assassinated in Bucharest.\*\*

20 January 1941.

Bogatsch: Short-range Rcn Staffeln obtained by dividing existing organizations:

|                        |           |
|------------------------|-----------|
| "Marita"               | 8         |
| Kuebler                | 1         |
| Funck                  | 1         |
| Earmarked for "Attila" | 3         |
| Romanian Mission       | 2         |
|                        | <u>15</u> |

Long-range Rcn Staffeln:

|  |   |
|--|---|
| *"Attila"  | 1   |
| *Long-range Arty   | 2   |
| *Not yet transferred<br>by Air Force<br>(Come by end of month) | 5   |
| Still in VIII Air Corps  | <u>2</u>  |
|  | 10 plus 4 new Staffeln to be formed (in 4I) from organizations marked*. |

Night flying: Nine separate Ketten\* (Do 17).  
Training at Brieg.

Directed radio network (telephone). Arty?

Konrad reports and asks for orientation on "Attila."

Heusinger: a) Discussion of assembly order for "Barbarossa."  
b) Crossing on frozen Danube.  
Minister Benzer\*\* for Hq Twelfth Army.  
c) Navy: special squadrons for "Attila" (Marseille).

Paulus: (Preliminary orientation): Funck\*\*\* as soon as possible. 10 February #. Supplies in advance.

Albania: No transport. For the present it is intended to send only a smaller unit (Eglseer# #,) without med.Arty. Is to be readied; final decision early in March. Lanz and Kuebler will remain on their present assignments ("Felix").-- No decision yet!

"Marita": Diplomatic steps by Russia.-- Check back before starting bridge construction## #. Defense preparations for Constanza.

Shipping Kuebler to Albania would take 30 days.--  
Funck to Lybia, 45 days.

Evening: Farewell party for von Tippielskirch.\*

21 January 1941.

Fellgiebel:

- a) Report by Chief Army Signal Off. on signal communications for the Air Force. Air Force needs for its program additional 8,470 tons of raw materials. (This could perhaps be managed). Also needs 4,950 motor vehicles of all kind. (When we are 6,000 short in the Signal Corps)! Manpower requirements: Three to four Signal Regiments.
- b) Signal network along Coast in the West must be simplified!
- c) Italian cryptographic system.
- d) Signal Corps is 6000 motor vehicles short of authorized strength.
- e) Various current matters (Romania, peacetime organization, etc.)

Gercke:

- a) Traffic volume of the State Railroads (at present they have still over 125,000 French cars). Three-hundred military trains a day.
- b) Effects of extension of railroad operations to the East ("Barbarossa").
- c) "Otto" construction program on the whole satisfactory. Construction material is procured in the country.
- d) Railroad assembly plan for "Barbarossa" can be met. Curtailments elsewhere in the last three weeks to ensure maximum railroad timetable for military needs is under study.
- e) First echelon "Marita" is running as scheduled. Increase in civilian freight volume from 6 to 9 possible only after first echelon has run off.

Special order will be for the forthcoming.

- f) Italy (Libya): 12 trains are going to Naples via Brenner, daily (Could be increased to 18 daily).  
Navy in Naples cannot handle more than six trains a day (!) which makes it 45 days; 110 trains are required.\*
- g) The Bulgarians are asking for military bridge equipment or construction materials to extend their railroad lines (in connection with "Marita").
- h) Unsatisfactory progress in development of sectional bridge-building equipment for railroads.
- i) Sad condition of the Spanish railroads (70% of cars are half-rotten).
- k) Armored trains against Russia.

Evening: Report of internal disturbances in Bucharest and throughout Romania.  
Military Mission Romania has been instructed to hold aloof from all internal disputes, but support Antonescu with force of arms if necessary (on request!)

22 January 1941.

Buhle:

- a) Flatbed trailers: Prime mover and trailer 22.5 m. weight 32 tons (without prime mover) or 50 tons (with prime mover).  
(Bridges 20 tons possible\*\*.)
- b) Truck exchange program. Furlough Divs. will get captured materiel. "Marita" Divs. and 13 more Divs. can be replenished with standard trucks from the Furlough Divs. (18).
- c) Field Replacement Bns.
- d) 3.7 cm 4.7 cm Czech and French, 5cm AT guns in Inf. AT and Div. AT Cos.
- e) Furloughs for farmwork in the Reich from February to middle of April (15 February to 20 April).

Conference with Cbdt ( 1200 - 1430):

- a) Review of situation in the theaters of operations.
- b) Brief report on planning data for the assembly orders for "Barbarossa".
- c) Preparations for the conference with the CGs of the Army Groups on 30 January.
- d) Future position of the "Army Chief Surgeon".
- e) Gercke\*.

OQu IV: a) Oil deposits and their importance for the European economy. Baku.  
 b) Rokitno\*\* marshes.  
 c) 93 Russian interpreters from Field Army.-- 150 from Repl. Army.  
 Inspectorate 7 alone needs 400 interpreters\*\*  
 d) Submits report on Japan.

Gen Qu: a) Strength requirements in the East. Nine Divs. for Rear Area by using three Divs. of the Third Draft.  
 b) Supply districts, supply sectors as jump-off basis for "Barbarossa" #  
 c) Rehabilitation of Columns.  
 d) Command and employment of Light Columns.

23 January 1941.

- Op. Sec. 1.) Map exercise of AGps. A, B, and C.
- 2.) Preparatory program for "Barbarossa". Tactics.
- 3.) Romania: Ferry at Giurgiu will be ready end of Feb.; six trains daily. Bridge at Cernavoda: Not usable for crossing of troops. Could perhaps be used in "Barbarossa".  
 New directive on stopping all preparations on the Danube (OKW). List will get one Co. of Regiment Brandenburg ## (300 men).  
 ###
- 4.) Transport preparation for "Sonnenblume"
- 5.) Present status and possibilities of revival of "Felix".
- 6.) Exchange of Divs. in West for Furlough Divs. and shifting of Western Divs. to the East has started.
- 7.) Preparations for Conference of ObdH with the CGs of Army Gps.

24 January 1941.

1000 : On the occasion of the birthday of Frederick the Great, I present copies of the book "The picture of Frederick the Great" to Officers of my Staff. Present: von Lossberg, von Mellenthin, Radke, Soltmann, Gehlen, von Kahlden, von Dethleffsen, Dettner, Meichsner, Hansen, von Natzmer, Lassmann.

1030 : Conference with ObdH: "Marita". List's report on Gen. Staff conference has arrived. Bulgaria ~~affirm~~ willing, but timid.

All of a sudden List will need only two days to construct bridges. AAA defense for bridges will be ready by 7 February. Bulgarians must reinforce their border guard through concealed mobilization.

We can then start off early in February, when we have the Armad. Divs. in the Dobrudsha and some AAA in Sofia etc. (which must yet be put across the Danube). At the same time we can start building the bridges, so that the forces which depend on them can follow up beginning 7 February.

Recommendation to this effect to the Fuehrer, emphasizing that early action in this theater would relieve pressure in North Africa.

1000 Bulgarians want to join the Tripartite Pact only after we have marched in.



Capt. Loyke: (Navy) Atlantic forces: SS Hipper in Brest; Scharnhorst and Gneisenau put to sea day before yesterday.

Submarines: As of April, the number of craft in the operational area will be doubled (12); twice that number in three to four months. End of Sept., 100 submarines. Mediterranean.-- Baltic ("Barbarossa").

Op. Sec: Discussion of List's report.-- Report to OKW.-- Reply to List.--

Gehlen: Boundaries in "Barbarossa".-- Follow-up of reserves.

Paulus: We discuss details, including Liaison Officers and transport control organization for the East.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel questions.-- Unpleasant occurrences at GHq.

25 January 1941.

1000 ; The new Officers report on assignment to GHq after graduation from the Gen. Staff Tng. Course.

von Etzdorf: Conference Fuehrer/Il Duce. Il Duce just sat by "with a bland smile".  
Spain: Fuehrer wanted to get Il Duce to make use of his "Latin" connections.  
Russia: "Bulgaria and the Straits belong to Russia's security zone."

Op. Sec: a) Fuehrer's instructions for Constanza.  
b) First measures in the accelerated program for Libya.

Radke: Current matters of the Political Liaison Section.

26 January 1941.

Work in Berlin on allocation of GHq troops for "Barbarossa". Instructions for traffic control, thorough traffic, etc.  
Funk sends a report, stating that the forces allocated for Libya are insufficient.

27 January 1941.

1000 : (Tirpitzufer): Reception for the Generals of the Japanese Study Mission.

1200 Phone talk with ObdH on report by Funck/Rintelen. We cannot send to Libya anything more than originally planned, both because time is short and because we cannot cut any further into resources for "Barbarossa". For the time being the initiated measures must suffice.

1230 Bogatsch: Assignments of Air Rcn in "Barbarossa":

Long-range Rcn Staffeln                      Night Ketten\*

|                    |       |   |   |
|--------------------|-------|---|---|
| South: Armd. Gp. 1 | : 1 ) |   |   |
| Army Hq. 12        | : 1 ) | 4 | 4 |
| AGp. Hq.           | : 2 ) |   |   |

|                     |     |   |   |
|---------------------|-----|---|---|
| Center: Armd. Gp. 2 | 1 ) |   |   |
| Armd. Gp. 3         | 1 ) |   |   |
| AGp. Hq.            | 2 ) | 4 | 3 |

|                    |     |   |   |
|--------------------|-----|---|---|
| North: Armd. Gp. 4 | 1 ) |   |   |
| Army Hq. 18        | 1 ) | 3 | 2 |
| AGp. Hq.           | 1 ) |   |   |

ObdH

2

13. If another Long-range Rcn Staffel becomes available, it must go to South.

Close-range Rcn Staffeln:

Norway: 1

Armd. Divs.: 20

Mot. Corps: 10

In GHq Reserve for Mt. Corps: 1

For frontline Corps Hqs

in AGp. South 9

Center 8

North 6

55

plus

1 Staf-

fel in Libya

Total: 56

Gen Qu: a) Conference with Hanstein in Vienna (25 Jan.)  
 b) Preparation for Conference on 28 January.  
 c) Organization in the West and freeing of officers for Supply Services in the East (Toppe, Maehndrich, Weinknecht, Rauser, etc.)

OQuI :

- a) Review of the situation in Syria and estimate of time-required for possible developments on the friendly and the hostile side. Speed up our troop shipments?
- b) Conference of OQu I with Jodl on coordination of timetable for "Marita" and Libya, and for "Felix" and "Barbarossa". (Conference held in the morning).

Koestring:\*

- a) 600,000 -- 800,000 boys from workers' families in trade, railroad and industrial schools. (Beginning at age of 14). Cadet Corps similar. Four years' practical work. Strengthening of authority (in Army and Industry).
- b) Operational questions.-- Russian supply potential.
- c) Finland -- Petsamo.
- d) Iran.

Roessing:\*\*

- a) Food and economic difficulties in Finland; famine; rising prices.
- b) Petsamo.
- c) Uncertainty in Finnish political circles about Germany's attitude.

Bruckmann\*\*\*

- a) Question of Air defense when we march in. Dispatch an air defense formation in advance as Training Troops.
- b) Question of additional supplies from Bulgarian stocks.
- c) Mobilization and build-up of Border Guard would now take three weeks, instead of the 17 days, previously stated.
- d) Preparations for tele-communications, road construction, railroads, supply services.
- e) As an anti-sabotage measure a special German unit has already arrived. "H"

Gen. Brand:

- a) Eight Btrys. (materiel) and two personnel units for Norway.

- b) Distribution to troops of literature on campaign lessons.
- c) An "Advanced Artillery School" will be organized with courses for instructors, Regtl. Cos and Special Mission Officers.

Baentsch: a) Material for Conference on 28 January. (Trucks, Transport Clms., tires, fuel).  
 b) Supply of ammunition for Romania. At start of operations, middle of February, Inf. will have only one issue, Armor, two issues.

28 January 1941.

1030 Conference with Fromm, Thomas, Hannecken, Leeb (Ord.) von Seydel (Air Force) etc. on preparations for "Barbarossa":

Transport Clms: Our requests for additional 21,000 tons will probably be met from French Army materiel (which goes into the civilian economy, where it will free German materiel for us) and from Switzerland. Details by Gotsche before middle of February.

Trucks as previously. Decision probably before middle of February.

Spare parts: Situation improved. In general, spare parts will be on hand in time, and supply of tank spare parts will be assured, provided they are upgraded from S to SS in the priority scale. Even so, Fromm thinks that he can get everything ready in time.

Tires: Very serious; -- all leads for obtaining more from the civilian economy are being followed up. Question of rubber capping! By the end of February our reserves will be exhausted. After that our only hope will be the 12,000 tons expected from Indochina and the blockade runners from South America. Another 25,000 tons have been bought from the French; right now the Japanese won't let them out of the country. No positive figures can be stated beyond April. Beginning with May we will be wholly dependent on the uncertain imports. All has been staked on overseas shipments.

Substitute steel tires only practicable on trucks under three tons. For passenger-cars we can use the tires of laid-up civilian cars. (Would give us a supply for three months.)

Fuel situation: Serious. Gasoline assured for the first three months of the operation; on the whole no cause for anxiety. Beginning with April, our requirements will increase.

Diesel oil assured for one month only. Cut in quotas for the building trade and the rest of the civilian sector and for the occupied countries will yield a small reserve of 200,000 tons for the next six months.

We can assume that our requirements for the build-up and two months of operations will be covered. Ample storage facilities will be made available.

1300 Conference with ObdH:

- a) "Marita": List's latest reports give a new picture. In view of the risk involved, the tendency to postpone the start of the operation is increasing noticeably. Sending of AAA by way of Yugoslavia is urged. Proposal to OKW: we should start operations on 15 February. We must accept the risk. Turkey can be given reassurances.
- b) "Barbarossa": Purpose is not clear. We do not hit the British that way. Our economic potential will now be substantially improved. Risk in the West must not be underestimated. It is possible that Italy might collapse after the loss of her Colonies, and we get a Southern front in Spain, Italy and Greece. If we are then tied up in Russia, a bad situation will be made worse.
- c) Abetz' report: (Saw ObdH yesterday) Fuehrer has made up his mind that he does not want Laval in the French Government. He is to stay in Paris for possible use as a rival for Pétain. The policy of cooperation is at the moment held in abeyance. Fuehrer wants to notify Pétain to this effect and fall back on the Armistice terms. Also wants to keep Laval, in reserve for a future French Government, in case Weygand goes over to the British and De Gaulle.

Darlan is the "Dauphin" now. He is certainly not pro-British, and moreover is flattered by his present role.

He must be supported. For this reason we won't raise too many objections about leaves to the occupied Zone for French sailors returning from England.. (It is interesting to note that out of 18,000 French sailors in England, only 600 stayed.

1700 Heusinger - Stieff:

- a) Allocation of GHq troops in operation "Barbarossa".
- b) Allocation and activation of AAA units for the Ground Forces.
- c) Over-all survey of the European situation in relation to German strategy. Risks of operation "Barbarossa".

Ott (Chief Inf. Off.) :

- a) Training Manuals and amendments.
- b) Results of the Briesen exercise.\*
- c) Organizational questions.

von Bernuth: a) Report from Holland. Political movements, Economic situation. Troops and their training.  
b) Report on Briesen exercise.

29 January 1941.

OOu I: Preparations for the CG Conference on 30 January. Instructions and requests for Konrad.

Op. Sec. (Heusinger, Gehlen, von Natzmer): Draft plan for "Barbarossa" transport. (Very good work.)

Conference with ObdH:

- a) "Barbarossa": Assembly order, allocation of GHq troops, transport plan. Are accepted by ObdH without any changes.
- b) West: We must not have less than 37 Divs!
- c) General military policy: Possible political developments and risks of the Eastern operation:
  - 1.) Our entire Inf. strength will be engaged at a time when Britain will have increasing forces available for assignment anywhere.



- 2.) Economic risk.
- 3.) Possible political developments in France, Spain, Italy and Greece; role of Turkey.
- d) Conference with AGp CGs on 30 January.
- e) Position of the Liaison Officer at Reich Marshal Hq.

Buhle: a) AAA Btrys transferred from Air Force to the Ground Forces (30).

- b) Replacement situation.
- c) Armd. Bn. for Norway from forces for "Alpenveilchen"\* (3 Cos.) Early in March.
- d) Discussion on organizational questions presented in the progress report of the Chief Artillery Officer.
- e) Truck exchange program.
- f) Flatbed trailers.
- g) Measures for mobilization of trucks in France.
- h) Armament of Inf. in the Div. mot. (one or two MG per squad).
- i) Construction Bns. After allocations to railroads, bridge construction and supply services, Chief Eng. Officer will have 100 Bns. left.
- k) Organization of road-building service.
- l) Fourth Mt. Div. for "Alpenveilchen". Trains must be readied.

Heusinger: a) Issue of orders for "Sonnenblume".

- b) Fuehrer does not want to give SS Adolf Hitler for "Marita"; wants to leave mot. units in France as a means of pressure. If List needs additional forces for the march into Bulgaria, we must help ourselves by substituting Sixteenth Armd. Div. for SS Adolf Hitler. We must also turn to use the motor transport no longer needed for SS Adolf Hitler, for supply and for Air Force.

30 January 1941.

- 0930 Presentation of decorations at Zeppelin.
- 1200 (Berlin) Konrad: Report on outcome of his Conference with Reich Marshal. It will be necessary to assign a General; Konrad now understands that himself. He wants redesignation to "Chief Ground Forces Officer at Air Force Hq." Then his old request for early briefing.
- 1300 Luncheon with General Heinrichs, Chief of Finnish Gen. Staff.
- 1440 Presentation of war decorations in Berlin. (OQu V Staff).
- 1500 Welcome address for the incoming new Gen. Staff Officers.
- 1630 Conference with General Heinrichs: Army, in war strength, on the border on ninth day. Mobilization will be quiet, but cannot go unnoticed. Thrust on both sides of Lake Ladoga; five Divs. south, three Divs. north of Lake Ladoga.
- 1930 Evening with the new Gen. Staff Officers in the Officers' Mess of the War Academy.

Overnight in Berlin.

- 0930 Presentation of decorations at Zeppelin.
- 1200 (Berlin) Konrad: Report on outcome of his Conference with Reich Marshal. It will be necessary to assign a General; Konrad now understands that himself. He wants redesignation to "Chief Ground Forces Officer at Air Force Hq." Then his old request for early briefing.
- 1000 Conference on the situation in Libya, at ObdH's home.
- 1030 - 1300 Conference with the AGr. CGs, same place.
- 1630 First showing of the film "Victory in the West".
- 2130 Return to Zeppelin.

Pistorius on Funck's report from Tripolitania.

Gehlen: Talk on new OKW directive concerning "Marita" (a wild jumble!)

1000 - 1300 Conference with the AGr. CGs, same place.

1930 Evening with the new Gen. Staff Officers in the Officers' Mess of the War Academy.

Overnight in Berlin.

1 February 1941.

Buschenhagen:

- a) Relief of the Mt. Corps. If completely by sea, will take two months. (Cannot be done!)  
Combined sea and land transport: three months.  
Transport not available.  
With transportation available now movement will take five months. But we have to get the Mt. troops.
- b) SS Brigade (which ObdH did not want), Buschenhagen does not want to do without.  
Advance force to protect assembly at Kemi-jaervi will take seven days, if they start from Trondhjem.
- c) Supplies; ammunition, and rations for one month.
- d) Army Hq holds that four Divisions are insufficient for defense of coast (Spitzbergen! Russians and British).  
Units, that can be freed: Dietl, with  $1\frac{1}{2}$  Divs; two Divs. from Southern Norway; SS Brigade.
- e) Murmansk: 500 Russian fishing craft assembled (30 men each, = 15,000).
- f) Russian preventive attack?  
Second Mt. Div. "Renntier". Must be automatically released! (Fuehrer order)
- g) Time required by the forces in Southern Norway. Four weeks to get ready for operations (not counting time needed to cross Sweden).  
(XXXVI Corps Hq reduced).

1230 - 1430 Fuehrer conference. (ObdH, Funck):

Tripolitania: Funck's inspection report. Rather slight opinion of the Italian determination and capabilities to resist. Can be remedied by sending a unit with real striking power, capable of smashing the British mot. elements (which undoubtedly are weakened by their long advance).

Whether or not we would be able to get such a unit to Tripolitania depends on whether it is possible to slow the British advance in North Africa. Fuehrer directs that this question be clarified by obtaining pertinent information:

- a) By inquiries in Italy.

- b) By studying the capabilities of our Air Force against British Armor and sea communications from its base in Tripolitania. Troop shipments of Funck's Division will be stopped, supply shipments can for the time being proceed to Naples.

Heusinger: Outcome of Fuehrer Conference (Troop shipments will be stopped; Armd. Divs. must be checked for possible use in Tripolitania). Result of the Conference for "Marita", with Jodl.  
Preparation of Fuehrer report on "Barbarossa".

Radke: Case Claer/Stefani.  
Impending conference of ObdH with the Deputy of the Fuehrer.

2 February 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).

Afternoon back at Cossen, work on report to Fuehrer.

3 February 1941.

1215 - 1800 Presentation of report on "Barbarossa"  
to Fuehrer.

- a) Mission -- Balance of strength-- Build-up. Political demands on our neighbors. Transfer of forces from West to East and its consequences in the political, economic and military fields. Final line-up of forces at the start of Eastern operation.
- b) Review of the situation in Libya and in the Mediterranean (together with Jeschonneck): Air Force effort to slow the British advance in Libya.-- Malta.-- Commitment of Fifth light Div., reinforced by Armor, to enable it to carry out its offensive mission.
- c) Air Force demands concerning signal communications are discussed. Their demand for eight-wire overhead line\* is physically impossible to meet.

1800 - 1900 Conference with ObdH on the outcome of the preceding conference:

- a) Breith (with Hauser) - Fifth Lt. Div.  
Rommel (with new Chief of Staff) -- "Commander of the German Ground Forces in Libya".\*
- b) Give Fifth Lt. Div. another Armd. Regt. and one Artillery Bn., but one AT Bn. less.  
Troop shipments to Naples can be resumed.

Conference with Gehlen: Missions for Romania.

Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters.

Gen Qu: Assembly in the East. -- Deplorable antagonism within Military Administration. -- Training of Supply specialists for Gen. Staff.

Evening: Leave for Saint Germain. (0100)

4 February 1941.

En route to St. Germain.

- Buhle:
- a) Future organization of reconnaissance in Inf. Divs. -- Cycle Bn., Cav. formations.
  - b) Questions of armament and organization of Infantry. Comments on the proposal of BdE Arms Commission.
  - c) Utilization of motor vehicles in Holland.
  - d) Directive for Chief of Army Library.
  - e) Demands submitted by Falkenhorst for the equipment of Inf. Divs. and Div. Supply Services.
  - f) Demands submitted by von Salmuth for bridging equipment for Armd. Divs. cannot be fulfilled.

- Heusinger:
- a) Report of AGp. B on allocation of accommodations.
  - b) Operational exercise AGp. A.
  - c) Movement of GHq reserves.

Evening and night in train to St. Germain.

5 February 1941. (at Hq AGp.A,  
St. Germain).

Discussion of operation in the Ukraine viewed as an operational study, with Gen. von Sodenstern in charge. Very well thought out; good discussion. It shows the difficulty of accomplishing an enveloping operation west of the Dniepr, with the northern wing alone, particularly in view of the possibility that this wing might be threatened or at least slowed in its advance by enemy attacking from the Pripet area. The plan of the initial attack, which provided also for an eastward advance of a sizeable group in the Northern Carpathians, south of Lwow, eventually led to a bunching in the center (direction Tarnopol), which then had to be broken up again. A contributory factor was the fact that the forces coming from the Bukowina advanced hard to the north instead of eastnortheast.

Afternoon: Conference with Military Administration Paris on the local situation. Afterwards conference with the Chiefs of Staff taking part in the operations of AGp. South, on operational plans and the truck situation. (Buhle).

6 February 1941.

Return from St. Germain.

Interrupt journey at Saarbruecken (report by Rohr). Inspect the sector of the Division which carried out the main thrust when First Army broke through the Maginot Line in direction of Dieuze.

7 February 1941.

Conference with Rommel in ObdH's office: Orientation on ObdH's view of the situation. Main task is to see to it that Graziani will not retreat on Tripoli without a fight. Form a staff.--



Before taking the plane, he should give us a picture of the ideas he had formed on the subject. Report again from Rome before taking off for Africa.-- Finally he is to report on arriving in Africa.

Conference with ObdH: Filling up of Third Armd. Div.

Norway -- Coastal Artillery.

Finland: Assignment of SS to Falkenhorst.

Bogatsch: Proposal on AA defense. Make an estimate of requirements. Instructions on traffic control. COs of roving army police patrols must not be burdened with this job.

General Paulus: "Sonnenblume": Order of battle of Fifth Light Div.--Formation of Staff for Rommel.-- Signal Bn.-- ready to strike in Africa by end of March.

von Leeb's report to ObdH. Armor should be assembled for attack in the German strip east of Memel.

Plenipotentiary-General for transport movements in the East.

Gen. Leeb: Departments for Military Technology at Universities. (Memorandum). Officers, on temporary duty at Universities.

Pennants for automobiles.\*

Spare parts situation. The Divs. are reported to be short in supply.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Gercke: a) Transport difficulties in Hungary and Romania.-- Again 30 locomotives to Hungary. Second echelon now will not start before 11 March.

b) Difficulties in assembly for "Barbarossa": Air Force demands 1,000 trains in the last transport echelon. Train schedule: 12 trains daily 15/16 March. 24 trains daily until 10 April. Starting 10 April we need the maximum railroad schedule. Will be set in operation when we cross the Greek frontier. Withholding of leaves. 48 trains daily as of 10 April. Probably we shall not be able to complete assembly on original plan.

- c) Preparations of measures for the event of a French railroad strike. First take out German personnel and have them stand by; a 10 day alert period will be needed.

8 February 1941.

Buerker: Traffic control.-- Instead of using the Officers of roving military police patrols in the Army Rear areas, the already existing traffic control organization will have to be somewhat expanded.

- Buhle:
- a) Traffic Control Staff for the Army in the East.
  - b) 8.8 cm AAA on SPM for "Barbarossa"--Reintroduction of First Co., Light AT Regt.
  - c) Equipment with hand carts: Four Lt. Divs. and 24 combat Divs. by 1 May. Afternoon about 5 - 6 more Divs. by 15 May. Fourth Mt. Brigade/ No date given - Ed. / This will leave for Norway 250 instead of the requested 450. (Right!)
  - d) Polish peasant carts: procure 15,000, with horses and drivers from Poland. This gives about three carts per unit. Report by beginning of April, then distribution.

Bogatsch:

- a) Estimated AAA requirements for "Barbarossa": 52 mixed, 28 light AAA Bns. ObdL now has a total of 58 mixed and 24 light AAA Bns. In "Marita" alone 7 mixed and 6 light AAA Bns. To this must be added newly activated Reserve Bns. (slight mobility) as of 1 March.
- b) Long-range Rcn Staffeln will be activated in time.
- c) Replacement of observation planes difficult. Strength of Staffeln at the start of operations 7 - 8 planes (instead of 9 plus 3, = 12).
- d) Air Force Tactical Circular No. 33: Rapid fire method.

- Brand: a) Allocation of Polish or German hv. How. for Norwegian coast defense. (Polish hv. How. fires one round every two minutes.)
- b) Very good results in test firing on dug-in Russian tanks.
- c) Corps Artillery Commanders must leave now for the Corps Hqs with which they will work. 21 are with their Corps now; 8 are with Army Groups, 13 will join their organizations later. 15 are OKH Reserve. Orders re reassignment of Corps Artillery Commanders will be issued.
- d) Manual for Artillery of Armd. Commands (Provisional directives).
- e) Conduct of fire and method of applying fire in areas without good maps.

OQu I: Preliminary consultation for conference with the Bulgarians. Question of Supreme Command. Reinforcements for Turkish border.

Op. Sec., Org. Sec., Gen Qu: Norway -- Falkenhorst's requests. Total Supply Column requirements for proposed forces: 2,000 tons (excluding Div. Clms.) Army Hq. Norway thinks it can furnish 500 out of own resources.

"Sonnenblume": Four (instead of originally two) MT Bns. = 1,440 tons. Additional 720 tons needed for mobile warfare, i.e. twelve 60-ton truck columns, in two additional Bns.

Op. Sec: a) Field Hospital, Tire detachment; two 30-ton truck columns; advance party of Fifth Lt. Div.; Unloading Organization Tripoli left 8 Feb., 0830.

b) Field Repl. Bn. for Fifth Lt. Div.

c) Transport situation "Marita".

d) Projected general map maneuver Guderian.-- List of participants.

e) Assembly:

|               |                   |
|---------------|-------------------|
| GHq Troops    | 1,000 trains      |
| Air Force     | 1,000 trains      |
| Rear Services | 300 trains        |
| Supply        | <u>700 trains</u> |

Total 3,000 trains

plus Div. transports.

Must be divided in three groups.

- f) Work on orders for the change-over from West to East.

9 February 1941 (Sunday, Berlin).

Attend to correspondence.

1600-1800 OQu I: We discuss the Bulgarian demands.

1900 Dr. Kloenne.

10 February 1941.

Gen. von Mittelberger reports on:

- a) Possibilities of a Turkish operation in the direction of Plovdiv.\* He holds that the Turks could attack on a 10 Div. front north of the Maritsa river, and on a 5 Div. front south of the river. Their advance would have to be covered by a deep echelon on the right flank. The movements must follow mountain paths throughout. Since their supply service uses mainly pack-animals, the Turkish Divs. would find the terrain no obstacle. But both the higher and the intermediate command echelons probably would not measure up to the task. Moreover, supply would prove a major difficulty in any operations over larger distances.
- b) Turkish defense capabilities in Thrace in the face of a German-Bulgarian attack: The fortified camp of Kirk-Kilisse commands the road to Istanbul which the main thrust would have to follow. It is supplemented by border fortifications in the north, and strong fortifications round Edirne, facing west. Farther to the rear the existence of a position has been established west of the Chataldsha position, the line Mydia - Eregli. Then comes the Chataldsha position, which lies very close to the Bosphorus. Landing possibilities on the Black Sea coast exist near Mydia, on the Aegean Coast east of Eregli.

- c) An operation against Turkey in Thrace should be conducted with armored forces along the Istanbul road, and must aim at splitting the front in order to prevent a retreat of the Turkish forces to the Bosporus. An armor spearhead breaking through to Istanbul would find sufficient shipping to cross over to the eastern shore in the initial confusion. For a crossing of the Sea of Marmara to the Bandirma railhead, the few vessels in the small ports would be insufficient.
- d) Operation through Anatolia:  
Must follow two main roads and main railroads and accordingly would be very slow. Unless Turkish morale suffers a complete collapse, we must expect tough resistance also by isolated groups. Difficulties presented by the Taurus Mountains. South of it we must get across another important obstacle before we reach the better developed communications network leading to Syria.
- e) Ammunition is one of the main problems of the Turks.

OQu IV: Computation of British strength.

Rintelen reports: No crisis in Albania, but it will take a long time before everything is straightened out. A German High Command of the Italo-German forces must be established: difficulties of such an arrangement.--  
 Il Duce's directive on operations in Libya conform with the Fuehrer's demands.--  
 Japan and the possibilities of her joining in the war against England.--  
 Spain, Gibraltar.--  
 Position of the Attachés and other current questions.

OQu IV: Chief Op. Sec:

- a) With Naval Liaison Officer: Protection of our convoys to Libya appears to be inadequate.
- b) With Liaison Officer of the Transp. Chief: Insertion of GHq troops, Air Force and supply shipment in the First and Third echelon ordered as of 14 February.
- c) Assembly area and unloading facilities for GHq Reserves.
- d) Tasks of Hq AGp.D in the West in the event of an Eastern operation.
- e) Russian operational capabilities.

Paulus: (on phone); Bulgarian demand for full mobilization. Decision must be taken soon.

Schniewind: (on phone): Protection of our convoys to Libya. We ask him to get arrangements under the way through Liaison Officer Rome.

- Buhle:
- a) Condition of newly activated Divs. of AGp. Leeb on the whole quite satisfactory.
  - b) Activation of three Corps Hq and seven Security Divs. for the East from three Reserve Divs., for Gen Qu.
  - c) Replacement Bn. for Fifth Light Div. for Libya.
  - d) Activation of LIV Corps Hq out of Armed Forces Mission in Romania (Mansen). Dispatch Mobilization orders.
  - e) Comment on inspection report of the Signal Troops Commission.

- Radke:
- a) Claer/Stefani Alleged comment on differences of opinion among the Generals of the Fuehrer (in a talk in April).
  - b) ObdH/Deputy of the Fuehrer.-- Showdown over complaints by soldiers through Party.-- Church attendance.
  - c) Ban on dancing in occupied territories.

- Paulus:
- a) New recommendation on command set-up in Bulgaria and on Bulgarian mobilization. Discussion on procedure.
  - b) Progress of road-building in the East. Report by von Salmuth.--

11 February 1941.

Meeting with OQu I, Op. Sec., OQu IV, Transp. Chief.

Fellgiebel:

- a) The Reich Marshal has allocated 15,000 tons of copper for Air Force Signal Communications without consulting anyone.
- b) Italian cryptographic service.-- The Italians have as yet no cryptographic specialists for Greek. Have to be trained by us.



- c) If Libya is to be reinforced with an Arm. Regt., we must also send a Signal Co. (Radio Co.).
- d) Signal units in "Marita" and effect of their assignment on "Barbarossa".

- Gen Qu:
- a) Question whether political reports from Paris should be prepared by Ic, AGp. D\* or Military Administration.
  - b) Economic situation in Romania. No reserve stocks built up yet.--Fuel storage depots still under construction. Canister situation difficult.
  - c) Balkans' supply problems.
  - d) Setting up of Military Administration for "Barbarossa".

Arendts: Talk on conditions in Military Government France. Recommendation to remedy duplication in Administrative and Military Organizations by merging them under a joint Chief and to appoint economists and administrators as "advisers" for special fields.

Paulus: The question of Bulgarian mobilization is again thrown into confusion by interference of OKW.

- Buerker:
- a) Special pointers on training for the East.
  - b) Traffic control regulation.-- Activation of movement control staffs at Army Hqs.

12 February 1941.

0930 Morning conference -- Also transport questions.

Ruedt von Collnberg reports as Chief of Army Libraries. Talk on program for periodical literature.

- OQu V:
- a) Report on Eighth Army in Poland.\*
  - b) Dispute with Ministry of the Interior over Vienna Archives.
  - c) OKW plans for writing the history of this war.
  - d) Various current matters.

Heusinger - Gehlen - Stieff:

- a) Gehlen reports on observations on tour in Romania. Important points: 1st wants deployment of his forces completed, before the start of operations, which, if possible, should not come off before 28 February.

List would like the Bulgarians to mobilize before his jump-off.

Romanian Army cannot be looked upon as an Army at all.

Our troops have supply difficulties due to foreign currency restrictions.\*

- b) Hauffe must be informed as soon as possible of our stipulations to the Romanian Army and on requirements for "Barbarossa". At the moment nothing has to be done as regards List.
- c) Difficulties with Russian maps. Especially the tactical maps (1 : 100,000) are very poor. Lower echelons must be warned on how Staff work will be affected by such bad maps.

Luncheon with Mittelberger.

Lt. Gen. Dihm reports as Field Supply Chief.\*\*

OQu IV: a) Schildknecht reports on Koestring's study on Iran and Russian operational capabilities. Koestring holds that fourteen Inf. Divs., seven Cav. Divs. and four mot.-mcz. Brigades, could be committed on that front, partly east of Caspian Sea.

- b) Miscellaneous: Materiel deliveries to Hungary, temporary assignments of Swiss Officers, etc.

Lt. Col. Goth (OQu 17): Report on supply situation in his Army. Difficulties resulting from departure of Twelfth Army are gradually being straightened out.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff questions.-- Reassignments.-- Wish to elevate the status of the Ia in the Division.\*\*\*

13 February 1941.

Morning conference: No important news; shipments are running normal.

Col. Streich: promoted to General and appointed Commander of Fifth Lt. Div., reports for his briefing. I stress the offensive and urgent character of his mission.

Ochsner: a) Gas Schools and Gas Defense Depots in the West are good. Training too mechanical.

b) Production of Chemical Mortar -- 40 will be delayed.

End of March: two Bns.

End of April: two Bns.

End of May: two Bns.

End of June: two Bns.

A new Do Regt.\* could be formed, but would necessitate drawing on existing Chemical Mortar Bns.

c) Training on Hv. Chemical Mortar will be completed by 22 February.

Matzky: Diplomatic developments; British Minister will leave Romania on 15 February, because Romania no longer has status of a neutral.

Bulgaria wants to give her promise to join the Tripartite Pact at present only in the form of a secret agreement; announcement after we have marched in.

Turkish-Bulgarian pact of non-aggression is making no headway.

Position of the Military Attaché and of the Liaison Officer after entry of List's troops in Bulgaria must be clarified.

Points to be cleared up about status of the Propaganda Company.

Buhle: a) Request for guard forces in Romania.-- Release one Regtl. Hq. and three Bns.!

b) Twelve to fifteen Occupation Brigs. could now be activated by reducing the Replacement Army (now 600,000): Ten could be formed from Replacement Army, remainder from Regional Defense units (20 Bns.).

c) Shifting of Div. trains to the rear in charge of Ib\*\* (Separate instructions for mot. and non-mot. Divs.)

d) 301st Armd. Bn. (captured tanks) ready for Norway in early March.

Conference with ObdH: I inform him on latest developments here; he gives me impressions from his tour in France.

Gen. Jacob (with Heusinger): we discuss Eng. equipment for the impending tasks in "Barbarossa."

Bridging equipment will on the whole meet all requirements through the Dniepr - Dvina crossings. SS ferries\* will have to be moved into the river mouths from the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea. Must be prepared organizationally and by special training! Additional Bridge Cms. must be requested from BdE. Eng. Bns. and Road Constr. Bns. will be sufficient if placed strategically. Plan of disposition must be checked by the Armies before start of operations.

14 February 1941.

Morning conference: Shipments are running normal. Intention: Begin bridge-building and march into the Dobrudsha on 21 Feb.; cross Danube on 24 Feb.

Altenstadt: Police requirements for "Barbarossa"; activation of new units and transfers from the West.

Wagner: OKW draft on Executive Power in "Barbarossa". Organize Military Government Russia!--- Current matters.

von Schell returns. Report on truck, rubber and fuel situation. Trucks will probably be freed in the number demanded by us. Rubber: From Indochina and Japan we can expect about 7,000 tons by spring, enough to cover three months' requirements. New indigenous rubber plant.--- Fuel shortage apparently worse on paper than in fact. Must see how things develop.

Buhle-Koerner: Leaves will be reduced to maximum of two weeks' starting 27 February for transport reasons. Shortly before Easter it will be necessary to ban all leave traffic, because leave trains must be cancelled after introduction of the maximum railroad schedule. The start of the maximum railroad schedule must be so timed as not to interfere with our plans ("Marita") and strike the public just in the last days before Easter. (That means about 4, 5, or 7 April.)

Heusinger:

- a) Aid for Finnish operations for seizure of Hangoe and closure of the White Sea Canal.

The only thing we can do for the Finns is sending heavy Arty (heavy howitzer). We would have to ship them at an early date, so that the Finnish crews could be trained. OKW will have to decide whether this is politically feasible. Support for the attack on Hangoe will be mainly an Air Force mission i.e., keeping enemy planes away from the Finnish artillery (Heinrich's request). Air Force would have to operate from bases on the Aaland Islands, which in turn calls for German occupation of these islands.

- b) The White Sea Canal is exclusively a job for Air Force or Lahousen's organization.

von Bernuth: Training courses for Divisional Commanders in Armd. Gp. 3  
Map maneuver for junior Gen. Staff Officers.  
Traffic control regulations.

15 February 1941.

Morning conference: Second convoy\* has safely arrived in Tripoli.

Col. Gen. Haase reports as C in C Fifteenth Army.

Gen. -rum reports out and introduces his successor.

Heusinger: a) Instructions to List on action to be taken in the event of Turkish hostility.  
b) Preparation for conference with Hauffe (Tuesday).  
c) Instructions to Army Hq 12 on reporting after crossing of Danube.

OQu IV: Franco - Caudillo. /Sic-Ed/

- a) Convinced that the Axis will win the war.  
b) Demands: Economic and military aid, precise definition of "legitimate interests".  
c) Il Duce: The only possible course is to "keep Spain in the political lineup of the Axis".

Japanese Foreign Minister will be here middle of March.

Conference with ObdH on operation "Marita". Interrelation between Greece and Turkey.

16 February 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).

Work at home: Offensive against Turkey.-- British capabilities.-- France after transfer of troops to the East.-- Norway.

17 February 1941.

Berlin

Presentation of Military Attachés. China: General Kwei. Brazil: Lt. Col. Holl. Rumania: Col. Gheorghe.

von Haase reports. Commander of Berlin Garrison, promoted to rank of Maj. Gen.

Count Luckner: Farewell presents for Attachés.

Ritter von Wurmb: Personal matters.

Return to Zeppelin.

von Etzdorf:

- a) Conference with Yugoslavs in Obersalzberg. Fuehrer is pressing the Yugoslavs to join the Tripartite Pact, but they defer all decisions to the Prince Regent. They are not interested in annexation of Saloniki. Make a counterproposal: Yugoslav - Bulgarian - Turkish block against any foreign landing attempt. Are ready to act as mediators in the Italo-Greek conflict. Fuehrer refers them to Rome; thinks that the proposal might be accepted.
- b) Fuehrer's remark about Russia: He is stunned by the reports on the Russian Air Force. A conflict is inevitable. Once England is finished, he would not be able to rouse the German people to a fight against Russia; consequently Russia would have to be disposed of first.



Heusinger: a) "Marita" will be delayed by weather difficulties of the Air Force. Build-up of supplies for Air Force operations from Bulgaria cannot be completed before 2 March.

b) Bridge-building can start within two days; preparations have been made.

c) Suggestion: Highway\* not before 28 February, then Danube crossing on 2 March.

Konrad presents digest of his reports to the Reich Marshal: Future economic problems, structure of the Army, assembly of the Army, cooperation Army/Air Force. Report on tanks and demonstration before the Reich Marshal.

General Jaehnicke reports en route. Review of preparedness preparations in France. Would like to get a Division.

Radke: a) Claer/Stefani affair (Schidlausky, Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat\*\*).  
b) Listening to foreign radio.-- Repeat notice on prohibition.  
c) Points at issue with Deputy of the Fuehrer: Church attendance.-- Complaint procedure.  
d) Soldiers' Clubs in Norway.-- Supervision.

Heusinger (with Gehlen): Draft plan of attack against Turkey.

Alternative a) Immediate execution, with limitation of objectives in Greece.

Alternative b) Execution after attainment of extended objective Saloniki.

Wagner: (Gen Qu): Depots near the frontier in the sector of Fourth Army. Protest of the CG Fourth Army. Fuehrer ruling on Transport Cms. conforms to our specifications. Interference by State Secretary Stuckart in the administrative functions of Military Administration France. Transportation difficulties affecting food supply and economic activities in the occupied West.

18 February 1941.

Buhle: a) Lightweight guns; 10.5 cm, 8,000 m -- available 70 Krupp, 70 Rheinmetall, for Airborne Division;

one Battery for Bicycle Company of Cav. Div.

- b) Armored personnel carrier with rocket launcher rack on trailer. -- Six in each Eng. Co. of Armd. Divs.
- c) AP Ammunition for Armd. Commands: 5 cm AP 40 shell penetrates 120 mm. (plan is to include 10% in ammunition issue).  
Hollow charge projectiles very effective!
- d) Renault chassis with 4.7 Czech gun: 90 ordered for delivery by May for GHq AT units.  
Renault prime mover for 21 cm heavy How.: 250 available, after reconditioning.
- e) Extension of range of Lt. Fd. How. and med. Fd. How. by muzzle brakes.
- f) Med. Inf. gun cannot be used on Tank II (confined space!) New vehicles in four months; mass production in one year.
- g) New 28 ton bridge-launcher. Its superstructure can be subdivided into three truck loads; moves at speed of Tank III! Every car 10m. Four will be completed; assigned to Third Armd. Div.
- h) Request by Fifth Light Div.; we must help out.
- i) Reich Labor Service Bns. for the East.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff reassignments.

Hauffe, Grolmann, Heusinger, Gehlen are my luncheon guests.

Kinzel: a) Russian language courses for NCO's.  
b) Air reconnaissance units will not have finished their missions by 1 March.  
c) Pripet Marshes.

19 February 1941.

Morning conference: Situation. -- Transport questions. -- Proposal by Grolmann.

Chief Personnel Div.: Officers' situation. -- Awarding of decorations. -- Awarding of Gen. Staff uniform for Ib officers of the home Mil. Districts.

Promotions and titular promotions.-- Reassignments in West and East.

Gen. Brand: New method of Arty. air observation.--  
Artillery production program 41/42 (17 cm guns, 21 cm guns, M 1\*).  
Artillery strength on the Atlantic Coast. After completion of the transfers to the East, GHq Artillery on the coast will be two Bns. less.  
Artillery for Black Sea Coast: GHq Artillery will be ready by end of February, Navy by middle of March.

Prolonged talk with ObdH concerning operational capabilities against Turkey. British capabilities next spring and summer.-- Current matters.

Noon. Luncheon with Stuehnagel (Army Hq 17), von Thoma, Mueller, Radke.

Gercke: Necessary extensions of road network in Hungary, Slovakia. Progress of work in Poland satisfactory.-- Coal supplies for the State Railroads have reached the lowest level compatible with operation.-- Passenger traffic will be curtailed.--  
15,000 trains needed for the entire build-up; in addition, 96 trains daily for current supplies. (excluding Libya and "Marita");  
160,000 railroad cars.  
Eight trains of empties required. Eight different types of trains.  
Assembly plan, Transport echelons III and IV.  
Preparations for railroad extensions behind the "Barbarossa" front. One line in each Army Gp. In all, six possible.

20 February 1941.

Morning conference: Recapitulation of the individual points of Ground Forces cooperation with Abwehr\*; Navy and Air Force.  
"German Africa Corps"-- Plans must be made for another full Armd. Div.

Paulus, Heusinger, Grolmann, Gehlen: Discussion of the individual drafts for operations of the Army Gps. in "Barbarossa".

AGp. South: Sound. Our conference has produced excellent results.

AGp. Center: Not a happy solution. Launching of armor on the two wings without Inf. must result in dangerous gaps. The proposed moves, moreover, would lead to a battle at Bialystok, instead of at Vilna, where we want it.

AGp. North: On the whole, good. More Inf. apart from Army Gp. Reserves must and can be packed in behind the Armd. Corps.

Gen. Jodl: Alarmist report on bridge construction on the Danube received from Bruckmann.

- Buhle:
- a) Results of work during winter: Third, Seventh, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Drafts fairly satisfactory.
  - b) An Armd. Bn. can be activated from Armd. Demonstration Bn. for "Barbarossa" (early May).
  - c) Fifteen Occupation Brigs. from Replacement Army: two Regts., six Bns., of four Rifle Cos. each, one Artillery Bn., Seven Brigs. are needed for Mil. Districts VIII, XX, XXI and I, and for the Protectorate. Ready as of 1 June. 400,000 men in the Reich for loss replacements in East.
  - d) Establishment of a Section: Chief Armored Troops Officer.\*
  - e) Bridge columns: If we are to get 8 to 10 new Bridge Clms. each month, they will have to be given a higher priority.

Col. Homlok (Hungarian Attaché) relates impressions of the Hungarian Attaché in London, who came home to report.

Telling effects of our air attacks, production drop 30%, but not yet decisive. Effect of our Navy: Can be felt, but also not yet decisive. Effect on morale considerable at the end of November, renewed stiffening since that time. Strength in the homeland, 30 Divs. as of end of January; 5,000- 6,000 planes. De Gaulle's position is no longer taken seriously in England.

Major Forster, Ia, Military Government\*\* reports briefly on situation in the Government-General.

General Wagner (Gen Qu): Fuel situation confused and difficult.-- Supply questions Libya.-- Transportation requirements.-- Setting up of supply dumps in the East preceeding satisfactorily.

----- concluded 20 February 1941. -----





# WAR JOURNAL

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OF

FRANZ HALDER

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Chief of the General Staff of Supreme  
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## Volume VI



**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL**  
**OF**  
**GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER**

**Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

**14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942**

**VOLUME VI**

# CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

VOLUME VI.

CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA. PART I.

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

First entry: 21 February 1941

Last entry : 31 August 1941

\* \* \* \* \*

21 February 1941

Morning Conference: No special news. Things in Libya are proceeding satisfactorily. In the Eastern Mediterranean no clues to British measures.

Admiral Canaris: Points discussed:

- a) The general situation. All briefing of the Wehrmacht (also on naval and air matters) must be centralized in our hands.
- b) British capabilities at the outset of the operation in the East.
- c) Preparatory measures in the Ukraine and the Baltic States.
- d) Safeguarding of security, top secret matters.
- e) Personnel matters (Change of Section Chiefs).

Lt. Col. Radke: a) Soldiers' Memorial Day: Decoration of graves, celebrations in Berlin and in units.

b) Army Art Exhibition opening on 16 March.

c) Organization of Propaganda (Hesse).

Conference with ObdH: (Heusinger present): Reports from the Army Groups. -- Operational objectives for Barbarossa. Full agreement is reached on all proposals.

OCu IV: Current matters.

British Air Strength. 15 February 1941

|                        |      | Bomber and<br>Transport   | Fighter               | Close Recon-<br>naissance &<br>multiple<br>purpose | Long-<br>range<br>recon-<br>naissance | Total Staffeln |               |
|------------------------|------|---------------------------|-----------------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| <u>K.</u>              | 1100 | (750 Class I<br>(350 " II | 700 (550 I<br>(150 II | 400 including<br>Transport and<br>Seaplanes        | 300 Land<br>70 Sea                    | 400<br>2600    | 180 to<br>192 |
| <u>Mediterranean</u>   |      |                           |                       |  |                                       |                |               |
| Egypt, Libya,<br>Sudan | 300  |                           | 180                   | 70   | 35                                    | 585            | 45 to 50      |
| Greece, Crete          | 120  |                           | 60                    | -  | -                                     | 180            | 10 to 12      |
| Malta, Gibralt-<br>ar  | 20   |                           | 30                    | -  | 10                                    | 60             | 5             |
| Irak, Palestine        | 45   |                           | 35                    | 45   | 5                                     | 130            | 10            |
| Aden, Kenya            | 80   |                           | 60                    | -  | 5                                     | 145            | 11            |
| India, Far East        | 60   |                           | 20                    | 75   | 5                                     | 160            | 12            |

In the Eastern Mediterranean 20 % Second-Class.

In East Africa, Irak, India, Far East: 60 % Second-Class.

To these must be added the South African and Australian Air Forces in Egypt, Eastern Mediterranean, Kenya and Far East (Singapore)

- 100 South African aircraft (6 Staffeln) in Kenya (60 % Second Class)
- 50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in Egypt and Eastern Mediterranean
- 50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in the Far East (Singapore).

Naval Aircraft:

|   |     |  |
|---|-----|--|
| Shipborne (not including aircraft carriers) | 150 | ) Of these about<br>200 are in the<br>Mediterranean. |
| On aircraft carriers                        | 350 |  |
| On land, for new aircraft carriers, etc.    | 150 |  |
| On land, for other purposes                 | 100 |  |

22 February 1941.

Morning Conference: No important new developments.

Russian Air Force. (Gen. Gennadi):

- a) Air Force is not an independent part of the armed forces  
(Organization).

- b) Ground facilities and strength:  
 1100 airfields, 200 serviceable. Equipment inferior to ours. Estimated strength 4,000 - 5,000 bomber and fighter aircraft. North of Pripet:  
 Reconnaissance and bombers 1530, fighters 2200  
 South of Pripet:  
 Reconnaissance and bombers 675, " 1250  
 Main concentration north of Pripet.  
 Our Air Force considers this the final Russian disposition for their concentration in the West. (New Russia pamphlet).---  
 Transport aircraft and parachutists: based on Kiev.  
 By next summer, it is estimated, 60% of the above strength will be ready for commitment.
- c) Types: Reconnaissance craft obsolete, range around 300 km (a few new ones have range up to 640 km); speed 150 to 250 km.
- Close-support craft: Majority old types; cooperate with Armd. troops. Between 100 and 200 are modern (speed: 380 km, range up to 700 km). Armament: only machine guns (4 fixed forwardfiring MG).
- Fighters: Bata - J 16 is good; 4 machine guns, or 2 machine guns and 2 cannon. Inferior to the German fighter (Spain); is slightly slower. Craft now under construction probably not ready for 1941.
- Bombers: Two-thirds good; SB 1 - 3 and TB 3, make up two-thirds of total. SB 1 - 3, range 600 km, night and bad-weather craft.  
 Fair game ( TB 3. Range 1,000 km (bomb load 2,000 kg).  
 for German ( BB 3. Range 1,500 km (bomb load 800 kg).  
 fighters
- Transport craft: Not much is expected.
- Paratroops: Same.
- d) Training, leadership and tactics:  
 Fighters and bombers good while in formation; depend heavily on lead pilot. Blind and bad-weather flying deficient. Fighters are especially trained for action against ground targets, but their foremost mission is to fight enemy air force in the air and on the ground. Between Fighter and bomber teamwork poor.  
 Leadership: Hard and brutal, but without training in modern tactics; mechanical, lacking adaptability.
- e) Ground organization, Air Force Signal troops: Air force signal troops, as we know them, are non-existent. Only radio communications! Transmit in clear in emergencies. Ground organization scanty. Large parts attached to flying organizations. Supply stocks apparently low.
- f) Probable dispositions: See b).  
 Deployment will take considerable time; is being watched\*. Fighters work in close support of their own and against enemy ground troops. Close-support craft against enemy armor. Bombers have targets in the enemy rear area. Clear nights essential. Targets: East Prussian supply base, Silesian industries, Romanian oil fields, Baltic ports, Berlin.

g) Own air strength: Our Air Force expects Russians to have 4,000 (probably more) plus 600 new craft.

Russian

Friendly

|                |           |   |                     |   |      |
|----------------|-----------|---|---------------------|---|------|
| 1600 bombers ) | Ratio 1:2 | } | Barbarossa and Z Et | } | West |
| 4250 fighters) |           |   | 2,500.              |   | 900  |

If we assume 60 % operational: 1,100 to 1,700 (sic) bombers  
2,650 to 4,050 fighters.

Barbarossa: AGp North 380 )  
Center 910 ) Planned strength.  
South 510 )

Russian, AAA: 300 medium, 200 light and AA MG batteries.  
Own total: 798 medium ) AA batteries.  
827 light )

von Treskow (Ia AGp B):

Discussion of our broad viewpoints regarding conduct of operation Barbarossa in theater of Army Group:

- 1.) No battle at Bialystok, but at Minsk.
- 2.) Watch against gap between his Army Group and Leebl
- 3.) Press with all means available behind southern wing, so as to obviate threat to flank. Technical details of build-up.

Gen. Jacob reports off on leave.

Heusinger: Current matters. -- Transmissions to List of our study on attack on Turkey.

ObdH (on phone):

- 1.) 8.8 cm AA guns to be used as "concrete crackers" for Barbarossa.
  - a) Are they needed against Russian fortifications? sa.
  - b) Can we count on having Ground Forces AA available for ground combat?
  - c) Can we distribute 10 cm guns so as to have them on hand in time as "concrete crackers"?
- 2.) Ground Forces AA units must be activated: are to be committed on motor highway. Will have to train there, not in Z.I.
- 3.) 110 Renault \* on hand: Enough for three mobile Siege Gun Bns.

Col. Mierzinsky (Foreign Armies East): Mission to collect most complete data on enemy (Russian) fortifications.

23 February 1941

Sunday, Berlin.

Work on draft of Tactical Manual for Motorized Battalion. -- Talk with [Ex-Crown Prince] George of Saxony. -- Leyher family.\*\*



24 February 1941.

Schuchard (Liaison Officer to Abetz): Situation report. Confidence in Vichy apparently is on the rise since the Cabinet reshuffle and there is a desire to win our Government over to a policy of trusting collaboration.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) 13,000 trucks from Occupied Zone on the way. Difficulties in moving them out.
- b) Beginning March we join in control of Morocco and Algiers. Concurrence of Rome not yet received. I emphasize our interest in Algiers.

Gen. von Kirchheim reports before leaving for Africa.

Gen. Tiemann and Lemelsen (CG XXXXVII Corps) report.

Heusinger: Aerial and naval operations:

- a) Dardanelles cannot be blocked with aerial mines. -- Lemnos. We have no naval force there. Airborne landing! -- In peacetime some shipping available on Thracian coast. Can be chartered. - Importance of the Greek Aegean coast. Nothing can be expected of Italian Navy. -- Rumanian oil for Italian Navy. -- Protection of coastal shipping route to Odessa.
- b) Operations in the Baltic: Navy sees no possibilities for active support. No protection for our coastal supply route.
- c) Hangoe: Navy does not consider it a practical base for the Russian fleet. Aalands Islands afford no naval bases.

Buhle: a) Ready for Fifteenth Armd. Div.:

20 March: 1 Rifle Bn. and 1 AT Bn.

1 April : 1 Rifle Regt. and light Fd. How. Bn.

15 April: Remainder.

- b) Tank complements; 1 May: in th general complete (Interchange of Tank III, IV, and II and I necessary). Between 1 May and 15 about 3-4 Divs. come off the line, i.e. about 5 % of the entire tank forces in the East. 15 May to 15 June one Div. comes off the line, i.e. replacements would drop out for four weeks. I suggest that the pro tem Armd. Divs. be not activated before 1 June and meanwhile see to it that the Armd. Divs. get their tank replacements.
- c) French tanks not much good in Norway. Try to use old Czech tanks instead.
- d) 15 Brigs. (mixed Brigs.) as of 1 June (7 for East!).

25 February 1941.

Morning Conference: Nothing of importance. Uncertainty persists as to British intentions in the Mediterranean, both in the Malta area and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Personnel: Ia, Rommel; Frfurth for Bulgaria. Wachenfeld for Romania. Xylander?
- b) Operation against Afghanistan.
- c) Items for discussion with Navy and Air Force.
- d) Charge of duties for Konrad.
- e) Tactical training for Russian campaign.
- f) Tank replacements: Whatever becomes available before start of operations, goes to the front. What comes after, will be held for new units. Location: Warsaw.
- g) Supply trains for Libya. Combine Italian and German supply trains. Take trucks from Italian Divs.!
- h) Preparation for continuation of African operation. Production for it must be under way by summer.

Heusinger:

- a) Barbarossa: Briefing of the Divs. arriving at the front in the last transport waves (also discussed with Training Sec.).
- b) Afghanistan - Persia.
- c) Gibraltar - Malta - North Africa (here attack on Egypt with two Armd. Corps besides Italian units).
- d) For event that the British land in Thrace, something must be done to forestall them! List must be prepared for that.
- e) Various inquiries from List on the execution of Operation Marita.

Ochsner: Current matters of Chemical Warfare and Decontamination Service.

von Thoma: Current problems of motorization of Army. Replacement of maintenance NCO's. Training manual for Rifle Regts. and Rifle Bns. in Armd. Divs.

26 February 1941.

Berlin --- War Academy:

Visit to courses conducted by Feyerabend, Blumke, Staedke. Impression on the whole good. Afterwards, address to the participants and conference with the instructors.

1715 - 1830 hrs. Conference with Adm. Schniewind on common problems of Operation Barbarossa.  
(Baltic: Coastal protection and Finland. -- Difficulties of organizing coastal shipping for supply purposes along the Baltic coast.  
Aaland, Hangoe, Black Sea. Questions of Russian naval forces and possibility of supply routes along the coast.)

South-East: Lemnos. Their ideas jibe with ours. -- Dardanelles. Shipment of oil to Italy (through Canal of Corinth).

Mediterranean: Gibraltar, coastal shipping, Africa, Malta. -

West: A unified Coastal Defense.

Evening. von Ziehlberg: Current matters. -- Liaison Officers.

27 February 1941

Morning Conference: Possibilities for speeding up shipment of troops to Libya. Withdrawal of study on Italian Generals by Foreign Armies West.

Bogatsch:

- a) Questions regarding Air Support Hq Staff\* and signal communications settled to conform to our wishes. Air Staff somewhat small.
- b) Liaison between AGps and Air Force will be handled by Support Commander.
- c) Allocation of airfields for reconnaissance planes.
- d) AA: AA Corps are to stay, also ground missions (Fuehrer ord. It would be out of the question to leave them with the Air Fleets and use them as reserves.
- e) Ground Forces AAA:  
Thirty batteries, i.e. 10 battalions, are supposed to be on hand for us on 1 May.  
Beginning May, additional 30 batteries, i.e. 10 Bns., will be added as organic AA of the Ground Forces.  
We have specified: 50 Bns., including 30 mixed; (mixed Bns. make up 60 to 80 % of total requested) plus 11 light Bns. requested: 22-24, i.e. 50 %).\*\*

f) Air Defense Commanders for rear area (24 Reserve Bns.).  
East of the Reich frontier.

Heusinger: Current matters. One additional Corps Hq for third wave of Marita (L Army Corps Hq). - Corps Hq (reduced) Boehm in Holland to be released. - Distribution of the Reinforced Brigs. (15) which will be ready in the ZF. beginning middle of March. Liaison Officers for Bulgaria.

Jodl inquires officially, whether we have any reason for wishing to have approach march in Bulgaria stopped, which would still be feasible today. The answer is in the negative.

Radke: Friction between the Deputy of the Fuehrer and ObdH (regarding Mieth, Weck and other incidents).

Buhle: Ground Forces AAA: Materiel: So far nothing has been delivered by the Air Force. Promise to send bulk of equipment second half of April, so that everything would be on hand 1 May. Provisional fire control instruments for Batteries. Hope to get fire control instruments also for Bns.

Training: Courses in progress. Specialists ready 1 May. Afterwards unit training. Personnel apparently not bad. Battery training a minimum of three weeks. Cannot be in action before 1 June.

Traction equipment lacking: Tests now in progress to determine serviceability of French traction equipment. Only limited mobility. Will have supply vehicles, but tactical mobility cannot be achieved. (No ammunition columns). Two batteries are put on self-propelled mounts, to serve as heavy tank destroyers.

"Traction Bns., motorized" could be formed, but chain of command and control would be very difficult in practice.

Fellgiebel:

Finland. Senior Sig. Corps Officer to Finland for operational communications (through Sweden postal network).

Marita: Three river cables; tele-communications via Belgrade.

Barbarossa: Each Armd. Group 2 dcm lines. Three large direct transversal decimeter lines. Supply service network East: Government -General, trunk lines to the advancing armies.

Monitoring of cryptograph traffic: Seehausdienst \*.

Conference with Gen. Jeschonnek, (present Major Christ, Col. Heusinger):

North: Reconnaissance off Murmansk (based on central Norway).  
Hangoe - Aalund : no facilities.

Barbarossa: Fighters 6:1 (3:1); training and material said to be considerably inferior.

Bombers 2:1 (1:1). Training inferior.

Fighters: Only 400 modern, total 3,000; for close-support effort.

Bombers 1,600 to 2,000, mostly older types.

Air Force expects concentrated attacks against our spearheads, but thinks they will collapse owing to our superior technique and experience. Targets for long-range fighters.

Russian ground organizations, being organic to operational flying units, are clumsy and, once disrupted, cannot be readily restored. Distribution of forces: 1 Air fleet for each AGp. Further details later.

Mediterranean remains possible, but purpose must be clearly defined. Malta-Crete in preparation (airborne landing). I call attention to possibilities for airborne operations in Tangier and Ceuta. Corsica still being studied.

France: Relatively strong fighter and long-range fighter forces under Sperrle. In Holland, Belgium and Northern France excluding Brittany. -- Night fighters. Fight for control of air for reconnaissance over the sea.. XI airborne Corps probably to go to France (deception). Attila still on active list. AAA ample.

ZI: Weise. \* -- Fighters and night fighters in the Ruhr and Northwest Germany. AA defense will be slightly weakened (20%) in favor of Barbarossa.

Airborne troops: XI Corps. Either use right off the start or not at all. Discussion of possible airborne operations in the Mediterranean and in Barbarossa.

AAA: Fuehrer wants no serviceable piece to remain inactive. Personnel for 30 Batteries. AA Corps, of 6 Bns., for Sixth Army (Armd.Group 1) and for Armd.Group 2.

Norway: Unchanged, under Stumpff.

Liaison Air Force - Ground Forces: Konrad's position.

Buhle: Tanks for Norway. -- 800th Regt. as "fire brigade" against uprisings! Use of tanks in Barbarossa. Roechling projectile for Armor in Libya.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters (Liaison Officers, personnel assignments on the Balkans).

28 February 1941.

Twelfth Army has started building of bridges. Covering force of fighters and AA has crossed into Bulgaria.

Morning conference:

No special reports. Still no clear picture of British intentions.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. -- (With Buhle present) Peacetime organization of OKH.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Navy's evaluation of the situation. Situation and intentions of Air Force agree with information in yesterday's conference with Jeschonneck.

- b) Norway: Disposition of forces and operational staffs for Barbarossa.
- c) Hangoe. Only Luftwaffe can do it.
- d) Briefing of the CGs of Armd, Groups and Corps on technical innovations by the Ordnance Office.
- e) "Suedwind".\* Comments on Hilpert's study.
- f) Exchange of views on operation in Libya. We must beware of unduly interfering there.

Brig. Gen. Dr. Grosse (Med. Corps) and Brig. Gen. Dr. Bingler (Med. Corps) call.

Maj. Gen. Paulus:

- a) Report on trip to Guderian's map maneuver: Very satisfactory. The leaders arrived at conclusion that the Pripet line would be reached in eleven days.
- b) Result of consultations with AGp. B on the conduct of operation Barbarossa. General agreement of views!

Gen. Bogatsch: Result of conference with Jeschonneck. - AA problems.

Col. Matzky:

- 1.) Foreign Office sent cabled instructions to Ambassador Ott to see to it that Japan should rush attack of Singapore.  
I suppose that it is not as simple as all that for Japan. A coordinated war plan is probably needed as a basis.
- 2.) Turkey: Leading Turks are reported to have expressed misgivings to Papen to the effect that Germany's Balkan policy is moving to a point where Turkey would be forced to go to war against her. Papen has been instructed to make the following statement to the Turkish government: Germany is fighting England only, but otherwise wants only peace and order on the Balkans. But if the Turks were trying to find fault, he would be ready at any time to pack his trunks.
- 3.) Russia: Isolated reports on Russia's unfriendly attitude towards us received lately, are of no importance. Russia has made no protest against our measures, nor against Bulgaria's attitude.
- 4.) 1 March 1941, is the date when Bulgaria will sign the Tripartite Pact by Bulgaria. Russia, Turkey and Yugoslavia are being informed of our march into Bulgaria.

Evening. Message is received that two of the three Danube bridges are finished. Bad weather, bottomless roads.



1 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Construction of bridges on the Danube makes good progress. (Last bridge finished 1000 hrs. Tested for loads of 26 tons).

Conference with Paulus and Heusinger:

- 1.) Situation in Libya. Rommel's preparations for forthcoming attack.
- 2.) "Suedwind": Expression of opinions on Hilpert's study; forestalling action.
- 3.) Norway: Organization of Command agencies for Operation "Silberfuchs".

OQu IV (with Liss): Situation in England (homeland): Now 40 Divs., including one new Armd.Div.  
Squabble between Hq. Second Army and Ninth Armd.Div. as to who is to have credit for capturing the French war archives.

Heusinger: Current business of Operational Sec.

Ehlert: ( Ia, Africa Corps) reports in; Is briefed on our ideas concerning coming offensive operations.

ObdH (on phone): Liaison instructions for Konrad. I make quite plain my annoyance at K.'s working methods.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Result of conference in Paris. Rather unsatisfactory. The personalities involved will not be able to avoid friction for long.
- b) Provisioning of forces in France from local sources will be feasible.
- c) There will be difficulties in obtaining enough trucks for motorization of troops in France. Wood generator gas etc.
- d) Feeding of industrial workers is getting difficult. Belgium, e.g. wants emergency train Bayern with one million rations. Industrial canteens.
- e) Barbarossa: CP of Gen Qu operational as of 10 April. Administrative orders on 20 March.
- f) Libya: Shipping space.

2 March 1941.

(Sunday - Zossen).

Twelfth Army (List) marches into Bulgaria.

Crossing was effected at 0600 hrs, as per schedule, on the two eastern bridges; 1000 hrs on the western bridge. Delay was due to bridge damage sustained when opening for passage of oil barge train.

Reports from Rintelen on alleged Italian plans for offensive in Albania. Attack is to start within a few days on the supposition that the Greeks will withdraw troops from the Albanian front in reaction to our advance into Bulgaria.

The mere fact that Italy believes to be able to launch such a drive on a few days notice shows that no more than local attacks are to be expected. They do not in any way affect our plans.

Evening in Berlin.

3 March 1941.

- Gercke:
- 1.) Assembly of troops is proceeding according to plan. Government-General now falls in line. We shall be ready on time.
  - 2.) Water transport problems viewed in the light of future developments.
  - 3.) Railway Construction Troops needed for additional lines serving not only current requirements but also stockpiling of new base. In contrast to the West, also station installations will have to be moved forward and operation must be organized on military lines. Construction Troops must advance right behind the Armor. Whereas in France we had a wide frontage on which the railroads were pushed forward, the base line of departure in the East will be narrow. One Railroad Bn. changes tracks from Russian to German gauge at rate of 20 km a day.
  - 4.) Distribution of Railway Troops. In the West four Cos, in Norway three (including two operating units), two in Bulgaria. All others set aside for Operation Barbarossa.
  - 5.) Road construction to follow behind advancing troops.--- Main supply routes.
  - 6.) Railway accidents.

Conference with ObdH:

- 1.) Military-political situation on the Balkans. Coordination with political leadership again very tenuous.
- 2.) Operational possibilities in Libya now and later, when additional troops could be released from Barbarossa.

- 3.) Continuous intrigues by various non-military agencies against us, to undermine the position of the military.

Jodl OKW (on phone): Liaison with political command is too loose. We must have a clear knowledge of what is going on.

- a) Is the political command interested in having German advance elements appear at the Greek frontier to impress on the Greeks that we are faster than Mr. Eden's troops, who is just now in Athens?
- b) What are Turkey's reactions: Must we expect interference from that quarter?
- c) Are the Italians being made to understand that piecemeal attacks in Albania are only disrupting plans?

Reply:

Concerning a): OKW welcomes everything calculated to further an early appearance of German troops on the Greek frontier. However, the question is still being discussed with the Fuehrer. Definite instructions soon.

Concerning b): Turkish question "settled".

Concerning c): Wholly in agreement with OKH.

von Etzdorf:

- a) Effect of note informing the Russian Government of our march into Bulgaria. General reaction: Obvious concern. Molotov replied to the German Ambassador in writing, as follows:
  - 1.) Events have not developed on the line recommended by Russia. It is a matter of regret that contrary to the Russian proposal of 25 November, the German Government has deemed it desirable to take a course infringing on Russian security interests. The march into Bulgaria is in opposition to the Russian conception of security zones, which include that country.
  - 2.) The Reich Government cannot expect Russia to give any support of its action in Bulgaria. (This probably refers to diplomatic support).
- b) Effect of the information on the Turkish Government: Friendly in tone, no direct reference to the matter. Eden had shown understanding for Turkey's situation. Nothing tangible has come out of Eden's visit. Turkey has not been maneuvered into any new commitments, because Turkey is not yet sufficiently armed at the moment. Eden had pointed to the Italian collapse. Turkish Foreign Minister and Yugoslav Envoy cooperate to keep Yugoslavia from tying herself to Germany.
- c) A similar announcement of the German march into Bulgaria, by the Bulgarian Government, met with an unfriendly reception, without any comments, in Yugoslavia.
- d) Letter of the Fuehrer to the Turkish State President: "No further intentions".

- e) Meeting Antonescu-Goering arranged for 5 March in Vienna.
- f) Conversation Oshima - Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop urges early attack on Singapore (from the land side). Leave Philippines alone. Cover requirements in Netherlands East Indies. Oshima refers to raw materials shortages. Wants end of war with China.
- g) Letter Fuehrer - Il Duce: Cannot get anywhere with Spain. The impending arrival of our Armd.Divs. in Africa sets off new trains of ideas, which he hopes he will be able to talk to him about. Anxiety about Dodecanese. We need Rhodes for operations against Suez.

Heusinger:

- a) Current business of the Operations Sec.
- b) Hansen at one time, was instructed to help List with transportation on condition that the material would be returned by 20 March, so as to be reconditioned by 1 April. Now 350 trucks have been turned over. Sixteenth Armd.Div. is spread over too large an area and ought to recall one of its Rifle Regts. AT troops have been detached for service at Constanza and the Danube Delta.
- c) Navy has earmarked six 17 cm guns and six 15 cm guns for the Thracian coast.

Gen.Jodl:

- a) The question as to whether armor should soon be sent up to the Greek frontier, will not be decided before tomorrow, since we must first clear up the situation with the Yugoslavs.
- b) For the time being the Fuehrer will not use his influence with Il Duce in the question of the Italian attack in Albania. Let them scorch their noses!
- c) On the whole, the Fuehrer shares our view.
- d) Great excitement on the "Mountain" \* caused by receipt of a picture of an British tank with 80 mm armor. What can we put up against it in Africa, and what else could we do?

Buhle:

- a) Protection of our tanks against British 80 mm tank in North Africa.
- b) Furloughs. All must terminate on 11 April.
- c) Coast artillery: Activate 5 new Bns.
- d) Traction problems of the partly motorized Siege Gun Bns.
- e) Requisitioning of trucks in France.
- f) Conversion of conventional tanks to amphibian tanks takes 12 weeks.

Reich:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) ...
- d) ...
- e) ...
- f) ...

4 March 1941.

0900 -- 1100 hrs. Attend conference held in Gen Qu office dealing with supply service for AGp. South. We must not underrate the difficulties connected with switching the fuel supply base of the entire Army Group to the Romanian oil base. The idea of the Advanced Supply Points must not be overdone. With all its advantages, the system has the drawback of rigidity which we must not take upon us until the development of the operations can be made out clearly. As long as we don't know exactly where we stand we must be content with improvised installations, which later on can be reorganized into such supply points.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) Control services in all French western ports will be taken over in the near future. General Eichhorn, assigned to this mission, is standing by with his economic staff and other agencies. In Oran, Tunis and Algiers, German liaison agencies (with 8 airplanes) will be integrated with the Italian organization.
- b) Fuel will be very short in supply in France and North Africa till the middle of April. A 14,000 ton tanker is on its way from America. Doubtful whether the British will let it through.
- c) Seizure of French merchant shipping by the British. French want easing of regulations to strengthen convoy system, for vessels sailing in French convoys have so far not been attacked by the British.
- d) Important points in the exchange of notes: French demand on permission to recruit soldiers in the Occupied Zone. Demand release of white Colonial officers from PW camps, for service in North Africa.
- e) 13,000 trucks bought by us. First instalment has arrived at the Demarcation Line. Transfer will be completed after 15 March.
- f) Rubber crop in Indochina: 25,000 ton for us, 18,000 ton for France (partly for our purposes). 25,000 ton for America. This portion is now claimed by Japan.

Gen. Scherer, the new Headquarters Commandant, successor of Colonel Schmelzer who died today, reports.

Maj. Gen. Mueller:

- a) Claer-Stefanie affair.-- Psychiatric observation of Stefanie necessary.
- b) Studies on International Law with a view to a reform of International Law. Must be turned over to a Commission under BdE after the war.

- c) Measures against the De-Gaulle movement in France.  
Question of death sentences.
- d) Cooperation of Replacement Army and Field Army. Interchange of NCO's and Officers.
- e) Findings on hospital inspection. Social service care can stand improvement (vocational guidance, vocational training, psychological care). Use of Field Hospitals. Medical service not a problem of transportation, but one of supplies.

5 March 1941.

Morning Conference: March into Bulgaria proceeding according to plan. Subsequently conference with OQu I and Operations Officer on current matters.

OQu IV - Krabbe:

- a) Hungarian intrigues against our military attaché, who has become irksome for them (Krabbe). -- Our demands regarding road building and railway preparations.
- b) Negotiations Buschenhagen in Sweden ( take in a lot of ground! ).
- c) Current matters.

von Bernuth: Directives for training of Divs. under Generals who will be their leaders in the Eastern campaign.  
Current business of the Training Section.

Map Exercise Gen Qu on problems in the theater of AGp South.  
Question of Supply Points , Advanced Supply Bases, CPs of Gen Qu is discussed.

von Ziehlberg: Death of Col. Schmelzer Hq Commandant.---  
Efficiency ratings and other current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Wagner Gen Qu : Draft of an OKW directive on organization and administration of the occupied areas in the East. Behind the advancing troops, Government Commissars will be established, who will have Armed Forces Commanders attached to them. The stipulations of the ObdH are to be observed, but otherwise the Army must not be burdened with administrative tasks. Special missions of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

ObdH - Keitel:

- a) The Fuehrer will not advise ~~the~~ Duce against an offensive in Albania; he will merely tell him that we shall come in later.



- b) Yugoslavia: Conference with Regent Paul produces no positive results. No intention to join the Tripartite Pact. No transportation facilities across Yugoslavia. It is hoped to settle the Greek question without the use of force. However, so far I can see no signs that such a solution has a chance.
- c) Great excitement over Lofoten raid.\*

6 March 1941.

Quiet day. -- Advance into Bulgaria proceeding according to plan. Otherwise, only telephone consultations throughout the day; no important conferences, except one on AAA problems (Bogatsch) and current operational matters. Desk work on neglected larger studies.

7 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Advance in Bulgaria continues according to plan. Uncertainty on the situation in the Aegean persists. -- French canal system seems to be largely serviceable again; only the Rhine-Rhone Canal and the canal connections with the English Channel, paralleling the Seine, have not yet been restored.

OQu IV with Chiefs Foreign Armies East and West: Situation reports. England, no important new information. Russia: We are getting a clearer picture of disposition of forces.

Gen. Brand:

- a) Fuehrer order regarding 160 Batteries for Norway. This number will include 38 batteries already sent to Norway (10-28 cm). The Batteries still unassigned are to be accompanied each by one officer, 2 NCOs and 15 EM; also, there will be one Battalion Staff for every 6 batteries, and two telephone sections with 12 km wire each for each Battery. Immediately available: 33 batteries. The main thing is that there must be no reductions in the allocations for coastal defenses in the Black Sea and the Baltic.
- b) K Battery can be used against Brest-Litowsk (citadel). \*
- c) Results of the large Observation Bn. exercise. Attempt to centralize the heavy sections in the Army Corps was a failure. The solution lies in keeping the old method and reducing the number of heavy sections.

- d) Trials with R projectile \* for 15 cm How. satisfactory.  
5,000 projectiles a month; larger output not before fall.
- e) Missions for railway artillery in the East not yet final.  
Probably we shall have use for the following:  
1 - K 12; 5 - K 5; 1 - Bruno N; 2 short Bruno (in AGp North).

1500 hrs: Funeral ceremony for Col. Schmelzer — Hq Commandant.

Chief Personnel Division: Consultation on officer, replacements, reassignments, etc.

ObdH (on phone): Operational intentions in Libya.— Defenses on West Coast (artillery, tanks).— Air missions in the East.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Norway, Coastal defenses: artillery, captured enemy tanks (Renault) and 1 Bn (2 Cos) of 201st Arm. Regt.
- b) Organization of the still unallocated 250 2 cm AA into groundforces antiaircraft force; horsedrawn?
- c) GHq troops for Barbarossa:
  - 20 out of 28 Eng. Bns: ) can get small truck
  - all Railway Eng. Bns: ) column as of 1 May.

Rear services and signal components will be ready in time.
- d) Two medium Fd. How. Bns and four 10 cm Gun Bns become new GHq Artillery reserve as of 1 June.
- e) Liaison Staff "North" and "South".
- f) Improvement of Thirteenth Armd. Div.

Capt von Both reports on results of his inspection trip to Libya. Rommel's operational intentions need a sound basis and should be reviewed in the light of practical possibilities. Supply services in Libya must be centralized; supply route to Libya still leaves room for improvement. (Naples, Rome).

8 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Yugoslavia apparently veering round to the Tripartite Pact. Three possibilities for the British. Report of British efforts to trade capitalships for destroyers.

7th convoy arrived in Libya; 8th convoy Palermo; 9th still in Naples on account of British Cruisers.

Lt. Col. Reinhard reports as Chief of Staff General Army Office.

Heusinger: 1.) Rowehl flies for Richthofen and List.

- 2.) Liaison Officers for Eastern Campaign AGp  
South: One older Officer with two or three younger assistants form a Liaison Detachment.  
AGp Center: 1 Liaison Officer each for AGp, Guderian and AHq 9 (Hoth) (total 3).  
North: 1 Liaison Officer for AHq 16 (Hoepfner) (1).
- 3.) Disposition of Russian forces at the front and in the rear.
- 4.) Demands on Luftwaffe for demolition and disruption missions.
- 5.) Defenses in the West.
- 6.) Operation in Libya.

Gen. Ott (Inf): Tactical Manual for Antitank Co. in Inf. Regt.---  
General training problems (utilization of terrain, kneeling position for aiming) etc.) \*

Enemy intelligence from Turkey reveals that apart from air support England is preparing to support Greece with two to three Divs., now standing by on islands between Lemnos and Crete, so as to be moved into Greece via Volos, or also into Turkey, if necessary.  
Greek intentions. At start, defense of Struma or Vardar, as the case may be. In case of an attack on Vardar Valley a defense is planned, with the right wing based on Mt. Olympus, and the left wing extending over Mt. Gramosi (on the Greek Albanian border) to the present left wing in Albania.

Paulus:

- a) Organization of road improvement work.--- A new map of Russia showing road conditions (good work).
- b) Military-political data for Grohlmann's study.

Report on Yugoslavia's Reply. Regent Paul thinks he can induce his Cabinet to accept the Tripartite Pact, on three conditions:

- a) No transit for German troops. Discussion possible on transportation of materiel by rail and by Danube.
- b) No commitment to active participation in this war.
- c) Access to the Aegean for Yugoslavia.

9 March 1941. (Sunday - Berlin).

Work at Home: Organization of the West during the Barbarossa Campaign.

Questions relating to Operation "Sonnenblume". -- Attache service.-- Efficiency ratings.

10 March 1941.

Conference on situation: Italian drive in Albania 9 March -- Aegean.-- 8th and 9th convoys due at Tripolis. Advance of Twelfth Army difficult.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Clarification necessary about instructions for defenses in Norway.  
West Coast, Baltic, Black Sea, Aegean Islands.
- b) Clear-cut statements wanted from Navy on:  
What are the capabilities of the Russian Navy in Baltic and in Black Sea?  
What can our Navy do, and what are its limitations?  
(Canaris).

Heusinger:

- a) Current business.
- b) Rommel is instructed not to advance his front too far ahead before arrival of Fifth Lt.Div. and sufficient Italian forces.
- c) Coastal defense problems in the West and in the Baltic.  
(Ruegen).
- d) Our troops must start building field fortifications on the Russian border early and on a sufficient scale. Handle rear line more as a propaganda show! \*

Radke:

- a) Case Hesse.-- Fired from the Press Section by the OKW because of clumsy handling of motion picture matters.
- b) Inquiry to Gen.Mieth on alleged political indiscretions at a conference in December, 1939.
- c) Recruiting for SS; no danger; cannot fill their ranks.
- d) Participation of Party members in Church activities permissible only if Party membership is held in the background.

Lt. Col. Kochler reports as Chief of Staff of the BdE. Problems of coordination discussed.

OQu IV: a) Yugoslavia. Belgrade Cabinet meets today. Yugoslavia's three conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact have been accepted by Germany and Italy.

- b) Greece: Up to 4 March, only 7,000 British in Greece (Air Force), in Athens area. In the last few days additional 5,000 arrived in Athens area (claimed mission: protection of airfields). Reports state that evacuation of Mirace is being prepared. Greece said to be getting ready for war. Change can be hoped for only if Yugoslavia changes her attitude.
- c) Turkey's reply to Fuehrer's letter still outstanding.
- d) Conference Goering-Antonescu: Increase in oil deliveries. German production aids accepted. Sparing of Iron Guard refused. Wants to form new Party from reliable elements.
- e) France: Darlan announces convey protection against England for French shipping; will use arms if necessary. Proposal to appoint Laval Minister-President.
- f) Spain: Franco's letter stating reasons preventing his entry into the war now demands clearcut statement on colonial promises.
- g) Fuehrer's demands on Japan. ~~Japanese~~ capabilities.

11 March 1941.

Morning conference: Report of Russian movements from Moscow Military District toward Smolensk and Minsk. Intelligence on new roads in Russia, which would indicate existence of better roadnet than heretofore assumed. Encroachment on command fraction of Oad by OKW, which orders that Fourth Mtn.Div. must join "Marita" in place of some other Div.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Libya: Shipping space.-- Separate supply organization for Libya.--  
Moldavia: Health conditions. Officers mess problems (too many use up too much food).

Col.Gen. Hoepfner: Missions for Armd.Gr. 4 in Operation Barbarossa discussed.

Vorl (Armistice Commission):

- a) French shipments to North Africa stopped.
- b) Mediterranean ports now under our control: West of Marseilles, German Control Officers; east of Marseilles, by Italian Officers, with German representatives.
- c) French report on progress of disarmament in North Africa expected soon.
- d) Food situation in France has deteriorated. Grain reported sufficient only for 1 to 1½ more months.

- e) Protest against British materiel shipments on Bagdad railroad to Greece or Turkey.
- f) Djibuti. Italians release weapons for 7 French Bns, for defence against British.
- g) 13,000 trucks bought in France.

von Uthmann: Report on Sweden. Only the use of railways will be open to us. Roads to the North not practicable before middle or end of June; moreover interrupted by water bodies crossed by ferries.

Lunch with Uthmann, Jodl (OKW): Showdown over direct interference with the command function of OKH. (Substitution of Fourth Mt.Div. for 183rd Div.).

von Ziehlberg: (Central Branch) Current reassignments. -- Style of living of officers in Hq. Procurement of additional food directly from France for their Sections.

Heusinger: a) Another AA Bn. for Rommel (ObdL).

b) 8th and 9th convoys have arrived in Libya. Marada freed.

c) Movement order for Fifteenth Armd.Div.

12 March 1941.

Morning conference:

- a) Question regarding relation between Liaison Officer Albania and AHq 12.
- b) Yugoslavia: 3 Divs. mobilized. Strength 70,000.
- c) Intensive convoy activity in Mediterranean.
- d) Rommel: Bulk of Fifth Armd.Reg. now on land. Movement to the front will be completed in about 7 days (including one day of rest). Enemy reconnaissance from Agedabia to the south.
- e) Transport congestions in Bulgaria. -- Boulogne railroad station bombed out.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Magnesium flare photographs for night reconnaissance.
- b) Instructions on missions of AA in Operation Barbarossa.
- c) Organization of home air defense.

Wagner (Gen Qu ) (Baentsch-Finkh):

- a) Libya: Apart from remaining on the defensive, two courses of action are open to us:  
Mounting a major offensive from Agedabia with main thrust against Tobruk.  
Starting several minor offensives in sectors along the coast.  
For the first alternative we would need four Supply Column Bns. in addition to the four Supply Column Bns already shipped to Libya.  
For second alternative, a total of four Supply Column Bns. would do, but the drawbacks of plan are loss of time and lessened striking power. Send Memorandum to OKW.
- b) Coastal shipping Tunis-Libya.
- c) List of functions for "Command Posts" of Gen Qu.
- d) Fuel problem.

Adm. Schuster, Capt. Heye (Navy) with Heusinger and Loyke:  
Navy-Army problems in the Aegean (Samothrake, Thasos, and Lemnos).  
Common problems in Black Sea (inshore coastal supply line to Odessa and points east).

Lunch with Adm. Schuster, Capt. Heye, Capt. Loyke, and Col. Heusinger.

Col. Spalke (Chief, War Economy Mission, Romania) report on  
situation of Romanian war economy. Picture of armament economy fairly satisfactory; agricultural production could be increased. - Unpleasant stories about Gerstenberg.

Radke: New OKW Propaganda Directive. -- Morale building in hospitals.

13 March 1941.

Morning conference: Report from Japan: Shipment of British troops to Greece from North Africa are said to have been in progress since 1 March.

Boetticher reports, that appearance of German troops in North Africa had sobering effect on Weygand.

Libya: Fifth Armd. Regt. at the front on 20 March!  
Marada free.

Marita: Bridge at Bechetu dismantled. Ferry in operation.  
Second Armd. Div. crosses over bridge at Turun Magurolo.

Hommerich-Mueller:

- a) Supply of maps for Barbarossa (four to six sets for each Div.).



- b) Future organization of Surveying Service. An Air Force memorandum; idea not acceptable.

Wagner Gen Qu):

- a) Conference at Ministry of Economics:  
Russians are getting cagey. Flow of oil down to a dribble; a 40% price increase demanded for grain. We stop coal deliveries and delivery of the cruiser. \* Romanian production completely in our hands. Annual oil output will be increased from 1.5 to 5.9 million tons.
- b) Fuel. Aviation gasoline on hand sufficient for one year (last year 200 000 tons were turned over to us). Motor and Diesel fuel very tight.  
Without Russian deliveries we shall be able to sustain a large-scale offensive on existing stocks for a period of 2 to 2½ months. After that we shall have to depend on our own production and on Romania.
- c) Supply Columns, Schell believes he can let us have additional 4,000 tons for Libya.
- d) Oil drum factories in Romania meet production schedules.
- e) Supply problems Norway.
- f) Charge of duties for Military Commander France.
- g) Conference Wagner-Heydrich: Police matters. Border control service.

14 March 1941.

Morning conference:

- 1.) Albania: The Greeks are attacking, instead of the Italians.  
Yugoslavia: Slovenia is being evacuated.  
First, Third and Fifth Divs. are setting up Rear Services.  
Greece: Flight of population in Thrace; no Englishman in Saloniki up to 10 March.  
England: Britain requests, 1 cruiser, 119 submarine chasers, 115 patrol vessels, 2,5 million tons from U.S.
- 2.) OKW: Movement of third wave (Marita) must wait on order of OKW.
- 3.) Libya: Graziani -- difficulties.
- 4.) Barbarossa: 2,500 trains of firstechelon have been dispatched.

OQu I: Deception maneuvers in the West — More friction with Konrad over delivery of materiel.

Operations Sec: Heusinger, Grolmann, Gehlen report on plans of the Armies in Operation Barbarossa.

Twelfth Army: Operation against Cernanti with only one Div. of the left wing is wrong. Will have to use also Romanian Mt. Brig. (4) on this wing.

Seventeenth Army: Hungarians and Slovaks must be mobilized about two days before the operation starts and follow behind. Fake commotion on the front between Tarnow and the Mountains\* (Security Div., etc.).

Sixth Army: On the whole in agreement with the very heavy concentration of forces; should point left wing further to north (Kowel)!

Fourth Army: Its southern portion still rather weak; its central portion is getting too close to Bialystok. Concur on all other points.

Ninth Army: Disposition with objective Lomza is waste of effort. On the northern wing coordination between Armd. Gp. 3 and Army not yet perfect. Feel for operational requirements lacking here. Army Hq evidently cannot assert itself over the CG of Armd. Gp. and is reluctant to place Infantry units under the command of Armd. Gp.

Eighteenth Army: Our suggestions have not been paid much attention to. Teamwork Hoepfner — Inf. Corps must still be brought into line with our ideas.

Sixteenth Army: Front still too wide. In any event striking power will be greater when reserves close up.

OQu IV, with Chiefs of Sub-Sections: Report on situation: Libya and Egypt:

Fifteen British Divs. (including two of Armor). In Libya itself between four and eight (including Armd. Divs.).

England: Activation of 5 Divs. has started. Total of 45 Divs. now in the homeland, including 4 Armd. Divs. (two new). Of the 41 Inf. Divs., about 21 are ready for assignment. Flow of materiel permits fitting of one to two Inf. Divs. per month.

France must reduce her troops in North Africa to 120,000 by 1 April.

Russia: Reported mobilization of four age groups probably only replacements, as the specialists are already in the services. Intensified concentration on the borders of the Baltic provinces. Reported road movements from direction Moscow toward the frontier via Minsk.

Conference with ObdH: Situation and intentions Libya — Situation in Bulgaria. — Personnel matters. — Heusinger reports on Armies for Operation Barbarossa.

Wagner Gen Qu: Fuel situation (stocks for only three months). — Preparations in Romania: Fuel preparations adequate, ammunition varying, Definition of command powers of Gen Qu. Command Posts. — "Administrative Orders" for Barbarossa.

Noon: Demonstration of pyrotechnics and signal devices. Inspection of Zeppelin\*signal center.

15 March 1941.

Morning conference: Marada in our hands. Swap of naval craft (Britain) U.S. — (H.M.S. King George V).

Gen. Buhle: a) Inspection ObdH. of Training Divs, 101st Div.  
Sectional railroad bridges.

b) Artillery and 2 cm AA for Norway.

c) Antiparatroop defense.

d) Organization of Liaison Detachment Romania.

Gen. Brand: Questions regarding use of artillery on coasts of Norway, Denmark, Holland, western France. Railway artillery on the Barbarossa front. — ObdH reserves allocation for himself. Unfortunately ObdH emphasizes security of French West Coast to such an extent that his specifications can be met only by sacrificing striking power in Barbarossa. Of course, when you ask the Navy and everybody else, whether they could carry out their missions 100% or whether they would need some aid from the Army, everybody wants something from the Army. The point, however, is not to be 100% sure everywhere, but rather to make sure of the necessary minimum of safety, and then put everything behind Operation Barbarossa.

Heusinger: Current business. — Preparations for report to Fuehrer.

16 March 1941.

(Sunday Berlin).

Nameday celebration. Preparations for Report to Fuehrer. — current business.

17 March 1941.

Wagner ( No entries)

Conference on situation: Albania: Operation without conclusive results.

Greece: British troops 18-20,000 strong (including Air Force). No higher command staff.  
Attache tour cancelled.

Buschenhagen: Solvaer.\*— Fuehrer insists: Norway must be rendered absolutely safe against any surprise attack. British now are in position where they must take the offensive. West is impregnable, perhaps Syria; best chance Norway. Our Air Force largely centralized; Navy weak, shipping lacking for large-scale land operations. If the British secure a lodgment, ~~cooperation~~ <sup>cooperation</sup> with Russia will become possible. Construction of continuous defense system impractical and, moreover,

unnecessary. Objective of defense: The English must not be allowed to gain a foothold, not even for two weeks. Safe-guarding of our traffic along the coast, both by sea and by land. All centers of economic and military importance must be secured against surprise raids. (Air raid warning posts, etc.). To insure accomplishment of this task: Set up 160 Batteries (echeloned in depth, with Inf. and AA cover). -- Transfer all replacement organizations of Norway units to Norway, as well as one or two of the Occupation Divs. earmarked for France. -- Increase strength of Construction Troops.

Barbarossa: 50% cannot be taken out of Norway.\* -- Sweden is not likely to let us use their facilities. -- Dietl will strike via Petsamo. Two Divs. to Narvik to relieve Dietl.

Strengthening of defenses: Falkenhorst's proposal: For Murmansk only 2 Mt. Divs. Third Mt. Div. cannot be managed. One Occupation Div. for Norway: one-third to northern Norway, two-thirds to southern Norway. 54 Batteries with reinforced T/O can arrive in northern Norway by sea on 15 April; five or six large steamers. Personnel will proceed to Narvik as "furlough personnel"\*\*. This plus one-third of the Occupation Div. and two MG Bns. for northern Norway will make up for Second Mt. Div. by 15 May.

Central Norway: Batteries by 25 April. 50 Batteries in ports (lower T/O; reinforced by Inf.).

Southern Norway: 50 Batteries and two-thirds of one Occupation Div. will sail from Stettin on May 1.

Operation Silberfuchs: 2nd Mt.Div. will strike toward Polarnoj, 1 Finnish Div. (12th Brig.) and 1 German Div. from Kemi-jaervi in eastern direction. Seaborne movements: Allow 6 days for unloading at Kemijaervi and Uleaborg.

1500 - 2030 hrs. Fuehrer conference (with Col. Heusinger):

- 1.) Marita: The operation must be carried to the objectives that will assure us a base for air domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. This requires control of Attica, perhaps even of the Peloponnese. Operation must be carried out with maximum speed. Occupation of Thasos and Samothrake if possible should be simultaneous with occupation of the coast. To accomplish this we must try to obtain shipping from Romania and Bulgaria. -- Lemnos will be seized by paratroops as soon as possible, thereafter.

Turkey: Satisfactory letter from the Turkish Chief of State would suggest that Turkey is desirous to keep out of a conflict with Germany. Forces assigned to watch Turkey may be withdrawn after we have reached the Aegean coast.

Conclusion: The forces allocated for Marita must be written off from build-up for Barbarossa.

## 2.) Barbarossa:

- a) We must score successes from the very start. There must be no reverses.

- b) It would be pointless to base our operational plans on forces which cannot be counted on with certainty. As far as actual fighting troops are concerned we can depend only on German forces.  
The Finnish forces can only be counted on to attack Hango and prevent a Russian withdrawal into the Baltic area.  
On Romania we cannot rely at all. Their Divisions have no offensive power.  
From Sweden we can expect nothing, for we have nothing to offer.  
Hungary is unreliable. She has no reason for turning on Russia. Her political aims lie in Yugoslavia, where they see something for themselves.  
Slovaks are Slavs. May perhaps be used for occupation purposes later.
- c) Rokitno Marshes would not restrict movements. (!) It is a terrain in which Armies could maneuver freely. (!)
- d) AGp North and Center will push as far as the Dniepr, then, taking advantage of the protection afforded by the river, mass forces for a thrust to the north. Moscow is of no importance whatsoever.
- e) AGp South: "It would be fundamentally wrong to attack everywhere." Pruth and Dniestr are rivers, which will block any offensive. The Dniestr is much more impregnable as a defense line than the Rhine. Hence, no attack across the Pruth. "Here we would only drive the Russian away from a spot where we should beg him to stay put."
- f) Conclusion:  
In the Romanian sector, employ only the forces necessary for the protection of Romania. All other available forces will be used for frontal attack north of the Carpathians, with greatest weight on the northern wing, where additional armor will be brought to bear. Armcd. units must be pulled out of Romania at the earliest!

### 3. Finland-Sweden-Norway:

- a) No plans can be based on the assumption that Swedes will tolerate transit of combat troops.
- b) Present defense of Norway not yet strong enough. The British will make diversionary attacks. Norway vulnerable: Fjords, roads.
- c) No threat in the West: Air incursions impossible in daylight. Landings in the West out of the question. Some troops in the area can be released for Norway. (Two or three Divs.)
- d) Proposal to Sweden. We want to relieve two Mt. Divs. in northern Norway, and request right of transit for two Divs. (material by sea).  
If arrangements cannot be made, exchange must be made by sea.

- e) One Mt. Div. is to be released in this manner. An attempt will have to be made to ship another Div. into the Gulf of Bothnia shortly before beginning of operations. These two Divs. will have the double mission of keeping the British from establishing a foothold in Murmansk, and of closing the White Sea Canal.
4. Gen. Wagner presents the great picture of supply. No comments.
5. Rear Areas: No difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be taken over by Finland. Baltic States will be taken over together with their administrative machinery. Ruthenians will welcome us with open arms (Frank). Ukraine uncertain, Don Cossacks uncertain. We must create Republics isolated against Stalin's influence. The intelligentsia put in by Stalin must be exterminated. The controlling machinery of the Russian Empire must be smashed.  
In Great Russia \* force must be used in its most brutal form. The ideological ties holding together the Russian people are not yet strong enough and the nation would break up once the functionaries are eliminated. Caucasia eventually will be ceded to Turkey, but first must be exploited by us.
6. Lybia: Agrees to the forward shift of the defensive front. Current preparations must enable us to pass over to the offensive as soon as a favorable balance of strength is attained. Sending of additional troops now impractical. Landing operation in Tunisia is rejected; plan to purchase ships in Tunisia must be studied.

2230 hrs. Gen. Paulus is given outline of the results of Fuehrer conference.

18 March 1941

Morning Conference:

Albania: The Italians are relieving their frontline Divs. British in the Peloponnesè? What use can be made of Rhodes?

Yugoslavia: Report of preparations to join the Tripartite Pact.

Four Battleships must be laid up for repairs (Hipper, Scheer, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau).

Speidel (Paris)!

- a) Balance of security assignments between Belgium and France.
- b) 100,000 prisoners of war must be evacuated if Operation Attila comes off. Would guard units become available?
- c) Political situation (Weygand!).
- d) SD and SS are spreading themselves all over.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) Surrender of arms and material: Surprisingly good progress. 341 train-loads of material.
- b) Aircraft construction program is running into snags. France wants concessions (prisoners of war, coal).
- c) 7.5 cm Field Guns (700) cannot be shipped off. Alternative: Have panoramic telescopes turned in.
- d) Trucks (13,000) are going out at very good rate. Tires first-class.
- e) Altmeyer case not yet settled.
- f) Material depots in Africa will not be shipped out until later.
- g) Casablanca Commission had difficulties owing to vastness of area and Italian passive resistance.

Ochsner:

- a) AGp D has assigned Chem. Mortar. Regt. (Dora) to the Armd. Group.
- b) Improvised vehicles for terrain decontamination. Will be stored in the chemical defense depot. 12 truck columns for chemical defense depot. Training with operating units. Sprinkling from trucks no problem.
- c) Chem. Mortar: 40 is coming off production too slowly.
- d) Briefing of chemical warfare officers by Ochsner.

Radke: Hess' letter. — Böhler's letter. — Files on incidents in Poland closed by SS. — Case Tondorf settled. (Government General)

Wagner: a) Moldavia base must be maintained despite change of conditions.  
b) Marita: Strength requirements for rear services.  
c) Directives on policies for OKW rear area issued.

Heusinger: Discussion of possibilities in view of the changed situation on Barbarossa and Marita.  
Sixteenth Armd. Div. can be pulled out as of 25 March.  
By 15 May all armed units of AGp South, with the exception of SS Viking Div., can be assembled north of the Carpathians. Kleist then will have 5 Armd. Divs., 3 mot. Divs., and SS Adolf Hitler.  
9 Divs. GHq reserves will be coming in behind AGp A, between 16 May and 5 June.

Conference with ObdH: Change of plans to conform to new situation. Mission for List in view of new situation. Norway orders requested from OKW. Personnel questions.

von Ziehlberg: Out of turn seniority advancements and other current business.



19 March 1941

Conference: Yugoslavia will join Tripartite Pact. -- British in Greece 18,000 to 20,000 strong.  
Port Said-Alexandria: British troops ready for embarkation.  
Twelfth Army reports information interpreted to indicate evacuation of Thrace.

Heusinger: Discussion on disposition of forces in Greece, Romania and Norway. -- GHQ reserves.

Foertsch (Colonel) reports completion of the War Academy course.  
Remains at my disposal.

Töppe, late OCu France (Gen Qu I), reports as CO of Gen Qu CP North, for Barbarossa.

Krebs (Chief of Staff VII) reports off to Moscow as substitute for Koestring (during the latter's illness). Detailed review of the military situation and its impending alteration resulting from assembly of our troops on Russian border. Summation of points to which he should give particular attention. General questions of line to be followed in talks.

Winter (Ia, AGp A): Review of revised missions for AGp South.  
Depth of disposition and concentration of tanks in Sixth Army. --  
Hold Seventeenth Army close toward the northern wing. --  
Possibilities of subsequent attack from the Moldavian front, meanwhile deception and sham movements.

Hermann (Ia, AGp C): Missions for AGp North reviewed:  
Armd. Gr. 4 must jump off together with Infantry.  
Strong infantry forces on both sides of road to Siauliai.  
Shift one or two Divs. to Memel area.  
Problem of bridges for Memel crossing at jump-off.

Buhle: AP shells for 5 cm gun on tanks = 15% of total ammunition.  
Flamethrowers for Rommel. -- Combat with engineers with flamethrowers on tank I. -- Development program for Infantry.  
Norway: Replace construction troops with Reich Labor Service.  
Reorganize Corps Hq III as a Corps (mot.) Hq.

Paulus: Points brought out at conference of ObdH with Armd. Div.  
Commanders: Close control of Divs. by Corps. -- Air situation. --  
Protection of rear communications of armd. units. -- Close teamwork with Inf.

20 March 1941

Heusinger: Current matters: Norway. -- Romania. -- Greece.

Enemy Intelligence: Greece. Landing of British troops seems to have started. Movements, also motorized elements, from Attica northward.

Gen. Rommel: Report on Lybia. Overall impression: British passive and apparently thinking in terms of defense only. British Armd. units apparently being concentrated in direction of Bengasi. The area to the south, around Agedabia and Solum, seems to be treated as a no-man's land. This would indicate British intentions to defend the Djebel area, which offers favorable health and tactical conditions. We shall not be able to attack on the base line of the arc \* in the direction of Tobruk before the enemy in the Djebel is beaten. But the Africa Corps is not strong enough at the present to do this. Nevertheless we could weigh the possibility of occupying the no-man's land around Agedabia and making preparations for a drive in direction Tobruk next fall.

Afternoon: OQu I and Gen Gu confer on details with Gen. Rommel, who then will present an estimate of what he could achieve with available forces before onset of the hot season.

Ministerial Director Sarnow:

- a) Whale oil: 10,000 plus 15,000 tons, a total of 25,000 tons.
- b) Dutch gold: 35 millions.
- c) Rubber: stocks on hand 4,000 tons; monthly withdrawals 800 tons. ---  
Belgian gold 235 tons = 536 million gold marks
- d) German war finance system.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Results of conference with Rommel. In line with morning discussion.
- b) Results of conference with Guderian on disposition of forces on right wing of AGp Center.
- c) Appraisal of possibilities of operations in northern Norway (Britain-Russia).

21 March 1941.

Situation: The British seem to be disembarking also at Saloniki. Perhaps they are making preparations for a stand east of the Vardar line. We will have to reckon with a total of no more than 4 British Divs., brought over in two crossings (six days each).

Conference with ObdH and Rommel: In line with yesterday's conferences. --- Also current matters. --- Assignment for Army Hq 11. --- ObdH trip to Bulgaria. --- Edirne corner.

Matzky: Current matters of his Section, including questions of protocol.

|                               |      |        |
|-------------------------------|------|--------|
| <u>Gen. Otto (Slovakia)</u> : | T/O  | actual |
| Officers:                     | 1196 | 885    |
| General Staff Officers        | 37   | 16     |
| Generals                      | 7    | 3      |
| NCO's                         | 5093 | 2378   |

Lunch: Vogl (Armistice Commission), Otto (Slovakia) and aides.

Heusinger: a) Dispositions of AGp Center (Armd. Gr. Hoth) for jump-off not yet perfect. Reluctance still shown to team up Inf. with Armd. units at the jump-off.  
b) Group Falkenhorst will be directed by OKW.  
c) Police Div. to be put under Himmler and sent to East.  
d) GH q troops must be taken from List and allocated to AGPs South and Center. List will keenly feel loss of medium artillery, assault batteries, light AA Bns., Engineers, bridge columns etc.

Evening: Demonstration of visual training aids (Sculptetus and Major Wratschko, Chief of Army Film Center).

22 March 1941.

Situation: No important news.

Heusinger - von Grolmann: Discussion of disposition for List's drive. Liaison Officers. -- Romania. -- Protection of border in the East.

The question of protecting the Eastern border in event of Russian preventive action is becoming acute. However, we must not allow ourselves to be scared into premature measures. I do not believe that Russia would take the initiative. It surprises in List's plan that no measures are taken to protect his eastern wing (apparently Bulgarians!), and that Armd. Corps is set to strike in direction of Veria and Katerini, instead of Edessa. Instructions to Grolmann for his conference with List.

Noon: Lunch guest of State Secretary of the Foreign Office\*, with Oshima, and Alfieri. Discussion of our demands to Japan and Italy (Libya).

Evening: <sup>\*\*</sup>George calls, in Berlin on official business.

23 March 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

George visiting. Max drops in on his way from Warsaw to the West.

Had words with ObdH over his signing of an operational order for List.  
At home: Future organization of the General Staff. --  
General Staff personnel. -- Efficiency ratings and minor desk jobs.

24 March 1941.

Situation: No signs yet of any change in Thrace. East of the Mesta river there are still only one Div. and the border guards. West of the Mesta 4 to 5 Divs.; British in line Katerini - Veria - Edessa. British reinforcements apparently also on Crete. Yugoslavia will join Balkans' pact tomorrow. Turkey's attitude unchanged. No cause for anxiety. England seems to be under heavy pressure.

Paulus - Heusinger - Beck:

- a) Shipment of light\* troops to Romania must be speeded up after departure of XIV AC and Thirteenth and Sixteenth Armd. Divs. The danger of having only weak light troops in Romania must not be overlooked.
- b) Instructions to Rintelen on our intentions in North Africa.
- c) Romania must soon be informed on the need for strong defense measures on the Pruth border.
- d) 5 Coastal Arty Bns. are leaving for Romania beginning 5 April.

von Ziehlberg: Reassignments in April, 1941, and current matters.

- Buhle:
- a) AT defense in Greece.
  - b) Corps Hq Hansen and liaison officers.
  - c) Air Signal Bn.; allocation of trucks.
  - d) Military police patrols checking trains through Hungary.
  - e) Bridge columns: March and April 20; beginning May, eight to ten each month; target 460. Problem of traction, however, remains unsolved.
  - f) Special wishes of the Air Force for 22nd Airborne Div.
  - g) 15,000 Polish peasant carts with drivers will be made ready for Barbarossa by beginning of May.

25 March 1941.

(Yugoslavia joins  
Tripartite Pact).

- Situation:
- a) In Greece, one Australian Div. from Palestine, one New Zealand Div. from Tobruk. Troops from Palestine are being replaced, apparently from Mesopotamia. Concentration of British Eastern Mediterranean Fleet off Crete, purpose unknown. Possibly Crete as staging area for movements. British are disembarking troops in Greece: Attica, Volos. Scattered British detachments reported on Katerini - Edessa line. Greek islands off Turkish coast said to be still free from British troops, as are Thasos, Mytilene, Kephallonia and Lemnos.
  - b) Roatta, Chief of Italian General Staff.

- c) Alleged trouble between Twelfth Army and Romanian authorities over supplies, on account of demands by Twelfth Army not previously discussed.

Wagner: (Gen Qu):

- a) Report on stocks of gas ammunition: Available on 1 June: 2 mill. for Lt. Field How.,  $\frac{1}{2}$  mill for Med. Field How. Gas of several types will be fired at the same time. Shells on hand in sufficient quantities, need only to be filled; has been ordered.  
The munitions depots can load:  
Prior to 1 June: 6 trains daily  
after 1 June : 10 trains daily.  
To speed delivery, three gas trains will stand by behind each AGp,  
The assembly of gas trains in the Z.I. will depend on availability of sidings to Chief of Transportation.
- b) Decontamination: Static decontamination station on the border. -- 19 Field Decontamination Companies (one for each Army; Norway and Romania 2; Gen Qu reserve 7). Assignment to Armd. Groups is declined.
- c) Friction with Schell, who interferes in the business of the then Gen Qu. Huff between ObdH and Gen Qu, who feels offended that he was not told about some alleged divergence of opinion between them.
- d) Lybia: Mil. Com. for Rear Area.
- e) Bulgaria: Establishment of a supply base Bulgaria, after List has started drive to the south.
- f) Care of wounded for East: 50,000 beds to form hospital pool for East (base hospital); under BdE.
- g) 38 hospital trains are readied for evacuation of the base hospitals to the ZI.
- H) Military administration Greece: Question open.

Siewert: Missions of Liaison Detachment Bulgaria.

Heusinger:

- a) Changes in the instructions on assembly of troops for Barbarossa in view of the new situation on the southern wing. Changes in the demands on Air Force.
- b) Comparison of Russian and German strength ready for commitment. We are extremely weak compared with the Russians up to 20 April. After that the Divs. arrived in such numbers as to eliminate all danger. Meanwhile of course, our supply base is under a threat, but I believe that we must avoid any unusual forward concentrations at this time.

- c) New instructions for AGp, South.  
Various possibilities of operational disposition in AGp Center (Ninth Army).
- d) Mission of Army Hq 11 in Romania. Also various minor current matters.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Agenda for conference of Finance Minister with OKH. — Reinforced Border Control Service.
- b) Item for discussion for conference with Heydrich on impending Eastern matters.
- c) Conference Altenstadt — Thomas.

von Bernuth: a) Motion pictures: Activation of eight new motion picture units, (two for tropics) brings total to 16 (including 2 in ZF., 2 in Libya).  
b) Program for peacetime officer training:  
c) Experiences of the Training Divs.

Evening: Lecture by Prof. Mende before the officers of General Staff: Currents in the intellectual life of present-day Russia.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Progress of deception maneuvers in the West. Review of orders issued.
- b) Reflections on British capabilities: Shipping space available at any one time could take care of only four Divs. That would severely limit their capabilities for anything outside their operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

26 March 1941.

Situation: No important news. British strength in Greece is hardly more than 30,000 at the moment. This number, however, is reported to include Air Force and supply services, which means that they would not even have two complete Divs. as yet.

1030 Paulus: British capabilities. For my part, I don't think it very likely, at least for the present, that the British would send to Kirkenes any of the 20 homeland Divs. they may have gotten up by now. Such a move would be more likely later on, after getting in touch with Russia following the start of our attack. But even then the mutual distrust of the British and Russians in this area is so strong that we can expect more benefit than trouble from such a move. England's foremost concern is the Eastern Mediterranean and the land route to India. Here they are building up strength, but only with defensive intentions for the time being.

1100 Conference with Heusinger in ObdH's Office:

Discussions in preparation of tomorrow's conference of CGs.  
No new ideas.

Gen. Otto (Gen of Inf.) reports as substitute for the CG XXX AC who is sick.

Talk about tactical manuals: MG Co and Inf Regt. will not be ready for begin of the offensive.

Konrad: Air targets in England: Seaborne supplies, shipping, harbour installations. Minesowing. Training against ship targets, etc. Weather questions. -- Weather reports. -- British food situation.

Waldau: Outcome of map maneuver Bogatsch (AA). -- Difficulties of airborne operations in Barbarossa. -- Review of Air Force missions

Fellgiebel: a) Hungary. Some signal operating troops must be set up in Hungary. Communication lines AGp South - Army H q ll.  
b) Marita: Very difficult without telephone line Belgrad - Nish - Saloniki. Solution by using civilian facilities.  
c) Sweden. Same solution.  
d) Finland: Senior Sig. Corps Officer.  
e) Radio communications questions. Dummy traffic in Romania, and other current matters.

Noon: Japanese Officers my guests at lunch: Chief of the Japanese military mission, a general of the mission, Military Attaché Bansai.

From 0930 Conference of ObdH with the CGs of the AGps, Armies and Armd. Gps.

AGp. Center: No significantly new viewpoints. Only Ninth Army and Hoth will need direct orders to get them to team up Inf. Divs. with Armd. Gp. in the jump-off.

AGp. North: Plan to strike with one Div. (SS Div. Reich) in the direction of Kowno is criticized; is changed by AGp. At Kowno we must do as best as we can with improvisations and keep Armd. Grp. together. In this case, too, cooperation of Inf. Divs. in the attacking sector of the Armd. Group is discussed and accepted by AGp.

1200 hrs. Called to the Reich Chancellery on account of Yugoslav coup d'état.

1300 - 1430: Fuehrer demands earliest possible march into Yugoslavia. Four invasion thrusts:

- a) On Lists's right wing, reaching Axios river via Novo Selo, to give quick support to advance of List's right wing.
- b) Detached from the right wing, but still under List's command: Strike from the area around Sofia towards Skoplje, to join up with the Italians and to prevent linking up with Greece.\*
- c) With a separate group from the Sofia area, in direction of Belgrade, to seize enemy capital and open up the Danube.
- d) From Germany, in the North, perhaps even from Hungary, with Armd. ...



1600: After return: ObdH continues conference with the CGs of the AGps, etc. (AGp South), General discussion. Present: OQu I. I discuss with Operations Section the operational possibilities against Yugoslavia and their ultimate effects on Barbarossa. Subsequently, conferences with Operations Officer, Transportation Officer, Gen Qu and ObdH on time needed for assembly and grouping of forces for Yugoslavia.

28 March 1941.

Leeb: (Ordnance Office), Increase of effectiveness and range: Rocket projectiles for Lt. Fd. How. To begin with, only a few thousands rounds. Bore tapers from Med. Fd. How. caliber to Lt. Fd. How. caliber. Tapered-bore tubes are ground down, e.g. from 5 cm at breech to 3.7 cm at muzzle.

Antitank weapons: Tapered-bore tubes and 8.8 cm, 10 cm gun on self-propelled mount (as of May).

Hollow-charge projectile: Equal section hollow-charge projectiles for larger calibers, 7.5 to 10. Fitted with impact fuse, can be used also by Lt. Field How., against Infantry.

"D" Siege gun: 80 cm caliber, maximum range 40,000 m, available for Spain after March 1942; Railway gun on Spanish railways.

1230 Reich Chancellery: (Myself, Paulus, Heusinger):

Fuehrer reviews the courses of operations open to us: Thinks that group against Nish must be made as strong as possible, because strongest resistance may be expected in this sector (armament center, capital).

Go-ahead given for negotiations with Hungary. Accordingly I instruct Paulus to proceed to Budapest immediately. Negotiations with Bulgaria must refer only to preparative measures.

Italy: Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce. Speaks of situation which is serious but not disastrous, and of determination to crush Yugoslavia. Demands suspension of drive in Albania, covering of northern flank of Albanian front, and readiness for attack in Istria.

Il Duce's letter to the Fuehrer: Promises to call off drive in Albania, to cover three northern approaches to his wing and to add six Divs. to the seven Divs. stationed in northeastern Italy (in addition to the 15,000 frontier guards). Also pledges support of Croat separatist movement.

Turkey: List must report immediately if Turks march into the Edirne corner; such a move is not very likely. The Fuehrer's appraisal of Turkish attitude is highly optimistic. He has told the Turkish Ambassador that Russia did not join the Tripartite Pact, because the Fuehrer would not agree to Russian bases in the Straits.

Other matters put before the Fuehrer:

- a) List should not be confined to Mt. Olympus line.
- b) Timing: List is to strike at the earliest; the drive toward Skoplje should coincide with List's attack, if possible.
- c) Air Defense Africa. Fuehrer thinks Rommel should try to make the best with what he gets.
- d) Airborne operation: Fuehrer suggests an airborne landing at Krusevac (Yugoslavia's arsenal). Regt. Goering to Vietinghoff.

Buhle:

- a) Orders for Corps Hq Hansen.
- b) Light Road Construction Bns: Five activated by the Reich Labor Service.
- c) Tactical control of 22nd Div. (under XI Air Corps).
- d) 10.5 cm AT Gun, SPM.
- e) Training of Maintenance NCO's during the war.
- f) Make preparations for reconditioning of tanks, etc. after Greek and Yugoslav campaigns.
- g) Make best use of postponement of Barbarossa which gives us at least 4 weeks.

Lt. Col. Spaeth (Liaison Officer in Albania):

Orientation on situation for his personal information, with instruction to talk to the Italians only on matters regarding Twelfth Army.

Paulus-Heusinger: Composition Second Army:

1st Mt. Div., carried by Truck Transportation Regt., arriving by 11 April. XXXXIX Corps (fully motorized) Kuebler. LI Corps, Briessen LII Corps, Reinhardt XXXXVI Corps, von Vietinghoff Temesvar: Reinhardt, XXXXI Corps (mot.) plus SS Div. Reich. One Artillery Regt. Staff. one medium field How. and one 10 cm Bn. One Eng. Bn., Bridge Column; Div. Grossdeutschland? 4 Artillery Commanders, 4 Artillery Regt. Staffs, 8 Medium Field How. Bns., 2 Siege Gun Bns., 2 15 cm Gun Bns., 2 Observation Bns., 2 Assault Gun Bns. (from the East), 3 Eng. Regt. Staffs, 16 Bridge Columns, 3 Eng. Bns., mot.; 3 Bridge Construction Bns., 3 AA MG Cos., 2 Medium and 2 Lt. AA Bns.

Army Hq Schobert will be sent to Romania sometime later.

Capt. Giese, Capt. Obermayer report in; assigned to Operations Sec.

Gen. Konrad: Briefing on operational intentions of OKH against Yugoslavia.

Gen. Jodl OKW calls up: Hungary agrees to everything and accepts proposals.

29 March 1941.

Kinzel (reports from Finland):

- a) European Russia: 15 Divs. more than previously estimated.
- b) Russian Armd. Corps Pskov with two Armd. Divs.: 2 Tank Regts., 1 Rifle Regt. Etc.
- c) Paratroops: 10 Brigs. of 3 Bns. each.

Situation: OQu IV: Italian defense measures against Yugoslavia in the North, and preparations for attack in Albania (contrary to promise to Fuehrer).

3 Divs., including Armd. Div. Centauro to Libradz, Kukes and Scutari.

Italian Fleet: Motor torpedo boats to Suda Bay (Crete).

3 British Divs. left Alexandria for Crete on 9 March (reported by Japanese Gen Staff)

Op. Off.: 2 ships of the 15th convoy to Libya (supply) torpedoed. 8th MG Bn. arrived at El Agheila. Operational order for Yugoslavia issued.

Tv. Off.: Two movements shifted from Barbarossa will not get through.

OQu IV: Requests of foreign governments to accredit officer observers. Tours of Romanian Gen Staff officers on Western front. -- Werth (Hungary) wants us to recall Krabbe.

Fellgiebel reports on possible Signal Communication lines between Army Hq 2-Hungary-- Italians; Temesvar -- Army Hq 12. Tunnel shelter for Fuehrer train south of Wiener-Neustadt.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Basic factors of supply operation against Yugoslavia. Instruction for rear services to detrain along railroad line Linz - Vienna whenever practical and keep line to Graz open for troops. Group Temesvar must be based for supplies on Merk's \* organization in Romania. Have everything ready to use Danube below Vienna! Army Hq 12 needs more trucks.

von Etzdorf: Conversations with Matsuka apparently successful. Attack on Singapore seems to be contemplated. Noncommittal on dates. Matsuka was informed that we are not interested in a Russo - Japanese non-aggression pact; agreement on fishing rights, etc. would be enough. State Secretary is being informed on dates for attack on Yugoslavia and for Barbarossa. Watch Belgrade diplomatic corps!

Bogatsch: Army Hq. 2, Army Air Commander (7): 1 Long-range recon Staffel, 1 Courier Staffel, 1 light Sig. Bn.  
II Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staffel ) Old type  
III Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staffel )  
XXXXVI Corps (mot.): 1 Group Air Commander; 1 Close-range recon Staffel, plus 2 Close-range recon Staffeln for Armd. Divs.; 1 Air Signal Net Operations Co.  
XXXXIX Corps must be helped out by XXXXVI Corps.

Army Hq. 12: 8 Close-range recon Staffeln (including 4 for Armd. Divs.) Long-range reconnaissance (2 Staffeln to be lent by VIII Air Corps). (Silent reserves: 2 Close-range recon Staffeln at Bucharest).

Wagner (Gen Qu), Baentsch, Krumpelt (Supply Officer, Army Hq 2)! Discussion of Administrative Orders attached to Operational Orders. "Operation 25". Some difficulties will develop in Romania and Bulgaria owing to scarcity of transport. Nevertheless, despite unloading points far to the rear and with the remainder of the frontward movement having to depend on trucks, they will squeeze through with getting the supply troops going and just manage to complete stockpiling before start of the operation.

Paulus phoning from Vienna:

- a) Reports unexpected delays in arrival of Infantry units.
- b) List wants to put Kleist in command of the entire Western drive, not only of Group Nish.
- c) List does not want to strike against Greece until way is open for attack toward Ueskub.

These wishes have as basis the desire to assure success of the Greek campaign, whereas my considerations aim at speedy conclusion of the Yugoslav operation. I think that Group Ueskub will be ready to strike on 5 April, and believe it is sound to postpone List's Greek drive until then.

2100 ObdH (on phone): Short report on my talk with Paulus and my view of List's proposals: divergent idea; we must watch out!)

2200 Gehlen: Finish drafting of assembly orders for "Operation 25".

30 March 1941. (Sunday)

0830. To Berlin. Phone talk with ObdH on List's proposal and my criticisms.

1100. General meeting at Fuehrer Office. Address lasting almost 2 1/2 hours. Situation since 30 June. Mistake of British not to take advantage of chances for peace. Account of subsequent events. Italy's conduct of war and policies sharply criticized. Advantages for England resulting from Italian reverses. England puts her hope in the U.S. and Russia. Detailed review of U.S. capabilities. Maximum output not before end of four years; problem of shipping. Russia's role and capabilities. Reasons for necessity to settle the Russian situation. Only the final and drastic solution of all land problems will enable us to accomplish within two years our tasks in the air and on the oceans, with the manpower and material resources at our disposal.

Our goals in Russia: Crush armed Forces, break up State. — Comments on Russian tanks: redoubtable; 4.7 cm gun (AT) a good medium weapon; bulk of tanks obsolete. Numerically Russia's tank strength is superior to that of any other nation, but

OQu IV

they have only a small number of new giant types with long 10 cm guns (mammoth models, 42 - 46 tons). Air Force very large in number, but mostly outmoded; only small number of modern models.

Problems of Russia's vastness: Enormous expanse requires concentration on critical points. Massed planes and tanks must be brought to bear on strategic points. Our Air Force cannot cover this entire huge area at one time; at the start of the campaign it will be able to dominate only parts of the enormous front. Hence, air operations must be closely coordinated with ground operations. The Russians will crumple under the massive impact of our tanks and planes.

No illusions about our Allies! Finns will fight bravely, but they are small in number and have not yet recovered from their recent defeat. Romanians are no good at all. Perhaps they could be used as a security force in quiet sectors behind very strong natural obstacles, (rivers). Antonescu has enlarged his Army instead of reducing and improving it. The fortunes of large German units must not be tied to the uncertain staying power of the Romanian forces.

Mines! Questions regarding Pripet Marshes: Flank protection, defenses, mines. Problems arising if Russians should make strategic withdrawal: Not likely, since they are anchored on both the Baltic and the Ukraine. If the Russians want to pull out, they must do so at an early stage; otherwise they cannot get away in good order.

Colonial Tasks! With our goals in the East achieved we shall need no more than 50-60 Divs. (~~armor~~). One part of the Ground Forces will be discharged into armament production for Air Force and Navy; the others will be required for other missions, e.g. Spain.

Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshevism, identified with social criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for our future. We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before nor after the battle. This is a war of extermination. If we do not grasp this, we shall still beat the enemy, but 30 years later we shall again have to fight the Communist foe. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy.

Future political map of Russia: Northern Russia goes to Finland. Protectorates: Baltic States, Ukraine, White Russia.

War against Russia:<sup>the</sup> extermination of the Bolshevik Commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia. The new states must be Socialist, but without intellectual classes of their own. ~~Group~~ of a new intellectual class must be prevented. A primitive Socialist intelligentsia is all that is needed. We must fight against the poison of disintegration. This is no job for Military Courts. The individual troop commanders must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in this fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This need not mean that the troops should get out of hand. Rather, the commander must give orders which express the common feelings of his men.

Embody in This war will be very different from the war in the West.  
ObdH Order In the East, harshness today means lenience in the future.  
Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their  
personal scruples.

Noon: All invited to lunch.

Afternoon: Fuehrer Conference:

- a) Yugoslav Question. Decision in conformity with my ideas.  
List will attack with I Corps and on his Marita front on  
5 April. SS Adolf Hitler attached to Corps.  
Kleist will attack with 3 Armd. and 2 Inf. Divs. and 1  
Bulgarian Div. on 8 April.  
Group Temesvar on 12 April.  
Weichs likewise on 12 April.

Italy is no help as a partner. In Albania they are paralyzed  
with fear. On the Giulia Frontier they claim they cannot attack  
before 22 April. No need to define a boundary for them against  
sector of Second Army since they will not attack anyway.  
Details: Airborne landing Krusevac. - Assignment of Regt.  
Goering. - Location of GHq.

Op. Sec.: Ship 22nd Div. to Hungary.

- b) Barbarossa: Reports of AGp leaders and of several subordinate  
commanders (Guderian). Nothing new, except a clever plea by  
Rundstedt for assigning the Carpathian sector to the Hungarians  
and making the Pruth line an offensive front.

31 March 1941.

Reporting in or out: Several Gen. Staff officers, leaving (Natzmer,  
v.d. Heyde) or joining us (Nippold).

Situation: Yugoslav movement to south (Skutari, Skoplje); British  
movement toward the Yugoslav northern border. Yugoslav mobili-  
zation continues.

Paulus: Returning, reports on conferences with List and with Weichs and  
Hungarian Army High Command.

List, as was evident from his cabled report, wants to give  
precedence to the drive into Southern Yugoslavia and conse-  
quently would like to cut Group Nish down to two Armd. Divs.  
Wants to keep back 60th mot. Div. as reinforcement for the  
Ueskueb Group. Moreover, he insists that he is too weak with  
respect to the Yugoslav concentrations in the South.

Weichs accepts mission assigned to him. Will be informed on  
Hungarian intentions.

Hungary readily accedes to our demands concerning Army Hq 2.  
Wants to attack along Lake Balaton and Tisza river, and with  
smaller forces east of the Tisza. Hungarians will fight under  
German High Command.

Gen. Thomas reports on organization of the war economy with regard to Operation Barbarossa.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Transfer of GHq to Wiener Neustadt or Baden near Vienna.
- b) Problem of protective measures for Iron Gate.\*
- c) List sends message that he must have 60th mot. Div. for Ueskueb under all circumstances.

Heusinger: Availability of new Divs. for Operation 25:

- 101. Lt. Div. (as of 9 April, Brody)
- 100. Lt. Div. (as of 15. April, Doellersheim).
- Twelfth Armd. Div. perhaps ready before 18 April (i.e. 12 Apr).
- Perhaps bring over Fourth Armd. Div. (Bordeaux).

Teletype talk with List: Need of strong motor forces for Ueskueb drive emphasized. Pleads again for 60th Div. Request declined. Bulgarians do not want to take active part in campaign against Yugoslavia. Are afraid of Turkey.

von Ziehlberg: Organization of a Forward GHq.

1 April 1941.

Situation: Eden in Belgrade. New Balkans alliance: England - Greece - Yugoslavia. Movements to Southern Serbia continue. Increasing signs of disintegration of the Yugoslav State.

von Ziehlberg: Transfer of GHq to Vienna area. -- Conference with Thiele and Fellgiebel on signal facilities. Target date 8 April 0000 hrs.

ObdH: Discussion of offensive possibilities against Southern Serbia. Von Brauchitsch plays with the idea of having Second Armd. Div. strike toward Veles instead of against Greece, in order to be stronger in Southern Serbia. I oppose this disposition which would allow the entire Greek Second Army to get away from us. We must steel our nerves to believe in the devastating effect of the attack of Ninth Armd. Div. and SS Div. Adolf Hitler on Skoplje. Must yet talk over missions of Army Hq 2 in Operation 25 with Witzleben.

von Witzleben: C/S. Army Hq 2. Discussion of dispositions for drive of Second Army. Main effort on left wing; first objective: Hills north of Zagreb.

Gen. Jodl (OMW): Fuehrer wants maximum railroad schedule set in operation at latest possible date.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Currency arrangements for Romania are now coordinated with those in effect in Bulgaria.



- b) Finkel's report. Rommel shows total lack of interest in supply organization. Transportation lying idle in Naples. Staff Weller (Rome) very good.
- c) Preparations for Military Government in Operation 25.

Gen. Brand: a) Artillery commander for Army Hq 4. Temporary incumbent: Gen. Berlin with Staff drawn from Artillery School.

b) Setting up of heavy artillery on the Channel Coast. Turn over to Navy four 34 cm French railway guns (range 40 km).

c) "Fortress gun emplacements". Trials with K 3 gun tube requested. Must be put off.

von Bernuth: a) Reorganization of training supervision after departure of Army Hq 2.

b) Tactical employment of Chem. Mortar units.

c) Regulation and coordination of military training projects of Labor Service and Hitler Youth.

Gen. Paulus: a) Fuehrer will leave for Hq South on 7 April at the earliest, but more likely on 8 or 9 April.

b) Discussion of outcome of visit to Hungary.

Gehlen comes with report that Army Hq 12 cannot launch operations before 6 April (7 April better). Reply: OKH demands specific reasons.

2 April 1941.

Situation: Tartar reports from Bulgaria about Yugoslavia. Claim 3 Divs. and 9 Brigs. and very much Artillery and Engineers in Southern Serbia. — Must be seeing things!

Reports from Greece speak of four British Divs., including one of Armor, as well as 2 Divs. disembarking at Piraeus. Considering the time factor alone, this is quite impossible.

Turkey is said to have changed sides suddenly. Popular sentiment is in favor of war with Germany. Military attaché in Ankara reports the opposite.

Col. Greiner reports out (was in charge of training manuals in Section of Chief Inf. Off.); takes over command of an Inf. Regt.

1300 - 1400. Fuehrer Conference on over-all situation in Yugoslavia (Heusinger with me). New viewpoints. Emphasis again on Nish. Mission of Twelfth Army discussed. Plan regarding Croat autonomy. Strong language about Italians, who should use their Air Force on front of Twelfth Army, instead of on their Albanian front.

Gen. Heiner is briefed on his duties. Suggestion is made to set up a German Administrative Hq in Budapest.

- Buhle:
- a) Refitting of mot. units after Operation 25.
  - b) Ban on furloughs lifted. 5 % for farmers.
  - c) All units in Operation 25 have their field replacement Bns., except 164 Div.
  - d) Brigade 900, assignment possible as of 15 May, while training goes on. Components:
    - 1 Rifle Regt. (two Bns.)
    - 1 Lt. Arty. Bn., plus Assault Gun Bn.
    - 1 Eng. Bn., two Cos.
    - 1 Sig. Bn., two Cos.
    - 1 AT Bn., of three Cos (1 Co 4.7 cm)
    - Rear Services (for Supply Columns)
  - e) Use of Tank Training Bn. and Reconnaissance Training Bn. (mot.)
  - f) Use of French medium B 2 gun in Barbarossa (Seventeenth Army)?
  - g) Tank III with long 5 cm gun. Tube too long.
  - h) Waterproofing of Tank III and IV : Fording depth increased to 2.20 m. (Work must be intensified to attain depth of 4m): Waterproofing must be accomplished throughout Third and Eighteenth Armd. Divs., Fourth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Seventeenth Armd. Divs. In all other Divs. for 2 - 3 tanks.
  - i) Greater carrying capacity for ammunition and fuel in tanks. Gasoline in outside steelhooped drums; as yet no solution for ammunition.

Foertsch reports as Liaison officer OKH to Army Hq. 12. Receives briefing on situation. — List of duties.

Heusinger: Current business: Authorization of forward shift of Divs. in the East. — Reporting schedule for Army Hq. 2. Employment of Airborne Divs. (Movement takes 12 days!) Take Parachute Regt. instead.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone: Gienanth is at the end of his tether trying to check SS in the Government-General. Requests action by OKH, to back him up in the question of evacuation of billets.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Transfer of Executive Power from Army Commanders to Corps Commanders in Operation 25. Definition of jurisdiction of the Special Detachments etc. of the SS and Secret Field Police.

3 April 1941.

Situation: Agedabia taken by German Africa Corps (which reports heavy British losses). Enemy in hasty retreat to the north. Turkey estimates British strength in Greece at 3 Divs., as we do.

Heusinger:

- a) Airborne Div. needs 5 trips to get to Nish. Air route via Bucharest. Total 15 days (starting 7 April). Better to transfer Parachute Regt. to Bucharest, which is then available for missions anywhere. (Yugoslavia, Greece).
- b) Date for jump-off of Operation 25 will be set by OKW.

- OOu IV: a) Reports from Finland: Attempts to recruit men for SS Regt. Nord are viewed with disfavor; Finns would rather have revival of Jaeger Bn. 27 idea.\*
- b) Italian-Portuguese arms deals are purely financial transactions; no raw materials involved.
- c) Bircher, Danniker\*\* visit of schools etc. in Germany.
- d) Material turned over to Oshima (situation maps) and Marras\*\*\* (secret regulations); other current matters.

Ochsner: Conference on preparations for Barbarossa - Gas protection for horses. - Tactical problems in use of smoke. - Preparations for smoke laying exercise.

OOu IV reports that the Fuehrer wants to take control of the Hungarians out of hands of OKH, and give orders to them directly.

Too bad!

Col. Homlock brings letter from Werth, Hungarian Chief of Gen. Staff, requesting recall of Krabbe. Reports Yugoslav mobilization completed; 1.2 million men. Matschek has founded a Croat National Unity Party.

Keitel (Personnel Div.):

- a) Officers situation generally satisfactory. All quotas filled. Junior officers situation good (New training class 15 May).
- b) Bn. Commanders: bad shortage.
- c) Officer pools for Romania (Army Hq 12), Vienna, and all Army Groups; 300 each.
- d) Out of turn seniority advancements - 255 Gen. Staff officers.
- e) Promotions of E-officers # to General rank.
- f) Results of Mieth.

Heusinger: a) Control of Hungarian Army by the Fuehrer, not by OKH, is due.

b) 22nd Div. all of a sudden is supposed to go to Ploesti, taking the place of Regt. Goering. Cannot be moved by rail.

c) Fuehrer Order to Africa Corps. Recognition of accomplishments and reminder not to be reckless, as Air Force units are being withdrawn, and arrival of Fifteenth Armd. Div. will be delayed; moreover, the Italians now need all their strength against Yugoslavia and so have nothing left for North Africa. Under these circumstances there is danger of English counter-attacks on flanks. Further advance authorized only, when sure, that British Armd. elements have been taken out of area.

d) Army Hq 12 wants to start operations on 6 April, at dawn. Air Force first against Rupel Pass.

Paulus: a) Tartar reports from Hungary: Teleki has committed suicide; his death is supposed to have political reasons. Horthy will not mobilize the entire Hungarian Army, but only border guard and one mot. Corps. Reported resignation of Hungarian Government.

b) Study for "Suedwind".

Buhle-Reinhard:

- a) Truck situation makes it necessary to equip ~~armor~~ units with French material.  
Units affected: 20th Armd. Div., 14th, 18th, 25th, 36th mot. Divs. Last Inf. Divs. not to be fitted out before 20 May, to preclude necessity to reequip an additional mot. Div. -- One small Spare Parts Column for each reequipped Div. and 3 large Gen Qu Spare Parts Depots for French material are being organized.
- b) State Railroads near breakdown. They cannot take over any further jobs in the Southeast unless we help them out. Want release of 35,000 officials and employees of age groups 18 and over for operation and workshops.  
Decision: We give them age groups 18 and over in all troops except Railway, Armd. troops and all units assigned to Operation 25. To what extent this should apply also to officers must be examined in consultation with Personnel Div.

Paulus: Reports of Teleki's suicide are confirmed. Apparently there have been serious disagreements in the Cabinet concerning participation in the campaign against Yugoslavia, which overtaxed the strength of the ailing Prime Minister. The current Foreign Minister is his probable successor. Mobilization will be limited to IV and V Corps, mot. War Minister von Bartha is on his way with a letter from Horthy to the Fuehrer.  
Fuehrer's decision on start of Operation 25: 6 April, as was recommended by us after receipt of List's report.

4 April 1941.

Situation: British reported to be evacuating Bengasi, setting fires. In Northern Greece, the presence of 3 British Divs. is confirmed. Now, after all, the Bulgarians make their 6th and 11th Divs. available for Operation 25.

Paulus: Study for "Suedwind". -- Paulus, too, has got the impression at conference in Vienna, that supply officer, Twelfth Army, is not equal to his job.

- Bork:
- a) Listing of roads which must be restored in Serbia.
  - b) Use Railway troops for construction and, for the first time, operation of railroads in Serbia.
  - c) Technical crews (of Reich Ministry of Transportation) for reopening of Danube shipping lane will stand by in Vienna.
  - d) Activation of three (later four) Field Railway Directorates (294 civ. officials) and 18 Field Railway Operatinn Centers (1,000 civ. officials).
  - e) Liaison Detachments of Chief of Transportation at Armd. Groups, for emergency restorations of railroad operation in their sectors. With them, one Railway Eng. Co. (mot.) each, for construction and operation. -- Also for Kleist.

- f) Urged stepping up of shipment of products from Romania, not possible before middle of June.
- g) Fourth assembly echelon for Barbarossa (26 days) will probably be run from about 20 May to 20 June. Maximum railroad schedule. At that time it won't unbalance railroads, economic experts hold, since the spring bottlenecks will have been dealt with by that time.

- Radke:
- a) Case Mieth: Wording contested by witnesses. (Only Captl. Mayberg, attorney, insists on the wording. Members of the Army interrogated by a Gauleiter!
  - b) Case Claer cleared up with Bouhler. - "Army Yearbook" affair settled by talk with Bouhler.
  - c) Order concerning separation of Church function from troop celebrations. Ban on speeches by Chaplains on subjects other than purely religious ones. (OKW Order).
  - d) Old complaints about SS incidents in Poland. Investigations must be continued with participation of Army representatives. Final disposition must be deferred until all facts are known.
  - e) Memorial cemeteries in the East.

Doerr: Briefing of Liaison Officer for Udine.

von Salmuth reports back from leave. Review of situation in the East.

Col. Kinzel: Situation report on Yugoslavia: Reports on disposition of enemy forces show that border troops are being reinforced by Divs. from the interior of the country. This will result in stronger initial resistance, but later on, when this has been broken, in a speedy collapse. No central reserves will be available after that. In the south of the country (mountains) the Divs. of the Third Army are being split up into 9 Brigs. strung out along the border. Against northern Albania, comparatively strong forces have been brought up; in Scutari area at least 3 Brigs., on the northeastern border 3 Brigs., and on the border north of Lake Ochrida three more Brigs., making a total of a maximum of nine Brigs. The direction in which they are pointed is a little awkward for us in view of the lack of Italian preparedness for defense in Albania. We must expect Serbian penetration into Albanian territory and some very costly fighting there. There is no evidence of a weakening of enemy defense measures in their northern border area.

Situation report Russia: Foreign Armies East now admits that strength of Russian Army in European Russia must be set higher than estimated originally. (The Finns and the Japanese stressed that all along.) The total figure is now put at 171 Inf. Divs., 36 Cav. Divs. and 40 motor-mechanized Brigades. The newly activated Armd. Corps of 3 Divs. apparently is stationed around Leningrad.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Part G of Administrative Orders for Barbarossa.
- b) Transfer of Executive Power to Armd. Groups and Corps Commanders disapproved.

- c) OKW order on administration of justice in occupied territories. Military Government set-up contemplated for Old-Serbia only.
- d) Fuel requirements for Serbia equal 14 days' requirements for Barbarossa.
- e) Supply situation: Generally speaking all preparations for Operation 25 are completed. 10,000 tons of fuel for Vienna (barge train) still to come.

Apart from that, Second Army is fully taken care of. Temesvar will be completely stocked by 8 April.

Twelfth Army: For the time being no crisis. Shipping for Marita made available in Constanza. First, 3 ships (10,000 tons). On 3, 4, and 6 April, one for Aegean. Daily loading capacity 400 tons, loading time 5 - 7 days; crossing will take 2½ days. Additional vessels are being assembled. Army Hq 12 specifies needs to Admiral Balkans. Supply Officer Romania supervises loading operations.

Danube basin: Barge train Belgrade", 10,000 tons plus one tanker, already in Vienna. "Barge train II Romania" is being formed between Regensburg and Vienna; 16,000 tons, provisions and ammunition to Romania, for regrouping after conclusion of Marita. One trip will carry supplies for Moldavian base.

- f) Field Post problems which will result from cancellation of Army Leave trains.

Legation Councillor von Schmieder (in place of Etzdorf):

Review of Hungarian situation. Diplomatic procedure at the beginning of hostilities against Yugoslavia and Greece.

Conference with ObdH: Gives me his account of tour to the Balkans.

Conversation with King Boris and Antonescu, List and Weichs. --  
No news about List. Apparently a good deal of friction between Kleist and List, because List regards his drive as the main thing and wants to cut down on Kleist,

Weichs does not want to give any Infantry to Corps Vietinghoff, disregarding ObdH's suggestion.

Boris is mobilizing 6 Bulgarian Divs., but will not allow them to cross into Yugoslav territory, on account of Balkans' Pact.

Antonescu knew nothing at all of our impending offensive against Yugoslavia. Requests that Hungarians should not operate east of the Tisza river. By 20 April, Romanian will have 15 Divs. and two-thirds of one mot. Div. in the Russian border region. Of our German Divs. one will go to the Bukowina border, one to the Pruth river knee; Armd. Div. to the approaches to Ploesti.

Kinzel: New intelligence from Yugoslavia, which gives an entirely different picture; the forces stationed near and north of Nish have moved south and are being replaced by units from central Serbia. Report that 2 Divs. in the Banat have been withdrawn behind the Danube. On the northern border no change.

- Liss: a) Australian Corps has disappeared from Cirenaica. Still in area: Seventh Armd. Div., 1 Australian Div., Sixth British, Ninth Indian. The bulk of the forces sent to Greece come from Cirenaica. After the victory over the Italians, strong forces seem to have been transferred to Abyssinia.
- b) Greece: No British on Serbian soil. Wilson in command?
- c) French West Africa: No change. De Gaulle has not made any progress.

- Heusinger: a) Friendly airplanes will be painted yellow.
- b) British Mediterranean Squadron reported in direction Gibraltar. Azores apparently without importance for Dakar, but in American sphere of interest.
- c) Operation Orseva.
- d) Second Parachute Regt. in Plovdiv area with 2 Bns.; 1 Bn. still due (date uncertain).
- e) Situation Libya: Bengasi taken. Reconnaissance units push on in the direction of Derna.
- f) Air Force in Operation 25. Strength and disposition of forces. Ample.
- g) Effect of Operation 25 on Barbarossa, which lost: 6 Inf. Divs. and 2 Corps Hqs from second and third assembly echelon. and 3 Inf. Divs. from GHq reserve. Of these Divs., the 6 former can be replaced from GHq reserve (third assembly echelon); 2 Corps Hqs, (XXXIX and LII), (third assembly echelon) can be replaced by XXXVII and LV from GHq reserve. Of 23 Divs. in GHq reserve, 12 remain available, including 5 mobile Divs. from the West.

Armer: Campaign in Yugoslavia: 3 Corps Hqs., 9 Armd. Divs. (7 Armd., 2 mot.) plus SS Regt. Adolf Hitler without Greece.

Timing: If Presov available, 17 Inf. Divs. and 13 Corps Hqs could be on the ground by 20 May; then 9 Inf. Divs. of the fourth assembly echelon (maximum railroad timetable); subsequently 24 Armd. and mot. Divs. and 5 Corps Hqs by 23 June. Armd. Divs. in Serbia would have to be refitted in rehabilitation districts (Vienna etc.) by 1 June; consequently must be out of the fighting by 30 April: 10 days for movement to the rehabilitation district, refitting will last 3 weeks.

Paulus took my place at conference this afternoon with the Hungarian War Minister von Bartha.

Bartha told him that Teleki committed suicide because he felt he could not take the responsibility for this policy after having himself signed friendship pacts with Yugoslavia. Left letter to Regent, urging on him a policy of loyal observance of pacts. This has made the Regent waver in his original decision. He sends the Minister to the Fuehrer, to appeal for sympathetic understanding and submit new proposals.

Mobilized: Border Guard, IV, V, mot. Corps (so he says).

Promised additional mobilization of I and VI. II and VII (and III) still outstanding from original commitment. Promises that all Corps will be ready by 15 April (?), Armd. Corps by 12 April.



Paulus had been instructed by the Fuehrer before the conference as to what arguments he wanted him to use with Horthy. Apparently Bartha was extremely embarrassed by these arguments and after the reference to the agreements concluded in Budapest. We must wait and see what comes of this.

5 April 1941.

Morning Conference:

- a) Reports are confirmed that Yugoslavia is shifting her main forces to the area south of Nish. The informations - often grossly overdrawn - differ a good deal. One source places 12 Inf. Divs. and one Cav. Div. in Southern Serbia along Bulgarian border; another reports 10 Inf. Divs., 1 Cav. Div., 8 Inf. Brigs. Reports on Greece generally portray an unchanged situation. Estimates of British strength in Greece vary between 45,000 (which may be correct) and 120,000. The report that the Yugoslav High Command, in case of war, would seek to join up with the British and Greek forces, probably is correct.
- b) North Africa: Bengasi taken; equipment of one Italian medium artillery Regt. and one Armd. Bn. recaptured. Reconnaissance in direction of Derna in progress.

ObdH! Outcome of Fuehrer Conference on the evening of 4 April.

- a) Situation Hungary. The Fuehrer seems to be soft in his dealings with Horthy and appears to be impressed by the Teleki business. Hungary is not going to strike right away; it wants to wait until the Croats have declared their independence. With that, the State, with whom it concluded a Friendship Pact, will have ceased to exist.
- b) Fuehrer is greatly concerned over the Italians, particularly in Albania, as also over the possibility that the Serbs might fall back before the Italians in southward direction into the Serbian Mountains.
- c) Lines of action:
  - 1) Seize Agram quickly. Have Vietinghoff with one Armd. Div. (8th), move on Agram.
  - 2) Provide against developments south of Sava river Vietinghoff's tanks must push further on toward Sarajevo.
  - 3) Serbia is assembling very strong forces in southern part of country. This increases the likelihood that Kleist would have to be shifted south from Nish.
  - 4) Move Reinhard and Vietinghoff closer to border.
  - 5) Airborne operations: Nish 22nd (Airborne Div.), Ueskuels (paratroops).

- d) Overall picture: The conduct of the campaign once more comes under the dictate of political considerations and, what is more, considerations of purely transitory character. This precludes any planning with clear goals and harbors the danger of dissipating our strength in a series of isolated operations. Always the same story. Good nerves are the only antidote.

Heusinger:

- 1.) I shall talk with Witzleben: Hungary's attitude may make it necessary to effect a quick seizure of Agram.\*  
Think over and report: Possibilities in following the original plan of operation against Agram (Eighth Armd. Div., Advance Combat Team, and remainder of Vietinghoff's Corps pushing only as far as the mouth of Drave river). What are possibilities, if parts of Vietinghoff's Corps have to strike earlier. (Fourth Armd. Div. already in place, Eighth Armd. Div. ready to strike on 10 April).
- 2.) Op. Sec. will prepare orders: Tie together List with 20nd Airborne Div. and Parachute Regt. at Plovdiv. Prepare for operation against Ueskueb and Nish. Reinhard will have SS Div. Reich available on 10 and 11 April; "Grossdeutschland" not before 12 April. Examine possibility of striking before these dates. List authorized to start operations.
- 3.) GHq Reserves: a) Troops: 101st Div. already assigned. 100th Div. arriving by 13 April (Vienna). Fourth Armd. Division in Vienna as of 15 April. Twelfth Armd. Div. as of 18 April, Warthe Lager and Olmuetz. Nineteenth Armd. Div. as of 20 April, Sennelager.  
b) Truck transport units available: One group (for 1st Mt. Div.) as of 10 April.  
One group (for 101st and 100th Divs.) as of 23 April.  
One group (for 22nd Airborne Div.), still uncertain.
- 4.) Arrange moving of GHq, so that we can start work at Wiener Neustadt on morning of 9 April.

- Buhle:
- 1.) Development program for Chem. Mortar troops.
  - 2.) Norway: In addition to 160 Batteries: 7 Arty Regt. Staffs (small T/O); and 3 Construction Bns. We give them 1 Fortress Constr. Bn. and 2 Reich Labor Service Bns. Regional Defense Bns., nothing available. --- One Security Brig. --- MG Bn. can be taken out.
  - 3.) Set up Administrative Hq. Budapest by 15 April. (?).
  - 4.) Libya, dust protection for tanks (muzzles and turret base).
  - 5.) Rehabilitation of Armd. Divs. after Operation 25.

Witzleben (Army Hq 25) on phone: Gets 3 assignments!

- 1.) Draft plans for quick seizure of Agram by Eighth Armd. Div. reinforced by Advance Combat Team.
- 2.) Split up 11th Armd. Div. for missions south of Agram and make arrangements for arrival of Fourth Armd. Div., 15 April.
- 3.) Advance starting date for Vietinghoff.

Schuchard (Paris): Rivalry between Embassy and Military Commander more sharply marked. Abetz is in Berlin to see the Foreign Minister. Embassy is overstepping its jurisdiction in all fields and tries to squeeze out the Military Commander. Proof that Embassy is working against us: Dr. Brinon said to be afraid that Abetz might leave his post, on the allegation that he could not work any longer with the generals and Wiesbaden.\* Kommerzienrat Lehrer has mentioned a similar remark indicating Abetz's attitude toward us.

Reasons: Pressure from Ribbentrop. - Abetz! making every effort to score successes against us before his Minister. Arrest of Americans, which von Stuelpnagel refused, leads to disputes. "If higher authorities intervene, the fight might become unending".

von Ziehlberg: a) Current Gen. Staff business.  
b) Studies on revision of Rules of Land Warfare (Kriegsrecht).

Heusinger: 1.) Second Army: Advance Combat Team of LI Corps:  
1 Bicycle Bn., 1 Eng. Bn. mot., 1 Med. Arty. Bn.  
Ready for operations: Fourteenth Armd. Div., 8 April.  
Eighth Armd. Div. 10 April.  
2.) Sixteenth Regt.\*\* and AA Bn., plus AT Co of 22nd Airborne Div. in Bucharest tonight.  
Entire Div. in Bucharest ready for operation by 13 April (?)  
Air Transportation available for two-thirds.  
Commitment only on authorization by OKW.  
3.) Parachute Regt. in Plovdiv by 7 April.

6 April 1941.

Campaign against Serbia and Greece.

Beginning of hostilities in Twelfth Army Sector.

Morning reports: Operation Iron Gate successful.\* Against Southern Serbia, surprise apparently complete. Resistance on Rupel Pass. Ninth Armd. Div., 73rd Inf. Div. and Second Armd. Div. have crossed border. Second Army Sector: seizure of points of tactical importance on Yugoslav territory; demolitions in the interior.

Conference with ObdH: Situation: Corps Reinhard: Date fixed for start of operations. -- Report from von Witzleben (Army Hq 2), that a strong Advance Combat Team of Armd. Corps of Vietinghoff will be ready to strike on 10 April. -- Preparations for bridge construction at Belgrade. Hungarians will help with bridging equipment; German Eng. troops (under-water cutting and welding, and demolition detachments) stand by in Bucharest and Vienna.  
Hungary: In addition to mot. Corps and IV and V Corps, I and VII Corps have been mobilized since 5 April. Still outstanding from original commitment: III, II, VI Corps.

Disposition of Russian Forces: Strong concentrations in the Ukraine are noteworthy. Would be right for an offensive against Hungary and the Bukowina, but I feel sure this possibility can be discounted.

Paulus-Heusinger:

- a) OKW inquires about possibility of shifting Armd. Divs. to Romania: Possible dates of arrival: Fourth Armd. Div. on 22 April, if wheeled vehicles go by road; on 25 April, if everything goes by rail. Twentieth mot. Div. on 24 April, if wheeled vehicles go by road; on 5 May, if everything is shipped by rail. This would mean cutting across shipment of 239th Div., which then would not be ready until 29 April, and 170th Div. would arrive in Romania not on 28 April, but on 6 May.
- b) Airborne troops: At Plovdiv 2 Bns. of Parachute Regt., third on way.  
Arrived near Bucharest: Sixteenth Inf. Regt.  
Remainder of the Div. can be down by 13 April. Commitment only on authorization by OKW.

Air Force reports it believes to have scored a decisive success against enemy force, and that it now will turn to the targets requested by Ground Forces (railroads, highways).

Evening Report: Air Force has made three attacks on Belgrade (Palace, Citadel, Ponton Bridge)  
Destroyed 44 aircraft on the ground, 20 shot down; own losses 2 twin-engine fighters. AA Defense thin.

Sofia reports bombing attack by planes flying at high altitude.

Twelfth Army. Ninth Armd.Div. in action against retreating enemy west of Vetunica at 1400 hrs.

73rd Inf.Div. Advance Combat Team reached Kocane in the evening.

Second Armd. Div. fighting at Strumica. Intends to drive southward.

Sixth Mt. Div. reported on railroad line near Kalo Horjo.

Fifth Mt. Div. and 125th Regt. in heavy fighting on Rupel Pass.

72nd Div. at Chiron, pushing on toward Kate Vondru.

164th Div. advancing on Xanthi.

50th Div. still fighting in Nymphaea area.

Enemy columns moving from Stip on Strumica.

Heusinger:

- a) Plans worked out for changeover from Operation 25 to Barbarossa and for resulting modifications in Barbarossa plan.
- b) Twentieth mot. Div. will move close behind Fourth Armd.Div.
- c) Refitting facilities for Armd. units can be set up in the following areas:

Bucharest for 2 Divs. ( without need of shipping new materiel)

Vienna 3 Divs.

Mil. Distr. VIII \* 3 Divs.

Protectorate 2 Divs.

Berlin 1 Div.

Mil. Distr. IV\*\*1 Div.

- d) Next successes of Rommel in North Africa.

7 April 1941.

Morning Reports: Progress over the evening situation only in Ninth Armd. Div. Sector. They have taken the mountain pass on their front. In the Greek border area fighting is rather heavy.

Libya: Reacting to the first surprise advances, the British seem to take energetic countermeasures to escape encirclement. Fuel difficulties.

Abyssinia: After abandoning of Addis Abeba, the Italians concentrate resistance in some districts of the Interior, in which they could hope to hold out until the rainy season.

Movements progressing satisfactorily. Twentieth mot. Div., if ordered entrained now, would arrive from Auxerre area on 19 April, 2000 hrs.

Disposition of the Russian Forces gives food for thought. If one discounts the much-advertised idea that the Russians want peace and would not attack on their own account, one cannot help admitting that their troop dispositions are such as to enable them to pass to the offensive on shortest notice. This might become extremely unpleasant for us.

Buhle - Wagner:

1.) Refitting:

- a) Schell needs three weeks. Hungary impractical, Romania for minor jobs.
- b) Military District XVII \* : 3 Armd. Divs.  
Military District VIII \*\*: 3 Armd. Divs.  
Protectorate: 2 Armd. Divs. (including Eighth Armd. Div.)  
Military District IV\*\*\* : 1 Armd. Div.  
Military District III # : 1 Armd. Div.  
Romania : 2 Armd. Divs. (Thirteenth and Sixteenth Armd. Divs.) Supply Column Bn Vienna, or rather Chemnitz, where there are better facilities for refitting.
- c) GHq Troops and Columns distributed: (Protectorate and Milit. Distr. IV).
- d) Infantry Divs: 3 each in Milit. Districts XVII \* and XVIII ##; 4 in Milit. District I###. About 2 in Bucharest.
- e) BdE must be ready for MT units by 20 April, for Armd. Divs. by 1 May.
- f) Current tank production: 80 German tanks III and 40 Czech tanks a month.

2.) Administrative setup for Southeast: Military Government for Serbia and, at first, also for Croatia. Preliminary orientation for Thurner. Give him temporary Staff Southeast.

3.) Tension Abetz/Stuelpnagel is really not directed against Stuelpnagel, but against Armistice Commission. The latter has instructions from the Fuehrer to be hard on the French. Abetz wants to take the collaboration line in conformity with Ribbentrop's policies. With Foreign Office and Armistice Commission receiving diverging

directives from above, contradictions and conflicts on the lower level are unavoidable. Futile for us to try to do anything against Abetz from here.

- 4.) Waffen SS - Poland: Reichsfuehrer (Himmler) sends representative to Government General, to straighten out the matter.

Jodl (OKW) on phone: Russia's uncertain attitude. Shall railroads be put on maximum schedule? On Fuehrer's decision, the reply is: No, but defensive measures now can be taken openly.

Housing: Marching orders to Twentieth Div. mot. Move SS troops to more central location in France for convenience of entraining.

Org. Sec.: Requirements for future organization of Ground Forces:

24 Armd. Divs., including 10 for tropical service ("Light Divs.").

12 mot. Divs., including 5 Lt. Divs. for tropical service.

66 Inf. Divs., normal T/O, including 6 for airborne operations and 10 with tropical equipment.

10 Mt. Divs.

24 Mobile Divs., 8 with tropical equipment.

6 MT Regts. for operational assignments.

2 Air Transport Staffeln, each with carrying capacity of 1 Div.

Estimated Needs:

| Theaters: | Armd. | Mobile | MT. | Inf. | MT Regt. |
|-----------|-------|--------|-----|------|----------|
| West      | --    | 6      | --  | 24   | 1        |
| North     | --    | --     | 2   | 6    | --       |
| East      | 6     | 6      | 2   | 20   | 2        |
| Southeast | --    | --     | --  | 6    | --       |

Operational Groups:

|                   |   |   |    |    |    |
|-------------------|---|---|----|----|----|
| Spain Morocco     | 3 | 2 | -- | 2  | 1  |
| North Afr.--Egypt | 6 | 2 | -- | -- | 1  |
| Anatolia          | 6 | 4 | -- | 4  | -- |
| Afghanistan       | 3 | 4 | 6  | 4  | 1  |

Afternoon to Berlin (tailor) 1630 - 1930.

von Below: ObdH will have control of Army Hq 11, Armd. Gp. 2 and 3 during training in Z I (in conformity with my wishes).

Evening Reports: Skoplje and Stip taken, Movement of XVIII Corps in Rupel Pass has gotten under way.



Kleist starts operations on 8 April, 0520 hrs.  
Bridge at Barcs taken (Second Army), which means, that with the bridge at Koprivnica for XXXXVI Corps we can now positively count on two bridges across the Drava.

Jeschonneck calls up, and hints sort of vaguely, that the Reich Marshal has dropped remarks to the Fuehrer on "unsatisfactory" progress of XVIII Corps. This damned back-biting is starting again.  
Fortunately, in this case, the Fuehrer already had the news that meanwhile the XVIII Corps has broken through the mountains after hard fighting.  
I request preparations be completed for paratroop operation against Saloniki.

Hoesinger: Can Second Army be given a free hand for drive on Maribor? Yes!  
Air Force reinforces VIII Air Corps by 2 Fighter Groups, 1 Divebomber Group, 1 Do 17 \* Group, with two more coming later.

Hinor reports mobilization of Hungarian I, IV, V, VII, Corps and the Armd. Corps, comprising 12 Inf. Brigs., 2 mot. Brigs., 2 Cav. Brigs. Eighteenth Brig. not mobilized (area flooded). Nineteenth Brig. remains west of Tisza river.

8 April 1941. Kleist starts offensive in direction of Nish.

Situation Conference: New advances. Skoplje taken. Second Armd. Div. on way to Saloniki. Overall picture shows complete disintegration of the enemy operating in Southern Serbia.

Paulus: Discussion of instructions on deception manœuvre on the Western Front ("Haifisch"). \*\*

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. — With Matzky, Attaché matters.

Conference with ObdH: He is still concerned about Albania, and wants to urge List to move even closer to the Albanian border. Doing this would serve no good purpose, for we are no longer threatened from Albania. Any forces detached in this direction are a waste of troops which now are needed for building up swiftly the front facing south.

Airborne landing at Ueskueb \*\*\* desirable.

Afternoon. Leave on special train, at 1500.

2130. Breslau: List wants to get Fifth Armd. Div. to the south as reinforcement for Ninth Armd. Div. as quickly as possible, so as to be able to break through to Florina. Can't have it. —

Kleist has not yet pushed beyond Piroet. The battle round Nish is still to come. Fifth Armd. Div. is needed there now, but after completion of its mission it can be released for the South. The request to have Sixteenth Armd. Div. brought up is justified.

In the evening, ObdH talks with the Fuehrer from his train. No decision on Sixteenth Armd. Div. Fuehrer suggests that, if road trouble impedes closing up of Fifth Armd. Div. behind Eleventh Armd. Div. toward Piroet, Fifth Armd. Div. might strike toward Kumanovo. (Wrong! In that event the Div. would be lost for the Nish operation). It would be better to have Fifth Armd. Div. attack Leskovac via Piroet.

9 April 1941. (Wiener Neustadt)

0800. (train one hour late): Arrival at Wiener-Neustadt. Our office is in the Maria-Theresia Academy.\*

Situation Conference: Our troops have entered Saloniki (Second Armd. Div.). Local Army Commander has offered capitulation. In Southern Serbia, apparently only remnants of the enemy forces left. Italians report slackening of enemy pressure in Albania. At Skutari too, nothing has happened. North of the Danube, enemy seems to be evacuating. No report yet as to when Reinhard could start operations. In Second Army sector troops on the border are approaching the Drava. Maribor taken. Drava crossing near Barcs in hands of Fourteenth Armd. Div.

Kuebler reports entry of Second Armd. Div. into Saloniki at 0700 hrs.

List protests against yesterday's Wehrmachts communique, which fails to do full justice to the achievements of the Ground Forces and the honor of the attacking troops.

1130: OKW disapproves release of Sixteenth Armd. Div.

By noon it is clear, that the Nish front also is collapsing.

Hence, Fifth Armd. Div. is moved up via Nish in order to be brought to bear against Leskovac. The Greek Army between Turkish border and the Vardar river has capitulated. So far 20,000 prisoners are reported, (not counting the Greeks), including 5 Generals and a complete Divisional Staff; 100 guns; 28 AA guns, 25 AT guns; several hundred MG; 131 new Dornier aircraft engines, (on two fields), aircraft spare part depots; 4 Bridge Columns; 1,5 mill. liter or 1500 tons of gasoline; several rations depots and rations trains, and spare part depots. Skoplje radio transmitter intact in our hands.

Evidence of demoralization: Only the Serbians want to continue fighting. Macedonians and Croats throw their weapons away.

Heusinger:

- a) Reinhard is still facing garrisoned borders and antitank obstacles. Unless enemy withdraws, he will not start before 11 April.
- b) Possible reinforcement: 52nd Do Projector Regt. \* (rocket projectiles) range 6,000 m.  
Eighth Chom. Mortar Bn. (heavy incendiary oil rockets), range 1,800.  
43rd and 51th Engineer Bns.
- c) ObdH. with Fuehrer: Fuehrer releases Fifth Armd. Div. wants if in any way possible, junction with Italians along line Albanian border - Giulia border.

From Libya report of capture of 2,000 British including 6 Generals near El Mechili. It is claimed (agent report) that three Australian Divisions are moving up from Egypt.

Wagner:

- a) Greek Army should receive every possible consideration; Serbian Officers are to be treated in the worst possible manner (OKW order).
- b) Supply for Second Army: All right. Base of XXXXVI Corps is taken over by Staff Grote-Vienna. Field Hospitals for Second Army arrive late. Emergency improvisations! Send them hospital trains!
- c) Barge train Constanza (fuel, ammunition, rations, in ratio 3 to 2 to 1, total 10,000 tons). To be dispatched in groups of 4 ships. Transit  $2\frac{1}{2}$  days.

Heavy British air raids on Kiel!

Evening reports: Kleist has driven through Nish and is advancing northward.

This evening's order to Twelfth Army, by special order of the ObdH, includes the instruction to move Fifth Armd. Div. to vicinity of XXXX Corps via Pristina, and have XXXX Corps make junction with the Italians "on both sides of Debar", completion of mission to be reported at once. To me, this order seems wrong. For it delays XXXX Corps with the trivial business of joining up with the Italians, when there is perhaps still a chance to push ahead, via Bitolj, to Florina, without serious resistance in the next few days. Probably this step, which I denounced when talking with the ObdH in the forenoon, is motivated by political considerations on top level.

The evening report brings a puzzling observation by Air Force that, from 1630 to 1700., no traffic was observed between Kozani - Florina - Edessa and Veria. Either the British are beginning to pull out or they have not advanced farther north than Larissa.

Request Air Force to strike against Volos and Piraeus.

Report from Attache in Ankara that not only Britain, Greece and Yugoslavia, but also Turkish Army circles are exerting strong pressure to induce the Turkish political and military leadership to enter the war. This enthusiasm probably will quickly cool when they have heard announcement of the German successes on the radio.

10 April 1941 (Second Army starts  
operations with XXXXVI Corps)

Morning situation: Nothing substantially new. Fifth Armd. Div. apparently is still on the move to close on Pirot and probably will take two to three days to join XXXX Corps because of the detour over Pristina they had to take. Eleventh Armd. Div. is pursuing the enemy retreating toward Belgrade. In Southern Serbia an Advance Combat Team has broken through to Florina via Bitolj, and has made contact with the enemy. Let's hope that the eagerly desired junction with the Italians in Albania will come off soon, with XXXX Corps having taken not only Bitolj, Kicevo and Tetovo, but also Prizren, and the Italians having proclaimed their intention to meet us by advancing to Bitolj via Struga, and to Kicevo and Tetovo via Debar (Alpinis).

Reports indicating disintegration of the Serbian Army continue to come in. In Northern Yugoslavia Croats seem to have refused to obey orders in some instances. Concerning the liquidation of Thrace we have no detailed reports as yet.

The Greek Government has resigned. Political situation obscure. Unrest in Turkey and apparently also in Rumania. Hungarians (in response to the letter of the Fuehrer) have now promised to strike on 12 April, in the direction of Osijek, perhaps already on 11 April.

Rainhard, who still thinks he has major forces in front of him, now wants to start out on 11 April. We think he will encounter only Border Guards and Cavalry.

1230. Call up Grolman (who will report to Greiffenberg):

- a) Why was plan of attack of Second Armd. Div. changed?  
At what tactical juncture do they intend to attack Veria?
- b) Liquidation of Thrace.
- c) Securing of coastal towns by XXX Corps.

Replies:

- a) Twelfth Army Hq, depending on the rate of progress of drive southward from Florina, is considering bringing up Second Armd. Div. over Edessa or Veria, as soon as the

pressure from the north begins to become effective. Only as a last resort will the Div. be brought up by detouring them to the North, through Yugoslav territory.

- b) Capitulation negotiation concluded and report on way. In the sector of XXX Corps, as also in the mountains around Rupel Pass, the order to lay down arms apparently has not yet reached all elements.
- c) Communication with XXX Corps extremely difficult. Advance Combat Teams are occupying coastal towns. Naval detachments are being called.

1730. Conference ObdH with Fuehrer :

- 1.) New offensives against Greece. Boundary line against the Italian zone: From eastern bank of Lake Prespa to Pindus Mountains.
- 2.) Has agreed to continuation of drive on Larissa. Permission is obtained to transfer 60th Div. \*
- 3.) Italians: Second Army must start operations with parts of Fourteenth Armd. Div. (from Zagreb) in the direction of Fiume at earliest date. The bulk of the Army may move in general direction Sarajevo.
- 4.) Russia: No reasons for anxiety.  
Turkey: Attitude not quite clear yet; it would seem that British money again has been greasing palms. The Fuehrer does not want to let the Bulgarians march into Thrace as long as the Turkish attitude is not clarified.

Gen. Konrad:

- a) Bad weather for the next few days. Snow expected in the Serbian Mountains. Weather will be slow in clearing up.
- b) Distribution of German and Yugoslav air forces, and of German AA forces.
- c) Progress of operations against England. ObdH has likewise no clear picture on the distribution of British Air strength in the Eastern Mediterranean.

1745 Message that Fourteenth Armd. Div. has entered Zagreb, received by cheering population. Evening reports show steady advances by Eleventh Armd. Div. toward Belgrade, as also by Eighth Armd. Div., moving from Barcs on Slatina, and in the south by SS Div. Adolf Hitler from Florina toward Vevi. Elsewhere the reports are that the units following in the rear are closing up on all fronts. We have not yet been able to get the Italians going in Albania. On the Giulia border they are supposed to start on 11 April. I don't believe they will.

Hungarian Liaison Detachment reports on arrival: Brig. Gen. von Beldy, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff) von Makray, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff)

von Sziklay, Capt. Krasznay, Capt. Furgach.

11 April 1941. Good Friday (Operational Group XXXXI Corps starts operations).

During the night the Fuehrer had us on the phone again, trying to make us change the plans for Fourteenth Armd. Div., which is poised to drive west, and for Eighth Armd. Div., which will push southeast. Apparently Heusinger was able to contain this outbreak of jitters. Eighth Armd. Div. ~~will~~ still drive toward Osijek, Fourteenth Armd. Div. is already moving on Karlovac and will be pushed on toward Deince.

Morning conference: Yesterday's picture confirmed: Fourteenth Armd. Div. roaming the country almost without enemy opposition. Eighth Armd. Div. has come up against some resistance near Slatina and will attack again today. The remainder of Second Army finds little opposition in its southward advance, but has difficult terrain and poor roads.

Nothing substantially new from Twelfth Army. The Italians on the Albanian front have not really got going yet and it looks as if we shall actually have to go up to the border to effect the junction. In the south our troops are still in contact with the British southeast of Florina. No positive measures which would indicate that British front is being taken back.

Talk with ObdH: I express resentment over interference with the conduct of operations. This timorousness shying away from every risk while continuously clamoring for victories, may be acceptable politically but from the military standpoint it is intolerable. We have our job cut out in the South, against Greece. Every unnecessary step in another direction is a sin against success.

Wagner:

- a) Labor pains in the setting up of a Military Government in Serbia. Air Force wants to furnish the General, and Consul-General Neubauer, in his capacity of representative of the Four Year Plan, already seems to be up to his ears of blocking any constructive work.
- b) Constanza: One ship can sail. \* Await orders for further sailings. List needs nothing for Kavala. \*\*
- c) Rommel makes preposterous demands. His wishes can be satisfied only insofar as preparations for Barbarossa permit.

Himer reports that Hungarians are set to start off on both sides of the Danube today, at 1400. Divebombers of our Second Army will give ground support. Talk on future missions south of the Danube.

von Greiffenberg reports, 1300: Saloniki harbor taken over empty.---  
SS Adolf Hitler is in action against the British southeast  
of Florina, between the lakes (British still have artillery  
in area ! ) \* --- Kleist: This morning's action still in  
progress. Rupol Pass open for vehicles since last night. --  
72nd Div. will reach Seres tonight.

Reports coming in the course of the day and evening show quickening  
disintegration of the northern Yugoslav front. Units are  
laying down arms or surrender to our planes flying overhead.  
One Bicycle Co. captures an entire Brigade, complete with  
staff. An enemy Division Commander radios to his higher Hq  
that his men are throwing away their weapons and leave for home.  
The only fighting still going on is south of Belgrade, in  
the sector of Eleventh Armd. Div., but here, too, enemy  
resistance was broken by evening. XXXXVI Corps is with its  
right wing at Karlovac, where they are to wait for the Italians  
who have at last come out via Fiume, which has surrendered  
to them. With its left wing, XXXXVI Corps is in the area  
south of Novi Sad. In Southern Serbia a junction with the  
Italians has at last been effected on the northern shore of  
Lake Ochrida (Struga). On the Greek-British front, west  
and southeast of Florina, no new progress. Here we must  
wait for our forces to close up, which should take another  
day or two. In the Saloniki area, XVIII Corps is advancing  
westward. The Hungarians are reported to have started  
operations. Effect is not noticeable as yet.

Reinhard has started off, but his progress has been slowed  
by bottomless roads.

12 April 1941.

(Bardia, North  
Africa, taken).

The situation is developing according to plan. Yugoslav resistance  
in the north has completely collapsed. Croatia wants to  
declare her independence.

North of the Danube, Reinhard, south of the Danube, Cruewell,  
and from the southwest, Eighth Armd. Div. are closing in on  
Belgrade. The fall of the city is imminent.

In Northern Greece the British are making a stand and fight  
back at Vevi, supported by Arty; apparently rear guard units.

After conference with ObdH: New operational order directing  
assignment of First Armd. Group (Kleist) to Second Army as  
of 13 April, 1941, 0600. Divisions previously earmarked  
for GHq. reserves have been stopped en route. We need no  
additional troops for Serbia.

Gen. Streccius and Col. Zoellner call. Nothing of importance

Streccius, Zoellner, Beldy, Maklay, Siklay are my guests at luncheon;



present also Housinger and Ziehlberg.

Evening no more desk work, but visit with Irmingard, until midnight. \*

13 April 1941. (Easter Sunday).

Belgrade taken.

Morning reports: In Yugoslavia things are developing according to plan. Second Army moves in general direction of Sarajevo; in Croatia a Croat National Government is being formed. No news from von Vietinghoff (XXXXVI). The orders to turn south reached him yesterday noon. Since then we have had no signals from him. This must be investigated.

Kleist entered Belgrade with Eleventh Armd. Div. this morning at 0632. after an officers' patrol of Regt. Grossdeutschland had crossed the Danube and occupied the Ministry of War during the night.

More signs of demoralization in the Yugoslav Army are reported.. The Croats have stopped fighting altogether. Only on the Adriatic coast, some energetic commanders still seem to be trying to keep their troops together.

Greece. The Heights barring the approach to Vevi were taken after bringing to bear a concentration of medium artillery. Enemy situation shows the British with about one Corps (three Divs.) in the Kozani area, whereas the Mount Olympus front (facing Saloniki), which previously seemed to have been held by the British, has been taken over by the Greeks (with British Artillery). The plan of attack of Twelfth Army is to launch a double enveloping movement, with parts of its forces pushing on west of the Aliakmon river and with the XVIII Corps striking from Saloniki in the direction of Mount Olympus, and thereby to crack the British out of the Greek Front. This plan is completely in line with our ideas. Casualty reports so far are gratifyingly low: 400 killed, 1,900 wounded). Ammunition expenditure very small.

Morning Conference with ObdH produces no new developments.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Supply base must be set up in Belgrade.
- b) Plan of returning some units by boat, via Italy.
- c) Assignments for 602nd, 605th, 616th MT Regts:  
602nd (moved the Mt.Div.) will be free as of 15 April. To be refitted in Chemnitz and Plauen.

605th (inmoved 161st Div.) will be available on 20 April; probably around Vienna. At the moment, its Third Bn. is with XXXXVI Corps, the other Bns. with 101st Div.

616th (in moved the Airborne Div.) Is the most severely strained of the Three. Second Bn. will be overhauled at Znaim. First Bn. is transport unit under Second Army; stays until 20 April. Third Bn. is in Romania, and will be for some time to come.

- d) Military Governments: Trans-Mur area goes to Hungary. Shift southern border of Styria across the Sava. Italy will take over Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina. Croatia is to become an independent State under German protection. For pre-1918 Serbia (including Montenegro), a centralized Military Government, which will control also the Banat area east of the Tisza river. Of the former, the region between the Danube and the Morava river, together with the Banat area east of the Tisza river is to be placed under special German protection, with military safeguards and a special regime. Southern Yugoslavia, as far as it is inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians, will go to Bulgaria.
- e) The following arrangements are to be made: In the theaters of Second and Twelfth Armies, the Rear Area Commanders will take over administration of these regions for the time being, while making all preparations for subsequently turning them over to the permanent authorities yet to be set up. Since these regions form a single economic whole, it would be advisable to have the two Commanders be assisted by one advisor, that is State Counciller Thurner.

General von Beldy (Hungary):

- a) Reports Hungarians have entered Novi-Sad.
- b) We reach an agreement with him to the effect that the motorized and bicycle-mounted units of the Hungarian Army will cross the Danube and will be further employed in the sector of Armd. Group 1. Hungary's consent to this measure will be secured.
- c) I inform him of our decision regarding eventual transfer on Trans-Mur area to Hungary, at a date yet to be set.
- d) Hungary's wishes regarding Nagykikinda and Agaye areas.

Jodl calls up (for Keitel):

- 1.) Belgrade. On 12 April, 1700., Capt. Klingenberg of the SS Div. Reich hoisted the German flag on our Belgrade Legation. At 1845, the Mayor of Belgrade handed over the city to the representative of the Foreign Office and to Klingenberg. Great excitement in Fuehrer Hq over fact that this report did not reach top level through the OKH.
- 2.) Protection of the Bor mining district.
- 3.) SS Reich and Regt. Grossdeutschland should, if possible, not move southward across the Danube, but rather stand by for other missions.

- 4.) Projected letter to Horthy on continued Hungarian participation. Parallel agreements between both Army Commands.

ObdH (hear from Engel): Fuehrer considers sending one mot. Inf. Regt. to North-Africa. ObdH had previously refused. on the following grounds:

- a) Matter was under consideration for a long time here.
- b) We don't see our way to spare troops for North-Africa in view of the impending great tasks.
- c) Shipping not available until Fifteenth Armd. Div. has reached Africa.
- d) Impracticable owing to lack of motor transport and fuel.
- e) Without strongest air support it would certainly be unwise to enter upon operations with ambitious objectives.
- f) As we approach Egypt, British resistance will stiffen.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. - Preparation of motorized CP caravan for Eastern Campaign.

Talk with ObdH on stopping movement of reserves. In Second Army the units affected are 79th and 125th Inf. Divs., and 60th mot. Div., in Twelfth Army, 46th, 76th and 198th Inf. Divs.

Talk with Gen. Paulus:

- a) Assign Police Div. to GHq reserves in West. Send 169th Div. to Norway.
- b) Divs. of the Fifteenth draft ready by 1 May: 2 Divs., by 15 May: all others. One will go to Norway to relieve 163rd Div., one to reinforce the occupation forces.
- c) Control of Divs., in ZI for training purposes can, in individual cases, still be settled to suit wishes of the Armd. Groups.
- d) Liaison Detachment Rome hands in colossal requests for Rommel. As far as we are concerned Barbarossa has precedence.
- e) Tank Repair Centers: Silesia and Berlin will be ready first, Vienna later. Berlin may be reserved for SS Div. Reich.

Heusinger 2300.: Issuance of current orders - Danube bridge problems. Latest reports on enemy resistance on front of XXXXVI Corps.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Organization of Military Government Serbia and procedure for transfer of territories to Hungary and Italy; also basic outline of structure of Croat State. Issuance

of orders and telegrams to the agencies concerned.

14 April 1941. (Easter Monday).

Morning reports: Continuing advance of Second Army toward Serbian mountain area from the Northwest.

Resistance on the southern bank of the Save against elements of the XXXXVI Corps which are wheeling northward. Resistance also in the area of Cacak, in the Morava Valley west of Krusevac.

On the Greek front: Advance of the Ninth Armd. Div., which has taken Ptolemais. SS Adolf Hitler pushes westward in order to reach the Aliakmon Valley south of Lake Kastoria, and XVIII Corps strikes out eastward along the coast, via Kastoria.

Orders are issued to stop movements of: XXXXI Corps north of Danube (elements which have entered Belgrade will remain there);

Second Army ( 1st Mt. Div. and Corps  
( 125th Div. and 79th Div. under LI Corps  
( 101st Div., which will be shipped back by 602nd  
( MT Regt.

Twelfth Army ( 76th Div.  
( 198th Div.

Rommel wants to drive toward Suez from Sollum via Marsa Matruk.  
Reich Marshal willing to furnish air support.

Talk it over with Jodl (OKW): This operation can be staged only as a raid. To hold Suez, we have neither the troops nor the supply facilities.--

OKW directive on continuance of the Greek operation contains nothing  
now, only some rather awkward formulations.

Fuehrer letter received here sharply declines out-of-turn promotions in the Gen. Staff. This, too, will pass. If there is any place, where achievement should be the standard for promotion, it is our organization.

Non-aggression Pact Russia - Japan for five years !

Albania: Since 13 April, the Greeks have been quite open about pulling back their northern wing. The Italians are following cautiously through Ochrida and Pogradec.

1400. - 1930. : By plane to Hq Second Army at Zagreb.

Review of the situation produces no significantly new information for OKH. The instructions issued by us have not yet reached Army Hq owing to bad signal communications. Future political set-up discussed. - Stopping of rear Divs. - Flight back over Baras, Lake Balaton, Lake Neusiedl.

ObdH at Hq. Twelfth Army, Sofia and Hq Armd. Group 1, Belgrade. Apart from reports indicating desirable development of situation, nothing of significance. Casualties low.

Armistice request by Yugoslav Government is answered with demand for unconditional surrender of arms. Destructions of any kind must cease. German operations are continuing.

Fuehrer's decision on Rommel's requests: Our prime objective is building up a front of ample width in the Solum area (including Shiwa Oasis). Apart from this, only raids.

Submission of OKW directive on Operation "Silberfuchs". \*

Decision on organization of command in XI Air Corps (22nd Airborne Div.): Contrary to our demand, Air Force gets full control.

15 April 1941.

Wagner (Gen Gu): Military Government in Serbia is arranged so that we are only in charge of military safeguards and retain supervision of a general nature over the civil administration (Thurner). In all other respects, we'll let the Police and the agencies of the Four Year Plan fight it out between themselves !

Situation conference: Mopping-up operations in Serbia continue, with our forces converging from west, north and east.

In Greece, Ninth Armd. Div. has secured a bridgehead across the Aliakmon river, south of Kozani, but terrain south of the river is very difficult. The westward drive of SS Adolf Hitler and 73rd Div. through Kastoria still encounters strong resistance. XVIII Corps is advancing through the Olympos area (Mone Petras) and south of Katerini.

Reconstruction of Croatia will be in hands of Glaise-Horstenau.

Gen. Wimmer is slated to head Military Government for Serbia, when it is established.

Conference with ObdH produces no new viewpoints. He is casting about for ways to speed the build-up of a base for Rommel, and wants submarines and the Airborne Div. for this purpose. I think both methods are wrong. The Airborne Div. is non-motorized and therefore useless, once it is landed in Africa. \*\* Furnishing submarines is the business of the Italian Navy, for I think it would be a mistake to withdraw any of our submarines stationed round England and in Freetown.

Gen. Marras pays a call. A rather unproductive interview, during which I tried to rouse his interest in new tasks for the Italians in Bosnia, and to draw his attention to their lack of information on Greek withdrawals on the Albanian front. I doubt that he understood what I told him. -- The possibility of Italian help in using sea route in transferring our troops from Balkan is mentioned.

Col. Toussaint (lately Mil. Attache in Belgrade) gives a dramatic account of his experiences previous to entry of German troops in Belgrade. There have been heavy civilian casualties and much material damage in the city; water and electric supply is disrupted. He shares my views concerning our further military action, which is no longer of the nature of a campaign, but rather a sort of liquidation in which there must be no let-up for even a moment, until the entire country has been combed through. Anyone refusing to surrender should be left to starve.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Review of naval warfare problems: He doubts the reported closing of the Dardanelles by British submarines. -- Coastal shipping route to Solum can be only partly protected by submarines. In any event, using submarines that way offers fewer opportunities for hitting the British, than does leaving them where they are now. Employment of Italian submarines would be desirable.

Gives a summary of submarine warfare todate: The peak will not be reached before next August.

Roosevelt's declaration including Greenland in the Western Hemisphere, is a maneuver to make it easier for the British to protect their convoys. So far only Iceland was included in the blockaded zone; now perhaps we shall have to extend it to include Greenland as well.

SS. Bismarck, Tirpitz and Prinz Eugen are to go into the Atlantic shortly. SS. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (the latter hit by an aerial torpedo and bombs) will not return before July.

Gen. Fellgiebel reports on plan to install a Senior Signal Officer in Belgrade, who will at first be under his command, and later serve under Military Government. Discussion of the new signal communication lines needed for continuation of campaign (Agram-Belgrade-Skoplje-Larissa and Sofia-Saloniki-Larissa-Athens).

Rommel reports meeting stubborn resistance at Tobruk, which blocks his advance; apparently a strong garrison, supported by Naval units from the sea. He has to use the two Italian Divs. to tighten the line of encirclement. Moreover, he is being attacked on the landside from Egypt. Now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the "unique opportunities" afforded by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here.

Gen. Zörn (CG, Twentieth mot. Div.) reports out.

Hausinger: Reintegration into Barbarossa of units employed in Operation 25.

von Altenstadt (Gen Qu):

- a) Collection and screening of prisoners of war. Collecting points at bridges. Classification by nationalities and by following categories: War economy and armaments workers; agricultural laborers from the rich farming districts of Serbia; auxiliary services for our troops; remainder will be shipped home.

Order to this effect to Army Hqs 2 and 12 and letter to OKW.

- b) Croat Legion (Nonsense !) and Glaise-Horstenau's job.

- c) Reorganization of the Reinforced Border Guard at the Styrian and Carinthian border sectors, and activation of new Regional Defense Bns.

Evening reports: The Armistice Commission sent by the Yugoslavs consisted of some Generals of the Fifth and Second Armies, who could not be recognized as plenipotentiaries and so were sent back. - Group Kleist, coming from the north, cannot make any headway against the countless hordes of prisoners entangling his columns in the narrow mountain valleys. A spearhead of Sixteenth mot. Div., led by the Div. Commander and pushing its way through the masses of surrendering enemy units, has reached Sarajevo, where he has taken control of military and other authorities.

The Yugoslav Government has issued a proclamation to lay down arms.

The movements of Eleventh Armd. Div. and 60th mot. Div. continue, but are hampered by Serbs who want to surrender.

In Greece only slight gains on the coast and in the area of Mt. Olympus are reported. The enemy is still holding the Liakmon Valley. Little shipping traffic in the Aegean.

In Albania, the Greeks are falling back slowly.

16 April 1941.

Morning reports show no significant developments since last night. No progress in Twelfth Army sector.

Progress of the surrender negotiations: Weichs' formulation of the conditions is good and leaves no loopholes. The negotiators are not empowered to sign. Formal conclusion of the negotiations therefore cannot be expected before



tonight or tomorrow. In the meantime, fighting is practically over.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

von Thoma: Gets assignment to inspect the Armd. Divs. in Second Army: Condition of materiel, tracks; experiences.

Bogatsch:

- a) Report on reconnaissance work. Cooperation apparently good; reconnaissance units have done a good job.
- b) Reconnaissance behind Greek front in Albania has not yet yielded any conclusive results.
- c) Difficulties in equipping Reconnaissance Staffeln with motor vehicles. Completion of assembly of these units for Barbarossa jeopardized. The Staffeln now ready in France and in the Reich for shipment to the East are in part unable to move to their entraining points owing to the lack of motor vehicles of every description.

Gen. von Beldy requests orders for Hungarian units. Reply: We only want them to keep the mot. units on a stand-by footing. Hungary can dispose of all other units in the way she considers best. Reports of Serbian treachery in the occupied territory. Losses per Brigade: 20 killed, 200 wounded.

Reports coming in during the day contain nothing new, only the shocking loss by torpedoing of Convoy No. 20 en route to Libya. (Last elements of Fifth Lt. Div. and first group of Fifteenth Armd. Div., including the divisional staff and one regimental staff).

17 April 1941. (Capitulation).

Morning reports: Nothing of importance from Second Army sector. The movement toward the Dalmatian coast continues. In the sector of Twelfth Army, it is still a moot question as to what has become of the Greek forces west of the Pindus Mountains. I am quite sure that the opposition still met south of Servia is sustained only by weak forces taking advantage of the exceedingly favorable terrain. But what may be the enemy's operational intentions remains obscure. A drive by our forces west of the Aliakmon river is the only way to prevent the enemy from building up a front. But such a drive would end at Trikala and take us in front of the range rising north of Lamia, which must be regarded as the probable next defense position in the line from Gulf of Volos to Gulf of Aita. Other possibilities are afforded by the line Thermopylae-Lepanto - southern shore of Gulf of Patras. This position would require the transfer of Greek forces from the area west of the Pindus Mountains across the Gulf of Patras to the northwestern part of the Peloponnese.

Conference with ObdH produces in no new viewpoints. One upshot is request to Air Force Officer to intensify reconnaissance and aerial action against the rear of the Greek front in Albania, and order to Hq Twelfth Army along same lines.

The fact that communications between Hq Second Army and XXXXVI Corps and their Armd. Divs. are quite poor, is blamed by ObdH on the General Staff Service (Ic) \*. I shall have the matter investigated.

Gen. von Glaise-Horstenau gives an account on his report to the Fuehrer. He emphasized the necessity to include Dalmatia in the Croat State now in process of formation, because without this territory, inhabited by Croats, the basic concept of the new State, namely unification of all Croats in one independent State, would lack vitality.

The impression gained by von Glaise-Horstenau at the conference is rather discouraging. Out of consideration for Mussolini, the Fuehrer does not want to risk curbing Italian claims. As a result Serbs and Croats will again make common cause against the Germans.

von Glaise-Horstenau has been assigned the mission by the Fuehrer to carry on the drive, initiated by Weichs, to raise Croat troop units of Bn. strength, which will be the nucleus of a Police Army to be organized with 2 to 3 Divs. now, and eventually 6 Divs.; it will receive, on the quiet, support from Germany; efforts should be made to keep out Italian instructors. \*\*

On the political side SA-General Kasche goes to Croatia as German Minister, with Legation Councillor von Trott-Obergsell as his aide, to do the real work.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Summary of Zagreb conference with Krumpelt and Schmidt-Logan:

- a) Supplying of Second Army from the Belgrade base will be possible within the week.
- b) Experiences with "flying start". \*\*\* Some difficulties developed in keeping up the sequence of transports and in regard to equipment.
- c) Organization of Belgrade base: Disband base at Graz and Lake Balaton. Break up supply concentration by sending some to ZI and Romania.
- d) Order for setting up Military Government.
- e) Conference with Himmler:

Each Security Div. will have attached: one Police Bn. mot., one National Socialist Motor Corps Co., and one Technical Emergency Service Co. Release of Police Bns. to the Corps Hqs of the Security Divs. not feasible. Instead one mot. Police Regt., under a Senior Police Chief, will be stationed in area of each Security Corps Hq.

Hausinger: Conditions governing shipment of troops to Barbarossa area. Surrender conditions for Yugoslav Army.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Bogatsch: reports on conference with ObdL along lines of my requests. Also telephone conversation with Konrad.

In the evening report comes in that Bor copper mines were destroyed. Will have to be checked. - Report that capitulation of Yugoslav Army has been signed.

18 April 1941.

Morning situation: Confirmation of report that large bodies of Greek troops have been captured in Grevena Valley (20,000), and that the way to Trikala is now open for our Armor advancing in this region. It would appear that the road from Grevena to Trikala can be used also by motor vehicles.

This and the advance of Second Armd. Div. and XVIII Corps through the Tempe Valley and across the surrounding mountains precludes any further resistance north of Larissa. The enemy will not have any trouble escaping, for the forces committed on the Aliakmon river probably consist only of very weak rearguards, who can take advantage of extremely favorable terrain.

The Greeks, in conjunction with the British, probably first tried to build up a defense line running from Mt. Olympus along the Aliakmon Valley and the Grammose Mountains to the southern border of Albania. It seems that elements from Thrace and the British between Mt. Olympus and the Aliakmon river had this mission, while troops brought up via Kastoria were to take over the central portion of this line. With this portion now cracked out of the defense position, the enemy has to take back his line of resistance. To effect this movement, he appears to have sent back the Greek forces to build up defense positions in the rear, the first of which must be assumed to lie on the high ground north of Lamia whereas the second, and probably the mainline, may be expected along the line Thermopylae - Lepanto. The mot. British troops seem to be forming the rearguard east of the Pindus Mountains and will soon disappear under pressure from us.

West of the Pindus Mountains withdrawal will be more difficult for the enemy. Here the retreating enemy cannot help being crowded together and forced into a bottleneck, where our massed Air Force will have opportunity for effective action.

Major Gen. Foerster to the Air Force, designated as Military Commander for Serbia, calls. I briefly outline to him our interests: Effective military policing, restoration and safeguarding of lines of communications, keeping industries and crop collection going; protecting the Danube shipping route.

Wagner-Altenstadt-Heusinger:

Future military set-up in the Southeast. The best way will be to create a Commander-in-Chief Southeast, similar to the one we have in the west. Under his control should be: the Military Commanders Greece and Serbia, Liaison Command Bulgaria and Military Mission Romania, along with some Divs. (controlled by Corps Hqs.) This Commander-in-Chief Balkans would carry on all the business of the ObdH, and so free us for operations in the East.

Radke: Current business : Mail censorship. -- Check patrols in the occupied Balkan territories. -- Conferences with SS-Gen. Wolff on Poland incidents in 1939 and Tiedemann case - Morale reports.

Gen. Paulus: Current business. -- Deception order. Agreement has now been reached with Navy and Air Force.

Kinzel:

- a) Details of enemy situation. The assumption that the Greeks started early to move troops from Albania to the Olympos area has been proved correct. The Italians saw nothing and reported nothing.
- b) A radio broadcast of the Greek Government has been reported, to the effect that war was lost and that population should keep calm. This report, which OKW wants passed on to all commanders in the field, is most certainly an OKW invention.--

Planes have dropped leaflets with purported proclamation of departing British Commander-in-Chief.

Fellgiebel Communication difficulties in Second Army. The reasons seem to lie partly in trouble with improvised equipment, partly in lack of initiative and skill of radio service in Second Army.

Gen. Wagner Organization of refugee control and materiel collection in the occupied Balkans territories.

von Ziehlberg: Fuehrer's birthday - Reassignments -- Organization of training in Gen.Staff and question of out-of-turn seniority promotions. -- I blow my top over tactless interference of ObdH in my command function.

19 April 1941.

The Morning Conference produces nothing significant in news or viewpoints. Among the intentions of Twelfth Army there is a plan to push XVIII Corps or at least Sixth Mt. Div. from area east of Larissa across the Odris Mountains to Lamia. That would be a mistake, for such a move gets the Div. into terrain on the Thermopylae front, where it could not make use of its special training and equipment (frontal attack across a plain).

PW interrogations are beginning to indicate a crumbling of the Greeks' will to resist on the front west of Pindus Mountains. -- Larissa taken this morning!

Dr. Haessler\*reports his observation on visits to the front. Apart from the usual troubles incidental to the "flying start", everything seems to be all right.

Radke: Current matters of his Section, including dealings with the Party and chaplain questions.

Gen. von Beldy brings a letter of the Hungarian C of S. Report on minor frictions on transfer of the district between the Sava and Drava rivers.

Paulus and Wagner report on visit to Belgrade.

20 April 1941. (Fuehrer's Birthday).

1045 : Awarding of decorations.

1100.: Review of Staff.

1300 : Luncheon with Staff.

Situation: The British seem to be pulling out. South of Larissa our advancing troops are nearing the northern outskirts of Lamia. In the Thermopylae Pass, no evidence of enemy resistance. Roads clear as far as Athens. West of the Pindus Mountains the Greek withdrawal movement after all appears to be slower than was assumed; the bulk of their forces seems to be still north of Yoannina.

Metsovon Pass reported taken by SS Adolf Hitler.

Rumors of formation of new Government and capitulation of Greece.

In the evening, talk with ObdH who feels there is some tension between us. Well meant, but nothing will be changed by it.

21 April 1941.

0800: Leave with Housinger, Mueller-Hillebrand and Senior Aide in Heinkel plane of OKW Staffel ( my personal plane had a crack-up in Belgrade).

1400.: Visit to Hq Twelfth Army. Itinerary Belgrade -- Sofia (stop-over) -- Saloniki. Plan to continue to Larissa was cancelled when we learned in Saloniki that C in C of Twelfth

Army was already flying back to Saloniki, and his C of S had flown on to Yoannina to conclude the armistice negotiations with the Greek Epirus Army.

1600. : Talk with Field Marshal List: The CG of the Greek Epirus Army has surrendered to the German High Command with the explicit understanding, that he was not surrendering to the Italians, who had been defeated by him.

Of German troops, SS Adolf Hitler has entered Yoannina after crossing the Metsovor Pass. Truce already in effect. It has turned out that the entire Greek Epirus Army is still north of Yoannina. List has given orders

- a) for SS Adolf Hitler to advance to the Greek frontier in Albania, and occupy the roads leading into Greece, and
- b) for the Greeks to evacuate Albanian territory, then lay down their arms and march to PW collecting points, in compliance with the instructions of Twelfth Army Hq. Details will be worked out by Gen. Bieler, CG, 73rd Div., as deputy for C in C Twelfth Army.

1800 - 2000. Flight round Mt. Olympus and tour of Saloniki.

Evening at Hq Twelfth Army. New orders from the OKW are received. It would appear that at the time when the OKW gave the order to conclude the capitulation negotiations, the Fuehrer thought he might manage to confront Mussolini with the accomplished fact. That fell through. Mussolini telephoned directly to the Fuehrer and demanded Italy's participation. So the Fuehrer ordered that the capitulation concluded by Twelfth Army should not become effective pending his approval. This was to give the Italians an opening for appearing as partners in conclusion of the capitulation. Such a political maneuver makes the German Field Marshal and C in C Twelfth Army look foolish in the eyes of the Greek Army, and, furthermore, lays the foundation for a systematic falsification of history, designed to create the fiction that it was the Italians who forced the Greeks to capitulate.

As a matter of fact, there was no contact between the Greeks and the Italians at the moment of capitulation, as stated explicitly by the Greek CG. Capitulation became necessary solely for the reason that German troops had appeared athwart the Greek line of retreat. This falsification of history, evidently now in the making, is indignantly protested by C in C Twelfth Army, who insists that the German Wehrmacht communique must give an accurate account of the actual situation in order that German troops would receive the credit due to them for their achievement.

I discuss with List the inaccuracies in von Richthofen's reports to the ObdH, which belittles the achievements of the Ground Forces.

Overnight (21/22) at Saloniki Hq Twelfth Army.

22 April 1941.

In the morning, talk with List. He again emphasizes that he concluded the capitulation negotiations on the direct order of and on the lines laid down by OKW, and bitterly speaks out against the OKW's subsequent action in repudiating the completed surrender. On the whole, reiteration of last night's arguments.

0800 Departure for Larissa. Thrilling flight over the Tempo Valley. Larissa airfield gives the impression of a fairground. There is a constant coming and going of bomber formations and transports. Thousands of men are waiting, working or resting. No enemy far and wide.

Side trip to Second Armd. Div. Talk with Veiel (CG) and Quast (Ic). The Div. is closing up toward Larissa. Materiel is in good shape, casualties gratifyingly low.

Back to the Airfield: Talk with Greiffenberg, Bieler (CG, 73rd Div.). The Italian Armistice Commission, for whom Jodl had been waiting and now will accompany him to Yoannina, has arrived. Talk with Speth, Liaison Officer to the Italian Army in Albania: He says that the Italians had lost contact with the Greeks yesterday, and that they probably started off tonight following reports of armistice negotiations. (Heavy Italian losses.)

1000 Start of return flight: Larissa - Kozani - upper Aliakmon Valley - Lake Kastoria - Lake Ochrida - Debar - Skutari - Adriatic coast as far as mouth of Marenda River - then in clouds over Mostar - Sarajevo - Brod - Lake Balaton to Wiener Neustadt. Arrived 1430.

News that transfer of GHq postponed because of the negotiations in Yoannina. So back to the old place.

1700 Talk with ObdH, who describes the agonizing seesaw during my absence. My suspicion that the Fuehrer, against our warnings, tried to get around the Italians in the negotiations from the start, is confirmed. Apparently he hoped to doublecross his "friend". When the scheme misfired, the muddle started. Incidentally, it is reported the Fuehrer had Field Marshal List expressly informed that he would have acted the same in List's place. Such pats on the back behind the scenes do List no good, as long as he remains publicly disavowed.

The question of an airborne operation against Corinth to prevent destruction of the Canal is once more raised by the OKW with fretful nervousness.

Exchange of views on the Peloponnese. I do not believe that the British are going to defend it. They would have no ports, that are needed as bases.

1800 Report stating that OKW has ordered Air Force to prepare VIII Air Corps for an immediate airborne operation against Corinth. Fuehrer will give word when to start.



That, of course, implies the risk of missing the critical moment.

Quite interesting are the Hungarian demands for compensation of all war costs and their claims to the Yugoslav booty, which would be a credit to a Jew.

2000. Telephone Talk Keitel (OKW)/Oberr: The Fuehrer does not give up the idea of letting the Greeks and Italians settle their war between themselves west of the line Pindus Mountains - Achelooos Valley, and to seal this line by German troops. He will not make his decision contingent on Jodl's return. The SS Adolf Hitler must be taken back to the Metsovon Pass.

2100. Gen. Greiffenberg Hq Twelfth Army ( on phone):

- 1.) Orientation on impending directive along lines of conversation with Keitel.
- 2.) Hq Twelfth Army reports:
  - a) The Greeks agree to sending a parlementaire to the Italian front.
  - b) Greeks and Italians agree to a demarcation line running west along the Kalamas river from a point 5 km north of Yoannina.
  - c) SS Adolf Hitler has been ordered to withdraw behind this demarcation line.
  - d) Greek CG or a plenipotentiary will arrive for final signing in Army Hq, Saloniki, tomorrow noon. Gen. Jodl will remain in Saloniki until that time.
  - e) (in response to my question). Hostilities between Greeks and Italians have not yet ceased everywhere.

23 April 1941.

(Departure from  
Wiener-Neustadt).

Negotiations with the Italians and Greeks dragged on till noon. In the afternoon at last the capitulation was signed. Earlier, however, the Italian Radio blared out reports of the capitulation as an accomplished fact, causing annoyance in the OKW.

Our troops push close to the Thermopylae Pass via Lamia, and strike at Euboea from the Volos area. In the Thermopylae Pass, the enemy is still holding, but apparently only with weak rearguard elements. Tanks abandoned in the Lamia area were burned out by the British.

Up to noontime, there is a continuous seesaw as to whether or not we should move GHq. A decision is finally reached when I declare that I would go.

The reason for my insistence is the North African situation. It is worrying me, and the pertinent information is available only at Zoppelin. \* Rommel has not sent us a single clear-cut report all these days, but I have a feeling that things are in a mess. Reports from officers coming from his theater as well as a personal letter show that Rommel is in no way up to his operational task. All day long he rushes about between the widely scattered units, and stages reconnaissance raids in which he fritters away his forces. No one has a clear picture of their disposition and striking power. Certain is only that his troops are widely dispersed and that their striking efficiency has considerably deteriorated. The piecemeal thrusts of weak armored forces have been costly. Apart from that, his motor vehicles are in poor condition from the action of desert sand. Many of his tank engines need replacing. Air transport cannot meet Rommel's senseless demands, primarily because of lack of fuel; aircraft landing in North Africa find no fuel there for the return flight. In view of all this, it is essential to have the situation in North Africa cleared up without delay. After giving thought to the matter, I decline flying down myself. It would not do for me to go there merely for fact-finding purposes. If I go, I want to have authority to give orders. ObdH has his private objections on that score and pretends difficulties with the Italian High Command. The real reasons of course are others, but perhaps it is better to dispatch Maj. Gen. Paulus. He has good personal relations with Rommel from way back when they served together, and he is perhaps the only man with enough personal influence to head off this soldier gone stark mad. Representatives of Oper. Sec., Org. Sec., Gen. Qu., as well as Capt. Loyke and Soltmann, of the Navy, would accompany him.

Say good-bye to Irmingard;--- 1600. - 1900. Return flight to Berlin, above the clouds ( up to 5,000 in altitude; very cold) in Heinkel machine of the OKW courier Staffel.

Evening at home. Georg Seiderer\*\* happens to have dropped in.

24 April 1941.

50th anniversary of Moltke's death. Return to Zossen.

0830. Leave Berlin.

0930 : Arrive at Zossen. Guard lined up for review; honor company of Guard Bn. Double sentry in front of my house; all flags out; flowers.

0950.: Conference with OQu I.

Following our phone talk from Wieser-Neustadt, OQu I has made the following preparations for sending aid to Rommel:

1.) Alerted:

a) Five Bns. from several Divs. in the ZI issued special equipment for desert service and additional carts and some motor vehicles.

- b) Eng. Training Bn. specially equipped as Assault Eng. Bn. and fitted for desert service.
- c) Two Coastal Artillery Bns. (533rd and 523rd) with 15 cm guns.

Timetable for fitting these units for desert service:

- 2 May: Eng. Training Bn. and 533rd Coastal Artillery Bn.
- 7 May: III Bn., 347th Inf. Regt., and 523rd Coastal Arty. Bn.
- 12 May: Two Inf. Bns.
- 17 May: One Inf. Bn.
- 20 May: One Inf. Bn.

- 2.) Maj. Gen. Paulus will be accompanied by Staff Officers. Departure 25 April, evening via Rome. Duration of absence estimated at 8 - 10 days.

Outcome of conference: Preparations are approved. Railroad movements for getting Fifteenth Armd. Div. to Naples must be speeded up, so that Rommel's most urgent requirements would be actually on hand at Naples, when needed. It may become necessary to establish a Hq at Naples, to supervise these troops.

Liss reports on enemy situation in Eastern Mediterranean. Distribution of forces:

Greece: 4 Inf. Divs.  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div. Elements of (first) Cav. Div. (mecz.) (some shipped out).

Tobruk: 1 Inf. Div. Elements of  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div.

Solun: 3 Inf. Divs. Elements of  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div.

Mersa

Matruh:

Nile Plain: 1 Inf. Div. plus one Inf. Div. being activated and two Egyptian Divs.

Palestine: 1 Inf. Div. Elements of (First) Cav. Div. (mecz.)

Irak: 3 Inf. Divs.

Syria: 1 Inf. Div.

Abyssinia: 6 Inf. Divs.

---

|               |               |  |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| 21 Inf. Divs. | 2 Armd. Divs. | 1 Cav. Div. plus three Divs. not available for immediate commitment. |
|---------------|---------------|--|

OQu I: Appraisal of situation:

We have reached a crisis, not at Tobruk, but rather at Solun. Enemy in Tobruk at the least matches Rommel's strength and is

even superior in artillery, but we may hope, to contain him. A decisive attack is out of question at the time.

If Rommel is beaten at Solum, which is quite possible in view of the mounting reinforcements brought in by the British, he will probably have to raise the siege of Tobruk. That would be highly undesirable, particularly for propaganda reasons. Now, the only way to help him effectively would be by committing the Air Force. Sending more ground troops has little value, for they would only encumber operations of the Africa Corps, which are predicated on high mobility. Air Force, however, is severely hampered by the low state of fuel stores in Africa.

Up until 5 May we are unfortunately quite helpless, and can only sit tight and hope that Rommel will manage to pull through. After that date, the Fifteenth Armd. Div., moving on schedule, will begin to come in.

Sending airborne troops to Africa seems pointless, for they would be immobilized there \*. Better keep them for Crete; such an operation would relieve Rommel very effectively.

Instructions for Paulus:

- a) Get a clear picture of the situation: Disposition of forces, striking power, terrain conditions, ammunition situation, supply, care of wounded. What are the possibilities for defensive operations if Solum should be lost?
- b) Make Rommel understand that our resources for sending aid to him are very slender. Find out his intentions in the light of present circumstances.

Heusinger:

- a) Teletype to OKW, transmitting telegram from Rommel. (significantly addressed to OKW), in which he reports increasing pressure round Bardia and for the first time hints at possibility of serious reverses.
- b) Teletype to Rommel spelling out to him that he cannot count on any help and so must shape his decisions accordingly.
- c) Distribution of forces in Yugoslavia: new German-Italian demarcation line.
- d) Jurisdictional questions regarding the new Military Commander: Executive Power must remain vested in CG, Second Army.

During the day several telephone consultations with ObdQ on the situation in North Africa. At first he frantically cast about for a workable plan, but finally resigned himself to acceptance of the fact that we could not do any more than what has already been done.

25 April 1941.

Thermopylae Pass has been taken. The British are fighting apparently with portions of two Divs., of a total strength of about three regimental combat groups. Our Mt. troops (5th and 6th Mt. Div.) play a decisive part in the advance. The Thermopylae road is demolished in several places. No reports available on previously claimed crossing to Euboea.

Putting into effect surrender of the Greek forces seems to have run into a snag north of the demarcation line. In that area there is still a full Division, which seems to be disbanding itself to escape the Italians. South of the demarcation line, collecting and disarming of prisoners seems to be proceeding in good order. Now, of course, SS Adolf Hitler cannot strike south (Gulf of Patras) except with reconnaissance forces. Lemnos occupied.

The parachute operation against Corinth is scheduled for tomorrow.

At our request, OKW has released to us, as of today, two air transport groups, which will be ready in Naples tomorrow and can be used to ferry over the Engineers of Fifteenth Armd. Div., to be followed by Rifle units of the Div. They will fly to Derna, via Tripoli.

Gen. Buhle:

- 1.) Activation of new smaller units (independent Bns., etc.) for North Africa.
- 2.) Preparations for Barbarossa are proceeding according to plan. Motorization of units not yet entirely assured. Uniformity of armament (MG 34, Lt. Field How. 18), will be accomplished by May.
- 3.) Old-type 21 cm How. for Guderian; they are better for Armd. Groups than the new type which takes longer to get ready for action.
- 4.) Replacements for the elements of Fifteenth Armd. Div. lost by torpedoing will be ready around middle of May.
- 5.) Partial motorization and filling up of 22nd airborne Div. will perhaps be completed by next fall.
- 6.) No more furloughs after 5 May, when maximum railroad schedule goes into effect.
- 7.) 900th Brigade\* very weak as yet, only 2 Bns., with complements!
- 8.) Special : Field Bns.\*\* Belong under BdE, not the Field Army.
- 9.) Technical Emergency Service \*\*\* will be integrated in Field Army after start of Barbarossa.

von Thoma: Report on inspection of Armd. Divs. in Second Army.

On the whole, good impression: Little wear and tear of vehicles low expenditure of ammunition. Maintenance and state of repair good, but rubber track blocks badly worn by mountain roads (1 Div. 1900 rubber track blocks). Three weeks will be sufficient for rehabilitation of all units. Resupply of spare parts was difficult due to the speed of operations. Commanders want supply by air (3 Junker transports for each Armd. Group). He inspected Fourteenth, Eighth and Eleventh Armd. Divs., and 60th and Sixteenth mot.; 60th mot. made a particularly good showing.

von Bernuth: Report on chemical smoke demonstration. Results seem to be quite promising if for both river crossings and area blanketing.

Training film program Motion-picture units for Africa.

Gercke: a) Lagging performance of railroads. - Coal shortage.

b) OKW request for rail transportation for Seventh Air Div. and 22nd airborne Div. turned down.

c) Barbarossa: On the whole progress is good.

d) Railroad situation in the Southeast. Bridge across Sava River at Belgrade will be restored by middle of June.

e) Railroad program "Otto" completed; improvised, but geared to full capacity.

f) Road program for "Otto" completed.

26 April 1941.

Morning situation: In North Africa situation seems somewhat eased by beating back of British tank attacks at Solum. At Tobruk enemy continues sorties. Our Air Force seems to have scored successes. Italian submarines, capable of operating only during night time, however, cut into supplies for Tobruk.

In Greece, our advances continue. Thebes taken. Advance toward Corinth (Fifth Armd. Div.). Parachute operation in progress. Bridge blown up. Offer of Greek Commander-in-Chief to form a new Government.

Kinzel: Russia: Overall situation unchanged since 1 April. Since that date strength in the West has been increased by 10 Divs. Expanded peacetime Army (about 170 Divs.) may now be regarded as being up to war strength. It is doubtful whether supply units have been activated. Trains are constantly moving up additional materiel (e.g. 250 trains to the Vilna area), to all evidence to bring equipment up to war strength; up to now many Divs. were still short, especially in artillery. Krebs reports that many units still have very large shortages in equipment.

As to personnel, Complaints are heard on lack of commanding officers. Regiments are being commanded by young Majors,

Divisions by Colonels. Strengthening of the Western front (by arrival of 10 new Divisions) is noticeable above all round Bialystok and Lwow. Behind the front, which is very close to the western border, are stationed four Armd. Groups of varying strength:

Bessarabia  
Near and to the west of Zhitomir.  
Vilna.  
Pskov.

CQu IV If U.S.A. entered the war now, we would have to reckon only with the peacetime Army, i.e. at most five Inf.Divs., two Armd. Divs., one Paratroop Bn, one or two Marines Divs., 30 Bomber Squadrons, 10 Reconnaissance Squadrons, 20 Fighter Squadrons.

Wagner (Gen Qu) with Finkh:

- a) Readyng and allocation of truck columns for Barbarossa. As result of activation of new MT. Regts., drawn from resources of industry and Nat. Soc. Motor Corps, our requirements seem to have been amply met. Of the old MT Regts. two, i.e., 605th and 616th, are at present in the Vienna area, and one (602nd) in Saxony, for overhauling. The distribution plan provides for allocation of transport to Armd. Units, Armies and Forward Gen Qu Hqs. \*.

Allocation of transport:

|   |                |             |                                       |
|---|----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| Barbarossa:   | AGp. South     | 15,880 tons | ) including<br>Forward Gen Qu<br>Hqs. |
|   | AGp. Center    | 25,020 tons |                                       |
|   | AGp. North     | 12,750 tons |                                       |
|   | Gen Qu Reserve | 13,590 tons |                                       |
| Libya   |                | 2,190 tons  |                                       |
| Southeast   |                | 480 tons    |                                       |
| West  |                | 2,970 tons  |                                       |
| To be made available<br>from various sources<br>(Chief of Ordnance,<br>Construction Program East,<br>Snow Clearing Southeast) |                |             | <u>2,040 tons</u>                     |
|   |                |             | 74,920 tons                           |

- b) Fuel situation. Request additional 10,000 cubic meter \*\* for training purpose from OKW.
- c) Lack of truck replacements. Gen Qu has nothing. All goes to the newly activated units.
- d) Future organization of the Southeast under C in C Balkans.



Noon report: Greek Commander-in-Chief's offer to form Government is supported by all Commanding Generals of the Greek Army. Corinth has offered surrender.

Heusinger: Last daily reports. -- Transfer of units from the Balkans. -- Notes for report to Fuehrer.

27 April 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).  
Athens taken.

Morning reports indicate new advances of Fifth Armd. Div. against enemy rearguards on two roads leading to Athens.

Greece: Embarkation of enemy troops \* on the east coast of Attica, at Piraeus and on the Peloponnese continues. Highly effective attacks by our Air Force on enemy transports at sea. The parachute operation has been successful and Corinth is taken. West of Pindus Mountains, SS Adolf Hitler is advancing southward through Arta. Consultations between Italy and Germany on the formation of a new Government under Greek Commander-in-Chief.

Libya: Arrived by air: 1 Bn., 2 Rifle Cos of Fifteenth Armd. Div. (46 airplanes). Scheduled for today: Remainder of Rifle Bn., 2 Eng. Cos. of Fifteenth Armd. Div. (50 airplanes). Another Rifle Bn. and Oasis Assault Cos to follow later. Afterwards replacements for lost portions of MG Bn., before 6 May.

Other reports during the day:

Athens occupied by Motorcycle Rifle Bn. of Second Armd. Div. Enemy retreating to Peloponnese. SS Adolf Hitler crossed Gulf of Corinth and took Patras after short fighting. An eight-ton bridge has been struck across Canal of Corinth.

28 April 1941.

Morning situation: Capture of Athens, Corinth, Patras confirmed. OKW directives on occupation of Crete. Argument with OKW over transfer of 22nd airborne Div. to Greece by trucks. Using our road transport for this purpose would rob us of 602nd MT Regt. for Barbarossa, where it has been apportioned among the Armd. Groups.

Operation "Merkur": \*\*ObdL will have operational control of airborne troops and air transport units operating already in the Mediterranean theater. Army only will have to hold in readiness reinforcements including a Mixed Tank Bn.

Navy makes all preparations for sea communications. Protection of communications etc. jointly with Italian Navy.

Libya: The first reinforcements ferried over in planes have arrived. A situation estimate by Rommel describes the situation as tense, but despite the alleged inefficiency of the Italian troops he has decided to attack Tobruk. He will concentrate all German forces for this task, leaving defensive operations around Solum to the Italians. In my opinion this is all wrong.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Experiences on Greek fortifications. Investigate and submit report on Greek and Yugoslav fortifications.
- b) Russian land mines. The Russians are said to have only old mines in wooden boxes. That I don't believe.-- Plastic mines render mine detectors ineffective.
- c) SS-ferries: Distribution and plans for use in Barbarossa. Very little seems to have been done in this respect. Assault boats: Distribution and use in Barbarossa.

Col. Ochsner: Report on chemical smoke demonstration on 7 and 8 April.-- Review of progress made in equipment and training of troops. Use of gas by Russians, and countermeasures.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Liaison between advancing spearheads and OKH through Liaison Officers equipped with shortwave sets, \* assigned to these elements. Monitoring companies as relays.\*\*
- b) Tele-communications through Hungary.-- Tasks in the Eastern Mediterranean - Barbarossa.

Gen. Buhle: 15,000 Polish peasant carts as of 10 May.-- 10 GHq Aa Bns.-- 7,000 foreign legionnaires for Africa. \*\*\*

Gen. Brand: Distribution of coastal artillery on the various fronts.

29 April 1941.

Morning report: Tripolis-in-Peloponnese taken. The Italians now hold the islands of Korfu and Preveza. In Cyrenaika, the situation seems to have been relieved by the German thrust at Solum. Whether this has improved prospects for success of the attack on Tobruk remains to be seen. Airborne landing on Crete set for 17 May.

Gen. Brennecke: (C of S AGp. North). Brief discussion on the mission of his Army Group. No lateral diversion! Push straight ahead into the country! \*  
Report on progress of Gen. Staff work. Satisfactory.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Organization of Southeast after the end of the Balkans Campaign. High Command in Balkans to be assumed by Army Hq. 12. Under Army Hq. 12: Military Government Serbia, for administrative tasks, a new Corps Headquarters (reduced\*\*) for control of troops (3 Divs.). Corps Hq XVIII for control of troops (3 Divs.) in Greece. Civil administration of Greece by Italy. Plenipotentiary German General in Bulgaria to take care of German interests (transportation, transit of troops, Quartermaster Service). Romania will be placed under C in C Balkans, as soon as operations based on Romania have started.

Major Deyhle (OKW): Report on tour to Army Hqs. 2 and 12. -- Danube shipping lane will be reopened early in May. -- Croatia wants to activate 37 Bns. (800 rifles and 16 MG each), as a beginning.

Heusinger:

1.) New orders to be issued to Army Hq. 12:

- a) Ninth Armd. Div. (Lamia): tracked elements to depart from Florina-Saloniki as of 5 May. Land march elements \*\*\* will entrain at Belgrade. Arrive in Military District XVII # 27 May (joins Group Kleist in place of Fifth Armd. Div.).
- b) Second Armd. Div. will follow Ninth Armd. Div. in similar manner early in June. Arrive in Military District ## III by 21 June (!). Will try to speed up movement by using sea route.
- c) Fifth Armd. Div.: Redeployment uncertain now. Later to GHq Reserve.
- d) Fifth and Sixth Mt. Divs., 164th Inf. Div. will stay behind in Greece for time being.
- e) 50th Inf. Div. (Saloniki) and 72nd Inf. Div. (Katerini) to Central Moldavia, via Sofia. By rail, as far as possible; movement completed middle of June. 125th Inf. Regt. will remain for the moment. 46th Inf. Div. to be relieved by Bulgarians (report!) and shipped to Belgrade.
- f) Withdrawal of Corps Hqs. created no difficulties. To stay behind: XVIII Corps Hq. and one other Corps Hq., for Serbia.
- g) GHq troops begin to run off 4 May. Still some trouble with Army Hq. 12 over one Eng. Bn. and two GHq Arty. Bns.

h) AAA in Greece is assigned to AGp. South. Must not get stuck in operation "Merkur".

- 2.) Liaison Service for Barbarossa. Liaison Officers with shortwave sets to the Armd. Groups ! Liaison Detachments for the Army Groups. Use OKH Monitoring Cos. \*
- 3.) Eighth Armd. Div. now can revert to its original organization under Hoernpfer (Czech equipment). Tenth Armd. Div. goes to Gudorian.

Luncheon with CO and Officers of Guard Bn.

OQu IV:

- a) Formation of Government in Greece: Duce asserts. Demands territorial safeguards, needed by Axis against later territorial surprises. Benzler and Italian negotiators. Is to be concluded today.
- b) Yugoslav shipping in ports goes to Italy, elsewhere to Germany.
- c) Rumored meeting Fuehrer/Darlan at Munich, middle of May.
- d) Current business, including methods of Air Force reporting and relations with Intelligence Officers. -- Movements of members of Attache groups.

von Ziehlberg:

- a) Routine Gen. Staff personnel matters. Switch Salmuth/Greifffenberg/Foertsch. \*\*
- b) Reorganization of projected Liaison Staff North as a new Corps Hq (reduced), to serve as Hq for troops in Serbia.
- c) Liaison Officers for Operation Barbarossa.
- d) Awarding of Iron Crosses and out-of-turn seniority promotions of Gen. Staff Officers.

30 April 1941.

Morning situation: Libya reports lessened tension. Softening up operation for assault of Tobruk will start tonight, with main forces to attack on 1 May. In Greece, evacuation of the Peloponnese completed. 5,000 British captured. Mytilene planned for 4 May. Brief conference with ObdH; Question of switch Salmuth/Greifffenberg/Foertsch.

1500. Report to Fuehrer:

1.) Timetable for Barbarossa:

Transport Echelon III, peacetime railroad schedule,

8 April - 20 May: 17 Divs., GHq troops from ZI and West.

Transport Echelon IV A, maximum railroad schedule, 23 May - 2 June: 9 Divs. and GHq troops from West.

Transport Echelon IV B, maximum railroad schedule, 3 June - 23 June: 12 Armd. Divs. and 12 mot. Divs. from ZI, West and Southeast.

Greater speed impossible because of transportation difficulties and time needed for refitting of units. No possibility to shift in time: Two Armd. Divs. (Second and Fifth), one mot. Div. (60th).

2.) GHq. Reserves:

30 Divs., including 5 Divs. from West and Police Div. Of this total, 11 Divs. are at present still in the Balkans.

3.) Comparison of Russian and German strength:

Discussion of the expected border battles, especially in sector of AGP. South. Opportunities for Hungarian troops. Opportunities afforded by Pruth front, if we have enough troops.

Fuehrer:

a) Formula for talks with Hungary, Finland and Romania: "Major developments possible in the West. Hence protection of the East essential. Russia has treated us unfriendly on several occasions, and we had better provide against surprises". Talks may start probably around 23 May.

b) Need for safeguarding Ploesti,\* Cernevođa .\*\*

c) Schobert will take over command six weeks before the start of operations, i.e. on 15 May at the latest.

4.) GHq. troops: Review of need to have all forces on hand for Barbarossa. The 10 cm guns and siege guns sent to Libya will be badly missed. Only one 10 cm Battery is to leave, while developments are watched. In case Tobruk falls, remainder will not be needed. Temporary shift of railway Btrys. from West to East ( 7 out of 17 Btrys.). Approved !

5.) Review of line-up on completion of movements: Fuehrer informed of activation of 15 Replacement Brigades. Recommendation to send to Holland only one Div. of the reserves of C in C West, as second occupation Div. (OKW order !) is approved. Replacement units must not be used for guard duty! (Holland). Improvement of 82nd Div. impossible (Keitel).

Fuehrer: Appraisal of British possibilities for landings in Portugal and Spain (Northern coast and from Gibraltar), perhaps

also Spanish Morocco.

6.) Miscellaneous:

- a) Final policy for occupation of Aegean Islands. Italians will do the Cyclades. We do Mytilene, Chios and Samos.
  - b) Divs. to stay behind in Greece.  
Fuehrer: Captured guns for coastal defenses ( British 9 cm).  
Fuehrer hopes that less than 3 Divs. will do. Mt. Divs. must be freed for other missions.
  - c) Plans for reorganization of Balkans High Command. Military Government Serbia will be subordinate to it. (Fuehrer).
  - d) Outfit additional Armd. Corps for Libya. Required materiel by BdE.  
In the evening Gen. Paulus reports from Libya:
- 1.) In the event that Tobruk falls, he will instruct Africa Corps: Secure Cyrenaica along general line Siwa-Solun-Bardia with echeloned south wing to guard against enveloping attempts. No advance beyond line Siwa-Solun, except for reconnaissance forays, even if the enemy withdraws further eastward. Forces must be regrouped and filled up. Watch coast.
  - 2.) In the event that Tobruk holds out, he wants to instruct Africa Corps to prepare a position along the eastern border of Cyrenaica, with left wing at Ain El Gazala and deep echelonning on right flank; line is to be manned with newly arriving reinforcements. Investment of Tobruk will be upheld until onset of hot season or until the tactical situation at Tobruk or Solun make necessary the planned withdrawal to Ain El Gazala position.

1 May 1941. ( All-out attack on Tobruk)  
( miscarried !)

Morning situation:

- a) Mopping up operation in Serbia round Propastica set for 3 May. -- Occupation of Mytilene set for 4 May. -- Parade in Athens (with Italians) set for 4 May.
- b) 23rd Convoy has sailed. No air shipments possible yesterday. Remainder of 2nd Bn. of Rifle Regt. will be shipped only today.

Brief conference with ObdH about Crete ( he wants to have some say about it and will talk to Fuehrer \*) and Libya; my travel

plans to the Pruth front.

Heusinger:

- a) Basic military-political data of an operation against Spain, Portugal.
- b) Movement of GHq reserves to be scheduled so that units in West will be drawn upon as late as possible.
- c) Wishes of AGp North concerning shifting of Divs. No objections.
- d) Preparations in the West for "Seelöwe". \*

Order to Paulus: \*\*

- 1.) I concur with proposed line Siwa-Solum, but possibilities of line Siwa-Mersa Matruh also should be studied. Under no circumstance should Rommel advance beyond Siwa-Solum line without order.
- 2.) Preparation of defense line on the eastern border of Cyrenaica is all right and, if necessary, could be held by skeleton garrison consisting of Italian Forces moved up for that purpose. Newly arriving German forces should not be immobilized in this line as long as there is a chance of using them for a new attack on Tobruk, protected by a covering force at Solum. Use only Armor at Solum.

Luncheon at Kopp's, afternoon at home in Berlin.

2 May 1941. (Outbreak of hostilities between Irak and Britain).

Morning reports bring nothing new except from Tobruk. The attack of 1 May has no doubt resulted in considerable gains at the important southwest corner and has breached the fortified lines against stiff resistance, especially by Australian troops. But for the time being it is doubtful that our forces are sufficiently strong to exploit this success and capture Tobruk. The 23rd Convoy with its precious cargo of tanks has reached Tripolis.

Operations on the Peloponnese are concluded. The take of British prisoners has risen to a gratifying figure. British losses in materiel seem to have been especially high.

ObdH on phone: Re Floesti, Cernavoda, Constanza and protective measures to be taken in connection with Barbarossa.

Field Marshal von Bock calls up concerning the switch Salmuth/von Greiffenberg. It is agreed that von Salmuth takes over XXX



Corps. Foertsch takes Greiffenberg's place.

Vogl (Armistice Commission) calls up:

- a) We get 3,000 - 4,000 trucks from French North Africa. Purchase Commission has left for Tunis. In return, the French want us to unfreeze the remaining trucks and release one Brig. General (Souhain) from prison camp.
- b) Combining transfer of the trucks with shipping vegetables to Tripoli is silly and would only delay the whole operation. It is essential for us to complete it with greatest dispatch.

Gen. Buhle :

- a) Organization of and directives for High Command Balkans and "German General at the Bulgarian Army High Command".
- b) Statement of policy by Gen. Staff regarding future development of the Engineer Corps.
- c) Allocation of the Polish peasants' carts from the Government General. About 2,000 for each Div.

Radke: Final disposition of the affair Tiedemann-SS \* concerning Grebbe line and of the unsettled issue of the SS incidents in Poland. -- Soldier mail censorship. -- Case Mieth. -- \*\* Heuerberg-Wichung incident. \*\*\*

OQu IV: Situation in Spain: Former disinclination of the generals to Spain's entering the war seems to be waning. British pressure must have let up. Monarchist tendencies. -- Attache tour to Rupel Pass. Russians, Turks, and Danes will be included. Return of Japanese Commission will not coincide with date of our attack. #

Hansen: New disposition of Turkish forces. Large elements in Thrace are being taken back to the Chataldsha Line. -- Troops in the Straits reinforced. -- Reinforcement of garrisons on the western coast not yet confirmed. -- Some troop movements from the interior to the southern coast.

von Etzdorf: Latest plan for the territorial division of the Balkans provides for:

- 1.) An autonomous Slovenia under Italian protection. The German language enclave of the Gottschee is to be liquidated by exchanging the German inhabitants for Slovenes from the territory taken over by us.
- 2.) An autonomous Croatia under a Prince of the House of Savoy, with a coastal strip from Spalato to Cattero.
- 3.) Montenegro as well as an enlarged Albania, in personal union with Italy.
- 4.) A severely truncated Serbia, with a capital as yet undecided (Krushevac, Nish or Belgrade).
- 5.) Bor district ## under German rule. We also acquire mining concessions for non-ferrous metals in Croatia and in the territory annexed by Bulgaria.

- 6.) Backa goes to Hungary, which also wants access to the sea in Croatia (free port) in return for relinquishing the triangle between the Drava and Mur rivers to Croatia.
- 7.) Banat, for the time being, remains under German rule. May be turned over to Hungary later on, if Romania could be compensated by the return of Bessarabia. (1)
- 8.) Saloniki is to become a free City ( the Danzig of the Mediterranean.)

Liss submits intelligence digest on British Army in Greece.

Apparently Seventh Australian Div. had not yet arrived in the theater. ( Only advance detachments were present, with the remainder in Tobruk and Egypt.)

Positively identified: "

Sixth Australian Div. ) with complete Arty. and  
 Second New Zealand Div. ) three Regts. each  
 30th Brig. (Homeland), probably independent, plus 1 Armd.  
 Regt. (Second Armd. Regt.)

Prisoner take to date: 2,000 British from the U.K. (including many construction workers), 1,300 Australians and New Zealanders, 1,200 Cypriots, 1,350 Jews and Arabs, 150 Indians, 2,000 Yugoslavs.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Instructions regarding radio training and maintenance of radio discipline during the waiting period in the East.

3 May 1941.

Morning report indicates:

- 1.) The mopping-up operation in Serbia near Propastica turns out to be a minor matter, which seems to be running itself.
- 2.) Our troops operating from Attica have occupied the island of Skythos.
- 3.) Paulus radios that the Tobruk operation must be regarded terminated, bringing only inconclusive local gains . Troops in bad shape. He has instructed Rommel not to resume the attack unless it offers chances of a quick success without major expenditure of forces, i.e. if the enemy leaves of his own accord. For the rest, pursuant to our directives he has instructed Rommel to regard the holding of Cyrenaika his primary mission, regardless of whether or not he had Tobruk, Bardia and Solum. To this end he was to reinforce the line Giala-Solum with mobile forces forthwith, regroup and dispose his troops in depth around Tobruk, and prepare a defense line along the eastern edge of the Djebel (El Gazala and southward).

Whether the arrival of Fifteenth Armd. Div. will permit resumption of the attack on Tobruk, is contingent on developments in the near future.

Talk with ObdH: He approves Paulus' instructions. Telegram is sent to Rommel, confirming Paulus' instructions as an official order of ObdH. \* — Prepare for sending to Libya: Two heavy Bns. requisitioned from OKW, 5 independent Bns. and replacements. — Speed up transfer of trucks from Tunis to Tripoli; send captured British motor vehicles from Greece to Libya.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Query regarding "Haifisch" and "Seeloewe". Answer: Must be geared to what is available on the spot. — Bordeaux Supply Base for Spain and Portugal. — Projected administrative set-up in Greece. — Advance supply bases probably will have to be established at Saloniki and Athens.

Heusinger:

- 1.) Navy: We have 12 destroyers: 3 in the Channel, 5 in the Baltic, 4 laid up for repairs. 30 Motor Torpedo Boats: bulk round Britain, rest in the Baltic. Use in Eastern Mediterranean too complicated because of need of setting up refuelling stations. For Crete, Italy will furnish 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  Motor Torpedo Boat flotillas.
- 2.) Army Group B. Russian airplanes reported over German territory.
- 3.) "Haifisch"—"Seeloewe".
- 4.) Army Hq 11 to Romania middle of May. At the same time CG, Second Army with skeleton Staff to Munich, to look after the Divs. in South Germany (which are being refitted after the Balkans campaign). Staff of Army Hq can carry on present duties under Corps Commander pending List's arrival. Army Hq 12 will not be installed as High Command Balkans until after conclusion of operation "Merkur".
- 5.) Redeployment from the Southeast:  
SS Adolf Hitler, 25 - 29 May, from Saloniki. Will have completed refitting by 21 June, and so come in time for jump-off of Group Kleist. .  
Second Armd. Div. sails 14 and 15 May: Tracked components from Patras, wheeled components from Spalato. Refitting in Munich, beginning 31 May; ready to move from Munich as of 20 June; accordingly will be in time for the start, if needed. Fifth Armd. Div. will depart with tracked components from Saloniki, on 31 May, with wheeled components from Belgrade, on 6 June. Arrives in Mil. District III for rehabilitation on 25 June. Too late for jump-off.
- 6.) Disposition of Reserves:

|              |         |           |              |
|--------------|---------|-----------|--------------|
|              |         | allocated | allocated    |
|              | 2 roads | 1         | 2 AGp. North |
| 16 Divs. un- |         |           | AGp.         |
| allocated *  | 2 roads | 2         | 3 Center     |
|              | 2 roads | 2 x 2 **  | AGp.         |
|              |         |           | 2 South      |

---

|                        |                          |                         |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 16 Divs. as of 10 July | 7 Divs. prior to 10 July | 7 Divs. prior to 1 July |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|

Spot must be found yet for Second Armd. Div. !

Goes to AGp. South at early date.

4 May 1941.

(Sunday, Berlin)

Reichstag: Serbian Campaign.  
Tribute to work of Gen.Staff.

OKW directives:

- a) Occupy the islands of Chios and Melos before start of "Merkur".
- b) Directive on preparations for a military operation on Iberian Peninsula in the event of British moves against Portugal and Spain (or Spanish Morocco). Our implementation orders \*\*\* were ready( e.g. Bordeaux Supply Base).
- c) Directive on conversations with Finland, Hungary, and Romania.

For Finland, with whom conversations are to start very soon, a program has been drafted, providing for OKW to initiate the talks, which then are carried on by the several branches of the Armed Forces. OKH's responsibility for talks concerning Finnmarken and Southeast Finland is still undefined.

By the end of May Hungary will be warned of the possibility of a Russian threat and told of our readiness for defense; this will be coupled with the request for getting set to step up her defense measures.

Romania will be informed only at the last possible moment, and even then we must speak only of defensive warfare.

It is apparent from various indications that both Horthy and Antonescu had hints of the plans directly from the Fuehrer, which these two gentlemen interpreted as pointing to an imminent German attack on Russia.

Paulus remains in Africa in compliance with my teletype message. I am glad he is there to act as a guardian of our ideas, which have also the blessing of the Fuehrer.

5 May 1941.

0900 Rabenau, Erfurth, von Ziehlberg: Proposals on development of the Reich Archives into a "Mecca" of German military historians.

Two plans are submitted:

- 1.) "Cowstable" ground plan, i.e. closed quadrangles with plain exterior, and
- 2.) Castle type, with more elaborate ground plan, especially a portico to the South, and a finely proportioned inner courtyard. The latter solution is more desirable in principle.

Questions of motion picture archives.

Questions of central information service.

Erfurth, Ziehlberg: Objective of military history research after the fall of 1941, when our job in Europe is completed.

Situation conference:

West: British react to our movements \* to the West and anticipate imminent invasion.

Libya: German casualties 30 April - 3 May :

8 Officers, 102 NCO's and EM killed  
16 Officers, 267 NCO's and EM wounded  
1 Officer, 64 NCO's and EM missing.

24th Convoy has sailed with remaining tanks and vehicles of the units transported by air.

Southeast: Second Army: Mopping-up operation proceeding without losses. -- Misconduct of Hungarians in the Banat. \*\* -- Desertion to us of Romanian soldiers of Racial German extraction must be discouraged !  
Twelfth Army occupied Mytilene and Chios, meeting only light resistance. 50th and 72nd Inf.Divs. have started redeployment.

Italy: The remainder of the islands, Naxos, Cyclades etc. will be occupied by the Italians. Proposal on demarcation line between the Italians and ourselves on the mainland forthcoming.

Gen. von Salmuth:

- a) Claims there is not enough photographic reconnaissance in the East.
- b) Border still guarded by Reinforced Border Guard Service. Are they to stay? Russians are getting cocky. Reply: Yes.
- c) Operational details.
- d) Personal matters: Handing over of functions and taking over of XXX Corps. \*\*\*

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Motor transport situation still tight, but better than a year ago ( before campaign in the West).
  
- b) Outfitting of Supply Troops for Barbarossa completed.
  
- c) Combat Troops: Artillery: Ready except for 10 Arty. Bns., which are only partly mobile.  
 Not yet ready: Four 10 cm Gun Bns. ; } Activation not yet  
   } ordered because of  
                Two med.Fd.How.Bns.; } lack of towing  
   } vehicles.
  
- AA and Siege Gun units, partially mobile \* - ready.

Engineers: Activations, as specified by Gen. Staff, completed. Of the 34 30-ton Truck Columns demanded for Engineer and Railway Troops, 20 are ready. Timber trailers for Engineers are still lacking. Equipment of Signal Troops with trucks and special motor vehicles still deficient.

- d) BdE thinks activation of units earmarked for Barbarossa would be completed by beginning of June. Whatever comes later is to be used as filler and loss replacements.
- e) Two Med. Arty. Bns. for Rommel not before 20 May.
- f) Directive for C in C Balkans.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Report on tour to Libya.

- a) Overall impression not bad. Morale good. Food situation good, health good; troops suffer from night cold; ammunition situation tight.
- b) Italians absolutely unreliable ( shooting of two officers demanded, others ought to be put, before a court-martial).
- c) Coastal shipping all right as far as Bengasi; past that point only "in dribbles", but, in any event, possible. Absolutely safe and dependable is only the overland route, but it is continually harassed by enemy aircraft at night. As long as we have no AA and fighter protection for Bengasi, we cannot take a direct sea course to that port. \*\* A present Bengasi waterfront damaged by enemy air action, and unloading impossible; unloading at Tripoli hampered as result of waterfront explosions. \*\*\*
- d) As long as the British have Malta, Rommel cannot stage an offensive to the East.

Krumpelt: (OQu 2) # reports on his experiences in the Serbian campaign. Armd. troops show enormous rapacity ##. Good results obtained with bicycle-mounted. Regional Defense troops, which act as collecting organization right behind Armd. troops relieving them of prisoners and securing captured materiel.

Ehlfeld reports on plan for distributing coastal artillery: We must economize on the Balkans in order to be strong enough in the Baltic and the Black Sea, and have reserves for Spain. Transfer of Railway Artillery from the West to the East (Barbarossa) will weaken the West for about three weeks. \*

Evening, 2000. - 2100. Conference with ObdH:

- a) Open questions Greece: Troop requirements and coastal artillery.
- b) Unsettled questions in Barbarossa: Talks with Bock, Reichenau, Kleist.
- c) Assignment for Army Hq 11. Directive.
- d) Army Hq 11 will be relieved by Army Hq 2 from all duties relating to the Mission in Romania, until such time when List will be available to assume his duties as C in C Balkans.
- e) Completion of building for Potsdam Military Archives must get priority.
- f) Loyke's report on Libya and Malta.
- g) OKW directive on Finland. Many obscure points.

Col. Krebs returns from Moscow, where he substituted for Koestring. He found the Russians very conciliatory. Russia will do anything to avoid war and yield on every issue short of making territorial concessions. Russian Higher Officers Corps decidedly bad (depressing impression). Compared with 1933, picture is strikingly negative. It will take Russia 20 years to reach her old level. Rearmament is in progress. New fighter planes, new long-range bombers, but pilot performance and ability is poor. Long-range bombers apparently concentrated close to German border. Shipments of construction material for fortifications are kept rolling to the border. However, there is no evidence of troop concentrations.

Warner ( Gen Qu):

- a) Truck situation for Barbarossa. Least satisfactory in Seventeenth Army.
- b) Truck situation in Libya: Of French materiel we can expect: 250 serviceable trucks in about 3 weeks  
1500 serviceable trucks in about 12 weeks.  
Fifteenth Arm. Div. will have difficulties in getting spare parts for its numerous vehicle types.  
Repair facilities in Libya too limited. An MT pool for desert service will be activated by end of June, and can be in operation in Bengasi early in July.
- c) OKW has at last released 10,000 liter of fuel for training purposes.



d) Bordeaux Supply Base for "Isabella". \*

6 May 1941.

Morning conference: No significant news:

Reports from North Africa indicate that the British Fleet Air Arm has become remarkably active again. The story is that they were short of bombs for a few days.

Beginning 12 May, only X Air Corps, with 50 flights a week, will be available for ferrying troops to Libya. The value of these shipments is in any case problematic, for the troops arrive without any equipment.

Italians want to have the use of Tunis. Memorandum by Guzzoni. They maintain, that with the shipping situation being what it is, they could not hold Libya, let alone prepare an offensive, without that port. It becomes increasingly evident that without Malta we'll never have a safe supply route to North Africa. But the Italians hold that Malta cannot be attacked and so want us to mount a drive on Suez, via Turkey.

Question of the Attaché for Irak is discussed. Two officers are to proceed to Mosul by different routes.

Gen. Wagner (with Lt. Col. Wagner): Report on impression in Libya.

There was apparently serious concern for Solum and Tobruk, but situation has eased since the British withdrawal from Solum.

Supply: Shipping to Bengasi by the coastal route suffices only for current needs. No possibility for stockpiling.  
Reasons: Getting supplies through to Tripolis contingent on naval and air protection, which at present is inadequate. Lack of air defense at Tripoli and Bengasi. Navy treats coastal shipping route as a secondary supply line instead as the vital main supply artery which it is.

Supply situation at the front: Ammunition on hand:  $1\frac{1}{2}$  basic issues; generally sufficient; relatively lowest is ammo for heavy Infantry weapons (0.5 - 0.7 basic issue). Supply of tank ammunition good (2 issues) AA ammo supply has again improved (now  $2\frac{1}{2}$  issues).

Rations: On the whole all right. Our field rations are said to be too rich for warm climate.

Fuel: Adequate; new tanker for bulk deliveries in prospect; tires, no complaints.

Spare parts: Requisitions are filled only up to 10-15%. Needed: Setting up of a spare-parts depot at Bengasi.

Relations between Germans and Italians in Rommel's Hq apparently rather strained; good in Air Force.

Rear Services hard to control because of enormous distances involved. An Admin. Hq is needed for Tripoli.

Naples apparently all right. Ample stocks.

Heusinger:

- a) Siege Gun Bns. for Tripoli (Libya).
- b) Parachute and Airborne Troops will not be available in early phase of Barbarossa because of operations on Crete.
- c) When Hansen leaves his post as Chief of Military Mission Romania, Speidel (Air Force) is to take over that agency as an Armed Forces Mission. Hauffe can carry on his work as Ground Forces Mission, independently of Speidel.
- d) Outlook for giving AGp. Center one Div. from GHq. Reserves.
- e) Report of Second Army concerning revision of the southern boundary of the new districts to be incorporated into Styria and Carniola.

Koestring and Krebs: Review of Russian capabilities in face of impending developments. No important new viewpoints. Luncheon.

Lt. Col. Doerr, lately Liaison Officer to Second Italian Army calls en route, is going to Air Force Gen. Staff as instructor for two-week course on problems of ground operations.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Nothing essentially new to be learned from Southeastern Campaign.
- b) Build-up for "Barbarossa" well under way. Will pose no overwhelming difficulties. The individual Army Hqs already have their Rcn. Staffeln assigned.
- c) Close range Rcn. Staffeln have an average of 7 planes (Reserve of 120 Henschel planes).
- d) Long-range Rcn. Staffeln have 9 Me 111 (Twin-engine fighters). \* Activation completed. Assignment to respective Army Hqs now under way. Distribution:

|  |          |
|--|----------|
| ObdH                                       | 2        |
| AGps. South and Center, 2 each             | 4        |
| AGp. North                                 | 1        |
| Armd. Groups                               | 4        |
| Eighteenth and Eleventh Armies, for flanks | <u>2</u> |

total: 13

3 night Staffeln,

grand total: 16.

- e) Truck situation has improved, but there are some weak spots still. We'll do the best we can with making up deficiencies from the Greek booty.

Major Hansen: Outcome of OKW conference on Irak. France agrees to transfer of arms from Syria to Irak (Mosul). German planes will get permission to land in Syria. Fuel must be supplied by France (Beirut). German bomber operations depend on delivery of this fuel. Dispatch of German Officer to Syria necessary.

Gen. z.b.V. Mueller, with Judge Advocate General.

- a) Order to troops along lines of last Fuehrer address to the generals. Troops must do their share in the ideological struggle of the Eastern Campaign.
- b) Questions of administration of justice in the AGp. Rear Areas.
- c) Easing of rules concerning channels for approving death sentences against army personnel during operations. \*

7 May 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Greece: Greek prisoners are now being discharged. (Difficulties can be expected when the Italians enter the country.) Corinth Canal will not be cleared for another 20 days.
- b) Libya:
  - 1.) At last a decent situation map; it shows that Rommel has broken up his units in a wild pattern and conducts a campaign with very scanty forces on a widely extended front which cannot be measured with European standards.
  - 2.) Tripoli: Air attack and explosions during the night of 3/4 May caused heavy damage and losses in the port. Unloading capacity of Bengasi considerably reduced and unloading of ships will be delayed: 24th Convoy cannot be cleared before 9 May. 25th Convoy cannot follow before 10 or 11 May.
  - 3.) Fourth Air Fleet (Greece) now takes over night operations against Tobruk.
- c) Irak: Local clashes with occasional use of arms over wide area; not a war as we know it. May last a long time! Combat action apparently only near Habbania, where Irak troops have been in the attack. German Mission being formed (probably Felmy, Niedermayer).

- d) Russia: Stalin becomes Chairman of Soviet of People's Commissars, which means strengthening of his position.

Gercke: 1.) Yugoslavia:

- a) Danube traffic now unobstructed. Danube, Tisza, Sava mined (being cleared).
  - b) Bridge at Maribor will be completed probably by middle of June. Bridge Zemun-Belgrade can be expected for 10 June.
  - c) In Belgrade we want a Hq with special powers, instead of a civilian Railroad Directorate.
- 2.) Hungary: Cooperation smooth. Frictions between Romania and Hungary can be settled by the Deputy of Chief of Transport. Road construction projects in the northern border area, which were originally shelved by the Hungarians, are now carried out by them of their own accord.
- 3.) Railroads and roads for "Barbarossa" making satisfactory progress.
- 4.) Build-up for Barbarossa: 17,000 trains. After completion of assembly, reserves will be moved plus 106 supply trains, daily, beginning 24 June.
- 5.) Air protection of railroads in "Barbarossa":
- 15 2 cm Railway AA Batteries (16 guns each):
- |                                     |          |
|-------------------------------------|----------|
| AGp. South (from Air District VIII) | 3 Btrys. |
| AGp. Center ( from Air District II) | 7 "      |
| AGp. North ( from Air District I )  | 5 "      |
- 6.) Spain. Iron bridge must be restored for "Isabella".

Col. Metz (C of S XIV Corps), calls en route and asks for transfer to another organization ( wants a Rifle or Armd. Brigade).

OQu IV:

- a) Question of Anglo-Indian PWs (1,100 in North Africa). Ship to Germany. Will be used for propaganda purposes. \*
- b) Darlan very accommodating in the Irak question. Only minor counter demands ( asks that postcards be allowed in inter-zonal mail).
- c) Attaché tour, Mellenthin in charge, 11 - 22 May, Athens and Greek battlefields.
- d) Difficulties in the Crete operation ("Merkur"). One New Zealand Div. 40 airplanes; shore Btrys., etc.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Directive for C in C Balkans and subordinate Liaison Officers, etc.
- b) Coastal artillery for Barbarossa available middle of June:

|                           |   |          |
|---------------------------|---|----------|
| 3 Bns. for Baltic         | ) |          |
| 3 Bns. for Black Sea      | ) | without  |
| 3 Bns. GHq Reserve (plus  | ) | traction |
| 3 more by middle of July) |   |          |

For activation of GHq reserves we need the third Btrys.\* of 211th, 15th, 223rd Divs. (light Btrys.), and 205th, 212th, and 218th Divs. (medium Btrys.), all in the West. Remaining Batteries get 6 pieces each.

- c) Medium GHq artillery: Ready by end of June:

4 10 cm Gun Bns.  
2 med. Fd.How. Bns.

- d) Buy up French coastal artillery in Tunisia for North Africa ( 16 7.5 cm Gun Btrys. , 8 10,5 cm Gun Btrys., 12 22 cm Gun Btrys.).

Evening: Party given by Gen. Yamashita of the Japanese Army commission at the Adlon Hotel. Talk with Osterkamp, Leeb, Fromm.

8 May 1941.

Situation conference:

- 1.) Effective 10 May, the area west of the Pindus Mountains will be taken over by the Italians.
- 2.) Operational control for Crete. ObdL will have overall responsibility. Ground forces will operate under him, to the complete exclusion of OKH (Dangerous business!).
- 3.) A teletype from Army Hq 12 states that ObdH has authorized them to keep the following components of Fifth Armd.Div. until further notice:

One Motorcycle Rifle Bn. (was to ship out 31 May). There is no way of getting it replaced.

One mixed Tank Bn. which, however, has already been assigned to Seventeenth Armd. Div. (Guderian), and would leave a hole there. If this Tank Bn. is committed in Crete, it can be replaced in "Barbarossa" only by a group of five mixed Armd. Platoons (captured tanks), which are now being activated and will be ready for shipment as of 18 May.

Detachment of these elements renders Fifth Armd. Div. practically unusable, i.e., it reduces the Div. to a reinforced Armd. Regt.

- 4.) Redeployment of troops from the Balkans is proceeding according to schedule.
- 5.) Nothing new in Tripoli. Supply is the main problem, as before. Unloading capacity of Tripoli harbor still four ships at one time. Strong British convoy escorted by 2 battleships, several cruisers and aircraft carriers (apparently troop transports) reported between Gibraltar and Malta, moving East.
- 6.) Irak situation still hazy. Unconfirmed report of successful British sortie from Habbania. Darlan makes far-reaching offers:
  - a) German submarines and merchant ships may use bases on the African West Coast in return for release of small forces for West Africa.
  - b) Exchange of unreliable leading personalities in North Africa (including Nogues). Wants return of Giraud.
  - c) Arms in Syria to be released for Irak against replacement from sealed stocks, which Darlan would send to Syria.
  - d) Broad support for German activities in Syria. Permission to land, airfields, release of French planes for our purposes. In return: Easing of postal restrictions and interzonal pass regulations, and reduction of occupation costs.

- 7.) Railroad line Saloniki-Belgrade now operates on a regular schedule of 7 trains daily.

Crete: Air Force units for the operations:

XI Air Corps (without 22nd AB Div.)

VIII Air Corps:

Third Staffel, 121st Long-range Recon.Gr. } 2 Long-range  
Seventh Staffel, Second Tactical Exper. Wing } Recon.Staffeln

Hq Second Bomber Wing:

I Gruppe, 2nd Bomber Wing }  
II " 2nd " " }  
III " 3rd " " }  
IV " 26th " " } 2 Bomber  
(of X Air Corps) } Groups

Hq 51st Bomber Wing:

I Gruppe, 51st Bomber Wing }  
II " 4th " " }  
I " 1st " " }  
II " 1st " " }

|     |                                       |   |              |
|-----|---------------------------------------|---|--------------|
| Hq  | Second Divebomber Wing:               | ) |              |
|     | I Gruppe, 2nd Divebomber Wing         | ) | 1 Divebomber |
| III | " 2nd " "                             | ) | Group        |
| I   | " 3rd " "                             | ) |              |
| Hq  | 26th Long-range Fighter Wing:         | ) | 1 Long-range |
|     | I Gruppe 26th Long-range Fighter Wing | ) | Fighter      |
| II  | " 26th " " " "                        | ) | Group        |
| II  | " 76th " " " "                        | ) |              |
| Hq  | 77th Fighter Wing:                    | ) |              |
|     | II Gruppe 77th Fighter Wing           | ) | 1 Fighter    |
| III | " 77th " " "                          | ) | Group        |
| I   | " Second Tactical Exp. Wing           | ) |              |

Gen Qu Wagner:

- a) Early ruling on future administrative set-up of Army Hq 12 in Greece is imperative.
- b) Truck situation: Before start of "Barbarossa", 300 trucks will be received to cover in part the deficit of 1,430 vehicles in units, and 400 automobiles etc., to cover deficit of 1,256 automobiles.  
  
After start of "Barbarossa": 1,500 trucks, 1,500 automobile, 500 motorcycles for allocation by Gen Qu every month.
- c) Rommel is crying for more supplies, especially ammunition. Shipping space is the bottleneck!
- d) Experiences in sector of Second Army in Yugoslavia: Advance Supply Point \* system proved very good, if forwarded far enough. Organization of requisitioning must be organized at an early stage \*\*. Determination of supply-roads to be built must take into account supply needs as well as troops movements.
- e) Items for OQu conference: Balkan experiences, signal communications in the Gen Qu service, dumps, maintenance of motor vehicles, Air Force supplies, supply arrangements for Armies in "Barbarossa", etc.
- f) Administrative Orders for C in C S. East.

Major Soltmann: Observations in North Africa. It is important to note that Indian troops apparently are poorly armed and very badly treated by the British. Indians show positive attitude toward Fuehrer.

Prisoner of war matters. Insolence of the British. Italians sneering.

Counterintelligence questions; counteract enemy espionage, expand our own.



Crushing verdict on Italians, who lack moral fibre and any interest whatever in the war.

Major von Merz: Observations in North Africa. Organizational questions. Substantially confirms what I have heard from other sources.

Maj. Gen. Paulus calls up from Catania. Crux of problem in North Africa is not Tobruk or Solum, but organization of supply.

Heusinger:

- a) Assembly of reserves. New schedule. Its first reserves following directly behind Transport Echelon IVb. First and second wave already assigned to Gps., remainder is available for flexible planning. Overall picture satisfactory. We can make the Southern wing strong, and still have ample reserves for Center, which is very strong already, and for the Northern wing.
- b) Political instructions for Greece \* have not yet come in. Remind OKW.
- c) Effective 15 May unit war journals must again be kept.
- d) Order of battle of "Combat Group North" of the SS: one full Div. mot. of three Regts., only one of which will not take part in operation "Silberfuchs".

Talk with ObdH, on his return, about conditions in Greece and operation "Merkur".

9 May 1941.

Situation report:

- 1.) Africa Corps reports loss of 53 Officers and 1,157 EM and NCOs in offensive operations at Tobruk. Very high.
- 2.) Rommel's distress calls for supplies are getting more urgent.
- 3.) Abyssinia: Italian resistance seems to be drawing to a close. British officially still reckon with 30,000 men.
- 4.) Situation in Iraq confused. It would seem even now that the attempted uprising against the British is about to break down.

Conference with ObdH: His notes on Greece:

- a) Elements of Fifth Armd. Div. staying behind in Greece for operation "Merkur".
- b) GHq troops for List; he must organize his own mot. units.

- c) List must arrange with Fourth Air Fleet for re-transfer of command of ground troops after landing in Crete.
- d) Date for "Merkur", 17 May, if serious resistance anticipated; otherwise, 11 May.
- e) Transfer of Army Hq 12. Location of new Hq still undecided.
- f) Bulgaria/Turkey: Bulgaria is already getting impatient to discharge her troops. As long as Turkey's attitude is not entirely clear, only furloughs can be authorized.
- g) Alleged high-handedness of the Bulgarians on the line Sofia-Nish-Saloniki (a Bn. is reported in Nish and Saloniki).\*
- h) Relations of Greeks with Italians and with ourselves.
- i) Food situation in Greece. (First aid of 30,000 tons of grain. Mobilize Hungary and Turkey.)
- k) Greek Government has no money. Interim credits necessary.
- l) Development of situation on the Balkans (jurisdiction of C in C Balkans; status of the Italians).
- m) Army Hq 2 needs a mobile reserve in the final set-up.
- n) Seventh Air Div. will be moved from Bucharest to Greece by overland route, using 4,800 trucks!\*\*

Paulus (on phone):

- 1.) He has talked with Italian Chiefs of Gen. Staffs of Armed Forces and of the Army. They assure him that all aid requested will be furnished.
- 2.) Fighter and AA protection for Bengasi is yet to be pushed through.

Guests at luncheon: Gen. von Greiffenberg, Gen. Scherer, Baentsch, Liss, Wanka. The latter reports on North Africa.

Afternoon, dentist. Afterwards Navy film: Submarines against the West (1700.-1930.)

Back in the evening and paperwork into the late hours of the night.

10 May 1941.

#### Situation report:

- a) Clamorings of the Africa Corps for supplies increase and grow more urgent.\*\*\* All we can do for them at the moment is sending a few more SS ferries (10 ferries are already

down there, together with 20 surf boats without motors).\*

- b) Situation in Irak still obscure. British appear to be getting the upper hand.
- c) Conference Darlan/Fuehrer set for 11 May.
- d) Railroad situation in the East again tight. Backlog 500 trains in the East alone. Beginning 16 May no more trains will be run for less-than-trainload shipments.

Buhle: Africa:

- a) Foreign Legion: \*\* 2 Bns. and 1 Bn. Mt.Arty. possible in July.
- b) Add one Regimental Hq and one more light Artillery Bn. to Fifth Lt.Div. by end of June.
- c) Add one Rifle Regt. to Fifth Lt.Div. from an Armd.Div. earmarked for Africa, in exchange for MG Bn. (Convert to Armd.Div.)

Matzky-Mellenthin: Question of Attachés accredited to Balkan States. Foreign Office representatives at Army Hqs. Orientation of Washington attaché. -- Problems of Gen.Staff intelligence service.

Fellgiebel:

- 1.) Tele-communications in Southeast:

|  |   |            |
|--|---|------------|
| Sofia - Saloniki   | } | all right. |
| Belgrade - Saloniki via Nish   |   |            |
| Belgrade - Saloniki via Bitolji  |   |            |
| Saloniki - Athens, 5 lines plus decimeter radio connection via Mt. Olympos - Euboea. |   |            |

- 2.) "Isabella": Keep ready 8 Cos of the Signal School.
- 3.) North Africa wants one more Corps Signal Bn. Can't be done. Perhaps smaller organizations to help them along.

von Ziehlberg:

- 1.) Special aide for Propaganda \*\*\* to ObdH, Schwatlo-Gescerding.
- 2.) Problem of decorations for Hq personnel and Gen.Staff Officers.
- 3.) Current business of Central Branch.

ObdH (on phone): Concern over supplies for North Africa. -- Worries over thoroughness of preparations for operation "Merkur". -- Stop redeployment of 73rd Div. as a precaution, in order to have reserves on hand in case "Merkur" fails.

11 May 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

Luncheon at Kopp's. - I meet Lutz (father).

1700.-1930., Paulus: Report on his 2½ weeks' stay in North Africa. Stopped in Rome and paid call to Mussolini.

Situation in North Africa unpleasant. By overstepping his orders, Rommel has brought about a situation, for which our present supply capabilities are insufficient. Rommel cannot cope with the situation.

12 May 1941. (The R.Hess affair breaks.)

Morning conference: Libya: Solum reinforced by one Armd.Bn. and one Motorcycle Rifle Bn. Italian submarine with 79 tons of ammunition en route to Derna, another one being readied.

Italy: Conference Guzzoni-Rintelen. Transfer of X Air Corps to Greece possible under Italian convoy escort. On the return voyage, the convoy will ferry over Second Armd. Div. to Taranto and then completes the transfer of the second half of X Air Corps. Loading of Second Armd.Div. for Taranto starts 13 May.

OKW conference, Salzburg (today 1800.):

- a) Operation "Merkur" and its repercussions on Barbarossa. We are asked to release for "Merkur": 2 mixed and 4 light AA Bns. We can release them only until 25 May, and at that only for the protection of the jump-off air fields.
- b) VIII Air Corps (Richthofen) was to be transported by rail to Oderberg; now Air Force wants rail shipment all the way to East Prussia in order to arrive in time for "Barbarossa". This means that we would need seven more days to complete assembly of troops for Barbarossa.
- c) Air Force has demanded 100 more materiel trains for the East. That would make another delay of two days. They will have to make up their minds whether or not they want to do "Merkur". The delay for Barbarossa resulting from this operation is very awkward. Since 23 May must remain the date for start of the maximum railroad schedule, the time during which the Russians can react, is stretched to six weeks. In that period they could effect drastic changes in the disposition of their forces.

Conference with ObdH: Situation in Libya. - Form a new Hq:

"Commander of German Troops in North Africa". Question of head (Kirchheim, von dem Borne, Ehlert).

Gen. Osterkamp: Difficulties with meat supply. Hog population has dropped from 27 to 20 million. Since existing cattle holdings

are not to be touched, it will be necessary to check the drain on reserves. Meat consumption, also in the Army, will have to be cut even before start of campaign. Reduction from 1550 to 1350 gram in the Armed Forces, from 500 to 400 gram for the civilian population.

Heusinger/Gehlen:

- a) Report on Air activity against Suez Canal.
- b) Five mixed Tank Platoons for Crete leave 18 May and arrive in Saloniki, 23 May.
- c) Gehlen reports on final grouping for jump-off in "Barbarossa", and disposition of GHq reserves. Army Gps. North and Center have made their dispositions largely in accordance with our plans. In Army Gp. South, Reichenau has chosen a line-up, which does not effectively take advantage of the striking power of his Armor. The arrangement, whereby Kleist will not have control of the tanks until after the breakthrough, is fraught with danger. Reinforcing Seventeenth Army has produced good results.

Question of using long-range artillery in Seventeenth Army sector.

Gen Gu Wagner:

- a) Supply situation North Africa: At the moment, 6 steamers with a total of 6,500 tons, 16 medium-sized sailing vessels with 3,200 tons are operating the coastal route (capacity is 29,000 tons a month). The German Forces need 1,000 tons a day. Together with Italians 50,000 tons a month are needed.  
Ration strength of German Forces 25,000 - 45,000.  
Losses since 1 May: 2,500 tons on the coastal route to Bengasi.
- b) Military Hq Serbia: Conference at Agram. -- Reich Fortress Belgrade. -- Relationship between Army Hq 2 and Military Commander no simple matter. -- Troop requirements of Military Hq for partisan fighting. -- Beginning next August, Bor will produce copper at a rate of 40,000 tons a year (can be increased to as much as 80,000 tons).

13 May 1941.

Morning conference: Outcome of OKW conference at Salzburg on 12 May has been entirely satisfactory for the Army.

Of the 4 Light AA Bns. of the Army, only one will go to Crete. The question of how this loss is going to be made up to OKH is still open.

VIII Air Corps will not be shipped by rail all the way to East Prussia except for five trains; bulk goes only as far as Oderberg.

Of the 400 trains which Air Force finally wanted for moving materiel, only 100 will be run.

Redeployment of Second Armd. Div. by sea starts in 16 May, instead of 15 May.

"Merkur:" OKW teletype to Italy. Target date is 18 May, weather permitting. Responsible for the operation: Fourth Air Fleet with support of Army Hq 12 and Admiral Southeast. Italy furnishes Motor Torpedo Boat escort and provides protection of flanks against British naval attacks. Italy also furnishes mine-sweepers for Suda Bay.

Libya: One Light AA Bn. from Sicily goes to Tripoli, 2 are withdrawn from Sicily. No major action at Tobruk. Main British forces apparently assembled west of Tobruk. This means they are thinking only of defense! Enemy has a total of 11 Bns.

Italy: Favagrossa to become Economic Dictator (fuel control).

Irak: Italian fighter planes and MG for Irak arrive in Rhodes on 15 and 16 May.

Turkey and Bulgaria are negotiating about withdrawal of their respective forces from border.

France: Street demonstration in front of Army Hq 7 in Bordeaux.

Belgium: Strike in the coal mining district (50,000 out).

von Ziehlberg: Recommendations for new High Command Africa: C of S Gause; Ia, Westphal; Ic, Mellenthin; Ehlert\* to be replaced by Wuestefeld.

Gen. Brand:

- a) Coastal Btrys. on Channel Coast: Progress seems satisfactory. More practice needed for firing on sea targets. Demonstration Battery! Fifteenth Army wants to activate 15 coastal Btrys. with captured materiel; guns are available. Seventh Army wants to organize 8 coastal Btrys. with captured enemy materiel. Trials with small mobile Observation Bns. for operational use in the sector of AGp. D.
- b) Heavy artillery in the East. No heavy artillery wanted in the Suwalki tip: Hq Seventeenth Army also objects to K 5 and K 12 guns. \*\*
- c) Training of Arty. officer candidates. This summer still at Jueterbog. Later we need a new training center.
- d) R projectiles: \*\*\*4,000 on hand, current monthly production 5,000.

Radke:

- a) Rudolf Hess affair. Political blow of the first order. Danger of an extremist political course.
- b) Strength through Joy \* activities in the East; Combat troops are taken care of by Army Hqs. Replacement Army, by Mil. District Hqs.

Conference in ObdH's office on latest reports from Army Hqs regarding jump-off preparations for "Barbarossa". No new viewpoints.

Other points discussed: International situation (Russian attitude in the Irak question). -- Situation created by Hess' flight. -- Wish to reinforce Fifth Light and Fifteenth Armd. Div. with 10 cm Guns.

Security forces in Serbia: After arrival of 15th Draft, mobile reserves will be organized, using captured enemy tanks where-ever possible. Troops not under command of Foerster, but under Army Hq 12. Instruction to this effect to Army Hq 12.

14 May 1941. (ObdH with .....) \*\*

Morning conference: Nothing of importance. Air shipments to North Africa still going on. (Sheer nonsense). -- Werth is touring Hungarian border.

Gen. Leeb (Ord. Office): AT guns: Exchange \*\*\* 3.7 cm (2.7), 5 cm (3.7). Tapered bore tubes on old gun mounts. Maximum muzzle velocity of AT projectiles 1400 meter per second.

Inf. weapons: Longer life for rifle barrels by addition of chromium (MG).

Trials with 1.5 cm AT rifle (7.9 mm and 28/20 mm exist already).

Recoilless guns, Krupp and Rheinmetall: Owing to high powder consumption only as special-purpose guns.

Extension of range:

Lt. Fd. How. to 11,750 ) muzzle brake and special projectiles.  
Med. Fd. How. to 15,000 )  
With Roechling projectile to 19,000.

Dora Gun (80 cm) range 40,000 m; now in early stages. Ready for operation spring 1942.

Helicopter (improved observation): progress of development much too slow.

Sybel Ferry: 100 units ordered for AAA. #

Motor vehicles for use in tropics: Tracks, Storage of ammunition ##; firing trials in the tropics necessary. Experimental station in Libya.



Flatbed trailers: Monthly output by fall, 1941, 50 units, i.e. equipment for one Regt. every three months. By end of year, rate of output will be stepped up to 100 units. — By end of April we shall have:  
388 10-ton,  
143 20-ton (plus 36 lacking tires).  
On order: 700 22-ton trailers.

Czech 4.7 cm gun on Renault SPM: 18 May, 60 ready (Paris).

Fuel trailers for tanks with built-in pump: By 10 June, 1,860 units (increase range of tanks 100%).

Dieherrenfurth:\* Gelan (chemical agent causing paralysis)  
1 Oct 1941.\*\*

Tank building program: Engine bottleneck.

AA gun production program: Output 1,000 AA guns, one million projectiles a month.

French chemical warfare agents: Nothing new. Our effects not reached. Bacteriological warfare agents (cattle plague).

von Bernuth: Organization of Officers' Training (program for post-war setup).--- Current matters.

Buschenhagen: reports on operation "Silberfuchs". Conversations with Finns have not yet started, because OKW wants to keep all strings in its own hands. Timing is so complex, that coordination with the Barbarossa schedule appears impossible. The whole undertaking is an expedition, not an operation.--- It is a shame to waste the men allocated for this purpose.

Buhle: List of Divs. showing level of readiness for operations. Motor vehicle situation in the mot. and Armd.Divs. (We shall be lucky if they get all the equipment together in time; training of the Divs., equipped last will be incomplete in any event.)

Situation report on Africa Corps: Very high tank losses.--- Drivers for trucks bought in Tunisia.---

Report from 22nd AB Div. Their demands cannot be met at the moment. Solution of the problem is off in some future when there will be enough transport Staffeln to ship by air all mot.Divs.

BdE is forming for Government General 4 Brigades of 6 Bns. each, without artillery etc. from Replacement Reserve II,\*\*\* in order to release the two Divs. of the 15th Draft.---

Serbia 1 - 2 Bns. can be made mobile with 12 - 13, 30-ton, truck columns released by Gen Qu: 10 Tank Platoons are being prepared. - No coast Defense Bns. available to Army Hq 12 for manning captured enemy guns; must be furnished by Army Hq 2. - Military Police army patrols.

von Ziehlberg proposes Hanstein (Army Hq 10) for out-of-turn seniority promotion. Von Blottnitz, XVII Corps Hq, is to be relieved.

Conference with ObdH on results of conference at Fuehrer's:

- 1.) Hess case. Attempted unification of the Germanic races.
- 2.) Fuehrer concurs with OKH measures in Tripolitania.
- 3.) Set-up in North Africa is to be revamped by attaching a "German Chief of Staff" to Gariboldi's Hq.
- 4.) General review of political situation produces nothing substantially new. (Spain, Northwest Africa.)
- 5.) Continuance of operations in Libya next fall is believed to require 4 Armd. Divs. and 3 mot. Divs.

Radke: Press report on Yugoslav Campaign.

Wagner: (Gen Qu): Shipping situation in the Mediterranean can be eased by using tonnage available at Marseille.

15 May 1941.

Morning conference: Number of strikers at Liège has decreased (only 35,000 as against 50,000). — Naples so crowded with German troops, that further inflow must be stopped until outflow runs more smoothly. — One supply vessel for Lemnos torpedoed by the British. — Hq of the Italian Army Group Albania will be deactivated 25 May. Army Hq 9 takes over command.

- OQu IV:
- a) A shipment of German ammunition has arrived in Irak on the Bagdad Railroad (Rahn reports). Enthusiastic reception.
  - b) Two German Staffeln in Rhodes ready to take off for Irak. Advance parties in Syria.
  - c) Personnel changes in Romania (Chief of Gen.Staff, War Minister).

Chief of Transportation:

- a) Railroad situation unsatisfactory. Gercke will send personal letter to Minister of Transportation.
- b) Ever new changes in transport requisitions. — Civilian freight mixed with army freight.
- c) In Bulgaria, 100 railroad trains with Army freight are standing around with no one knowing their destination. (60% Air Force shipments.)

- d) Army cannot build railroad line to Athens. Viaduct, which would tie up 500 meter of military bridge equipment, must be built by civil contractors.

- OQu IV:
- a) Section Foreign Armies West must stay behind in Berlin during Barbarossa. Liaison officer.
  - b) Exchange of OQu IV with corresponding Air Force organization (Col. Schmidt) requires Liaison Officer.

Chief Op. Sec. (OQu I): North Africa:

- a) French grant permission to use sea route to Tunis area (small port). Tunisia trucks may then be used to trans-ship cargoes.
- b) Fuehrer holds we would need 4 Armd. Divs. and 3 mot. Divs. for continuation of operations against Egypt.
- c) New command set up in North Africa. Under "Chief of the German General Staff at the Italian Hq": Commander of the Rear Area, Coast Defense, Defense of Desert Oases.
- d) Preparations for conference with Army Group Rundstedt on 19 May.

Conference with all OKH Section Chiefs: Case Hess !

- I. Fuehrer's account of events to the ObdH is in agreement with the second, more detailed press communique.
  - 1.) The Fuehrer was taken completely by surprise.
  - 2.) Facts previously known:
    - a) Hess' inner conflict growing out of his personal attitude toward England and his grief over the fratricidal struggle between the two Germanic nations.
    - b) Depression brought on because Fuehrer had barred him from active war service; repeated requests to be sent to the front had been denied.
    - c) Mystical tendencies ("visions", prophecies, etc.).
    - d) His daredevil flying, which had prompted the Fuehrer to bar Hess from any flying.
  - 3.) New facts discovered:
    - a) Since August last year, Hess had a standing order for reports on weather over England.
    - b) Attempt to procure radio direction information through Terboven in Norway (radio traffic).
    - c) Systematic training by Messers-mitt, after Udet had refused.

- d) Planning of technical preparations for flight (reserve fuel tanks).

4.) Chronology of events:

- a) Saturday: Fuehrer received package containing documents and put it aside, thinking it was some memorandum. Later opened it and found a letter informing him of the plan, and explaining the reasons. Glasgow was given as his destination. Wanted to visit Duke of Hamilton (President of the British Veterans' Association \*).
- b) Consultation of Fuehrer with Reich Marshal and Udet to determine if Hess was likely to reach his destination. The result being affirmative and with the British bound to exploit the incident, a brief communique was issued to the press. Ribbentrop sent to Rome to inform Il Duce (separate peace offer).
- c) Meeting called of all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter and documents relative to the case read to them.

II. All present are requested to pass on this information and deny all divergent versions.

1230. Conference in Gen Qu's office with the Chief Supply Officers of the Armies in the East:

- a) Ruling on relations between Adv. Gen Qu Hqs and AGp. Hqs.
- b) 60-ton truck columns must not follow the advancing troops too far forward.\*\* Keep roads free (supply artery to the Zi). No 60-ton truck columns on secondary roads\*\*.)
- c) Armd. Groups are echeloned in great depth! # Supply arteries secured by Advance Combat Teams of the Inf.Corps.
- d) Traffic control must be organized more uniformly. (Separate briefing ! )
- e) Establishing of ammunition etc. dumps near border should not be overdone. Consequence of accumulations of excessive stocks is pointed out; jamming of railroads, etc.
- f) Truck column requirements of Chief of Eng. and Chief of Signal Corps. (Separate briefing.)
- g) Road building in Army area not yet what it ought to be. (Separate briefing.)
- h) Indoctrinate lower Gen Qu agencies and brief them on impending missions. - Measures to combat hoggish hoarding by units. ##
- i) Maps and road information service; reporting on prisoners and booty.
- k) Briefing about Hess case.

- von Ziehlberg: a) Speth recalled from Italian Army Group Albania.  
b) Replacement for Metz - Bluemke. See ObdH.  
c) Gause to be promoted to General. \* --- Summoned to report for briefing.  
d) Alternate GHqs (Spala and Reichshof).\*\*  
Preparations for transfer to Askania.\*\*\*

Heusinger: a) Col. General Grauert shot down near St. Omer.  
b) Solum reported lost.

Afternoon in Berlin, Bulgarian Legation (King's name day). - Evening with Kloenne # at Adlon Hotel.

16 May 1941.

Situation conference: West: Number of strikers in the Verviers and Huy districts has again increased (51,000). Food shortage.

Mediterranean: Canal of Corinth again navigable for ships drawing 6 meter (at low tide 5 meter). Air Force drops 15 ton of bombs on Suez Canal (including 10 mines from lowest altitude).

Irak: German auxiliary cruiser destroyed in Persian Gulf.

Damascus: 2 Ju 90; 16 Me and He planes and ## 27 carloads of arms and ammunition. More German planes in Rhodes.

Fighter Experimental Wing assigned to submarine hunt in the Aegean.

North Africa: 14 May. Rommel has informed Air Force Commander Africa that he plans to concentrate the bulk of his forces near Solum, and will leave siege of Tobruk to the Italians. Air Force Commander has refused to order requested shift of Air Forces to the area west of Solum.

15 May. Solum attacked by 5 Rifle Bns., 2 light Arty. Bns. (horse) and 1 medium Arty. Bn., Armd. Rcn. Bn., Antitank and Armd. Bns. (1-3).

Crete: Preparations under way. The small island of Antikythera is to be occupied (jump-off basis for Crete). No positive information available on conditions in Crete and the difficulties likely to be met.

All AAA. except one Bn. probably will get out of the Crete operation in time for "Barbarossa". AA MG Bn. must be assigned for the Crete operation, but substitute will be furnished by 22nd AB Div.

Second Armd. Div. sails from Patras as scheduled. Difficulties caused by excess loading.

The situation of the British in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming progressively more difficult as regards available forces. Irak ties down British forces, instead of sending them to the theater. Palestine is in a state of unrest, Abyssinia is not yet liquidated. The situation at Tobruk appears to be so difficult that high stakes are risked to raise the siege (attack on Solum).

OQu I: OKW proposal for command set-up in North Africa has been received. An utterly vague ambiguous concoction! Counter-proposal.

Col. Spalke:

- a) Arms deliveries to Romania: First instalment, 15 June; Second instalment, 15 September (4.7 AT guns with ammunition, etc.).
- b) Food situation in Romania fairly good. Good crops in prospect. Acreage sown to wheat larger than before.
- c) Armament economy: Problems of manpower and capacity.
- d) Supply of oil drums: 10,000 drums by June. Zinc for drums from Hungary.
- e) Political currents.

von Ziehlberg: Current reassignments.

Jacob: 1.) Progress in preparing equipment: First Sybel ferries; 58 for August, 100 later. — After assembling in Vienna, they will take two weeks to get to Braila, arriving 20 June. Can operate 16 hours at 25 km an hour before refueling. Form a bridge 800 meter long.

24 ferries made up of Danube b. es form bridge 600 m or long.

5 Assault Boat Cos, 81 boats each.

One for each Armd. Group.

One Co. as reserve for Southeast.

Also one detachment on Channel Coast.

Mines: Rommel 25,000 T, 15,000 S Mines\*.

Three Army Gps.: 295,000 T, 496,000 S (i.e. 3 T mines or 2 S mines per linear meter of frontage in East), plus stocks in depots: 288,000 T, 497,000 S mines and the mines carried by Engineer units.

Reserves of barbed wire are ample.

Emergency bridge construction materiel sufficient for jump-off.

2.) Road-building organization.

- 3.) Required for Danube bridges in Hungary: One Construction Bn. from the ZI. plus one Eng. Co. from Replacement Army.
- 4.) Army Hq Norway: Engineer Officer and Construction Unit from the West Wall.
- 5.) Russian mines: Instruction leaflet will be issued.

Paulus:

- a) New Libya see mem. Counterproposal to OKW.
- b) Position of OQu I. At present apparently overworked, but no reason for radical change.
- c) Operational orders for "Haifisch". I am against referring to individual Divs., because this deception would only create confusion on our own side.

Liss: a) New information on disposition of British forces in Irak. Latest reports on Tobruk.

- b) British air raid on Syrian airdromes; French defense; British leaflets dropped in Syria.
- c) Gen. Dentz' attitude in Syria very friendly toward us. British Consul expelled.

Major Heymer (Long-range Rcn. Staffel of the Africa Corps) reports on his work in North Africa. Nothing substantially new. (Evening at the Officers' Club, with Bogatsch).

17 - May 1941.

Situation conference: Libya: Solum retaken by Africa Corps, also Sidi Suleiman. 100 prisoners. On the Tobruk front successful engagements of assault detachments (some prisoners, tanks destroyed, etc.).

Greece: Fuehrer orders occupation of Antikythera. Army Hq 12 thinks, this would compromise surprise. "Merkur" probably will be postponed to 20 May.

|                                |                      |             |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| <u>Suez:</u> 13 May: Shipping: | Suez outer roadstead | 256,000 ton |
|                                | Suez harbor          | 200,000 ton |
|                                | Port Ibrahim         | 72,000 ton  |
|                                | Port Said            | 118,000 ton |

Syria: British air attack on Damascus. French ground and air defense in action against the British !!!

West: Strike situation unchanged. The strike leaders have been called together. Settlement expected for Monday. Cause is exclusively the food situation (potato shortage).



East: Transport echelon III for "Barbarossa" starts moving on 21 May. Totodate average of 300 trains daily.

- Buhle:
- a) Status reports: Eighteenth Div.mot.; Thirteenth Armd. Div. Training of these Divs., activated at the last moment will be rather sketchy; have no unit training.
  - b) Additional personnel for Army Hq 10 and AGp. D.
  - c) Fourth, Tenth, Seventh Armd. Divs. will get their fourth Armd. Companies yet before start of "Barbarossa".
  - d) Observation Btry. for North Africa; tide them over with small detachments for Tobruk; a full Bn. next fall.
  - e) Transfer of replacement units to France not before 15 July. Must do without them if "Isabella" comes off earlier.

Matzky/Schildknecht: Review of changes in Russian dispositions in the border area (Western Russia), from the beginning of the war todate, by three-month periods.

Paulus - Heusinger - Pistorius: Draft of operational plan for "Isabella" (Army Group D) with suggested modifications; ten-day alert period.

Heusinger:

- a) OKW has again been asking for a second Div. for Holland. We have not got it.
- b) 169th Div.(destined for Finland) entrains for Stettin, beginning 23 May.
- c) Finland: No progress to report.
- d) Request of 22nd Div. cannot be granted. Div. should apply for reassignment to Ground Forces. We cannot move their ground elements \* behind them.
- e) Crete postponed to 20 May. - Fuehrer insists on occupation of Antikythera, against advice of Air Force.
- f) Regt. Brandenburg details one Bn. each to AGps. Center and South, 2 Cos. to AGp. North.\*\*
- g) Subversion plans for Ukraine and Baltic States.

Evening conference with ObdH on his return from the East. Important points:

AGp. North: Preparations for Oesel. Bridge construction material will do in a pinch.--- Bring up supplies on the Niemen river as far as Kowmo. - Collect barges for Niemen bridges beginning 20 May (2 bridges at Memel; 3 bridges can be built of other materials on hand.)

General matters:

- a) Refugee problem --- Evacuation of border regions?!
- b) Tighten border protection (S mines.)
- c) Evacuation of 60,000 children. \*
- d) Evacuation of Reich Labor Service girls and of the Labor Camps (must be freed for military occupancy).

Army Gp. Center frames its orders in accordance with our ideas. Inactive fronts secured by mines. Regrouping toward the right wing is in progress. Inf. reserve close to the front, mot. reserve kept in rear. AA protection along the Vistula very thin.

Army Gp. South: Seventeenth Army wants no heavy artillery for the jump-off. Reserves will be put behind left wing. What shall we do about Slovakia? (2 Divs.)

Proposed Zero Hour: 0305 hrs. No coups de main before.

Air Reconnaissance: Rowehl is urgently wanted.

18 May 1941. Berlin. ("Mother's Day").

No substantial changes in situation. Solum Fort Capuzzo again in our hand.

Private Correspondence. --- Visit from Adenauer.\*\* Gerti calls with her children. --- Evening at theater "Veilchenredoute".\*\*\*

19 May 1941.

Situation report: Russia: Ban on all travel by foreigners and indigenous non-residents in the border districts.

Belgium: Strike has spread to Hasselt (54,000 out now).

Libya: 26th Convoy again turned back to Palermo. --- Casualties at Solum apparently alike on both sides. Enemy lost much materiel.

Irak: Reinforcements for the British at Habbania have arrived, apparently from the West.

Gen Qu: Review of OtdH's findings on eastern tour, which have bearing on Gen Qu. SS units for Rear Areas. The missions requested by these units must be refused. # The first 120-ton column has arrived from Tunis.

Conference with ObdH on plans for "Isabella". ObdH holds that concentration of forces in the South will rouse comment in France. Other items:

- a) MT situation in the Armd.Divs. activated last. - Decides to move them by road instead of by rail, to give them at least good road march training.
- b) Strike in Belgium.
- c) Hanstein's out-of-turn promotion delayed.\*

Buerker (Ing.Sec.): Ordered to go immediately to the Armd.Divs. which are coming out last, to find out, what could still be done for their training (allocation of fuel, etc.).

- Housing:
- a) No basic directives from OKW on command set-up in Romania, since the question has not yet been discussed with Antonescu.\*\*
  - b) OKW dismisses our recommendation on a "German Chief of Staff in the Italian Headquarters" and wants, instead, to give Rommel a second Chief of Staff supposed to run the rear services for him. Idiotic!

1500.-1730. Conference at ObdH, with von Rundstedt/Sodenstern, later Reichenau/Heim, then also Kleist/Zeitzler\*\*\*and, finally, von Schobert. Questions relating to assembly of AGp. South. No fundamental difficulties with High Command of Army Group. Lively arguments with von Reichenau, who at last decides to group the three center Corps under Kleist's command right from the jump-off. Only tentative discussion on dispositions with Schobert, since we still have not received any political directives on the command set-up. (Von Schobert will get his instructions at Obersalzberg on Thursday). Afterwards short talk with Heim.

Paulus (on phone) about his conversation with Jodl on the command set-up in North Africa. All the Fuehrer cares about is that Rommel should not be hampered by any superior Hq. put over him. Jodl will send us another plan.

Col. Schaeffler (Chief Artillery Officer OKH): Use of heavy artillery in the sector of AGp. South. -- List needs a Coastal Arty. Bn. for Crete.

Evening: Receive "directive" with orders for Greece and C in C Balkans.

Gen. Wagner reports on a conference with Thomas, Fromm and Gercke, (afternoon), at which it came out that OKW now thinks it can furnish only 16 fuel trains, daily, instead of the 22 expected. Also the Com Z fuel depots in the East, which should be 50% full, are said to have dropped to a 20% level.

20 May 1941. (Attack on Crete).

Morning conference:

- 1.) 0500. - 0713. Landing on Crete prepared by bombing attack. Subsequent unopposed drop of paratroops and landing of gliders on Chania, Rethymnon and Iraklion airfields. The "airborne landing" of airborne troops will not come off before tomorrow.
- 2.) First echelon of Second Armd. Div. (3 ships) has landed at Taranto.
- 3.) Unconfirmed reports that British Second Chief of the Gen. Staff, Gen. Haning, has taken over command in Egypt.
- 4.) Syria: The French on the border are getting set to fight the British.
- 5.) In recognition of the French attitude in the Syrian question, Germany will return 80,000 prisoners.
- 6.) Maribor Tunnel reopened for traffic. Bridges at Maribor and Belgrade will be reopened by 15 June.
- 7.) Difficulties in fuel supply during July. In August, oil will be delivered to theater of operation directly from Romania, across the Pruth river. - Italy's needs are filled by OKW at the expense of our own quotas. Gasoline supply for civilian use is bogged down.

Bahle:

- 1.) Truck situation: French trucks are praised. Tools and spare parts as yet not in sufficient quantities. - The mot. units will not be ready in time. Extension of assembly date will not be necessary. Only in the case of Fourteenth and Eighteenth Divs. it may perhaps be necessary to set a later date for departure (which would not be serious).
- 2.) "Isabella" Divs. will be 100 % equipped with mortars and antitank rifles by 20 June. Artillery will be re-equipped with Lt. How. 18 and med. Fd. How. 18 by 20 June.
- 3.) Corps Hq LIV will be ready by 1 June (Romania).
- 4.) "Armd. Replacement Division" Barb. Bossa: Refitting feasible within four weeks after start of operations.

Col. General Fromm:

- 1.) Loss replacements : 90,000, in Field Replacement Bns. 475,000 in the Replacement Army (less 90,000 for Air Force, leaves 385,000). Anticipated losses in the initial border battles: 275,000; for September 200,000. This would leave nothing for October, unless we induct age group 22 on 1 August (last reserve). Forty percent

of age-group 22 is in the Labor Service, sixty, in civilian occupations. Should not be called before the end of the year (Nov.), when men can be released from the front to replace them. We can take the risk of having no trained reserves in October.

- 2.) Fuel situation: June requirements covered, 10% short for July. In August the situation will be relieved by direct deliveries of fuel from Romania to AGp. South.
- 3.) Current problems of his Section.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- 1.) Replacement for Signal Replacement Bn. of Fifteenth Armd. Div. lost at sea arrived in Naples.
- 2.) Two Cos, for Rear Communications ready in Germany by 15 June; can be in North Africa early in July.
- 3.) Various current matters.

Col. Gause: (ordered to North Africa ) reports. Since situation precludes decision on his assignment at this time, I furlough him to Berlin.

Gen. Hiner, being in Berlin, calls on me. Reviews conditions in Hungary. Gets briefing on line to be followed in the coming months.

\*

von Thoma: Traffic control.-- Fifth Armd.Div. still tied up.-- Good work of the Tank Maintenance Groups. -- Preparations for the East: Ethylization center to adjust octane number for our purposes by addition of benzol. -- Track blocks made of Buna rubber. -- Collection of booty in Greece. -- 3690 tanks are now at the German front. -- Spare parts supply for Barbarossa.

von Etzdorf: France: Cooperation in Syria. -- Cooperation in North Africa. -- Supply line via Toulon (?!)\*\* - Cooperation in West Africa. -- North Africa: Use of port of Bone. In return: New regulation of travel into restricted zone (officials, industrialists, farm managers.)-- Easing of traffic restrictions for Demarcation Line. -- Furloughs for Prisoners of War (up to 100,000 at a time). - Occupation costs (prompt negotiations, aiming at reduction from 15 to 12,5 billion franc ). Coastal Btrys. in North Africa. -- Improvements of the Navy. -- Specialists for North Africa.

Plan to tie Turkey closer to us by a p . Transit to Syria (against Turk). Papen protests against his mission. \*\*\*

Japan: Matsuoka warns he will have to take a "zig-zag course". American offers to Japan. - Also: Status quo for Philippines . Offer of mutual undertaking not to enter European conflict (defense only).

Rome: Visit of our Foreign Minister: Hess -- Darlan -- Japan.

Spain: Crisis apparently put off for the moment. Concession to the Falange (two new ministries).

Crete: Dropping of paratroops (2 Regts.) seems to have been successful, but strong enemy resistance seems to have developed soon afterwards at Chania. Airfields, on which airborne forces were to land, are reported to have been rendered unserviceable.

21 May 1941.

Morning reports: In Crete the situation is satisfactory. More paratroops have been dropped. Stubborn British resistance in some places. Report of landing of Mountain Infantry has not been confirmed. No new information on disposition of British troops in the Middle East. Situation still strained and forces as widely dispersed as ever. Report of British in Irak advancing on Bagdad (Al Falluja) are unfounded.

Col. Ochsner: Report on eastern tour. — Armies want flame oil ammunition and HE ammunition, at ratio of 1:1. — Enforcement of safety regulations for Rocket Projector Troops.\* Each Rocket Projector Bn. now includes one Btry. of the new rocket projectors with 6,000 meter range. — Preparations for new Decontamination Service. — Channel for reporting of intelligence on enemy chemical warfare service. — Dogs as gas detectors. —

Enemy intelligence: Britain is preparing flame oil for defense of beaches.

Russia is activating Ossoaviakhim\*\* to fight parachutists. Reported to have prepared 7% gas ammunition. France: Preparations for bacteriological warfare (cattle plague).

Heusinger:

- a) At request of Army Hq 12, Fifth Armd.Div. will be left in Athens for a few more days.
- b) Letter to Jodl on pending questions, e.g., on undesirability of having German forces strike from Hungary, as such a move would be at the expense of the main concentration of AGp. South\*\*\*.
- c) SS-Ferries: 6 for Africa Corps (newly arrived), 44 for Black Sea; 25 ferries coming off the line in June will go to AGp. North for Baltic.
- d) Let AGp. Center have Corps Hq XXXIII or Corps Hq XXXV (reduced !). Then they will get no Corps Hq later on with the GHq reserves.

- e) Changes in plans for road movement for Barbarossa, due to delays in arrival of trucks for newly activated Armd. Divs.
- f) Inquiry relating to preparatory work for new Rules of Sea Warfare: Limited or unlimited blockade zones on high seas? I am for latter alternative (Bluff).

von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters (among others, von Loeffelholz, Army Hq 9).--- Ban on flying for higher officers within range of enemy fighters. --- Transfer of GHq to Askania. --- Conference of Chiefs of Staff after the Whitsun holidays.--- Current business.

Army Hq 2: reports on the possibility of unrest in Croatia and requests ruling on whether they could use German troops at own discretion. Reply: Use troops only at the request of Croat government authorities, unless our military interests are involved.

Gen. Bogatsch (with Ziehlberg): Allocation of courier planes for Hqs (reasonably satisfactory).

(with Buhle: ) Allocation of motor vehicles to air reconnaissance and signal units.  
One light AA Bn., which was assigned to Ground Forces for "Barbarossa", is being taken away and goes to Crete.

Gen. Wagner (with Baensch):

- a) Sea route for supply base Baltic:  
Memel: 2 convoys of 5 ships of 300 tons each.  
Koenigsberg: 4 convoys of 5 ships of 300 tons each.  
Also river barge trains of 15 - 20 ships of 75 - 100 tons each, for Memel river.

- b) Message procedure in Quartermaster service.

Wagner alone:

- a) OKW directive on Greece. --- OKW directive on Rear Areas Barbarossa. --- Order of battle of Himmler's SS Army.
- b) Supply columns: The organic Troop Supply Columns have all arrived in first half of May.

In second half of the month (20 - 30 May), we shall get the 30-ton truck columns.\*

Ready before start of operations: 60-ton truck columns.\*\*  
After start of operations: 8,000 tons (616th Regt.) (OKH reserve) plus additional 4,000 tons.

- c) Fuel for training purposes: One quota (equal to 100 road kilometers) released for each mot. Div.
- d) Noticeable drop in the clothing output (by one-third).  
Very heavy drain on stocks.



- e) Are Field Hospitals to become GHq troops? Chief Army Surgeon is against it. However, the Divs. must be compelled to relinquish their Field Hospitals. Once this policy has been established, they may be compensated by Corps and Armies.
- f) Issue of Iosanthin. Efficacy: If used within five minutes no injury; within 10 minutes, injury is light, after 15 minutes, ineffective.

Gen. Paulus calls up from Paris: Outcome of conference with C in C West, on the whole conforms with my demands. \* I instruct him that in locating troop reserves, account must be taken of fact that the West-East railroad system might be in use both ways at one time.\*\*

Heusinger: Crete: 4 Mt. Bns. have landed in Crete. 2 west of Chania, 2 near Iraklion.

Situation at Chania improved. Town encircled. Contact established between isolated paratroop groups. Attempted sorties repelled.

Air transport hampered in area west of Chania where landing field is unserviceable. The transport planes land on the beach where they cannot take off.

Rethymnon in our hands. No reports received on Iraklion.

British naval forces northeast of Crete have disappeared, west of Crete still on the spot (under attack by our planes).

Shipments by sea will start tonight.

Army Hq 12 thinks that the show in Crete may drag out quite a while .

During the night a signal indicates that two transport vessels of Second Armd.Div. have struck mines in the western end of the Gulf of Corinth.

22 May 1941.

Morning conference: Second Armd.Div. (which sailed from Patras) reported to have lost in sinking: 122 tanks, 200 motor vehicles, 29 motorcycles, 1,328 men.\*\*\*

Crete: Troops landed: Malenes: One Assault Regt. (Gen. Meindl), one Paratroop Bn., one Mt. Inf.Bn.

Chania: 5 Bns.

At Malenes and Chania our troops are opposed by 6 New Zealand Bns. and one Arty.Regt.

Rethymnon: Town apparently not yet taken; the Bn. set down by us may be in trouble by now.

Iraklion: 3 Paratroop Bns., Airfield and town apparently taken.

Libya: Rommel states he cannot take Tobruk with the forces now at his disposal.

France: has 214,000 tons in the Western Mediterranean.

Belgium: Strikes dying down.

Syria: Reported invasion of Syria by DeGaulle's troops highly doubtful.

Irak: Mosul attacked. No British at Al Falluja.

Egypt: Attempt to get Chief of Egyptian Gen. Staff, who is collaborating with Germany, out of the country. Attitude of Egypt on the whole not friendly to Britain.

Transp. Chief: Situation improved. Easing in the East. Shipment of gasoline to Com Z depots now included in supply program of Field Army, as requested by BdE.

Buhle: Considers replacing lost elements of Second Armd. Div. with Tank Demonstration Bn., originally earmarked for Seventeenth Div.

Maj. Westerberg (Photo Sec. in staff of Chief Air Officer): Submits air photographs taken by Rowehl's Staffel in the Russian border area. They clearly show extensive construction activities for strengthening border defenses (especially anti-tank ditches). Numerous cable trenches indicate preparation of a continuous defense position.

The photos corroborate our view that the Russians are determined to make a stand at the border.

Maj. Schildknecht (Foreign Armies East) reports on disposition of Russian Army along German border. For the most part closed up to front.

Defense build-up comprises three major groups:

Baltic: One Army Gp. of two Armies, with one group of operational, and one group of strategic reserves in the rear.

Center: One Army Gp. of three Armies, with one group of operational, and one group of strategic reserves(?) in the rear.

South: One Army Gp. of three Armies, one group of operational reserves.

Independent Pruth front: One Army Gp.

Heusinger: Reports from Greece:

- 1.) The announcement of loss of tanks off Patras has proved erroneous. The tanks of Second Armd. Div. have already been landed at Taranto. The losses seem to be largely in light and med. Artillery of the Div. Very hard to replace because of shortage of prime movers. Personnel losses: morning figures confirmed.
- 2.) The transfer of the light AA Bn. to operation Crete was ordered by Army Hq List and cannot be reversed at the moment. Must try to get replacement for "Barbaroosa" from Air Force.

- 3.) Situation in Crete seems rather complex. The British are in undisputed command of the sea north of Crete and seem to have scattered or sunk a convoy of small craft attempting to make the crossing. Reinforcements for Crete can therefore be sent only by air. It now looks quite doubtful that the Air Forces committed in Crete would be available for "Barbarossa" at the appointed date. Perhaps it will be necessary to postpone start of "Barbarossa".

Buhle:

- a) Artillery replacements for Second Armd.Div.: A Bn. now nearing completion, re-equipped with light Fd.How., plus Demonstration Bn. of 900th Brig. Med. Arty will be allocated when Div. goes into action.
- b) 1,800 fuel trailers for Tank III will be ready by 9 June; trailers for Tank IV not until later in June.
- c) 100th Armd.Brig. will be reasonably mobile by 15 June.
- d) Eighteenth and Seventeenth Armd. Divs. will complete outfitting just about in time. Seventeenth Armd.Div. has 240 different types of motor vehicles !
- e) Activate a Rocket Projector unit in Replacement Army, for "Haifisch".\*
- f) Improvements of Army Group D, "Isabella".
- g) Regulation of furloughs to Biarritz.

von Glaise-Horstenau: Situation in Croatia. Croats want their Army to stay in country; clamor for partial motorization. Also want transport for civilian economy. Glaise's future role. Future strength of the Croat Army: 3 Mt.Divs., 2 Inf.Divs., 6 Air Gruppen of 22 planes, each.

Maj. Ehlert: Have a serious talk with him on the reasons for his separation from the Africa Corps.

Heusinger: One Bn. of Fifth Mt.Div. wiped out in crossing to Crete. Current questions (med. Arty. for Kythera on Sybel ferries). Probable necessity to postpone date for Barbarossa.

von Ziehlberg: Commission for Irak. Recommendations for out-of-turn promotions.

Evening to Berlin:

23 May 1941.

By plane (with intermediate landing at Brieg) over Galicia, Tatra (Zakopane) to Cracow, Hq AGp. B. Sightseeing. Evening at Hq. AGp.B.

24 May 1941.

Conference with AGp.B:

- a) Depth of left wing of Seventeenth Army.
- b) Send XIV Corps through Seventeenth Army sector to widen Kleist's jump-off frontage.

1000. - 1200. Ride to Reichshof.\*

Conference at Hq First Army : Disposition of forces. ---  
Employment of artillery (heavy Artillery).--- XIV Corps will go into line through IV Corps.  
Meet the Gen.Staff Officers.

By plane from Debica to Lublin via Bilgoraj - Zamoss - Chelm and Wlodawa. Arrive 1700.

Conference with CG III Corps (von Mackensen).

Evening with Gen. Staff Offs. of III and IV Corps (Vierow)  
at Hq III Corps.

25 May 1941. (Sunday).

Ride with Faeckenstedt (C of S III Corps), later joined by Wagner (LV Corps) from Lublin ( 0700 to Krystinopol, through Chelm, Hrubieszow, and Sokal. At Sokal, Triebe (C of S, XXXXVIII Corps) reports and Heim (C of S, of Staff, Sixth Army) joins us.

Inspection of jump-off terrain of III and XXXXVIII Corps.  
It has the peculiarity that movements must directly follow road network.

Problems resulting from lack of cover for assembly of artillery.

Conference with Heim: Jump-off of XIV Corps alongside XXXXVIII.

Return from Krystinopol via Hrubieszow to Zamosc. From there, to Berlin by plane; arrive 2000.

2000. - 2100. Talk with Gen. Paulus on the airfield. Overnight in Berlin.

26 May 1941.

Arrive Zossen 0900. Discuss with OQu I and Op. Off. on material for conference with the Finns.

0900.- 1000. Gen. von Tippelskirch calls (30th Div.). Bluenke reports (new C of S XIV Corps). Meyer-Ricks reports out (off with Irak Commission).

1130. Conference with ObdH on Finland.

1230. Welcome of Finns, headed by Chief of Gen.Staff, Heinrichs.

Luncheon.

After luncheon conference with Finnish Gen.Staff:

Along lines of OKW conference: Operational possibilities are discussed. Attack west or east of Lake Ladoga. With appropriate disposition for assembly, they strike east of Lake Ladoga on a 6 Div. front.

Mobilization near border camouflaged, in rest of the country only after passage of German troops for operation "Silberfuchs" (16 June).

Hangoe: The Finns must do this by themselves.

Aaland: This is likewise a job for them; at least they must make all preparations on this assumption. (German help needed: 2 Regts.)

Long-distance call from Gen. Vogl (Armistice Commission) about negotiations with France. No important news.

Fromm on phone. Re Holland: He told Keitel that 82nd Div. will have its equipment by 1 June, the same as all Divs. of the Sixth Draft (i.e., without Inf. guns and only part of the AT Bn.). The Div. has been issued 6,000 bicycles. Trucks prepared. -  
Relocation of Replacement Units.

Afternoon: Talk with ObdH about Finland. -- Occupation in Holland. -- Command set-up in North Africa. -- Tour in Eastern border area.

27 May 1941.

(S.S. Bismarck sunk).

Situation conference: S.S. Bismarck under heavy attack by superior British naval forces in the Atlantic. Reported to be making only 7 knots (down from normal 30). At noon, British report that Bismarck has gone down.

27th Convoy sailed for Libya( Coastal artillery).

Thasos and Samothrake turned over to the Bulgarians.

Situation on Crete improved. The Western part of the island now cleaned up; eastward advance continues.

OKW insists that original date for Barbarossa must stand: No objections on the part of the Army, except that AAA might not be ready; 2 mixed AA Bns. and 3 light AA Bns. still engaged in Crete. The 2 mixed Bns. were taken out of Army Hq 11, the three light Bns. out of Armd.Divs. Air Force must make up deficiency! Air Force, however, will have a hard time keeping the date.

Italy will touch bottom of her oil supplies unless oil deliveries can start early in June. Total required: 260,000 ton.

100,000 are to be shipped by rail \*  
5,000 through Canal of Corinth  
25,000 from Germany. The remaining  
60,000 have yet to be found.

Count Sponeck (CG, 22nd Div): Discussion of status of 22nd Div. In order to be committed as airborne troops, they need 1,400 planes. Since that number is not unavailable, it would be inexcusable to let the Div. hang around idle. Submit proposal to OKW.

Gen. Brand: a) Idea of Fuehrer about mixed med.Artilletry Bns. (runs counter to our experience and the wishes of the troops).  
b) Report on tour in East, AGp.B.  
c) Miscellaneous minor matters (including level of training of GHq Artillery).

OQu IV:

- a) With Chief of Attaché Sec.: Various Attaché questions. Hungary, Krabbe.
- b) French Transitional Army (Memorandum).
- c) Negotiations with Darlan: 75 per cent of the French materiel frozen in Syria is to go to Irak; vehicles, port facilities, railroads, roads.

Movement of supplies to Irak to be handled by French in French ships from Cyprus waters. Training for Irak under French in Syria. \*\* Exchange with us information on British in Middle East.

North Africa: We are getting 1,740 trucks now, 400 more later. French take our supplies to North Africa in their ships and forward them to Libyan border. Bizerte will be available for our use.

French med. guns, including ammunition, for us in North - Africa. West and Equatorial Africa: Dakar available for German naval operations, effective 15 July.

Summary:

- d) Spain: Mobilization takes 8 days. Alert period for march readiness 12 hours. Ammunition for one to three months (varying for different weapons); tight on AA ammunition. Fuel supplies for 2 months. Fighting quality of Spanish troops against British supposed to be good.
- e) Portugal: Will fight better against the Spanish than against the British.

- Gen. Buhle:
- a) Second Army Div.: Replacement of Artillery with newly activated units by 1 July; likewise Bridge Cpls. from GHq Reserve.
  - b) Activation of four Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Hqs for East, as specified by OKW. \*
  - c) Conclusion of drive to reduce number of types of motor vehicles. A flop.
  - d) 82nd Div. Condition, filler replacements before going to Holland. Report to OKW.
  - e) Activation of four Divs., Sixteenth Draft; 6 Bns. of 4 Cos. (Regional Defense troops) begins 15 June. Activation will take two weeks.
  - f) Other current business.

Col. Heusinger: S.S. Bismarck. -- 22nd Div. -- Paulus' conference on "Haifisch" and "Isabella" in Paris (ground disposition). -- Weather prediction for the East for period from now until next fall. -- Armored trains. -- Preparedness for defense in the East. -- Other current questions.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Selection of personnel for Liaison Staff Finland and Liaison Staff Bulgaria. -- Preparations for C of S meeting.

28 May 1941.

Newly promoted officers in Gen.Staff (Majors) introduce themselves.

Situation conference:

Crete: Paratroops seem to have suffered high casualties. -- The Italian want to make a landing with one reinforced Inf. Bn. and tanks from the Rhodes base on 28 June.

22nd Div. OKW wants to transfer 22nd Div. to the ZI. The Div. can be assembled either in Bucharest or in Troppau by 26 May. If the Div. does not belong to us, we are not interested in it. (Braunschweig out of question.)



Syria: French flyers from North Africa en route to Syria, with intermediate landing at Catania.

U.S.A.: "Fireside talk" by Roosevelt: State of unlimited emergency.

Lt. Col. Radke: SS Div. Reich will go to the southeastern theater by motorized movements across Germany. \*

Fieldpost censorship must be instituted because military matters are being discussed in letters.

Civilian morale in the ZI bad : a) in Party circles: Hess case; shortcomings of Party leaders; lawlessness (religious orders). \*\* b) General population: Religious question. -- Relations with Russia. -- Failure to strike blow against England.

Current business.

Gen. Stumme (XXXX Corps) calls en route. -- Col. Buelowius reports out (Co. of Regt.).

Schwatlo-Gesterding: Propaganda questions. -- Press. -- Entertainment films and documentaries.

Heusinger - Bork: Repercussions of "Merkur" on "Barbarossa": 2 mixed and 4 light AA Bns. unavailable because of Crete.

The 2 mixed Bns. belong to Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. Must be in Saloniki for shipment by 8 June, to be in time for "Barbarossa." Need no rehabilitation.

The 4 light Bns. went to:

|                    |                 |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| Seventh Armd. Div. |                 |
| Nineteenth "       | "               |
| Second "           | " (lost at sea) |
| Fifth "            | " (Crete).      |

These Divs. are GHq Reserve and therefore not required for the jump-off. Probably there won't be any chance to get them replaced.

VIII Air Corps must leave Rumania on 7 June, in order to reach Suwalki by 20 June.

Lt. Col. Stieff: Observations made on tour in Greece: Hq Twelfth Army -- Crete Development slower than anticipated by Air Force. Air Force was quite off in assessment of enemy: they expected the British to bolt.

British are in undisputed command of the sea. We are in equally undisputed command of the air.

Mistakes of tactical planning: Troops were set down, in three equal forces, in three places. Lack of reconnaissance of the landing area (olive groves). Landing of planes very difficult (olive groves, mountains).

Sailing of first sea-borne echelon was timed too late, to begin with, and then postponed once. This robbed us of the element of surprise.

Critical stage was over on 25 May. Gen. Ringel has situation under control. Most urgently needed: heavy weapons.

British were expecting airborne landing since 26 April and made effective preparations for defense, especially against parachute attacks. This explains our very heavy losses. Combat strength of Seventh Air Div. down to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  Bns., from 9 Bns. Assault Regt. lost 50 officers and 1000 men, killed.

Transport considerably depleted. Out of 600 transport planes, 170 unserviceable, mostly total loss.

Losses in Convoy 1 were 500 out of 2,300 (Fifth Mt.Div., light AAA).

Hq Twelfth Army ventures no estimate of the duration of fighting, as that largely depends on what the British are going to do. During night of 24/25 May, they brought five freighters to Suda, and two freighters to Iraklion; it is not known whether with reinforcements or supplies, or for evacuation.

Twelfth Army thinks it will be necessary to keep elements of Fifth Armd.Div. in Athens for time being. Atmosphere in the city critical. The Italians are not doing anything about it, nor have they started any arrangements for looking after the country. \*

Also says it must keep six GHq Bridge Clms in Greece (for Crete). Wants to leave 164th Div. in Saloniki, Sixth Mt. Div. in Athens, and Fifth Mt.Div. in Crete.

In order to hold Crete against any British attacks, it is essential to secure domination of the Aegean from the air.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Africa. Logistical planning for future operations. Offensive by middle of October (?).
- b) Greece: Ideas on future administration of the Saloniki district, which is to remain under military occupation.
- c) Gas warfare.
- d) Needs of 22nd Div.

General Ott:

- a) Report on his activities as CG XXX Corps in Greek Thrace. Personnel difficulties in 50th Div.
- b) Questions of organization: Infantry can get improvised equipment for hill country operations, i.e. 250 pack saddles per Regt. This works only for minor operations of short duration. For major operations they would be lacking Mt. Artillery.

He wants more smoke ammunition issued to troops. That is a question of long-range planning by supply organization, not one of changing basic issues.

von Bernuth -- Buerker: Findings on return from inspection of the new mot. units, activated the last. They will just make the jump-off (as Org.Sec. reported). Inspection of Security Division gave gratifying impression. Command has the right idea about their mission. Mobile.

Use of radio direction beams for night ground operations in Africa (840 sets ordered for delivery next fall).

29 May 1941.

Situation conference: Crete: Suda Bay cleared. --- First tanks landed at Kastelli. --- Iraklion airfield not yet mopped up.

Rintelen reports: Italian Eleventh Army has 12 Divs. ready for occupation of Greece, of which 1 Div., for Attica, and 1 Div., for Peloponnese are available at once. Italian crack Guard Regt. is also assigned to the Peloponnese.

British attack on Sfax. British air attack on convoy.

Syria: Hansen reports: France is changing her plans from defense of the Lebanon Mountains to defense of the southern border, i.e. defense of the whole of Syria. Strength of French forces: 50,000, mostly colored troops, 40 fighter planes from the homeland, 3 destroyers, 3 submarines. British: 50,000 in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. British are anxious about Cyprus.

Irak: According to Hansen's report, situation not unfavorable, but no decisive turn for the better yet. Lack of fuel.

Keitel (Personnel Div.): Officer reserve small. --- Problem of the officers of the 100,000 men Army, who feel slighted. (As a matter of fact, their promotions have not been slowed by the influx of E-officers.) \* Reactivation of E-officers. --- Problem of decorations. --- Members of former ruling houses in the Armed Forces. --- Officers reserve pools will be set up directly in AGp. Rear Areas.

Gol. Ochsner: Safety regulations for Hv. Rocket Projectors. --- Radio direction beam (170 transmitters, 800 receivers); training required. --- Use of poison gas in "Barbarossa".

Gen. Wagner: Railroad tractors (three for each Army and Armd. Gp.)\*--- Tank spare part depots, 400 tons are carried by AGps. for each Armd.Gp. In addition a depot for parts in short supply near Magdeburg (parts will be flown to the front). --- Field Hospitals must become GHq troops.

Conference with ObdH: North Africa (Cause assignment settled).—  
Greece (C in C Balkans). — Meeting of Cs of S, 4 and 5 June.

Calls: Col. Gause, appointed "Liaison Officer at Italian High  
Command Libya". — Kinzel, prior to taking off for Finland.

30 May 1941.

Morning conference: In Crete, things are now starting to run smoothly. The British are trying to make a getaway from the south coast. The Greeks are offering capitulation. The Italian have landed in the eastern part of the Island. Large take of prisoners and materiel, including a satisfying number of guns.

22nd Div. will revert to Ground Forces after all. Ruling of the Fuehrer.

Irak: Owing to deficient preparation and the impossibility of sending effective support, the Irak show, which is more in the nature of a political uprising than a conscious fight for liberation, must eventually peter out. Whatever the outcome, however, it did force the British to spread themselves critically thin, both during the Crete operation, and at a time when our situation in North Africa was rather precarious.

Transport movements for build-up are proceeding in gratifying manner.

Fuehrer's decision that 22 June date will stand.

- Buhle:
- a) Jurisdiction of Army Mission Romania. — Official instructions.
  - b) Conversion of med. Arty. Bns. in most Armd. Divs. to mixed Bns.
  - c) Current business: Jurisdiction of List. — Field Hospitals as GHq troops, etc.

OQu IV: Current matters.

- Heusinger:
- a) 20 SS-ferries are going to be assembled in Gdynia starting 15 June.
  - b) "Haifisch" and "Harpune". \*
  - c) Proposals by AGp. North and Center on disposition for jump-off.
  - d) Current details.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters. — Reassignments. — Decorations.

31 May 1941.

Morning conference:

- a) Strike in Belgium. -- Local food strikes continue.
- b) Sinking of ship in Piraeus harbor, allegedly due to spontaneous combustion.
- c) Fifth Armd. Div. (less one Armd.Bn., 1 Motorcycle Rifle Bn., 13th Rifle Regt.) will start movement on 7 June.
- d) Ban on reconnaissance flights along the Eastern frontier lifted.
- e) Situation in Irak is taking a progressively bad turn. Any decisive military help by us is out of question. But this does not mean, the end of trouble for the British in that corner of the world, even if they return the old government to Baghdad.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) with Col. Baentsch:

- a) Supply preparations for AGp. North. Result of Baentsch's tour in the East.
- b) C in C Balkans and administrative problems in Greece.

Gen. Bogatsch (with Gen. Buhle): Motor-transport in Air Reconnaissance units very difficult. Try to remedy situation by taking some away from ground troops.

Col. Speth (C of S LIV Corps) reports completion of his mission in Italy and assumption of new post.

Heusinger: After talk with OKW: 22nd Div. now under exclusive OKH control. Holland gets one Div. out of our Northeast line.

Report to OKW in reply to their inquiry concerning North Africa.

Evening at Kopp's in Belitz.

1 June and 2 June 1941. (Whitsun)

Whitsun. Work in Berlin. On Whitmonday, visit the Koppes in Belitz, with Gerti.

3 June 1941.

During the morning, visitors:

Ht. Col. Doerr reports as new C of S LII Corps Hq. Major Abelein, to express his thanks. Lt. Col. von dem Borne, C of S, Africa Corps; comprehensive discussion of situation and divergent views.

OQu IV: a) General political situation all over the world.

b) Joint action by Axis F on Roosevelt's speech.

c) Turkey: Since we are no longer interested in arms transit to Irak, it will probably be possible to conclude a non-aggression pact and a guarantee treaty.

d) Greece: Pro-German public sentiment is cooling. Reasons: Arrival of Bulgarians and Italians; alleged harshness of German occupation troops; food problem. British agents.

e) Ireland: German bombs on Dublin.

f) Russia: Stalin had a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stressing good relations. Offers 20,000 tons of grain.

g) Italy: After Starace, Sebastiani, Mussolini's party secretary for many years, has been fired also.

Op.Sec.: a) 22nd Div. now under our control. — Fuehrer will soon have conference with Antonescu.

b) 719th Div. from Northeast line to Holland; 710th Div. to Norway.

c) Coastal Artillery: 3 Bns. for Eleventh Army (Black Sea Coast). Initial location at Galatz. 3 Bns. in East Prussia prepared for Russian Baltic ports (will go by sea). Coastal artillery for Murmansk and Archangelsk.

d) Captured enemy tanks: Six Platoons are leaving for Serbia. Six Platoons for Crete are in Saloniki.

e) Syria: Fuehrer order: Stop troops alerted for shipment. Commission will stand by.

f) Greece: Peloponnese will be occupied immediately by the Italians; Thessaly on 8 June, Attica and Euboea on 12 June.

Gen. Jakob: a) Industrial plants may now be built in the Rhine defense zone near Kehl.

b) Distribution of Sybel and SS-ferries.

c) Construction Bns. for Navy.

4 June 1941.

Meeting with Army and AGp. Cs of S:

Morning: Eastern questions with Eastern Cs of S: Only noteworthy items: Teamwork of Inf. and Armor at jump-off; Artillery preparation.

Afternoon: General questions with all Chiefs.

Evening: Social at the Gen Qu Officers' Club.

Strike: Lille, 80% of the French coal mines.

5 June 1941.

Lille strike situation unchanged. Very inconvenient now !

Morning: Conference with the Western Cs of S. On the whole, we go over old ground. It would probably be a good idea to establish once for all the number of "ideal" vehicles that would be needed in the "ideal" situation". \*

Gen. Fellgiebel: Current matters: Assignment of radio bands Decimeter circuits in the East. -- Demands of CG of Railway Troops. -- Italian radio traffic can be intercepted. -- Direction beam equipment. -- Signal communication lines running through Sweden. \*\*

Talk with ObdH: Visit of King Boris of Bulgaria. -- ObdH's talk with Rosenberg. -- New Balkans set-up; Hq List. Fuehrer is afraid the British might emulate on the Channel Islands our airborne landing in Crete. -- Russians (Romania).

Wagner, Gen Qu:

- a) Rosenberg and territorial divisions in the East.
- b) Air transport: Out of 500 transport planes used for Crete 250 cracked up (130 total loss). Two Transport Groups will be deactivated. Twelve groups of 40 planes each, totalling 480, will remain. Of these, 8 groups of 40 each, totalling 320, are allocated to "Barbarossa". Available for troop and supply shipments (distributed among Air Fleets). Another 42 planes might come in from production.
- c) Effective 1 June, the Air Force will get no more automotive tires from Army.



6 June 1941.

Morning conference:

East: Increasing Russian air activity.

North Africa: British again getting frisky, especially opposite Bengasi; aircraft carrier reported en route.

Navy: In sea battle resulting in the loss of the SS "Bismarck", the ship was under simultaneous attack by 50 torpedo planes, 12 of which were shot down (great work!). It appears likely that acoustic torpedoes were used. British apparently have a radar instrument with 35 km range (ours has only 20 km).

Navy: SS Prinz Eugen ready to go to sea in 8 days. SS Luetzow will carry out feints from Norway. SS Scharnhorst now completed, will probably leave for the Atlantic through the Channel, under cover of diversionary maneuvers. \* SS Hipper will be ready in July, SS Gneisenau in October. Tirpitz now on shakedown cruise, will enter service in August.

Romania: Increasing Russian movements along the border. -- Communist propaganda.

Hoelter: Liaison Staff North, reports. Briefing on cooperation with Finns.

Kralle: Formerly Attaché in Hungary, calls before leaving for Madrid.

Conference with Col. General Guderian:

Armor has its main task not at the jump-off, but finds it in exploitation of the breakthrough. All strength must be conserved for the tasks that follow. At jump-off, maximum advantage must therefore be taken of Inf. support. 267th and 293rd Inf. Divs. must be placed under control of Armd. Group 2. They will be committed not as Divs. but rather as regimental teams without trains, under the command of Armd. Divs. An order to this end will be issued by the OKH at once.

Maj. Gen. Buhle:

- a) Tank repair centers for period after conclusion of "Barbarossa." We have one for German tanks (Warsaw or perhaps also Mil. District VIII) and one for Czech tanks. Setting up repair centers for other Divs. which must be taken out of the front, would require 10 days, but that is about the time it takes for a Div. to be shipped back.
- b) New Balkans set-up. New directive (Nr.31) and supplement on political function. \*\*

- c) Reorganization of the Army after fall, 1941.
- d) Army set-up Bulgaria.
- e) Questions relating to Army officials.\*
- f) 22nd Div.; special equipment for airborne operations will remain under guard in Romania for time being.
- g) AAA situation improved. All that is lacking now are some prime movers and truck columns.
- h) Table of Organization authorized for Commandant of British Channel Islands.
- i) 16th MG Bn. becomes static on the Channel Islands.
- k) Rest leaves in North Africa.

Heusinger - Stieff Ruling scale of maps for daily reports in "Barbarossa."

Dankwarts: Report on strike situation at Lille: Obviously politically inspired by Britain, De Gaulle movement and America (money). But the basic reason probably is the food situation, for which the German Ministry of Economics, more than anyone else, is to blame.

Measures taken by Military Government sound and energetic, without need to resort to arms. The main thing is to get the food situation ironed out promptly. Local Government agencies, police and employers are cooperating with us. The peak seems to have been reached, and the strike movement may be expected to fold up in about 8 days.

Heusinger:

- a) All AA Bns. have been recalled from Greek theater.
- b) GHq AA Bns. will be fully motorized.
- c) Mine Clearing Bn. already on way to AGp. Center. Will be employed as a unit under Hoth.
- d) Styria, etc., keep the old borders with Croatia.
- e) Latest estimates show that all troops in Naples will be transferred to North Africa in June, leaving only one Coastal Arty. Btry., one Field Hospital, etc. Six convoys with four Italian and one German ships, each.
- f) Hungary: Requires 12 days to complete assembly of troops. Our intentions will not be divulged before middle of June. Hence, an Hungarian attack cannot come off before B plus 5 \*\* or B plus 6; provided, that is, that they mean to be in on it. Our preparations then have to be this: Fourth Mt. Div. and 125th Inf. Div. will be moved as GHq. Reserves to AGp. South; 294th Div. which will be ready to ship out by 18 June, can be sent to Presov\*\*\*,

where it would be unloaded, beginning 20 June, to constitute the link between Romania\*and Hungary; again provided that Hungary is serious about joining the attack. If not, the Div. will be moved behind AGp. Center, as GHq reserve.

Kinzel: Reports back from his visit to the Finnish Gen.Staff.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen.Staff personnel matters.

7 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) At Solum, the British seem to be building up a new concentration. Something seems to be up also in the direction of Sidi Suleiman.
- b) We shall not approach Slovakia before middle of June (same as Hungary).
- c) Maximum railroad schedule on net west of Elbe river will be cancelled effective 16 June, 0000 hours. Likewise in occupied territory.
- d) 150,000 Croat workers will come to Germany (for war industries).
- e) Gen Qu reports supplementary requisitions for 190 trains for period between 17 and 23 June. That again !

Inspection of CP motor caravan ( organized by Central Branch ).  
30 office vans.

Lt.Col. Sperl, C of S L Corps calls. Reports on experiences in Serbia.

Col. Ochsner: Employment of smoke in Africa. (British are using phosphorus...).. Ammunition issued for "Barbarossa".

Col. Kinzel, Heusinger, Hoelter: Kinzel's report on tour to Finland. Conversations with Heinrichs. The Finnish High Command has squared their plans with ours, and seems to be going at it with every ounce of energy.

V Corps (Fins) , with two Divs., is assigned to the Kandalaksha operation.

Aaland will be handled by one Inf.Regt., which is not needed elsewhere.

For Hangoe they have set out one Div.

Assembly of troops:

|   |              |
|---|--------------|
| On border facing Leningrad                            | 4 Divs.      |
| North of Lake Ladoga                                  | 2 Divs.      |
| In central sector                                     | 5 to 6 Divs. |
| (Operational group for offensive east of Lake Ladoga) |              |

|                    |        |
|--------------------|--------|
| Reserves: Helsinki | 1 Div. |
| Turku              | 1 Div. |

(Would be available for follow-up.)

Time requirements: Mobilization and assembly, 12 days, including five days' warning on contemplated direction of attack.

The following target days have been fixed:

10 June: Call-up of Border Guard and third Bns. of Army units.

15 June: Mobilization of V Corps.

20 June: Ready to cross over to Aaland and attack Hangoe.

Full mobilization only after we open hostilities. They can start operations when we have crossed the Dvina.

Finnish Gen.Staff urges attack east of Lake Ladoga.

Col. Baentsch: Report on inspection at AGp. South. Assignment of MT Regt., disposition and employment in AGp. South. Points for briefing of QM Hqs in impending tasks.

Keitel OKW (on phone):

- a) Crete cannot be made an exclusive Air Force domain. Question of Executive Power.
- b) In Finland, Army Hq Norway can only look after its own, and cannot take care also of the southeastern operation.\* An assignment for Erfurth.
- c) Fuehrer's talk with von dem Borne on North Africa. Tactical details.
- d) Keitel's talk with Cavallero. Italy's plans for shipping troops to Africa are reaching too high. What the theater needs are not large masses of troops, but small contingents of crack troops with the best of equipment. Africa is a problem of logistics and equipment, not of mass concentrations.

Importance of protecting unloading operations in Benghazi (coastal artillery, escort planes, fighters, AAA).

Increase in Africa Corps' artillery fire power. -- Safeguarding of coastal shipping lane and cutting of British supplies to Tobruk.

General Bogatsch:

- a) Presents Rowehl's latest reconnaissance photos. Some gaps left around Kovno.

- b) Timing of long-range reconnaissance. Staffeln must be held back at first; probably will not start operations before second day, in AGP. Center.

von Bernuth (with von Ziehlberg):

- a) Relationship of "Staff School" to War Academy entrance examination in peacetime. Gen.Staff must insist on the special preparation and administrating of the Academy examinations. Selection of future Gen. Staff Officers must remain in our hands. The scores given by Staff School naturally will have to be given due consideration. On the other hand, the graduates' rating sheets will have to incorporate criteria which can serve as basis for the selection of War Academy candidates.
- b) Academy courses starting next fall. Hard to tell as yet whether emphasis will be put on training of young Staff Officer Candidates, or on refresher training of World War I Gen.Staff Officers. The latter courses will be necessary in any event.
- c) Motion pictures. Assignment of Motion Picture units. Developments in color films.
- d) Defense measures against flame throwers.

Evening at Kopp's in Belitz.

8 June 1941. (Sunday).

British invade  
invade Syria.

Berlin. — Leyherr comes for a visit. — Color pictures taken.

9 June 1941.

By air to front. Warsaw (von Hobe\*), Biala, Brest-Litovsk and Tilsit. Return via Frisches Haff — Danzig — Gdynia.

Conferences with Cs of S XII Corps (von Waldenburg) and XXXXVII Corps (Bamler), and the Div. Gen.Staff Officers. All know their jobs and are in high spirits. Preparations for 22 June completed.

The imposing vastness of the spaces, in which our troops are now assembling, cannot fail but strike a deep impression. By its very nature it puts an end to the doctrine of "Tuchfuehlung" \*\*. The Division as a self-contained operational unit becomes a dominant factor. All the work of decades \*\*\*, which was undertaken to train the Div. Commanders for independent leadership, must pay dividends here. Artillery support at

the jump-off will not be spectacularly strong, but must do. Engineer work and signal communications seem to be well prepared.

10 June 1941.

Situation conference:

North Africa: The British have finished regrouping their forces at Solum; not yet clear whether for defensive or offensive operations. (Radio intelligence has located one more Div. Hq and one more Regt.)

Crete: Command set-up still unsettled. On top of all the combat missions which Air Force must carry through from its Crete base, they insist on having administrative control. (On his own authority, the CG of XI Air Corps has styled himself "Governor".)

Balkans: Transfer of GHq troops from Saloniki to Eleventh Army is slow. Russians report presence of seven German Divs. in Moldavia.

Syria: Minor advances of British. The French view the situation optimistically.

Turkey: Conclusion of pact likely.

Croatia: Reported to be about to join Tripartite Pact (15 June, in Italy).

Heusinger:

- 1.1.) Finland: Reinforcement of Border Guard between 103-1130. June. Mobilization: Troops allocated to Hangoe and Aaland operations, 12 - 20 June. -- V Corps (Northern Group), 15 to 25 June. -- Bulk of Army, 16 to 28 June.
- 2.) 710th Div. (second occupation Div. for Norway) will be shipped between 14 and 17 June.
- 3.) "Haifisch II" \* cannot be carried out in the form planned by High Command West, because Navy has not got the required shipping available for immediate tasks.
- 4.) Crete-Greece: Foolish plans of OKW in Crete, for which they want 4 Regts. Put up strong opposition! Also, we must get out again one of the Mt. Divs. tied up in Greece.

Major Hansen reports on his tour in Turkey, Syria and Irak:

Turkey: Popular sentiment on the whole is favoring us. The Turks went over to England because they were afraid of the Italians. Realizing now, that their fears are unfounded, they would like to come around, but must wait a while for

the public to get used to this change of front. The Turks have no political claims for the future.

Iraq: Impotent as a military factor. Internal situation chaotic. British forces in that theater will remain tied up for some time to come.

Syria: Dentz apparently a good soldier and determined to resist. Popular sentiment in the southern part of the country anti-British, in the North it seems to be partly pro-De Gaulle. Forces available in the South against British: 20 Rifle and 6 Arty. Bns.; ought to be enough.

OQu IV:

- a) Preparations for intelligence service in "Barbarossa". All intelligence sources must be cleared through Ic officers.
- b) Preparation for intelligence service in future operations in Eastern Mediterranean.
- c) France: Exploit channels for exchange of information on Britain.
- d) Exchange of cables Boetticher/Foreign Office.
- e) Conversation Fuehrer - Duce. Apparently an exchange of general ideas, without binding commitments. (Switzerland disgusting.)

Radire:

- a) Propaganda organization for "Barbarossa".
- b) New enemy campaign for undermining German morale by personal attacks on high army leaders on the radio (slurs on von Bock).
- c) Memorial Cemeteries and Soldiers' Monuments in France.
- d) Current matters.

11 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Delay in transfer of units from Army Hq 12 to Army Hq 11 affects: 2 med.Arty. Bns., 2 Eng.Bns. Arrival by 22 June now is doubtful.
- b) Eastern front all set. Build-up proceeds according to plan.
- c) Troop shipments running on schedule. Railroad accidents in the ZI will not affect them appreciably.



d) Strike in Belgium has collapsed.

CQu I:

a) Deception measures in West and East. No suspension of mail services in West now. Measures must be stepped up during July and possibly August. \*

b) Operations on the periphery of "Barbarossa" theater.--- Preparations.

Gen. Erfurth reports as C of S Liaison Hq North. Briefing on operational and personnel questions.

Adm. Schuster (Admiral Balkans) reports on Crete and Aegean, and inquires about "Barbarossa" (southern wing).

Luncheon with Gen. Ott, Gen. Paulus.

Gen. Wagner: Report on trip to Rome. Favorable impression of Italy and of Rintelen's work. The talks in Rome strongly indicate that build-up of stores may become possible during June. In terms of present strength of Africa Corps, the over-all supply picture is as follows:

| On hand  | Ship in June |
|--|--------------|
| Ammunition: 4 issues (1 with troops)                       | 5            |
| Fuel: $6\frac{1}{2}$ consumption quotas (bulk with troops) | 50           |
| Rations: 15 daily allowances (mostly Benghazi)             | 20-30        |

Required shipping space 44,000 tons.

These transport requirements, plus what the Italians need, can be supplied only by putting 20,000 tons to work on the French route Toulon -- Bizerte and then Gabès -- Zarzise -- Tripoli. Of course, this means reloading at several points.

Efficient operation can be assured only by establishing in Rome an agency equipped with sweeping powers, to route required supplies through France, Naples -- Tripoli, Naples -- Benghazi, or Taranto -- Peloponnese -- Benghazi, according as shipping and naval and air escort become available. Such a powerful agency does not exist as yet. Aerial and coastal protection necessary to insure safe operation of the routes must be furnished by Air Force and Army.

12 June 1941.

Situation conference:

North Africa: Minor changes in enemy dispositions, furnishing no clues to offensive intentions. Still, an attack need not be ruled out. It may well develop in the coming month.

bright nights.

Fifth Lt. Div., having now been taken out of line, is held in readiness for counterattacking southeast of Tobruk. Will work together with elements of Fifteenth Div., which were also withdrawn.

Syria: Local British advances, mainly along coast; in this sector, Dentz has no means for striking back.

Turkey: Will not intervene in Syria. It looks to them that Dentz has little chance to hold out long. Britain has not todate approached Turkey to take positive action in the fighting in Syria.

22nd Div., with Arty. and trains will arrive in operational area between 20 and 25 June.

Gen. Konrad: Reports back after illness. -- Dietl's wishes concerning Air Force support for "Silberfuchs!" -- Uniformity in procedure for enemy reports in Air Force and Army. -- Exchange of information between the two Branches of the Armed Services and its organization. -- Exchange of maps. -- North-African supply problem and what Air Force can do for it.

- Gercke:
- a) Personnel questions: Recommendation for promotion of Bork and Ludwiger.
  - b) Railroad operation. Allocation of cars for industry and coal distribution satisfactory in spite of maximum railroad schedule.
  - c) Motor trucks for operations on RR tracks: Available 174. Can pull 3 trucks, with through-brakes.
  - d) Construction of bridge near Edirne makes no headway, because Turks want their own contractors to do the work. We are interested in having the work done quickly, for we may need that railroad line next fall.
  - e) Organizational questions: "Inspectorate of Railway Troops" is necessary also in wartime. Some Brigade Hqs required for control of these troops.

Inspection of CP motor caravan: One van for ObdH, one van for Gen.Staff.

Fellgiebel reports on his tour in the East: Suggestions:

- a) Dummy movements in Hungary and Romania, in coordination with AGp. South.
- b) Hqs must be instructed on proper radio procedure for traffic between rear and forward CPs.

Gen Qu:

- a) Organizational set-up of "Armed Forces Commander Southeast".\* -- Relationship between Military Commander "Serbia" and "German General Bulgaria". Take Army Hq 2 out of theater.

- b) Organization of supply services for Africa. Transport dictator.
- c) Road-rail automobile and rail prime movers.
- d) Issue no more orders involving basic changes prior to "Barbarossa".

Op. Sec.:

- a) Briefing of Corps Hqs of GHq reserves. Reception Hqs; assembly and transfer to front. \*
- b) Improve defense preparedness of Channel Islands.
- c) Ninth Armd.Div. has difficulties getting equipment together. Second Armd.Div. will help out, but as a result will complete own outfitting later than scheduled.

13 June 1941.

Situation conference:

Tobruk: Solum unchanged. Pavia Div.\*\* has taken over southern front at Tobruk. Fifth Lt. Div. taken out of line.

Romania: Readyng of ships for Bessarabia. Dismantling of tracks on railroad bridge.\*\*\* Radio communication with Navy. \*#

East: Movements on schedule.

Syria: French reports sound somewhat better now; apparently British advance along the coast and south of Damascus has been checked.

General Bogatsch:

- a) Missions for close-range reconnaissance Staffeln. I won't let him use also the OKH Staffeln at the start; their turn comes later.
- b) Allocation of AAA to Armies.

OQu IV (at first with Mellenthin): Position of Attachés in relation to the "German Generals" (in Bulgaria etc.,) Military Missions etc. Intelligence Center under Rohde in Middle East.

Col. Ziegler: (C of S XXXXII Corps) drops in while here for briefing of Corps Hqs of the GHq Reserves.

General Thomas (Armament Economy Office): Fuel reserves will be exhausted in fall. Aviation gasoline will be down to one-half, regular gasoline to one-quarter, and Diesel and fuel-

oil to one-half of requirements.  
Cooperation with Armament Economy Office.

Political questions: Operational plans cannot be tailored to suit economic planners.

OQu I: Dissension regarding relocation of replacement units in the West are settled between Army Hq 1 and BdE.

von dem Borne, Heggenreiner \* and Rommel are ganging up on Gause in his new post.

Gen Qu: C in C Balkans; legal and administrative tasks.

Buhle: a) Report on Eastern tour. Divs. on the whole in better shape than last spring. Very satisfactory over-all impression.

b) Repair facilities for Armd. troops. How much static and mobile?

c) Special Bn. Irak — To be formed with volunteers. \*\*

Conference with ObdH after his return from the East:

a) Over-all impression satisfying. Troops in good shape. Operational planning generally well thought through. Open questions: Timing of attack. Some of the Corps want dawn instead of 0330.

What to do in the event that enemy attacks before we strike. Proclamation to troops on attack on Russia. Must set forth reasons! \*\*\*

b) Review of the situation created on the Balkans by the new OKW order (with Gen Qu present).

c) Review of general situation.

Heusinger: Report on Eastern tour with ObdH. His impressions parallel those of ObdH.

Gen. Paulus: a) How to overcome the difficulties confronting the mission of Gause's Staff in Gariboldi's Hq.

b) Shift of replacement units of BdE to France.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

a) Dummy Radio traffic in Hungarian territory prior to "Barbarossa". Consultation with the Hungarians on 18 June.

b) Radio communications during shifts of CPs.

14 June 1941. (General conference in  
Fuehrer's Office).

Reports on "Barbarossa" by the GPs Army Gps., Armies and Armd.  
Groups.

1100 : Falkenhorst together with Stumpff (Air Force) report  
on "Silberfuchs". Northern Group, B plus 7; Southern Group,  
plus 9.

1300 - 1400. : Report of CGs. Armies and Armd. Gp. of AGp.  
South. The question of control of Romanian Army is clar-  
ified. Up to the start of offensive operations, Antonescu  
will formally exercise supreme control in Romania. Army  
Hq 11 will be attached to him as his "working staff", and  
thus will be in actual control, but orders to the Romanian  
troops must be issued through Antonescu. -- In this set-up  
the "Army Mission" will act as liaison staff between Army  
Hq 11 and Antonescu. Hungary will not be taken into  
confidence, but merely advised that Hungarian defense  
measures must take into consideration the mounting strength  
of Russian forces on her border.

Slovakia will not be informed for the time being. On start  
of hostilities, their Army Command will be requested to get  
their troops ready to move, in order to be able to repel a  
Russian advance into Slovak territory. (Employment  
desirable on the Russian border south of Seventeenth Army.)

After luncheon, the Fuehrer delivers a lengthy political  
address, in which he explains the reasons for his intention  
to attack Russia and evolves his calculation that Russia's  
collapse would induce England to give in.

1630 - 1830 : Report on measures in the Baltic (Adm.  
Schmundt), afterwards AGp. North and Center.

Prolonged debate on the dangers which threaten GHq \* from  
the Bialystok salient. Minefields !\*\*

It has now been decided to advance Zero Hour from 0330. to  
0300.

15 June 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).

Farewell visit to Gerti. -- Visit to Farbfilm-Foto\*\*\* to take a  
look at the color photo taken at home. -- Visit by Koppen-  
berg. #

16 June 1941.

Situation report:

- a) Superior British forces, striking far to the south and southwest, have been attacking Solum since Sunday morning. British throw in 150 - 200 tanks. Enemy has air superiority. 60 tanks knocked out, also 11 airplanes. Tank battle southwest of Capuzzo. All attacks have been repelled. British are transferring airplanes to the Eastern Mediterranean. Intensified British submarine activity in the Mediterranean (embracing Aegean).
- b) Operations area of Russian Navy. Russian patrol activity at Hangoe and on the western end of the Gulf of Finland.
- c) U.S. Navy shifts its main concentration to the Atlantic.

Jakob:

- a) Turun-Magurele bridge dismantled (11 June), will be moved to Cernavoda\* and replaced by large ferry.
- b) Sybel ferries have arrived at Cernavoda. Constanza: 23 ferries under construction (number to be increased to 47). Will not be ready before 25 June.
- c) Mine detectors for Eleventh Army.

Conference with Field Marshal List in ObdH's office regarding appointment of "Armed Forces Commander Southeast".

- Buhle:
- a) Reinforcement of Channel Island defenses: 3 22 cm Btrys., 3 15 cm gun Btrys., 6 siege gun 18 Btrys.
  - b) Assault guns and Tank IV. Use of assault guns as substitutes for lacking tanks IV.
  - c) Question of furloughs in Africa. 2% of furloughs in ZI, 3% in African rest centers. Replace married personnel.\*\*
  - d) Replacement situation: By 1 October Replacement Army will be 450,000 strong. Anticipated normal attrition losses (sickness, discharge for unfitness, etc.) 150,000. This leaves 300,000 plus 70,000 in Field Replacement Bns., a total of 370,000, as replacements for battle losses in "Barbarossa".
  - e) Current business. Also expression of views on organization program of Railway Engineers.

Briefing of Liaison Officers at Army Gp., Army and Armd. Gp. Hqs.

Afterwards Heusinger for current business; current matters turned over to Paulus.

Buhle: Get ready 900th Brigade. Will be committed around

Ostrolenka, under tactical control of AGp. B, to guard against any Russian breakout attempt from the Bialystok salient; otherwise GHq Reserve.

17 June 1941.

By plane to Wiener Neustadt -- Belgrade -- Bucharest (conference with Army Mission and Attaché) -- Constanza -- Danube Delta -- Bacau (Moldavia) and to Hq Eleventh Army.

18 June 1941.

Tour by plane and car along northern and eastern border of Romania. Defense positions. In the evening conference in Eleventh Army Hq. At dinner I meet the Romanian War Minister.

19 June 1941.

Rain during the night causes severe floods which complicate ride to Bacau airfield in the morning. Take-off delayed. Flight above clouds (4,000 m) to Budapest, where we are received by Gen. Werth; luncheon and conference. -- By air to Bratislava (conference with Gen. Ott and Military Attaché Becker). -- Return flight to Rangsdorf.

20 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) North Africa: Defensive success at Solum. Two enemy tank brigades at least badly crippled (200 tanks). X Air Corps transfers the following new units to Africa: 1 long-range fighter Staffel, and 2 divebomber Staffeln.
- b) East: Assembly of troops proceeding according to plan. Weather favorable. Rivers partly below normal.
- c) Replacement units in Mil. Districts II and III go to XX and XXI on 23 June, from Protectorate to Mil. District I \* on 15 July.
- d) Molotov wanted to see the Fuehrer on 18 June.



Heusinger:

- a) Fuehrer concerned about area west of Augustow,\* and about Romania. Augustow: Use SS and 900th Brigade.  
Romania: Parts of 5th Armd. Div. are to be sent over (Fuehrer's wish). Actually only components available are: two-thirds of 13th Rifle Regt. and 2nd Bn./31st Armd. Regt. Movement from Athens to Romania will take 8 - 9 days. For now they can go to Saloniki (2-3 days).
- b) East: Squabble between AGps. North and Center about jump-off time. Protection of Vistula bridges (AAA). SS Adolf Hitler will not be ready in time. Tracked components leave on 22 June, others not before 25 June.
- c) Romania: New Command set-up. Hq of Romanian Third Army steps down.\*\*
- d) 46th and 294th Divs. in Belgrade area ready to be shipped. Move 294th Div. to Saxony.
- e) AGp. South wants 4th Mt. Div. No! May follow up as GHq Reserve behind Seventeenth Army in its drive on Jaroslav.

Gen. Oehquist: Wishes of the Finnish C in C.

- 1.) Want to receive request of German High Command to start Ladoga operation at latest possible date.
- 2.) Operation east of Lake Ladoga is the one they want.
- 3.) Seven days' alert notice for start of operation (five days only in an emergency). Something new!
- 4.) Finnish High Command wants to have V Corps freed as soon as possible for operation Ladoga. Other items of information:
  - a) Difficult food situation.
  - b) Mobilization starts on 18 June. Completed 28 June.

Gen. Bogatsch: AAA protection of Vistula bridges. First use troops available on the spot. Nothing must be taken from the weak AAA of Ground Forces, at least not in the first days.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Transfer of GHq. Current Gen. Staff questions.

Conference with ObdH on my travel impressions and on "Barbarossa". No important new viewpoints.

In the evening we receive the Fuehrer proclamation to the troops for "Barbarossa". A longwinded manifesto, surprisingly in a predominant political tenor.

Late in the evening von Ziehlberg still has some reports on personnel matters (Ia, VI Corps).

21 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Codeword "Dortmund" \* has come through.
- b) Materiel position of SS Adolf Hitler has improved. Div. may yet get ready in time.
- c) Losses at Solum are on a reasonable scale: Total 560 men, with proportion of killed considerably lower than at Tobruk. Number of missing large, but that is probably inevitable in such desert battles.
- d) Hungary has effected certain improvements in her border defenses (AT guns).
- e) The SS destined as security force on border north of the Bialystok tip, will go to Arys.\*\*
- f) Syria: Situation not unfavorable. Attitude of French airmen is becoming increasingly pro-German.

Gen. Brand, Gen. Buhle:

- a) Artillery developments. Gen. Staff comments on development program of Chief of Armament.
- b) Brand reports on his inspection tour: Artillery assembly in the East.
- c) Ratio of combined German and Romanian artillery to Russian is as 2.2 : 2.9.

Gen. Buhle: a) Current organizational matters.

- b) Tank developments program next fall (Schell).
- c) Experiences gained in refitting Armd. units after the Southeast operation.

Gen. von Kirchheim:

- a) Experiences in North Africa. Suggests forming of Camel Transport columns (6,000 camels equal to two 30-ton truck columns).
- b) Disbanding of Colonial Staff.
- c) Personal impressions on relations between certain personalities in North Africa.
- d) Requirements for attack on Tobruk: 9 Rifle Bns., 3 Combat Eng. Bns. 30 Rocket Projectors Btrys.

Maj. Gen. Paulus: Reorganization of office routine after start of operation. (Written instructions for internal Gen. Staff service).

Gen. Matzky: a) Britain: 42 combat-fit Divs. and 7 newly activated Divs. in the homeland.

- b) Resources for moving British troops to Senegambia.
- c) Time required for shipping one British Div. by sea: 3 weeks (assembly, loading and unloading) plus voyage.
- d) Rhode team for collection of intelligence in the Middle East installed in Ankara.
- e) Individual Army officers on special missions will be subordinate to the Military Attaches.
- f) 25 Romanian highschool graduates will enter the German Army as officer candidates.

Wagner - Baentsch:

- a) Possibility of transport difficulties in the Lublin corner. If necessary, make adjustments in troop transport ports.
- b) Suspension of Fieldpost from the ZI to the Army between B plus 1 to B plus 5.
- c) Oversea Staff (an OKW creation which in that form comes too late and is ineptly organized).

Wagner alone:

- d) Conferences of Gen Qu in France: "Attila", "Haifisch", "Isabella".
- e) French political situation. (Intrigues by our political agencies make Darlan's position very difficult.)
- f) Test mobilization of "Resurrection columns" was a full success. \*

Heusinger:

- a) Thirteenth Rifle Regt. for Romania? (arrives Saloniki 25 June, could reach Romania 29 June) OKW's interest slackening.
- b) Il Duce offers for Eastern operation: One Corps Hq, 2 Cav. Divs., 1 mot. unit (to operate on the Balkans?),\*\*
- c) Slovakia: No political steps intended.
- d) Air Force (Waldau) reports that it is ready.
- e) ObdH would like to have 164th Div. in "Barbarossa". Now "marooned" on Greek islands. Will not arrive in time. Could be used in Anatolia operation. Will be offset by a Div. of Fifteenth Draft.

Enemy intelligence: Heightened Russian alertness reported in some places (manning of positions facing VIII Corps).

Finnish mobilization proclamations reported to have been posted.

Conference schedule in "Barbarossa":

In my office: 0900 and 2000.  
ObdH: about 1000 and 2100.  
Report to Fuehrer after conferences.

Balance of strength:

Germany ("Barbarossa" front):

102 Inf. Divs. (incl. 4 lt. and 2 Mt. Divs.)  
19 Armd. Divs.  
14 mot. Divs. (incl. 4 SS Divs.)  
5 Special Divs. (i.e., 3 Security Divs. and 2 Divs.  
Fifteenth Draft  
1 Cav. Div.

Total 141 Divs.

Russia (entire European Russia)

154 Inf. Divs.  
25 $\frac{1}{2}$  Cav. Divs.  
37 moto-mcz. Brigs.

Total 213 Divs. (rounded figure).

## THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA .

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22 Juni 1941. (Sunday) 1st Day.

The morning reports: indicate that all Armies (except Eleventh) have started the offensive according to plan. Tactical surprise of the enemy has apparently been achieved along the entire line. All bridges across the Bug river, as on the entire river frontier, were undefended and are in our hands intact. That the enemy was taken by surprise is evident from the facts that troops were caught in their quarters, that planes on the airfields were covered up, and that enemy groups faced with the unexpected development at the front inquired at their Hqs in the rear what they should do. More effects of the surprise may be anticipated from the assaults of our Armor, which have been ordered in all sectors. The Navy reports that the enemy seems to have been taken by surprise also in their zone of action. His reactions to the measures of the last few days were of a purely passive nature, and he now is holding back his naval forces in ports, apparently in fear of mines.

Paulus communicates to me 1100. State Secretary von Weizsaecker's appraisal of the situation: Britain will at first feel relieved by the news of our attack on Russia and will rejoice at the "dispersal of our forces". But a rapid advance of German troops will soon bring disillusionment, for the defeat of Russia cannot but lead to a marked strengthening of our position in Europe.

As to Britain's readiness for an accord with us he has this to say: The propertied classes will strive for a settlement leaving us a free hand in the East, but it would involve renunciation of our claims to Holland and Belgium. If these tendencies are to prevail, Churchill has to be overthrown, as he relies on the support of the Labor Party, which is not interested in a peace concluded by the propertied classes. Such a peace would bring the propertied interests back into power, whereas the Labor Party wants power for itself. The Labor Party therefore will continue the war until the propertied class is entirely eliminated. Under what conditions it would eventually be willing to come to terms with Germany, cannot be predicted. Probably vehement opposition to National Socialism, by reason of strong Jewish influence and Communist connections. For the time being, in any case, the Labor Party will not be disposed to put an end to the war.

In the Far East, an attack by Japan on Britain appears unlikely. Both Japan and U.S. will endeavour to keep from being drawn into the war. It is in Germany's interest to keep both out of the conflict; otherwise the war, both in duration and resources would be entirely out of control, and the making of an eventual peace would be infinitely complicated.

Kinzel, Matzky:

- a) Russian operational mot. Reserve Group Pskov has been located south of the Dvina river(!), 300 km southwest of the area where it was originally believed to be.

That's just right for us!

- b) Identity of various Russian units confirmed. Russian radio signal: Staff Third Army wiped out, send long-range fighters.
- c) Situation in Syria is becoming critical. Damascus fallen, British mot. forces advancing on Palmyra from the east.

1200. Report that Russians have resumed international radio communications, which were interrupted this morning. They have asked Japan to act as intermediary in the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany, and are in constant radio contact with the German Foreign Office.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): reports on war situation at sea. Russians surprisingly passive.

1330. Op. Sec.:

- a) Air Force reports 800 enemy aircraft destroyed (First Air Fleet 100, Second Air Fleet 300, Fourth Air Fleet 400). Leningrad sea approaches mined without losses. Own losses so far 10 aircraft.
- b) AGp. Center reports wild flight on the Brest-Litovsk - Minsk road. Russian command organization in complete confusion.
- c) AGp. South reports that own patrols have crossed the Prut river between Galatz and Husi and Jassy without encountering any resistance. Bridges are in our hands.

Afternoon: Reports on advances especially north of Brest-Litovsk (Hoth) and of Armd. Gp. 4 (Hoepfner).

Italy declares herself to be in a state of war with Russia.

The over-all picture of the first day of the offensive is as follows:

The enemy was surprised by the German attack. His forces were not in tactical disposition for defense. The troops in the border zone were widely scattered in their quarters. The frontier itself was for the most part weakly guarded.

As a result of this tactical surprise, enemy resistance directly on the border was weak and disorganized, and we succeeded everywhere in seizing the bridges across the border rivers and in piercing the defense positions (field fortifications) near the frontier.

After the first shock, the enemy has turned to fight. There have been instances of tactical withdrawals and no doubt also disorderly retreats, but there are no indications of an attempted operational disengagement. Such a possibility can moreover be discounted. Some enemy Hqs have been put out of action, e.g., in Bialystok, and some sectors so are deprived of high echelon control. But quite apart from that, the impact of the shock is such that the Russian High Command could not be expected in the first few days to form a clear enough picture of the situation to make so far-reaching a decision. On top of everything, the command organization is too ponderous to effect swift operational regrouping in reaction to our attack, and so the Russians will have to accept battle in the disposition in which they were deployed.

Our Divs. on the entire offensive front have forced back the enemy on an average of 10 to 12 km. This has opened the path for our Armor.

In AGp. South, Group Kleist was able to get its northern and central Corps moving in the noon hours. If, as seems likely, they reach the Styr river still today, they will have to fight it out with the enemy mot. Group east of the Styr tomorrow and the day after. The outcome will be decisive for their operational freedom of movement.

In AGp. Center, the right wing of Armd. Gp. Guderian (Third and Fourth Armd. Divs.) was for a time held up in difficult wooded terrain (which I believe could have been avoided) and will start rolling on the Brest - Minsk motor highway toward evening, if all goes well. The northern wing (Lemelsen) has pierced the opposing enemy forces and has gained operational freedom of movement. The two coming days will show in what way Guderian can dispose of the enemy mot. forces round Minsk. Once they are beaten, the operational success of this Armd. Group is assured.

North of Bialystok, Armd. Group Hoth scored quite a remarkable success. It has pushed through the forest and lake country to the Njemen river. The important crossings near Olita and Merkinė have fallen into our hands intact. Advance elements of eight Divs., thrown against it have been scattered and there is no organized enemy resistance in front of it. Full operational freedom of movement appears to have been achieved in this sector.

In the area of AGp. North, Armd. Gp. Hoepfner has battled its way to the Dubissa river and captured two crossings intact. Here the enemy will be able to throw fresh forces against us from his depth in the next few days.

The Army Gps. are pursuing their original objectives. Nor is there any reason for a change. OKH has no occasion to issue any orders. The time is not ripe yet for a decision on how to employ Eleventh Army. Our assault troops have crossed the Prut river at various points and have seized the bridges. But there are no signs that the Russians are yielding the area between Pruth and Dniestr.



Slovakia has offered for immediate commitment an Armd. Gp. in the strength of about a reinforced Regt., to be ready at Presov by 23, evening. The offered Group is accepted and assigned to Seventeenth Army. In addition, two Divs., to be brought up to war strength immediately, will be available by 25 June. They, too, will go to Seventeenth Army.

Hungary, which has stationed 2 Brigs. on her border and 3 Armd. Brigs. behind them under VIII Corps Hq, has closed her frontier. On the political side we make no request to Hungary. If the soldiers want to join us, let them prevail on their politicians to do so.

Air Force reports 850 enemy airplanes shot down. This number includes entire bomber squadrons, committed without fighter escort, which were taken on and destroyed in the air by our fighters.

23 June 1941. 2nd Day.

The morning reports of 23 June and the concluding daily reports for 22 June, which came in during the night, indicate that an enemy attempt at disengagement must be expected. AGp. North even believes that the enemy may have made this decision as far back as four days ago.

The assumption that considerable portions of the enemy are further in the rear than we assumed, and are partly being taken back even now, is corroborated by the fact that our troops, although they had to fight for it, did penetrate the border areas to a depth of as much as 20 km on the first day, and by the absence of any large take of prisoners and the singular absence of any major artillery activity; another indication would be the withdrawal of mot. Corps in the direction of Minsk.

In front of AGp. South also the enemy appears to be falling back eastward from the Hungarian border, in order to get his forces out of the pocket. The fact that troops are moving frontward in some places does not argue against these inferences, for these are spots where a rapid advance of German troops would compromise the withdrawal, e.g. opposite Armd. Group Hoth and Kleist's northern wing, and in the IV Corps sector of Seventeenth Army.

In view of all this we must adhere to our plan for the operations north of the Pripyet Marshes, that is, to push the two Armd. wedges of Guderian and Hoth on Minsk and pinch off the Bialystok pocket. Prospects of success are good. If we succeed, the hole torn into the entire Russian front will be so large and elimination of so many enemy Divs. will have changed the balance of strength so greatly in our favor that we shall have full operational freedom.

The situation looks more difficult in the sector of AGp. South, because in abandoning the original plan of operation, based on Romania \*, we have thrown away our best strategic opportunity. We shall have to confine ourselves to probing for the soft spot and then drive an Armd. wedge through it as hard as we can. At the moment this soft spot seems to present itself on the motor highway in Kleist's central sector, north of Tarnopol.

1200. Himer (on phone): We gratefully accept every kind of Hungarian cooperation, provided it does not strain our road and rail communications with Romania.

1400. By plane to Elbing, and then by car to new Hq. \* \*

Development of situation: In AGp. South, in Romania, the Russians are attacking our Prut bridgeheads and are making reconnaissance forays against the Romanian Cavalry from Cernauti. That's very good ! \*\*\*

In Seventeenth Army sector enemy resistance seems to be slackening in the direction of Lwow. In Sixth Army sector, the faulty development of Thirteenth Armd. Div. has had the result that Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd. Divs. could not start off and are now waiting on the northward highway, until the Infantry has cleared the way for them. The farthest advance has been made by Eleventh Armd. Divs., after battling it out with enemy tanks. Unfortunately Thirteenth Div. is not now behind it. Another Div. will be moved up, but what a loss of time !

In AGp. Center everything goes according to plan. Hoth has made the farthest advance, whereas Guderian is being checked again and again. This occasions a discussion with AGp. B, as to whether Hoth should continue his drive on Minsk, or had better strike at once farther north, for Polotsk. As a matter of fact, von Bock, from the start, had objections against a joint operation by the two Armd. Gps. in the direction of Smolensk, and wanted Hoth to strike farther north. That, however, would have put an almost impassable strip of water and marshland between Hoth and Guderian, enabling the enemy to beat the groups separately. Such a possibility merits consideration all the more as the Russians are the originators of the idea of quick mass concentration (Budjonny), and inasmuch some reports of withdrawals would indicate that the Russians might be attempting to concentrate Armor far in the rear.

The over-all picture is best characterized by the report from Fourth Army: The enemy in the Bialystok pocket is not fighting for his life, but to gain time.

I very much doubt that the enemy High Command really has unified and organized control of the situation. It rather looks as if the local withdrawal movements both of the Ground Forces and of the Air Force are being carried out under the pressure of our advances, and that it is impossible at this time to speak of a planned withdrawal.

The only exception is perhaps the enemy in front of AGp. North. Here a withdrawal, probably behind the Dvina river, seems in fact to have been prepared long ago. We cannot yet see through the reasons for that. Perhaps the Russians thought we might demand disputed Lithuania and so were preparing to abandon the country to us. In spite of these preparations the enemy has remained in his positions near the border around Bialystok; this can be explained only by the deficient and plodding working of the Russian Command machinery.

At the evening situation conference, the question is discussed whether Hoth and Guderian should continue to drive on Vitebsk and Orsha. In any case Hoth's right wing must advance to the high ground around Minsk. If necessary, he must wait there for Guderian. ObdH discusses the situation in these terms with Field Marshal von Bock.

Midnight: Talk with Paulus and Bogatsch on having the OKH air Staffeln carry out reconnaissance on the upper Dvina and the upper Dniepr.

24 June 1941. 3rd Day.

Situation: The final reports for 23 June and today's morning reports confirm the picture we gained so far.

The enemy is making a stand almost everywhere in the border area. Our troops do not fully grasp this because resistance was disorganized and relatively ineffective in consequence of the tactical surprise achieved. In the country traversed by our tanks there are still substantial active enemy forces broken up in smaller groups. The number of prisoners, which on the first day ran to about 2,000 in every Army sector (i.e. a total of about 10,000), will increase only in the next few days, when the drives of our Arm'd. wedges will have taken full operational effect. There are no signs of an operational withdrawal of the enemy. Only in the North an attempt is being noted to take back forces; this may be done with a view to building up a Russian Dvina front, which might compel us to move over Hoepfner's Arm'd. Group nearer to Hoth, so as to cross the Dvina in its upper reaches. \*

The supply situation is taking a normal development. The first Advance Supply Points are being moved forward. Fuel and oil consumption very high. Expenditure of ammunition low.

Losses in wounded and killed are moderate. Remarkably high officer casualties.

Bogatsch: Submits report on Air effort. On the whole the same picture.

Wagner: reports on supply. Decision: Bulk of MT Regts. will advance toward Smolensk.

Fellgiebel: Digest of radio intelligence: The operational Reserve Groups surmised north of Schaulen, around Minsk and around Shepetowka, far from moving eastward, are even shifting forces to the battle front. Only isolated front Corps opposite AGp. Center are being taken back in small bounds.

Gercke: Change of gauge of railroad track east of the frontier has been started, as planned. \*

1530. ObdH returns from the Fuehrer:

- a) Fuehrer is worried that our ring around Bialystok is not close enough.
- b) The Italians, who will send one Corps to Romania, must in no case be allowed in the Crimea. \*\*
- c) Spaniards (Spanish Legion). Nothing definite yet about activation and arrival, but it will be best to equip them with arms ourselves.

Lt.Col. Kahlden, Liaison Officer to Hoth's Corps, reports.

Noon: Vilna, Kovno, Kedainiai taken. Interesting historical coincidence that Napoleon also took Vilna on 24 June.

The picture in the course of the afternoon is as follows:

AGp. South is advancing against counter-attacks, especially strong in IV Corps sector, north of Lwow. Very heavy enemy casualties. New heavy enemy tank! The right wing of Seventeenth Army has reached its objective, the high ground of Mosciska. Armd. Gp. Kleist now has 4 Armd.Divs. in line and has reached the Styr river. The enemy throws into the battle all reserves available in the rear, so that there is a chance that we might smash the entire enemy force in the Ukraine in the battles of the next few days. The stubborn resistance of individual Russian units is remarkable. Bunker crews have blown themselves up with their bunkers, rather than surrender.

In the sector of AGp. Center closing of the ring east of Bialystok, in the Minsk area, is nearing completion. Hoth, who against von Bock's opposition, has been ordered by OKH to strike through Molodeczno toward the high ground north of Minsk, is only 30 km from Minsk. He now stands in the rear of the last enemy Reserve Group which was thrown from Minsk toward Baranowichi against Guderian's advancing Armd. Group and, supported by reinforcements brought westward through Slazk, has engaged him in the Slonim area. If Guderian makes headway in the direction of Baranowichi, in the next few days the ring will be completely sealed. Air Force must prevent any eastward retreat of the forces coming from Slazk.

In the further development of the battle, Fourth Army must advance its left wing Corps toward Volkovysk, and Ninth Army its right wing Corps (XX) toward Lunna, in order to

form an inner ring of Infantry around Bialystok; this ring must be made as tight as possible by moving up additional Infantry from the west.

The time necessary to complete this will be utilized to allow the components of Guderian's and Hoth's Armd.Gps. to close up on the high ground around Minsk. Meanwhile strong Advance Combat Teams can secure the crossings on the Upper Dniepr at Mogilev and Orsha, and on the Upper Dvina, at Vitebsk and Polozk. Continuation of the offensive by the combined Armd. Gps. toward the high ground northwest of Smolensk only after consultation with OKH.

Army Group North has to fight off strong enemy tank attacks almost along its entire front; the only exception is the sector of 291st Div., which is advancing on Libau. These attacks are probably maintained by III Russian Armd. Corps, originally in the area, and by several moto-mez. Brigs. Nevertheless the strong right wing of AGp. has forged ahead to Vilkomir. Here, too, the Russians are fighting stubbornly and doggedly.

Generally speaking, it is now clear that the Russians are not thinking of withdrawal, but are throwing in everything they have to stem the German invasion. Throughout this effort, the High Command seems to remain entirely in the background. The reasons are not clear, but the absence of any large-scale operational reserves probably precludes its effective intervention. That the Russians had adapted their plans to an all-out defensive near the border, is also demonstrated by the large quantities of stores which were to be the logistical basis of the plan.

As to the previously known operational reserves, we have as yet no clear idea of the whereabouts of Armd.Gp. Pskov, which is reported to have been moved forward to the area between Schaulen and the Dvina river, but apparently has not as yet been committed against AGp. North. Such a policy would be in keeping with Russian tactics, always to keep back some forces against the possibility of the breakdown of the enemy attack.

The course of the entire battle evolves gratifyingly according to plan. A new feature in the sectors of AGp. South and AGp. North are the new heavy Russian tanks, reported to be armed with 8 cm guns and, according to another, but untrustworthy, observation from AGp. North, even 15 cm guns.

The enemy air force is completely out of the picture after the very high initial losses (reports speak of 2,000).

After the evening conference with ObdH the following orders are issued:

- a) Eleventh Army must get ready to attack (time needed: 5 days).
- b) 900th Brigade is made available to AGp. Center to

complete the ring circling Bialystok.

- c) Liaison Staff North receives instructions that Finland must make all preparations for starting offensive east of Lake Ladoga. The operation must be on a front of at least 6 Divs., with main weight on left wing and objectives deep in enemy territory.

Prolonged discussion as to the most efficient command set-up for continuance of operations by AGp. Center. Should Armd. Gps. 2 and 3, which probably can no longer be controlled by AGp. Hq, be placed under command of Fourth Army Hq? Second Army Hq then would take charge of the investment of Bialystok. Or should Guderian assume command of all armored operations? -- Talk with OQu I and Gen Qu.

I believe it would be impossible for Fourth Army Hq to direct the offensive of Fourth Army and at the same time conduct the operations to reduce Bialystok. Since von Bock cannot get through to Minsk on his signal communications, the best plan would be for von Kluge, as he once did in the West, to take over control (in addition to Infantry, i.e. the two Corps on the right wing of his Army) of the two Armd. Gps. together with responsibility for their supply. It might be desirable to leave Supply Officer Fourth Army at Bialystok, under control of Second Army Hq, which will be in charge there, and reassign Supply Officer Second Army to Fourth Army instead.

I object to putting Guderian in command of the combined Armd. Gps.

Sweden will raise no difficulties about transit of 163rd Div. through Swedish territory. Entraining at Oslo may start on 25 June, evening. Authorization will also be given for our planes to fly across Sweden. Russian planes will be fired at.

25 June 1941. 4th Day.

Review of the situation in the morning generally confirms the impression that the Russians have accepted the great border battle and are taking back only those positions of the front, which are being pushed back under the enormous impact of our attack.

This, for instance, is the case in the sector of AGp. North. It is hard to tell whether I Armd. Corps (Pskov), which in the last few days was moved across the Dvina river to the area south of Riga, has been committed against Leeb's northern flank, in its entirety or only in part. Certain is, that III Armd. Corps, which had been in this area from the start, has been beaten by Reinhard's Armd. Corps, and that von Manstein's Armd. Corps has advanced so far to the

east that the Russians have been compelled to take their forces behind the Dvina. They are trying to do this by striking at us with their Armor, and meanwhile run a large transport movement from the north to the far bank of the Dvina, between Riga and Jakobsstadt.

On the front of AGp. Center., the inevitable critical situations develop, which are the normal accompaniment of any turning movement preparatory to a battle with inverted front. The Russians are making strong, if uncoordinated attempts to gain elbow room by attacking in the direction of Grodno, in the north, and on the front of Fourth Army, in the south, and so check the sweep of our eastward drive. These attempts have failed everywhere, despite an occasional critical situation in VIII Corps, whose western wing is being attacked also by strong Russian Cavalry. But it is necessary to supplement the pressure by Fourth Army, from the south toward Volkovysk, by corresponding counter-pressure by Ninth Army, from the north, in order to form an inner encircling ring of Infantry Corps south of the confluence of Szczara Njemen rivers, while Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. form an outer ring by linking up at Minsk. This will keep the enemy bottled up in the Bialystok pocket and prevent repetition of what happened on the Bzura in the Polish Campaign, that is, his pressing eastward (toward Novogrodek), which would delay and hamper liquidation of the pocket.

The attempts of the encircled enemy to fight his way back to Minsk through Slonim have resulted in local crises at Slonim (Seventeenth Armd. Div.).

In the sector of AGp. South, the enemy is bringing new forces toward Kovel from the east by rail and toward Rovno, by motorized movements. West of Rovno, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd. Divs. are still in aggressive action to force their way to the Styr river. On reserved roads in the central sector, Eleventh Armd. Div., which is now followed by Sixteenth, has got as far as Dubno across the Styr. Against this Div., the enemy already yesterday brought Infantry on a broad front from the south. It seems that he is moving new forces also from south and west against von Briesen's Corps, and IV Corps which now is slowly gaining ground toward the east after heavy fighting; The purpose apparently is to absorb the beaten elements and build up a new front - perhaps on the line Sambor - Lwow - Dubno. It is worth noticing that High Command of this front has moved Hqs up front, to Tarnopol.

Morning conference with ObdH shows full agreement of views.

AGp. Center must be instructed to go out to meet right wing of Fourth Army (VIII Corps), so as to form an inner encircling ring.

Conference ObdH with Fuehrer: Fuehrer is now less worried about the eastern closing line of the Bialystok pocket.

Bogatsch: Our air reconnaissance will cover the area between Pskov, Dvinsk, Rositten, Dvinsk, Upper Dvina and Upper Dniepr, Kovel.



Finnish Gen. Oehquist comes in for orientation on our ideas concerning the conduct of the Finnish offensive east of Lake Ladoga, and is informed of the instruction issued to Erfurth. \*

Major von Below reports on his assignment as Liaison officer to Guderian. He confirms that 45th Div. suffered unnecessarily high casualties at Brest-Litovsk.

Order to Gen. Brand (Arty.):

- a) Collect data on effect of the "Karl" gun at Brest-Litovsk.
- b) Investigate conduct of Commander of 45th Div. at Brest-Litovsk.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) receives instructions to adapt supply arrangements to the following new command set-up in AGp. Center:

- a) OQu 4 is placed under Hq Second Army (the encircling Army).
- b) OQu 2 will make preparations for establishing a supply base at Minsk, and later become part of Hq Fourth Army.
- c) Fourth Army assumes control of Armd.Gps. 2 and 3.

Telephone talk with AGp. Center (von Tresckow): Swing 28th and 161st Div. southward, to have the ring east of Bialystok closed by Infantry Corps.

Detailed data are coming in on new Russian tanks, now committed on the front:

Weight 52 tons; front armor 37 cm (?), side armor 8 cm.  
Armed with 15,2 cm gun and 3 MGs. Crew of five.  
Speed: 30 km per hour; range 100 km.

Vulnerability: 5 cm AT gun penetrates at lower seam of turret. 8.8 cm AA apparently also penetrates the sides (still doubtful).

Another new type is reported with a 7.5 cm gun and 3 MGs.

1800. Gen. von Greiffenberg (C of S AGp. Center) reports on the execution of my order given to Tresckow. 28th and 161st Divs. will be turned southward in the direction ordered, to close the ring round Bialystok. Correspondingly, V and VI Corps of Ninth Army will move to the right, against the line Lida-Vilna. In order to prevent a gap to AGp. North, 900th Brig. will move to the left wing near Vilna. This meets our specifications. It is characteristic that Field Marshal von Bock expressly demands a written order, as he does not agree with us. (He does not want to do anything about the pocket forming to the south, and would rather press on to the east.)

OQu IV reports on the Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce of 21 June, immediately before the start of "Barbarossa". Noteworthy points in that string of disjointed ideas:

Attack on Russia explained on grounds of Russian troop dispositions. Lessons drawn from Crete operation: In attacking an island air strength must be employed to the last plane.

War against Russia is aimed at England.

Syria will not be able to hold out long.

Attitude of France doubtful. Italy is requested rather bluntly to keep herself ready against France.

Egypt cannot be attacked before next fall. In that undertaking, Italy must be prepared to safeguard her western border in North Africa and if necessary also launch an attack in westward direction. Stepping up of submarine warfare in the Mediterranean is demanded.

#### Evening situation:

Russian strength front of Eleventh Army is estimated at 11 or 12 Divs. -- Eleventh Army can be ready to attack on 2 July. Air raids on Constanza are becoming heavier. -- German fighter Staffeln have been brought in for protection of the oil fields. -- Braila and Galatz also were attacked by Russian planes.

AGp. South: The battle has not yet reached full strength; it will be a few more days. Kleist has taken Dubno after hard fighting. Tank battle west of Luck still going on. Troop movements from the east through Kovel and Rovno, also movements to the front at Tarnopol and points west. Slovak Divs. (Corps Hq and 2 Divs.) ready around Presov on 28 and 29 June for assignment to AGp. South. Hungary's cooperation would be desirable, but Hungary wants us to extend an official request. That the Fuehrer does not want to do for political reasons.

AGp. Center: Situation at Slonim has been resolved. Action by 29th Div. mot. has freed Seventeenth Armd.Div. at Slonim for operations toward Minsk. Third Armd.Div. has started drive on Sluzk. Eighteenth Armd. Div., with parts of Third, has taken Baranovich. Situation south of Grodno stabilized. Attack repulsed. Hoth has taken Voloshin and thus gained a foothold on the hill mass of Minsk.

AGp. North: In various sectors of the front local encirclement of strong enemy elements reported. Orderly movement at good pace in the planned direction. Hoepfner continues northeastward through Vilkomir.

In the evening an order is issued to Army Gp. Center on sealing the Bialystok pocket and on preparations for the new command set-up. By this order Hq Second Army (with OQu 4) will take over command of the encircling forces. Von Kluge will assume control of the components of Fourth Army, which are not needed for this job, viz., Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 (together with OQu 2, who is directly briefed by Gen Qu on building up an intermediate supply base around Minsk).

Later in the evening we receive a Fuehrer order on direction of operations of AGp. Center and South. It betrays concern that we are operating too far in depth. The old refrain !

But that is not going to change anything in our plans.

26 June 1941.      5th Day.

The closing situation on 25 June and the morning reports of 26 June show:

AGp. South is advancing slowly, unfortunately with considerable losses. The enemy on this front has energetic leadership. He is continuously throwing new forces against the tank wedge, attacking frontally, as before, and now also the southern flank, and, on the railroad to Kovel, apparently also the northern flank. The latter attack will hardly develop to anything serious, but the southern flank at present is still vulnerable, because we do not have sufficient forces available to give it adequate Inf. protection. (the conveyor belt system would be necessary here \* ), and also because Armd. Corps von Wietersheim, which is still far in the rear, cannot get to the front at the moment because the bad roads are crowded with vital supply traffic. It will be the overriding task of OKH to maintain a steady flow of reinforcements behind AGp. South.

AGp. Center: Development just as desired. Situation at Slonim cleared up. Guderian now is in a position to continue the attack with his right wing on Bobruisk, through Sluzk, and with the bulk of his forces through Baranovichi. Hoth, with 3 Armd. Divs. in front, is making good progress toward Minsk, so that the ring in this area probably will soon be closed and concentration of a strong armd. force for the thrust on Smolensk would appear assured.

The inner ring is closing according to plan. It seems that we might not be able to close it around Piaski, through Volkovysk, and would have to include the area around Novogrodek. For it is in that direction that enemy elements threatened with encirclement apparently are still trying to escape. Behind \*\* them, however, Hoth has already advanced toward Minsk, so that there is no danger of their escape. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to eliminate these forces with Inf. Divs. alone, without having to call on Hoth's Armd. Gp.

AGp. North is advancing eastward according to plan, encircling enemy elements in its path. The reported rail movement to Jakobstadt (through Riga) seems to be without any special significance.

A very large retrograde rail movement from Schaulen to Riga is new evidence that the Russians are swinging back their entire northern wing.

Gen. Fellgiebel reports that signal communications to Minsk, through Kovno and through Baranovichi could be set up in

three days. This would make it possible for Hq AGp. Center to follow the eastward moving front.

Gen Bogatsch: Detailed air observations. Our reconnaissance organizations keep closed up to the front. Sporadic attacks on our airfields. -- Distribution of AA conforms with situation. -- Reconnaissance missions for OKH Staffeln.

Lt. Col. von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters. -- Clausius affair\* ( was Briesen's C of S).

Bogatsch: Important development: Heavy retrograde movements have been observed since this morning:

- a) 0720. : Minsk - Borissov ( 20 trains), Minsk - Orsha (10 trains) moving eastward. On the parallel motor highway dense motorized movements (two columns abreast) in same direction.
- b) 0645.: From Molodechno to Polotsk: 10 trains going east.
- c) Enemy air strength: In sector of AGp. South 1,200; Center 400; North 300 planes.
- d) At Orsha large tank and vehicle parks. Photographs show over 2,000 tanks, reconnaissance cars and trucks.

1415 Report AGp. North: Monitored radio signal from Eighth Armd. Div.: Dvinsk taken after hard fighting. From Armd. Gp. 3, through Liaison officer: Increasing enemy pressure on south flank impedes advance. Armd. Gp. 2 has taken Sluzk.

1815. Confirmed report passed on to Fuehrer: Eighth Armd. Div. penetrated into Dvinsk at 0800., occupied town at 1250 after hard street fighting (railroad bridge and vehicular bridge).

The evening reports indicate no important new developments.

In the sector of AGp. South the expected attack of strong tank forces against the south flank of Armd. Gp. 1 has started. Local enemy successes, but apparently no crisis. Armd. Gp. 1 is under direct tactical control of AGp. By moving Thirteenth Armd. Div. behind Eleventh Armd. Div., Armd. Gp. has shifted its main concentration to the right shoulder. Moving Armd. Divs. to the south flank from the rear has been initiated.

In AGp. Center, the attempts of the enemy to escape from the Bialystok pocket to the northeast or east, are now becoming strongly felt, as are those in the direction of Armd. Gp. Hoth's right flank. It will be necessary not only to push east with elements of Guderian's right wing, (Third Armd. Div.) which now has reached Sluzk, but also to send other elements (Fourth Armd. Div.) northward into the area between Baranovichi and Minsk, in order to seal this last gap through which encircled enemy elements

are escaping, and simultaneously to crack the Minsk barrier. Orders to this effect to AGp. Center.

In the sector of AGp. Center, extensive rail and road evacuations from Minsk and Vilejka toward the east and northeast. Evidently strong mot. elements are being taken back in order to build up a mot. Group in the area west of Moscow.

In the sector of AGp. North the enemy is falling back behind the Dvina river. Strong wedged-in enemy elements are causing our Inf. Divs. a lot of trouble even far behind the front.

For the first time our radio intelligence picture shows Moscow functioning as operational High Command.

Finland has been attacked by Russian air forces (10 ports and airdromes). She considers herself in a state of war with Russia.

Hungary has been attacked by the Russians from the air in the vicinity of the frontier. An official declaration of war is not intended, only retaliation for the air attack.

Croatia has made known its desire to participate with military forces in the war against Russia.

Romania: Russians have made a local thrust and started construction of a bridge across the northern arm of the Danube Delta. Our fighters attack Odessa, inflicting heavy losses.

27 June 1941

6th Day.

Daily reports of 26 June and morning reports of 27 June present the following great picture:

In the sector of AGp. South, von Kleist has not only repelled all enemy thrusts against his south flank, but his right wing has even gained ground toward the southeast. The front has moved a little eastward and with its 3 Armd. Divs. is now strong enough to warrant expectation of major advances soon.

The Russian formations thrown against the south flank have apparently been scraped together pell-mell. The Zhitomir Group probably has been committed against Kleist's front, the Russian Armd. Gp. Cernauti against his south flank. The Russian Armd. Group Tiraspol, transferred from Southern Bessarabia some days ago, is being moved northwest by rail and probably will soon turn up in front of Kleist's right shoulder, to be thrown into the battle as a last resort. After that we shall have smashed everything that can be brought to bear against AGp. South by the Russian Command in the Ukraine( which, one must admit, is

doing a pretty good job ), and we shall then be free to swing to the south in order to force the enemy still holding around Lwow and on the Hungarian border to a battle with inverted front. This probably will come about at the time, when the Romanian assault army will just be ready to come out to meet us.

In the sector of AGp. Center everything is going as anticipated. The Bialystok enemy is moving more and more to the east. Our western front slowly follows him. Concentrations in the Novogrodek area, whose presence is now becoming more strongly felt, are pressing on Hoth's right flank and make it necessary for elements of V Corps (Ninth Army) to turn south, since enemy forces have also appeared north of the Njemen river. Fifth Div. thus detached from V Corps, will be replaced by 161st Div. VI Corps is being moved to the front well to the south of Vilna, and in its place 900th Brigade is thrown against Vilna, in order to safeguard the gradually widening gap to AGp. North.

AGp. North is moving strong Armor to Dvinsk and pushes Reinhard's Armd. Corps on Jakobstadt. The left wing of the Inf. Corps is advancing on Riga. Thus everything is proceeding according to plan. The penetration at Dvinsk has set off heavy panic movements on the enemy side. The impression is that strong forces are streaming east away from the Dvina.

On the whole, therefore, the picture is satisfactory in AGp. South as also in AGp. Center, though by now it is high time for Second Armd. Group to make headway on Minsk. In AGp. North the situation is very satisfactory.

At the morning conference, ObdH shows irritation because various movements in the Army Group sectors did not come off as agreed upon yesterday between ObdH and the Cs in C South and Center. This is the natural consequence of interference in the command of Army Gps. and Armies. Back here we cannot have a clearly detailed picture and so should confine ourselves to assigning broad missions and not try to direct the movements of individual Corps or even Divisions. At the front, under the pressure of events road conditions, etc., things take a different turn and the result is the erroneous impression that OKH orders are being ignored.

OKH air reconnaissance effort is employed over the strategic triangle Orsha, Vitebsk, Smolensk, in order to ascertain whether the enemy elements streaming back from Minsk and Polotsk are being formed into a new operational group between Minsk and Moscow. The plan may exist, but the capabilities for carrying it out appear to me slight.

Col. Ochsner:

- a) Report on the effectiveness of the Rocket Launchers in the assault on Brest-Litovsk. Apparently very satisfactory.

- b) Review of potentialities of bacteriological warfare against Britain (foot-and-mouth disease) and by Britain against us (cattle plague).

Gen. Himer (on phone, 1245 ): Hungary has announced on the radio that she is in a state of war with Russia. The Hungarian Gen. Staff knows nothing of a state of war.

Two days ago the political authorities inquired at the German Foreign Office whether Hungary's participation was required. The reply of the Foreign Office is still outstanding. It is not believed that the military authorities could readily comply with OKW and OKH's proposal that Hungary come in on her own accord. The Hungarian Gen. Staff has assembled the Mobile Corps (two mot. Brigs. and one Cavalry Brigade) in the neighborhood of Marmoros-Sziged and is standing by for employment on the right wing of the Hungarian Carpathian front. I tell Himer that the Carpathian Mountains cannot be forced by armor alone. To accomplish this it would be necessary to attack along the entire front. We would welcome a Hungarian thrust toward Kolomea-Stanislawow. I tell him to discuss these possibilities with Laszlo.\*

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance and air situation. No important news. Emphasis on reconnaissance in the direction of Smolensk.

New reports: AGp. South: On Kleist's right wing, Sixteenth Armd. Div. has reached Krzemianiec. Here the Armd. Div. thrusts into the soft spot prepared by yesterday's air assault. Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth Divs. in tank battles between the Styr river and Rovno.

AGp. Center: Seventeenth Armd. Div. has reached Stolpce in its advance on Minsk.

1400. Keitel (OKW) on phone: Fuehrer wants to throw the whole weight of Armd. Group Hoepfner on Dvinsk. Possibilities of a crossing at Jakobstadt problematic.

As soon as there is a chance, Jakobstadt to be opened for the Inf. Corps from the rear by a raid on the northern bank.

Hoepfner's Armd. troops, massing for thrust on Dvinsk, are at the earliest to push through to Ostrov from the east bank of the Dvina, safeguarding the flank toward Jakobstadt, in order to prevent escape of the Russian forces in the Baltic area to the country south of Lake Peipus.

1420. phone talk on this subject with ObdH (who is at Hq AGp. North): He tells me that only 36th mot. Div. is being sent against Jakobstadt, while the bulk of Hoepfner's Armd. forces is striking for Dvinsk.

At noon to Angerburg and motorboat ride across Lake Mauer.



Heusinger, Grolman, Koerner: Moving of the last wave of GHq Reserves to the front. They must be so disposed that we get one Armd. Div. (Second Div.) and one mot. Div. (60th Div.) and three more Inf. Divs. behind AGp. South, the other reserves behind Center, between North and Center. Later on we shall need reinforcements on the Lower Dniepr and the dry route \* Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk. One Div. must be sent to Romania.

Buerker (Tng. Sec.): Experiences in Crete -- Information Pamphlet for air Transport. -- Utilization of radio direction beams (Mt. Troop School, Engineer Corps.)

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports large dumps captured at Dubno (AGp. South). Oil and gasoline in larger quantities. 42 21 cm Hows. 65 MG, 95 trucks, 215 tanks, 50 AT guns, 18 Btrys.

Evening reports indicate crumbling of enemy resistance in front of AGp. South and distinct withdrawal movements in front of the Seventeenth Army. Accordingly, already at noon, C in C AGp. South ordered Seventeenth Army to attack forthwith in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Seventeenth Army has ordered main pursuit effort in direction Zloczow, Armd. Group 1 has ordered penetration beyond the Horyn river, without regard to flank and rear security.

In the sector of AGp. Center the operation continues to develop according to plan. The enemy has abandoned Bialystok. As a result the western end of the pocket is getting narrower and the enemy is trying to fight his way out to the northeast and southeast in the Novogrodek and Roszna areas. Apart from creating local tensions, these attempts are fruitless.

AGp. North is reinforcing and expanding the Dvinsk bridgehead and continues to press on to the Dvina river with Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies.

28 June 1941. 7th Day.

Daily reports of 27 June and morning reports of 28 June in the main only verify the reports received yesterday.

In the sector of AGp. South the impression is gained that the strong local efforts of the enemy are only attempts at extricating himself, and not an operational or even strategic disengagement. A singular feature is a railroad movement from Znitomir toward Kiev, for which we have no reasonable explanation.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the inner ring is now closing east of Bialystok; in the Bialystok Forest, southeast of the town, there is violent fighting which quite unexpectedly has engaged the entire central portion and parts of the right wing of Fourth Army.

The outer ring, formed by the Armd. Gps., is strained to breaking point north of Novogrodek (Hoth); between Minsk and Baranovichi it is still not closed. Fourth Armd. Div. is now advancing from the area of Sluzk on Minsk, to close this gap.

The movements of AGp. North continue to develop according to plan. In front of the right wing of Busch's Sixteenth Army, an enemy group of several Divs. is still fighting; let us hope it will be cut off soon, before it manages to get across the Dvina. With Armd. Group Hoepfner far in their rear, and newly arrived GHq reserves being moved up behind the left wing of Strauss' Army, to the south, there is a chance that this enemy group, too, will be liquidated while still west of the Dvina.

1100 Field Marshal von Leeb ( on phone): AGp. North has arranged with AGp. Center that it, instead of Center, will move Hq I Corps to the area north of Vilna, where it would remain at disposal of OKH. It also wants to place 206th and 86th, instead of 253th and 306th Divs. under this Corps Hq\*. Such a change makes no difference to OKH, and proposal is approved.

Gen. Wagner reports on supply situation:

- a) The most urgent task now is to build up the supply bases Minsk, Molodeczno (3 July) and Dvinsk. Some sections of the railroad lines can be utilized for the purpose, using Russian rolling stock. Assigning railroad operating organizations to the Armd. Gps. has been a great success.
- b) Distribution of Security Divisions remains as planned. Movement from the rear initiated; needed particularly in Minsk area.
- c) At Tauroggen we have found enormous food stocks (export organization); e.g. 40,000 tons melted butter, 20,000 tons bacon, very large quantities of meat and of tin-sheet for canning. Will be turned over to State Secretary Backe. \*\*

Also at Kovno the large food depots and processing plants of private industry were captured intact. They had been guarded by Lithuanian Home Guards.

Reports at noon: Center: Minsk taken. Guderian's right wing close to Bobruisk. In the sector of AGp. South, the Russian Eighth Armd. Corps is advancing behind our Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. from Brody on Dubno. We can only hope that that way it is walking right into destruction.

Gen. von Greiffenberg ( on phone):

- a) We settle the procedure for bringing up GHq Reserves on the boundary of AGps. North and Center.
- b) Build-up of the supply bases Molodeczno and Minsk.

Bogatsch: Air observations show tanks assembling north and east of our Dvinsk breakthrough.

Gen. Brandt: Report on the fighting at Brest-Litovsk (31st Div.) Heavy Rocket Projectors and the "Karl" gun very effective, but defense was conducted by numerically superior, fanaticized troops, which accounts for the heavy casualties in 31st Div. Commander apparently is not at fault.

Keitel (OKW) on phone: Use Rocket Launchers in Eleventh Army? (Fuehrer is considering the question.) -- I give a brief review of recent progress at the front.

Noon: Major von Below (Liaison Off. Armd. Gp. 2) returns and communicates Guderian's statement that he would ask to be relieved from his command if he is placed under Field Marshal Kluge in the new grouping of Armd. forces.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Order of battle of Italian Divs. destined for Eastern theater. -- Poor in Div. troops.
- b) Fifth Armd. Div. will be ready:  
First echelon (reinf. Inf. Regt.)  
not later than 9 July  
Supply elements for first echelon " " 15 July  
Entire Div. " " 1 Aug.
- c) Replacement situation: Casualties heaviest in Seventeenth Army; normal in all other Armies. On the whole, losses are slight compared with those in World War I.
- d) Procurement and assignment of Polish peasant carts for GHq Reserve Divs.
- e) Subordination of Mil. Hq in Government-General under AGp. B must be promptly removed in view of changed conditions. \* -

Reports: Rovno taken. -- We have broken into Libau. -- Bobruisk reached. -- Substantial elements of Russian First Armd. Corps positively identified on Eighteenth Army front.

Gen. Paulus (OQu I): Organizational problems in North Africa. (Best arrangement would be to form an Armd. Group Rommel under Italian High Command.)

Evening reports confirm the withdrawal of the enemy forces opposing AGp. South. For the past two days uncoordinated motorized movements have been running from southeast and east to the rear of the slowly crumbling front. Apparently the enemy is making an effort to organize resistance in the previously known fortified line Novograd Volynskij -- Proskurov -- Dniestr. But in taking back his forces to that line he is consuming much of his strength in counter-attacks. Seventeenth Army is at the gates of Lwow.

Kleist has taken Rovno.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the desperate attempts of the enemy to break out from the Volkovysk and Novogrodek pockets cause many tight situations, which necessitate e.g. in Fourth Army sector, a northward thrust of XII Corps, in Ninth Army, a southward thrust of V Corps. But these tensions will be overcome. The gap between Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Groups is still not entirely closed, but Guderian has arrived with his right wing at Bobruisk, and has perhaps still a chance to strike quickly across the Dniepr. at Mogilev or Rogachev. That would be a decisive success.

AGp. North reports Dvinsk bridgehead expanded, and Jakobstadt taken by left wing of Armd. Group Hoepfner. The Dvina bridge at that town, however, has been blown up by the enemy. AGp. North has trouble with the many scattered enemy groups roaming the forests, some of them still with their tanks, which burn and loot villages. Application of effective counter-measures is frustrated by the expanse of the country and the limitation of our manpower resources. Libau has been taken. Motorized movements are reported from the Lower Dvina to Leningrad, the purpose of which is unclear.

What strikes one in all these battles is the singularly small number of prisoners compared with the large booty (including fuel), e.g. 35,000 prisoners along with 1,300 tanks.

29 June 1941.

8th Day.

Summary of the daily reports for 28 June and the morning reports for 29 June:

Army Gp. South reports still heavy fighting. On the right shoulder of Armd. Gp. 1, behind the sector of Eleventh Armd. Div., a deep penetration by Russian Eighth Armd. Corps in our lines, apparently has caused a lot of confusion in the area between Brody and Dubno and temporarily threatens Dubno from the southwest. This would have been very undesirable in view of the large dumps at Dubno. Also in battle zone of Armd. Gp. 1, enemy elements with tanks are still active behind the front, sometimes covering even large distances.

We must continually keep our minds on what must be done to arrive in time at a practical disposition for the operations of AGp. South. The present disposition is not particularly adapted to the impending tasks. In the next moves, the main objective of Army Gp. must be to break through the Russian rear position on the line Belokorovichi - Novograd Volynskij-Mogilev Pod. - Mouth of the Dniestr, without engaging in major frontal attacks, and then swing south still west of the

Dniepr. Two points are suitable for a breakthrough. One, in the north, where the main effort should be made, is between Novograd Volynskij and Zhitomir. The other, further to the south, which can be tackled with a smaller force, though it must be strong enough to effect a breakthrough, is in direction of Starokonstantinov, where there seems to be a gap in the fortified line. If we succeed in punching through here, the northern assault wing can swing south on this pivot with cover against Kiev and the north.

AGp. South must now regroup its forces for this breakthrough through the Russian rear position, which we must anticipate the Russians will be able to reach and man with the frontally retreating front armies as well as with reserves, which they can move up on a fairly undisturbed railroad network. For this breakthrough Armd. Gp. 1 must be furnished with Infantry (which apparently was deliberately excluded when Armd. Gp. 1 and Sixth Army were split off from each other). Also, Seventeenth Army will have to dispose its forces in greater depth and will transfer some of its Divs. to Sixth Army and Armd. Gp., in order to give sufficient strength to the right wing, which will be open to attack from the north, i.e. from the eastern part of Polesia\*, after it has passed through the Rovno area. Additionally, Artillery and Engineer and Signal troops must be placed suitably to fit into the new plan for the assault on the Russian rear position. Op. Sec. has been instructed to discuss these plans with AGp.

In AGp. Center, the situation continues to develop as anticipated. The Fuehrer's worry that the Armd. forces would overreach themselves in the advance has unfortunately prompted ObdH at a conference with AGp. Center to refer to Bobruisk as nothing more important than the objective in a flank cover. Guderian, however, quite soundly from the operational point of view -- is advancing on Bobruisk with two Armd. Divs. and is reconnoitering in the direction of the Dniepr; he certainly does that not just to cover the flank, but indeed in order to cross the Dniepr as soon as there is an opportunity to do so. Were he not to do that, he would be making a grave mistake. I hope that he will take the Dniepr bridges at Rogachev and Mogilev still today, which would open for him the road to Smolensk and from there on the country to Moscow. This is the only way right off to get around the dry gap between the Dniepr and the Dvina, now fortified by the Russians, and so block the way to Moscow for the enemy forces in the gap. Let us hope that CGs. of Corps and Armies will do the right thing even without express orders, which we are not allowed to issue because of the Fuehrer's instruction to ObdH.

AGp. North by now should be strong enough at Dvinsk to push ahead on Ostrov, perhaps also facilitate construction of a bridge at Jakobstadt by a raid in that direction. The withdrawal movements by rail and road, which are reported to be rolling day and night from Riga toward Lenin-grad, are probably for the most part evacuations. It seems the Russian High Command is abandoning Lithuania,

perhaps also the other Baltic states. Radio intelligence reports transfer of the high Hqs to the rear.

Bogatschi: Air reconnaissance furnishes no important new information, mainly because of bad weather. Trench digging at Orsha - Vitebsk.

Talk with Keitel (OKW) (on phone) again indicates that the Fuehrer is worried:

- a) About the tight situation of Armd. Gp. 1 south of Dubno.
- b) About the threat from the Pripet Marshes.
- c) About the possibility that AGp. Center might strike too early beyond the line Minsk -- Bobruisk, before the "pocket" is completely liquidated.

I give him reassurance on all these points.

Reports from all fronts confirm previous indications that the Russians are fighting to the last man. Sometimes treacherous methods are used, especially where Mongolians are among the troops (Sixth Army, Ninth Army). A singular note is, that as a rule only very few soldiers are taken with captured Batttrys, etc. Some let themselves be killed, while others run away, get rid of their uniforms and try to make their way back as "peasants". Morale of our troops everywhere is described as very good, also where they had to go through hard fighting. Horses very tired.

Gen. Ott (Inf.) reports in particular on his impressions on the battlefield of Grodno. Now, for once, our troops are compelled, by the stubborn Russian resistance, to fight according to their combat manuals. In Poland and in the West they could take liberties, but here they cannot get away with it. Enemy air effort against our troops appears to be on a very minor scale.

1700 Keitel (OKW) informs me that a Group of long-range fighters will strike today in front of AGp. South.

Messages: Left wing of AGp. North has penetrated into Riga with the Advance Combat Team of I Corps. Another Advance Combat Team, of VIII Corps, is following up. Railroad bridge intact, road bridges destroyed.

Evening situation: In the sector of AGp. South, an unexpected battle has developed south of Dubno, in which Sixteenth Armd. Div. joined from the south (after abandoning the high ground of Krzemieniec), 75th Div. from the west, Sixteenth mot. Div. from the northwest, 44th Div. from the north and 111th Div. from the east. The enemy involved is Eighth Armd. Corps. The situation at Dubno evidently is tight.

Also in the northern part of this sector, a lot is happening on the northern flank of Armd. Gp. Kleist. All attacks by the (tentatively identified) Russian XVII Corps from the Pripet Marshes were repelled. Behind Thirteenth Armd. Div., forming the spearhead at Rovno and advancing as far as the

Horyn river, follows 25th mot.Div. Fourteenth Armd.Div. covers the north flank, and is in turn followed by 298th Div.; behind this Div., XVII Corps is moving up from Kovel.

Near Lwow the enemy is taking back his front step by step to the east. Here for the first time many bridges are found destroyed.

In the central sector of AGp. Center, a wild medley of Divisions is busy sealing the inner ring around the enemy, who is breaking out in all directions. The outer ring, formed by the Armd. Divs., is closed, but still fairly thin, of course. It will take several days before the disposition of our forces, which in its present form is the outcome of the developing of the situation, can be sufficiently reorganized to allow us to continue the attack toward Smolensk on the dry route Orsha - Vitebsk. (Not before 5 July.)

AGp. North everything is pressing in the ordered direction, toward the Dvina, as planned. All crossings have been occupied by our troops. At several other sites bridges have been struck by Armd. Corps Reinhardt. Of the enemy forces which originally opposed AGp. North, considerable body of Infantry must still be south of the Dvina. Only a small proportion will succeed in escaping east through the lake country between Dvinsk and Minsk, in the direction of Polotsk.

Air reconnaissance has not been very productive today because of bad weather.

New plans. AGp. South - as has been discussed with them - will have to strike with a strong northern wing for the big Russian rear position north of the Dniestr. This northern wing will be on a wide enough front to take advantage of any gaps, and deep enough in order to cover the flank toward the north and, on wheeling southward later on, have sufficient strength to have forces to protect the wheeling wing toward the north (Gomel) and Kiev.

It is a question whether the tank spearheads of the northern wing will manage to break through by themselves; if not, and if they must wait for their Inf. components, a decisive success cannot be expected before 10 to 15 July.

AGp. Center wants to place Armd. Groups 2 and 3, which will certainly take at least until 5 July to reform (for supply reasons alone), under von Kluge's Fourth Army Hq and reinforce the Army with two or three Inf. Corps. The Divs. still tied down in the battle of the pocket in the rear, will be moved up by Army Hq 2 (instead of Army Hq 4) and by Army Hq 9.

AGp. North wants to advance with Armd. Gp. 4 from Dvinsk on Ostrov and Opochna, on 2 July, so as to cut off the area south of Lake Peipus. Perhaps this operation could be started even earlier on 1 July. The Inf. Divs. will not be



able to cross the Dvina in any strength before 3 July.

Enemy intelligence: In the South on the front of AGp. South, there are no reports of new frontward movements of the enemy. It must be assumed that all Armd. commands operating south of the Pripet Marshes were committed in the attacks of the past days against the front of AGp. South. (Their designations are absolutely different from what we thought they were, e.g.; Cav. Divs., mot. Brigs., etc.) On the Romanian front the enemy is believed to be withdrawing behind the Dniestr. On the front of AGp. Center, enemy road movements are reported south to Smolensk (formation of a defense group for Moscow); the railroad movement from Dvinsk to Pskov is still in progress; probably many evacuation trains. High Hq shifted to the rear from Dvinsk to Rositten. \*

Hungary reports that the "Carpathian Corps" will be ready to start operations on 2 July. Command set-up is still to be clarified. Control by AGp. South would seem the best arrangement.

Italy communicates order of battle of the Corps of 40,000 men, slated for operations in Russia.

Slovakia participates with two Inf.Divs. and one mot. Brig.; the latter is already committed on the right wing of Seventeenth Army.

Spain wants to send a "Legion": 15,000 men. They will be assigned to Rombertow \*\* (Warsaw), where we shall issue them arms.

In Norway, Dietl's Corps has started out from Petsamo towards Murmansk. Air raid on Murmansk.

Finland presents a new plan of attack conforming to our wishes. It provides for an offensive on a front of at least 6 Divs. east of Lake Ladoga. A German Div. recently brought over from Norway is to be moved behind this important wing, to strengthen it. It will be supplied by Falkenhorst's Army, but operated under direct control of Field Marshal Mannerheim.

In the afternoon, my three adjutants offer their congratulation on my birthday.

30 June 1941. 9th Day.

The situation last night rounded out by early reports in the morning, presents the following picture:

In AGp. South, the fight continues successfully despite local crises. The enemy allows himself to be pushed back step by step.

Lwow was taken by First Mt. Div. this morning, at 0430.

XIV Corps is not yet in line, but its arrival can be counted on in the course of the day. The situation at Dubno is straightened out. Still, Sixteenth Armd. Div. and Sixteenth mot. Div. were not inconsiderably delayed by the episode, and 44th, 111th, and 299th Divs., which were brought up behind Third Armd. Corps, will be stalled for some days; this greatly delays and hampers the follow-up of Infantry behind III Corps. There is, however, an endeavor on all hands to make up for this dislocation in every possible way.

No arrivals of new enemy reinforcements from rear areas are reported on the Army Gp. front. Most likely, the enemy has already committed the greater part of the forces he was able to muster.

In AGp. Center, cleaning out of the "pockets" is tying down considerable forces. Army Gp. must in particular see to it that Infantry forces are brought up behind Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. around the pocket. Bringing together the forces, including Inf., for a strong northern wing in continuing the offensive past the line Mogilev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk, will be the joint concern of AGp. Center and OKH.

AGp. North is sweeping ahead with its Inf. Corps to the Dvina. It has announced that its initial mission, viz., to beat the enemy this side of the Dvina, has been completed. Its next mission, viz., to push through to the high ground northeast of Opochna with a strong right wing, is well prepared by the disposition of Army Gp.

Bogatsch brings no important new air observations. The rearward movements to Leningrad, behind the northern wing, continue. Between Vitebsk and Orsha, fortifications (anti-tank ditches) are being built in great haste. In the Pripet Marshes, the situation is still somewhat obscure. Apparently the enemy is pulling out some of his strength, but we probably must still reckon with one Inf. Corps and some Armor.

To celebrate my birthday, the men of my lower staff held a formal review early in the morning and offered their wishes before breakfast. The breakfast room was decorated for the occasion. ObdH sent red roses and strawberries, accompanied by a very cordial letter. At the morning conference, Paulus made a speech. Congratulations by ObdH, who told me that the Fuehrer's visit in the afternoon is primarily on my account.

Other well-wishers: Scherer, Hq Commandant, accompanied by a man of the guard unit, who brings a bunch of wild flowers; von Ziehlberg, Loyke, Gehlen, Gen. Keitel (Personnel Div.), von Etzdorf, Frau von Brauchitsch, on the phone.

1300 Major Nagel (formerly in Moscow) is briefed as Liaison Off. to Fourth Army (von Kluge), which now takes over control of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3.

Order to AGp. South: Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 will secure line Rogachev -

Mogilev -- Orsha -- Vitebsk -- Polotsk with combat forces \* at the earliest.

Afternoon (1630) Visit by the Fuehrer to the camp.\*\* Report presented at ObdH's house. Afterwards tea.

Report by me on progress, with estimate of the situation and the resulting operational possibilities.

The Fuehrer stresses the following points:

- a) Mastery of the Gulf of Finland must be secured at the earliest. For only elimination of the Russian Navy will give us free communications through the Baltic (iron ore shipments from Lulea). After seizing the Russian seaports from the landside, we must allow three to four weeks for all enemy submarines to be positively out of action. Four weeks mean 2 million tons of iron ore.
- b) Ukraine: Significance for food supply and industry.

He attaches great importance to reaching Leningrad as soon as possible with the Inf. Divs. of AGp. North, but Armor need not wait for their advance. He does not see clear yet whether Leeb's strength, especially his Armor, is sufficient for the purpose. He expects that after reaching Smolensk in the middle of July, we would not be able to take Moscow by Infantry assault before August; Armor alone cannot do it. The time it takes for the Inf. to get to Moscow, he believes could be utilized by our Armor to make a clean slate in the north. Then we could mass Armor east of Moscow. Speeding of gasoline supply to Hoepner and Hoth is emphasized.

At tea, the conversation turns mostly to purely political subjects: European unity as a result of common war against Russia. -- Britain's domestic political scene: Possibility of Churchill's overthrow by Conservatives with a view to forestalling a Socialist-Communist revolution in the country. Lloyd George, Hoare. -- Possibilities of improving our relations with Turkey are viewed optimistically. Also Afghanistan and other small nations will actively collaborate with us if they feel they need not be afraid of Russia any longer. Continental character of Germany's future mission is emphasized, without renouncing claims to a colonial empire, which might include Togo and the Cameroons, plus the Belgian Congo. East Africa desirable, but not essential.

Evening Situation: Slow but steady developments in all Army Gps. In AGp. Center, however, enemy forces have broken through Guderian's Armd. Gp. between Slonim and Minsk. This is awkward, but probably is of no major importance. In AGp. North, the Riga railroad bridge appears to have been blasted by enemy elements, who penetrated into our lines in the confused fighting.

Hoepfner thinks he will be ready to advance on 2 July. Coming behind him, AGp. North will be ready to cross the Dvina on 4 July. Hoth reports that he likewise will be ready to continue advance on 2 July. But Guderian is still lagging behind, south of Minsk, where his forces are partaking in the encirclement of the Novogrodek pocket. He so will take several days longer than the others to get ready for new operations. Irrespective of these plans, Guderian's right wing could secure the Dniepr crossings at Mogilev and to the south.

Air Force is being reinforced in the sector of AGp. South and on the Romanian front. In AGp. South, very effective action by our Air Force against enemy Air Force and enemy columns retreating before our troops (as many as three columns abreast are reported). A total bag of over 200 aircraft shot down during this day. Enemy reported to be already reduced to sending very old four-engine models into the battle.

1 July 1941.      10th Day.

Situation: In AGp. South, Seventeenth Army is having good going. On its left wing XIV Armd. Corps is coming to the fore and is gaining freedom of movement toward the east. The Dubno episode seems to be over. The Russian VIII Corps is bottled up. Some of their tanks seem to have run out of fuel; they are being dug in and used as pillboxes. On the northern wing, Fourteenth Armd. Div. and 25th mot. Div. are following behind. Moving of the Inf. Divs., which will be needed both for attack at the front and for flank cover to the north and east in case of a turning movement to the south, is not at all proceeding well. AGp. South will need some vigorous prodding to get action. Eleventh Army believes to have positive indications of a systematic withdrawal on its front. I don't believe it is so. I, too, am almost certain that the enemy will try to defend his rear position, but a planned withdrawal would have required a long-range decision, and we have no reason to believe that such a decision was ever taken. The enemy is just being pushed back by us.

Russian atrocities at Lwow.

In AGp. Center further progress has been made by Ninth Army and Armd. Gp. Hoth in the build-up for the new attack. Progress is less in Fourth Army and Armd. Gp. 2. In the case of the former the reason is that it has to bear the burden of liquidating the Bialystok pocket; in the case of the latter, the delay is due to the fact that Armd. Gp. 2, in disregard of its orders, has neglected to attend to the mopping up of the territory traversed by it and now has its hands full with local enemy break-throughs. To our surprise, nothing is heard from the area around Bobruisk which only yesterday was the focal point of Russian anxieties, with

SOS signals to all forces in the vicinity and finally the hasty and extremely costly commitment of Russian planes. Either our troops are not getting anywhere, or they want to surprise us with big results. -- A teletype order is necessary to make AGp. Hq move one Div. toward Pinck, for protection of the right flank.

In AGp. North everything is going according to plan, except at Riga, where the Advance Combat Teams of I and XXVI Corps seem to have had some trouble; the situation was saved by the timely arrival and crossing of a reinforced Inf. Regt. The railroad bridge evidently is a total loss. 291st Div. has been detached to take Windau and clean up the country west of Riga. The new attack of Armd. Gp. 4 from the line Dvinsk - Jakobstadt is set for 2 July.

The Hungarians will launch offensive against the line Kolomea - Stanislawow on 2 July.

Eleventh Army has set 2 July as the date for its attack. It expects the Russians to withdraw behind the Dniepr. Disturbances have broken out in Romania, involving also some localities in the assembly area. (Iron Legion?)

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance in the sector of AGp. South no longer shows any large-scale movements. Heavy concentrations of immobilized railroad cars have been observed everywhere. A possible explanation is that the trains, which are arriving in closest succession, are simply left standing on the tracks by the Russians, with only the locomotives going back to fetch more trains. A striking feature in the southern sector is a heavy concentration in the Proskurov "bastion", forward of the Russian rear position, and a certain loosening up around Cernauti.

In sector of AGp. Center earlier reports of troop concentrations in the Orsha-Vitebsk-Smolensk triangle are confirmed. The enemy assembly area seems to extend as far as Mohilev, in the south.

We still have no completely clear picture about what is going on in the Gomel area and the Pripet Marshes.

In AGp. North, no new observations.

Transport movements from the east, perhaps also from the west into the Nevel area, apparently intended for the build-up of a defense line in the corner between the Dvina and the old Russo-Estonian border.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) The supply situation in AGp. North is satisfactory. Armd. Gp. 4 will start operations on 2 July with a full issue of ammunition and fuel for 400 km. By 7 July, the bulk of Army Gp., will have on hand in the Dvinsk supply base, in addition to complete issues to the troops: one additional full issue of ammunition, three fuel quotas and two days' rations. (Start of operations by

this AGp. scheduled for 5 July.)

In AGp. Center 17,000 tons of supplies, in addition to the hand supplies of Armd.Gp., will have been accumulated in dumps, representing a total of 24,000 tons. An advance detachment of Krumpel's staff goes to Minsk to prepare everything. The stockpile is to be increased to 73,000 tons (one issue of ammunition, five fuel quotas, five days' rations).

AGp. South reports considerable booty found at Lwow; including fuel in surface and underground dumps. By 1 July, several large Forward Supply Points will be moved closer to front, including one to Rovno.

- b) Fuel situation: Estimated daily consumption 9,000 cbm, or, 250,000 cbm, per month, i.e., 22 trains daily. Actual consumption has been 11,500 cbm. per day, or, 330,000 cbm. per month, quite a lot more than expected. About one-third of this comes out of booty. Daily requirements until 6 July, 7 trains; beginning 6 July \* we shall again need 14 trains, daily.
- c) Pacification of the Rear Areas is a matter of serious concern. Owing to our method of advance, our communication lines are liable to serious disruption by isolated enemy elements. The Security Divs. alone cannot do the job in this vast territory. It will be necessary to detach combat Divs. for these operations.

Gen. von Waldau (Op. Chief Air Force): We review the probable lines of development and the operational tasks resulting from them. OKL planning for the massing of air strength\* is again in an absolute muddle, due to misconstrued talks of the Fuehrer with ObdL.

The Air Force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy. It is quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes. Half of this number probably has already been shot down or destroyed on the ground, so that numerically we now are about equal with the Russians. But Russian flying efficiency cannot nearly compare with ours, owing to the poor training of their pilots and crews, and that is why entire enemy squadrons, or large parts of them, get shot down so often in combat, as, for instance, happened yesterday over Dvinsk and Bobruisk.

At present, Air Force estimates Russian air strength opposite AGp. South, at 800 to 1,000 operational first-line craft; in AGp. Center, at 400 - 500; and in sector of AGp. North, at 400 - 500. In the battles of the last few days, the Russians have been using obsolete planes side by side with latest models.

Gen. Oehquist (Finland): Orientation on our plans for the impending operations. -- Discussion of Finnish operations. -- Experiences with the Russians.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. --  
Decorations for GHq personnel ( 10 July and 1 August). \*

Evening reports indicate that Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 could start off on 3 July. Approve date, Some features of the plans of AGp. South cause me to ring up their Hq, in order to emphasize the necessity for feeding more Inf. Divs. into the northern wing.

Allocation of Inf.Divs. to the Commanders of AGp. Rear Area is being arranged.

Concern about the threats that may develop from the Pripet Marshes for the inner wings of Army Gps. Center and South, prompts issuance of an order directing initiation of joint supervision and offensive mopping up of the area. According to radio intelligence and air observations we must reckon with 2 Corps Hqs, with 7 Divs.

2 July 1941. 11th Day.

Eleventh Army launches offensive from Romania, Fourth Armd. Gp. from Dvinsk, in direction of OPOCHKA-Ostrov. Also the Hungarians start operations.

In AGp. South, the situation reports prove the correctness of my view concerning the northern wing of Armd. Gp. 1. Only yesterday, on 1 July, Russian Inf. from Pripet Marshes west of Rovno, made quite a deep penetration into the flank of Armd. Gp. 1, in the general direction of Dubno. I do not think this penetration imperils our operations, but the nearby Inf.Divs., which I would like at last to move up behind the Armd. spearheads in an eastern direction, are again kept back to deal with this enemy thrust.

In AGp. Center, the Bialystok pocket is in the final stages of liquidation. ObdH now is worried about the Novogrodek pocket.

In AGp. North, I Corps should better not move off to the east.\*\* Parts of it must first clean out the forests south of Riga. 291st Div. must comb out the northern part of the coast, west of Riga.

Bogatschi: Air reconnaissance shows something new: A movement, apparently from around Odessa, towards and east of Kiev, and then to the north. Air also confirms earlier reports of dense movements from the east in the direction of Orsha-Vitebsk and, further north, in the direction of Navel.

The resulting picture would indicate that in addition to the new group, assigned to the defense of the dry route Orsha-Vitebsk, whose sector extends perhaps to Mohilev in the south and to Polotsk in the north (Dvina bridges there are blown up), another new group is being built up northeast of



the triangle formed by the old Russo-Estonian\* frontier and the Dvina .

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) The base at Dvinsk will be ample to maintain our Inf. Corps up to the line OPOCHKA - Marienburg, and the Armd. Gp. as far as Leningrad.  
For that purpose we need:  
From Kovno to Dvinsk, 10 trains, daily.  
From Siauliai, 6 trains, daily, until 6 July, and  
12 trains, daily, after that date.  
In addition to trains, 14,000 tons of trucking space.  
( Is available !)
- b) In AGp. Center, big fuel depots were found near Baranovich and Molodeczno.
- c) Question of tank replacement. On hand: 35 tanks 38 (Czech), 50 tanks III.

Additionally, to form a unit (materiel only) at Sagan:  
35 Tanks 38 (Czech), 71 Tanks III, and 30 Tanks IV.

By 15 July we shall have received from new production:  
60 Tanks III, 30 Tanks 38 (Czech), 15 Tanks IV.

By 30 July additional 60 Tanks III, 30 Tanks 38 (Czech),  
15 Tanks IV.

Field Marshal von Leeb (on phone):

- a) Necessity to comb out forests south of Riga; 271st Div. turned off to the area.
- b) von Leeb wants to move up XXIII Corps\*\* behind his right wing under his command, whereas we have already assigned the Corps to the neighboring Ninth Army. This wish cannot be complied with. Ninth Army itself is very much interested in moving this Corps to the front along AGp. boundary line.

At noon ObdH is called to the Fuehrer:

Apprehensive about the Novogrodek pocket. The Fuehrer thinks the ring must be contracted and tightened, and wants it bolstered with reserves. It seems there was still some discussion about launching the new operations by Armd.Gps. 2 and 3, which have already been authorized by us.

There they go worrying again.

ObdH makes various suggestions on how to compress and crack the pocket. He wants to use Eighteenth mot. Div. and Tenth Armd. Div., which belong to the assault wave of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3, set to strike on 3 July. I object. I call up AGp. Center to discuss that with Greiffenberg.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone! In reply to my talk with his Chief of Staff he states: An enemy breakthrough from the forest pocket of Novogrodek to the northeast is highly unlikely. Behind Fourteenth mot. Div., 900th Brigade will be brought up from Vilna tonight. Pressure on the front of Fourteenth mot. Div. is also eased by arrival of 161st Div. on its right wing. Moreover, the northeastern edge of the forest area has been amply mined by Hoth.

Of V Corps, 35th and 5th Divs. have reached the forest region. VIII Corps, south of the Njemen, has crossed the Baranovichi-Lida railroad.

The situation is more difficult for Fourth Army and Guderian. Armd. Group 2 is under order not to withdraw any units from the encircling ring, without orders.

Armd. Groups 2 and 3 are ordered to push their inner wings ahead to the forest edge (eastern edge of the big forest), if the situation permits. The process is most difficult between the big forest and Slonim. This area would afford the enemy with the best operational opportunities; but there are no signs that he is trying to take advantage of them. This Novogrodek pocket cannot be compared with the Volkovysk pocket, where the enemy suffered very heavy losses. Any unit that escaped into the Novogrodek pocket, is badly mauled, and the enemy has no ammunition nor food. This accounts for his passivity. \*Nevertheless it will be impossible to prevent some smaller enemy bodies seeping through to the southeast.

IX Corps has already crossed the Szczara river and will reach Molczadz tomorrow.

XII Corps is one day's march, LIII Corps two days' marches behind schedule. But advance elements of these Corps are already committed next to Regt. Grossdeutschland to reinforce the ring encircling the Slonim area.

Fighting on the southern outskirts of Minsk. Von Kluge cannot move up his troops.

After this conversation, I report briefly to ObdH and talk with Jodl (OKW) to ease the Fuehrer's mind.

Major Golling (Liaison Off., Armd. Gp. 4) reports. Hoepfner is nervous that Inf. Corps behind him might be moving across his lines of communications. It will be impossible to avoid that. There also seem to be certain differences in von Leeb's and Hoepfner's views of what the next moves should be. That, however, depends on our directives, which have not yet been given, but are due now.

Armd. Gp. 4 must proceed to block the gaps south and north of Lake Peipus and encircle Leningrad. von Leeb's Inf. Corps must sweep Estonia clear of enemy forces and occupy the coast, meanwhile pushing all forces they can spare on Leningrad and the southeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, and guarding their right flank against Nevel.

Computation of enemy strength. My own computations and those of Foreign Armies East show:

On the fronts of von Leeb and von Bock, 15 to 20 Inf. Divs. and about 6 Armd. Divs., of which three may have been withdrawn (mauled?). To these 3 front Divs. must be added, new:

1 (18th) from Moscow

3 from Volga-Ural

4 from Siberian Railroad

1 from Crimea

12 Armd. Divs. plus Divs. in

Estonia and Leningrad.

Estimated total tank strength, 15,000, or 35 Armd. Divs., of which 22 have been identified. In the Far East are five Divs., which leaves eight Divs. unaccounted for (Third in the north, one from Moscow area, and Sixth Div. of II Corps). Excluding the three Divs. in parentheses, five Divs. would be left available as operational reserve.

Evening reports.

AGp. South: A heavy enemy attack was repulsed with severe enemy losses, west of Rovno; III Corps (northern wing of the Armd. Gp.) temporarily stalled; central sector and southern wing advancing. In Romania, the Pruth river has been crossed and our forces have penetrated about 12 km into enemy territory. On the front of Seventeenth Army, the enemy is effecting a planned withdrawal, apparently under cover of strong Armd. forces. Our Divisions are in close pursuit.

In AGp. Center strong elements of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 have started to move forward in order to be as close as possible to the Dniepr and Dvina line on jump-off day (3 July). Good progress. Stubborn enemy resistance on the Beresina is broken by Armd. Gp. 2. The other components of Army Gp., after the close of the Bialystok battle, are regrouping for a new offensive against the line Mhilev-Polotsk. The ring encircling the forest pocket east of Novogrodek is now complete.

In AGp. North, Armd. Gp. 4 has started operations and advanced halfway to Pskov. The Inf. Divs. are following close behind.

At the Fuehrer's Hq they now seem to be reassured about the situation in the Novogrodek pocket. Start of new offensive by Armd. Gps. is approved.

3 July 1941. 12th Day.

Daily reports of 2 July and morning reports of 3 July indicate that the enemy fronting Eleventh Army has apparently withdrawn behind the Pruth river, but is still fighting strong rear guard actions. Our advance is slowed by pouring rains, which turn roads into bogs.

The Hungarians are still fighting at the mouths of the mountain passes and have made no important advances. Seventeenth Army, where two Slovak Divisions have been introduced on the right wing, is pressing on "in pursuit" behind the yielding enemy. This pursuit is repeatedly checked by counter thrusts of individual enemy groups, mostly against the flank and as a rule with tanks. Tarnopol is taken.

As a result of this advance, Seventeenth Army has developed greater depth, which is all to the good, and now has its main concentration on its left wing, in conformity with the basic operational dispositions of Army Gp. Next to it, Sixth Army with its main concentration on the right wing, has continued its southeastward movement in good formation. This puts its main weight between Ninth Armd.Div. and Sixteenth Armd.Div. on the right, and III Corps (11th, 13th, 14th Armd.Div.), on the left. AGp. so has developed a definite wedge pointing at Berdichev. To the north, Armd. Gp., that is, its left wing (III Corps), is still severely hampered in its movements by attacks from the Pripet area, which the enemy now is launching west of Rovno.

This threat to the northern flank from the Pripet area has been a matter of concern for days. Everybody is vying for the honor of telling the most hair-raising tale about the danger from the north. Foremost are the radio intelligence people, who claim to have located a large number of enemy troops, namely three Armd. Corps and two Infantry Corps under the command of an Army Hq. This assertion is baseless and therefore dangerous. The events over several days do show that there are enemy forces in this maze of swamps and forests, but they certainly are not stronger than 2 or three Divisions; there cannot be any doubt that they include some mot. elements and tanks. The attacks are conducted in a manner which plainly shows that their command is completely confused. Also the tactics employed in these attacks are singularly poor. Rifleman on trucks abreast with tanks drive against our firing line, and the inevitable result are very heavy losses to the enemy. Such desultory attacks cannot be regarded as a threat to our operations. Nevertheless it would be intolerable to allow this factor of uncertainty to persist unchallenged on our flank. It must be removed by offensive action and systematic combing out of the marshes.

In AGp. Center, the Novogrodek pocket has been further contracted and sealed, as agreed upon yesterday. The moves of Second and Ninth Army are continuing according to plan, and with forced marches, in order to introduce Infantry with greatest rapidity behind the Armd. Gps., which are launching the offensive today. Both Armored Gps. have already started off. Guderian forced the Beresina river this forenoon, Hoth's left wing reached the Dvina northwest of Polotsk by noon.

In AGp. North Hoepfner advanced but slowly, owing to very bad weather which give him the worst road conditions. Still,

his left wing is already midway between the Dvina and Pskov. He has been directed by teletype orders issued last night, to occupy the areas between Velikie Luki and Lake Ilmen and between Lake Ilmen and Lake Pskov, with a view to safeguarding them toward the east, and to advance northward beyond the line Lake Ilmen-Lake Pskov only on order of OKH. The latter advance will have the twofold aim of closing the gap between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus, and of cutting off Leningrad between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies, by forced marches, are moving on in excellent formation, with a strong right wing behind Armd.Gp., toward the Dvina. On the Army Gp. boundary close contact is maintained with the vigorously pushed left wing of Ninth Army.

Enemy intelligence (Kinzel and Bogatsch) brings no important findings. In front of our southern wing (AGp. South) the enemy has ceased reinforcing his front. In Center (triangle Orsha - Vitebsk - Smolensk) there is still some movement, but with the movement which apparently came from the Caucasus brought to a close yesterday, it is on a much smaller scale than in the past few days. In the "dry route", trench digging is in progress. Owing to bad weather there are no new developments in the Nevel Group.

The enemy situation in the Pripet Marshes remains obscure. We must not overrate the strength of this enemy. On the whole, with no more signs of enemy activity in the Novogrod-ek pocket, we may be fairly sure that the enemy in the Bialystok sector, who was estimated at 15 - 20 Divs. by a captured Russian Corps CG, is annihilated except for some negligible remnants. On the front of AGp. North we may also figure with 12 - 15 Divs. completely wiped out. On the front of AGp. South the enemy's withdrawal and the crumbling of his front certainly cannot be interpreted as a disengaging movement planned by his command; it must be explained by the fact that his troops have been cut up and for the most part scattered by our unceasing, massive blows.

On the whole, then, it may be said even now that the objective to shatter the bulk of the Russian Army this side of the Dvina and Dniepr, has been accomplished. I do not doubt the statement of the captured Russian Corps CG that, east of the Dvina and Dniepr, we would encounter nothing more than partial forces, not strong enough to hinder realization of German operational plans. It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks.\* Of course, this does not yet mean that it is closed. The sheer geographical vastness of the country and the stubbornness of the resistance, which is carried on with all means, will claim our efforts for many more weeks to come.

#### Future plans:

- a) For the continuance of the Russian operations it will be of primary importance to gain a new jump-off line

between Smolensk and Moscow, and another bast around Leningrad. From here we could proceed to the capture of Northern Russia and the industrial region around Moscow, and subsequently, in conjunction with AGp. South, of the Donjets industrial region.

Once we are across the Dvina and Dniepr, it will be less a question of smashing enemy armies, than of denying the enemy possession of his production centers and so prevent his raising a new Army with the aid of his gigantic industrial potential and his inexhaustible manpower resources.

- b) As soon as the battle in the East changes from an effort to annihilate the enemy armed forces to one of paralyzing the enemy economy, our next tasks in the war against Britain will come to the foreground and require preparation:

Preparations must be made for the offensive against the land route between Nile and Euphrates, both from Cyrenaica and through Anatolia, and perhaps also for an offensive from the Caucasus against Iran. The former theater, which will always remain dependent of the quantities of supplies we can bring across the sea, and so is subject to incalculable vicissitudes, will assume a secondary role and for the most part will be left to Italian forces. We will have to assign to it only two German Armd. Divisions (Fifth light and Fifteenth), which will be brought up to full strength and reinforced by small additional complements. As an initial move for the operations through Anatolia against Syria, possibly supported by a secondary thrust from the Caucasus, we shall have to initiate concentration of the necessary forces in Bulgaria, which at the same time may serve as a means of political pressure to compel Turkey to grant transit for our forces.

- Wagner (Gen Qu): a) Summary of casualty reports, booty reports etc.  
b) Organization of Rear Areas and assignment of troops to these.  
c) Review of plans for moving forward our supply bases after the Dvina Dniepr line has been gained.  
d) Spare parts for tanks and tank replacements.

1200: Through ObdH and Op. Sec. we hear again the usual buzzings from the Fuehrer's Hq. Now again the whole place is in a state of jitters, because the Fuehrer is afraid that the wedge of AGp. South now advancing eastward might be threatened by flank attacks from north and south. Tactically speaking, of course, this fear is not at all unwarranted, but that's what we have Army Corps CGs for. What is lacking on top level is that confidence in the executive commands which is one of the most essential features of our command organization, and that is so because it fails to grasp the coordinating force that comes from the common schooling and education of our Leader Corps.

I call up AGp. South (Lt.Col.Winter, Ia) to make suggestions on how the threat to the northern flank could be removed once and for all by employing Advance Combat Teams and moving the GHq Reserves toward Rovno. Any threat to the southern flank, which will soon effect a link up with the Hungarians, must be forestalled by Seventeenth Army with its own forces, by organizing Advance Combat Teams amply equipped with AT units and obstacle construction material.

1600 AGp. South reports compliance with my suggestions. It is really heartwarming to see the readiness with which the Field Marshal and AGp. Commanders cooperate with us and adopt our ideas.

Casualties. Total for period 22 - 30 June: 41,087 (or 1.64% of actual strength of 2.5 million).

Killed: 524 O, 8,362 NCO and EM

Wounded: 966 O, 28,528 NCO and EM

Officer casualties:

Wounded 3.3% (Campaign in West 3.10%)

Killed 7.2% ( " " " 4.85%)

Missing 1.5% ( " " " 2.00%)

4 July 1941.

13th Day.

Situation: South: Eleventh Army is advancing slowly. Difficult road conditions, owing to recent rains. The Mt. Brigs. of the Romanian northern front have started the attack against Cernauti.

The Hungarian right wing has reached the northern rim of the Carpathians.

In spite of difficult road conditions, Seventeenth and Sixth Armies are getting on well. Main weight on the inner wings. On the northern wing of Sixth Army, our safeguarding measures against the Pripet Marshes are beginning to show results. The enemy is withdrawing in the Marshes to the east before our pressure from southwest and west, but at the same time is bringing reinforcements from the east. We must expect that Reischau will feel continued pressure on his left shoulder, at first from the area north of the line Rovno-Korez and later from the area between Korosten and Kiev.

Center: The right wing (Third Armd.Div.) of Guderian's Armd. Gp. has crossed the Dniepr at Rogachev, establishing so far only a bridgehead. Further north Armd.Gp. has forced the Beresina at the destroyed crossings and is battling its way to the Upper Dniepr.

The northern wing of Armd.Gp. Hoth has reached the Dvina at Drissa, where it is encountering stiffer enemy resistance. Road conditions difficult. High tank casualties from bad roads. Hoth reports 50% combat strength.



Second and Ninth Armies are pressing on behind Armd.Gp. in rapid marches. But owing to the delay in the encirclement operations at Bialystok, the distance between them and Armd. Gp. has become so great, particularly behind Guderian, that special measures will be necessary to bridge the gap. Combined Advance Combat Teams of the Inf. Corps must be moved ahead behind Guderian's Armd.Gp.

Von Bock has moved his Hq to Baranovichi. Von Kluge who, on our orders and over their objections, assumed command of the two Armd.Gps., has moved his Hq to Minsk.

North: Armd.Gp. Hoepfner is advancing rapidly, and is approaching Ostrov with its left wing. Right wing encountered stronger opposition shortly after crossing the Dvina, but thanks to Field Marshal von Leeb's foresight, Inf. forces were brought up here in time (on trucks), so that this enemy constitutes no threat; on the contrary, he is already being forced back by the troops originally on the scene. During this fighting, the Commander of 121st Div., Gen. von Lancelle, was killed. The bulk of the Inf. Corps is advancing briskly and has started crossing the Dvina. On the northern wing, almost an entire enemy Division was captured in the forests north of Riga.

Enemy: On the front of AGp. South local resistance, which leads to formation of pockets, in some places; but on the whole we discern distinct withdrawal movements, covered by armored counter-thrusts. Some troops are still arriving through Kiev from the east, but to all appearance they do not represent a large-scale coordinated movement. The large number of trains cramming the railroad stations and some eastward train movements probably must be interpreted as evacuation measures. Movements of fresh troops toward Korosten are observed, but apparently they are not on an operational scale.

On the front of Center the situation is unchanged. Movements run from Smolensk to Orsha, but also in the opposite direction. The large quantities of railroad cars around Bryansk seem less an indication that the Russians are forming an operational reserve - they would not have sufficient forces for that - than, merely the accumulation of rolling stock used in the frontward movements of the last days, left on sidings for technical reasons.

In North, two movements are reported on the way from the area around Moscow. One is running into the area west of Velikie Luki, i.e. between Hoth's and Hoepfner's inner wings, the other one is swinging northward around Lake Ilmen, to the vicinity of Pskov.

Over-all picture: The situation supports the assumption that the enemy does not have sufficient forces left for a sustained defense of the line running from the old Russo-Estonian frontier along Dvina and Dniepr to the south. This theory is borne out also by a Russian order, intercepted yesterday, to the effect that the Dvina river will be held only by groups concentrated at the crossings. \*

As our Armies advance, any attempt at further resistance probably will soon collapse and we shall be confronted with the question of reducing Leningrad and Moscow. It remains to be seen whether Stalin's proclamation calling for a people's war of all workers against us, will be successful. On the result depends the method by which we are going to sweep the enemy out of these extensive industrial areas. The main thing is to deny their use to the enemy at an early date.

As to the date when the Finns will strike, a decision will have to be made today : ( 6, 7, or 8 July).

Col. Ochsner reports on the outcome of his tour to the fronts of Ninth and Sixteenth Armies:

Some units still show a certain reluctance about using smoke. Heavy Rocket Launcher and Do Projector \* apparently highly effective wherever employed. The ammunition still seems to have some bugs.

Question of propaganda about the new flame ammunition. I am against it. It would only afford later opponents an opportunity to prepare counter measures.

At noon the first break in many days, which allows me to spend an hour on horseback.

Gen. Wagner, Gen Qu:

- a) Settling cooperation of "Gen Qu Command Post" - Chiefs with Bn. TO.\*\*
- b) Difficulties in supplying AGp. North by rail (Siauliai).
- c) Transport situation at present permits maintenance of offensives in
  - AGp. South: Armor to Kiev, Inf. to the line Zhitomir-Berdichev.
  - AGp. Center: Armor within close distance from Moscow\*\*;
  - Inf. across Dvina and Dniepr.
  - AGp. North: Armor to Leningrad, Inf. to area Velikie Luki - Dno' - Pskov - Dorpat.

Gen. von Thoma reports on observations on his tour to front of Armd.Gp. 3:

- a) In fighting the enemy's giant tanks, 10 cm 8,8 cm AA and 5 cm AT guns are very effective.
- b) Tanks I are a liability for the troops and should be taken out for home defense, coast defense and training purposes.
- c) Very tough fighting with Russians. Only few prisoners are taken.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters -- Preparations for transfer of GHq.

Evening reports from the South again indicate that we are advancing along the entire front. Road conditions, which must be very difficult in some sectors, are slowing the advance. The Drohobycz oil fields have fallen into our hands with very little damage. On the northern wing, the attacks against the north flank have ceased.

In Center, crossings over the Dniepr have been forced in heavy fighting at Rogachev by the right wing of Guderian's Group, and over the Dvina, at Drissa, by Hoth's left wing. Elsewhere the two Armd. Gps. are battling their way to the Dvina and Dniepr against occasionally stubborn enemy resistance. The Inf. Corps are following in rapid marches all along. All is quiet in the pocket west of Minsk.

In North, Hoepfner has pushed as far as Ostrov \* while beating off attacks against his flank just north of the Dvina. The heads of Inf. columns are crossing the Dvina river.

Enemy intelligence report on the whole contains nothing new. Only one observation is striking viz. unusually larger numbers of trains crowding the stations around Briansk and Orel, and trains moving northward in this area. Normally such a picture would indicate a build-up of an operational reserve, but the enemy does no longer have enough strength available for such a policy. In any case, a close watch will be kept on these movements.

5 July 1941. (14th Day.)

Situation: The entire front is advancing in accordance with our intentions. In AGp., South, in the Southern Ukraine, road conditions are very difficult as a result of cloud-storms, and rate of advance is slow. Apparently the enemy now is withdrawing eastward from the Pripet Marshes opposite Reichenau's left shoulder. In consequence, GHq Reserves can be moved eastward beyond the line Dubno - Luck.

In AGp. Center, Guderian's right wing (Model) has held its bridgeheads at Rogachev. But the central sector of the Armd. Grp., fighting all the way, is making little headway between the Beresina and the Dniepr. In addition to the Drissa bridgehead, Hoth now has gained another firm foothold at Ulla, on the northern bank of the Dvina, upstream from Polotsk. -- The "pocket" west of Minsk is slowly burning out. Since yesterday morning 52,000 Russians have surrendered.

In AGp. North Hoepfner's Armd. Gp. is sweeping the area assigned it clear of the enemy. The Inf. Corps are closing

up a satisfactory rate, especially on the right wing.

Report on enemy situation. Our troops have more or less lost contact with the enemy on the fronts of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies. Air reconnaissance shows that the enemy is retreating in disorder before Seventeenth Army and the Hungarians, with several columns packed together on one road in some instances. We may assume that these movements are withdrawals, getting mixed up with refugee columns. Enemy AA protection generally covers the rear position west of Kiev, enemy fighter protection covers the area round Kiev. Behind the northern part of the position parallel troop movements and arrival of troops from the north.

On the front of AGp. Center, confirmation is obtained on unloading of troops round Orsha, from where they move westward to Guderian's front. AA protection makes itself felt west of Orsha, fighter protection round Orsha and to the east. Strong fighter cover above Briansk and Orel. The enormously large number of railway cars left standing on the sidings has again been observed. The purpose of these accumulations of rolling stock and of the movements into this area, apparently from the south, is not clearly understood. Operational reserves? Group for a flank thrust?

Air reconnaissance again confirms the existence of an enemy concentration round Velikie Luki. No indications that it has been committed in the fighting. It might become effective against Hoepfner's right flank, as well as against Hotin's left flank, especially if the latter should strike eastward from his crossing points at Drissa and Ulla. The enemy's fighter cover is above Velikie Luki, his AA protection is moved further west in the direction of Dvinsk.

Enemy's command set-up is as follows:

|              |      |                            |
|--------------|------|----------------------------|
| Russian AHq  | 8 )  |                            |
|              | 27 ) | forming AGp. Northwest     |
|              | 11 ) |                            |
| Russian AHq  | 13 ) |                            |
| Unidentified | )    | forming AGp. West          |
| new AHq      | )    |                            |
| Russian AHq  | 5 )  |                            |
|              | 6 )  |                            |
|              | 12 ) | forming Southwestern Front |
|              | 2 )  |                            |
| Odessa Army  | )    |                            |

Heusinger (1300):

- a) A teletype from Erfurth indicates that on orders of OKW (apparently the Fuehrer himself) the last Regt.\* of 163rd Div. now moving up behind Heinrich's assault group, was diverted for Falkenhorst's combat group at Salla. Apart from the fact that this Regt. cannot be

of any help in the Salla operation, the Div. as a result is disrupted and its striking power impaired where it was needed most. This clearly shows up the dubiousness of this entire Murmansk operation, which serves only political ends and is open to gravest censure from the operational point of view.

- b) In the episode with the Mongolians hordes (allegedly Stalin's bodyguard) trapped behind the front of Sixth Army, 168th Division is reported to have broken down completely. Relief of COs is demanded.

Wagner (Gen Qu) and Gercke (Transport Chief): Discussion of train requirements for supply and of the most practical procedure for cooperation between Gen Qu and Transp. Chief. (North needs 14, Center 21, and South 12 trains; overall planning by Transp. Chief; details of execution, by BvTO.)\*

Buhle (Org.):

- a) Condition of Divisions. 168th has lost part of its Artillery! Cav. Div.: condition of horses good; organization has proved unworkable ! \*\*
- b) Suitable for new missions (i.e., possible employment on Balkans, etc.)\*\*\*:
- |                |    |   |
|----------------|----|---|
| From Armd. Gp. | 1: | 5th, 11th, 16th, 14th Armd. Divs.         |
| " "            | 2: | <u>3rd</u> , 4th, <u>17th</u> Armd. Divs. |
| " "            | 4: | 1st Armd. Div.                            |
- Those underlined are the best suited. All other Armd. Divs. have French vehicles or Czech tanks.
- Also available: 16th, 20th, 60th mot. Divs. All other mot. Divs. have mixed or French vehicles.
- c) Africa: Two new Field Repl. Bns., i.e., 3,000 men, needed; adding 5% normal furloughs, makes a total of 5,000 men to be sent over.
- d) Chenillettes ## and Renault trucks lost in operations.
- e) Requests from Army Hq. Norway for Northern Norway, where signal equipment and supply installations have been diverted (!) ##
- f) Croat Legion: 1 Regt. of 6 Bns. Activation in Croatia 10 July. Will not be at training centers before 20 July; then training; ready for commitment by middle of August.

Situation in the evening: In South, advance slowed by terrain difficulties and enemy opposition. The report that AGp. South has lost contact with the enemy, is not confirmed. Armd. Gp. Kleist seems to have punched through the enemy defense system. In Center, a victory of Guderian's and Hoth's outer wings is in the making. Very bad roads. In North, the attempt of the enemy to build up a front against Hoepfner with forces hurriedly thrown together, does not seem to come off. The "intentions" set forth in the AGp.

reports are in line with the ideas of OKH.

ObdH back from tour to AGp. Center, Army Hq 4 and Armd. Gp. 2:

Eighteenth Armd. Div. suffered heavy losses in the forest area. -- PW problem is beginning to get troublesome. -- Insecurity of Rear Areas. -- Population movements on the roads.

OKW interferes in the moving of 163rd Div. to Finland with a direct order by the Fuehrer. The Division was supposed to go to Heinrich's group east of Lake Ladoga and is now ordered to go "as a whole or in part" to the Salla front. Reason: SS Brigade "Nord" committed at Salla, has been a failure.

C of S, AGp. South sends an interesting situation estimate. It shows how widely AGp. South, which has decided to direct its main effort against Berdichev (non-existent gap in the fortified line) diverges from our plan (main concentration on the northern wing).

6 July 1941. (15th Day.) Sunday

Situation: The final reports last night and the morning reports bring no important news.

In AGp. South, the situation of Armd. Gp. 1 develops generally fair, both at the front and on the northern flank. The right wing of Sixth Army has come up against an enemy front consisting of field fortifications laid out in difficult terrain, east of Yampol. Seventeenth Army has generally made fair advances, Eleventh Army only slight ones. It is still an open question whether the enemy will succeed in the timely organization of unified resistance in the fortified line west of Kiev, on which we now have accurate air reports. The energetic leadership of the enemy south of the Pripet Marshes would make this appear quite likely; against it is the attrition of forces bled by the recurrent counter attacks and the disruption of withdrawal movements by our air effort.

In AGp. Center, the only change from last night's situation is that Seventeenth Armd.Div., north of Eighteenth, without any orders has started moving away from Minsk, and that strong elements of Fourteenth mot.Div., which was in the "pocket" guard", has been set in motion behind Hoth.

In AGp. North, the forward movement of the Infantry right wing north of Dvina is thoroughly satisfying.

Gen. Bogatsch:

a) Air observation shows nothing new of any importance as regards enemy movements.

- b) Photographic reconnaissance furnishes the explanation for the huge number of cars standing on sidings in the Briansk-Orel area. In this area the Russians have enormous, evidently brand-new industrial plants with vast railroad sidings. To all appearance they represent rolling stock factories and major railroad shops.

Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern ( C of S AGp.

South) on his situation estimate submitted on 3 July. OKH Reserves were brought up behind the northern wing (III Corps) not because of any anxiety about the flank in the Rovno area, but with a view to supplying III Corps in its further advance with ample Infantry against any possible threat in the area north of Korosten from the direction of Mozir, thus giving III Corps freedom of movement toward Kiev or to the southwest.

Army Gp. states its intention to advance with III Corps on Kiev in order to form a bridgehead. The other elements of Armd. Gp. 1, after breaking through at Berdichev will strike west of the Dniepr through Byelaya Tserkov in the direction of Kirovograd, while the strong forces concentrated on the inner wing of Sixth and Seventeenth Armies, after breaching the line at Berdichev will drive on in south-eastern direction for tactical cooperation with Eleventh Army in the encirclement of the enemy.

Gen. Ott reports on visit to front. (VII and XXXIX Corps.) He

describes pillbox fighting which he witnessed at VII Corps (heavy howitzers are very effective against them; also gasoline poured in ventilator shafts). In sector of XXXIX Corps, heavy losses were sustained by First Mt. Div. Morale of troops very good; all are imbued with a sense of superiority over the enemy.

It was good to see the general convictions among our troops that they can get the better of the enemy tanks. In some instances, enemy crews are reported to abandon the tanks, in others they keep on fighting until they are burned to death in their tanks. As over against the campaign in the West, our troops seem at last to have learnt to make effective use of their heavy Inf. weapons against a stubbornly resisting enemy.

Inf. Supply ~~Clns~~ have proved very useful. — Everybody wants semi-automatic weapons and telescopic sights. — Close combat training has paid its way.

Russian attack method: three-minute artillery barrage, then pause, then Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapon support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses.

Casualties up to 3 July:

|         |        |                           |   |
|---------|--------|---------------------------|---|
| Wounded | 38,809 | (including 1,403 Officers | ) |
| Killed  | 11,822 | (including 724 Officers   | ) |

Missing 3,961 (including 66 Officers)

---

Total losses about 54,000 = 2,15% of 2,5 Million.

The large number of medical casualties, (almost 54,000), practically equalling bloody casualties, is quite remarkable.

Larger proportion of officer casualties than in preceding campaigns.

Proportion officer casualties in the Russian campaign to-date: 3,8% wounded, 6,6% killed, 1,7% missing.

In the Western Campaign: Officer casualties were 3,1% wounded, 4,85% killed, 2% missing.

In the Polish Campaign: Officer casualties were 1,95% wounded, 4,6% killed, 1,35% missing.

In the afternoon, long talk with Gen. Gause, OKH Liaison Off. to - Italian High Command Libya, summoned from North Africa.

Summary:

a) Personal relations are complicated by Gen. Rommel's character and his inordinate ambition. The desired relationship of mutual confidence between Gause and Rommel has not been established. Rommel's character defects make him extremely hard to get along with, but no one cares to come out in open opposition, because of his brutality and the backing he has on top level. The Italians at first met Gause with suspicion, but now are friendlier. Incidentally, Roatta's insincerity also was an aggravating factor in this connection.

This obviously bungled situation might be rectified by modifying the mission of Gause's staff in the process of changing the command set-up (formation of an Armd. Gp. Rommel).

b) The situation at Bardia and Solum continues tight. The British have withdrawn after their last defeat, but it appears entirely possible, that they might repeat their attack toward the end of July. The weather then is said to be no worse than it was at the time of the last attack, when the British used 400 tanks and 2 Inf. Divs. By the end of July they may be in a position to put into the field 600 tanks and 3 Inf. Divs. It is a question whether the German forces then will be able to hold, for even at the last British attack it was touch and go. If there is another offensive, we shall have to reckon with attacks out of Tobruk, too.

c) The problem of transport now as ever is the dominating factor in the North African situation. Nothing has materially changed. We now do use the direct route to Bengasi, but German-Italian shipping space is



visibly diminishing. Strangely, Gause thinks it would be possible to substitute land transport for our dwindling shipping tonnage. I thoroughly disagree.

#### Evening situation.

South: In Romania \* there has been a sudden change to optimism. Eleventh Army is reported to be advancing briskly and has pushed Advance Combat Teams toward the Dniestr in the XI Corps sector. A surprise thrust is planned against the bridge at Mogilev Podolsky. XXX Corps is to continue its attacks. The Romanians are to swing eastward south of the Dniestr. With road conditions improving, Seventeenth and Sixth Armies are pressing on in frontal advance. The northern wing of Armd. Gp. 1 is fighting inside the enemy positions.\*\* The German Divs. advancing in the Pripet area are moving ahead at a fair pace, without enemy contact.

Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is encountering stiff opposition on its right wing, at Rogachev. Attack from the direction of Gomel against its right wing. On its left wing there is still fighting between the Beresina and the Dniepr. Central sector of Armd. Gp. is on the Dniepr.

North: Highly gratifying progress. Hoeppner has gained more ground to the north and has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Sixteenth Army is moving to the right, to safeguard the right flank already now. Eighteenth Army is turning off its left wing northward, to occupy Estonia.

Finland: Unchanged. Of 163rd Div., only the last Regt.\*\*\* has been detached to Salla.

7 July 1941. (16th Day.)

Situation: South: Yesterday's optimism in Eleventh Army, has vanished. XI Corp is again held back. The reasons are not apparent. Seventeenth Army is getting along well and is concentrating its Advance Combat Teams against Proskurov. Wietersheim's Corps, leading the Army, has spread itself surprisingly far to the south (road conditions?).# Sixth Army continues to advance, led on its left wing by Armd. Gp. 1, of which only the southern wing appears to have made any sizeable penetration into the enemy position west of Minsk, ## whereas its northern wing is still fighting in the pillbox line. The Inf. wing of Sixth Army on the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes is advancing nicely.

The enemy is trying with all means to extricate his forces out of the pocket in the process of being formed by Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. It seems that he is retreating behind the Dniepr, but we have no conclusive

evidence as yet. The numerous movements in the rear area between the Dniepr and the position to the west could well be shipments of materials and the concentration of large reserves, which would have to be assembled in the area south of Kiev, if he intends to hold the position.

Center: The enemy on our Dniepr front is still fighting hard and stubbornly against Armd. Gp. 2 at Orsha, and is shifting reinforcements from the south to the Dniepr Line.

On the Dvina front, Hoth's left wing has gained elbow-room on the northern bank of the river and, by swinging up-river, is endeavoring to move its entire front across the river. This situation offers the big chance for carrying forward our operation. Second and Ninth Armies are following closely behind the Armd. Gps.

North: Operations are proceeding according to plan, which means that a strong right Inf. wing is taking over flank cover against Nevel, thus freeing Armor for the regrouping against Leningrad.

Enemy: Apart from our uncertainty about enemy intentions in the South -- is he or is he not retreating behind the Dniepr -- there is still the open question whether the observed larger enemy movements in the Briansk -- Orel -- Kursk area are for the purpose of massing strength or are destined for the evacuation of industries. Radio intelligence indicates that there are still four enemy Corps Hqs in the Pripet Marshes in front of Reichenau's left wing. However, we have no clear idea of the location of the combat troops, as XVII Corps, advancing through the marshland has lost contact with the enemy.

Summary: At the moment the best chances of success are on the front of left wing of AGp. Center (Armd. Gp. 3). To the north, the enemy group Velikie Luki is less active than one would have expected after the large movements to that sector in the past few days. Since, moreover, the right wing of AGp North is advancing well, and so holds this enemy group in check, Hoth may have a chance to roll up the Vitebsk positions from the north, and so open up a great operational opportunity.

If the enemy in the South falls back behind the Dniepr, such an opening might prove very valuable, since it could initiate a north-south operation east of the Dniepr.\*

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance We are beginning to run short of aircraft for long-range reconnaissance. OKH Staffeln take over the Estonian area to relieve AGp. North. In return, AGp. North does reconnaissance in the area between Leningrad and Moscow for us. OKH aircraft continues to cover the area Briansk -- Orel -- Kursk and the Pripet Marshes.

Lt. Col. Buerkner (Eng. Sec.) reports on current business of his section. New Artillery School to meet replacement requirements for Artillery officers. -- Courses for selection of

officer candidates from NCO ranks. -- Analysis of results of final examination of Officer Schools, for selection of War Academy candidates. -- Supply of periodical military publications to the front will be suspended during operations.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Trunk-line net-work is well organized up to Dvina and Pripet line; there is of course the gap made by the Pripet area.
- b) Withdrawal of signal units from the "Barbarossa front" for eventual assignment to Libya and Syria.  
Refused for the present !

Heusinger comes with a report that the breakthrough in the central sector of AGp. is now under way. Eleventh Armd. Div. is clean through the enemy positions east of Polonnoje and is pushing right through fleeing Russian columns in the direction of Berdichev. Sixteenth Armd. Div. is at Starokonstantinov (fighting in progress). Ninth Armd. Div. now is engaged in a major tank battle at Proskurov. -- Question of future command set-up. On the northern wing unified command is necessary for VII, XXIX, III (mot.) Corps. Sixth Army and Armd. Gp. 1 must swing to the south-east. Eleventh Army has crossed the Dniestr near Mogilev (railroad bridge has been made usable for the crossing). 22nd Div. had heavy losses by a tank attack.

1700 Message that Eleventh Armd. Div. has reached Berdichev. A very gratifying success. Whether this will furnish an adequate basis for the enveloping movement to the south-east, is not yet quite clear at the moment.

1900 Talk with Heusinger on consequences of the breakthrough to Berdichev for our plans. Bridgehead of Eleventh Army across the Dniestr has been lost again (only parts of Regt. Brandenburg).

Situation in the evening: The movement in AGp. South seems to be getting on very well. The possibility of an operational breakthrough is developing. Nothing new from the fronts of the other Army Groups. Rain has started again in AGp. Center. Resistance by numerous stray enemy elements west of the Dniepris also reported.

ObdH back from AGp. North brings nothing new. Good impressions of morale and efficiency of troops.

2300 Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (AGp. South) on next moves. The thing tomorrow is to move Armd. Gp. Kleist in such a direction, that we can turn to form the "inner ring" forthwith, resorting to an "outer ring" only if we are compelled to do so. The trouble is that the farther Armor penetrates into enemy territory in such a case, the quicker our Infantry loses contact with them and the enemy forces marked for destruction escape in masses through the resulting gaps.

8 July 1941. ( 17th Day. )

Situation: On the Romanian front our offensive is advancing slowly. Seventeenth Army is pressing on. Armd. Gp. 1 wants to move XIV Corps to Eleventh Armd. Div. in order to use it for the encirclement of the enemy in front of Seventeenth Army. III Corps is fighting its way through the fortified line at Zvyagel and to the south. Sixth Army is pushing on close behind.

AGp. Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is battering its way to the Beresina, partly against aggressive enemy resistance. It reports bitter enemy counter attacks with tanks particularly against its northern wing from the direction of Orsha. Advance elements of Armd. Gp. 3 have crossed the Dvina at several points and are fighting for maneuvering space in the direction of Vitebsk while repelling counter-attacks from the north. The Inf. Armies are following, with strong forces on the outer wings and commendable depth in center.

AGp. North is fighting hard and soon will have gained freedom of movement to the north (Armd. Gp. 4), and now is committing Inf. arriving from the right wing, to replace the forces of Armd. Gp. 4 detached for covering the east flank.

The Inf. Armies are pressing on in rapid marches on a wide front and with great depth, with their Advance Combat Teams following closely behind the Armor. On the left wing of Eighteenth Army, it was possible to use sections of the railroad in moving Inf. quickly to the north, into Estonian territory.

1100 Kinzel: Review of enemy situation:

Of 164 identified Rifle Divisions, 89 have been totally or largely eliminated:

46 Russian Combat Divs. are on this front.

18 are tied down in other theaters (Finland 14, Caucasus 4).

11 are possibly still in reserve, in the rear.

Of 29 identified Armd. Divs., 20 have been totally or largely eliminated ; 9 still have full fighting strength.

The enemy is no longer in a position to organize a continuous front, not even behind strong terrain features. At the moment the apparent plan of the Red Army High Command is to check the German advance as far to the west as possible by draining our strength with incessant counter attacking with all available reserves. In pursuing this policy they evidently have grossly overestimated German losses.

Meanwhile we must reckon with the attempt to activate new units, with which they might eventually stage an offensive. The plan of a large-scale disengagement is nowhere discernible.

Activation of new units, certainly on any larger scale, will fail for lack of officers, specialists and Artillery materiel. This holds particularly for their Armor, which even before the war was sadly lacking in officers, drivers and radio operators, as well as signal equipment.

In the individual Army Groups, the situation works out as follows:

North, which at the start of the campaign was numerically equal to the enemy, definitely outnumbered him after annihilation of numerous enemy Divs. on its front; this superiority applies to both Inf. and Armor.

Center which was stronger from the start now has a crushing superiority and can maintain it even if the enemy, as is expected, should bring new units to that front.

South, which in the beginning was noticeably weaker in numbers, now has equal strength, due to the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, and soon will add numerical to tactical and operational superiority.

1230 Report to the Fuehrer ( at his Hq):

ObdH first presents the latest tactical reports. I follow with an estimate of the enemy situation and an operational appraisal of our situation, and review the operational questions on which a decision must now be made: Continuance of the encircling operation in AGp. South. Start in AGp. Center of the battle of envelopment with strong outer wings against the Dniepr - Dvina line, calculated to crack the triangle Orsha - Smolensk - Vitebsk. Conduct of operations by AGp. North against Leningrad and start of operations by the Finns. A discussion follows.

Result:

- 1.) The Fuehrer has in mind the following " perfect solution", which should be aimed at:

AGp. North accomplishes with its own forces the missions assigned it in the original operational plan.

AGp. Center, by a pincer attack, will force the last organized resistance group north of the Pripet Marshes out of the overextended Russian front and thus opens the road to Moscow. Once the two Armd. Gps. have reached the areas assigned to them by the operational plan,

- a) Hoth can be halted (to assist von Leeb, if necessary) or else continue operating in an eastern direction, e.g., with a view to investing Moscow, but not proceeding to an assault of the city).
- b) Guderian can strike in a southern or southeastern direction, east of the Dniepr river, cooperating with AGp. South.

2.) It is the Fuehrer's firm decision to level Moscow and Leningrad, and make them uninhabitable, so as to relieve us of the necessity of having to feed the populations through the winter. The cities will be razed by Air Force. Tanks must not be used for the purpose, "A national catastrophe which will deprive not only Bolshevism, but also Muscovite nationalism of their centers."

3.) Details:

- a) The draft operational plans of the Army Groups are approved. An added feature is the stressed importance on cutting off the Leningrad area from the southeast and east with the strong right wing of Hoepfner's Armd. Gp. This idea is sound.
  - b) After destroying the Russian Armies in a battle at Smolensk \*, we shall block the railroads across the Volga, occupy the country as far as that river and, after that, proceed to destroy the remaining Russian industry centers by Armd. expeditions and air operations.
  - c) Preparations must now be made for housing our troops during the winter. Our troops must not be quartered in villages and towns, because we want to be able to bomb them at any time in the event of uprisings.
  - d) Reduction of the Italian contingent for the East is opposed (it was to be reduced in favor of Libya). A special point should be made of giving the Italian troops a big reception on arrival. With Italian troops at the German front, a visit by Mussolini to the Fuehrer's Hq may be expected.
- 4.) Tanks: The Fuehrer explains why he is keeping the new tanks coming off production concentrated in the ZI. He wants to make sure that we would have brand-new equipment for the missions still ahead, for these will again extend over thousands of kilometers. The tank losses suffered since the beginning of the campaign therefore necessitate a reduction in the number of Armd. Divs. The personnel so freed will make up the crews for the new tanks in the ZI. He envisages the following operations:

- a) Norway: Safeguarding of the "Norwegian flank". Required for this purpose: two Armd. Divs. Could use captured tanks.
- b) Anatolia. Against the British land route in the Middle East. For this purpose we need at least four Armd. Divs. One of these (2nd Armd.Div.?) should be sent as soon as possible to the Bulgare - Turkish border, as a warning to Turkey, which is again getting too frisky.

c) Spain /Portugal. Against the potential British threat. To counter this threat, at least four Armd. Divs. are required. One should go to France soon, to bolster our prestige there and show the world that Germany still has forces available over and above what is needed in the Russian theater.

d) In North Africa we shall confine ourselves to reinforcing the German Divs. there, improving supply and establishing a supply base. (Raise number of Tank Bns. in Armd. Div. to three.)

After we plead the urgent requirements of the front, Fuehrer releases from the tanks stored in the ZI: 70 tanks III, 15 tanks IV and the Czech tanks as materiel replacements for the Russian front.

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports on supply situation. It is fairly satisfactory everywhere. The railroads are handling more freight than we ever dared hope. Only on the line Brest-Minsk results fall behind expectations. The objectives of the next operations are logistically assured.

For the time being we have sufficient 60-ton Truck Cms.; rest days for attending to maintenance, so as to avoid excessive wear of the tracks, are necessary and we can afford them.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance: New heavy transport movements toward the Dniepr near Orsha, from the direction of Moscow and Briansk ( 1 - 2 Divs.).

Apart from rearward railroad movements in northeastern and northern direction on Hoepfner's front, no movements of operational significance.

Evening situation: New development: On the northern wing of AGp. South, the "Stalin Line" has been breached by III Corps. Advances continue in all other sectors.

In AGp. Center, fighting is still going on in the approaches to the Dniepr (Guderian). The offensive will start on 10 July. Hoth has made further good progress on the northern bank of the Dvina in the direction of Vitebsk.

Particularly gratifying are the advances of AGp. North, where Armor on the defensive front facing east is now being relieved by Inf., and Armd. Gp. is concentrating against the north. Hoepfner had made good strides in the northward advance, and has reached Pskov. On the western wing of AGp. (Eighteenth Army) Ullersperger has taken Paernu with the bridge intact. The entire AGp. is pressing on behind Armd. Gp. 4 in forced marches and with Advance Combat Teams far ahead.

Orders are issued to AGp. North on the next moves against Leningrad; to AGp. South on the closing of the pocket now forming on Seventeenth Army front and the advance of the northern wing on Kiev; to Finland, with the request to launch the offensive on 10 July.

Presentation of air photographs by the two pilot officers who flew over Briansk, Orsha and Gomel to day. (Long-range Recon. Staff of OKH).

9 July 1941. 18th Day.

Situation: South: Eleventh Army is forging ahead to the Dniestr according to plan, and is preparing for a crossing at Mogilev. In this operation the balance of strength is as follows:

The German XXX Corps ( 5 German, 3 Romanian Divs.) is opposed by three enemy Inf. Divs. (elements ) and II Armored Corps ( 2 Armd. Divs., one mot.Div.). The German XI Corps ( three German Divs., one Romanian Cav. Corps) is opposed by one Russian Division drawn up on both sides of Mogilev.\* On the flank of both Corps we must figure with two Russian mot. Divs. and elements of two Inf.Divs. This means, that apart from Armor, the German-Romanian assault force is stronger. The Romanians are fighting surprisingly well.

Seventeenth Army is advancing eastward against the Stalin Line \*\* in good and deep formation. Marching slowed down by cloudbursts and fatigue of our troops.

Sixth Army is pushing its right wing behind Armd.Gp. 1 on Berdichev, impeded by the transverse movement of XIV Corps, which is shifting from the south to Berdichev. Armd. Gp. 1 now has breached the Stalin Line with III Corps at Zvyagel , and is advancing on Zhitomir with three Armd.Divs., one behind the other. The northern wing of Sixth Army is following closely, with the objective Kiev.

Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is closing to the Dniepr, according to plan. On the northern wing, very bitter enemy counter attacks from the direction of Orsha against Seventeenth Armd. Div. Our troops repulsed them, knocking out 100 enemy tanks, with minor own tank losses but more serious losses in men. This engagement held up Seventeenth Armd. Div. and kept it from catching up with Guderian's main attacking force south of Orsha. It will now be relieved by Twelfth Armd.Div. of Armd.Gp. 3. Second Army is closing up behind Armd. Gp. 2 with Advance Combat Teams and follows with its Corps in good formation. Armd. Gp.3, north of the Dvina, is in rapid advance on Vitebsk and is now fighting 7 km west of the city. The enemy is bringing up reinforcements from Smolensk to Vitebsk by rail and on trucks, Ninth Army is closing up behind Hoth with remarkable speed and in good order. Also von Leeb's right wing is forging ahead with strong forces north of the Dvina in the direction of Hoth's left wing, to protect his flank in case of counter attacks from the direction of Nevel.\*\*\*

North is advancing and closing to Pskov. Eighteenth Army, which yesterday took Paernu, now has also captured Fellin.



Enemy: The large transport movement from the southeast and east to Smolensk, noted yesterday, is beginning to show its effects around Vitebsk. At Smolensk, where dense transport movements have arrived from three directions there seems to be a major traffic jam; the lines are choked with trains which apparently cannot be unloaded. Motorized movements from the east toward the Dniepr on both sides of Mogilev. No new developments in the sector of AGp. South.

AGp. Center submits a final report on the twin battle Bialystok - Minsk. AGp. states its opponents were four Russian armies, comprising 32 Rifle Divs., 8 Armd. Divs., 6 moto.-mcz. Brigs. and Cav. Divs. Out of this total it has destroyed 22 Rifle Divs. 7 Armd. Divs., 6 moto.-mcz. Brigs. and 3 Cav. Divs. The remaining Divs. were severely crippled by very high bloody losses. Figures counted up to 8 July: 289,874 prisoners (including several Corps CG and Div. Commanders); 2,585 captured and destroyed tanks (including heaviest types); 1,449 guns; 246 airplanes. Also large quantities of small arms, ammunition and vehicles.

Radio intelligence shows the following enemy command set-up (from north to south\*):

Russian AGp. Northwest, with 8th, 27th, 11th Armies (from north to south).

Russian AGp. West, with 22nd, 20th, 13th Armies.

Russian AGp. Southwest, with 5th, 6th, 12th and 2nd Armies and one Armd. Gp.

Report:

- a) Armd. Gp. 3 has taken Vitebsk. Twelfth Armd. Div. and 900th Brig. are now following up in that direction.
- b) Appearance of a strong and still growing enemy group between Orsha and Vitebsk has prompted an order from Army Hq. to Armd. Gp. 2 to put off planned attacks temporarily and instead take over cover of the left wing against enemy attacks and assure contact with Armd. Gp. 3. Armd. Gp. 3 is continuing in the attack.

Gen. Oehquist reports on his trip to Finland. Only minor local changes in the disposition of troops. Plan of attack entirely in line with our ideas. Road network east of Lake Ladoga thin; roads narrow. Air raid damage very small. Morale of the Finnish people is good. Troops are keen to attack.

OQu IV: Military-political matters:

Japan's intentions still obscure. Having first tried to whet Japan's appetite for Singapore we now are busy needling her against Russia. The new policy will take some time to show results.

In France, relations between Abetz and von Stuelpnagel are strained on the question of the volunteers.

Sweden still very reserved. Seems to be disposed toward a pact with Germany, but for the time being has no intention to join the Tripartite Pact.

From Faruk (Egypt) a report has been received that Britain is making preparations for a move from Irak into Iran to seize the oil wells and advance to the north. This sounds quite plausible, for besides giving Britain a better defensive position in the event of a German advance across the Caucasus, it enables her to build up, on Iran territory, an air basis for attacks on the Caucasian oil fields. Moreover, Turkey would then be bounded by British-held territory along her entire southern and eastern frontier and thus could be kept under pressure.

Elaboration of the necessity to capture Gibraltar soon and to begin preparations immediately. I don't think, this is correct. Preparations cannot be made until directly before we march in, that is, when we positively know that we are going to do it. Otherwise Britain simply lets the Spaniards starve to death.

U.S. has the following forces available for immediate action: 6 Inf.Divs., 2 Armd.Divs., 2 Cav. Divs.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Exchange of high power radio equipment between Armd. Gps. and Advance Gen Qu Hqs. -- Activation of signal formations for the Africa Corps. -- No new findings by radio intelligence.

1700 Heusinger: Current business:

- a) Further offensive operations of Fourth Army: Guderian must not be rushed, but should attack only when ready and with definite concentration on one wing, best probably south of Mogilev.
- b) Allocation of GHq Reserves. Part of them (now in AGp. South) must be used for pacification missions in the areas traversed by our advancing Armies.
- c) Exchange of views about the future organization and distribution of forces in occupied Russia after the Russian Armies have been destroyed. Winter preparations must be initiated now.

Gen. Buhle: Rating of Divisions by casualty figures. -- Availability of tanks and activation of new Divisions out of new production. -- "Rehabilitation Bns." \* have proved a good idea. -- Radio direction beams for Africa. -- Armd.Divs. may be replenished with personnel from Inf. Divisions (best from Divisions held back for occupation duty). -- Replacements: The Field Replacement Bns. are largely used up by now.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Organization in North Africa when Armd.Gp. Rommel is formed. Use Gause's Staff in organizing Hq of Armd. Gp. ObdH wants the Armd. Gp. activated as soon as possible.
- b) Questions of the organization of road construction during the operation. I think that we must have a check-up on how plans are being carried out in the Army areas.

Evening situation: In AGp. South, no reports have come in from Eleventh Army and the Hungarians. Seventeenth Army's advance is slow because the roads are rainsoaked. Sixth Army is slowed down for the same reason; its northern wing is being moved round the southern edge of the Pripet forest area and will continue north when it reaches Korets. The forest area will be crossed directly only by mounted patrols. Reason: Run-down condition of the horses.

The burning question now is the further employment of Armd. Gp. 1. AGp. states its intention to strike with its northern group (III Corps) for Kiev and with the bulk of the Armd. Gp. for Belaya Tserkov, and then to push in southern or southeastern direction.

In the meantime the Fuehrer has called up ObdH and told him that he wants Armd. Gp. to swing the elements which have penetrated to Berdichev, to the south, in the direction of Vinnitsa, in order to effect an early junction with Eleventh Army. At the evening situation conference with ObdH, this leads to an agitated exchange about the direction in which Armd.Gp. 1 ought to be moved. My standpoint is as follows:

We must on no account ignore Kiev. There is so much evidence of enemy confusion, what chances to take Kiev by some sort of surprise thrust: look good; the enemy is building several ponton bridges there, which means that he is preparing a retreat precisely on Kiev. If this estimate, however, should prove wrong, then we must use no armor in the battle for Kiev. All Divs. moving behind Thirteenth Armd.Div. in the direction of Zhitomir could then be brought to bear advantageously against Belaya Tserkov and help block the roads and railroads leading to the Lower Dniestr.

For the Armd. forces advancing south of III Corps (mot.), the immediate objective is Belaya Tserkov, in order to strike from there to the south (not to the southeast at first) in the direction of Uman, into the enemy's rear. In that case it will be indicated to direct the right wing of Eleventh army toward Uman. Should it become necessary to advance from Berdichev toward Vinnitsa i.e. on the inner ring, the Armd. Divs. following behind Eleventh Armd. Div. could always do that on their commander's own initiative.

Thus the ring to be formed will run from Berdichev through Belaya Tserkov and to the sector of Eleventh Army. Sealing the ring is the primary objective. Kiev and the Dniepr crossings south of Kiev are secondary objectives.

ObdH outlines this scheme to the Fuehrer. He does not object, but apparently is not yet converted and emphasizes that he expects nothing from the Kiev operation.

AGp. Center: Armd. Gp. 3 has broken through the enemy's Dvina position in the direction of Vitebsk. Enemy movements from Vitebsk in the direction of Velizh and slackening of enemy pressure round Senno suggest that the enemy might be trying to disengage. I don't see it. Nor, in my opinion, can the reported heavy movements of the enemy from Orsha to Smolensk be interpreted as a positive indication that the enemy is abandoning the dry route Orsha-Vitebsk. In order to exploit the success of Armd. Gp. 3, to the fullest extent, XXIII Corps, with 3 Divisions and the Training Brigade (900th) are being moved behind it.

Owing to the easing of enemy pressure around Senno, the attack of Armd. Gp. 2 can be launched as planned, namely, on 10 July, with line of departure from Stary Bykhov to the north. Second and Ninth Armies are continuing their advance.

AGp. North: Armd. Gp. 4 is approaching the line Porkhov-Pog, but will not push beyond this line in the direction of Leningrad before LVI Corps has moved closer to XXXXI Corps by swinging northeast.

Eighteenth Army is to detach elements for a northward drive on Dorpat (airport). The right wing of Sixteenth Army will remain in the offensive in order to cover Armd. Gp. 3 against enemy attacks from the direction of Nevel.

Conference with Heusinger and Paulus on direction of the battle of encirclement of AGp. South. Their ideas are in substantial accord with mine.

Telephone conference with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S AGp. South) on my ideas concerning direction of the battle of encirclement. I give explicit orders not to turn initially southeast from Belaya Tserkov, but to let strike toward Uman to effect encirclement.

They should make a try at Kiev but, if surprise is not achieved, must not risk Armor against the city.

10 July 1941. (19th Day.)

Finns launch offensive.

0130 ObdH calls. The Fuehrer has again rung him up. He cannot put his mind at rest for fear that Armor might be committed

against Kiev and so needlessly sacrificed (Kiev has 35% Jews, we won't get the bridges in any case). The encircling ring is to run from Berdichev through Vinnitsa to Eleventh Army.

Accordingly, the following order goes out to AGp. South: The Fuehrer does not want Armor to be brought to bear against Kiev, beyond what is necessary for reconnaissance and security. Furthermore, he wants the immediately available forces of Armd. Gps. 1 to strike from Berdichev on Vinnitsa in order to link up with Eleventh Army as soon as possible and encircle the enemy forces fronting Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies. Only those forces of Armd.Gp. 1 which are not needed or not adapted for this purpose will strike for Belaya Tserkov and then to the south.

Total of Army casualties (excl. medical casualties) up to 6 July, 1941:

Wounded 42,755 ( 1,588 ); killed 13,869 ( 829 ); missing 5,010 (81); total 61,634 ( 2,498 ).

Figures in parenthesis refer to officers; they are not included in the totals.

Situation South: Slow progress. Russian II Armd. Corps (two Armd.Divs. and one mot.Div.) attacks from Kishinev into the flank of the Romanian Fourth Army in the direction of Jasy and Balty. The attacks are repelled. A Russian Cav. Corps is reported further to the south. Plans of Eleventh Army remain unchanged. No new developments elsewhere in AGp. South.

Center: Guderian: Third Armd.Div. has been relieved by Cav. Div. and three Advance Combat Teams, and so is free to join the assault group. Attack on Stari Bykhov has started at 0500. (Later report: lodgement gained on eastern bank; bridge construction in progress at noon). At Shklov, Eleventh\* and Seventh Armd.Divs., reinforced by Seventeenth Armd.Div. will attack on 11 July. Enemy at Ulla is trapped. Vitebsk railroad bridge is not destroyed. Hoth's left wing unchanged.

North: Stiffening opposition on front of the northernmost elements of XXXXI Corps. Otherwise operations continue according to plan.

Enemy situation: Many trains standing on the line between Vinnitsa and Kiev. Between Vinnitsa and Kalinovka alone, 10,000 railroad cars and 40 locomotives. Yesterday, between 0620 and 1800 retrograde movements from Orsha to Smolensk. Many trains standing still. Two more enemy Divs. have arrived from the Caucasus since 8 July.

Over-all picture introduces no new elements in our estimate.

1100 ObdH calls up from Hq AGp. South:

Early this morning, ObdH received the following teletype

from the Fuehrer:

"I think it advisable and necessary, on reaching the line Zhitomir - Berdichev, to swing the leading elements of Armd.Gp. 1 promptly to the south in order to prevent the enemy from retreating over the Bug river and to the south of Vinnitsa and, if possible, by thrusting across the Bug, effect a junction with Eleventh Army. -- The rear elements of Armd.Gp. must protect this movement against attacks from Kiev, but will not make any attack into the city. Should it become apparent that there are no large bodies of enemy troops left to cut off west of the Bug, Armd.Gp. 1 will be massed for an advance on Kiev and the Dniepr line to the southeast. Investment must be executed in such a way as to bar enemy reinforcements from reaching the city from the northwest."

Field Marshal von Rundstedt's analysis: Overtaking the enemy in pursuit means striking far ahead. If the ring runs through Vinnitsa it becomes too close. Seventeenth Army has completely lost contact with the enemy, which means he has already withdrawn far to the rear. On the other hand, Army Gp. believes that there are substantial enemy forces in the area southwest and south of Belaya Tserkov, which seem to be moving on Kiev and to the area southeast of the city. In taking Belaya Tserkov, we should be astride the retreat routes to Kiev. von Rundstedt hopes to engage large enemy forces there, and then to be able to advance in a southwestern direction, to link up with Eleventh Army. -- If this should prove inadvisable, we still would have two courses of action open to us: either advance in a southeastern and southern direction, west of the Dniepr, or across the Dniepr at Kiev and to the southeast and then drive on east.

This conception of Army Gp., with which ObdH agrees, differs from the solutions envisaged by the Fuehrer. It is a compromise between the two alternatives outlined by the Fuehrer. ObdH will make no decision that would not have the Fuehrer's approval. It is now up to me to get the Fuehrer to agree.

1130 After unsuccessfully trying to get the sleeping Fuehrer to the phone, I have Field Marshal Keitel called and explain the plans to him, emphasizing:

- a) that OKH has been directed by the Fuehrer to destroy the largest possible portions of the enemy west of the Dniepr, so as to prevent any possibility of a coordinated operation by large enemy forces east of the river, and
- b) that the capabilities of Eleventh Army must be rated so low that no plans could be made which rest on Eleventh Army as a dependable partner in a paired attack.

1230 Phone call from OKW (Christian): The Fuehrer approves the proposed plan, but wants us to make sure that nothing untoward happens on the north flank of Armd.Gp.

This answer is transmitted to ObdH at 1300.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone:

- a) Success of Guderian's attack; they are already building a bridge.
- b) Hoth is in Vitebsk with two Armd.Divs. This afternoon yet he wants to continue the drive with these two Divs. from Vitebsk, and with Twelfth and Thirteenth Divs., south of Vitebsk.
- c) Guderian will attack north of Mogilev on 11 July.
- d) The commitment of Fourth Army Hq complicates the command set-up.
- e) Condition of the troops: Morale excellent. Horses are worn out.
- f) Air action against railroad installations in the rear: Our urgings have caused bad feelings. That will straighten itself out.  
Air reconnaissance : Of the long-range Rcn.Staffeln of Army Gp. (apart from those at Armd.Divs.) one has only three operational craft left, the other one is down to nothing. Night Rcn.Staffel has two craft in operating condition. In the circumstances, Air Fleet has offered to combine Army and Air Force reconnaissance. I emphatically advise against such an arrangement and recall the controversies between ObdH and ObdL before the start of the offensive.

Col. Metz (Liaison Off., Eleventh Army). Report on situation on the Romania front: Road conditions very difficult. -- Russian tactics the same as in other sectors of the eastern theater; excellent in camouflage. -- Bad luck of 193th Div., where Inf. went ahead without waiting for its AT Bn., and ran into heavy enemy tank attack.

Description of the Russian Dniestr position. Ultra-modern installations, partly with steel cupolas. Behind it, on the railroad line Vinnitsa-Odessa a new position is under construction; the materials are brought to it by rail. Three more days will be needed to reach the Dniestr river, then two days to prepare for the attack. Accordingly the attack could not very well start before 15 July.

1700 ObdH returned from AGp. South. Short review of what he learned; nothing essentially new.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Material on Russia's economic production (new maps).-- Report on conference at Hq AGp. North.
- b) AGp. North: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the Dvina.  
AGp. Center: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the line Borisov-Dniepr.  
AGp. South: Situation at present not yet settled enough for firm planning.

- c) Cooperation of the AGp. Eng. Commanders with the OQu on road construction is apparently not quite what it ought to be.
- d) Worries about volume of traffic on railroad line to Minsk (has dropped off badly in the last few days).
- e) Sixty-ton Truck Clms. have 25% losses.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Enemy situation: Shifting and reduction of forces on front of AGp. Center. Clogged lines in the South.
- b) Strength of enemy air force: Of about 1,500 operational planes, about 500 are estimated to be committed on each of the AGp. fronts.
- c) Enemy AAA concentrated in triangle Vitebsk-Orsha-Smolensk, at Gomel and north of Korosten-Kiev.
- d) Major concentration of enemy planes: Lake Ilmen; north and south of Smolensk; Korosten; Kiev; Vinnitsa; Uman.

von Ziehlberg: Clausius affair.-- Decorations (Iron Cross, Cross of Merit, Bulgarian decorations).-- Current matters.

Evening situation:

No new developments in AGp. South. Intentions in line with today's conversation with ObdH.

In AGp. Center all battles are still in progress. Intensive enemy movements; for the time being one would be inclined to interpret them as troop movements to hard-pressed sectors of the front, rather than withdrawal movements.

Enemy rear position located on the Sozh river line. Air Force has for the first time succeeded in destroying important enemy railroad lines.

Later reports from Armd.Gp. 2 strengthen the impression that the enemy is withdrawing at least part of his forces from the Dniepr front, to the east. Movements observed on roads and railroads.

AGp. North. No important news. Intentions unchanged. Thrust on Leningrad and Estonian ports, with Sixteenth Army covering the east flank in the line Velikie Luki - Porkhov.

11 July 1941. ( 20 th Day )

Situation South: Russian pressure on Schobert's right flank and right wing has apparently resulted in a weakening of the Romanian contingent. Eleventh Army reports that it regards



these elements disabled for attacking. A "new operation" against Kishinev is considered necessary. We shall have to watch that this "operation" is limited at most to LIV Corps, and does not result in dissipation of strength.

Center: Guderian's attack has started and come through. We have no reports on Hoth's planned attack at Berdichev, but the over-all enemy situation indicates that hastily gathered elements is all the enemy can put up against us. It has been learned that broken Divs. withdrawing from the front are filled up with partly untrained replacements rushed to the front, and immediately committed to battle again. At Nevel the enemy has set up a big straggler collecting point which is feeding to the front-line Divs. totally disorganized masses of men, without officers and NCO's. Under these circumstances it is clear that the front, which also has no more reserves left, cannot hold much longer, despite the attempt to give that front apparently at least a backbone of energetic leadership by introducing a number of new tactical Hqs (AHQs). These new Hqs cannot make their presence felt and desperately radio thru the whole ether to establish contact with their Divisions. I do not share the opinion that the enemy in front of AGp. Center is falling back (this opinion evidently originates in the Armd.Cps., not at AGp. Hq). He is making an effort to hold, but he is cracking in the attempt.

But there is one question which neither this battle of Smolensk will settle for us and that is the question of the enemy's Armor. In every instance, large bodies, if not all, manage to escape encirclement, and in the end, their Armor may well be the only fighting force left to the Russians for carrying on the war. The strategy of that war would have to be visualized on the basis of operations by two or three major and perhaps some subsidiary groups of Armor, supported by industrial centers and peacetime garrisons, and by the remnants of the Russian Air Force.

North: Enemy attacks against Hoepfner have been beaten back and preparations are made for continuing the drive to the area southeast of Leningrad, with a strong right wing. In the Estonian theater, more advances against merely local resistance. At last we have succeeded in rousing in AGp. North some interest also in Dorpat. On the right wing, there is more tough fighting against the enemy group apparently based on Nevel, but this does not seriously interfere with the movements of AGp. for massing in a northward direction.

Enemy: Air Force now seems to have succeeded in wrecking Russian railroads also far to the rear of the enemy communication zone. The number of lines with immobilized railroad transport is growing most satisfactorily and the good work is being continued. A striking feature are heavy concentrations of rolling stock in the area east of Gomel (Unecha), as well as to the west and southeast of that point. These concentrations seem to consist largely of trains loaded with vehicles and tanks. Either this is an attempt to supply new materiel to crippled Armd.units or an attempt to shift

Armor.

In the area south of Kiev the large accumulations of railroad cars on the railroad lines probably must be interpreted as a blocked large-scale withdrawal movement, which I think is more of the nature of an industrial evacuation, than a troop movement. The enemy is evidently trying to by-pass the blocked lines by routing movements through Odessa and the North. But heavy jams can already be seen on the lower reaches of the Dniepr also (e.g., 34 trains south of Cherkassi).

Field Marshal Keitel calls up at noon. Anxieties of the Fuehrer:

- a) Ninth Armd.Div. and SS Div."Wiking"are closing up too slowly.
- b) The frontal battles of II Corps on von Leeb's right wing, which he wants to have cut short by action from von Bock's left wing. (As a matter of fact, the two Army Gps. do have perfect cooperation.)
- c) Hoepfner's operation (Armd.Gp. 4). He is afraid that it is losing contact with its own Inf. in its heedless push on Leningrad.

Gen. Bogatsch brings the latest aerial photographs. They verify the facts outlined under the heading "Enemy" above.

Col. Ochsner reports on his tour to Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. Facts worth noting:

- a) Russian air action at the Dvina crossings, southwest of Vitebsk.
- b) Enemy has good leadership. He is fighting with fanaticism and dogged determination.
- c) Our Armor has considerable losses in personnel and materiel. Troops tired.
- d) Leaflet propaganda highly effective.
- e) "Do" Rocket Projector is highly praised. Individual Btrys. go along with advance detachments.-- Large-caliber Projectors are not much used. Ammunition difficulties.
- f) Report that the border area of the old Russian frontier was dotted with barracks and airdromes of the most modern type. Demonstrates Russian gas protection and detection equipment.

Col. Heusinger: Current matters in Op.Sec.-- Supply getting tight in AGp. Center. -- Sector assigned to Italians: between Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. -- Bridge at Giurgiu .

Telephone talk with Gercke and Wagner: I know about the supply troubles in AGp. Center. But the reason is not the limited

capacity of the railroad, but failure to unload supply trains (Russian rolling stock). In AGp. area, four trains for the Air Force, three trains with Engineer construction materials, and five trains for Armd.Gp. 3 have not been unloaded, with the result that rolling stock runs short. A Gen.Staff Officer of the Transp. Chief's Office will fly to the front tomorrow, to look into the situation. Quite apart from all this it seems that Eckstein's cooperation with Greiffenberg in Hq AGp. Center stands in need of some improvement.

I suppose the crisis will be resolved within two days.

Evening situation: South: The advancing wedge of Armd.Gp. 1 is subjected to heavy attacks from the south and southwest at Berdichev, and from the north at Zhitomir. Thirteenth Armd.Div. has penetrated to Kiev's inner ring of fortifications and turned southward.

Center: Guderian has crossed to the eastern bank of the Dniepr at both points of attack. The enemy is falling back. Hoth at Vitebsk is subjected to furious attacks from the southeast and east and is repelling them. South of Vitebsk, his Twelfth and Seventh Armd.Divs. have reached the Orsha-Vitebsk highway. On the northern flank his forces, put across the Dvina, are gaining elbow-room for him.

North: Hoepfner has made some frontal advances; and now, with the Inf.Divs. arriving from the rear having replaced the Armor on his flank, he is concentrating his forces northward in the direction of Dno. The Armies are following up. Dorpat, for which, alas, only a weak Advance Combat Team was detached (and that too late), is in flames. What a pity about that fine old German city!

Enemy:

- a) The quality of the Russian frontline units is progressively deteriorating. Badly mauled Divs., in many instances, have been reported filled up with untrained replacements.
- b) The best Generals have been sent to lead the Armies at the front: AGp. Northwest, Voroshilov; AGp. West, Timoshenko; AGp. Southwest Budyonny.
- c) Over-all picture:

In the sector of AGp. South, the enemy is trying to check Eleventh Army and Armd.Gp. 1 by counter attacks. In the sector of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies, rear guard fighting is reported. In the sector of AGp. Center no evidence of a general withdrawal, notwithstanding individual disengaging movements. In AGp. North, on the front of Armd.Group, fierce opposition of strong rear guards supported by planes and tanks. The bulk of the enemy forces apparently is being taken back to the east.

12 July 1941. (21th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, in the sector of Eleventh Army, the enemy now seems to be falling back behind the Dniestr also in front of the Romanian wing. As to mobile troops, the commands involved are II Armd. Corps ( 2 Armd. Divs., one mot.) and one Cav. Corps of four Divs.

On the front of Seventeenth Army it has been established that the enemy is making no attempt to hold the Stalin Line.\* Advance Combat Teams of the Army have penetrated into these positions.

Sixth Army has made progress on its southern wing; on its northern wing at Zvyagel, it has beaten off the attacks from the area around Korosten and apparently thrown back the enemy.

Armd.Cp. 1 is engaged in a battle around Berdichev, into which the enemy keeps throwing new elements from the south-east, south and southwest, for the most part Armor. Among these have appeared some units which evidently belonged to the Russian Fifth Army (Mozir) until now.

Fourteenth Armd.Div. has closely followed 13th Armd.Div., reaching out to the south of Kiev in the direction of Belaya Tserkov.

Center: Guderian is across the Dniepr in force. Now he must brace himself for a heavy attack from the south.

Hoth, at Vitebsk, has had to repel bitter attacks from north and east. Also his forces following up along the Dvina are constantly subjected to attacks from the north, from the area around Nevel and Velikie Luki. The enemy elements still fighting south of the Dvina, have been engaged by the Advance Combat Teams of Ninth Army, which, I am pleased to note, is following closely behind Hoth.

Second and Ninth Armies are following up.

North: On the right wing, continued stubborn enemy resistance ( group formed by forces at Nevel). Very difficult terrain.

Elsewhere in this sector the advance continues according to plan. Hoepfner, whose spearheads are growing increasingly tired and weak, has made no substantial advances in the direction of Leningrad. Army Gp's. report that the enemy is "withdrawing" in front of their eastern flank, probably must be taken only in a tactical sense.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air observation shows the effect of our interdiction effort against the enemy railroad system deep in the rear. Dense detouring movements and traffic jams in the railroad network south of Kiev. Jams in the area south of the line Orsha - Smolensk. Choked masses of rail-

road transport in the area between Vitebsk and Smolensk. Intense AA defense in the area around Vitebsk and to the south and southwest, and south of Berdichev.

Gen. Paulus submits aerial photographs of Kiev. The reported bridge constructions require very cautious interpretation: One of these bridges is apparently only under construction, and at present no more than a ponton bridge; two other bridges give the impression of being special installations, perhaps with narrow-gauge lines, for construction projects. A possible explanation is that plans were made for extending the fortifications of Kiev on the eastern bank and that the narrow gauge lines served this purpose. In any case, one does not get the impression of unusually extensive preparations for a large-scale withdrawal.

Reports (Kinzel, 1145):

- a) A field order by Timoshenko threatening court-martial for anybody talking of retreat.
- b) The enemy is moving new forces against both wings of Fourth Army.
  - 1.) From the direction of Gomel, where previous reports located a group of Russian Inf. Divs. which had not been in action so far, a road movement, 100 km long, is in progress in the direction of Mogilev.
  - 2.) It has been learned from a captured Russian order that the new Russian Nineteenth Army, comprising 6 Divs., is to be detrained east of Vitebsk. The Divs., whose Div. numbers are given, were previously on the front of AGp. South. The document, dated 8 July, contains the orders for AAA to safeguard the detraining area.

Reporting out as CO, Guard Bn.: Lt. Col. Kaumann, 3rd Bn. of 284th Inf. (96th Div.)

Reporting in as JO Guard Bn.: Major Mathes (from 162nd Div.).

Gen. Brand (Arty.) reports on his tour to AGp. South:

- a) Enemy Artillery activity slight. Mostly in direct support of Inf., sometimes broken up into platoons. No central fire direction. Fire with air and sound observation poor, with direct observation good. Effect of projectiles good, also moral effect. Many modern Artillery instruments of a design unfamiliar to us.
- b) Very bad roads make it difficult for the Artillery to follow the advance. Condition of horses varies; in some units severely strained. On several occasions Artillery was completely immobilized by rain for 24 hours.

- c) Mobility of Ground Forces AAA improved by allocation of prime movers. But they have no Supply Clms. Good results against pillboxes. Also successful in air defense.
- d) Partly mobile Heavy Howitzer Bns. are merged to make one Bn. mobile. Decision on employment of the remainder only after the fall of Kiev.
- e) In pillbox fighting, Artillery was not very successful, because there was not enough time. But good results in other places. No bursting layers.
- f) Anti-tank fighting: Only one tank type encountered with 130 mm armor; all others not over 70 mm. The heaviest tanks were knocked out by 10 cm guns; less often by 8.8 cm AA guns. Also lt. Fd. Hows. have put out 50-ton tanks with AP projectiles, at 40 m range. Russian tank drivers reported showing little driving skill. Many track failures. Crews nervous when under Artillery fire.
- g) Improper allocation of 15 cm Guns, which were erroneously put under Div.
- h) Karl Gun \* arrived at the front heavier than anticipated. Maximum weight 61 tons. This complicates rail transport and road travel (roadbeds collapse).
- i) Report on Island Fortress Kronstadt, which covers also the land approaches with its guns. The individual forts are built on small islands and so are very difficult to attack.

1400 ObdH calls up! The Fuehrer is again nagging about the slow development of the attack on von Leeb's right wing, and demands that Nineteenth Armd.Div. strike northward to encircle the enemy. In reply I explain: I am by no means advocating any eastward race of the two Armd. Gps. It is quite clear to me that Hoth might have to swing northward with a considerable body of his Gp., to get into the back of the new Russian Nineteenth Army and Group Nevel, and that Guderian might have to swing southward, to encircle the new enemy appearing on his southern wing, perhaps even to push on down to the Kiev area, in order finally to encircle and defeat the Red Fifth Army which keeps popping up in the south. But the prerequisite for either move is that Hoth and Guderian break into the open to the east and so gain freedom of movement.

1800 Heusinger:

- a) Planning on continuance of operations with the object of preventing frontal retreat of the enemy and ensuring liquidation of the largest possible enemy force. The operations are evolved from ideas outlined by me to ObdH, and crystallize first of all in plans for a new drive by Armd.Gp. 3, aiming at liquidating the concentration

of 12 to 14 Divisions now opposing von Leeb's right wing. By taking advantage of the marshland extending southward from Lake Ilmen, which is traversed by very few roads, we should be able to cut off the enemy facing von Leeb's forces. Accordingly, we should have to dispose Armd.Gp. 3 in such a manner that notwithstanding its original mission to reach the area north-east of Smolensk, it would be in a position, by advancing on Velikie Luki and Kholm, to cut off the enemy elements falling back before von Leeb's right wing.

Applying his scheme of thought to the area south of the line Orsha-Smolensk, the northern wing of Armd.Gp. 2 would have to strike for Yelnya, the southern wing, for Roslavl. This southern part would have to be followed in echelon formation by the Cav. Div., relieved by Advance Combat Teams.

- b) Report on intentions of AGp. South:  
The recurrent threat to the northern flank from the direction of Korosten has prompted the decision to push this enemy in a northward direction, away from the advance and supply route Zvyagel-Zhitomir. Von Reichenau wanted the entire III Corps for this mission. Von Rundstedt decided that Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler be placed under his command, while Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs. remain in Armd.Gp. to help carry out investment of Kiev from the south. This decision must be approved despite the consequent temporary disruption of the Armd.Gp.

1900 von Bernuth ( Liaison Off., AGp. South). Report on situation:

- a) At Korosten, a small group put on an attack from the north, on 11 July ( elements of three Divs., which were destroyed). On 12 July, the attack was resumed by considerably larger forces. Units filled up with recruits with two weeks' training. Signs of severe demoralization: White flags ! Attack in mass assaults, under enormous losses.
- b) Berdichev: Eleventh Armd. Div. and 60th mot.Div. have passed to the defensive in the face of heavy enemy attacks from east and south; Sixteenth mot. and Sixteenth Armd.Div. are gaining ground only slowly. -- Air reconnaissance and captured maps indicate existence of concrete road from the area between Zhitomir and Berdichev to Skvira. -- Armd.Gp. hopes to be able to bring the tank battle at Berdichev to a conclusion by 13 July, evening. -- Notwithstanding these enemy attacks, withdrawal movements are going on in direction of Kiev.
- c) Enemy on front of XXXXIV Corps is holding tenaciously in the Stalin Line. Further to the south, the situation is still obscure. Although the Stalin Line is manned, Artillery has not yet become active.
- d) Eleventh Army will attack with XI Corps on 15 July, with XXX Corps probably not before 17 July; the enemy is

evacuating the area between the Pruth and Dniestr.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Question of lateral communications. Next lateral communication line east of the Dniepr.
- b) Methods for overcoming technical difficulties in the use of short waves.
- c) Opposition to attempt of Police to take over control of radio counter-intelligence.
- d) Results of radio intelligence. (Nothing new)

Evening situation: South: Eleventh Army has reached the Dniestr. Based on the right flank. -- The Hungarian mot. Corps is to be assigned to Armd. Gp. Then the Italians will be inserted between Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies.

Center: In Guderian's sector, good progress. Also Hoth is getting on well and is expanding his front to the north. In doing so he is anticipating our wishes.

North: Movements of First and Sixth Divs. are severely hampered by bad roads. Resistance on front of right wing of Sixteenth Army appears to be weakening.

Air Stepped-up enemy activity on front of AGps. South and North. Attack on enemy air-bases ordered for 13 July.

Distribution of enemy air strength : On front of AGp. South, 1.043 planes, which are now scattered all the way to the area east of the Dniepr. On front of AGp. Center, 700, with the bulk in the Orel - Moscow - Vitebsk area. No report on North, on account of bad weather.

von Greiffenberg (AGp. Center ) on phone:

- a) Orientation of our ideas concerning further employment of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3.
- b) He reports that components of the Hq of the Russian Thirteenth Army have been captured. Interrogations of prisoners as well as maps make it clear that our attack across the Dniepr took the enemy completely by surprise. The Army was under orders to defend the river line.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) on phone.

- a) Report on his flight to AGp. South. Highly satisfied. Armd. Gp. has enough fuel to carry it as far as Kirovograd, and enough ammunition to fight its way across the Dniepr. Continuous supply assured. Motor vehicle maintenance service deserves special praise. Large repair shops have already been set up at Tarnopol, Shepetovka and Rovno.



- b) Center: Situation is still tight. C of S, AGp. is now personally looking into the matter. Misguided initiative on the part of subordinate agencies and lack of compact centralization have resulted in the freezing of rolling stock. It is expected that this situation will be cleared up soon.  
Supplies will maintain Armd. drive to Moscow, Infantry as far as Smolensk (?). -Need 2,000 tons of 60-ton Truck Clms.
- c) North. Supplies adequate. Roads very bad.

13 July 1941. ( 22nd Day.) Sunday.

Situation: AGp. South: In Eleventh Army, pressure on the right flank is perceptibly slackening, as the Russians are falling back before the Romanian (Fourth Army. Now only local Russian attacks.

Seventeenth Army is following in frontal advance; the Stalin Line is said to be held only by weak forces. Contrariwise, reports coming in during the day indicate increasing Artillery fire. According to prisoner statements, the troops in the positions are a jumble of ill-assorted units.

Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1: Fighting at Berdichev continued and let up only toward the evening. It is not yet clear where the enemy, who attacked with strong Armd. forces, has disappeared to. The enemy penetration west of Berdichev has been wiped out. Our hopes, however, that Eleventh Armd.Div. might continue its swift advance in the direction of Belaya Tserkov has been disappointed. Further northward at and to the east of Zhitomir, repeated enemy attacks were repulsed at great cost to the enemy. Thirteenth Armd.Div. and, behind it, Fourteenth Armd. Div. have reached the area west and south of Kiev.

In AGp. Center, Guderian's attack is developing surprisingly well. Misdirection of some units in initial deployment (Third and Seventeenth Armd.Divs. ) is being straightened out. No clear picture yet on employment of the Cav.Div., which should be on the right wing.

Hoth is making gratifying progress east of Vitebsk , gets on well further northeast, but is almost at a standstill on his left wing (Nineteenth Armd.Div.).

AGp. North, has made only slight advances, owing to condition of the roads. The right wing is still attacking, without making headway (II Corps). Some progress in Estonia, but resistance there is stiffening noticeably. More Inf. is closing up in the direction of Lake Ilmen.

1230 Report to Fuehrer ( in his Hq): After ObdH reviews the advances made by the Armies, I report:

- 1.) In the enemy front, which is weakly held or manned by troops of dubious value in some sectors, but surely has no thought of giving ground, now that the new leaders have taken hold, we can make out the following grouping of forces:
  - a) Leningrad: Defense group consisting of forces hastily gathered up and strengthened by improvisations; showing no operational activity. As a first step, it will have to be cut off by a thrust into the Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga area.
  - b) Nevel-Volikiye Luki. This group is about seven Divs. strong, including fresh troops, some of which arrived from the Ukraine and from the interior of Russia in the past few days. It has taken in also some battered units, veterans of the border battles, which were filled up at the straggler collecting point at Nevel. This group is strong and it would pay to mount a special operation to destroy it for good.
  - c) Orsha - Vitebsk - Smolensk. This group includes the enemy elements opposing Armd.Gps. 2 and 3; it has been reinforced on several occasions lately. Nineteenth Army, now in progress of formation east of Vitebsk, also belongs to this group; it is doubtful whether the enemy will be able to complete organization. The group will be attacked and destroyed by the offensive of the Armd.Gps. merged under Fourth Army Hq, which was planned as a pincer movement but for the most part is taking effect as a frontal assault.
  - d) Group Gomel. Has not been attacked by us so far. Substantial portions seem to be moving against Armd. Gp. 2. Calls for no major attention, save that Armd. Gp. 2 must cover its right flank against it.
  - e) Group Korosten (about four Divs.) comes from the Pripet Marshes. It comprises elements which opposed our XVII Corps in the early border battles, and is reinforced by mot. forces. Its strength is occasionally put at as much as 4 Corps Hqs, but I have my doubts; the estimates are based on radio intelligence (deception?). This group as well as the one at Gomel can be cut off only in the course of the development of our movements, that is, with AGp. South also across the Dniepr, and Armd.Gp. 2 cooperating from the north. For the present we must confine ourselves to containing it.
  - f) Group Kiev. It must be liquidated by the envelopment operation started by AGp. South west of the Dniepr, or, if we see no prospects of success here, by envelopment east of the Dniepr.

- 2.) Next objects: We shall temporarily halt the dash toward Moscow by AGps. 2 and 3, with the object of destroying a maximum of enemy strength on the present front. To this end Armd.Gps. 2 and 3 will be headed for the area northeast and southeast of Smolensk in such way as to enable Gp. 2, by striking for Velikie Luki and Kholm, to cut off the enemy group mentioned under b), and Gp. 3, to swing southward.

In AGp. South, Sixth Army will try with 25th mot. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler to destroy parts at least of Group Korosten, and concurrently, with the bulk of Armd.Gp. 1, by pushing the enveloping tank wing on Belaya Tserkov, to liquidate the enemy southwest of Kiev.

The Fuehrer approves the plans submitted. Particulars stressed by him:

- a) A quick advance to the east is less important than smashing the enemy's military strength.
- b) AGp. North must see its foremost object in breaking through north of Lake Ilmen, to close the gap to Lake Ladoga, and south of Lake Ilmen, to block the route at Staraya Russa.
- c) The enemy Group opposite the right wing of von Leeb's AGp. (referred to above under b) must be attacked from the rear by mot. forces of Armd.Gp. 3. Leeb must not be allowed to become too weak. Can we give him reinforcements?
- d) Terror raid on Moscow is essential in order to prevent orderly evacuation of Government agencies and give the lie to enemy propaganda, which is speaking of exhaustion of German offensive capabilities.
- e) Transfer of Second Armd.Div. will be stopped. Political reasons dictate its presence in the West.

Gen. von Greiffenberg ( on the phone): C in C of his AGp. holds that the chances are very good for our tank spearheads to smash through to Moscow. Their immediate objective would be the high ground northeast and southeast of Smolensk. He objects strongly against detaching forces in northeastern direction; sees no chance of cutting off any substantial bodies of enemy troops. All forces must be kept together to strengthen the thrust to the east.

A teletype received in the afternoon (addressed to ObdH, over von Bock's signature) develops the same ideas.

ObdH rings up shortly after noon: Since we left, the Fuehrer has been harping away on the following line:

There is a large gap between Zhitomir and Thirteenth Armd. Div., he thinks. Concentration of weight in the zone of action of Thirteenth Armd.Div. is making no progress. Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler must be moved to Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs.; they in turn would have to be relieved by Advance Combat Teams, pushed into the area northeast of Zhitomir, which, for this purpose, must be temporarily combined into a force directed by Army or Army Gp.

This plan for solving the problems of Army Gp., with which ObdH is not at all in sympathy, has prevailed because nobody around there is capable of standing up to von Reichenau's obstinate aggressiveness. Advance Combat Teams must, therefore, be combined, with a twofold purpose:

- a) Protecting the north flank of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs.
- b) Relieving Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler.

The matter is discussed between Chief of Op.Sec. and Army Gp., which must report what measures it will take.

These ideas are communicated to ObdH during the afternoon in a written order of the Fuehrer (!) ( Passed on verbatim to AGp. South).\*

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Report on over-all condition of Armd. troops: Average tank losses, 50%. Personnel losses are equal to the strength of the Field Repl.Bns., which now have been completely absorbed. Six personnel Repl. Transfer Bns. for Armd.Gps. 2 and 3 will arrive in Warsaw on 20 July.
- b) Activation and reorganization program for fall, 1941.
- c) North Africa: Composition and order of battle of troops. Most of what is destined for North Africa, is now ready, but facilities are lacking to accelerate shipments. Fuehrer orders them equipped with Heavy Inf. Guns on selfpropelled mounts, which will be ready in September. ObdH insists on his demand, that both Armd.Divs. in North Africa should get third Tank Bns. Where we should get them is a mystery to me at the moment.
- d) Finnish requests for ammunition.
- e) Request of Army Hq Norway for Transport and Signal units can be met on a restricted scale.

Lt. Col. Kitschmann reports as Military Attaché at Kabul.

OQu IV: Current questions, including position of the Military Attachés on the Balkans in relation to List.

Bogatsch:

a) Air reconnaissance on the whole furnishes only confirmations: Choked railroad lines south of Kiev. -- Troop movements from Gomel to the north (on foot). -- Heavy road movements west and east of Smolensk largely to the east (transport Clms.) but some also to the west (troop movements). -- Troop movement to the western end of Lake Ilmen, from the northeast.

b) Total losses in Army Rcn. planes since 26 June:

|                                   |        |         |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------|
| Staffeln. of Armies and Armd.Gps. | He 126 | 24%     |
|                                   | FW 189 | 15%     |
| Long-range Rcn.Staffeln           | JU 88  | 33 1/3% |
|                                   | Me 110 | 39%     |
| Night Staffeln                    | Do 17  | 20%     |
|                                   | Fi 156 | 13%     |

Losses are for the most part replaced from materiel reserve, but delivery always lags several some days.

Evening situation South: At Berdichev, situation has eased. No progress south of Kiev, where Thirteenth Armd.Div. is reported to have run out of AP ammunition.--- Enemy attacks from the direction of Korosten again successfully repulsed.

Center: Further progress of Armd.Gps. 2 and 3. The enemy Group at Gomel has not yet become active.

North: Road difficulties slow advance. Inadequacy of measures against enemy in Estonia necessitates an OKH order to have one Division strike in the direction of Dorpat.

Syria: Cease-fire. Signs of demoralization reported among French troops.

Irak: Heavy British troop concentrations in the north-east and east, in order to make Iran more tractable on the subject of establishment of a British air-base against the Caucasus.

AGp. South reports that the attack of Eleventh Army will probably not come off before 17 July.

Distribution of the enemy air force: Observed in front of enemy airplanes.  
AGp. North 354 (distributed in great depth).  
" Center 640  
" South 1,500  
Total ca. 2,500

Situation: South: The attack into the northern flank at Zvyagel turns out to be an all-out offensive which has made local gains and even compelled us to commit Twenty-fifth mot. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler, to drive the enemy to the north, away from the Zvyagel-Zhitomir highway, which he had already crossed. This road is the only supply and communications line to III Corps sector. Its being temporarily under enemy pressure was the reason for the ammunition shortage in Thirteenth Armd.Div. yesterday.

The battle around Berdichev, which at times was very bitter and turned into wholesale slaughter of the senselessly attacking enemy, is now also abating. Eleventh Armd. Div. has 2,000 casualties (!) Army Gp. thinks that the enemy was so severely beaten, that Eleventh Armd.Div. could start its eastward thrust today yet. In conjunction with the latter, Sixteenth Armd. Div., next northward, is to strike against Belaya Tserkov.

Thirteenth Armd.Div. has destroyed the two railroad lines running into Kiev from west and south. Fourteenth Armd. Div. is following up closely. A reinforced Bn. of Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and a Regt. of SS "Wiking" are following behind Fourteenth Div. The rest of SS Wiking\* is following Ninth Armd. Div., which is striking for Belaya Tserkov, from Zhitomir.

Center: Guderian's attack has made astonishing progress. Some of the enemy are running away in wild flight, some are making a stand. On the south flank, we have the first signs of a developing enemy counter attack, which will come from the previously reported Gomel group.

Hoth's central sector has made great strides with his right wing (Twelfth Div.), in heavy fighting. His left wing, (Nineteenth Armd.Div.) is still immobilized.

North: The drive of the southern group now seems to be making progress. Hoepfner has taken Reinhard off the road to Leningrad, moving him to the west, into the area east of Lake Peipus. This creates a gap between him and Manstein, who is striking at Novgorod (seat of Voroshilov's Hq). The Divs. of Eighteenth Army are following up at a good rate in the direction of Pskov.

Over-all picture: The big battle in the South must be fought out by Army Gp. with its own resources. AGp. Center had better look after its right flank. On its left flank, the advance of the right wing of the Sixteenth Army offers the chance of achieving a partial success west of Nevel. To take advantage of this opportunity, the operations of the Army Gps. must be closely intergrated. In the central sector of Sixteenth Army, another battle of encirclement is developing, which may lead to final destruction of the remnants of a Russian Army (two Divs).

fighting west of the big marsh area. AGp. North must do everything to keep its forces from dispersing and to mass them for the main thrust against Novgorod.

Talk with Gen. von Greiffenberg (on phone): Coordination of AGps. Center and North in the battle of Nevel. Nineteenth Armd.Div. must be pushed on Nevel, but from there not any further in the direction of Velikie Luki before the battle of Nevel has been brought to a successful close.

South of the Nevel battlefield, another battle of encirclement is developing at Polotsk. Here it is important not to tie down the Inf. of V and VI Corps, and to move them on as quickly as possible in a general eastern direction.

Talk with Field Marshal von Leeb ( on phone ): The subject also is coordination of the Army Gps. in the battle of Nevel. He is particularly anxious that Nineteenth Armd. Div. should become effective against Nevel soon.

Brief review of the situation on the fronts of Army Gp.: It is necessary for Inf. to close to Lake Ilmen in order to mass a maximum of strength in the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga.

Gen. Oehquist: Erfurth sends me a telegram stating that von Mannerheim is showing a certain passive resistance against the idea of an operation east of Lake Ladoga, which accounts for the insufficient strength of the attacking wing; this prompts me to dispatch Gen. Oehquist to Finland to clear up the situation. There are some misunderstandings, it seems.

Col. Gall ( C of S, Hq Mil. District I ) reports. He has a whole lot of minor worries about prisoners of war, mine clearing, dismantling of border fortifications, etc. His report gives a most distressing picture of German soldiers in Lithuania looting and sending their loot home.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Movements on the railroad line Leningrad - Bologoye, mainly in direction Leningrad, day before yesterday, and in direction Moscow, yesterday. Dense traffic on the Bologoye - Moscow line in northwestern direction, yesterday. These movements may indicate either a build-up at Bologoye or evacuation of Leningrad. The line must be watched and disrupted.
- b) The Orsha - Smolensk - Vitebsk railroad line is completely choked with trains. Little traffic from Viazma-Briansk to the east.
- c) On the Kiev-Kursk line, few moving trains; stations clogged with rolling stock (waiting troop trains or industrial movements).

- d) On the Kharkov-Kursk-line, industrial movements, apparently deliveries of tanks and motor vehicles.
- e) South of Kiev fewer standing trains, less traffic in the direction of Dniepropetrovsk.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Road Construction Organization: Manpower requirements at the front make it necessary to transfer units of the Todt Organization. (Inform Transp. Chief.)  
Todt forces will have to be increased to enable them to do all the work in the steadily expanding occupied area.
- b) Bridge at Giurgiu will be replaced by Herbert ferries ( material from Belgrade).\*
- c) Lanninger\*\* loading ramp for unloading at beaches.
- d) Russian mines.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu): South: Sixth Army can fight the battle for Kiev and the Dniepr with its own resources. It needs no additional transport from OKH. Seventeenth Army has enough to last it to Vinnitsa. Armd.Gp. is supplied up to Kirovograd. Eleventh Army finds large enemy stocks.

Center: Situation still tight. Volume moved by railroad line still insufficient. Fourth Army have enough to maintain them to the east of Smolensk. (Requirement 11 trains.)

In Second Army, supplies will not last far beyond the Dniepr, for the bulk of its troops, in Ninth Army, not far beyond the Vitebsk area.

North: Armd.Gp. 4 can be maintained up to Leningrad, as can be also some of the Infantry; the bulk will have just enough to reach the area around Lake Ilmen and Lake Pskov.

ObdH is back from AGp. South, where he discussed operational plans at Hqs Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1. Details related by him show how hard the fighting is, but on the whole there is nothing substantially new.

Evening. Guderian has been amazingly successful: Smolensk was reached as early as 10 o'clock this morning. Hoth's left wing also reports remarkable advances. I am baffled by the report that Hoepfner's left wing (Reinhardt's Div.) is rushing on to Narva, with the right wing concurrently advancing on Novgorod ( von Manstein's Div.). This splits his Armd. Gp. in two and prevents developing of any real striking power.

The fact that the Russians are still roaming the area between Pruth and Dniepr, on Schobert's flank, brings on a long discussion regarding the need for protecting the oil region. To my mind, there is no such threat.



Gen. Brennecke ( on phone ): He says the splitting of Hoeppner's Armd. Gp. was necessitated by road and terrain conditions on and west of the Pskov-Leningrad highway. For the time being, AGp. will not allow Reinhard to break out of his bridgeheads across the Luga river.

The unusual movement executed by AGp. preparatory to the attack beyond Fellin is explained on the grounds that a) 217th Div. rushed off to the west \* and ) with the enemy at Dorpat believed to be weak, the plan has been adopted for an envelopment through Fellin (where railroads can be used) that would cut off his retreat to the Narva area. Following a talk of the Fuehrer with ObdH ( it must again have been on a rather sharp note) dealing with Hoeppner's movement, which displeases the Fuehrer. I request Brennecke to give me an estimate of the situation in writing, which I could present to the Fuehrer.

These futile telephone conversations continue until long past midnight; they only accomplish killing in field commands any desire to shoulder responsibility and waste everyone's time. The Fuehrer's eternal meddling in matters, the pattern of which he does not understand are becoming more than anyone can stand .

A Fuehrer order comes in, fixing the future total strength of Armd. Forces at 36 Armd.Divs. of 3 Bns. each, and 18 mot. Divs.

15 July 1941. (24th Day).

Situation South: Eleventh Army has gained elbow room on its right flank, but the enemy is still holding out south of the Dniestr.

Sevanteenth Army has made local penetrations in the Stalin Line, but is under counter attack.

Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1 have regrouped on their right wings, west of Berdichev.

The movement on Belaya Tserkov from Berlichev and Zhitomir has got under way and is already within a few kilometers of the objective. ( Ninth Armd.Div., behind it two-thirds of SS"Viking!")

West and south of Kiev the situation of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs. reinforced by mot. Infantry, is unchanged. At Zvyagel and to the east, the enemy has been pressed back so that the Zvyagel - Zhitomir road is clear again. Second Armd.Div. has been ordered halted; the other GHq reserves are following behind center and northern wing of Army Gp.

Center: In the territory passed through by Armd.Gps. 2 and 3, numerous local centers of resistance have become

active and must now be liquidated. On the left wing, the situation at Polotsk is now gradually coming to a head. Here, and west of Nevel, the formation of pockets is becoming discernible. At Polotsk, a number of Inf.Divs. can now be freed to follow up behind Hoth.

North: Hoeppner has been halted on the line reached today. The gap between his two Groups is now being filled by an Inf.Div.; he will have to wait for I Corps to come up behind von Manstein, before he continues his drive on Novgorod.

Enemy situation: The over-all impression is that the enemy, responding to the Commanders and probably also to British efforts, is doing all he can to prevent being pushed back any further to the east. The Russian troops now as ever are fighting with savage determination and with enormous human sacrifices. We can make out:

- a) A group at Leningrad, probably based on the marshlands southeast, south and southwest of the city, which is attempting to throw a wide defense ring around the city and the industrial region.
- b) A new group in formation apparently between Kalinin and Rzhev which, securing its flank with the marsh and lake country, will have the mission to close, at Ostashkov, the gap between that area and the Moscow Group. The defense positions at Rzhev are quite formidable.
- c) The Moscow Group in the area Sychevka-Vyazma, west of Kaluga, which has the mission of blocking any advance on Moscow.
- d) A central reserve, which apparently is maintained in readiness on trains in the area Bryansk - Orel - Gorbachevo - Sukhinichi. It is probably the source of the forces fed into the counter attacks against Guderian's right shoulder.
- e) The small Gomel group.
- f) The Korosten Group, and
- g) the Kiev Group, which embraces the entire region west of the Dniepr down to the Black Sea.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reports confirm the existence of the enumerated groups. In Group b), enemy positions have been reported on a 40 km front. In group c), between Vyazma and Gzhatsk, the positions extend over an 80 km front, with some systems five lines deep. A rail movement can be made out from the area around Bryansk in northwestern direction, which originates in the group mentioned under d) (mobile operational reserve on railroad trains).

Disruption of the railroad movements by our air effort makes itself felt in the Leningrad area and between

Smolensk and Moscow, also around Bryansk and especially in the sector of AGp. South. The bridges at Kiev are damaged; the bridge at Cherkassi has been badly hit.

Phone talk with Gen. Brennecke ( C of S, AGp. North ) to comment on the situation estimate submitted by him:

- a) The mission of Army Gp. is not to capture Leningrad, but at present merely to cut off the city.
- b) The enemy forces round Dorpat are estimated by OKH at two Divs. Brennecke thinks they are less.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) The new Fuehrer program for the activation of Armd.Divs. Before next fall, eight Divs., including Second and Fifth in the total.\* Of this number, four must be fitted for service in the tropics.
- b) Personnel, motor vehicles and complementary units of one Div. mot. and one Inf.Div. make up about two Armd. Divs. of, initially, 2 Armd.Bns., 1 Rifle Regt. of 3 Bns., and 1 Motorcycle Bn.
- c) In order to activate the six Armd.Divs. scheduled for fall, 1941, in the Fuehrer program, we must, if we understand "fall" to mean end of October, free within the next four weeks: Two Armd.Divs., two mot.Divs., two Inf.Divs., i.e., two existing Armd.Divs. and the makings for four new Divs.
- d) Two hundred trailers for heavy Chemical Mortars must be ordered.
- e) Condition reports and losses. The condition report of SS Norway plainly shows that the Commander of this unit was fully aware of its weaknesses.

Gen. Ott reports on his tour to Eleventh Army. The reason for what happened to 198th and Twenty-second Divs. was that, owing to bad roads, their AT commands were not with them when they were hit by the Russian tank attack. His opinion of the Romanian troops is not very complimentary, but he would not deny that they are trying hard.

Basic Fuehrer Directive on new T/O and T/E. Program of 14 July 1941.

Report: Polotsk taken (XXIII Corps); reported to be a fortress.

Wagner (Gen Qu) with Op.Chief and OQu I:

- 1.) Review of capacity of a supply base Minsk - Molodeczno, serviced by railroad lines operating at full capacity, for continuance of operations of AGp.Center.  
Conclusions:

Center has 45,450 tons of 60-ton Truck Clms; from this total we must deduct one-third laid up for repair, leaving 30,700 tons for continuous operation. Transp.

Chief guarantees 14 trains with 6,300 tons, daily, for base Minsk - Molodeczno. This is sufficient to maintain:

- a) Operational Group for offensive in the general direction of Moscow or in southeastern direction:

4 Armd. Divs.  
3 mot. Divs.  
10 Inf. Divs.  
GHq Reserves

or,

4 Armd. Divs.  
4 mot. Divs.  
6 Inf. Divs.  
GHq Reserves

or,

6 Armd. Divs.  
5 mot. Divs.  
3 Inf. Divs.  
GHq Reserves,

computed at T/O strength require  $8\frac{1}{2}$  trainloads.

- b) Remainder, for which supply can be maintained only as far as the Upper Dvina and the Upper Dniestr\*:


5 Armd. Divs.  
5 mot. Divs.  
25 Inf. Divs.

requiring  $5\frac{1}{2}$  trainloads.

|   |                   |
|---|-------------------|
| 60-ton Clms. for Operational Group        | 26,000 tons       |
| " " " " remainder (distribution only)     | 2,500 tons        |
| Still needed for transloading at Varena** | <u>1,600 tons</u> |
| Total                                     | 30,700 tons       |

- 2.) Effective 25 July, OKH can turn over to the Wehrmachts-Befehlshaber the Rear Area of AGp. North up to the Dvina, exclusive of Riga and Dvinsk.

Housing ( with OQu I): Operational disposition of enemy forces. My opinion ( see today's entry under enemy situation) is shared by both. But it must always be remembered that this disposition is hypothetical rather than actual, for the enemy is short of troops. Paulus suggests that the mission of the Kalinin group may be not only to secure the gap between Moscow and Leningrad, but also, to attack the flanks of the German forces advancing on Moscow, in conjunction with the Bryansk group kept mobile in trains. The great picture of the enemy groupings then would be as follows:



Legend:

L - Leningrad Group

K - Kalinin Group

M - Moscow Group

B - Bryansk Group

G - Gomel Group

Ko - Korosten Group

U - Ukrainian Group

Groups resulting from pressure of events

Groups provided for in the original plan of assembly as reserves far to the rear.

--- Possibilities of offensive thrusts.

The evening situation, in AGp. South, show slow advances toward Kishinev on the flank of Eleventh Army and breaching of the Stalin Line by the right wing of Seventeenth Army. The enemy is falling back before the right wing of Sixth Army, whereas on the front of its left wing, the pressure from Korosten is now so uncomfortable that Army Gp. wants to shift its weight to clear out this trouble spot. Armd. Gp. 1 has started operations out of Berdichev and striking from Zhitomir, has reached the immediate vicinity of Belaya Tserkov, while III Corps, curiously, has not made any progress, and it is still at its old spot.

Center: In the breakthrough area, a number of quite substantial enemy groups have been isolated; it will not be possible to liquidate them before the Infantry, which is marching without a break, has arrived. There will be many tight situations before these enemy groups have been disposed off. In front of the center of our breakthrough, many supply Clms. seen to be flight from Smolensk toward Moscow.

North: has now taken disposition in conformity with our wishes. The encircling movement by its right wing is slowly developing. The northern wing is closing up. Request for Artillery against Russian coastal fortifications.

Enemy: Heavy movements of columns (mot. and horse-drawn) from Smolensk to the east have the character of a rout. The same to the southeast.

Number of enemy aircraft observed: North, 208; Center, 855; South, 626. Major variations in these figures need not be interpreted as real shifts in the main concentration; discrepancies probably are due to incomplete information on individual areas.

Political: The French have sent us notes announcing that they regard the basis on which the military agreements were concluded as fundamentally changed and accordingly wish the Armistice Treaty superseded by a new agreement which expressly guarantees the sovereignty of France.

There is talk of a Cabinet reshuffle in France. (Interior, Pucheux, Foreign Affairs, Benoist-Mechin; Huntziger, as before ). Weygand still at Vichy.

An armistice has been concluded in Syria.

16 July 1941. (25th Day )

Situation: South: Enemy is evacuating Bessarabia. -- Seventeenth Army has broken through the Stalin Line on its entire front. -- The breakthrough wedge, which points at Kiev, is being attacked from the north. -- The Korosten enemy group has ceased attacking, and has passed to the defensive. Artillery is still strong, but there are no more tanks. Railroad movements from this group to Kiev.

Center: From the Gomel area, a force of seven Divs. is attacking the right shoulder of AGp. Center. This is the entire strength of the Gomel group which thus is pinned down for the moment. In the area passed through by Guderian's and Hoth's breakthrough there are still many enemy groups in fighting condition, which makes it necessary for our Armor to attack in all directions. Even west of the Dniepr there are still some active enemy groups.

Hoth's right wing has reached the big concrete highway to Moscow, near Yartsevo, while Guderian's left wing has battled its way to the sector of Smolensk. Here, then, the inner wings have linked up. Hoth's left wing apparently has pushed into an area only weakly held by the enemy. To check him the enemy may be forming a new enemy group in the Rzhev area.

On the northern wing of Army Gp., Nineteenth Armd. Div. has reached Nevel, but the planned junction with 12th Division has not been achieved, and so this pocket on the Army Gp. boundary has not yet been closed.

North: Regrouping continues in preparation for the drive with main effort against and beyond Novgorod, but is still hampered by the local demands on Sixteenth Army, which so is very slow in releasing troops for the northward thrust.

Radio intelligence indicates presence at Dorpat, of 3 enemy Divs. opposing our advance unit, I Corps (!). This situation is intolerable. Army Gp. will at least have to do something about this.

Enemy situation: Over-all picture: On the front of AGp. South, the enemy is softening. His front is crumbling before Seventeenth Army; here, it seems, he has nothing left in the rear. I do not believe that here there is any coordinated plan for withdrawal behind the Dniepr. Possibly the Russian Divs. falling back from Southern Bessarabia will show up yet deep in the rear of the crumbling front. It remains to be seen whether the enemy will try to bring parts of his strong Korosten Group to bear against our spearhead, through Kiev.

On the rest of the front the enemy no doubt intends to hold fast. I am entirely inclined to believe that the retreat movements from Smolensk to the east were momentary phenomena only. We have no clear picture yet of what is going on around Bologoye (southeast of Lake Ilmen) where unloading and movements of troops have been observed. Is an enemy group, gathered up in other places, forming in the Rzhev area? What about the Bryansk group? Does it really exist and what is it doing?

Gen. Brennecke (AGp. North) on phone:

- a) Reports on the pocket now being formed by Twelfth and Nineteenth Divs. on both sides of Army Gp. boundary.
- b) The situation at Dorpat. He receives instruction to move 93rd Div. to the Dorpat front with all available means and to report on compliance.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reports on 15 July:

- a) In front of the Seventeenth Army, positive withdrawal movements to Zhmerinka and north, on 16 July, p.m.
- b) North of Uman, 38 trains blocked; tanks are being unloaded and driven off eastward.
- c) Bridges at Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe attacked by our Air Force.
- d) Area east and southeast of Kiev no important road movements.
- e) At Zhlobin and Rogachev the enemy is on the western bank of the Dniepr. The enemy is crossing the river; very much Artillery.
- f) Railroad movements from Moscow now go only as far as Viazma, and from Bryansk only as far as Roslavl.
- g) Last night mot. movements from the east toward Yartsevo.
- h) Moscow area: little railroad traffic.
- i) West of Staraya Russa, heavy AAA. Road from Staraya Russa to Dno is described by the Air Force as serviceable, by the ground troops as non-existent. Perhaps only the eastern section has been finished so far.

k) On the road leading from the western end of Lake Ilmen to Luga, horse-drawn and mot. movements. At Luga, AAA.

l) Enemy air action against Reinhard's Corps and the Divs. on the eastern shore of Lake Peipus. East of the Lake, heavy fighter and AAA defense.

The whole pattern of the enemy air effort indicates clear-headed and aggressive leadership.

Lt. Col. Radke: Current business of his section.-- What is to take the place, in citations for bravery, of the individual's name, which now must be omitted from Wehrmacht communiques on order of the Fuehrer?

Maj. Buerker: Report on his tour to Tenth Armd.Div. The stubborn resistance of the many isolated enemy elements scattered behind our advance brings about many critical situations, but notwithstanding this, our troops feel self-assured and superior. However, the striking power of the Armd.Divs. is slowly declining. When the current objectives have been reached, a break will be necessary in order to give the units a rest, and if advisable to merge and refit several units. Gulerian thinks he can do that in three to four days. I believe much more time would be needed. The supply system of AGp. Center will not be functioning at full capacity before 25 July. By that time the Armd.Gps. will again be ready for new operations.

The performance of Regt. "Grossdeutschland" does not seem to satisfy higher Hqs.

Evening situation: South: Kishinev has fallen. Operations of Army Gp. continue according to plan. Before Kiev, situation seems to have tightened as a result of ammunition shortage. Enemy attacks III Corps from the north.

Center: The enemy front is breaking up into a several groups, with our Armd. Divs. cutting through between them. This complicates the picture for direction of operations. Local crises may yet develop, especially on the right wing of Armd.Gp. 2 and in the center of Armd.Gp. 3.

North: Movements are proceeding according to plan. At Dorpat, the enemy is regrouping for defense.

Air situation: In the South, the enemy air force is being taken back behind the Dniepr. In front of AGp. Center the enemy is apparently intensifying his air effort.

17 July 1941. ( 26th Day)

Situation: No important changes.



In AGp. South, the situation is developing along its logical lines. The enemy is attempting, with local forces, to counter the encircling moves against his northern wing at Belaya Tserkov and southeast of Berdichev, but by and large he appears to concentrate on extricating himself from the pocket developing between Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies.

On the northern flank ( Korosten-Kiev ), the jumble of enemy units previously reported in the area between Korosten and Kiev has been reinforced by two new Divs., one coming from the Caucasus.

What I cannot understand is the inaction of Thirteenth Armd. Div., which seems to be doing nothing about the enemy reported to be retreating right past it from Korosten in the direction of Kiev.

AGp. Center: Formation of the pockets is proceeding consistently. Guderian's right wing seems to have again full freedom of movement in the direction of Roslavl. Quite far to the rear, the enemy is trying to turn the situation by launching attacks into Guderian's flank and, further back, against Second Army, but without success.

AGp. North: Here, too, the formation of pockets is developing. On the right wing, at Nevel, the junction with Hoth's left wing has not been quite accomplished yet. Also in this sector, enemy elements appear to have escaped to the east and are now moving in the direction of Velikie Luki. The "eastern front"\* shows another promising pocket in the Opochna area; some enemy bodies initially got away to the east, toward Khelm, but appear to have returned to free their encircled comrades.

Situation of Hoepfner's Gp. unchanged. I Corps is closing up in rapid marches.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance shows:

- a) Confirmation of our picture of the situation on the front of AGp. South. Clogged railroad lines in the area west of Cherkassi.
- b) Mozir: AAA. -- Moving lights on the Pripet river, apparently troops crossing to the other bank.
- c) Gomel: Large quantities of rolling stock and locomotives on sidings. AAA and searchlights. Airdrome (fighters).

South of Mogilev, east of the Dniepr, no enemy movements to the north.

- d) From the area Gomel -- Bryansk -- Roslavl -- Dovsk, no movements.
- e) Continuous retrograde movements from Roslavl on Yukhnov, last night. From Yartsevo, heavy traffic to the east, through Vyazma. At Vyazma, AA searchlight concentration.

Message: Eleventh Army has started its attack, leading with XI Corps, as planned, and has crossed the Dniestr.

Gen. Wagner ( Gen Qu ):

- 1.) Rosenberg is Reich Minister for Occupied Territories. Under him four Reich Commissars: Lohse, for the Baltic States; Kasche, for Russia; Koch, for the Ukraine; Schickedanz for Caucasia. As soon as the tactical situation permits, the Four Year Plan will set up its organization in the occupied territory. An agreement has been reached with Himmler, clarifying when the Police will get its instructions from the Reich, and when from Rosenberg.
- 2.) Transfer of western portion of Rear Area AGp. North to the Reich Commissar for the Baltic States. Between 18 and 25 July, the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Baltenland will take over the area from AGp. North. Basic questions of command organization ( coast defense, control of troops). -- Transfer instrument receives signature.\*

3.) Supply situation:

North: Assured until 18 July. Main supply base Riga. Action radius: Armd. Gp. 4, as far as Leningrad; Armies, to the line Lake Ilmen - Narva. One-half issue ammunition, two fuel quotas, 2 days' rations.

Center: On 15 July, Dniepr base had: one-fifth issue of ammunition, one-half fuel quota, one half day's rations. Troops have three-quarters issue of ammunition, three fuel quotas, 7 days' rations. Action radius: Armd. and mot. Divs., as far as Smolensk, Inf. to the eastern banks of Dniepr and Dvina. To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied by us. Bulk of 60-ton Truck Clms. still on the shuttle run between frontier and Dniepr. Scheduled to be taken off as 20/23 July.

South: On 15 July, Seventeenth Army used up one-half to three-quarters issue of ammunition, more than that for their light and med. Fl. Hws. Temporary interruption of railroad line at Tarnopol (washouts); shuttle service already in operation, as far as Berdichev.

Casualties: Total from 22 June to 13 July: 92,120 = 3.68%. Officer losses in per cents of NCO and EM losses: Wounded, 3,4; killed, 3; missing, 1,7.

Major Schuchardt, formerly Paris, assigned to post at Ankara, reports to me. Situation in France. Nothing significantly new.

Col. Kinzel:

- a) Railroad service in Russia: Material was abused even in peacetime, and probably will be all the more so under war conditions. Captured documents indicate that railroad situation is catastrophic. Railroad movements confused; they show no clear pattern, one reason perhaps being that we cannot watch them continuously.
- b) Probable disposition of enemy forces, after the current battles have been fought. Of course it is impossible to foresee everything in detail, but we may assume that after the cleaning up in Estonia there will be available:

Front of AGp. Leeb:

Around Leningrad: 15 Inf. Divs. and 2 Armd. Divs.  
Around Bologovo: 3 Inf. Divs. and  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div.

Front of AGp. Bock:

Opposite Hoth \*2 - 3 Inf. Divs.  
Opposite Guderian's  
northern wing and center \*2 Inf. Divs. and 1 Armd. Div.  
  
Opposite Guderian's southern  
wing 4 Inf. Divs. and 1 - 2 Armd. Divs.  
  
Between Bock and Rundstedt,  
in the area around Gomel \* 3 - 4 Inf. Divs.

AGp. Rundstedt:

North of Kiev, opposite northern wing  
of Sixth Army and Armd. Gp. 1 8 Inf. Divs. and  
1 Armd. Div.

Opposite right wing of Sixth Army,  
Armd. Gp. 1 and Seventeenth Army \*2 Inf. Divs. and  
1 Armd. Div.

Opposite Eleventh Army 8 Inf. Divs.,  
1 Armd. Div. and  
1 Cav. Div.

This would add up, on the enemy side, to a total of about 50 Inf. Divs. and 7 Armd. Divs. (apart from Cav. Div.).

In the groups marked \*, I consider the estimates distinctly on the high side.

ObdH, back from AGp. North, relates:

- a) Enemy air superiority. The strength of our frontline Divs. has greatly declined.
- b) Eighth Armd. Div. had to be taken back. SS has moved up and is covering its flank. I Corps starts its attack

today at 1600 and will take pressure off the flank; it is under tactical control of Armd. Gp. 4.

- c) Attack at Fellin (Eighteenth Army) set for 18 July (perhaps not until 19 July).
- d) Intentions: First bring to a conclusion the actions now in progress on the right wing, then regroup for attack with one Corps south of Lake Ilmen, with two Corps northward along Lake Ilmen, with one Corps between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus, and with one Corps along Lake Peipus (eastern shore). One Corps must then watch the area north of Army Gp. boundary, and, if necessary, take aggressive action.
- e) On 25 July we shall probably be able to attack across the line Novgorod-Narva.

Major Count Stauffenberg gives a highly informative report on his visit to Guderian's Group. Peculiar character of the breakthrough battles demand great skill in maneuvering Armd. Div. Troops subjected to great strain. Striking power is gradually diminishing, self-assurance is continually growing. Third Armd. Div. !

Evening situation South: Crossing successfully accomplished by Eleventh Army. Also the Romanians, crossing on its left wing, have reached the eastern bank. Seventeenth Army, in wedge formation, has pushed into the depth of the enemy position. Eleventh and Twelfth Armd. Divs. of Armd. Gp. 1 are now abreast of Ninth Armd. Div., and Armd. envelopment movement can be started. Must move 75th and 111th Inf. Divs. up to III Corps. SS Adolf Hitler will replace Third Armd. Div., which in turn will strengthen the Armd. enveloping wing. --- Advance at Korosten.

Center: Enemy pockets are beginning to show up more clearly. Guderian is gaining ground and his forces have linked up further east. Southeast of Gomel, troops are being detrained on the open tracks. Enemy is falling back under pressure from Cav. Div. --- Trouble at Hoth's and Guderian's boundary.

North: Report shows nothing significantly different from ObdH's account. Coastal blockade Btry. on shore of the Moon Straits taken back because of threat from the landside.

Gen. Wagner reports on result of Baentsch' tour to AGp. Center: Organization now running smoothly. Railroad difficulties will be resolved.

North: Six more ships en route to Riga. AGp. North is all right and can temporarily help out Ninth Army (rations).

Situation: AGp. South's operation is becoming increasingly shapeless. The front against Korosten still absorbs large forces. The appearance of new, strong enemy forces attacking from the north near Kiev, compels us to move Inf.Divs. to that sector, to relieve and replace Armor (III Corps). This pins down greater strength on the northern front than is desirable. The turning wing of Armd. Gp.1, too, does not seem to get started on its southward drive. It is still hanging back around Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov. Meanwhile, the breakthrough wedge of Seventeenth Army has advanced so far that right wing of Sixth Army ( operating under Armd.Gp. 1 ) might as well be switched from the encircling operation, for which it was slated, and sent on eastward to the area south of Kiev, to be on hand for the Dniopr crossing.

The Fuehrer has now given orders to take Odessa. For that mission we have only Hansen's Corps with two German and several Romanian Divs. This move which, I agree, is necessary, would divert strength from the big envelopment now initiated.

In AGp. Center, the Armd. Divs. are reforming for the fronts to be established to the northeast and southeast. Inf.Divs. are moving close behind. The organizations forming the rings around the pockets are continually changing, and it will be interesting to see how long this can go on without impairing the tightness of the encirclement. On the southern wing, east of Mogilev, the enemy keeps up his heavy attacks, which is precisely what we want him to do (Fifth Russ. Army).

North of the line Smolensk-Orsha, on the northern wing of Army Gp., the northernmost pocket seems to have been securely closed by Twelfth Inf.Div. moving down from the north and linking up with Nineteenth Armd.Div. Tension seems to be easing also in the process of forming the other pocket, but we cannot be quite sure yet.

In AGp. North no important changes. At OPOCHKA, the enemy is struggling to extricate his encircled units by attacking us from the outside; he is being repulsed.

At Gdov (eastern shore of Lake Peipus), a "Special Division" has been captured; it is composed of, respectively, a unit of women, of convicts, and of Communist Youths.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Photographs of Moscow. Very extensive industrial installations, with vast railroad system. Strong AAA defense. Numerous balloon barrages, no fortifications.
- b) Photographs of Bologoye; according to captured documents a supply center ( Artillery parks, Chemical Defense depots).
- c) 1.). Observed enemy movements (from north to south): From

Staraya Russa and Velikie Luki to Bologoye.

- 2.) West of Moscow, Vyazma is apparently the railhead for supply of troops.
- 3.) South of the line Smolensk-Moscow movements to the northeast (evacuations?).
- 4.) Vast train movements from the West to Kremenchug.
- 5.) Reconnaissance east of the Dniepr unfortunately unavailable; the same for area around Bryansk.

Gen. Fellgiebel

- a) Extension of the OKH trunk line first to Belaya Tserkov to be continued, according to the development of the situation, either northward to Kiev or across the Dniepr, south of Kiev.
- b) Regulation of signal communication service in the areas of the Civil Commissars for Occupied Territories, to be set up under Rosenberg.
- c) Findings of radio intelligence confirm data extracted from captured documents and PW statements.
- d) Moscow's role as center of the Russian communications system. With the elimination of Moscow, the entire Russian communications network collapses.

von Greiffenberg:

- a) Over-all mission: Smash all enemy forces that can be reached now. We must be sure to finish the job. On this account, and to ensure thorough mopping up, the area conquered must be safeguarded from incursions; further extensions only insofar as necessary to consolidate these gains.
- b) Possible future tasks: Form frontal group with Ninth Army and right wing of Second Army; on its northern wing, Armored Gp. 3. Another group for turning movement to the southeast, comprising the bulk of Second Army (inner ring) and Armd. Gp. 2 (outer ring). Movements of reserves and bringing up of GHQ Reserves must conform with these ideas. What should be the command organization for this operation?
- c) Direction of the mopping-up operations in newly-conquered territory. Cover right flank.
- d) Striking power of the Armd. Divs.: 60%.

Col. Gen. Fromm: Recommendations on the implementation of the Fuehrer's Armd.Divs. program: Activate the 36 Armd.Divs. initially with 2 Bns., each (except the Africa Divs., where 3 Bns. are specified), each Bn. of three, if possible, four Cos. To enable us to activate the eight Armd.Divs. ordered completed by next fall (incl. two for Africa), the Field Army must give up, by the end, if possible even by the middle, of August, two Armd.Divs. (Third and Seventeenth) and two mot. Divs. (both in Guderian's Gp.).

The 18 Inf. Divs. mot. we shall get together by taking the ten already existing plus Inf. Regt. "Grossdeutschland", SS Adolf Hitler and three SS Divs. mot., and then activate two Inf. Divs. mot. and one SS Div. mot. (or rather one more regular Inf. Div. mot. instead) by reducing Divs. to four mot. Bns., one mot. Rcn. Bn., reorganize the Motorcycle Bn. to a mixed Bn. (?) and cutting the Antitank Bns. of the Divisions to two Cos. etc.

The motor transport requirements (transport, not tanks are the bottleneck in the new activations), it is hoped, can be covered from GHq Reserve Arty., Engineers (!) and Observation Bns., and by centralizing supply services.

Comment: Inasmuch as reduction in strength of the Inf. Divs. mot. and of the Rifle formations of the Armd. Divs. in favor of the newly activated units involves no reduction in fire power (the number of MGs and mortars, except light mortars, remains the same or is even increased), I have no objection to the principle of the proposal. I only want to have my say in the reduction of GHq Reserves (ratio of Artillery to Observation Bns., requirements in Engineers, Construction units, Railroad Engineers).

von Ziehlberg: Gen. Staff personnel matters (including medical opinion on Clausius) -- Decorations (Bulgaria) -- Current matters.

Col. Liss with OQu IV:

- a) Distribution of forces in the British homeland according to captured Russian documents. Figures on the whole square with our information. These documents assume that the units are still Brigs. and mot. Divs., because of lack of Artillery. (This probably does not hold true any more at this date.)
- b) Distribution of British forces in Irak (two Divs.), one more Division must be expected from India.
- c) Distribution of British forces in India. Indian troops now on the battle fronts have been replaced by newly activated units. Apart from the one Indian Div. destined for Irak, there probably can be no further withdrawal of troops from India.

Conference with ObdH on situation in AGp. South and the necessity to have the Inf. Divs. now arriving in the rear of the Sixth, moved to the area south of Kiev. The following two points must now be borne in mind by AGp. South:

- 1.) The encircling ring by Armd. Gp. must not be drawn too close, and if possible along the Dniepr.
- 2.) A strong group must be brought up to the Dniepr south of Kiev from the rear now for an early crossing.

The evening situation shows no essential changes in the picture.

In AGp. South a pocket is apparently forming at Vinnitsa as a result of Seventeenth Army'd breakthrough. In the central sector, Armd.Gp. is beginning to make headway in southeastern direction, and on the northern wing Sixth Army has gained ground against the enemy at Korosten and has pushed him away from the supply route.

In AGp. Center, the battle with the encircled enemy bodies continues, but resistance varies in degree. South of Orsha little is going on, but north of the line Orsha-Smolensk, the largest group staged a break-out attempt in all directions; it was driven back.

In AGp. North our forces continue to close up to Armd.Gp.4. The enemy is throwing new forces against Hoepfner's left and right wings, but with our Inf. on the spot now, there is no danger.

Talk with Gen. von Sodenstern (AGp. South, on phone):

- a) In my opinion the envelopment will not be ample enough if Armd. Gp. strike for Uman; the Group must advance southeastward to the Dniepr in direction of Krivoi Rog. Army Gp. has reached the same conclusion. Only a weak right wing of the Armd.Gp. needs to drive in the direction of Uman. An intercepted radio signal of the Russian Twenty-sixth Army indicates that we are going to be attacked by 4 Inf.Divs. and 2 Cav. Divs. from the area south of Kiev, tomorrow.
- b) Prepare a strong group with bridging equipment, Artillery, etc. south of Kiev for the Dniepr crossing as soon as possible. Army Gp. has earmarked for this mission LV Corps, with 111th, 75th and 71st Inf.Divs. I add 132nd and 94th Inf.Divs. from Gp. Reserves. Under consideration is also XXXXIV Corps, with 57th and Ninth Divs.
- c) Political friction between Hungarians and Romanians makes it desirable to separate the Hungarian Armd Corps from the Romanians; Army Gp. should think up an elegant way of doing it.

19 July 1941. ( 28th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South all planning is dominated by the discovery of the imminent attack by the Russian Twenty-sixth Army; captured orders indicate that it consists of 6 Inf.Divs. and 2 Cav. Divs., under two Corps Hqs. Three of these Divs. are supposed to come from the Lithuanian front, whereas the rest ( VI Corps ) are said to have fought in the Ukraine from the start.

The weather continues bad, which will probably slow the movements of AGp. South to a considerable degree. If we add to this the effect of the impending enemy attack by quite a sizeable force, it appears likely that the start of



this large-scale Armd.Gp. offensive will be cancelled or delayed again.

AGp. Center: Reports capture of a Russian order indicating that the Russian High Command is aiming at separating the German Armor from supporting Inf. units by driving attacks between them. In theory this is a very pretty scheme, but in practice it is something that can be carried out only by an opponent superior in number and generalship. Against our Armies, and with the Inf. Corps never slackening in closing to the Armor, I do not see a chance for applying such a policy. On the southern wing of the Army Gp., enemy pressure continues.

AGp. North: No new trends discernible in the development. The appearance of a Bn. of Moscow factory police demonstrates that communications between Moscow and Leningrad must still be open; it would be desirable from the operational standpoint if the enemy were not able to maintain communications between Lake Ilmen and Moscow. But I am beginning to wonder if we are not being confronted here with the incipient formation of a strong group between Bologoye and Rzhev, which eventually might make it necessary for Leeb's right wing to advance beyond the northern edge of the Valdai Hills.

In Estonia, the situation is developing favorably due to the enemy's inaction. The possibility of a crisis is fading.

Navy thinks that the enemy is becoming increasingly aware of our weakness and passivity in the Baltic; we must therefore expect intensification of enemy activity and a mounting threat to the sea route to Libau and Windau. These ports are essential for our supply.

Air Reconnaissance has no results worth noting due to persistent bad weather.

Gen. Buhle:

- 1.) Discussion of the BdE's plan for implementation of the Fuehrer's Armd. Forces program ( fall reorganization of the Army ).
  - a) Armd.Divs. On the whole no objections. The combination of motorcycle-mounted Inf.Bns.with Armd. Ren. units must not result in absorption of the unit in the Infantry. It must remain a reconnaissance unit . With Divs. becoming smaller, they will need fewer Truck Clms.
  - b) Inf.Divs. mot. The proposed organization of the Inf. Bn. eliminates the Bn. Commander almost completely. By transferring to the Co.all weapons necessary for forming a main effort it would strip him of any real control over the situation. Cutting Artillery down to two light Btrys. for each Bn. can be approved only as an interim measure, designed to prevent the excessive depletion of GHq Artillery

by allotments to the new Divs. Later on, the Btrys. must again be increased to the normal number of three for each Bn.

- c) GHq troops: Artillery: We shall still have to put up a fight to retain a substantial GHq Artillery, incl. Observ. Bns. and Corps Artillery Hqs, to facilitate exercise of control over operations. The argument that modern war is waged no longer with Artillery, but with tanks, is fallacious.

Engineer troops: It would be absurd to allocate 17 of the 20 existing GHq Eng. Bns. to the newly activated Divs. Modern motorized warfare has made the Engineers more indispensable than ever. The requirements of the new Divs. must be met by allotting to them the mot. Eng. Cos. of deactivated Inf. Divs.

Railroad Engineers: Their number must be increased. If the new organization of the Army is to be adapted to the needs created by operations over vast spaces, the Railroad Eng. units must be accorded an important place in the program.

Supply Services can probably be rendered more efficient and economical for movements in vast areas by centralizing and consolidating transport.

Heavy Artillery. Reduction will have to wait until Gibraltar is completed. These big guns tie down too much transport.

- 2.) A special organization under Balch\* for the checking and revising T/Os with a view to reducing them to essential war needs will be set up at BdE, with the cooperation of Gen. Staff.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu.):

- a) Demands by the Reich Marshal regarding safeguarding of native stocks in the operational theaters. Insofar as possible they have already been met on our own initiative.
- b) New boundaries for Rear Area AGp. Center: Joining AGp. North at the Dvina, the boundary in the main is formed by the Dvina-Dniepr line as far as Gomel. Rear Area AGp. South will eventually also be advanced to the Dniepr.
- c) AGp. North's request for motor transport to move 93rd Div. must be rejected.
- d) Arrived at Riga by sea: Convoy I, 900 tons; convoy II, 2,000 tons.
- e) Supply situation: South: Very high fuel consumption.

Not much fuel captured.

Sixty-ton truck columns only 50% operational owing to unseizable roads. Supply of AGp. nevertheless assured.

Center: The tense situation seems to be easing due to the smooth cooperation of Baentsch and the Railroad dictator dispatched by Gercke. The transport situation has improved. Little booty.

North: Owing to movement of troops ( 93rd Div. ), three trains less are available daily for supply. Transport needs amply covered nevertheless .

Kinzel ( Foreign Armies East ): Command set-up on Russian front.  
• ( from north to south):

Field Command Hq Northwest (Voroshilov ): Eighth, Twenty-seventh, Eleventh, Twenty-second (?) Armies. It is not yet clear whether Twenty-second Army belongs to Northwest or to West; the former is more likely. Important for operational appraisal of the area Rzhev-Bologoye.

Field Command Hq West ( Timoshenko ) : Nineteenth, Twentieth, Thirteenth and Twenty-first Armies. Behind them there seems to be additionally an Army Hq 4, which formerly operated in the Bialystok pocket and apparently was taken back.

Field Command Hq Southwest ( Budyonny ): Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Sixth and Twelfth Armies.

Field Command Hq South (?) : Eighteenth (?), Second, Ninth (?) Armies. The existence of this Hq appears to me doubtful. Probably it is the Hq of the Odessa Military District. If a strong operational Hq actually were committed here, we surely would know the name of the CG, just as we know the names of the three Marshals. Army Hqs 18 and 19 are known to us only through radio intelligence, and have for practical purposes not appeared at the fighting front. If they exist at all, they may be Hqs for coast defense or have other special functions.

von Thoma reports out to take over the command of Seventeenth Armd.Div.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Report on his findings in touring the supply arteries in the sector of AGp. North. With some Roadbuilding and Construction units being better equipped with transport than others, the situation has developed where all mobile units have been ordered up front and the less mobile units, left behind, never finish marching. They are continuously on the move to catch up with the others instead of doing their work. We need static organizations, which would employ PW and indigenous labor. Orders to this effect have been issued.

b) GHq Engineer and Constructions units needed in relation to the Armd. Divs. organization program.

Conference with Gen. Brand (Arty) and Gen. Gercke: Their demands within the Armd. Divs. organization program, which will require my backing.

Evening situation. No important news. Slow progress on all fronts along the lines of the development laid down by us.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu): The North African supply situation is increasingly deteriorating. Schleusner reports that Fifth Light Div. is so short of fuel that in the event of an attack on Solum it would just manage to get to the battlefield. Recommends to send additional 1,000 tons of truck transport to Africa. They can be taken only from Brussels. I turn down a proposal to obtain supposedly more suitable transport for Africa by an exchange with Romania, a process that would take four weeks. If Africa needs the stuff, send it down the quickest way possible!

Casualties: Total up to 16 July 1941 (excluding medical casualties): 102,588, i.e. 3.05% of a strength of 3,35 million.

Officer casualties in per cents of total losses: Wounded, 3,4; killed, 5,2; missing 1,6.

20 July 1941. (29th Day) Sunday.

By plane to Hq AGp. South.

0700. Situation report by Lt. Col. Grolmann. No important change in the situation since yesterday.

0730. Leave by car; 0830, take-off at Loetzen; 1130, arrival at Staro Konstantinov.

Army Hq is housed in a Russian Military School. A characteristic feature are the tokens of "culture"; on the outside, colossal plaster columns with Corinthian capitals, on the inside heroic-sized plaster statuary (sitting group Lenin-Stalin, soldiers of Army and of Air Force).

Conference with IA: Lt. Col. Winter sketched the situation for me. The over-all picture agrees with that we have at OKH. A new feature are the enormous difficulties besetting the movements of Armd.Gp. Kleist. E.g. Eleventh Armd.Div. is advancing on Uman in three distinct groups;

- 1.) Tracked vehicles, with Infantry on top.
- 2.) Polish peasant carts carrying Infantry, following behind the tracked vehicles.
- 3.) Wheeled motor vehicles, which cannot keep up on the

rainsoaked roads and so must be left behind in towns.

The main problem now is how to get Kleist's Group where we want it to go. Its main body together with elements of III Corps, brought down from the north, where they were relieved by Inf. now is fighting the Russian Twenty-sixth Army, which is attacking with its northern wing just to the south of Kiev, and with its southern wing, at Tarashcha; each wing has one fresh Division, while the rest are chipped in earlier battles. The attacks have all been repelled, but they pin down the bulk of Kleist's group so that actually only a weak Armd. force, Eleventh and Sixteenth Armd. Divs., remains available for tactical envelopment in the rear of the enemy now retreating before Schwedler's drive. The operational envelopment in the direction of Kirovograd has not yet got under way and will probably hang fire for some time yet. The assumption that the Russian Twenty-sixth Army will soon be defeated, looks to me too optimistic.

The next question, concerning Reichenau's Army, is answered to the effect that in consequence of the events at Zvyagel, his left wing has become comparatively strong. He is still confronted by a strong enemy, whose Artillery is now less active. The right wing, which is a long way off to the east, is gaining ground, but it looks as if it will be impossible to give that wing the strong forces that would enable it effectively to interpose itself between the enemy's Korostov Group and the Dniepr. Army Gp. rather expects that the enemy will be pushed against the Dniepr, which will successively be crossed by von Reichenau north of Kiev. The city then would be taken from the east.

For forming the group which we would like to build up south of Kiev, Army Gp. has available only the GHq Reserves standing far in the rear, now that LV Corps has been committed to relieve III mot. Corps. We thus get the following picture, which is also presented in a sketch submitted by Army Gp. The forces of Army Gp. fall into two groups moving in divergent directions: The big enveloping operation south of Kiev, in which Kleist will push with his main concentration in the direction of Kirovograd, and von Reichenau's attacking operation. The link between them is a weak group, LV Corps, which will have to be satisfied if it accomplishes as much as blocking enemy action from Kiev against the two large offensive groups.

Von Reichenau's prospects of success are not too rosy, for his attack will back the enemy against the Dniepr, instead of pushing him away from it and so cut him off. The Russian Twenty-sixth Army, which Kleist must shake off, before he can strike southeastward with sufficient forces, will likewise be pressed back frontally behind the Dniepr. To cross to the other side, it has four military bridges available between Cherkassi and Kiev. It is altogether uncertain what Kleist's offensive against Kirovograd, which is already behind schedule, would be able to catch. Undoubtedly there are still some strong enemy groups in the area west of Uman, but whether they can be cut off depends on how much time is lost in fighting the Russian Twenty-sixth Army.

I stress the following points:

- a) von Reichenau's operation must be conducted in such a way that the enemy will be pushed away from the Dniepr. As of 25 or 26 July, it will be possible to have cooperation of XXXV Corps out of the Mozir area.
- b) Everything must be done to form a strong group south of Kiev. In addition to the GHq Divs. earmarked by Army Gp., it must be allotted also parts of von Reichenau's and Schwedler's forces at the very earliest.
- c) Everything must be done to avoid pushing the Russian Twenty-sixth Army to the Dniepr in purely frontal fighting and to prevent its withdrawal to Kiev with elements still capable of giving battle.
- d) We must soon be able to exert strong Armd. pressure in the direction of Kirovograd.

Particulars taken up at the conference:

- a) Future missions for Hansen's Corps. It must cross the Dniestr, east of Kishinev, using whatever he has got.
- b) Employment of the Italians. It will be best to commit them on the northern wing of Eleventh Army.
- c) Separation of Romanians and Hungarians. AGp. sees no difficulties.
- d) Opportunities for future operations east of the Dniepr.

Worries of Army Gp.:

- a) Horse replacements are becoming a burning question. Army Gp. has heard that there are still plenty horses to be had in Poland.
- b) Army Gp. reckons with the possibility of the enemy organizing a defense west and south of the Dniepropetrovsk industrial area, by forming a line of resistance on its western outskirts, i.e. yet west of the Dniepr.
- c) Tank strength of individual Divs.: Sixteenth Armd.Div., less than 40%; Eleventh Div., around 40%; Thirteenth and Fourteenth Divs., better.
- d) The number of operational reconnaissance planes is seriously diminishing ( 2 - 3 per Staffel ).
- e) The enemy pockets in our rear are still a most vexing problem. We have no troops in the rear to clean them out.
- f) Bridge-building equipment for Dni crossing: Army Gp. believes that it will be able to build only one 16-ton bridge and one 8-ton bridge across the river.

Take-off from Army Gp.: 1530. Arrival Loetzen, about 1830.

After my return, brief report to ObdH: The great picture of the operation is not very cheering; Army Gp. is being split into two diverging directions, and a decisive major success in either direction is doubtful. After the Dniepr has been reached at least a short rest period will be needed by the troops, especially for refitting of tank units.

Development of the situation: In the meanwhile, the enemy on AGp. Center's front has succeeded in breaking out of the Nevel pocket. We cannot say as yet whether this is the result of Nineteenth Armd.Div. swinging toward Velikie Luki too soon; in any case, this is a distressing development. The escaped elements will hurl themselves against Velikie Luki and will make life miserable for the elements of Nineteenth Armd.Div. in the area, which have very tough going even now. And there are many more sore spots on the front of AGp. Center. On the southern flank, for instance, the enemy has been able to penetrate at several points; and on the eastern front of von Kluge's Army, which is forming north and south of Smolensk, several sectors are under heavy attack. Notwithstanding all this, we shall probably succeed in stabilizing our position east of Smolensk and so ensure an early liquidation of the big enemy pocket west of Smolensk.

The costly battles involving some groups of our Armd. forces, in which the Inf. Divs. arriving from the west can take a hand only slowly, together with loss of time due to bad roads which restrict movement and the weariness of the troops marching and fighting without a break, have put a damper on all higher Hqs.\* Its most visible expression is the severe depression into which ObdH has been plunged. But in matter of fact there is really no reason for any such thing. We must let the great break-through battle take its course and judge its result later.

In AGp. South much ground has meanwhile been gained toward Uman, but the successes of our troops in the battle with the Russian Twenty-sixth Army are on the whole of a defensive character. AGp. North continues shifting its troops to the north as has been planned, without too much interference from the enemy now. AGp. Center reports a mounting bag of prisoners: Nearly 100,000 since 10 July.

21 July 1941. ( 30th Day ).

Situation. AGp. South: The offensive of the Red Twenty-sixth Army indeed has pinned down the bulk of Armd.Gp., as was to be expected. The advance on Uman is executed by parts only of Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd.Divs. Owing to bad weather, the other Armies are advancing slowly.

AGp. Center: Velikie Luki, on the northern wing, unfortunately had to be abandoned. This is bad; many of the retreating enemy elements will get away as a result. On the southern flank of Armd. Gp. 2, at Propoisk the enemy has had local successes, which were checked by attacks of Fourth Armd. Div. Moreover, the situation is still quite precarious in the Smolensk area, where we have not yet succeeded in completely sealing the ring around the enemy.

In AGp. North, continuation and smooth completion of the initiated movements.

1100 - 1200. Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S, AGp. South):

- a) Splitting of Armd. Gp. 1 ! : \* As long as the Russian Twenty-sixth Army south of Kiev has not been defeated, Armd. Gp. 1 cannot strike out for any new objectives to the south. Armd. Gp. will be lucky if, by tactical envelopment of the enemy falling back before Seventeenth Army, it can reach Uman with some elements.
- b) If Armd. Gp. 1 fails to batter its way beyond Uman, Eleventh Army must go out to meet it with at least strong Advance Combat Teams. Hungarian Cavalry alone is not enough.
- c) Reichenau's Army is splitting in two. It must put more punch in its right wing and let up on its left wing, in order to push the enemy away from, and not against, the Dniepr.
- d) Forming of a strong group south of Kiev for the eastward advance across the river must be initiated as soon as possible, or we shall be too late ! In addition to reserves and troops now far to the rear, it must comprise parts of Reichenau's and Schwedler's armies.

Gen. Brennecke (C of S AGp. North):

- a) Thoughts on the next operations of Army Gp.'s right wing. I have become increasingly convinced that the right wing of the AGp. North must be detached from its command and combined with AGp. Center; the boundary would run on Bologoye, through Kholm, with these two towns passing to AGp. Center. I request examination and comment by Army Gp.
- b) Thoughts on the eventual reduction of Kronstadt and Leningrad. Army Gp. will let us know its ideas on the subject.
- c) Condition of roads through the marsh area south of Lake Ilmen. Aerial photograph.

Otzen (Rome): Heggenreiner affair. Let him stay with his organization.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air situation. No essential new findings apart from additional indications that the movements from



Bologoye to Leningrad, Staraya Russa and Velikie Luki are apparently being carried out under unified direction. This would support the assumption that Twenty-second Red Army after all is a part of the northern Group.

There is increasing evidence of a new rear position running from the Lake district of the Valdai hill complex through the headwater region of the Dniepr to Roslavl and the Desna.

The operational strength of the air reconnaissance units is temporarily quite low. Difficulties in material replacement. Losses.

The AA units, committed are closing on the combat troops with commendable speed.

Gen. Oehquist reports on his journey to Finland. Erfurth's suspicion that Marshal Mannerheim is opposed to the operation east of Ladoga, is unfounded. Talked with Mannerheim and Erfurth. The underlying cause of this storm in the teacup seems to be that Erfurth, having little to do and to say, suffered an attack of inferiority feelings.

The successes of the Finnish troops in the advance are very gratifying.

Gen. Matzky reports on current business in his section.

Gehlen reports on the Fuehrer's visit to AGp. North. All seems to have gone well at the conference. Someone, apparently Keitel, is constantly egging on the Fuehrer that Armor should be shifted from Center to AGp. North, that is, to the high ground east of Lake Ilmen. Doing that would be quite a mistake.

True, it might prove necessary to divert some of our steadily dwindling Armor to the Bologoye area in order to eliminate this railroad center, but farther north von Leeb now has all he can use. The Bologoye mission would best be carried out as an AGp. Center operation (after shifting the boundary ! ).

Major Buerker (Training Sec.): Training instructions for airborne troops, and other current questions.

Major von Ondarza reports on his trip to Guderian's Armad. Gp. Nothing new of any consequence.

ObdH went to AGp. Center, accompanied by Heusinger.

He relates his observations, and then I discuss with him my ideas on the future command organization in Center: von Kluge must take over the right wing (southern part of Second Army and Guderian's Group) to move it out of AGp. Center in a southeastern direction and then, under direction of von Rundstedt, advance with Ninth's left wing in direction of Stalingrad. Von Weichs must get the right wing of Ninth Army attached his present left wing, Strauss\*, von Leeb's left wing. Von Bock would then conduct the

offensive south of the line Kholm - Bologoye (these towns included) in an eastward direction outflank Moscow on both sides (and reduce the city) and then continue with axis of advance on Kazan. As the spearhead of his front or his left wing, Hoth would lead with his tanks under von Bock's command.

This regrouping must in general be deferred until the objectives specified in the initial directives for the attack have been reached. \* We can and must go beyond them in tactical operations, wherever that is necessary in overrunning those parts of the new Russian position which are situated directly in front of the objectives.

Gen. Koestring (Mil. Attaché Moscow) reports back. He gives an account of his experiences at the start of the war and is very sharp in criticizing the air and Naval Attachés for leaving their posts.

Evening situation: AGp. South: Due to more heavy rainfall, only minor changes in our positions. Uman has not yet been taken, but to the north, Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. pushed from the north into an enemy retreat movement going east and are now apparently engaged in heavy fighting. Eleventh Armd.Div. has blocked several trains loaded with troops and is fighting it out with them now.

Center: Easing of tension at Propoisk. At Mogilev there still is bitter enemy resistance. At Smolensk we have not yet succeeded in slamming the door on the last escape route. Fighting is continuing at Nevel, where considerable enemy elements obviously have fought their way out. Velikie Luki had to be abandoned. In spite of these local setbacks, von Bock's haul of prisoners in the second series of battles\*\* has already risen to more than 100,000; over 1,000 guns have been captured.

AGp. North: On Lake Ilmen, the enemy is being driven back slowly. On the right wing of Army Gp. the movement to the north is getting under way. No other change.

22 July 1941. ( 31th Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, heavy fighting is in progress at Uman, where Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. have clashed with strong forces of the enemy. Apparently the enemy is concentrating units taken out of his withdrawing front against our tank wedge, in order to save as much as he can of the perhaps substantial force in the area, now threatened with encirclement. This policy may of course produce some tight situations for our Armor in the Uman area, especially as the operation against the Red Twenty-sixth Army looks as if it might drag on a while.

In Reichenau's sector, adoption of our suggestion is showing

results. He is now making his main effort on the right wing in order to push the Korosten enemy away from the Dniepr. Also formation of the assault group south of Kiev has now been initiated.

In AGp. Center, the Smolensk pocket is actually not yet closed. Seventh Armd.Div. is apparently not on the great motor highway to Moscow, but north of it; fighting is continuing also in that area. Now with the Nevel pocket burst open and Velikie Luki abandoned, the prospects of an overwhelming success in terms of enemy destroyed, are dwindling. Also on the Dniepr, at Novi Bikhov, the enemy is still holding firm and fighting.

In AGp. North, the movements are developing according to plan.

Air: Bogatsch: a) Destruction of railroads. Railroad movements.  
b) Aircraft destroyed to date: 7,564.  
c) Assault on Moscow: 200 aircraft, using also the new 2.5 ton bombs.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Plans for future operations and new locations of Hqs of Army Gps. and of OKH.
- b) Signal troops for railroads: To date, Gercke has received one Bn. and five Cos. to strengthen his own railroad formation.
- c) Radio intelligence: Three Corps at Odessa. Leningrad: One new Army Eq., one Armd. unit southwest of Leningrad, two Divs. at Luga.
- d) Twenty-ninth Red Army at Rybinsk.
- e) Twenty-eighth Red Army at Sukhinichi.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Report on naval situation: The Russians are becoming more active under British influence. Control Gulf of Riga with light naval units. Our mine barrages cannot be adequately replenished. Riga is being used by our light naval units, but is not yet usable as a permanent base. Windau is under attack by enemy air force. Consequently, Memel and Libau are depended on as bases for our shipping in the Baltic.

France: Necessity of cooperation with France. Our problems in Mediterranean cannot be resolved any other way.

Mediterranean: Problem of shipping space can be conquered with the aid of French. The Italians are in no position to furnish the escort required.

Atlantic: No battleships in the Atlantic before next fall. Until then only submarines (at present 20, in fall 40, at the end of the year 60 operating); their effort greatly obstructed by intensified air patrolling: U.S. activity is making itself felt !

In the afternoon, ObdH returns from the Fuehrer, who is again in a state over AGp. North. It is not concentrated anywhere and does everything wrong. As a matter of fact, things up there are not quite as good as in other places, and cooperation with us is a little less smooth.

In the afternoon, work on the directives for the coming operations of the Army Gps.

Evening situation: Good progress on the southern wing of AGp. South. Otherwise no change.

Evening: Conference with ObdH, Heusinger, Wagner on conduct of operation "Barbarossa" in the weeks to come.

With Paulus, on preparations for likely operations in the West and in the Mediterranean.

23 July 1941. ( 32nd Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, the wedge of Arm. Gp. 1, pushed on Uman, is under heavy attacks from all sides. Our other offensive operations, also the one against the Red Twenty-sixth Army, are proceeding according to plan.

AGp. Center: The Inf. Divs. are rapidly closing up. The flanks of Army Gp. are now coming under attack.

AGp. North: When Sixteenth Army has brought the current battle to a close, it will be transferred to its jump-off sector.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance indicates start of movements against the flanks of von Bock. Kalinin and Bologoye bear continued watching. Also Rzhev! Heavy AAA on the Smolensk and Bologoye fronts.

Gen. Wagner:

- a) Supply situation. Still tight in Center, where consumption of ammunition is at a mounting rate. Instead of the required steady flow of 14 trains, arrivals vary between 8 and 15.
- b) Continuance of the operation. It will be impossible to start off three groups simultaneously in AGp. Center on 3 August. The best plan will be to move up Ninth Army first, bring Second Army up to full strength in the meantime, and after that concentrate on filling up Ninth Army. Bobruisk probably will be sufficient for von Kluge's new group.\*
- c) For supply purposes, Armd. Gp. 3 must be transferred to Ninth Army (Dvinsk).

Gen. Buhle: Tank losses generally reasonable. Total losses comprise on an average. 20% of tank casualties. Personnel losses vary with Divs. ! Worst hit are Eleventh, Sixteenth, Third, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, First and Eighth Armd. Divs. Officer casualties in some units as high as 50% !  
Truck situation generally satisfactory. Armd. Commands want 8 to 10 days for reconditioning. Impossible at present !

1800 Report to Fuehrer: I summarize the enemy situation and raise the question of the ultimate objectives of the operation. He has settled in his mind the objectives specified in yesterday's OKW directive and sticks to them, enemy or no enemy, or any other considerations.

Von Bock so will have to release his Armd. Gps. and move on Moscow with Inf. alone.

Moreover, the Fuehrer right now is not interested in Moscow; all he cares about is Leningrad. This sets off a long-winded tirade on how von Leeb's operation ought to have been conducted and why Armd. Gp. 3 now has to be thrown into the battle to destroy the enemy at Leningrad.

The chief object of the operations is viewed by him in the smashing of the enemy, a task which he believes would probably be accomplished by the time we are abreast of Moscow. Subsequently ( and into the rainy fall season!) he imagines one could drive to the Volga and into the Caucasus with Armd. Divs. alone.

Let's hope he is right -- but all one can say is that time spent in such a conference is a sad waste.

Evening situation: At Uman, the situation is still tight. -- In AGp. Center, large numbers of prisoners are beginning to come in from the pockets. \* The coming attack on von Bock's flanks is becoming more sharply outlined.

24 July 1941. ( 33rd Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, the situation in Eleventh and Seventeenth Armd. Divs. is growing increasingly acute. The two Divs. are much too weak to withstand the onrush of the enemy driven back by Schwedler and Seventeenth Army, and it is difficult to get reinforcements to them from the main body of Armd. Gp., which is pinned down in fighting right now. Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies are making good progress; but Eleventh Army is pointed very far to the southeast instead of hard to the east ! Sixth Army is still scattered all over the map. No concentration anywhere !

Center is closing up. Enemy pressure against the flanks is preparing or ( in the north ) already developing. Difficulties on the extreme right wing of Second Army.

North is regrouping for new advances. So far it is still impossible to make out at what point the main weight is going to be concentrated.

Gen. Bogatsch reports transport movements: rearward on the front of AGp. South, and frontward, in the sector of AGp. Center.

In the evening, another movement is reported running eastward from Gomel.

Radio intelligence has indications that Timoshenko's Hq has been divided into two sections, whereby it may be expected that his personal influence will be felt on the right flank of AGp. Center, and that of his C of S, on the left flank.

Gen. Buhle

- a) Ten days' pause for overhauling before Armd. Divs. start on the new offensive. Then we can count on 60 - 70% tank striking power. Dust is to blame for rise in engine casualties, since the crossing of the Beresina.
- b) Some Armd. Divs. should be stripped to fill up other Divs. That would get us to Kharkov with about 50% operational tanks.

We would release for that purpose Sixteenth Armd. Div. in Armd. Gp. 1, Seventeenth in Armd. Gp. 2, and Twentieth in Armd. Gp. 3. The Divs. destined for cannibalization will surrender the bulk of their materiel and all personnel save their Hqs. These skeleton Divs. comprising 50% of the NCO and 10% of the enlisted personnel and at least one officer of each tactical unit, will be returned to the Zi\*.

Gen. Keitel (Personnel Div.): Our reserve of 2,000 young officers is used up except for a few Anti-Tank, Artillery and Engineers officers; of the 4,700 remaining in the Replacement Army, not all are fit for frontline service. -- System of direct requisitions from Mil. Districts will be discontinued. All requisitions for officers must go through Personnel Div. -- New officer training courses begin on 20 Aug; 5,000 candidates. -- Bn. COs are getting scarce. (Take good men of company rank ! )

Heusinger: Current matters and preparation for the C of S conference on 25 July.

Liaison Off. AGp. North: Talk about situation in AGp. North and orientation on new operation.

Gen. Paulus: Navy does not want to continue assignments for "Haifisch". OKW will not reopen the English question before the spring of 1942, but it is essential to have something going in the West, to keep the interest of the troops alive.

Field Marshal von Bock: Had a talk with the Fuehrer:

- a) Concerning the "hole" at Smolensk.

b) His worries about the right wing of Second Army.

Evening situation shows nothing new. The situation on the right wing of Second Army has eased. ( Apparently only reconnaissance thrusts).

25 July 1941. ( 34th Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, some progress in the development of the situation on the northern wing and south of Kiev. On the southern wing of Armd. Gp. 1 the situation is still a little uneasy. On the whole, things are clearing up, though.

In AGp. Center yesterday's air reconnaissance shows that the enemy is bringing up forces against the right flank of Army Gp., apparently also by rail. Here we shall have to expect an attack soon.

On the northern flank of Army the enemy seems to be re-grouping with the idea of using only Armor to protect his rear position at Rzhev, and building up his front in the Valdai Hills with Inf.

In AGp. North no important developments.

1130 - 1600 Conference with the C of S of the Army Gps.: von Sodenstern, von Greiffenberg, Brennecke.

- a) Brief opening address by ObdH (thanks, interference from top level, need for adapting to the character of country and enemy; demand for energetic leadership; warning against overdispersal by lateral expansion; \* maintenance of depth; resupply; need for clear-cut dispositions by sectors\*\*). Discussion:
  - a) Brief retrospect. We review tactical and operational experiences.
  - b) Present situation. Resources for developing opportunities and necessity for Army Gps. to take a hand, especially in North and South\*\*\*.
  - c) Plans for conduct of new operations, with particulars on possible execution.
  - d) Supply matters. (Presentation by Wagner.)
  - e) Organizational matters. (Presentation by Buhle.)

The AGp. Cs of S briefly comment on the possibilities envisaged by them, and on timing.

Allowing for a period of rehabilitation, AGp. Center could be ready to start the new offensive on about 10 Aug. Right wing, if necessary, could start off sooner. Also left wing, where less opposition is expected, could start

operations at an earlier date ( 3 - 5 Aug).

AGp. North believes it will be able to start at the end of the month, with main effort at Lake Ilmen (Busch).

AGp. South thinks that, by the end of the month, it will have everything ready for Reichenau's offensive across the Dniepr north and south of Kiev. It also hopes that Armd. Gp. 1 will have completed its mission west of the Dniepr by that time, so that it could proceed to the crossing of the river at Kromenchug and Cherkassi with a view to an eventual junction of Armd.Gps. 1 and 2 in the area northwest of Kharkov.

It remains to be seen if local cooperation with AGp. Center west or directly east of the Dniepr at an earlier date ( end of July ) offers any chances of success against the Russian Fifth Army.

Supply will be quite difficult, even if railroad capacity improves over present levels. Overwhelming problems need to be overcome in supplying northeastward advance of Armd.Gp. 3, toward the Valdai Hills.

Frontline messages report heavy attacks into southern flank of AGp. Center (Regt. Grossdeutschland and XII Corps).

The evening reports offer no important news apart from confirming the transport movement from Gomel on Orel through Bryansk, which started on 24 July and continued through 25 July.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the enemy put on particularly heavy attacks east of Novi Bikhov, a Vidara and northwest of Roslavl today.

In AGp. South, the unsettled situation at Uman has been stabilized.

In AGp. North, no important new developments. The attacks on Lake Ilmen are making only slow progress.

Statistics on prisoners and booty in AGp. Center: Since battle of Minsk, 185,487 prisoners, 2,030 tanks, 1,918 guns.

26 July 1941. ( 35th Day )

Situation: South: The enemy is still finding means to escape the developing encirclement. Savage counter attacks against the advancing pursuit forces cover the effort of extricating troops from the threatened area, which is accomplished with exceeding skill, by both rail and mot. movements. The Red Twenty-sixth Army has been severely compressed; the Red Fifth Army is shifting its main weight to the east.

Center: On the front of von Bock's extreme right wing, the enemy is giving ground. The strong forces which recently



were at Gomel apparently are being shifted northward, to the area of the Roslavl - Smolensk highway. At Yelnya, the enemy is continuing his attacks with new Divs. and new tanks, brought up from the east.

Attacks also from northeastern direction against Hoth's northern flank. Our Inf. is closing up.

North: Enemy resistance by many small enemy bodies fighting stubbornly on the front of the southern wing and on both sides of Lake Ilmen. In Manstein's sector, slow progress in very difficult terrain. West of Lake Peipus, the enemy forces are being pinched off at Dorpat.

Over-all picture: Enemy defense is becoming more aggressive; more tanks, more planes. In addition to ten new Divs. previously listed, fifteen more new Divs. have been reported.

Morning conference with ObdH. I outline the proposals of the Army Gps. for the next moves, adding my critical comments. I am surprised by his emphasis on the necessity of an early attack against the strong enemy group at Gomel. It becomes soon apparent that this is one of the Fuehrer's notions.

Such a plan implies a shift in our strategy from the operational to the tactical level. If striking at small local enemy concentrations becomes our sole objective, the campaign will resolve itself into a series of minor successes which will advance our front only by inches. Pursuing such a policy eliminates all tactical risks and enables us gradually to close the gaps between the front of the Army Gps., but the result will be that we feed all our strength into a front expanding in width at the sacrifice of depth and end up in position warfare!

ObdH calls up von Bock\* to talk over the possibilities for an offensive against the Gomel group. von Bock vehemently opposes any attack with tanks from the east, holding that such a diversion of Armor would sabotage the very operational conceptions underlying the plan for the new phase of the campaign.

Major von Below (Liaison Off. to Guderian) reports on enemy picture and situation. Combat strength of our own troops after five days of refitting will be an average of about 50%.-- Memorandum in justification of himself.

von Etzdorf: Japan: New Cabinet apparently continues pro-Axis orientation. Timing may be changed. -- Indochina. -- Vladivostok.

France has been put on ice. No reply to their notes before two or three weeks. Question of Bizerte is being worked on.

Turkey: Papen reports that things will follow their logical development if we make progress against Russia. German offers postponed until some later date. The Turks are thinking of the creation of buffer states in Caucasia and Turkestan.\*\*

Iran: Government virtually under British control. (gold!).

U.S.A. Entry into the war unlikely at the moment. --  
Still, Roosevelt's "hectic policy" admits of surprises. --  
Efforts to give assistance by supplies are indicated by  
stepped-up shipments to Basra.

Finland fights shy of breaking diplomatic relations  
with England. Seizure of Finnish ships by England will  
perhaps speed up the matter.

Sweden has refused joining the Axis. We shall ignore her  
in the future.

Balkans: Bulgaro-Romanian conversations on frontier read-  
justment and resettlement of populations.

Italy: War unpopular. Strong voices against the policy  
of Colonial and Empire expansion. Fuehrer's letter to Il  
Duce, reminding him to keep watchful eye on France. (The  
motive probably is to dissipate Italian suspicions.)

Gen. Konrad:      a) The Reich Marshal is critical of the Army.\*  
                      b) Air Force wants Army to tell where it  
                          wants main effort.  
                      c) Review of coming operations.

1800 - 2015 Report to the Fuehrer on plans of the Army Gps.  
Longwinded, at times warm, discussion on missed opportu-  
nities for encirclement. He wants:

- 1.) AGp. South must abandon the plan of an operational  
envelopment west of the Dniepr, if prospects of success  
are seen diminishing. All Armd. Divs. must then be  
put across to eastern bank.
- 2.) Disposition of Gomel by a purely tactical operation  
conducted by a new group to be formed under von Kluge.  
The operation must be launched at the earliest, regard-  
less of the timing of other attacks, and if possible  
be developed into encirclement of the Korosten group.
- 3.) Von Bock's group for the frontal offensive on Moscow  
should start pushing ahead slowly as soon as ready.\*\*  
No hurry.\*\*\*
- 4.) Hoth should start his drive on the Valdai Hills as  
soon as possible, so that he would get there no later  
than the right wing of Sixteenth Army.
- 5.) In AGp. North main effort on Lake Ilmen.

The Fuehrer's analysis, which at many points is unjustly  
critical of the Field Commands, indicates a complete break  
with the strategy of large operational conceptions. You  
cannot beat the Russians with operational successes, he  
argues, because they simply do not know when they are  
defeated. On that account it will be necessary to destroy

them bit by bit, in small encircling actions of a purely tactical character.\*

Of course, there is something in these ideas as regards the Russians. But following such a course implies letting the enemy dictate our policy, and reduces our operations to a tempo which will not permit us to reach our goal, the Volga. We must remember that the Russians have plenty of manpower, and it is very unlikely that we could pursue the new policy to the point where the enemy cracks and the way is clear again for operations on a big scale.

To me, these arguments mark the beginning decline of our initial strategy of imaginative operations, and a willingness to throw away the opportunities offered us by the impetus of our Inf. and Armor.

It remains to be seen whether this radical change in strategic conception, which at first certainly will come as a surprise also to the enemy, will bring the desired success. My representations stressing the importance of Moscow are brushed aside without any valid counter evidence.

Gen. Paulus reports on his visit to AGp. North. Hoepfner, Manstein and Reinhard concur that the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus is unsuited to operations of Armd. units. All we can do at Lake Ilmen is to attack with Infantry while keeping in readiness the Armor not yet committed (Manstein's Corps.), for a follow-up where Infantry has cleared the path. As a consequence development of the battle will be very slow.

The situation of Reinhard's Corps is very uncomfortable. Reinhard vehemently demands to be given the go-ahead signal. But this is out of the question as long as the offensive from the direction of Luga has not become effective.

Greatly intensified enemy air activity is reported also in that area.

Evening situation: No major changes. Heavy enemy attacks in the sectors previously subjected to enemy action: In AGp. South, against the tank wedge, where the enemy evidently had a local success against Eleventh Armd.Div.; and in AGp. Center against von Kluge's wings and flanks.

Increased enemy air and tank activity, especially against Hoth's left shoulder.

The enemy shows intense activity along the entire front, evidently in the hope of freeing yet the elements encircled at Smolensk. Two or three Army Hqs are believed to be trapped in the pocket. New Army Hqs are taking their places on the front of AGp. Center.

27 July 1941. ( 36th Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, disastrous rainstorms have paralyzed all movements. All we can try to accomplish now is to push the tank wedge aimed at Uman sufficiently far to the south, so as to cut at least the railroad and roads going east through Uman.

In AGp. Center weak enemy attacks are reported on the Dniepr, at Gomel, heavier ones at Roslavl. All were repelled, at great cost to the enemy in prisoners and guns. At Yelnya, the front has quieted. In Hoth's sector, the enemy launched local attacks mostly in Bn. or Regt. strength, without success. Attacks were also repulsed on the left wing, south of Velikie Luki. Enemy air activity is on the increase and in part quite uncomfortable.

AGp. North. Nothing new. Stiff enemy resistance on the front of our Lake Ilmen group; on the rest of this front no major actions. West of Lake Peipus, part of the enemy force is encircled north of Dorpat. The other sectors are quiet.

Gen. Wagner:

- a) Transport of wounded -- Hospital trains. A process is now underway to have all hospital cases evacuated by 10 August. To this end we need one train per Army; Sixth Army needs more.
- b) Arrival of supply trains satisfactory in South; just enough in Center; not enough in North.
- c) OQu conference on 28 July ! Program for conference. Our aim must be to fill up the first issues everywhere by 3 Aug.; after that we can begin stockpiling ammunition.
- d) Briefing on operational plans.
- e) Military Government: Ukrainians and nationals of the Baltic States are being released from prison camps. In AGp., South the boundary of the Rear Area is being moved forward.  
On 1 August, Vilna will be taken over by the Wehrmacht-befehlshaber; Bialystok will be incorporated in East Prussia and Lwow passes to control of Military Commander in the Government-General.
- f) Hungarians will be taken out of the areas temporarily administered by them, which go to Government-General, on 1 Aug.
- g) Slovaks will remain in the area now taken over by Government-General, with Army Gp. retaining formal control of them. They are merging two Divs. into one and carry out a training program.
- h) Army mail. On the whole no complaints. Delivery either

way 6 - 8 days in Sixth Army, 10 - 14 days in Fourth Army.

- i) Tank spare parts situation improved, also as regards engines.
- k) Occupation costs in France reduced from 20 to 10 billion francs.

Gen. Brand (Arty.):

- a) Coastal artillery: To date only nine Btrys. along coast to Riga; three more in preparation for shore east and west of Pernau. Project for coast of Gulf of Finland: one 17 cm Bn., two 10 cm Bns.
- b) Kronstadt: Artillery armament of fortress and possibilities for attack. Pictorial map.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Loss of materiel through enemy surprise attack on Sixteenth Armd. Div.\* Motorcycle Co. and a 5 cm AT Plat. must be activated.
- b) Organizational plans for the activation of first-class Divs. (present First Draft, strengthened), second-class Divs. (for all defensive missions); and of third-class Divs. (occupation duty).
- c) In each Division immobilized in the rear area, one Plat. of captured tanks will be activated for the Anti-tank Cos. (i.e., 6 tank platoons per Div., each with 4 or 5 tanks); in Security Divisions, one Plat.
- d) Himer's Staff will be recalled, Erfurth's Staff reduced.
- e) The post of a "Staff Officer in charge of Armd. Trains" must be created at OKH. Will be assigned to the Staff the Armored Troops Chief.\*\*

Gen. Jacob :

- a) Distribution of Bridge Clms. Reallocation gives the following distribution:

|                   |                           |       |    |
|-------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|
| Armd. Gp. 3:      | 13 Bridge Clms. B (add 2) | total | 15 |
| Second Armies:    | 18 Bridge Clms. B         |       |    |
|                   | 4 " " T                   | total | 22 |
| Armd. Gp. 2 and   |                           |       |    |
| Second and Fourth | 30 Bridge Clms. B         |       |    |
| Armies:           | 3 " " G                   | total | 33 |
| Army Gp. South:   | 66 Bridge Clms. B         |       |    |
|                   | 3 " " G                   |       |    |
|                   | 5 " " "                   |       |    |
|                   | 1 Bench "                 | total | 79 |

|                 |    |          |       |   |           |
|-----------------|----|----------|-------|---|-----------|
| Army Gp. North: | 33 | Bridge   | Clms. | B |           |
|                 | 4  | "        | "     | G |           |
|                 | 3  | "        | "     | T |           |
|                 | 8  | Austrian | "     |   | total 48. |

b) River mines for the Dniepr; mines and wire carried by Eng. units.

ObdH visited AGp. Center: Review of the plans for Gomel, offensive against Moscow, and Hoth's operation against the Valdai Hills:

Guderian must take out time for rehabilitation of materiel and personnel. Will be finished about 3 or 4 Aug. VII and IX Corps will be placed under Guderian's command to relieve his Armd. forces. VII Corps will strike on Roslavl; this attack should, if possible, be conducted as a preliminary to the attack on Gomel.

Hoth will come under control of Strauss. Von Kluge will be withdrawn and take over Hoth's assault group now under Hq Second Army.

Evening: In South, bad weather. Bridge is being constructed at Dubossary. Eleventh Army wants a break of three days. (Impossible, paired attack with Armd. Gp.). Kleist again wants to run off to the southeast instead of swinging southward. -- Russian Cavalry north of Korosten.

On front of AGp. Center, appearance of two Divs. previously identified at Korosten. Cavalry west of Gomel, in the Bobruisk area. Some of the Russian Inf. attacking at Roslavl had no rifles; were guarded by partisans.\*

AGp. North. Lake Ilmen sector. In front of von Manstein, the enemy is holding doggedly. The time is ripe to take Narva. North of Dorpat, a Russian pocket has been cleaned out: 1,600 prisoners, over 50 guns. 9 enemy bridges north of Luga.

28 July 1941. (37th Day)

Situation: No important new developments. An order has been issued to AGp. South to swing Armd. Gp. 1 not to the southeast, but to the south, on Uman.

In AGp. Center the Russian Cavalry behind the right wing of AGp. Center is still active and is reported to have even damaged the railroad line to Bobruisk. Counter-measures have been initiated.

The Mogilev pocket is now completely cleaned out. The numbers of prisoners and guns corroborate our original estimate of 6 enemy Divs.

In AGp. North. Good progress toward Staraya Russa. Otherwise no change. AGp. asserts it can launch the Narva attack only if Reinhard's entire group is swung forward on the hinge of First Armd. Div. Sounds quite unfeasible. To my mind, the whole attack is no more than a Combat ng. assault.

Field Marshal von Bock ( on phone ) 1030:

- 1.) Terrain east of the Sosh river impracticable for Guderian's attack.
- 2.) Roslavl must be taken. To do this, Guderian need not advance in direction of Bryansk, but can turn off to the Iput river. Roslavl is in any event necessary as a jump-off base\* for the right wing of von Bock's Group in its eastward advance, as well as for Guderian.
- 3.) Von Bock's forces too weak for further advance to the east, since he needs large forces on his right wing (echelonned flank protection)\*. In that he is right!
- 4.) Action taken by Army Gp. to eliminate Russian Cav. force in its rear. (Fegelein, Schenkendorf; elements of rear Divisions are brought up for a concentric drive; Air Force is alerted).
- 5.) Guderian needs until 3 or 4 August.

Grouping of enemy:

New Front Hq South (Odessa): Ninth, Second, Eighteenth Armies.

Old Front Hq Southwest: Twelfth, Sixth, Twenty-sixth and Fifth Armies

New Army Hq near Leningrad.

Bogatsch:

- a) Unidentified transport movements from the area of Ribinsk to Leningrad. (From Moscow?)
- b) Narva bridge apparently made unusable for trains.
- c) New: Railroad line under construction from the Baltic ports south of Leningrad to the Ribinsk railroad line. Right of way and structures finished. Tracks have not yet been laid. Perhaps of service for moving troops.
- d) Extensive destructions in Bologoye-RR station (aerial photograph).
- e) Activities interpreted as attempts to prepare the Estonian ports for defense from land side. Land fortifications south of Kronstadt? \* \*
- f) Behind sector fronting AGp. South, industrial evacuations. For the most part the rail network appears to

be jammed at critical points. No operational movements observed.

von Ziehlberg: Current reassignments. Decorations for Gen.Staff personnel.

Report 1300: Enemy attacks south of Luga result in penetration in the sector of 289th Div. Parts of Eighth Armd.Div. must be committed.

Col. Ochsenri: Reports on his tour to AGp. South. The "Do" units and the Heavy Rocket Launchers\* have been exceedingly effective everywhere. We must see to it that this evidently very effective weapon is put to even more extensive use. The difficulty lies in ammunition supply.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Axes of communications for von Kluge and Hoth's Armd.Gp. in the projected operations. -- Cipher operations procedure.\*\*

Lt. Col. Stieff reports on his trip to Armd. Gp. 3. -- Road problems and combat conditions. -- Ammunition difficulties. -- Resentment against Armd.Gp. 2. -- Condition of vehicles. -- Directives, not orders !\*\*\*

Major Mueller-Hillebrand reports on his visit to Ninth Armd.Div. Combat conditions. -- Leadership. -- Roads. -- Traffic control.

Evening situation: South: With roads still very bad, Army Gp. is moving its Armd. Gp. harder to south-southeast. (Should be still more to the south!)

Center: Enemy encircled at Smolensk still fairly strong. An enemy attack (allegedly a Cav. Corps of three Divs.) has broken into the southern flank. Heavy attacks at Rogachev and Roslavl, and also on the front of Armd.Gp.3, where five Rifle Divs. and three Armd.Divs. have been identified.

North: Break-through at Luga has been sealed. Advances on the right wing and toward Staraya Russa.

At the evening situation conference I again point out the absurdity of the operation now decided on. They are bound to result in dispersion of our strength and checking of the drive on Moscow, the crucial objective. Von Bock's Group obviously has been weakened to a point where he is barely able to replace his Armor with Infantry, let alone mount any offensive. Attack impossible before 10 Aug.

29 July 1941. ( 38th Day ).

Situation: South: New restricted gains. Pockets are developing between Armd.Gp. 1 and Seventeenth Army, also between Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies.



Center: Local attacks. Enemy situation on the whole unchanged. Another new Army Hq has been inserted in the front; it controls three new Rifle Divs., one of which is made up mainly of untrained Moscow industrial workers.

North: Amazingly good progress on Kholm. Also advances in the direction of Staraya Russa. The enemy penetration in the Luga area has been contained. West of Lake Peipus two small enemy pockets have been formed.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Arrival of trains is good in North (18) and Center (10), insufficient in South (10).
- b) It will take until 15 Aug. to replenish the first ammunition issue in all organizations; stockpiling will be possible only after that.
- c) Spare parts situation: Repair installations in the Orsha base have been centralized. Engines have arrived for 80 Tanks III and 30 Czech 38 Tanks. (We requisitioned 250.) Specialist workers have arrived at the front.
- d) Truck replacements urgently needed.
- e) New operations:

North thinks it can carry out its operations with 18 trains, daily. Armd. Gp. 3 thinks its best plan is to advance along the railroad line. Railroad line usable as far as Novo Sokolniki; 8,000 tons of Truck Ctm. space (including 4,000 tons for immediate needs\*).

Eighteenth Army is supplying Reinhard's Corps through Pskov (Gen Qu base). Transport capacity of Eighteenth Army has declined 40%, owing to immobilization of trailers.\*\*

Center: Bridge \*\*\* under construction at Ulla.

South still needs more Truck Ctm. to transport supplies from the jump-off base to the front; railroad line cannot handle the volume. Dniepr crossing planned for 5 Aug. It will be possible to move up  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ammunition issues for the operation. 2,000 tons have been allocated for the preparation of the crossing at Cherkassi. Balta is Army base, with fuel depots and medical services. Base in the Dniepr bend planned for later on. Preparations initiated for sea route to Nikolayev (Merk).

- f) "Administrative Orders" appendix to the Operational Orders for the new offensive.

Col. Breith (Armd. Troops) reports on his visit to Armd. Gps. 2 and 3. Nothing new of any importance. Traffic discipline and control # deficient. Control Dets. too weak. Hqs of Armd. Divs. and Corps need organic Hq guards.

Gen. Paulus, Gen. Gause: Command organization in North Africa.  
Plan for attack on Tobruk.

Gen. Osterkamp ( Chief, Army Rations Office ):

- a) Preparations for the winter. Everything ready, expect cooking kettles.\* General conference at Gen Qu's Office today.
- b) Rations for North Africa set aside: 50,000, for 50 days.
- c) Crop prospects:
  - Bread cereals: Last year, 11.6 mill. tons, this year 12.8. Average of last five years, 13.9.
  - Fodder grain: Last year, 12.08 mill. tons, this year, 11.13. Average of last five years, 12.07.
  - Total grain crop: Last year, 23.07 mill. tons, this year, 23.9. Average of last five years, 25.9.
- d) Total crop: Good average crop. New East produced 0.6 mill. tons more than last year. Protectorate 0.2 mill. tons under last year's production.
- e) Farm labor:
  - From other countries 210,000
  - PWs 1,500,000
  - Russian PWs 200,000
  - round 2,000,000
- f) Potatoes: Late, but not bad.
- g) Hay: First mowing good average in both quantity and quality.
- h) Livestock: Cattle, stationary; hogs, somewhat more.
- i) Comparison between food rations in England and in Germany: Meat, same; bread, better in England; jam, cheese and fat, better in Germany; sugar, coffee, tea, better in England.

Heusinger: a) Problems likely to be encountered by AGp. North in fighting coastal fortifications. Artillery!  
b) Anticipated strength requirements after successful completion of operations in Russia. Memorandum on disposition of forces.

Paulus: Report on his conference with OKW:

- a) Any restrictions imposed on Army Gp. North by OKW? Answer evasive! VIII Air Corps employed in support of push of Lake Ilmen Group, without notifying OKH.

- b) North Africa is an Italian theater of operations. Bastide is in full charge there.— High Command Armd. Gp. must be organized. Will control defensive front at Sidi Barrani and the mobile wing. The Italians will decide about attack on Tobruk.
- c) Safeguarding of transport on North African route is the responsibility of the Italians. In the present situation it would be a crime to allocate German planes for this purpose. OKW has nothing left to help out with.

Evening situation:

- a) Straits of Eleventh Army due to lack of ammunition and attacks from the south.
- b) AGp. South plans to have Schwedler's strike eastward toward the Dniepr and against Kiev.
- c) Center: Enemy river boats on the Pripet are harrassing our troops. — Enemy Cav. Corps is still kicking up in the rear of the Army Gp. VII Corps is brought to bear against Roslavl. Enemy attack achieves minor penetration in Nineteenth and Twentieth Armd. Divs. Unusually heavy attacks against VI Corps and Fourteenth mot. Div.
- d) In AGp. North, enemy puts on powerful attacks on Velikie Luki. Our troops are in a precarious position owing to lack of ammunition. II Corps makes very good progress in the direction of Kholm.

The situation on the boundary between Army Gp. Center and North makes it necessary to combine the forces in the area for unified action. Order to this effect has been issued. The combined force will be under command of Ninth Army. I wanted to have this done several days ago, but was vetoed then.

30 July 1941 (39th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, the weeks of grinding at the Russian front in the Ukraine are beginning to tell. The enemy front is crumbling. Notwithstanding, we must expect that owing to the absence of any pressure from the Romanians and the existence of several well-preserved enemy Divs. in the sector of the Front Group South, an attempt will be made to hold the coastal district around Odessa. Odessa may become a Russian Tobruk. There is only one way to prevent this: Armd. Gp. I must strike due south through Pervomaisk.

Schwedler has reformed a large portion of his group. It would be inadvisable at this time to send him off in north-eastern direction for a crossing of the Dniepr south of

Kiev, instead, it must be moved due east so that it remains available a few days longer for operations to the south.

Sixth Army has now completely detached its left wing. Von Reichenau with his right wing is probably pressing on to the Dnieper, north of Kiev. He has his orders to destroy the enemy group at Korosten, and must be kept from doing anything else.

Center: Attempts to withdraw the Armd. Divs. from their sectors\* must be abandoned owing to the incessant enemy attacks. Fourth Armd. Div. had to be committed again at Kriukov, "Grossdeutschland" at Roslavl.

South and southwest of Toropets, heavy fighting is reported. Here we have a chance to catch a large enemy force, and would need cooperation of AGp. Center, attacking with Fourteenth mot. Div. from the south, and AGp. North, attacking with I Corps from the north, and with Schubert's Combat Team from Velikie Luki. The order for such an operation must come from OKH.

North: It is becoming evident that OKW is revising its erstwhile notions and no longer insists on the impossible demand for AGp. North to cut off the eastward retreat route of the enemy around Leningrad. For the time being the commitment of VIII Air Corps in the sector of AGp. North has been cancelled.-- Eighth Armd. Div. has gone into action at Luga.

Telephone talk ObdH/van Bock: Second Army claims that the enemy fronting it has softened. It proposes a small-scale operation from the west and north for clearing the enemy out of Rogachev and the surrounding country.

Army Gp. wants to do Roslavl on 31 July or 1 Aug. Twentieth Armd. Div. is up against a very tough situation (40 enemy Btrys.); XXIII Corps has passed to the defensive; Fourteenth mot. Div. is not up to its full fighting strength.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance:

- a) Westward movements on Leningrad, also from Moscow to Leningrad. Wrecking of railroad lines apparently was not complete enough.
- b) Plane replacement for Long-range Rcn. Staffeln has completely ceased.
- c) It has become necessary to withdraw the Close-range Staffeln from the Army Gps. Plane strength of units severely diminished, and no replacements available. Out of ten Staffeln, six at least must be reorganized as workshop formations for the period of rehabilitation\*\*; they will be under control of the AGp. Air Officers.
- d) By scraping the bottom of the barrel, we would have replacements for our Henschel planes only until 1 Sept. Then this type will be exhausted, and there will be no replacements. In the Night Staffeln things are not

much different. Here the bottleneck is more on the personnel side than in materiel.

Gen. Ott reports on his visit to Armd. Gp. 4. He canvassed Commanders on the form Armd. Divs. should be given in the fall reorganization. Balk's proposal to give everything to the Cos., which would deprive the Bn. CO of all means for exercising control over operations, is generally rejected. Discussion on employment of the Motorcycle Bn. for reconnaissance.

Gen. Wagner ( on phone ): Reply to inquiry concerning possibilities to supply Hoepfner's right wing (Reinhard's Corps):

Pskov - Gdov road serviceable only for motor vehicles without trailers. Shipping on Lake Peipus has been instituted with 300 tons, navigation head Gdov. No definite data yet on time required. Available shipping space estimated at 1,500 tons. Towing vessels are few. Assault boats can help out. Within three days the road from Pskov to Gdov is expected to be much improved; we shall see then to what extent 60-ton Truck Clms. could be brought into use to relieve the situation.

Major Meyer-Ricks has returned from Libya.\* Report on the work of Felmy's Staff and on his impressions in Syria.

Wagner (Gen Qu) - Schmidt-Altenstadt:

- a) Employment of Security Divs.
- b) Supply position of Reinhard's Corps.
- c) Care of wounded. Senior medical officer must be assigned to the Gen Qu Hqs at the Army Gps.
- d) Separation of Russian and German wounded.
- e) The Fuehrer has not signed the agreement with France on reduction of occupation costs.

Gen. Rommel comes in. Discussion on the importance of the African theater of operations. -- He does not expect an English attack before next September; I consider August more likely. -- Reviews situation in North Africa.

von Ziehlberg: Decorations and current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Major Philippi (Op. Sec.) reports on his observations in Eleventh Armd. Div. and Hq of Kempff's Corps.

1600 Gen. Jodl calls up: The Fuehrer has arrived at a new conception of the next phase of the campaign:

AGp. North must defeat the enemy at Leningrad; is left discretion in choosing direction of main effort. Plan of thrust to cut the Moscow-Leningrad railroad is dropped.

Center: Here we must pass to the defensive. Only security measures on the line Lake Ilmen - Kholm - Toropets! Withdraw Armd. Divs. for rehabilitation.

South: For the time being we must leave Gomel alone. Whether we shall do Roslavl is not yet decided at the moment.

Air Force: Shift main strength to AGp. North, for close support in eliminating the enemy in Estonia. Will not be withdrawn before accomplishment of mission of AGp. North is assured.

1720 von Greiffenberg (on phone):

- 1.) Cooperation with AGp. North at Velikie Luki -- Toropets, to cut off the enemy.
- 2.) Rogachev. Army Gp. wants to do this job, as a preliminary to the eventual capture of Gomel. Can be ready within two days.
- 3.) Roslavl not conceived as an independent operation but as part of the later operations against Gomel.
- 4.) I Corps will be completely out of Artillery ammunition day after tomorrow!

Evening situation:

- a) Very promising break-through of Armd.Gp. I in southern direction, toward Pervomaisk.--- At last!  
On the eastern front \* many enemy attacks, at some points eleven times in succession; all repulsed!
- b) Operation Rogachev can start in five days ( 4 Aug. ).
- c) Roslavl can start on 1 Aug.; XXIV Corps, with VII Corps to its left.

2400. Heusinger: OKW has signed new "directive" which adopts our proposals! Limited objective: Rogachev. Not more than one Armd.Div. will be employed. At Roslavl, 263rd Inf.Div. will help. Toropets must be done. All necessary orders will be contained in the forthcoming Fuehrer order.

This decision frees every thinking soldier of the horrible vision obsessing us these last few days, when the Fuehrer's obstinacy made the final bogging down of the eastern campaign appear imminent. At long last we get a break!

Memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff on the Battle of the Atlantic. Very gratifying, but also sober in its appraisal of the situation.

31 July 1941. ( 40th Day )

Situation: South: No report yet on the fresh enemy forces observed south of Eleventh Army; it may be assumed to be still in the area.

The forming of pockets west and northwest of Pervomaisk is developing satisfactorily. Armd.Gp. 1 has pushed into the assembled forces of Twelfth Army as they were being taken out of the line. Apparently the left wing of Armd. Gp. 1 simply rolled over an enemy Div.

The movement of the Inf. Div. \* from the rear toward the Dniepr crossing site south of Kiev has got under way. The attack against the strong enemy force directly south of Kiev is in progress. Sixth Army still shows no clear intentions.

Center: Local enemy attacks. Otherwise nothing new. The fighting power of the enemy seems to be declining. The enemy is intensifying construction of positions on the front of Army Gp.

North: Army Gp. is resisting detachment of forces from the Kholm group in the direction of Toropets.

Progress at Lake Ilmen. The southwestern shore of the Lake has been reached. Next to Eighth Armd. Div., Third mot. Div. has now been committed in the direction of Luga. Manstein seems to be pressing in that direction.

No change on the northern wing and in Estonia.

A captured Gen.Staff Officer has stated that the enemy is shifting troops from the Leningrad front to the area south of Lake Ilmen (?). Railroad movements between Leningrad and Moscow (evacuations?).

Gen. Bogatsch: Air observation shows nothing new of importance. Tactical reconnaissance apparently suffers from the fact that fighter protection on reconnaissance sorties has become thin.

Radio intelligence suggests the following enemy command set-up:

|                    |   |            |
|--------------------|---|------------|
| Baltic Front       | ) | Voroshilov |
| Northwestern Front | ) |            |
| Western Front      | ) | Timoshenko |
| Central Front      | ) |            |
| Southwestern Front | ) | Budyonny   |
| Southern Front     | ) |            |

The "Armies" comprised in the "Fronts" seem to be some sort of Corps Hqs, each commanding several Divisions.

Radke: a) Serious loss by 52nd Rocket Proj. Regt.: A large quantity of secret material has been captured by the enemy. Basic order\*\*.

b) Propaganda leaflets. Commands want more leaflets. Arrangements made for continuous supply.

- c) Himmler states in a letter that last year's Polish incidents are now finally closed\*.

Talk with Wagner ( Gen Qu ):

- 1.) Ammunition shortage in Ninth Army was caused by assignment of I Corps to Army, for ammunition supply.
- 2.) AGp. North will have a complete first issue in the hands of troops on 5 Aug. Armd.Gp. 4 already has its ammunition. Eighteenth Army is filled up.
- 3.) Conditions for supply of the Narva Group will be investigated. Seems to have road trouble.

Major Schroetter ( Central Branch ) reports on his experiences with Thirteenth Armd. Div. (Duevert) at Fastov (southwest of Kiev). Very good impression.

Surgeon-General Dr. Handloser:

- a) Epidemics: Only in Romania a short outbreak of mild dysentery; no fatal cases. Otherwise we have been lucky everywhere so far.
- b) Medical casualties:  $\frac{1}{2}$  %. Very good !
- c) Allocation of "Special Groups" for blood transfusion and epidemics control.
- d) Conditions in the Field Medical Service. Transport problem. Questions of organization. One-sixth of all doctors come from the regular Army; five-sixth belong to the Reserve.
- e) ZI: Of 254,647 beds, 180,038 are occupied. We must procure additional 17,000 beds; to raise the number of free beds in the ZI to 100,000. In the light of our experiences this will last us for about a month (i.e. till early in September).

OKH issues its implementation order to the last Fuehrer "directive". Unfortunately I cannot induce ObdH to inject into this order the slightest overtone expressive of a will of his own. Its wording is dictated by an anxiety to avoid anything that could be suspected as opposition to his superior.

Evening situation: South: Eleventh Army is attacked from the south; on the front of Seventeenth Army, tough enemy resistance. Armd.Gp. 1 is wheeling into the rear of the enemy fronting Seventeenth Army; in this process its right wing is being attacked from the inside, its left wing from the outside. Echelonning on its left is deep enough to obviate any danger. Here for the first time we have a battle with inverted front, in which the attacking front is not a flank of armored Divs., but a front of wheeling units.



Sixth Army is operating in difficult terrain and against a stubborn enemy, and so its progress is slow. The group northwest of Kiev has little chance of success in the country between the wide forest areas. Massing against the enemy at Korosten is getting under way, but it probably will be a long time before the process is completed.

Center: Attack against southern flank and front. Yelnya especially is subjected to assaults from all directions.

In the Smolensk pocket everything seems to be quiet.

Three enemy Divs. on the northern flank at Velikie Luki. South of Toropets two enemy Divs. Report on enemy movements both against the southern flank and the front of Army Gp.; road movements from Moscow toward the front of the Army Gp.

North: II Corps has to overwhelm bitter enemy resistance at Kholm and therefore is still pinned down in fighting. Accordingly transfer of Twelfth Division to the south, will be impossible for the moment.

Nothing new between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus. Some progress in the area of Lake Ilmen.

Estonia: Awkward enemy raids behind the front. Ground gained to the northwest.

Gen. Wagner calls up:

- a) Road conditions east of Lake Peipus prevent sending larger reinforcements to the Narva Group. On Lake Peipus, navigation difficult. Daily capacity only 300 tons.
- b) Eckstein reports heavy requests for ammunition from AGp. Center. Field Marshal von Bock, who has been looking into the ammunition question himself; thinks Hq Ninth Army too easily upset. Army Gp. expects to replenish the first issue of ammunition by tomorrow or the day after. Only after that can they think of stockpiling. If railroad service to AGp. Center remains as it is now, we can meet current demands, but cannot accumulate reserve ammunition.
- c) Arrival of trains on 31 July: North, 10; Center, 16; South, 6 trains.

Concluded: 31 July 1941. Initial: H.

/ End of volume VI, without date: \*/

Conference of Chiefs of Staff: Use of smoke in river crossings. Not a question of organization, but of foresighted supply! \*\*

Traffic control.

Evacuation of a border strip in the East.

Liaison Officers and monitoring.

Utilization of Truck Cpls. (Engineers, CQu etc.).

Relationship Armor/ Inf.

For tactical jump-off, all men on board.

Artillery of rear Divs. --- Engineers of rear Divs. must build emergency bridges. --- Signal units of rear Divs., to attend to what is needed in crossings of rivers.

Chemical warfare units, airborne troops.

AT defense ( Russian doctrine of tank attack. A little everywhere! ) Air defense.

Attack and pursuit at night (lessons of the Greek Campaign).  
Surprise.

Field Hospitals.

All notes on this page crossed out with pencil.

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# WAR JOURNAL

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OF

FRANZ HALDER

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Chief of the General Staff of Supreme  
Command of the German Army (OKH), Vol VI.  
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## Volume VI

**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL**  
**OF**  
**GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER**

**Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

**14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942**

**VOLUME VI**

# CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

VOLUME VI.

CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA. PART I.

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

First entry: 21 February 1941

Last entry : 31 August 1941

\* \* \* \* \*

21 February 1941

Morning Conference: No special news. Things in Libya are proceeding satisfactorily. In the Eastern Mediterranean no clues to British measures.

Admiral Canaris: Points discussed:

- a) The general situation. All briefing of the Wehrmacht (also on naval and air matters) must be centralized in our hands.
- b) British capabilities at the outset of the operation in the East.
- c) Preparatory measures in the Ukraine and the Baltic States.
- d) Safeguarding of security, top secret matters.
- e) Personnel matters (Change of Section Chiefs).

Lt. Col. Radke: a) Soldiers' Memorial Day: Decoration of graves, celebrations in Berlin and in units.

b) Army Art Exhibition opening on 16 March.

c) Organization of Propaganda (Hesse).

Conference with ObdH: (Heusinger present): Reports from the Army Groups. -- Operational objectives for Barbarossa. Full agreement is reached on all proposals.

OCu IV: Current matters.

British Air Strength. 15 February 1941

|                        |      | Bomber and<br>Transport   | Fighter               | Close Recon-<br>naissance &<br>multiple<br>purpose | Long-<br>range<br>recon-<br>naissance | Total Staffeln |               |
|------------------------|------|---------------------------|-----------------------|--|---------------------------------------|----------------|---------------|
| <u>K.</u>              | 1100 | (750 Class I<br>(350 " II | 700 (550 I<br>(150 II | 400 including<br>Transport and<br>Seaplanes        | 300 Land<br>70 Sea                    | 400<br>2600    | 180 to<br>192 |
| <u>Mediterranean</u>   |      |                           |                       |  |                                       |                |               |
| Egypt, Libya,<br>Sudan | 300  |                           | 180                   | 70   | 35                                    | 585            | 45 to 50      |
| Greece, Crete          | 120  |                           | 60                    | -  | -                                     | 180            | 10 to 12      |
| Malta, Gibralt-<br>ar  | 20   |                           | 30                    | -  | 10                                    | 60             | 5             |
| Irak, Palestine        | 45   |                           | 35                    | 45   | 5                                     | 130            | 10            |
| Aden, Kenya            | 80   |                           | 60                    | -  | 5                                     | 145            | 11            |
| India, Far East        | 60   |                           | 20                    | 75   | 5                                     | 160            | 12            |

In the Eastern Mediterranean 20 % Second-Class.

In East Africa, Irak, India, Far East: 60 % Second-Class.

To these must be added the South African and Australian Air Forces in Egypt, Eastern Mediterranean, Kenya and Far East (Singapore)

- 100 South African aircraft (6 Staffeln) in Kenya (60 % Second Class)
- 50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in Egypt and Eastern Mediterranean
- 50 Australian aircraft (4 Staffeln) in the Far East (Singapore).

Naval Aircraft:

|   |     |  |
|---|-----|--|
| Shipborne (not including aircraft carriers) | 150 | ) Of these about<br>200 are in the<br>Mediterranean. |
| On aircraft carriers                        | 350 |  |
| On land, for new aircraft carriers, etc.    | 150 |  |
| On land, for other purposes                 | 100 |  |

22 February 1941.

Morning Conference: No important new developments.

Russian Air Force. (Gen. Gennadi):

- a) Air Force is not an independent part of the armed forces  
(Organisation).



- b) Ground facilities and strength:  
 1100 airfields, 200 serviceable. Equipment inferior to ours. Estimated strength 4,000 - 5,000 bomber and fighter aircraft. North of Pripet:  
 Reconnaissance and bombers 1530, fighters 2200  
 South of Pripet:  
 Reconnaissance and bombers 675, " 1250  
 Main concentration north of Pripet.  
 Our Air Force considers this the final Russian disposition for their concentration in the West. (New Russia pamphlet).---  
 Transport aircraft and parachutists: based on Kiev.  
 By next summer, it is estimated, 60% of the above strength will be ready for commitment.
- c) Types: Reconnaissance craft obsolete, range around 300 km (a few new ones have range up to 640 km); speed 150 to 250 km.
- Close-support craft: Majority old types; cooperate with Armd. troops. Between 100 and 200 are modern (speed: 380 km, range up to 700 km). Armament: only machine guns (4 fixed forwardfiring MG).
- Fighters: Bata - J 16 is good; 4 machine guns, or 2 machine guns and 2 cannon. Inferior to the German fighter (Spain); is slightly slower. Craft now under construction probably not ready for 1941.
- Bombers: Two-thirds good; SB 1 - 3 and TB 3, make up two-thirds of total. SB 1 - 3, range 600 km, night and bad-weather craft.  
 Fair game ( TB 3. Range 1,000 km (bomb load 2,000 kg).  
 for German ( BB 3. Range 1,500 km (bomb load 800 kg).  
 fighters
- Transport craft: Not much is expected.
- Paratroops: Same.
- d) Training, leadership and tactics:  
 Fighters and bombers good while in formation; depend heavily on lead pilot. Blind and bad-weather flying deficient. Fighters are especially trained for action against ground targets, but their foremost mission is to fight enemy air force in the air and on the ground. Between Fighter and bomber teamwork poor.  
 Leadership: Hard and brutal, but without training in modern tactics; mechanical, lacking adaptability.
- e) Ground organization, Air Force Signal troops: Air force signal troops, as we know them, are non-existent. Only radio communications! Transmit in clear in emergencies. Ground organization scanty. Large parts attached to flying organizations. Supply stocks apparently low.
- f) Probable dispositions: See b).  
 Deployment will take considerable time; is being watched\*. Fighters work in close support of their own and against enemy ground troops. Close-support craft against enemy armor. Bombers have targets in the enemy rear area. Clear nights essential. Targets: East Prussian supply base, Silesian industries, Romanian oil fields, Baltic ports, Berlin.

g) Own air strength: Our Air Force expects Russians to have 4,000 (probably more) plus 600 new craft.

Russian

Friendly

|                |           |   |                     |   |      |
|----------------|-----------|---|---------------------|---|------|
| 1600 bombers ) | Ratio 1:2 | } | Barbarossa and Z Et | } | West |
| 4250 fighters) |           |   | 2,500.              |   | 900  |

If we assume 60 % operational: 1,100 to 1,700 (sic) bombers  
2,650 to 4,050 fighters.

Barbarossa: AGp North 380 )  
Center 910 ) Planned strength.  
South 510 )

Russian, AAA: 300 medium, 200 light and AA MG batteries.  
Own total: 798 medium ) AA batteries.  
827 light )

von Treskow (Ia AGp B):

Discussion of our broad viewpoints regarding conduct of operation Barbarossa in theater of Army Group:

- 1.) No battle at Bialystok, but at Minsk.
- 2.) Watch against gap between his Army Group and Leebl
- 3.) Press with all means available behind southern wing, so as to obviate threat to flank. Technical details of build-up.

Gen. Jacob reports off on leave.

Heusinger: Current matters. -- Transmissions to List of our study on attack on Turkey.

ObdH (on phone):

- 1.) 8.8 cm AA guns to be used as "concrete crackers" for Barbarossa.
  - a) Are they needed against Russian fortifications? sa.
  - b) Can we count on having Ground Forces AA available for ground combat?
  - c) Can we distribute 10 cm guns so as to have them on hand in time as "concrete crackers"?
- 2.) Ground Forces AA Units must be activated: are to be committed on motor highway. Will have to train there, not in Z.I.
- 3.) 110 Renault \* on hand: Enough for three mobile Siege Gun Bns.

Col. Mierzinsky (Foreign Armies East): Mission to collect most complete data on enemy (Russian) fortifications.

23 February 1941

Sunday, Berlin.

Work on draft of Tactical Manual for Motorized Battalion. -- Talk with [Ex-Crown Prince] George of Saxony. -- Leyher family.\*\*

24 February 1941.

Schuchard (Liaison Officer to Abetz): Situation report. Confidence in Vichy apparently is on the rise since the Cabinet reshuffle and there is a desire to win our Government over to a policy of trusting collaboration.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) 13,000 trucks from Occupied Zone on the way. Difficulties in moving them out.
- b) Beginning March we join in control of Morocco and Algiers. Concurrence of Rome not yet received. I emphasize our interest in Algiers.

Gen. von Kirchheim reports before leaving for Africa.

Gen. Tiemann and Lemelsen (CG XXXXVII Corps) report.

Heusinger: Aerial and naval operations:

- a) Dardanelles cannot be blocked with aerial mines. -- Lemnos. We have no naval force there. Airborne landing! -- In peacetime some shipping available on Thracian coast. Can be chartered. - Importance of the Greek Aegean coast. Nothing can be expected of Italian Navy. -- Rumanian oil for Italian Navy. -- Protection of coastal shipping route to Odessa.
- b) Operations in the Baltic: Navy sees no possibilities for active support. No protection for our coastal supply route.
- c) Hangoe: Navy does not consider it a practical base for the Russian fleet. Aalands Islands afford no naval bases.

Buhle: a) Ready for Fifteenth Armd. Div.:

20 March: 1 Rifle Bn. and 1 AT Bn.

1 April : 1 Rifle Regt. and light Fd. How. Bn.

15 April: Remainder.

- b) Tank complements; 1 May: in th general complete (Interchange of Tank III, IV, and II and I necessary). Between 1 May and 15 about 3-4 Divs. come off the line, i.e. about 5 % of the entire tank forces in the East. 15 May to 15 June one Div. comes off the line, i.e. replacements would drop out for four weeks. I suggest that the pro tem Armd. Divs. be not activated before 1 June and meanwhile see to it that the Armd. Divs. get their tank replacements.
- c) French tanks not much good in Norway. Try to use old Czech tanks instead.
- d) 15 Brigs. (mixed Brigs.) as of 1 June (7 for East!).

25 February 1941.

Morning Conference: Nothing of importance. Uncertainty persists as to British intentions in the Mediterranean, both in the Malta area and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Personnel: Ia, Rommel; Frfurth for Bulgaria. Wachenfeld for Romania. Xylander?
- b) Operation against Afghanistan.
- c) Items for discussion with Navy and Air Force.
- d) Charge of duties for Konrad.
- e) Tactical training for Russian campaign.
- f) Tank replacements: Whatever becomes available before start of operations, goes to the front. What comes after, will be held for new units. Location: Warsaw.
- g) Supply trains for Libya. Combine Italian and German supply trains. Take trucks from Italian Divs.!
- h) Preparation for continuation of African operation. Production for it must be under way by summer.

Heusinger:

- a) Barbarossa: Briefing of the Divs. arriving at the front in the last transport waves (also discussed with Training Sec.).
- b) Afghanistan - Persia.
- c) Gibraltar - Malta - North Africa (here attack on Egypt with two Armd. Corps besides Italian units).
- d) For event that the British land in Thrace, something must be done to forestall them! List must be prepared for that.
- e) Various inquiries from List on the execution of Operation Marita.

Ochsner: Current matters of Chemical Warfare and Decontamination Service.

von Thoma: Current problems of motorization of Army. Replacement of maintenance NCO's. Training manual for Rifle Regts. and Rifle Bns. in Armd. Divs.

26 February 1941.

Berlin --- War Academy:

Visit to courses conducted by Feyerabend, Blumke, Staedke. Impression on the whole good. Afterwards, address to the participants and conference with the instructors.

1715 - 1830 hrs. Conference with Adm. Schniewind on common problems of Operation Barbarossa.  
(Baltic: Coastal protection and Finland. -- Difficulties of organizing coastal shipping for supply purposes along the Baltic coast.  
Aaland, Hango, Black Sea. Questions of Russian naval forces and possibility of supply routes along the coast.)

South-East: Lemnos. Their ideas jibe with ours. -- Dardanelles. Shipment of oil to Italy (through Canal of Corinth).

Mediterranean: Gibraltar, coastal shipping, Africa, Malta. -

West: A unified Coastal Defense.

Evening. von Ziehlberg: Current matters. -- Liaison Officers.

27 February 1941

Morning Conference: Possibilities for speeding up shipment of troops to Libya. Withdrawal of study on Italian Generals by Foreign Armies West.

Bogatsch:

- a) Questions regarding Air Support Hq Staff\* and signal communications settled to conform to our wishes. Air Staff somewhat small.
- b) Liaison between AGps and Air Force will be handled by Support Commander.
- c) Allocation of airfields for reconnaissance planes.
- d) AA: AA Corps are to stay, also ground missions (Fuehrer ord. It would be out of the question to leave them with the Air Fleets and use them as reserves.
- e) Ground Forces AAA:  
Thirty batteries, i.e. 10 battalions, are supposed to be on hand for us on 1 May.  
Beginning May, additional 30 batteries, i.e. 10 Bns., will be added as organic AA of the Ground Forces.  
We have specified: 50 Bns., including 30 mixed; (mixed Bns. make up 60 to 80 % of total requested) plus 11 light Bns. requested: 22-24, i.e. 50 %).\*\*

f) Air Defense Commanders for rear area (24 Reserve Bns.).  
East of the Reich frontier.

Heusinger: Current matters. One additional Corps Hq for third wave of Marita (L Army Corps Hq). - Corps Hq (reduced) Boehm in Holland to be released. - Distribution of the Reinforced Brigs. (15) which will be ready in the ZF. beginning middle of March. Liaison Officers for Bulgaria.

Jodl inquires officially, whether we have any reason for wishing to have approach march in Bulgaria stopped, which would still be feasible today. The answer is in the negative.

Radke: Friction between the Deputy of the Fuehrer and ObdH (regarding Mieth, Weck and other incidents).

Buhle: Ground Forces AAA: Materiel: So far nothing has been delivered by the Air Force. Promise to send bulk of equipment second half of April, so that everything would be on hand 1 May. Provisional fire control instruments for Batteries. Hope to get fire control instruments also for Bns.

Training: Courses in progress. Specialists ready 1 May. Afterwards unit training. Personnel apparently not bad. Battery training a minimum of three weeks. Cannot be in action before 1 June.

Traction equipment lacking: Tests now in progress to determine serviceability of French traction equipment. Only limited mobility. Will have supply vehicles, but tactical mobility cannot be achieved. (No ammunition columns). Two batteries are put on self-propelled mounts, to serve as heavy tank destroyers.

"Traction Bns., motorized" could be formed, but chain of command and control would be very difficult in practice.

Fellgiebel:

Finland. Senior Sig. Corps Officer to Finland for operational communications (through Sweden postal network).

Marita: Three river cables; tele-communications via Belgrade.

Barbarossa: Each Armd. Group 2 dcm lines. Three large direct transversal decimeter lines. Supply service network East: Government -General, trunk lines to the advancing armies.

Monitoring of cryptograph traffic: Seehausdienst \*.

Conference with Gen. Jeschonnek, (present Major Christ, Col. Heusinger):

North: Reconnaissance off Murmansk (based on central Norway).  
Hangoe - Aalund : no facilities.

Barbarossa: Fighters 6:1 (3:1); training and material said to be considerably inferior.

Bombers 2:1 (1:1). Training inferior.

Fighters: Only 400 modern, total 3,000; for close-support effort.

Bombers 1,600 to 2,000, mostly older types.

Air Force expects concentrated attacks against our spearheads, but thinks they will collapse owing to our superior technique and experience. Targets for long-range fighters.

Russian ground organizations, being organic to operational flying units, are clumsy and, once disrupted, cannot be readily restored. Distribution of forces: 1 Air fleet for each AGp. Further details later.

Mediterranean remains possible, but purpose must be clearly defined. Malta-Crete in preparation (airborne landing). I call attention to possibilities for airborne operations in Tangier and Ceuta. Corsica still being studied.

France: Relatively strong fighter and long-range fighter forces under Sperrle. In Holland, Belgium and Northern France excluding Brittany. -- Night fighters. Fight for control of air for reconnaissance over the sea.. XI airborne Corps probably to go to France (deception). Attila still on active list. AAA ample.

ZI: Weise. \* -- Fighters and night fighters in the Ruhr and Northwest Germany. AA defense will be slightly weakened (20%) in favor of Barbarossa.

Airborne troops: XI Corps. Either use right off the start or not at all. Discussion of possible airborne operations in the Mediterranean and in Barbarossa.

AAA: Fuehrer wants no serviceable piece to remain inactive. Personnel for 30 Batteries. AA Corps, of 6 Bns., for Sixth Army (Armd.Group 1) and for Armd.Group 2.

Norway: Unchanged, under Stumpff.

Liaison Air Force - Ground Forces: Konrad's position.

Buhle: Tanks for Norway. -- 800th Regt. as "fire brigade" against uprisings! Use of tanks in Barbarossa. Roechling projectile for Armor in Libya.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters (Liaison Officers, personnel assignments on the Balkans).

28 February 1941.

Twelfth Army has started building of bridges. Covering force of fighters and AA has crossed into Bulgaria.

Morning conference:

No special reports. Still no clear picture of British intentions.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. -- (With Buhle present) Peacetime organization of OKH.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Navy's evaluation of the situation. Situation and intentions of Air Force agree with information in yesterday's conference with Jeschonneck.

- b) Norway: Disposition of forces and operational staffs for Barbarossa.
- c) Hangoe. Only Luftwaffe can do it.
- d) Briefing of the CGs of Armd, Groups and Corps on technical innovations by the Ordnance Office.
- e) "Suedwind".\* Comments on Hilpert's study.
- f) Exchange of views on operation in Libya. We must beware of unduly interfering there.

Brig. Gen. Dr. Grosse (Med. Corps) and Brig. Gen. Dr. Bingler (Med. Corps) call.

Maj. Gen. Paulus:

- a) Report on trip to Guderian's map maneuver: Very satisfactory. The leaders arrived at conclusion that the Pripet line would be reached in eleven days.
- b) Result of consultations with AGp. B on the conduct of operation Barbarossa. General agreement of views!

Gen. Bogatsch: Result of conference with Jeschonneck. - AA problems.

Col. Matzky:

- 1.) Foreign Office sent cabled instructions to Ambassador Ott to see to it that Japan should rush attack of Singapore.  
I suppose that it is not as simple as all that for Japan. A coordinated war plan is probably needed as a basis.
- 2.) Turkey: Leading Turks are reported to have expressed misgivings to Papen to the effect that Germany's Balkan policy is moving to a point where Turkey would be forced to go to war against her. Papen has been instructed to make the following statement to the Turkish government: Germany is fighting England only, but otherwise wants only peace and order on the Balkans. But if the Turks were trying to find fault, he would be ready at any time to pack his trunks.
- 3.) Russia: Isolated reports on Russia's unfriendly attitude towards us received lately, are of no importance. Russia has made no protest against our measures, nor against Bulgaria's attitude.
- 4.) 1 March 1941, is the date when Bulgaria will sign the Tripartite Pact by Bulgaria. Russia, Turkey and Yugoslavia are being informed of our march into Bulgaria.

Evening. Message is received that two of the three Danube bridges are finished. Bad weather, bottomless roads.



1 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Construction of bridges on the Danube makes good progress. (Last bridge finished 1000 hrs. Tested for loads of 26 tons).

Conference with Paulus and Heusinger:

- 1.) Situation in Libya. Rommel's preparations for forthcoming attack.
- 2.) "Suedwind": Expression of opinions on Hilpert's study; forestalling action.
- 3.) Norway: Organization of Command agencies for Operation "Silberfuchs".

OQu IV (with Liss): Situation in England (homeland): Now 40 Divs., including one new Armd.Div.  
Squabble between Hq. Second Army and Ninth Armd.Div. as to who is to have credit for capturing the French war archives.

Heusinger: Current business of Operational Sec.

Ehlert: ( Ia, Africa Corps) reports in; Is briefed on our ideas concerning coming offensive operations.

ObdH (on phone): Liaison instructions for Konrad. I make quite plain my annoyance at K.'s working methods.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Result of conference in Paris. Rather unsatisfactory. The personalities involved will not be able to avoid friction for long.
- b) Provisioning of forces in France from local sources will be feasible.
- c) There will be difficulties in obtaining enough trucks for motorization of troops in France. Wood generator gas etc.
- d) Feeding of industrial workers is getting difficult. Belgium, e.g. wants emergency train Bayern with one million rations. Industrial canteens.
- e) Barbarossa: CP of Gen Qu operational as of 10 April. Administrative orders on 20 March.
- f) Libya: Shipping space.

2 March 1941.

(Sunday - Zossen).

Twelfth Army (List) marches into Bulgaria.

Crossing was effected at 0600 hrs, as per schedule, on the two eastern bridges; 1000 hrs on the western bridge. Delay was due to bridge damage sustained when opening for passage of oil barge train.

Reports from Rintelen on alleged Italian plans for offensive in Albania. Attack is to start within a few days on the supposition that the Greeks will withdraw troops from the Albanian front in reaction to our advance into Bulgaria.

The mere fact that Italy believes to be able to launch such a drive on a few days notice shows that no more than local attacks are to be expected. They do not in any way affect our plans.

Evening in Berlin.

3 March 1941.

- Gercke:
- 1.) Assembly of troops is proceeding according to plan. Government-General now falls in line. We shall be ready on time.
  - 2.) Water transport problems viewed in the light of future developments.
  - 3.) Railway Construction Troops needed for additional lines serving not only current requirements but also stockpiling of new base. In contrast to the West, also station installations will have to be moved forward and operation must be organized on military lines. Construction Troops must advance right behind the Armor. Whereas in France we had a wide frontage on which the railroads were pushed forward, the base line of departure in the East will be narrow. One Railroad Bn. changes tracks from Russian to German gauge at rate of 20 km a day.
  - 4.) Distribution of Railway Troops. In the West four Cos, in Norway three (including two operating units), two in Bulgaria. All others set aside for Operation Barbarossa.
  - 5.) Road construction to follow behind advancing troops.--- Main supply routes.
  - 6.) Railway accidents.

Conference with ObdH:

- 1.) Military-political situation on the Balkans. Coordination with political leadership again very tenuous.
- 2.) Operational possibilities in Libya now and later, when additional troops could be released from Barbarossa.

- 3.) Continuous intrigues by various non-military agencies against us, to undermine the position of the military.

Jodl OKW (on phone): Liaison with political command is too loose. We must have a clear knowledge of what is going on.

- a) Is the political command interested in having German advance elements appear at the Greek frontier to impress on the Greeks that we are faster than Mr. Eden's troops, who is just now in Athens?
- b) What are Turkey's reactions: Must we expect interference from that quarter?
- c) Are the Italians being made to understand that piecemeal attacks in Albania are only disrupting plans?

Reply:

Concerning a): OKW welcomes everything calculated to further an early appearance of German troops on the Greek frontier. However, the question is still being discussed with the Fuehrer. Definite instructions soon.

Concerning b): Turkish question "settled".

Concerning c): Wholly in agreement with OKH.

von Etzdorf:

- a) Effect of note informing the Russian Government of our march into Bulgaria. General reaction: Obvious concern. Molotov replied to the German Ambassador in writing, as follows:
  - 1.) Events have not developed on the line recommended by Russia. It is a matter of regret that contrary to the Russian proposal of 25 November, the German Government has deemed it desirable to take a course infringing on Russian security interests. The march into Bulgaria is in opposition to the Russian conception of security zones, which include that country.
  - 2.) The Reich Government cannot expect Russia to give any support of its action in Bulgaria. (This probably refers to diplomatic support).
- b) Effect of the information on the Turkish Government: Friendly in tone, no direct reference to the matter. Eden had shown understanding for Turkey's situation. Nothing tangible has come out of Eden's visit. Turkey has not been maneuvered into any new commitments, because Turkey is not yet sufficiently armed at the moment. Eden had pointed to the Italian collapse. Turkish Foreign Minister and Yugoslav Envoy cooperate to keep Yugoslavia from tying herself to Germany.
- c) A similar announcement of the German march into Bulgaria, by the Bulgarian Government, met with an unfriendly reception, without any comments, in Yugoslavia.
- d) Letter of the Fuehrer to the Turkish State President: "No further intentions".

- e) Meeting Antonescu-Goering arranged for 5 March in Vienna.
- f) Conversation Oshima - Ribbentrop. Ribbentrop urges early attack on Singapore (from the land side). Leave Philippines alone. Cover requirements in Netherlands East Indies. Oshima refers to raw materials shortages. Wants end of war with China.
- g) Letter Fuehrer - Il Duce: Cannot get anywhere with Spain. The impending arrival of our Armd.Divs. in Africa sets off new trains of ideas, which he hopes he will be able to talk to him about. Anxiety about Dodecanese. We need Rhodes for operations against Suez.

Heusinger:

- a) Current business of the Operations Sec.
- b) Hansen at one time, was instructed to help List with transportation on condition that the material would be returned by 20 March, so as to be reconditioned by 1 April. Now 350 trucks have been turned over. Sixteenth Armd.Div. is spread over too large an area and ought to recall one of its Rifle Regts. AT troops have been detached for service at Constanza and the Danube Delta.
- c) Navy has earmarked six 17 cm guns and six 15 cm guns for the Thracian coast.

Gen.Jodl:

- a) The question as to whether armor should soon be sent up to the Greek frontier, will not be decided before tomorrow, since we must first clear up the situation with the Yugoslavs.
- b) For the time being the Fuehrer will not use his influence with Il Duce in the question of the Italian attack in Albania. Let them scorch their noses!
- c) On the whole, the Fuehrer shares our view.
- d) Great excitement on the "Mountain" \* caused by receipt of a picture of an British tank with 80 mm armor. What can we put up against it in Africa, and what else could we do?

Buhle:

- a) Protection of our tanks against British 80 mm tank in North Africa.
- b) Furloughs. All must terminate on 11 April.
- c) Coast artillery: Activate 5 new Bns.
- d) Traction problems of the partly motorized Siege Gun Bns.
- e) Requisitioning of trucks in France.
- f) Conversion of conventional tanks to amphibian tanks takes 12 weeks.

Reich:

- a) ...
- b) ...
- c) ...
- d) ...
- e) ...
- f) ...

4 March 1941.

0900 -- 1100 hrs. Attend conference held in Gen Qu office dealing with supply service for AGp. South. We must not underrate the difficulties connected with switching the fuel supply base of the entire Army Group to the Romanian oil base. The idea of the Advanced Supply Points must not be overdone. With all its advantages, the system has the drawback of rigidity which we must not take upon us until the development of the operations can be made out clearly. As long as we don't know exactly where we stand we must be content with improvised installations, which later on can be reorganized into such supply points.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) Control services in all French western ports will be taken over in the near future. General Eichhorn, assigned to this mission, is standing by with his economic staff and other agencies. In Oran, Tunis and Algiers, German liaison agencies (with 8 airplanes) will be integrated with the Italian organization.
- b) Fuel will be very short in supply in France and North Africa till the middle of April. A 14,000 ton tanker is on its way from America. Doubtful whether the British will let it through.
- c) Seizure of French merchant shipping by the British. French want easing of regulations to strengthen convoy system, for vessels sailing in French convoys have so far not been attacked by the British.
- d) Important points in the exchange of notes: French demand on permission to recruit soldiers in the Occupied Zone. Demand release of white Colonial officers from PW camps, for service in North Africa.
- e) 13,000 trucks bought by us. First instalment has arrived at the Demarcation Line. Transfer will be completed after 15 March.
- f) Rubber crop in Indochina: 25,000 ton for us, 18,000 ton for France (partly for our purposes). 25,000 ton for America. This portion is now claimed by Japan.

Gen. Scherer, the new Headquarters Commandant, successor of Colonel Schmelzer who died today, reports.

Maj. Gen. Mueller:

- a) Claer-Stefanie affair.-- Psychiatric observation of Stefanie necessary.
- b) Studies on International Law with a view to a reform of International Law. Must be turned over to a Commission under BdE after the war.

- c) Measures against the De-Gaulle movement in France.  
Question of death sentences.
- d) Cooperation of Replacement Army and Field Army. Interchange of NCO's and Officers.
- e) Findings on hospital inspection. Social service care can stand improvement (vocational guidance, vocational training, psychological care). Use of Field Hospitals. Medical service not a problem of transportation, but one of supplies.

5 March 1941.

Morning Conference: March into Bulgaria proceeding according to plan. Subsequently conference with OQu I and Operations Officer on current matters.

OQu IV - Krabbe:

- a) Hungarian intrigues against our military attaché, who has become irksome for them (Krabbe). -- Our demands regarding road building and railway preparations.
- b) Negotiations Buschenhagen in Sweden ( take in a lot of ground! ).
- c) Current matters.

von Bernuth: Directives for training of Divs. under Generals who will be their leaders in the Eastern campaign.  
Current business of the Training Section.

Map Exercise Gen Qu on problems in the theater of AGp South.  
Question of Supply Points , Advanced Supply Bases, CPs of Gen Qu is discussed.

von Ziehlberg: Death of Col. Schmelzer Hq Commandant.---  
Efficiency ratings and other current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Wagner Gen Qu : Draft of an OKW directive on organization and administration of the occupied areas in the East. Behind the advancing troops, Government Commissars will be established, who will have Armed Forces Commanders attached to them. The stipulations of the ObdH are to be observed, but otherwise the Army must not be burdened with administrative tasks. Special missions of the Reichsfuehrer SS.

ObdH - Keitel:

- a) The Fuehrer will not advise ~~the~~ Duce against an offensive in Albania; he will merely tell him that we shall come in later.

- b) Yugoslavia: Conference with Regent Paul produces no positive results. No intention to join the Tripartite Pact. No transportation facilities across Yugoslavia. It is hoped to settle the Greek question without the use of force. However, so far I can see no signs that such a solution has a chance.
- c) Great excitement over Lofoten raid.\*

6 March 1941.

Quiet day. -- Advance into Bulgaria proceeding according to plan. Otherwise, only telephone consultations throughout the day; no important conferences, except one on AAA problems (Bogatsch) and current operational matters. Desk work on neglected larger studies.

7 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Advance in Bulgaria continues according to plan. Uncertainty on the situation in the Aegean persists. -- French canal system seems to be largely serviceable again; only the Rhine-Rhone Canal and the canal connections with the English Channel, paralleling the Seine, have not yet been restored.

OQu IV with Chiefs Foreign Armies East and West: Situation reports. England, no important new information. Russia: We are getting a clearer picture of disposition of forces.

Gen. Brand:

- a) Fuehrer order regarding 160 Batteries for Norway. This number will include 38 batteries already sent to Norway (10-28 cm). The Batteries still unassigned are to be accompanied each by one officer, 2 NCOs and 15 EM; also, there will be one Battalion Staff for every 6 batteries, and two telephone sections with 12 km wire each for each Battery. Immediately available: 33 batteries. The main thing is that there must be no reductions in the allocations for coastal defenses in the Black Sea and the Baltic.
- b) K Battery can be used against Brest-Litowsk (citadel). \*
- c) Results of the large Observation Bn. exercise. Attempt to centralize the heavy sections in the Army Corps was a failure. The solution lies in keeping the old method and reducing the number of heavy sections.

- d) Trials with R projectile \* for 15 cm How. satisfactory.  
5,000 projectiles a month; larger output not before fall.
- e) Missions for railway artillery in the East not yet final.  
Probably we shall have use for the following:  
1 - K 12; 5 - K 5; 1 - Bruno N; 2 short Bruno (in AGp North).

1500 hrs: Funeral ceremony for Col. Schmelzer — Hq Commandant.

Chief Personnel Division: Consultation on officer, replacements, reassignments, etc.

ObdH (on phone): Operational intentions in Libya.— Defenses on West Coast (artillery, tanks).— Air missions in the East.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Norway, Coastal defenses: artillery, captured enemy tanks (Renault) and 1 Bn (2 Cos) of 201st Arm. Regt.
- b) Organization of the still unallocated 250 2 cm AA into groundforces antiaircraft force; horsedrawn?
- c) GHq troops for Barbarossa:
  - 20 out of 28 Eng. Bns: ) can get small truck
  - all Railway Eng. Bns: ) column as of 1 May.

Rear services and signal components will be ready in time.
- d) Two medium Fd. How. Bns and four 10 cm Gun Bns become new GHq Artillery reserve as of 1 June.
- e) Liaison Staff "North" and "South".
- f) Improvement of Thirteenth Armd. Div.

Capt von Both reports on results of his inspection trip to Libya. Rommel's operational intentions need a sound basis and should be reviewed in the light of practical possibilities. Supply services in Libya must be centralized; supply route to Libya still leaves room for improvement. (Naples, Rome).

8 March 1941.

Morning Conference: Yugoslavia apparently veering round to the Tripartite Pact. Three possibilities for the British. Report of British efforts to trade capitalships for destroyers.

7th convoy arrived in Libya; 8th convoy Palermo; 9th still in Naples on account of British Cruisers.

Lt. Col. Reinhard reports as Chief of Staff General Army Office.



Heusinger: 1.) Rowehl flies for Richthofen and List.

- 2.) Liaison Officers for Eastern Campaign AGp  
South: One older Officer with two or three younger assistants form a Liaison Detachment.  
AGp Center: 1 Liaison Officer each for AGp, Guderian and AHq 9 (Hoth) (total 3).  
North: 1 Liaison Officer for AHq 16 (Hoepfner) (1).
- 3.) Disposition of Russian forces at the front and in the rear.
- 4.) Demands on Luftwaffe for demolition and disruption missions.
- 5.) Defenses in the West.
- 6.) Operation in Libya.

Gen. Ott (Inf): Tactical Manual for Antitank Co. in Inf. Regt.---  
General training problems (utilization of terrain, kneeling position for aiming) etc.) \*

Enemy intelligence from Turkey reveals that apart from air support England is preparing to support Greece with two to three Divs., now standing by on islands between Lemnos and Crete, so as to be moved into Greece via Volos, or also into Turkey, if necessary.  
Greek intentions. At start, defense of Struma or Vardar, as the case may be. In case of an attack on Vardar Valley a defense is planned, with the right wing based on Mt. Olympus, and the left wing extending over Mt. Gramosi (on the Greek Albanian border) to the present left wing in Albania.

Paulus:

- a) Organization of road improvement work.--- A new map of Russia showing road conditions (good work).
- b) Military-political data for Grohlmann's study.

Report on Yugoslavia's Reply. Regent Paul thinks he can induce his Cabinet to accept the Tripartite Pact, on three conditions:

- a) No transit for German troops. Discussion possible on transportation of materiel by rail and by Danube.
- b) No commitment to active participation in this war.
- c) Access to the Aegean for Yugoslavia.

9 March 1941. (Sunday - Berlin).

Work at Home: Organization of the West during the Barbarossa Campaign.

Questions relating to Operation "Sonnenblume". -- Attache service.-- Efficiency ratings.

10 March 1941.

Conference on situation: Italian drive in Albania 9 March -- Aegean.-- 8th and 9th convoys due at Tripolis. Advance of Twelfth Army difficult.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Clarification necessary about instructions for defenses in Norway.  
West Coast, Baltic, Black Sea, Aegean Islands.
- b) Clear-cut statements wanted from Navy on:  
What are the capabilities of the Russian Navy in Baltic and in Black Sea?  
What can our Navy do, and what are its limitations?  
(Canaris).

Heusinger:

- a) Current business.
- b) Rommel is instructed not to advance his front too far ahead before arrival of Fifth Lt.Div. and sufficient Italian forces.
- c) Coastal defense problems in the West and in the Baltic.  
(Ruegen).
- d) Our troops must start building field fortifications on the Russian border early and on a sufficient scale. Handle rear line more as a propaganda show! \*

Radke:

- a) Case Hesse.-- Fired from the Press Section by the OKW because of clumsy handling of motion picture matters.
- b) Inquiry to Gen.Mieth on alleged political indiscretions at a conference in December, 1939.
- c) Recruiting for SS; no danger; cannot fill their ranks.
- d) Participation of Party members in Church activities permissible only if Party membership is held in the background.

Lt. Col. Kochler reports as Chief of Staff of the BdE. Problems of coordination discussed.

OQu IV: a) Yugoslavia. Belgrade Cabinet meets today. Yugoslavia's three conditions for joining the Tripartite Pact have been accepted by Germany and Italy.

- b) Greece: Up to 4 March, only 7,000 British in Greece (Air Force), in Athens area. In the last few days additional 5,000 arrived in Athens area (claimed mission: protection of airfields). Reports state that evacuation of Mirace is being prepared. Greece said to be getting ready for war. Change can be hoped for only if Yugoslavia changes her attitude.
- c) Turkey's reply to Fuehrer's letter still outstanding.
- d) Conference Goering-Antonescu: Increase in oil deliveries. German production aids accepted. Sparing of Iron Guard refused. Wants to form new Party from reliable elements.
- e) France: Darlan announces convey protection against England for French shipping; will use arms if necessary. Proposal to appoint Laval Minister-President.
- f) Spain: Franco's letter stating reasons preventing his entry into the war now demands clearcut statement on colonial promises.
- g) Fuehrer's demands on Japan. ~~J~~Japanese capabilities.

11 March 1941.

Morning conference: Report of Russian movements from Moscow Military District toward Smolensk and Minsk. Intelligence on new roads in Russia, which would indicate existence of better roadnet than heretofore assumed. Encroachment on command fraction of Oad by OKW, which orders that Fourth Mtn.Div. must join "Marita" in place of some other Div.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Libya: Shipping space.-- Separate supply organization for Libya.--  
Moldavia: Health conditions. Officers mess problems (too many use up too much food).

Col.Gen. Hoepfner: Missions for Armd.Gr. 4 in Operation Barbarossa discussed.

Vorl (Armistice Commission):

- a) French shipments to North Africa stopped.
- b) Mediterranean ports now under our control: West of Marseilles, German Control Officers; east of Marseilles, by Italian Officers, with German representatives.
- c) French report on progress of disarmament in North Africa expected soon.
- d) Food situation in France has deteriorated. Grain reported sufficient only for 1 to 1½ more months.

- e) Protest against British materiel shipments on Bagdad railroad to Greece or Turkey.
- f) Djibuti. Italians release weapons for 7 French Bns, for defence against British.
- g) 13,000 trucks bought in France.

von Uthmann: Report on Sweden. Only the use of railways will be open to us. Roads to the North not practicable before middle or end of June; moreover interrupted by water bodies crossed by ferries.

Lunch with Uthmann, Jodl (OKW): Showdown over direct interference with the command function of OKH. (Substitution of Fourth Mt.Div. for 183rd Div.).

von Ziehlberg: (Central Branch) Current reassignments. -- Style of living of officers in Hq. Procurement of additional food directly from France for their Sections.

Heusinger: a) Another AA Bn. for Rommel (ObdL).

b) 8th and 9th convoys have arrived in Libya. Marada freed.

c) Movement order for Fifteenth Armd.Div.

12 March 1941.

Morning conference:

- a) Question regarding relation between Liaison Officer Albania and AHq 12.
- b) Yugoslavia: 3 Divs. mobilized. Strength 70,000.
- c) Intensive convoy activity in Mediterranean.
- d) Rommel: Bulk of Fifth Armd.Reg. now on land. Movement to the front will be completed in about 7 days (including one day of rest). Enemy reconnaissance from Agedabia to the south.
- e) Transport congestions in Bulgaria. -- Boulogne railroad station bombed out.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Magnesium flare photographs for night reconnaissance.
- b) Instructions on missions of AA in Operation Barbarossa.
- c) Organization of home air defense.

Wagner (Gen Qu ) (Baentsch-Finkh):

- a) Libya: Apart from remaining on the defensive, two courses of action are open to us:  
Mounting a major offensive from Agedabia with main thrust against Tobruk.  
Starting several minor offensives in sectors along the coast.  
For the first alternative we would need four Supply Column Bns. in addition to the four Supply Column Bns already shipped to Libya.  
For second alternative, a total of four Supply Column Bns. would do, but the drawbacks of plan are loss of time and lessened striking power. Send Memorandum to OKW.
- b) Coastal shipping Tunis-Libya.
- c) List of functions for "Command Posts" of Gen Qu.
- d) Fuel problem.

Adm. Schuster, Capt. Heye (Navy) with Heusinger and Loyke:  
Navy-Army problems in the Aegean (Samothrake, Thasos, and Lemnos).  
Common problems in Black Sea (inshore coastal supply line to Odessa and points east).

Lunch with Adm. Schuster, Capt. Heye, Capt. Loyke, and Col. Heusinger.

Col. Spalke (Chief, War Economy Mission, Romania) report on  
situation of Romanian war economy. Picture of armament economy fairly satisfactory; agricultural production could be increased. - Unpleasant stories about Gerstenberg.

Radke: New OKW Propaganda Directive. -- Morale building in hospitals.

13 March 1941.

Morning conference: Report from Japan: Shipment of British troops to Greece from North Africa are said to have been in progress since 1 March.

Boetticher reports, that appearance of German troops in North Africa had sobering effect on Weygand.

Libya: Fifth Armd. Regt. at the front on 20 March!  
Marada free.

Marita: Bridge at Bechetu dismantled. Ferry in operation.  
Second Armd. Div. crosses over bridge at Turun Magurolo.

Hommerich-Mueller:

- a) Supply of maps for Barbarossa (four to six sets for each Div.).

- b) Future organization of Surveying Service. An Air Force memorandum; idea not acceptable.

Wagner Gen Qu):

- a) Conference at Ministry of Economics:  
Russians are getting cagey. Flow of oil down to a dribble; a 40% price increase demanded for grain. We stop coal deliveries and delivery of the cruiser. \* Romanian production completely in our hands. Annual oil output will be increased from 1.5 to 5.9 million tons.
- b) Fuel. Aviation gasoline on hand sufficient for one year (last year 200 000 tons were turned over to us). Motor and Diesel fuel very tight.  
Without Russian deliveries we shall be able to sustain a large-scale offensive on existing stocks for a period of 2 to 2½ months. After that we shall have to depend on our own production and on Romania.
- c) Supply Columns, Schell believes he can let us have additional 4,000 tons for Libya.
- d) Oil drum factories in Romania meet production schedules.
- e) Supply problems Norway.
- f) Charge of duties for Military Commander France.
- g) Conference Wagner-Heydrich: Police matters. Border control service.

14 March 1941.

Morning conference:

- 1.) Albania: The Greeks are attacking, instead of the Italians.  
Yugoslavia: Slovenia is being evacuated.  
First, Third and Fifth Divs. are setting up Rear Services.  
Greece: Flight of population in Thrace; no Englishman in Saloniki up to 10 March.  
England: Britain requests, 1 cruiser, 119 submarine chasers, 115 patrol vessels, 2,5 million tons from U.S.
- 2.) OKW: Movement of third wave (Marita) must wait on order of OKW.
- 3.) Libya: Graziani -- difficulties.
- 4.) Barbarossa: 2,500 trains of firstechelon have been dispatched.

OQu I: Deception maneuvers in the West — More friction with Konrad over delivery of materiel.

Operations Sec: Heusinger, Grolmann, Gehlen report on plans of the Armies in Operation Barbarossa.

Twelfth Army: Operation against Gernanti with only one Div. of the left wing is wrong. Will have to use also Romanian Mt. Brig. (4) on this wing.

Seventeenth Army: Hungarians and Slovaks must be mobilized about two days before the operation starts and follow behind. Fake commotion on the front between Tarnow and the Mountains\* (Security Div., etc.).

Sixth Army: On the whole in agreement with the very heavy concentration of forces; should point left wing further to north (Kowel)!

Fourth Army: Its southern portion still rather weak; its central portion is getting too close to Bialystok. Concur on all other points.

Ninth Army: Disposition with objective Lomza is waste of effort. On the northern wing coordination between Armd. Gp. 3 and Army not yet perfect. Feel for operational requirements lacking here. Army Hq evidently cannot assert itself over the CG of Armd. Gp. and is reluctant to place Infantry units under the command of Armd. Gp.

Eighteenth Army: Our suggestions have not been paid much attention to. Teamwork Hoepfner — Inf. Corps must still be brought into line with our ideas.

Sixteenth Army: Front still too wide. In any event striking power will be greater when reserves close up.

OQu IV, with Chiefs of Sub-Sections: Report on situation: Libya and Egypt:

Fifteen British Divs. (including two of Armor). In Libya itself between four and eight (including Armd. Divs.).

England: Activation of 5 Divs. has started. Total of 45 Divs. now in the homeland, including 4 Armd. Divs. (two new). Of the 41 Inf. Divs., about 21 are ready for assignment. Flow of materiel permits fitting of one to two Inf. Divs. per month.

France must reduce her troops in North Africa to 120,000 by 1 April.

Russia: Reported mobilization of four age groups probably only replacements, as the specialists are already in the services. Intensified concentration on the borders of the Baltic provinces. Reported road movements from direction Moscow toward the frontier via Minsk.

Conference with ObdH: Situation and intentions Libya — Situation in Bulgaria. — Personnel matters. — Heusinger reports on Armies for Operation Barbarossa.

Wagner Gen Qu: Fuel situation (stocks for only three months). — Preparations in Romania: Fuel preparations adequate, ammunition varying, Definition of command powers of Gen Qu. Command Posts. — "Administrative Orders" for Barbarossa.

Noon: Demonstration of pyrotechnics and signal devices. Inspection of Zeppelin\*signal center.

15 March 1941.

Morning conference: Marada in our hands. Swap of naval craft (Britain) U.S. — (H.M.S. King George V).

Gen. Buhle: a) Inspection ObdH. of Training Divs, 101st Div.  
Sectional railroad bridges.

b) Artillery and 2 cm AA for Norway.

c) Antiparatroop defense.

d) Organization of Liaison Detachment Romania.

Gen. Brand: Questions regarding use of artillery on coasts of Norway, Denmark, Holland, western France. Railway artillery on the Barbarossa front. — ObdH reserves allocation for himself. Unfortunately ObdH emphasizes security of French West Coast to such an extent that his specifications can be met only by sacrificing striking power in Barbarossa. Of course, when you ask the Navy and everybody else, whether they could carry out their missions 100% or whether they would need some aid from the Army, everybody wants something from the Army. The point, however, is not to be 100% sure everywhere, but rather to make sure of the necessary minimum of safety, and then put everything behind Operation Barbarossa.

Heusinger: Current business. — Preparations for report to Fuehrer.

16 March 1941.

(Sunday Berlin).

Nameday celebration. Preparations for Report to Fuehrer. — current business.

17 March 1941.

Wagner ( No entries)

Conference on situation: Albania: Operation without conclusive results.

Greece: British troops 18-20,000 strong (including Air Force). No higher command staff.  
Attache tour cancelled.

Buschenhagen: Solvaer.\*— Fuehrer insists: Norway must be rendered absolutely safe against any surprise attack. British now are in position where they must take the offensive. West is impregnable, perhaps Syria; best chance Norway. Our Air Force largely centralized; Navy weak, shipping lacking for large-scale land operations. If the British secure a lodgment, ~~cooperation~~ <sup>cooperation</sup> with Russia will become possible. Construction of continuous defense system impractical and, moreover,



unnecessary. Objective of defense: The English must not be allowed to gain a foothold, not even for two weeks. Safe-guarding of our traffic along the coast, both by sea and by land. All centers of economic and military importance must be secured against surprise raids. (Air raid warning posts, etc.). To insure accomplishment of this task: Set up 160 Batteries (echeloned in depth, with Inf. and AA cover). -- Transfer all replacement organizations of Norway units to Norway, as well as one or two of the Occupation Divs. earmarked for France. -- Increase strength of Construction Troops.

Barbarossa: 50% cannot be taken out of Norway.\* -- Sweden is not likely to let us use their facilities. -- Dietl will strike via Petsamo. Two Divs. to Narvik to relieve Dietl.

Strengthening of defenses: Falkenhorst's proposal: For Murmansk only 2 Mt. Divs. Third Mt. Div. cannot be managed. One Occupation Div. for Norway: one-third to northern Norway, two-thirds to southern Norway. 54 Batteries with reinforced T/O can arrive in northern Norway by sea on 15 April; five or six large steamers. Personnel will proceed to Narvik as "furlough personnel"\*\*. This plus one-third of the Occupation Div. and two MG Bns. for northern Norway will make up for Second Mt. Div. by 15 May.

Central Norway: Batteries by 25 April. 50 Batteries in ports (lower T/O; reinforced by Inf.).

Southern Norway: 50 Batteries and two-thirds of one Occupation Div. will sail from Stettin on May 1.

Operation Silberfuchs: 2nd Mt.Div. will strike toward Polarnoj, 1 Finnish Div. (12th Brig.) and 1 German Div. from Kemi-jaervi in eastern direction. Seaborne movements: Allow 6 days for unloading at Kemijaervi and Uleaborg.

1500 - 2030 hrs. Fuehrer conference (with Col. Heusinger):

- 1.) Marita: The operation must be carried to the objectives that will assure us a base for air domination of the Eastern Mediterranean. This requires control of Attica, perhaps even of the Peloponnese. Operation must be carried out with maximum speed. Occupation of Thasos and Samothrake if possible should be simultaneous with occupation of the coast. To accomplish this we must try to obtain shipping from Romania and Bulgaria. -- Lemnos will be seized by paratroops as soon as possible, thereafter.

Turkey: Satisfactory letter from the Turkish Chief of State would suggest that Turkey is desirous to keep out of a conflict with Germany. Forces assigned to watch Turkey may be withdrawn after we have reached the Aegean coast.

Conclusion: The forces allocated for Marita must be written off from build-up for Barbarossa.

2.) Barbarossa:

- a) We must score successes from the very start. There must be no reverses.

- b) It would be pointless to base our operational plans on forces which cannot be counted on with certainty. As far as actual fighting troops are concerned we can depend only on German forces.  
The Finnish forces can only be counted on to attack Hango and prevent a Russian withdrawal into the Baltic area.  
On Romania we cannot rely at all. Their Divisions have no offensive power.  
From Sweden we can expect nothing, for we have nothing to offer.  
Hungary is unreliable. She has no reason for turning on Russia. Her political aims lie in Yugoslavia, where they see something for themselves.  
Slovaks are Slavs. May perhaps be used for occupation purposes later.
- c) Rokitno Marshes would not restrict movements. (!) It is a terrain in which Armies could maneuver freely. (!)
- d) AGp North and Center will push as far as the Dniepr, then, taking advantage of the protection afforded by the river, mass forces for a thrust to the north. Moscow is of no importance whatsoever.
- e) AGp South: "It would be fundamentally wrong to attack everywhere." Pruth and Dniestr are rivers, which will block any offensive. The Dniestr is much more impregnable as a defense line than the Rhine. Hence, no attack across the Pruth. "Here we would only drive the Russian away from a spot where we should beg him to stay put."
- f) Conclusion:  
 In the Romanian sector, employ only the forces necessary for the protection of Romania. All other available forces will be used for frontal attack north of the Carpathians, with greatest weight on the northern wing, where additional armor will be brought to bear. Armd. units must be pulled out of Romania at the earliest!

### 3. Finland-Sweden-Norway:

- a) No plans can be based on the assumption that Swedes will tolerate transit of combat troops.
- b) Present defense of Norway not yet strong enough. The British will make diversionary attacks. Norway vulnerable: Fjords, roads.
- c) No threat in the West: Air incursions impossible in daylight. Landings in the West out of the question. Some troops in the area can be released for Norway. (Two or three Divs.)
- d) Proposal to Sweden. We want to relieve two Mt. Divs. in northern Norway, and request right of transit for two Divs. (material by sea).  
 If arrangements cannot be made, exchange must be made by sea.

- e) One Mt. Div. is to be released in this manner. An attempt will have to be made to ship another Div. into the Gulf of Bothnia shortly before beginning of operations. These two Divs. will have the double mission of keeping the British from establishing a foothold in Murmansk, and of closing the White Sea Canal.
4. Gen. Wagner presents the great picture of supply. No comments.
5. Rear Areas: No difficulties in Northern Russia, which will be taken over by Finland. Baltic States will be taken over together with their administrative machinery. Ruthenians will welcome us with open arms (Frank). Ukraine uncertain, Don Cossacks uncertain. We must create Republics isolated against Stalin's influence. The intelligentsia put in by Stalin must be exterminated. The controlling machinery of the Russian Empire must be smashed.  
In Great Russia \* force must be used in its most brutal form. The ideological ties holding together the Russian people are not yet strong enough and the nation would break up once the functionaries are eliminated. Caucasia eventually will be ceded to Turkey, but first must be exploited by us.
6. Lybia: Agrees to the forward shift of the defensive front. Current preparations must enable us to pass over to the offensive as soon as a favorable balance of strength is attained. Sending of additional troops now impractical. Landing operation in Tunisia is rejected; plan to purchase ships in Tunisia must be studied.

2230 hrs. Gen. Paulus is given outline of the results of Fuehrer conference.

18 March 1941

Morning Conference:

Albania: The Italians are relieving their frontline Divs. British in the Peloponnesè? What use can be made of Rhodes?

Yugoslavia: Report of preparations to join the Tripartite Pact.

Four Battleships must be laid up for repairs (Hipper, Scheer, Scharnhorst, Gneisenau).

Speidel (Paris)!

- a) Balance of security assignments between Belgium and France.
- b) 100,000 prisoners of war must be evacuated if Operation Attila comes off. Would guard units become available?
- c) Political situation (Weygand!).
- d) SD and SS are spreading themselves all over.

Vogl (Armistice Commission):

- a) Surrender of arms and material: Surprisingly good progress. 341 train-loads of material.
- b) Aircraft construction program is running into snags. France wants concessions (prisoners of war, coal).
- c) 7.5 cm Field Guns (700) cannot be shipped off. Alternative: Have panoramic telescopes turned in.
- d) Trucks (13,000) are going out at very good rate. Tires first-class.
- e) Altmeyer case not yet settled.
- f) Material depots in Africa will not be shipped out until later.
- g) Casablanca Commission had difficulties owing to vastness of area and Italian passive resistance.

Ochsner:

- a) AGp D has assigned Chem. Mortar. Regt. (Dora) to the Armd. Group.
- b) Improvised vehicles for terrain decontamination. Will be stored in the chemical defense depot. 12 truck columns for chemical defense depot. Training with operating units. Sprinkling from trucks no problem.
- c) Chem. Mortar: 40 is coming off production too slowly.
- d) Briefing of chemical warfare officers by Ochsner.

Radke: Hess' letter. — Böhler's letter. — Files on incidents in Poland closed by SS. — Case Tondorf settled. (Government General)

Wagner: a) Moldavia base must be maintained despite change of conditions.  
b) Marita: Strength requirements for rear services.  
c) Directives on policies for OKW rear area issued.

Heusinger: Discussion of possibilities in view of the changed situation on Barbarossa and Marita.  
Sixteenth Armd. Div. can be pulled out as of 25 March.  
By 15 May all armed units of AGp South, with the exception of SS Viking Div., can be assembled north of the Carpathians. Kleist then will have 5 Armd. Divs., 3 mot. Divs., and SS Adolf Hitler.  
9 Divs. GHq reserves will be coming in behind AGp A, between 16 May and 5 June.

Conference with ObdH: Change of plans to conform to new situation. Mission for List in view of new situation. Norway orders requested from OKW. Personnel questions.

von Ziehlberg: Out of turn seniority advancements and other current business.

19 March 1941

Conference: Yugoslavia will join Tripartite Pact. -- British in Greece 18,000 to 20,000 strong.  
Port Said-Alexandria: British troops ready for embarkation.  
Twelfth Army reports information interpreted to indicate evacuation of Thrace.

Heusinger: Discussion on disposition of forces in Greece, Romania and Norway. -- GHQ reserves.

Foertsch (Colonel) reports completion of the War Academy course.  
Remains at my disposal.

Töppe, late OCu France (Gen Qu I), reports as CO of Gen Qu CP North, for Barbarossa.

Krebs (Chief of Staff VII) reports off to Moscow as substitute for Koestring (during the latter's illness). Detailed review of the military situation and its impending alteration resulting from assembly of our troops on Russian border. Summation of points to which he should give particular attention. General questions of line to be followed in talks.

Winter (Ia, AGp A): Review of revised missions for AGp South.  
Depth of disposition and concentration of tanks in Sixth Army. --  
Hold Seventeenth Army close toward the northern wing. --  
Possibilities of subsequent attack from the Moldavian front, meanwhile deception and sham movements.

Hermann (Ia, AGp C): Missions for AGp North reviewed:  
Armd. Gr. 4 must jump off together with Infantry.  
Strong infantry forces on both sides of road to Siauliai.  
Shift one or two Divs. to Memel area.  
Problem of bridges for Memel crossing at jump-off.

Buhle: AP shells for 5 cm gun on tanks = 15% of total ammunition.  
Flamethrowers for Rommel. -- Combat with engineers with flamethrowers on tank I. -- Development program for Infantry.  
Norway: Replace construction troops with Reich Labor Service.  
Reorganize Corps Hq III as a Corps (mot.) Hq.

Paulus: Points brought out at conference of ObdH with Armd. Div.  
Commanders: Close control of Divs. by Corps. -- Air situation. --  
Protection of rear communications of armd. units. -- Close teamwork with Inf.

20 March 1941

Heusinger: Current matters: Norway. -- Romania. -- Greece.

Enemy Intelligence: Greece. Landing of British troops seems to have started. Movements, also motorized elements, from Attica northward.

Gen. Rommel: Report on Lybia. Overall impression: British passive and apparently thinking in terms of defense only. British Armd. units apparently being concentrated in direction of Bengasi. The area to the south, around Agedabia and Solum, seems to be treated as a no-man's land. This would indicate British intentions to defend the Djebel area, which offers favorable health and tactical conditions. We shall not be able to attack on the base line of the arc \* in the direction of Tobruk before the enemy in the Djebel is beaten. But the Africa Corps is not strong enough at the present to do this. Nevertheless we could weigh the possibility of occupying the no-man's land around Agedabia and making preparations for a drive in direction Tobruk next fall.

Afternoon: OQu I and Gen Gu confer on details with Gen. Rommel, who then will present an estimate of what he could achieve with available forces before onset of the hot season.

Ministerial Director Sarnow:

- a) Whale oil: 10,000 plus 15,000 tons, a total of 25,000 tons.
- b) Dutch gold: 35 millions.
- c) Rubber: stocks on hand 4,000 tons; monthly withdrawals 800 tons. ---  
Belgian gold 235 tons = 536 million gold marks
- d) German war finance system.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Results of conference with Rommel. In line with morning discussion.
- b) Results of conference with Guderian on disposition of forces on right wing of AGp Center.
- c) Appraisal of possibilities of operations in northern Norway (Britain-Russia).

21 March 1941.

Situation: The British seem to be disembarking also at Saloniki. Perhaps they are making preparations for a stand east of the Vardar line. We will have to reckon with a total of no more than 4 British Divs., brought over in two crossings (six days each).

Conference with ObdH and Rommel: In line with yesterday's conferences. --- Also current matters. --- Assignment for Army Hq 11. --- ObdH trip to Bulgaria. --- Edirne corner.

Matzky: Current matters of his Section, including questions of protocol.

|                               |      |        |
|-------------------------------|------|--------|
| <u>Gen. Otto (Slovakia)</u> : | T/O  | actual |
| Officers:                     | 1196 | 885    |
| General Staff Officers        | 37   | 16     |
| Generals                      | 7    | 3      |
| NCO's                         | 5093 | 2378   |

Lunch: Vogl (Armistice Commission), Otto (Slovakia) and aides.

Heusinger: a) Dispositions of AGP Center (Armd. Gr. Hoth) for jump-off not yet perfect. Reluctance still shown to team up Inf. with Armd. units at the jump-off.  
b) Group Falkenhorst will be directed by OKW.  
c) Police Div. to be put under Himmler and sent to East.  
d) GH q troops must be taken from List and allocated to AGPs South and Center. List will keenly feel loss of medium artillery, assault batteries, light AA Bns., Engineers, bridge columns etc.

Evening: Demonstration of visual training aids (Sculptetus and Major Wratschko, Chief of Army Film Center).

22 March 1941.

Situation: No important news.

Heusinger - von Grolmann: Discussion of disposition for List's drive. Liaison Officers. -- Romania. -- Protection of border in the East.

The question of protecting the Eastern border in event of Russian preventive action is becoming acute. However, we must not allow ourselves to be scared into premature measures. I do not believe that Russia would take the initiative. It surprises in List's plan that no measures are taken to protect his eastern wing (apparently Bulgarians!), and that Armd. Corps is set to strike in direction of Veria and Katerini, instead of Edessa. Instructions to Grolmann for his conference with List.

Noon: Lunch guest of State Secretary of the Foreign Office\*, with Oshima, and Alfieri. Discussion of our demands to Japan and Italy (Libya).

Evening: <sup>\*\*</sup>George calls, in Berlin on official business.

23 March 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

George visiting. Max drops in on his way from Warsaw to the West.

Had words with ObdH over his signing of an operational order for List.  
At home: Future organization of the General Staff. --  
General Staff personnel. -- Efficiency ratings and minor desk jobs.

24 March 1941.

Situation: No signs yet of any change in Thrace. East of the Mesta river there are still only one Div. and the border guards. West of the Mesta 4 to 5 Divs.; British in line Katerini - Veria - Edessa. British reinforcements apparently also on Crete. Yugoslavia will join Balkans' pact tomorrow. Turkey's attitude unchanged. No cause for anxiety. England seems to be under heavy pressure.

Paulus - Heusinger - Beck:

- a) Shipment of light\* troops to Romania must be speeded up after departure of XIV AC and Thirteenth and Sixteenth Armd. Divs. The danger of having only weak light troops in Romania must not be overlooked.
- b) Instructions to Rintelen on our intentions in North Africa.
- c) Romania must soon be informed on the need for strong defense measures on the Pruth border.
- d) 5 Coastal Arty Bns. are leaving for Romania beginning 5 April.

von Ziehlberg: Reassignments in April, 1941, and current matters.

- Buhle:
- a) AT defense in Greece.
  - b) Corps Hq Hansen and liaison officers.
  - c) Air Signal Bn.; allocation of trucks.
  - d) Military police patrols checking trains through Hungary.
  - e) Bridge columns: March and April 20; beginning May, eight to ten each month; target 460. Problem of traction, however, remains unsolved.
  - f) Special wishes of the Air Force for 22nd Airborne Div.
  - g) 15,000 Polish peasant carts with drivers will be made ready for Barbarossa by beginning of May.

25 March 1941.

(Yugoslavia joins  
Tripartite Pact).

- Situation:
- a) In Greece, one Australian Div. from Palestine, one New Zealand Div. from Tobruk. Troops from Palestine are being replaced, apparently from Mesopotamia. Concentration of British Eastern Mediterranean Fleet off Crete, purpose unknown. Possibly Crete as staging area for movements. British are disembarking troops in Greece: Attica, Volos. Scattered British detachments reported on Katerini - Edessa line. Greek islands off Turkish coast said to be still free from British troops, as are Thasos, Mytilene, Kephallonia and Lemnos.
  - b) Roatta, Chief of Italian General Staff.



- c) Alleged trouble between Twelfth Army and Romanian authorities over supplies, on account of demands by Twelfth Army not previously discussed.

Wagner: (Gen Qu):

- a) Report on stocks of gas ammunition: Available on 1 June: 2 mill. for Lt. Field How.,  $\frac{1}{2}$  mill for Med. Field How. Gas of several types will be fired at the same time. Shells on hand in sufficient quantities, need only to be filled; has been ordered.  
The munitions depots can load:  
Prior to 1 June: 6 trains daily  
after 1 June : 10 trains daily.  
To speed delivery, three gas trains will stand by behind each AGp,  
The assembly of gas trains in the Z.I. will depend on availability of sidings to Chief of Transportation.
- b) Decontamination: Static decontamination station on the border. -- 19 Field Decontamination Companies (one for each Army; Norway and Romania 2; Gen Qu reserve 7). Assignment to Armd. Groups is declined.
- c) Friction with Schell, who interferes in the business of the then Gen Qu. Huff between ObdH and Gen Qu, who feels offended that he was not told about some alleged divergence of opinion between them.
- d) Lybia: Mil. Com. for Rear Area.
- e) Bulgaria: Establishment of a supply base Bulgaria, after List has started drive to the south.
- f) Care of wounded for East: 50,000 beds to form hospital pool for East (base hospital); under BdE.
- g) 38 hospital trains are readied for evacuation of the base hospitals to the ZI.
- H) Military administration Greece: Question open.

Siewert: Missions of Liaison Detachment Bulgaria.

Heusinger:

- a) Changes in the instructions on assembly of troops for Barbarossa in view of the new situation on the southern wing. Changes in the demands on Air Force.
- b) Comparison of Russian and German strength ready for commitment. We are extremely weak compared with the Russians up to 20 April. After that the Divs. arrived in such numbers as to eliminate all danger. Meanwhile of course, our supply base is under a threat, but I believe that we must avoid any unusual forward concentrations at this time.

- c) New instructions for AGp, South.  
Various possibilities of operational disposition in AGp Center (Ninth Army).
- d) Mission of Army Hq 11 in Romania. Also various minor current matters.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Agenda for conference of Finance Minister with OKH. — Reinforced Border Control Service.
- b) Item for discussion for conference with Heydrich on impending Eastern matters.
- c) Conference Altenstadt — Thomas.

von Bernuth: a) Motion pictures: Activation of eight new motion picture units, (two for tropics) brings total to 16 (including 2 in ZF., 2 in Libya).  
b) Program for peacetime officer training:  
c) Experiences of the Training Divs.

Evening: Lecture by Prof. Mende before the officers of General Staff: Currents in the intellectual life of present-day Russia.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Progress of deception maneuvers in the West. Review of orders issued.
- b) Reflections on British capabilities: Shipping space available at any one time could take care of only four Divs. That would severely limit their capabilities for anything outside their operations in the Eastern Mediterranean.

26 March 1941.

Situation: No important news. British strength in Greece is hardly more than 30,000 at the moment. This number, however, is reported to include Air Force and supply services, which means that they would not even have two complete Divs. as yet.

1030 Paulus: British capabilities. For my part, I don't think it very likely, at least for the present, that the British would send to Kirkenes any of the 20 homeland Divs. they may have gotten up by now. Such a move would be more likely later on, after getting in touch with Russia following the start of our attack. But even then the mutual distrust of the British and Russians in this area is so strong that we can expect more benefit than trouble from such a move. England's foremost concern is the Eastern Mediterranean and the land route to India. Here they are building up strength, but only with defensive intentions for the time being.

1100 Conference with Heusinger in ObdH's Office:

Discussions in preparation of tomorrow's conference of CGs.  
No new ideas.

Gen. Otto (Gen of Inf.) reports as substitute for the CG XXX AC who is sick.

Talk about tactical manuals: MG Co and Inf Regt. will not be ready for begin of the offensive.

Konrad: Air targets in England: Seaborne supplies, shipping, harbour installations. Minesowing. Training against ship targets, etc. Weather questions. -- Weather reports. -- British food situation.

Waldau: Outcome of map maneuver Bogatsch (AA). -- Difficulties of airborne operations in Barbarossa. -- Review of Air Force missions

Fellgiebel: a) Hungary. Some signal operating troops must be set up in Hungary. Communication lines AGp South - Army H q ll.  
b) Marita: Very difficult without telephone line Belgrad - Nish - Saloniki. Solution by using civilian facilities.  
c) Sweden. Same solution.  
d) Finland: Senior Sig. Corps Officer.  
e) Radio communications questions. Dummy traffic in Romania, and other current matters.

Noon: Japanese Officers my guests at lunch: Chief of the Japanese military mission, a general of the mission, Military Attaché Bansai.

From 0930 Conference of ObdH with the CGs of the AGps, Armies and Armd. Gps.

AGp. Center: No significantly new viewpoints. Only Ninth Army and Hoth will need direct orders to get them to team up Inf. Divs. with Armd. Gp. in the jump-off.

AGp. North: Plan to strike with one Div. (SS Div. Reich) in the direction of Kowno is criticized; is changed by AGp. At Kowno we must do as best as we can with improvisations and keep Armd. Grp. together. In this case, too, cooperation of Inf. Divs. in the attacking sector of the Armd. Group is discussed and accepted by AGp.

1200 hrs. Called to the Reich Chancellery on account of Yugoslav coup d'état.

1300 - 1430: Fuehrer demands earliest possible march into Yugoslavia. Four invasion thrusts:

- a) On Lists's right wing, reaching Axios river via Novo Selo, to give quick support to advance of List's right wing.
- b) Detached from the right wing, but still under List's command: Strike from the area around Sofia towards Skoplje, to join up with the Italians and to prevent linking up with Greece.\*
- c) With a separate group from the Sofia area, in direction of Belgrade, to seize enemy capital and open up the Danube.
- d) From Germany, in the North, perhaps even from Hungary, with Armd. ...

1600: After return: ObdH continues conference with the CGs of the AGps, etc. (AGp South), General discussion. Present: OQu I. I discuss with Operations Section the operational possibilities against Yugoslavia and their ultimate effects on Barbarossa. Subsequently, conferences with Operations Officer, Transportation Officer, Gen Qu and ObdH on time needed for assembly and grouping of forces for Yugoslavia.

28 March 1941.

Leeb: (Ordnance Office), Increase of effectiveness and range: Rocket projectiles for Lt. Fd. How. To begin with, only a few thousands rounds. Bore tapers from Med. Fd. How. caliber to Lt. Fd. How. caliber. Tapered-bore tubes are ground down, e.g. from 5 cm at breech to 3.7 cm at muzzle.

Antitank weapons: Tapered-bore tubes and 8.8 cm, 10 cm gun on self-propelled mount (as of May).

Hollow-charge projectile: Equal section hollow-charge projectiles for larger calibers, 7.5 to 10. Fitted with impact fuse, can be used also by Lt. Field How., against Infantry.

"D" Siege gun: 80 cm caliber, maximum range 40,000 m, available for Spain after March 1942; Railway gun on Spanish railways.

1230 Reich Chancellery: (Myself, Paulus, Heusinger):

Fuehrer reviews the courses of operations open to us: Thinks that group against Nish must be made as strong as possible, because strongest resistance may be expected in this sector (armament center, capital).

Go-ahead given for negotiations with Hungary. Accordingly I instruct Paulus to proceed to Budapest immediately. Negotiations with Bulgaria must refer only to preparative measures.

Italy: Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce. Speaks of situation which is serious but not disastrous, and of determination to crush Yugoslavia. Demands suspension of drive in Albania, covering of northern flank of Albanian front, and readiness for attack in Istria.

Il Duce's letter to the Fuehrer: Promises to call off drive in Albania, to cover three northern approaches to his wing and to add six Divs. to the seven Divs. stationed in northeastern Italy (in addition to the 15,000 frontier guards). Also pledges support of Croat separatist movement.

Turkey: List must report immediately if Turks march into the Edirne corner; such a move is not very likely. The Fuehrer's appraisal of Turkish attitude is highly optimistic. He has told the Turkish Ambassador that Russia did not join the Tripartite Pact, because the Fuehrer would not agree to Russian bases in the Straits.

Other matters put before the Fuehrer:

- a) List should not be confined to Mt. Olympus line.
- b) Timing: List is to strike at the earliest; the drive toward Skoplje should coincide with List's attack, if possible.
- c) Air Defense Africa. Fuehrer thinks Rommel should try to make the best with what he gets.
- d) Airborne operation: Fuehrer suggests an airborne landing at Krusevac (Yugoslavia's arsenal). Regt. Goering to Vietinghoff.

- Buhle:
- a) Orders for Corps Hq Hansen.
  - b) Light Road Construction Bns: Five activated by the Reich Labor Service.
  - c) Tactical control of 22nd Div. (under XI Air Corps).
  - d) 10.5 cm AT Gun, SPM.
  - e) Training of Maintenance NCO's during the war.
  - f) Make preparations for reconditioning of tanks, etc. after Greek and Yugoslav campaigns.
  - g) Make best use of postponement of Barbarossa which gives us at least 4 weeks.

Lt. Col. Spaeth (Liaison Officer in Albania):

Orientation on situation for his personal information, with instruction to talk to the Italians only on matters regarding Twelfth Army.

Paulus-Heusinger: Composition Second Army:

1st Mt. Div., carried by Truck Transportation Regt., arriving by 11 April. XXXIX Corps (fully motorized) Kuebler. LI Corps, Briessen LII Corps, Reinhardt XXXVI Corps, von Vietinghoff Temesvar: Reinhardt, XXXI Corps (mot.) plus SS Div. Reich. One Artillery Regt. Staff. one medium field How. and one 10 cm Bn. One Eng. Bn., Bridge Column; Div. Grossdeutschland? 4 Artillery Commanders, 4 Artillery Regt. Staffs, 8 Medium Field How. Bns., 2 Siege Gun Bns., 2 15 cm Gun Bns., 2 Observation Bns., 2 Assault Gun Bns. (from the East), 3 Eng. Regt. Staffs, 16 Bridge Columns, 3 Eng. Bns., mot.; 3 Bridge Construction Bns., 3 AA MG Cos., 2 Medium and 2 Lt. AA Bns.

Army Hq Schobert will be sent to Romania sometime later.

Capt. Giese, Capt. Obermayer report in; assigned to Operations Sec.

Gen. Konrad: Briefing on operational intentions of OKH against Yugoslavia.

Gen. Jodl OKW calls up: Hungary agrees to everything and accepts proposals.

29 March 1941.

Kinzel (reports from Finland):

- a) European Russia: 15 Divs. more than previously estimated.
- b) Russian Armd. Corps Pskov with two Armd. Divs.: 2 Tank Regts., 1 Rifle Regt. Etc.
- c) Paratroops: 10 Brigs. of 3 Bns. each.

Situation: OQu IV: Italian defense measures against Yugoslavia in the North, and preparations for attack in Albania (contrary to promise to Fuehrer).

3 Divs., including Armd. Div. Centauro to Libradz, Kukes and Scutari.

Italian Fleet: Motor torpedo boats to Suda Bay (Crete).

3 British Divs. left Alexandria for Crete on 9 March (reported by Japanese Gen Staff)

Op. Off.: 2 ships of the 15th convoy to Libya (supply) torpedoed. 8th MG Bn. arrived at El Agheila. Operational order for Yugoslavia issued.

Tv. Off.: Two movements shifted from Barbarossa will not get through.

OQu IV: Requests of foreign governments to accredit officer observers. Tours of Romanian Gen Staff officers on Western front. -- Werth (Hungary) wants us to recall Krabbe.

Fellgiebel reports on possible Signal Communication lines between Army Hq 2-Hungary-- Italians; Temesvar -- Army Hq 12. Tunnel shelter for Fuehrer train south of Wiener-Neustadt.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Basic factors of supply operation against Yugoslavia. Instruction for rear services to detrain along railroad line Linz - Vienna whenever practical and keep line to Graz open for troops. Group Temesvar must be based for supplies on Merk's \* organization in Romania. Have everything ready to use Danube below Vienna! Army Hq 12 needs more trucks.

von Etzdorf: Conversations with Matsuka apparently successful. Attack on Singapore seems to be contemplated. Noncommittal on dates. Matsuka was informed that we are not interested in a Russo - Japanese non-aggression pact; agreement on fishing rights, etc. would be enough. State Secretary is being informed on dates for attack on Yugoslavia and for Barbarossa. Watch Belgrade diplomatic corps!

Bogatsch: Army Hq. 2, Army Air Commander (7): 1 Long-range recon Staffel, 1 Courier Staffel, 1 light Sig. Bn.  
II Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staffel ) Old type  
III Corps: 1 Close-range recon Staffel )  
XXXXVI Corps (mot.): 1 Group Air Commander; 1 Close-range recon Staffel, plus 2 Close-range recon Staffeln for Armd. Divs.; 1 Air Signal Net Operations Co.  
XXXXIX Corps must be helped out by XXXXVI Corps.

Army Hq. 12: 8 Close-range recon Staffeln (including 4 for Armd. Divs.) Long-range reconnaissance (2 Staffeln to be lent by VIII Air Corps). (Silent reserves: 2 Close-range recon Staffeln at Bucharest).

Wagner (Gen Qu), Baentsch, Krumpelt (Supply Officer, Army Hq 2)! Discussion of Administrative Orders attached to Operational Orders. "Operation 25". Some difficulties will develop in Romania and Bulgaria owing to scarcity of transport. Nevertheless, despite unloading points far to the rear and with the remainder of the frontward movement having to depend on trucks, they will squeeze through with getting the supply troops going and just manage to complete stockpiling before start of the operation.

Paulus phoning from Vienna:

- a) Reports unexpected delays in arrival of Infantry units.
- b) List wants to put Kleist in command of the entire Western drive, not only of Group Nish.
- c) List does not want to strike against Greece until way is open for attack toward Ueskub.

These wishes have as basis the desire to assure success of the Greek campaign, whereas my considerations aim at speedy conclusion of the Yugoslav operation. I think that Group Ueskub will be ready to strike on 5 April, and believe it is sound to postpone List's Greek drive until then.

2100 ObdH (on phone): Short report on my talk with Paulus and my view of List's proposals: divergent idea; we must watch out!)

2200 Gehlen: Finish drafting of assembly orders for "Operation 25".

30 March 1941. (Sunday)

0830. To Berlin. Phone talk with ObdH on List's proposal and my criticisms.

1100. General meeting at Fuehrer Office. Address lasting almost 2 1/2 hours. Situation since 30 June. Mistake of British not to take advantage of chances for peace. Account of subsequent events. Italy's conduct of war and policies sharply criticized. Advantages for England resulting from Italian reverses. England puts her hope in the U.S. and Russia. Detailed review of U.S. capabilities. Maximum output not before end of four years; problem of shipping. Russia's role and capabilities. Reasons for necessity to settle the Russian situation. Only the final and drastic solution of all land problems will enable us to accomplish within two years our tasks in the air and on the oceans, with the manpower and material resources at our disposal.

Our goals in Russia: Crush armed Forces, break up State. — Comments on Russian tanks: redoubtable; 4.7 cm gun (AT) a good medium weapon; bulk of tanks obsolete. Numerically Russia's tank strength is superior to that of any other nation, but

OQu IV

they have only a small number of new giant types with long 10 cm guns (mammoth models, 42 - 46 tons). Air Force very large in number, but mostly outmoded; only small number of modern models.

Problems of Russia's vastness: Enormous expanse requires concentration on critical points. Massed planes and tanks must be brought to bear on strategic points. Our Air Force cannot cover this entire huge area at one time; at the start of the campaign it will be able to dominate only parts of the enormous front. Hence, air operations must be closely coordinated with ground operations. The Russians will crumple under the massive impact of our tanks and planes.

No illusions about our Allies! Finns will fight bravely, but they are small in number and have not yet recovered from their recent defeat. Romanians are no good at all. Perhaps they could be used as a security force in quiet sectors behind very strong natural obstacles, (rivers). Antonescu has enlarged his Army instead of reducing and improving it. The fortunes of large German units must not be tied to the uncertain staying power of the Romanian forces.

Mines! Questions regarding Pripet Marshes: Flank protection, defenses, mines. Problems arising if Russians should make strategic withdrawal: Not likely, since they are anchored on both the Baltic and the Ukraine. If the Russians want to pull out, they must do so at an early stage; otherwise they cannot get away in good order.

Colonial Tasks! With our goals in the East achieved we shall need no more than 50-60 Divs. (~~armor~~). One part of the Ground Forces will be discharged into armament production for Air Force and Navy; the others will be required for other missions, e.g. Spain.

Clash of two ideologies. Crushing denunciation of Bolshevism, identified with social criminality. Communism is an enormous danger for our future. We must forget the concept of comradeship between soldiers. A Communist is no comrade before nor after the battle. This is a war of extermination. If we do not grasp this, we shall still beat the enemy, but 30 years later we shall again have to fight the Communist foe. We do not wage war to preserve the enemy.

Future political map of Russia: Northern Russia goes to Finland. Protectorates: Baltic States, Ukraine, White Russia.

War against Russia:<sup>the</sup> extermination of the Bolshevik Commissars and of the Communist intelligentsia. The new states must be Socialist, but without intellectual classes of their own. ~~Group~~ of a new intellectual class must be prevented. A primitive Socialist intelligentsia is all that is needed. We must fight against the poison of disintegration. This is no job for Military Courts. The individual troop commanders must know the issues at stake. They must be leaders in this fight. The troops must fight back with the methods with which they are attacked. Commissars and GPU men are criminals and must be dealt with as such. This need not mean that the troops should get out of hand. Rather, the commander must give orders which express the common feelings of his men.



Embody in      This war will be very different from the war in the West.  
ObdH Order    In the East, harshness today means lenience in the future.  
                 Commanders must make the sacrifice of overcoming their  
                 personal scruples.

Noon:      All invited to lunch.

Afternoon: Fuehrer Conference:

- a) Yugoslav Question. Decision in conformity with my ideas.  
List will attack with I Corps and on his Marita front on  
5 April. SS Adolf Hitler attached to Corps.  
Kleist will attack with 3 Armd. and 2 Inf. Divs. and 1  
Bulgarian Div. on 8 April.  
Group Temesvar on 12 April.  
Weichs likewise on 12 April.

Italy is no help as a partner. In Albania they are paralyzed  
with fear. On the Giulia Frontier they claim they cannot attack  
before 22 April. No need to define a boundary for them against  
sector of Second Army since they will not attack anyway.  
Details: Airborne landing Krusevac. - Assignment of Regt.  
Coering. - Location of GHq.

Op. Sec.: Ship 22nd Div. to Hungary.

- b) Barbarossa: Reports of AGp leaders and of several subordinate  
commanders (Guderian). Nothing new, except a clever plea by  
Rundstedt for assigning the Carpathian sector to the Hungarians  
and making the Pruth line an offensive front.

31 March 1941.

Reporting in or out: Several Gen. Staff officers, leaving (Natzmer,  
v.d. Heyde) or joining us (Nippold).

Situation: Yugoslav movement to south (Skutari, Skoplje); British  
movement toward the Yugoslav northern border. Yugoslav mobili-  
zation continues.

Paulus: Returning, reports on conferences with List and with Weichs and  
Hungarian Army High Command.

List, as was evident from his cabled report, wants to give  
precedence to the drive into Southern Yugoslavia and conse-  
quently would like to cut Group Nish down to two Armd. Divs.  
Wants to keep back 60th mot. Div. as reinforcement for the  
Ueskueb Group. Moreover, he insists that he is too weak with  
respect to the Yugoslav concentrations in the South.

Weichs accepts mission assigned to him. Will be informed on  
Hungarian intentions.

Hungary readily accedes to our demands concerning Army Hq 2.  
Wants to attack along Lake Balaton and Tisza river, and with  
smaller forces east of the Tisza. Hungarians will fight under  
German High Command.

Gen. Thomas reports on organization of the war economy with regard to Operation Barbarossa.

Conference with ObdH:

- a) Transfer of GHq to Wiener Neustadt or Baden near Vienna.
- b) Problem of protective measures for Iron Gate.\*
- c) List sends message that he must have 60th mot. Div. for Ueskueb under all circumstances.

Heusinger: Availability of new Divs. for Operation 25:

- 101. Lt. Div. (as of 9 April, Brody)
- 100. Lt. Div. (as of 15. April, Doellersheim).
- Twelfth Armd. Div. perhaps ready before 18 April (i.e. 12 Apr).
- Perhaps bring over Fourth Armd. Div. (Bordeaux).

Teletype talk with List: Need of strong motor forces for Ueskueb drive emphasized. Pleads again for 60th Div. Request declined. Bulgarians do not want to take active part in campaign against Yugoslavia. Are afraid of Turkey.

von Ziehlberg: Organization of a Forward GHq.

1 April 1941.

Situation: Eden in Belgrade. New Balkans alliance: England - Greece - Yugoslavia. Movements to Southern Serbia continue. Increasing signs of disintegration of the Yugoslav State.

von Ziehlberg: Transfer of GHq to Vienna area. -- Conference with Thiele and Fellgiebel on signal facilities. Target date 8 April 0000 hrs.

ObdH: Discussion of offensive possibilities against Southern Serbia. Von Brauchitsch plays with the idea of having Second Armd. Div. strike toward Veles instead of against Greece, in order to be stronger in Southern Serbia. I oppose this disposition which would allow the entire Greek Second Army to get away from us. We must steel our nerves to believe in the devastating effect of the attack of Ninth Armd. Div. and SS Div. Adolf Hitler on Skoplje. Must yet talk over missions of Army Hq 2 in Operation 25 with Witzleben.

von Witzleben: C/S. Army Hq 2. Discussion of dispositions for drive of Second Army. Main effort on left wing; first objective: Hills north of Zagreb.

Gen. Jodl (OMW): Fuehrer wants maximum railroad schedule set in operation at latest possible date.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Currency arrangements for Romania are now coordinated with those in effect in Bulgaria.

- b) Finkel's report. Rommel shows total lack of interest in supply organization. Transportation lying idle in Naples. Staff Weller (Rome) very good.
- c) Preparations for Military Government in Operation 25.

Gen. Brand: a) Artillery commander for Army Hq 4. Temporary incumbent: Gen. Berlin with Staff drawn from Artillery School.

b) Setting up of heavy artillery on the Channel Coast. Turn over to Navy four 34 cm French railway guns (range 40 km).

c) "Fortress gun emplacements". Trials with K 3 gun tube requested. Must be put off.

von Bernuth: a) Reorganization of training supervision after departure of Army Hq 2.

b) Tactical employment of Chem. Mortar units.

c) Regulation and coordination of military training projects of Labor Service and Hitler Youth.

Gen. Paulus: a) Fuehrer will leave for Hq South on 7 April at the earliest, but more likely on 8 or 9 April.

b) Discussion of outcome of visit to Hungary.

Gehlen comes with report that Army Hq 12 cannot launch operations before 6 April (7 April better). Reply: OKH demands specific reasons.

2 April 1941.

Situation: Tartar reports from Bulgaria about Yugoslavia. Claim 3 Divs. and 9 Brigs. and very much Artillery and Engineers in Southern Serbia. — Must be seeing things!

Reports from Greece speak of four British Divs., including one of Armor, as well as 2 Divs. disembarking at Piraeus. Considering the time factor alone, this is quite impossible.

Turkey is said to have changed sides suddenly. Popular sentiment is in favor of war with Germany. Military attaché in Ankara reports the opposite.

Col. Greiner reports out (was in charge of training manuals in Section of Chief Inf. Off.); takes over command of an Inf. Regt.

1300 - 1400. Fuehrer Conference on over-all situation in Yugoslavia (Heusinger with me). New viewpoints. Emphasis again on Nish. Mission of Twelfth Army discussed. Plan regarding Croat autonomy. Strong language about Italians, who should use their Air Force on front of Twelfth Army, instead of on their Albanian front.

Gen. Heiner is briefed on his duties. Suggestion is made to set up a German Administrative Hq in Budapest.

- Buhle:
- a) Refitting of mot. units after Operation 25.
  - b) Ban on furloughs lifted. 5 % for farmers.
  - c) All units in Operation 25 have their field replacement Bns., except 164 Div.
  - d) Brigade 900, assignment possible as of 15 May, while training goes on. Components:
    - 1 Rifle Regt. (two Bns.)
    - 1 Lt. Arty. Bn., plus Assault Gun Bn.
    - 1 Eng. Bn., two Cos.
    - 1 Sig. Bn., two Cos.
    - 1 AT Bn., of three Cos (1 Co 4.7 cm)
    - Rear Services (for Supply Columns)
  - e) Use of Tank Training Bn. and Reconnaissance Training Bn. (mot.)
  - f) Use of French medium B 2 gun in Barbarossa (Seventeenth Army)?
  - g) Tank III with long 5 cm gun. Tube too long.
  - h) Waterproofing of Tank III and IV : Fording depth increased to 2.20 m. (Work must be intensified to attain depth of 4m): Waterproofing must be accomplished throughout Third and Eighteenth Armd. Divs., Fourth, Tenth, Fourteenth, Seventeenth Armd. Divs. In all other Divs. for 2 - 3 tanks.
  - i) Greater carrying capacity for ammunition and fuel in tanks. Gasoline in outside steelhooped drums; as yet no solution for ammunition.

Foertsch reports as Liaison officer OKH to Army Hq. 12. Receives briefing on situation. — List of duties.

Heusinger: Current business: Authorization of forward shift of Divs. in the East. — Reporting schedule for Army Hq. 2. Employment of Airborne Divs. (Movement takes 12 days!) Take Parachute Regt. instead.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone: Gienanth is at the end of his tether trying to check SS in the Government-General. Requests action by OKH, to back him up in the question of evacuation of billets.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Transfer of Executive Power from Army Commanders to Corps Commanders in Operation 25. Definition of jurisdiction of the Special Detachments etc. of the SS and Secret Field Police.

3 April 1941.

Situation: Agedabia taken by German Africa Corps (which reports heavy British losses). Enemy in hasty retreat to the north. Turkey estimates British strength in Greece at 3 Divs., as we do.

Heusinger:

- a) Airborne Div. needs 5 trips to get to Nish. Air route via Bucharest. Total 15 days (starting 7 April). Better to transfer Parachute Regt. to Bucharest, which is then available for missions anywhere. (Yugoslavia, Greece).
- b) Date for jump-off of Operation 25 will be set by OKW.

- OOu IV: a) Reports from Finland: Attempts to recruit men for SS Regt. Nord are viewed with disfavor; Finns would rather have revival of Jaeger Bn. 27 idea.\*
- b) Italian-Portuguese arms deals are purely financial transactions; no raw materials involved.
- c) Bircher, Danniker\*\* visit of schools etc. in Germany.
- d) Material turned over to Oshima (situation maps) and Marras\*\*\* (secret regulations); other current matters.

Ochsner: Conference on preparations for Barbarossa - Gas protection for horses. - Tactical problems in use of smoke. - Preparations for smoke laying exercise.

OOu IV reports that the Fuehrer wants to take control of the Hungarians out of hands of OKH, and give orders to them directly.

Too bad!

Col. Homlock brings letter from Werth, Hungarian Chief of Gen. Staff, requesting recall of Krabbe. Reports Yugoslav mobilization completed; 1.2 million men. Matschek has founded a Croat National Unity Party.

Keitel (Personnel Div.):

- a) Officers situation generally satisfactory. All quotas filled. Junior officers situation good (New training class 15 May).
- b) Bn. Commanders: bad shortage.
- c) Officer pools for Romania (Army Hq 12), Vienna, and all Army Groups; 300 each.
- d) Out of turn seniority advancements - 255 Gen. Staff officers.
- e) Promotions of E-officers # to General rank.
- f) Results of Mieth.

Heusinger: a) Control of Hungarian Army by the Fuehrer, not by OKH, is due.

b) 22nd Div. all of a sudden is supposed to go to Ploesti, taking the place of Regt. Goering. Cannot be moved by rail.

c) Fuehrer Order to Africa Corps. Recognition of accomplishments and reminder not to be reckless, as Air Force units are being withdrawn, and arrival of Fifteenth Armd. Div. will be delayed; moreover, the Italians now need all their strength against Yugoslavia and so have nothing left for North Africa. Under these circumstances there is danger of English counter-attacks on flanks. Further advance authorized only, when sure, that British Armd. elements have been taken out of area.

d) Army Hq 12 wants to start operations on 6 April, at dawn. Air Force first against Rupel Pass.

Paulus: a) Tartar reports from Hungary: Teleki has committed suicide; his death is supposed to have political reasons. Horthy will not mobilize the entire Hungarian Army, but only border guard and one mot. Corps. Reported resignation of Hungarian Government.

b) Study for "Suedwind".

Buhle-Reinhard:

- a) Truck situation makes it necessary to equip ~~armor~~ units with French material.  
Units affected: 20th Armd. Div., 14th, 18th, 25th, 36th mot. Divs. Last Inf. Divs. not to be fitted out before 20 May, to preclude necessity to reequip an additional mot. Div. -- One small Spare Parts Column for each reequipped Div. and 3 large Gen Qu Spare Parts Depots for French material are being organized.
- b) State Railroads near breakdown. They cannot take over any further jobs in the Southeast unless we help them out. Want release of 35,000 officials and employees of age groups 18 and over for operation and workshops.  
Decision: We give them age groups 18 and over in all troops except Railway, Armd. troops and all units assigned to Operation 25. To what extent this should apply also to officers must be examined in consultation with Personnel Div.

Paulus: Reports of Teleki's suicide are confirmed. Apparently there have been serious disagreements in the Cabinet concerning participation in the campaign against Yugoslavia, which overtaxed the strength of the ailing Prime Minister. The current Foreign Minister is his probable successor. Mobilization will be limited to IV and V Corps, mot. War Minister von Bartha is on his way with a letter from Horthy to the Fuehrer.  
Fuehrer's decision on start of Operation 25: 6 April, as was recommended by us after receipt of List's report.

4 April 1941.

Situation: British reported to be evacuating Bengasi, setting fires. In Northern Greece, the presence of 3 British Divs. is confirmed. Now, after all, the Bulgarians make their 6th and 11th Divs. available for Operation 25.

Paulus: Study for "Suedwind". -- Paulus, too, has got the impression at conference in Vienna, that supply officer, Twelfth Army, is not equal to his job.

- Bork:
- a) Listing of roads which must be restored in Serbia.
  - b) Use Railway troops for construction and, for the first time, operation of railroads in Serbia.
  - c) Technical crews (of Reich Ministry of Transportation) for reopening of Danube shipping lane will stand by in Vienna.
  - d) Activation of three (later four) Field Railway Directorates (294 civ. officials) and 18 Field Railway Operatinn Centers (1,000 civ. officials).
  - e) Liaison Detachments of Chief of Transportation at Armd. Groups, for emergency restorations of railroad operation in their sectors. With them, one Railway Eng. Co. (mot.) each, for construction and operation. -- Also for Kleist.

- f) Urged stepping up of shipment of products from Romania, not possible before middle of June.
- g) Fourth assembly echelon for Barbarossa (26 days) will probably be run from about 20 May to 20 June. Maximum railroad schedule. At that time it won't unbalance railroads, economic experts hold, since the spring bottlenecks will have been dealt with by that time.

- Radke:
- a) Case Mieth: Wording contested by witnesses. (Only Capt. Mayberg, attorney, insists on the wording. Members of the Army interrogated by a Gauleiter!
  - b) Case Claer cleared up with Bouhler. - "Army Yearbook" affair settled by talk with Bouhler.
  - c) Order concerning separation of Church function from troop celebrations. Ban on speeches by Chaplains on subjects other than purely religious ones. (OKW Order).
  - d) Old complaints about SS incidents in Poland. Investigations must be continued with participation of Army representatives. Final disposition must be deferred until all facts are known.
  - e) Memorial cemeteries in the East.

Doerr: Briefing of Liaison Officer for Udine.

von Salmuth reports back from leave. Review of situation in the East.

Col. Kinzel: Situation report on Yugoslavia: Reports on disposition of enemy forces show that border troops are being reinforced by Divs. from the interior of the country. This will result in stronger initial resistance, but later on, when this has been broken, in a speedy collapse. No central reserves will be available after that. In the south of the country (mountains) the Divs. of the Third Army are being split up into 9 Brigs. strung out along the border. Against northern Albania, comparatively strong forces have been brought up; in Scutari area at least 3 Brigs., on the northeastern border 3 Brigs., and on the border north of Lake Ochrida three more Brigs., making a total of a maximum of nine Brigs. The direction in which they are pointed is a little awkward for us in view of the lack of Italian preparedness for defense in Albania. We must expect Serbian penetration into Albanian territory and some very costly fighting there. There is no evidence of a weakening of enemy defense measures in their northern border area.

Situation report Russia: Foreign Armies East now admits that strength of Russian Army in European Russia must be set higher than estimated originally. (The Finns and the Japanese stressed that all along.) The total figure is now put at 171 Inf. Divs., 36 Cav. Divs. and 40 motor-mechanized Brigades. The newly activated Armd. Corps of 3 Divs. apparently is stationed around Leningrad.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Part G of Administrative Orders for Barbarossa.
- b) Transfer of Executive Power to Armd. Groups and Corps Commanders disapproved.

- c) OKW order on administration of justice in occupied territories. Military Government set-up contemplated for Old-Serbia only.
- d) Fuel requirements for Serbia equal 14 days' requirements for Barbarossa.
- e) Supply situation: Generally speaking all preparations for Operation 25 are completed. 10,000 tons of fuel for Vienna (barge train) still to come.

Apart from that, Second Army is fully taken care of. Temesvar will be completely stocked by 8 April.

Twelfth Army: For the time being no crisis. Shipping for Marita made available in Constanza. First, 3 ships (10,000 tons). On 3, 4, and 6 April, one for Aegean. Daily loading capacity 400 tons, loading time 5 - 7 days; crossing will take 2½ days. Additional vessels are being assembled. Army Hq 12 specifies needs to Admiral Balkans. Supply Officer Romania supervises loading operations.

Danube basin: Barge train Belgrade", 10,000 tons plus one tanker, already in Vienna. "Barge train II Romania" is being formed between Regensburg and Vienna; 16,000 tons, provisions and ammunition to Romania, for regrouping after conclusion of Marita. One trip will carry supplies for Moldavian base.

- f) Field Post problems which will result from cancellation of Army Leave trains.

Legation Councillor von Schmieder (in place of Etzdorf):

Review of Hungarian situation. Diplomatic procedure at the beginning of hostilities against Yugoslavia and Greece.

Conference with ObdH: Gives me his account of tour to the Balkans.

Conversation with King Boris and Antonescu, List and Weichs. --  
No news about List. Apparently a good deal of friction between Kleist and List, because List regards his drive as the main thing and wants to cut down on Kleist,

Weichs does not want to give any Infantry to Corps Vietinghoff, disregarding ObdH's suggestion.

Boris is mobilizing 6 Bulgarian Divs., but will not allow them to cross into Yugoslav territory, on account of Balkans' Pact.

Antonescu knew nothing at all of our impending offensive against Yugoslavia. Requests that Hungarians should not operate east of the Tisza river. By 20 April, Romanian will have 15 Divs. and two-thirds of one mot. Div. in the Russian border region. Of our German Divs. one will go to the Bukowina border, one to the Pruth river knee; Armd. Div. to the approaches to Ploesti.

Kinzel: New intelligence from Yugoslavia, which gives an entirely different picture; the forces stationed near and north of Nish have moved south and are being replaced by units from central Serbia. Report that 2 Divs. in the Banat have been withdrawn behind the Danube. On the northern border no change.



- Liss: a) Australian Corps has disappeared from Cirenaica. Still in area: Seventh Armd. Div., 1 Australian Div., Sixth British, Ninth Indian. The bulk of the forces sent to Greece come from Cirenaica. After the victory over the Italians, strong forces seem to have been transferred to Abyssinia.
- b) Greece: No British on Serbian soil. Wilson in command?
- c) French West Africa: No change. De Gaulle has not made any progress.

- Heusinger: a) Friendly airplanes will be painted yellow.
- b) British Mediterranean Squadron reported in direction Gibraltar. Azores apparently without importance for Dakar, but in American sphere of interest.
- c) Operation Orseva.
- d) Second Parachute Regt. in Plovdiv area with 2 Bns.; 1 Bn. still due (date uncertain).
- e) Situation Libya: Bengasi taken. Reconnaissance units push on in the direction of Derna.
- f) Air Force in Operation 25. Strength and disposition of forces. Ample.
- g) Effect of Operation 25 on Barbarossa, which lost: 6 Inf. Divs. and 2 Corps Hqs from second and third assembly echelon. and 3 Inf. Divs. from GHq reserve. Of these Divs., the 6 former can be replaced from GHq reserve (third assembly echelon); 2 Corps Hqs, (XXXIX and LII), (third assembly echelon) can be replaced by XXXVII and LV from GHq reserve. Of 23 Divs. in GHq reserve, 12 remain available, including 5 mobile Divs. from the West.

Armer: Campaign in Yugoslavia: 3 Corps Hqs., 9 Armd. Divs. (7 Armd., 2 mot.) plus SS Regt. Adolf Hitler without Greece.

Timing: If Presov available, 17 Inf. Divs. and 13 Corps Hqs. could be on the ground by 20 May; then 9 Inf. Divs. of the fourth assembly echelon (maximum railroad timetable); subsequently 24 Armd. and mot. Divs. and 5 Corps Hqs. by 23 June. Armd. Divs. in Serbia would have to be refitted in rehabilitation districts (Vienna etc.) by 1 June; consequently must be out of the fighting by 30 April: 10 days for movement to the rehabilitation district, refitting will last 3 weeks.

Paulus took my place at conference this afternoon with the Hungarian War Minister von Bartha.

Bartha told him that Teleki committed suicide because he felt he could not take the responsibility for this policy after having himself signed friendship pacts with Yugoslavia. Left letter to Regent, urging on him a policy of loyal observance of pacts. This has made the Regent waver in his original decision. He sends the Minister to the Fuehrer, to appeal for sympathetic understanding and submit new proposals.

Mobilized: Border Guard, IV, V, mot. Corps (so he says).

Promised additional mobilization of I and VI. II and VII (and III) still outstanding from original commitment. Promises that all Corps will be ready by 15 April (?), Armd. Corps by 12 April.

Paulus had been instructed by the Fuehrer before the conference as to what arguments he wanted him to use with Horthy. Apparently Bartha was extremely embarrassed by these arguments and after the reference to the agreements concluded in Budapest. We must wait and see what comes of this.

5 April 1941.

Morning Conference:

- a) Reports are confirmed that Yugoslavia is shifting her main forces to the area south of Nish. The informations - often grossly overdrawn - differ a good deal. One source places 12 Inf. Divs. and one Cav. Div. in Southern Serbia along Bulgarian border; another reports 10 Inf. Divs., 1 Cav. Div., 8 Inf. Brigs. Reports on Greece generally portray an unchanged situation. Estimates of British strength in Greece vary between 45,000 (which may be correct) and 120,000. The report that the Yugoslav High Command, in case of war, would seek to join up with the British and Greek forces, probably is correct.
- b) North Africa: Bengasi taken; equipment of one Italian medium artillery Regt. and one Armd. Bn. recaptured. Reconnaissance in direction of Derna in progress.

ObdH! Outcome of Fuehrer Conference on the evening of 4 April.

- a) Situation Hungary. The Fuehrer seems to be soft in his dealings with Horthy and appears to be impressed by the Teleki business. Hungary is not going to strike right away; it wants to wait until the Croats have declared their independence. With that, the State, with whom it concluded a Friendship Pact, will have ceased to exist.
- b) Fuehrer is greatly concerned over the Italians, particularly in Albania, as also over the possibility that the Serbs might fall back before the Italians in southward direction into the Serbian Mountains.
- c) Lines of action:
  - 1) Seize Agram quickly. Have Vietinghoff with one Armd. Div. (8th), move on Agram.
  - 2) Provide against developments south of Sava river Vietinghoff's tanks must push further on toward Sarajevo.
  - 3) Serbia is assembling very strong forces in southern part of country. This increases the likelihood that Kleist would have to be shifted south from Nish.
  - 4) Move Reinhard and Vietinghoff closer to border.
  - 5) Airborne operations: Nish 22nd (Airborne Div.), Ueskuels (paratroops).

- d) Overall picture: The conduct of the campaign once more comes under the dictate of political considerations and, what is more, considerations of purely transitory character. This precludes any planning with clear goals and harbors the danger of dissipating our strength in a series of isolated operations. Always the same story. Good nerves are the only antidote.

Heusinger:

- 1.) I shall talk with Witzleben: Hungary's attitude may make it necessary to effect a quick seizure of Agram.\*  
Think over and report: Possibilities in following the original plan of operation against Agram (Eighth Armd. Div., Advance Combat Team, and remainder of Vietinghoff's Corps pushing only as far as the mouth of Drave river). What are possibilities, if parts of Vietinghoff's Corps have to strike earlier. (Fourth Armd. Div. already in place, Eighth Armd. Div. ready to strike on 10 April).
- 2.) Op. Sec. will prepare orders: Tie together List with 20nd Airborne Div. and Parachute Regt. at Plovdiv. Prepare for operation against Ueskueb and Nish. Reinhard will have SS Div. Reich available on 10 and 11 April; "Grossdeutschland" not before 12 April. Examine possibility of striking before these dates. List authorized to start operations.
- 3.) GHq Reserves: a) Troops: 101st Div. already assigned. 100th Div. arriving by 13 April (Vienna). Fourth Armd. Division in Vienna as of 15 April. Twelfth Armd. Div. as of 18 April, Warthe Lager and Olmuetz. Nineteenth Armd. Div. as of 20 April, Sennelager.  
b) Truck transport units available: One group (for 1st Mt. Div.) as of 10 April.  
One group (for 101st and 100th Divs.) as of 23 April.  
One group (for 22nd Airborne Div.), still uncertain.
- 4.) Arrange moving of GHq, so that we can start work at Wiener Neustadt on morning of 9 April.

- Buhle:
- 1.) Development program for Chem. Mortar troops.
  - 2.) Norway: In addition to 160 Batteries: 7 Arty Regt. Staffs (small T/O); and 3 Construction Bns. We give them 1 Fortress Constr. Bn. and 2 Reich Labor Service Bns. Regional Defense Bns., nothing available. --- One Security Brig. --- MG Bn. can be taken out.
  - 3.) Set up Administrative Hq. Budapest by 15 April. (?).
  - 4.) Libya, dust protection for tanks (muzzles and turret base).
  - 5.) Rehabilitation of Armd. Divs. after Operation 25.

Witzleben (Army Hq 25) on phone: Gets 3 assignments!

- 1.) Draft plans for quick seizure of Agram by Eighth Armd. Div. reinforced by Advance Combat Team.
- 2.) Split up 1st Armd. Div. for missions south of Agram and make arrangements for arrival of Fourth Armd. Div., 15 April.
- 3.) Advance starting date for Vietinghoff.

Schuchard (Paris): Rivalry between Embassy and Military Commander more sharply marked. Abetz is in Berlin to see the Foreign Minister. Embassy is overstepping its jurisdiction in all fields and tries to squeeze out the Military Commander. Proof that Embassy is working against us: Dr. Brinon said to be afraid that Abetz might leave his post, on the allegation that he could not work any longer with the generals and Wiesbaden.\* Kommerzienrat Lehrer has mentioned a similar remark indicating Abetz's attitude toward us.

Reasons: Pressure from Ribbentrop. - Abetz! making every effort to score successes against us before his Minister. Arrest of Americans, which von Stuelpnagel refused, leads to disputes. "If higher authorities intervene, the fight might become unending".

von Ziehlberg: a) Current Gen. Staff business.  
b) Studies on revision of Rules of Land Warfare (Kriegsrecht).

Heusinger: 1.) Second Army: Advance Combat Team of LI Corps:  
1 Bicycle Bn., 1 Eng. Bn. mot., 1 Med. Arty. Bn.  
Ready for operations: Fourteenth Armd. Div., 8 April.  
Eighth Armd. Div. 10 April.  
2.) Sixteenth Regt.\*\* and AA Bn., plus AT Co of 22nd Airborne Div. in Bucharest tonight.  
Entire Div. in Bucharest ready for operation by 13 April (?). Air Transportation available for two-thirds.  
Commitment only on authorization by OKW.  
3.) Parachute Regt. in Plovdiv by 7 April.

6 April 1941.

Campaign against Serbia and Greece.

Beginning of hostilities in Twelfth Army Sector.

Morning reports: Operation Iron Gate successful.\* Against Southern Serbia, surprise apparently complete. Resistance on Rupel Pass. Ninth Armd. Div., 73rd Inf. Div. and Second Armd. Div. have crossed border. Second Army Sector: seizure of points of tactical importance on Yugoslav territory; demolitions in the interior.

Conference with ObdH: Situation: Corps Reinhard: Date fixed for start of operations. -- Report from von Witzleben (Army Hq 2), that a strong Advance Combat Team of Armd. Corps of Vietinghoff will be ready to strike on 10 April. -- Preparations for bridge construction at Belgrade. Hungarians will help with bridging equipment; German Eng. troops (under-water cutting and welding, and demolition detachments) stand by in Bucharest and Vienna.  
Hungary: In addition to mot. Corps and IV and V Corps, I and VII Corps have been mobilized since 5 April. Still outstanding from original commitment: III, II, VI Corps.

Disposition of Russian Forces: Strong concentrations in the Ukraine are noteworthy. Would be right for an offensive against Hungary and the Bukowina, but I feel sure this possibility can be discounted.

Paulus-Heusinger:

- a) OKW inquires about possibility of shifting Armd. Divs. to Romania: Possible dates of arrival: Fourth Armd. Div. on 22 April, if wheeled vehicles go by road; on 25 April, if everything goes by rail. Twentieth mot. Div. on 24 April, if wheeled vehicles go by road; on 5 May, if everything is shipped by rail. This would mean cutting across shipment of 239th Div., which then would not be ready until 29 April, and 170th Div. would arrive in Romania not on 28 April, but on 6 May.
- b) Airborne troops: At Plovdiv 2 Bns. of Parachute Regt., third on way.  
Arrived near Bucharest: Sixteenth Inf. Regt.  
Remainder of the Div. can be down by 13 April. Commitment only on authorization by OKW.

Air Force reports it believes to have scored a decisive success against enemy force, and that it now will turn to the targets requested by Ground Forces (railroads, highways).

Evening Report: Air Force has made three attacks on Belgrade (Palace, Citadel, Ponton Bridge)  
Destroyed 44 aircraft on the ground, 20 shot down; own losses 2 twin-engine fighters. AA Defense thin.

Sofia reports bombing attack by planes flying at high altitude.

Twelfth Army. Ninth Armd.Div. in action against retreating enemy west of Vetunica at 1400 hrs.

73rd Inf.Div. Advance Combat Team reached Kocane in the evening.

Second Armd. Div. fighting at Strumica. Intends to drive southward.

Sixth Mt. Div. reported on railroad line near Kalo Horjo.

Fifth Mt. Div. and 125th Regt. in heavy fighting on Rupel Pass.

72nd Div. at Chiron, pushing on toward Kate Vondru.

164th Div. advancing on Xanthi.

50th Div. still fighting in Nymphaea area.

Enemy columns moving from Stip on Strumica.

Heusinger:

- a) Plans worked out for changeover from Operation 25 to Barbarossa and for resulting modifications in Barbarossa plan.
- b) Twentieth mot. Div. will move close behind Fourth Armd.Div.
- c) Refitting facilities for Armd. units can be set up in the following areas:

Bucharest for 2 Divs. ( without need of shipping new materiel)

Vienna 3 Divs.

Mil. Distr. VIII \* 3 Divs.

Protectorate 2 Divs.

Berlin 1 Div.

Mil. Distr. IV\*\*1 Div.

- d) Next successes of Rommel in North Africa.

7 April 1941.

Morning Reports: Progress over the evening situation only in Ninth Armd. Div. Sector. They have taken the mountain pass on their front. In the Greek border area fighting is rather heavy.

Libya: Reacting to the first surprise advances, the British seem to take energetic countermeasures to escape encirclement. Fuel difficulties.

Abyssinia: After abandoning of Addis Abeba, the Italians concentrate resistance in some districts of the Interior, in which they could hope to hold out until the rainy season.

Movements progressing satisfactorily. Twentieth mot. Div., if ordered entrained now, would arrive from Auxerre area on 19 April, 2000 hrs.

Disposition of the Russian Forces gives food for thought. If one discounts the much-advertised idea that the Russians want peace and would not attack on their own account, one cannot help admitting that their troop dispositions are such as to enable them to pass to the offensive on shortest notice. This might become extremely unpleasant for us.

Buhle - Wagner:

1.) Refitting:

- a) Schell needs three weeks. Hungary impractical, Romania for minor jobs.
- b) Military District XVII \* : 3 Armd. Divs.  
Military District VIII \*\*: 3 Armd. Divs.  
Protectorate: 2 Armd. Divs. (including Eighth Armd. Div.)  
Military District IV\*\*\* : 1 Armd. Div.  
Military District III # : 1 Armd. Div.  
Romania : 2 Armd. Divs. (Thirteenth and Sixteenth Armd. Divs.) Supply Column Bn Vienna, or rather Chemnitz, where there are better facilities for refitting.
- c) GHq Troops and Columns distributed: (Protectorate and Milit. Distr. IV).
- d) Infantry Divs: 3 each in Milit. Districts XVII \* and XVIII ##; 4 in Milit. District I###. About 2 in Bucharest.
- e) BdE must be ready for MT units by 20 April, for Armd. Divs. by 1 May.
- f) Current tank production: 80 German tanks III and 40 Czech tanks a month.

2.) Administrative setup for Southeast: Military Government for Serbia and, at first, also for Croatia. Preliminary orientation for Thurner. Give him temporary Staff Southeast.

3.) Tension Abetz/Stuelpnagel is really not directed against Stuelpnagel, but against Armistice Commission. The latter has instructions from the Fuehrer to be hard on the French. Abetz wants to take the collaboration line in conformity with Ribbentrop's policies. With Foreign Office and Armistice Commission receiving diverging

directives from above, contradictions and conflicts on the lower level are unavoidable. Futile for us to try to do anything against Abetz from here.

- 4.) Waffen SS - Poland: Reichsfuehrer (Himmler) sends representative to Government General, to straighten out the matter.

Jodl (OKW) on phone: Russia's uncertain attitude. Shall railroads be put on maximum schedule? On Fuehrer's decision, the reply is: No, but defensive measures now can be taken openly.

Housing: Marching orders to Twentieth Div. mot. Move SS troops to more central location in France for convenience of entraining.

Org. Sec.: Requirements for future organization of Ground Forces:

24 Armd. Divs., including 10 for tropical service ("Light Divs.").

12 mot. Divs., including 5 Lt. Divs. for tropical service.

66 Inf. Divs., normal T/O, including 6 for airborne operations and 10 with tropical equipment.

10 Mt. Divs.

24 Mobile Divs., 8 with tropical equipment.

6 MT Regts. for operational assignments.

2 Air Transport Staffeln, each with carrying capacity of 1 Div.

Estimated Needs:

| Theaters: | Armd. | Mobile | MT. | Inf. | MT Regt. |
|-----------|-------|--------|-----|------|----------|
| West      | --    | 6      | --  | 24   | 1        |
| North     | --    | --     | 2   | 6    | --       |
| East      | 6     | 6      | 2   | 20   | 2        |
| Southeast | --    | --     | --  | 6    | --       |

Operational Groups:

|                   |   |   |    |    |    |
|-------------------|---|---|----|----|----|
| Spain Morocco     | 3 | 2 | -- | 2  | 1  |
| North Afr.--Egypt | 6 | 2 | -- | -- | 1  |
| Anatolia          | 6 | 4 | -- | 4  | -- |
| Afghanistan       | 3 | 4 | 6  | 4  | 1  |

Afternoon to Berlin (tailor) 1630 - 1930.

von Below: ObdH will have control of Army Hq 11, Armd. Gp. 2 and 3 during training in Z I (in conformity with my wishes).

Evening Reports: Skoplje and Stip taken, Movement of XVIII Corps in Rupel Pass has gotten under way.



Kleist starts operations on 8 April, 0520 hrs.  
Bridge at Barcs taken (Second Army), which means, that with the bridge at Koprivnica for XXXXVI Corps we can now positively count on two bridges across the Drava.

Jeschonneck calls up, and hints sort of vaguely, that the Reich Marshal has dropped remarks to the Fuehrer on "unsatisfactory" progress of XVIII Corps. This damned backbiting is starting again.  
Fortunately, in this case, the Fuehrer already had the news that meanwhile the XVIII Corps has broken through the mountains after hard fighting.  
I request preparations be completed for paratroop operation against Saloniki.

Hoesinger: Can Second Army be given a free hand for drive on Maribor? Yes!  
Air Force reinforces VIII Air Corps by 2 Fighter Groups, 1 Divebomber Group, 1 Do 17 \* Group, with two more coming later.

Hinor reports mobilization of Hungarian I, IV, V, VII, Corps and the Armd. Corps, comprising 12 Inf. Brigs., 2 mot. Brigs., 2 Cav. Brigs. Eighteenth Brig. not mobilized (area flooded). Nineteenth Brig. remains west of Tisza river.

8 April 1941. Kleist starts offensive in direction of Nish.

Situation Conference: New advances. Skoplje taken. Second Armd. Div. on way to Saloniki. Overall picture shows complete disintegration of the enemy operating in Southern Serbia.

Paulus: Discussion of instructions on deception manœuvre on the Western Front ("Haifisch"). \*\*

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. — With Matzky, Attaché matters.

Conference with ObdH: He is still concerned about Albania, and wants to urge List to move even closer to the Albanian border. Doing this would serve no good purpose, for we are no longer threatened from Albania. Any forces detached in this direction are a waste of troops which now are needed for building up swiftly the front facing south.

Airborne landing at Ueskueb \*\*\* desirable.

Afternoon. Leave on special train, at 1500.

2130. Breslau: List wants to get Fifth Armd. Div. to the south as reinforcement for Ninth Armd. Div. as quickly as possible, so as to be able to break through to Florina. Can't have it. —

Kleist has not yet pushed beyond Piroet. The battle round Nish is still to come. Fifth Armd. Div. is needed there now, but after completion of its mission it can be released for the South. The request to have Sixteenth Armd. Div. brought up is justified.

In the evening, ObdH talks with the Fuehrer from his train. No decision on Sixteenth Armd. Div. Fuehrer suggests that, if road trouble impedes closing up of Fifth Armd. Div. behind Eleventh Armd. Div. toward Piroet, Fifth Armd. Div. might strike toward Kumanovo. (Wrong! In that event the Div. would be lost for the Nish operation). It would be better to have Fifth Armd. Div. attack Leskovac via Piroet.

9 April 1941. (Wiener Neustadt)

0800. (train one hour late): Arrival at Wiener-Neustadt. Our office is in the Maria-Theresia Academy.\*

Situation Conference: Our troops have entered Saloniki (Second Armd. Div.). Local Army Commander has offered capitulation. In Southern Serbia, apparently only remnants of the enemy forces left. Italians report slackening of enemy pressure in Albania. At Skutari too, nothing has happened. North of the Danube, enemy seems to be evacuating. No report yet as to when Reinhard could start operations. In Second Army sector troops on the border are approaching the Drava. Maribor taken. Drava crossing near Barcs in hands of Fourteenth Armd. Div.

Kuebler reports entry of Second Armd. Div. into Saloniki at 0700 hrs.

List protests against yesterday's Wehrmachts communique, which fails to do full justice to the achievements of the Ground Forces and the honor of the attacking troops.

1130: OKW disapproves release of Sixteenth Armd. Div.

By noon it is clear, that the Nish front also is collapsing.

Hence, Fifth Armd. Div. is moved up via Nish in order to be brought to bear against Leskovac. The Greek Army between Turkish border and the Vardar river has capitulated. So far 20,000 prisoners are reported, (not counting the Greeks), including 5 Generals and a complete Divisional Staff; 100 guns; 28 AA guns, 25 AT guns; several hundred MG; 131 new Dornier aircraft engines, (on two fields), aircraft spare part depots; 4 Bridge Columns; 1,5 mill. liter or 1500 tons of gasoline; several rations depots and rations trains, and spare part depots. Skoplje radio transmitter intact in our hands.

Evidence of demoralization: Only the Serbians want to continue fighting. Macedonians and Croats throw their weapons away.

Heusinger:

- a) Reinhard is still facing garrisoned borders and antitank obstacles. Unless enemy withdraws, he will not start before 11 April.
- b) Possible reinforcement: 52nd Do Projector Regt. \* (rocket projectiles) range 6,000 m.  
Eighth Chom. Mortar Bn. (heavy incendiary oil rockets), range 1,800.  
43rd and 51th Engineer Bns.
- c) ObdH. with Fuehrer: Fuehrer releases Fifth Armd. Div. wants if in any way possible, junction with Italians along line Albanian border - Giulia border.

From Libya report of capture of 2,000 British including 6 Generals near El Mechili. It is claimed (agent report) that three Australian Divisions are moving up from Egypt.

Wagner:

- a) Greek Army should receive every possible consideration; Serbian Officers are to be treated in the worst possible manner (OKW order).
- b) Supply for Second Army: All right. Base of XXXXVI Corps is taken over by Staff Grote-Vienna. Field Hospitals for Second Army arrive late. Emergency improvisations! Send them hospital trains!
- c) Barge train Constanza (fuel, ammunition, rations, in ratio 3 to 2 to 1, total 10,000 tons). To be dispatched in groups of 4 ships. Transit  $2\frac{1}{2}$  days.

Heavy British air raids on Kiel!

Evening reports: Kleist has driven through Nish and is advancing northward.

This evening's order to Twelfth Army, by special order of the ObdH, includes the instruction to move Fifth Armd. Div. to vicinity of XXXX Corps via Pristina, and have XXXX Corps make junction with the Italians "on both sides of Debar", completion of mission to be reported at once. To me, this order seems wrong. For it delays XXXX Corps with the trivial business of joining up with the Italians, when there is perhaps still a chance to push ahead, via Bitolj, to Florina, without serious resistance in the next few days. Probably this step, which I denounced when talking with the ObdH in the forenoon, is motivated by political considerations on top level.

The evening report brings a puzzling observation by Air Force that, from 1630 to 1700., no traffic was observed between Kozani - Florina - Edessa and Veria. Either the British are beginning to pull out or they have not advanced farther north than Larissa.

Request Air Force to strike against Volos and Piraeus.

Report from Attache in Ankara that not only Britain, Greece and Yugoslavia, but also Turkish Army circles are exerting strong pressure to induce the Turkish political and military leadership to enter the war. This enthusiasm probably will quickly cool when they have heard announcement of the German successes on the radio.

10 April 1941 (Second Army starts  
operations with XXXXVI Corps)

Morning situation: Nothing substantially new. Fifth Armd. Div. apparently is still on the move to close on Pirot and probably will take two to three days to join XXXX Corps because of the detour over Pristina they had to take. Eleventh Armd. Div. is pursuing the enemy retreating toward Belgrade. In Southern Serbia an Advance Combat Team has broken through to Florina via Bitolj, and has made contact with the enemy. Let's hope that the eagerly desired junction with the Italians in Albania will come off soon, with XXXX Corps having taken not only Bitolj, Kicevo and Tetovo, but also Prizren, and the Italians having proclaimed their intention to meet us by advancing to Bitolj via Struga, and to Kicevo and Tetovo via Debar (Alpinis).

Reports indicating disintegration of the Serbian Army continue to come in. In Northern Yugoslavia Croats seem to have refused to obey orders in some instances. Concerning the liquidation of Thrace we have ~~no detailed reports~~ as yet.

The Greek Government has resigned. Political situation obscure. Unrest in Turkey and apparently also in Rumania. Hungarians (in response to the letter of the Fuehrer) have now promised to strike on 12 April, in the direction of Osijek, perhaps already on 11 April.

Rainhard, who still thinks he has major forces in front of him, now wants to start out on 11 April. We think he will encounter only Border Guards and Cavalry.

1230. Call up Grolman ( who will report to Greiffenberg):

- a) Why was plan of attack of Second Armd. Div. changed?  
At what tactical juncture do they intend to attack Veria?
- b) Liquidation of Thrace.
- c) Securing of coastal towns by XXX Corps.

Replies:

- a) Twelfth Army Hq, depending on the rate of progress of drive southward from Florina, is considering bringing up Second Armd. Div. over Edessa or Veria, as soon as the

pressure from the north begins to become effective. Only as a last resort will the Div. be brought up by detouring them to the North, through Yugoslav territory.

- b) Capitulation negotiation concluded and report on way. In the sector of XXX Corps, as also in the mountains around Rupel Pass, the order to lay down arms apparently has not yet reached all elements.
- c) Communication with XXX Corps extremely difficult. Advance Combat Teams are occupying coastal towns. Naval detachments are being called.

1730. Conference ObdH with Fuehrer :

- 1.) New offensives against Greece. Boundary line against the Italian zone: From eastern bank of Lake Prespa to Pindus Mountains.
- 2.) Has agreed to continuation of drive on Larissa. Permission is obtained to transfer 60th Div. \*
- 3.) Italians: Second Army must start operations with parts of Fourteenth Armd. Div. (from Zagreb) in the direction of Fiume at earliest date. The bulk of the Army may move in general direction Sarajevo.
- 4.) Russia: No reasons for anxiety.  
Turkey: Attitude not quite clear yet; it would seem that British money again has been greasing palms. The Fuehrer does not want to let the Bulgarians march into Thrace as long as the Turkish attitude is not clarified.

Gen. Konrad:

- a) Bad weather for the next few days. Snow expected in the Serbian Mountains. Weather will be slow in clearing up.
- b) Distribution of German and Yugoslav air forces, and of German AA forces.
- c) Progress of operations against England. ObdH has likewise no clear picture on the distribution of British Air strength in the Eastern Mediterranean.

1745 Message that Fourteenth Armd. Div. has entered Zagreb, received by cheering population. Evening reports show steady advances by Eleventh Armd. Div. toward Belgrade, as also by Eighth Armd. Div., moving from Barcs on Slatina, and in the south by SS Div. Adolf Hitler from Florina toward Vevi. Elsewhere the reports are that the units following in the rear are closing up on all fronts. We have not yet been able to get the Italians going in Albania. On the Giulia border they are supposed to start on 11 April. I don't believe they will.

Hungarian Liaison Detachment reports on arrival: Brig. Gen. von Beldy, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff) von Makray, Lt. Col. (Gen. Staff)

von Sziklay, Capt. Krasznay, Capt. Furgach.

11 April 1941. Good Friday (Operational Group XXXXI Corps starts operations).

During the night the Fuehrer had us on the phone again, trying to make us change the plans for Fourteenth Armd. Div., which is poised to drive west, and for Eighth Armd. Div., which will push southeast. Apparently Heusinger was able to contain this outbreak of jitters. Eighth Armd. Div. ~~will~~ still drive toward Osijek, Fourteenth Armd. Div. is already moving on Karlovac and will be pushed on toward Deince.

Morning conference: Yesterday's picture confirmed: Fourteenth Armd. Div. roaming the country almost without enemy opposition. Eighth Armd. Div. has come up against some resistance near Slatina and will attack again today. The remainder of Second Army finds little opposition in its southward advance, but has difficult terrain and poor roads.

Nothing substantially new from Twelfth Army. The Italians on the Albanian front have not really got going yet and it looks as if we shall actually have to go up to the border to effect the junction. In the south our troops are still in contact with the British southeast of Florina. No positive measures which would indicate that British front is being taken back.

Talk with ObdH: I express resentment over interference with the conduct of operations. This timorousness shying away from every risk while continuously clamoring for victories, may be acceptable politically but from the military standpoint it is intolerable. We have our job cut out in the South, against Greece. Every unnecessary step in another direction is a sin against success.

Wagner:

- a) Labor pains in the setting up of a Military Government in Serbia. Air Force wants to furnish the General, and Consul-General Neubauer, in his capacity of representative of the Four Year Plan, already seems to be up to his ears of blocking any constructive work.
- b) Constanza: One ship can sail. \* Await orders for further sailings. List needs nothing for Kavala. \*\*
- c) Rommel makes preposterous demands. His wishes can be satisfied only insofar as preparations for Barbarossa permit.

Himer reports that Hungarians are set to start off on both sides of the Danube today, at 1400. Divebombers of our Second Army will give ground support. Talk on future missions south of the Danube.

von Greiffenberg reports, 1300: Saloniki harbor taken over empty.---  
SS Adolf Hitler is in action against the British southeast  
of Florina, between the lakes (British still have artillery  
in area ! ) \* --- Kleist: This morning's action still in  
progress. Rupol Pass open for vehicles since last night. --  
72nd Div. will reach Seres tonight.

Reports coming in the course of the day and evening show quickening  
disintegration of the northern Yugoslav front. Units are  
laying down arms or surrender to our planes flying overhead.  
One Bicycle Co. captures an entire Brigade, complete with  
staff. An enemy Division Commander radios to his higher Hq  
that his men are throwing away their weapons and leave for home.  
The only fighting still going on is south of Belgrade, in  
the sector of Eleventh Armd. Div., but here, too, enemy  
resistance was broken by evening. XXXXVI Corps is with its  
right wing at Karlovac, where they are to wait for the Italians  
who have at last come out via Fiume, which has surrendered  
to them. With its left wing, XXXXVI Corps is in the area  
south of Novi Sad. In Southern Serbia a junction with the  
Italians has at last been effected on the northern shore of  
Lake Ochrida (Struga). On the Greek-British front, west  
and southeast of Florina, no new progress. Here we must  
wait for our forces to close up, which should take another  
day or two. In the Saloniki area, XVIII Corps is advancing  
westward. The Hungarians are reported to have started  
operations. Effect is not noticeable as yet.

Reinhard has started off, but his progress has been slowed  
by bottomless roads.

12 April 1941.

(Bardia, North  
Africa, taken).

The situation is developing according to plan. Yugoslav resistance  
in the north has completely collapsed. Croatia wants to  
declare her independence.

North of the Danube, Reinhard, south of the Danube, Cruewell,  
and from the southwest, Eighth Armd. Div. are closing in on  
Belgrade. The fall of the city is imminent.

In Northern Greece the British are making a stand and fight  
back at Vevi, supported by Arty; apparently rear guard units.

After conference with ObdH: New operational order directing  
assignment of First Armd. Group (Kleist) to Second Army as  
of 13 April, 1941, 0600. Divisions previously earmarked  
for GHq. reserves have been stopped en route. We need no  
additional troops for Serbia.

Gen. Streccius and Col. Zoellner call. Nothing of importance

Streccius, Zoellner, Beldy, Maklay, Siklay are my guests at luncheon;

present also Housinger and Ziehlberg.

Evening no more desk work, but visit with Irmingard, until midnight. \*

13 April 1941. (Easter Sunday).

Belgrade taken.

Morning reports: In Yugoslavia things are developing according to plan. Second Army moves in general direction of Sarajevo; in Croatia a Croat National Government is being formed. No news from von Vietinghoff (XXXXVI). The orders to turn south reached him yesterday noon. Since then we have had no signals from him. This must be investigated.

Kleist entered Belgrade with Eleventh Armd. Div. this morning at 0632. after an officers' patrol of Regt. Grossdeutschland had crossed the Danube and occupied the Ministry of War during the night.

More signs of demoralization in the Yugoslav Army are reported.. The Croats have stopped fighting altogether. Only on the Adriatic coast, some energetic commanders still seem to be trying to keep their troops together.

Greece. The Heights barring the approach to Vevi were taken after bringing to bear a concentration of medium artillery. Enemy situation shows the British with about one Corps (three Divs.) in the Kozani area, whereas the Mount Olympus front (facing Saloniki), which previously seemed to have been held by the British, has been taken over by the Greeks (with British Artillery). The plan of attack of Twelfth Army is to launch a double enveloping movement, with parts of its forces pushing on west of the Aliakmon river and with the XVIII Corps striking from Saloniki in the direction of Mount Olympus, and thereby to crack the British out of the Greek Front. This plan is completely in line with our ideas. Casualty reports so far are gratifyingly low: 400 killed, 1,900 wounded). Ammunition expenditure very small.

Morning Conference with ObdH produces no new developments.

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Supply base must be set up in Belgrade.
- b) Plan of returning some units by boat, via Italy.
- c) Assignments for 602nd, 605th, 616th MT Regts:  
602nd (moved the Mt.Div.) will be free as of 15 April. To be refitted in Chemnitz and Plauen.

605th (inmoved 161st Div.) will be available on 20 April; probably around Vienna. At the moment, its Third Bn. is with XXXXVI Corps, the other Bns. with 101st Div.



616th (in moved the Airborne Div.) Is the most severely strained of the Three. Second Bn. will be overhauled at Znaim. First Bn. is transport unit under Second Army; stays until 20 April. Third Bn. is in Romania, and will be for some time to come.

- d) Military Governments: Trans-Mur area goes to Hungary. Shift southern border of Styria across the Sava. Italy will take over Dalmatia, Bosnia and Hercegovina. Croatia is to become an independent State under German protection. For pre-1918 Serbia (including Montenegro), a centralized Military Government, which will control also the Banat area east of the Tisza river. Of the former, the region between the Danube and the Morava river, together with the Banat area east of the Tisza river is to be placed under special German protection, with military safeguards and a special regime. Southern Yugoslavia, as far as it is inhabited by Bulgarian Macedonians, will go to Bulgaria.
- e) The following arrangements are to be made: In the theaters of Second and Twelfth Armies, the Rear Area Commanders will take over administration of these regions for the time being, while making all preparations for subsequently turning them over to the permanent authorities yet to be set up. Since these regions form a single economic whole, it would be advisable to have the two Commanders be assisted by one advisor, that is State Counciller Thurner.

General von Beldy (Hungary):

- a) Reports Hungarians have entered Novi-Sad.
- b) We reach an agreement with him to the effect that the motorized and bicycle-mounted units of the Hungarian Army will cross the Danube and will be further employed in the sector of Armd. Group 1. Hungary's consent to this measure will be secured.
- c) I inform him of our decision regarding eventual transfer on Trans-Mur area to Hungary, at a date yet to be set.
- d) Hungary's wishes regarding Nagykikinda and Agaye areas.

Jodl calls up (for Keitel):

- 1.) Belgrade. On 12 April, 1700., Capt. Klingenberg of the SS Div. Reich hoisted the German flag on our Belgrade Legation. At 1845, the Mayor of Belgrade handed over the city to the representative of the Foreign Office and to Klingenberg. Great excitement in Fuehrer Hq over fact that this report did not reach top level through the OKH.
- 2.) Protection of the Bor mining district.
- 3.) SS Reich and Regt. Grossdeutschland should, if possible, not move southward across the Danube, but rather stand by for other missions.

- 4.) Projected letter to Horthy on continued Hungarian participation. Parallel agreements between both Army Commands.

ObdH (hear from Engel): Fuehrer considers sending one mot. Inf. Regt. to North-Africa. ObdH had previously refused. on the following grounds:

- a) Matter was under consideration for a long time here.
- b) We don't see our way to spare troops for North-Africa in view of the impending great tasks.
- c) Shipping not available until Fifteenth Armd. Div. has reached Africa.
- d) Impracticable owing to lack of motor transport and fuel.
- e) Without strongest air support it would certainly be unwise to enter upon operations with ambitious objectives.
- f) As we approach Egypt, British resistance will stiffen.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. - Preparation of motorized CP caravan for Eastern Campaign.

Talk with ObdH on stopping movement of reserves. In Second Army the units affected are 79th and 125th Inf. Divs., and 60th mot. Div., in Twelfth Army, 46th, 76th and 198th Inf. Divs.

Talk with Gen. Paulus:

- a) Assign Police Div. to GHq reserves in West. Send 169th Div. to Norway.
- b) Divs. of the Fifteenth draft ready by 1 May: 2 Divs., by 15 May: all others. One will go to Norway to relieve 163rd Div., one to reinforce the occupation forces.
- c) Control of Divs., in ZI for training purposes can, in individual cases, still be settled to suit wishes of the Armd. Groups.
- d) Liaison Detachment Rome hands in colossal requests for Rommel. As far as we are concerned Barbarossa has precedence.
- e) Tank Repair Centers: Silesia and Berlin will be ready first, Vienna later. Berlin may be reserved for SS Div. Reich.

Heusinger 2300.: Issuance of current orders - Danube bridge problems. Latest reports on enemy resistance on front of XXXXVI Corps.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Organization of Military Government Serbia and procedure for transfer of territories to Hungary and Italy; also basic outline of structure of Croat State. Issuance

of orders and telegrams to the agencies concerned.

14 April 1941. (Easter Monday).

Morning reports: Continuing advance of Second Army toward Serbian mountain area from the Northwest.

Resistance on the southern bank of the Save against elements of the XXXXVI Corps which are wheeling northward. Resistance also in the area of Cacak, in the Morava Valley west of Krusevac.

On the Greek front: Advance of the Ninth Armd. Div., which has taken Ptolemais. SS Adolf Hitler pushes westward in order to reach the Aliakmon Valley south of Lake Kastoria, and XVIII Corps strikes out eastward along the coast, via Kastoria.

Orders are issued to stop movements of: XXXXI Corps north of Danube (elements which have entered Belgrade will remain there);

Second Army ( 1st Mt. Div. and Corps  
( 125th Div. and 79th Div. under LI Corps  
( 101st Div., which will be shipped back by 602nd  
( MT Regt.

Twelfth Army ( 76th Div.  
( 198th Div.

Rommel wants to drive toward Suez from Sollum via Marsa Matruk.  
Reich Marshal willing to furnish air support.

Talk it over with Jodl (OKW): This operation can be staged only as a raid. To hold Suez, we have neither the troops nor the supply facilities.--

OKW directive on continuance of the Greek operation contains nothing  
now, only some rather awkward formulations.

Fuehrer letter received here sharply declines out-of-turn promotions in the Gen. Staff. This, too, will pass. If there is any place, where achievement should be the standard for promotion, it is our organization.

Non-aggression Pact Russia - Japan for five years !

Albania: Since 13 April, the Greeks have been quite open about pulling back their northern wing. The Italians are following cautiously through Ochrida and Pogradec.

1400. - 1930. : By plane to Hq Second Army at Zagreb.

Review of the situation produces no significantly new information for OKH. The instructions issued by us have not yet reached Army Hq owing to bad signal communications. Future political set-up discussed. - Stopping of rear Divs. - Flight back over Baras, Lake Balaton, Lake Neusiedl.

ObdH at Hq. Twelfth Army, Sofia and Hq Armd. Group 1, Belgrade. Apart from reports indicating desirable development of situation, nothing of significance. Casualties low.

Armistice request by Yugoslav Government is answered with demand for unconditional surrender of arms. Destructions of any kind must cease. German operations are continuing.

Fuehrer's decision on Rommel's requests: Our prime objective is building up a front of ample width in the Solum area (including Shiwa Oasis). Apart from this, only raids.

Submission of OKW directive on Operation "Silberfuchs". \*

Decision on organization of command in XI Air Corps (22nd Airborne Div.): Contrary to our demand, Air Force gets full control.

15 April 1941.

Wagner (Gen Gu): Military Government in Serbia is arranged so that we are only in charge of military safeguards and retain supervision of a general nature over the civil administration (Thurner). In all other respects, we'll let the Police and the agencies of the Four Year Plan fight it out between themselves !

Situation conference: Mopping-up operations in Serbia continue, with our forces converging from west, north and east.

In Greece, Ninth Armd. Div. has secured a bridgehead across the Aliakmon river, south of Kozani, but terrain south of the river is very difficult. The westward drive of SS Adolf Hitler and 73rd Div. through Kastoria still encounters strong resistance. XVIII Corps is advancing through the Olympos area (Mone Petras) and south of Katerini.

Reconstruction of Croatia will be in hands of Glaise-Horstenau.

Gen. Wimmer is slated to head Military Government for Serbia, when it is established.

Conference with ObdH produces no new viewpoints. He is casting about for ways to speed the build-up of a base for Rommel, and wants submarines and the Airborne Div. for this purpose. I think both methods are wrong. The Airborne Div. is non-motorized and therefore useless, once it is landed in Africa. \*\* Furnishing submarines is the business of the Italian Navy, for I think it would be a mistake to withdraw any of our submarines stationed round England and in Freetown.

Gen. Marras pays a call. A rather unproductive interview, during which I tried to rouse his interest in new tasks for the Italians in Bosnia, and to draw his attention to their lack of information on Greek withdrawals on the Albanian front. I doubt that he understood what I told him. -- The possibility of Italian help in using sea route in transferring our troops from Balkan is mentioned.

Col. Toussaint (lately Mil. Attache in Belgrade) gives a dramatic account of his experiences previous to entry of German troops in Belgrade. There have been heavy civilian casualties and much material damage in the city; water and electric supply is disrupted. He shares my views concerning our further military action, which is no longer of the nature of a campaign, but rather a sort of liquidation in which there must be no let-up for even a moment, until the entire country has been combed through. Anyone refusing to surrender should be left to starve.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Review of naval warfare problems: He doubts the reported closing of the Dardanelles by British submarines. -- Coastal shipping route to Solum can be only partly protected by submarines. In any event, using submarines that way offers fewer opportunities for hitting the British, than does leaving them where they are now. Employment of Italian submarines would be desirable.

Gives a summary of submarine warfare todate: The peak will not be reached before next August.

Roosevelt's declaration including Greenland in the Western Hemisphere, is a maneuver to make it easier for the British to protect their convoys. So far only Iceland was included in the blockaded zone; now perhaps we shall have to extend it to include Greenland as well.

SS. Bismarck, Tirpitz and Prinz Eugen are to go into the Atlantic shortly. SS. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau (the latter hit by an aerial torpedo and bombs) will not return before July.

Gen. Fellgiebel reports on plan to install a Senior Signal Officer in Belgrade, who will at first be under his command, and later serve under Military Government. Discussion of the new signal communication lines needed for continuation of campaign (Agram-Belgrade-Skoplje-Larissa and Sofia-Saloniki-Larissa-Athens).

Rommel reports meeting stubborn resistance at Tobruk, which blocks his advance; apparently a strong garrison, supported by Naval units from the sea. He has to use the two Italian Divs. to tighten the line of encirclement. Moreover, he is being attacked on the landside from Egypt. Now at last he is constrained to state that his forces are not sufficiently strong to allow him to take full advantage of the "unique opportunities" afforded by the overall situation. That is the impression we have had for quite some time over here.

Gen. Zörn (CG, Twentieth mot. Div.) reports out.

Hausinger: Reintegration into Barbarossa of units employed in Operation 25.

von Altenstadt (Gen Qu):

- a) Collection and screening of prisoners of war. Collecting points at bridges. Classification by nationalities and by following categories: War economy and armaments workers; agricultural laborers from the rich farming districts of Serbia; auxiliary services for our troops; remainder will be shipped home.

Order to this effect to Army Hqs 2 and 12 and letter to OKW.

- b) Croat Legion (Nonsense !) and Glaise-Horstenau's job.

- c) Reorganization of the Reinforced Border Guard at the Styrian and Carinthian border sectors, and activation of new Regional Defense Bns.

Evening reports: The Armistice Commission sent by the Yugoslavs consisted of some Generals of the Fifth and Second Armies, who could not be recognized as plenipotentiaries and so were sent back. - Group Kleist, coming from the north, cannot make any headway against the countless hordes of prisoners entangling his columns in the narrow mountain valleys. A spearhead of Sixteenth mot. Div., led by the Div. Commander and pushing its way through the masses of surrendering enemy units, has reached Sarajevo, where he has taken control of military and other authorities.

The Yugoslav Government has issued a proclamation to lay down arms.

The movements of Eleventh Armd. Div. and 60th mot. Div. continue, but are hampered by Serbs who want to surrender.

In Greece only slight gains on the coast and in the area of Mt. Olympus are reported. The enemy is still holding the Liakmon Valley. Little shipping traffic in the Aegean.

In Albania, the Greeks are falling back slowly.

16 April 1941.

Morning reports show no significant developments since last night. No progress in Twelfth Army sector.

Progress of the surrender negotiations: Weichs' formulation of the conditions is good and leaves no loopholes. The negotiators are not empowered to sign. Formal conclusion of the negotiations therefore cannot be expected before

tonight or tomorrow. In the meantime, fighting is practically over.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

von Thoma: Gets assignment to inspect the Armd. Divs. in Second Army: Condition of materiel, tracks; experiences.

Bogatsch:

- a) Report on reconnaissance work. Cooperation apparently good; reconnaissance units have done a good job.
- b) Reconnaissance behind Greek front in Albania has not yet yielded any conclusive results.
- c) Difficulties in equipping Reconnaissance Staffeln with motor vehicles. Completion of assembly of these units for Barbarossa jeopardized. The Staffeln now ready in France and in the Reich for shipment to the East are in part unable to move to their entraining points owing to the lack of motor vehicles of every description.

Gen. von Beldy requests orders for Hungarian units. Reply: We only want them to keep the mot. units on a stand-by footing. Hungary can dispose of all other units in the way she considers best. Reports of Serbian treachery in the occupied territory. Losses per Brigade: 20 killed, 200 wounded.

Reports coming in during the day contain nothing new, only the shocking loss by torpedoing of Convoy No. 20 en route to Libya. (Last elements of Fifth Lt. Div. and first group of Fifteenth Armd. Div., including the divisional staff and one regimental staff).

17 April 1941. (Capitulation).

Morning reports: Nothing of importance from Second Army sector. The movement toward the Dalmatian coast continues. In the sector of Twelfth Army, it is still a moot question as to what has become of the Greek forces west of the Pindus Mountains. I am quite sure that the opposition still met south of Servia is sustained only by weak forces taking advantage of the exceedingly favorable terrain. But what may be the enemy's operational intentions remains obscure. A drive by our forces west of the Aliakmon river is the only way to prevent the enemy from building up a front. But such a drive would end at Trikala and take us in front of the range rising north of Lamia, which must be regarded as the probable next defense position in the line from Gulf of Volos to Gulf of Aita. Other possibilities are afforded by the line Thermopylae-Lepanto - southern shore of Gulf of Patras. This position would require the transfer of Greek forces from the area west of the Pindus Mountains across the Gulf of Patras to the northwestern part of the Peloponnese.

Conference with ObdH produces in no new viewpoints. One upshot is request to Air Force Officer to intensify reconnaissance and aerial action against the rear of the Greek front in Albania, and order to Hq Twelfth Army along same lines.

The fact that communications between Hq Second Army and XXXXVI Corps and their Armd. Divs. are quite poor, is blamed by ObdH on the General Staff Service (Ic) \*. I shall have the matter investigated.

Gen. von Glaise-Horstenau gives an account on his report to the Fuehrer. He emphasized the necessity to include Dalmatia in the Croat State now in process of formation, because without this territory, inhabited by Croats, the basic concept of the new State, namely unification of all Croats in one independent State, would lack vitality.

The impression gained by von Glaise-Horstenau at the conference is rather discouraging. Out of consideration for Mussolini, the Fuehrer does not want to risk curbing Italian claims. As a result Serbs and Croats will again make common cause against the Germans.

von Glaise-Horstenau has been assigned the mission by the Fuehrer to carry on the drive, initiated by Weichs, to raise Croat troop units of Bn. strength, which will be the nucleus of a Police Army to be organized with 2 to 3 Divs. now, and eventually 6 Divs.; it will receive, on the quiet, support from Germany; efforts should be made to keep out Italian instructors. \*\*

On the political side SA-General Kasche goes to Croatia as German Minister, with Legation Councillor von Trott-Obergsell as his aide, to do the real work.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Summary of Zagreb conference with Krumpelt and Schmidt-Logan:

- a) Supplying of Second Army from the Belgrade base will be possible within the week.
- b) Experiences with "flying start". \*\*\* Some difficulties developed in keeping up the sequence of transports and in regard to equipment.
- c) Organization of Belgrade base: Disband base at Graz and Lake Balaton. Break up supply concentration by sending some to ZI and Rumania.
- d) Order for setting up Military Government.
- e) Conference with Himmler:

Each Security Div. will have attached: one Police Bn. mot., one National Socialist Motor Corps Co., and one Technical Emergency Service Co. Release of Police Bns. to the Corps Hqs of the Security Divs. not feasible. Instead one mot. Police Regt., under a Senior Police Chief, will be stationed in area of each Security Corps Hq.



Hausinger: Conditions governing shipment of troops to Barbarossa area. Surrender conditions for Yugoslav Army.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Bogatsch: reports on conference with ObdL along lines of my requests. Also telephone conversation with Konrad.

In the evening report comes in that Bor copper mines were destroyed. Will have to be checked. - Report that capitulation of Yugoslav Army has been signed.

18 April 1941.

Morning situation: Confirmation of report that large bodies of Greek troops have been captured in Grevena Valley (20,000), and that the way to Trikala is now open for our Armor advancing in this region. It would appear that the road from Grevena to Trikala can be used also by motor vehicles.

This and the advance of Second Armd. Div. and XVIII Corps through the Tempe Valley and across the surrounding mountains precludes any further resistance north of Larissa. The enemy will not have any trouble escaping, for the forces committed on the Aliakmon river probably consist only of very weak rearguards, who can take advantage of extremely favorable terrain.

The Greeks, in conjunction with the British, probably first tried to build up a defense line running from Mt. Olympus along the Aliakmon Valley and the Grammose Mountains to the southern border of Albania. It seems that elements from Thrace and the British between Mt. Olympus and the Aliakmon river had this mission, while troops brought up via Kastoria were to take over the central portion of this line. With this portion now cracked out of the defense position, the enemy has to take back his line of resistance. To effect this movement, he appears to have sent back the Greek forces to build up defense positions in the rear, the first of which must be assumed to lie on the high ground north of Lamia whereas the second, and probably the mainline, may be expected along the line Thermopylae - Lepanto. The mot. British troops seem to be forming the rearguard east of the Pindus Mountains and will soon disappear under pressure from us.

West of the Pindus Mountains withdrawal will be more difficult for the enemy. Here the retreating enemy cannot help being crowded together and forced into a bottleneck, where our massed Air Force will have opportunity for effective action.

Major Gen. Foerster to the Air Force, designated as Military Commander for Serbia, calls. I briefly outline to him our interests: Effective military policing, restoration and safeguarding of lines of communications, keeping industries and crop collection going; protecting the Danube shipping route.

Wagner-Altenstadt-Heusinger:

Future military set-up in the Southeast. The best way will be to create a Commander-in-Chief Southeast, similar to the one we have in the west. Under his control should be: the Military Commanders Greece and Serbia, Liaison Command Bulgaria and Military Mission Romania, along with some Divs. (controlled by Corps Hqs.) This Commander-in-Chief Balkans would carry on all the business of the ObdH, and so free us for operations in the East.

Radke: Current business : Mail censorship. -- Check patrols in the occupied Balkan territories. -- Conferences with SS-Gen. Wolff on Poland incidents in 1939 and Tiedemann case - Morale reports.

Gen. Paulus: Current business. -- Deception order. Agreement has now been reached with Navy and Air Force.

Kinzel:

- a) Details of enemy situation. The assumption that the Greeks started early to move troops from Albania to the Olympos area has been proved correct. The Italians saw nothing and reported nothing.
- b) A radio broadcast of the Greek Government has been reported, to the effect that war was lost and that population should keep calm. This report, which OKW wants passed on to all commanders in the field, is most certainly an OKW invention.--

Planes have dropped leaflets with purported proclamation of departing British Commander-in-Chief.

Fellgiebel Communication difficulties in Second Army. The reasons seem to lie partly in trouble with improvised equipment, partly in lack of initiative and skill of radio service in Second Army.

Gen. Wagner Organization of refugee control and materiel collection in the occupied Balkans territories.

von Ziehlberg: Fuehrer's birthday - Reassignments -- Organization of training in Gen.Staff and question of out-of-turn seniority promotions. -- I blow my top over tactless interference of ObdH in my command function.

19 April 1941.

The Morning Conference produces nothing significant in news or viewpoints. Among the intentions of Twelfth Army there is a plan to push XVIII Corps or at least Sixth Mt. Div. from area east of Larissa across the Odris Mountains to Lamia. That would be a mistake, for such a move gets the Div. into terrain on the Thermopylae front, where it could not make use of its special training and equipment (frontal attack across a plain).

PW interrogations are beginning to indicate a crumbling of the Greeks' will to resist on the front west of Pindus Mountains. -- Larissa taken this morning!

Dr. Ha Gloser\*reports his observation on visits to the front. Apart from the usual troubles incidental to the "flying start", everything seems to be all right.

Radke: Current matters of his Section, including dealings with the Party and chaplain questions.

Gen. von Beldy brings a letter of the Hungarian C of S. Report on minor frictions on transfer of the district between the Sava and Drava rivers.

Paulus and Wagner report on visit to Belgrade.

20 April 1941. (Fuehrer's Birthday).

1045 : Awarding of decorations.

1100.: Review of Staff.

1300 : Luncheon with Staff.

Situation: The British seem to be pulling out. South of Larissa our advancing troops are nearing the northern outskirts of Lamia. In the Thermopylae Pass, no evidence of enemy resistance. Roads clear as far as Athens. West of the Pindus Mountains the Greek withdrawal movement after all appears to be slower than was assumed; the bulk of their forces seems to be still north of Yoannina.

Metsovon Pass reported taken by SS Adolf Hitler.

Rumors of formation of new Government and capitulation of Greece.

In the evening, talk with ObdH who feels there is some tension between us. Well meant, but nothing will be changed by it.

21 April 1941.

0800: Leave with Housinger, Mueller-Hillebrand and Senior Aide in Heinkel plane of OKW Staffel ( my personal plane had a crack-up in Belgrade).

1400.: Visit to Hq Twelfth Army. Itinerary Belgrade -- Sofia (stop-over) -- Saloniki. Plan to continue to Larissa was cancelled when we learned in Saloniki that C in C of Twelfth

Army was already flying back to Saloniki, and his C of S had flown on to Yoannina to conclude the armistice negotiations with the Greek Epirus Army.

1600. : Talk with Field Marshal List: The CG of the Greek Epirus Army has surrendered to the German High Command with the explicit understanding, that he was not surrendering to the Italians, who had been defeated by him.

Of German troops, SS Adolf Hitler has entered Yoannina after crossing the Metsovor Pass. Truce already in effect. It has turned out that the entire Greek Epirus Army is still north of Yoannina. List has given orders

- a) for SS Adolf Hitler to advance to the Greek frontier in Albania, and occupy the roads leading into Greece, and
- b) for the Greeks to evacuate Albanian territory, then lay down their arms and march to PW collecting points, in compliance with the instructions of Twelfth Army Hq. Details will be worked out by Gen. Bieler, CG, 73rd Div., as deputy for C in C Twelfth Army.

1800 - 2000. Flight round Mt. Olympus and tour of Saloniki.

Evening at Hq Twelfth Army. New orders from the OKW are received. It would appear that at the time when the OKW gave the order to conclude the capitulation negotiations, the Fuehrer thought he might manage to confront Mussolini with the accomplished fact. That fell through. Mussolini telephoned directly to the Fuehrer and demanded Italy's participation. So the Fuehrer ordered that the capitulation concluded by Twelfth Army should not become effective pending his approval. This was to give the Italians an opening for appearing as partners in conclusion of the capitulation. Such a political maneuver makes the German Field Marshal and C in C Twelfth Army look foolish in the eyes of the Greek Army, and, furthermore, lays the foundation for a systematic falsification of history, designed to create the fiction that it was the Italians who forced the Greeks to capitulate.

As a matter of fact, there was no contact between the Greeks and the Italians at the moment of capitulation, as stated explicitly by the Greek CG. Capitulation became necessary solely for the reason that German troops had appeared athwart the Greek line of retreat. This falsification of history, evidently now in the making, is indignantly protested by C in C Twelfth Army, who insists that the German Wehrmacht communique must give an accurate account of the actual situation in order that German troops would receive the credit due to them for their achievement.

I discuss with List the inaccuracies in von Richthofen's reports to the ObdH, which belittles the achievements of the Ground Forces.

Overnight (21/22) at Saloniki Hq Twelfth Army.

22 April 1941.

In the morning, talk with List. He again emphasizes that he concluded the capitulation negotiations on the direct order of and on the lines laid down by OKW, and bitterly speaks out against the OKW's subsequent action in repudiating the completed surrender. On the whole, reiteration of last night's arguments.

0800 Departure for Larissa. Thrilling flight over the Tempo Valley. Larissa airfield gives the impression of a fairground. There is a constant coming and going of bomber formations and transports. Thousands of men are waiting, working or resting. No enemy far and wide.

Side trip to Second Armd. Div. Talk with Veiel (CG) and Quast (Ic). The Div. is closing up toward Larissa. Materiel is in good shape, casualties gratifyingly low.

Back to the Airfield: Talk with Greiffenberg, Bieler (CG, 73rd Div.). The Italian Armistice Commission, for whom Jodl had been waiting and now will accompany him to Yoannina, has arrived. Talk with Speth, Liaison Officer to the Italian Army in Albania: He says that the Italians had lost contact with the Greeks yesterday, and that they probably started off tonight following reports of armistice negotiations. (Heavy Italian losses.)

1000 Start of return flight: Larissa - Kozani - upper Aliakmon Valley - Lake Kastoria - Lake Ochrida - Debar - Skutari - Adriatic coast as far as mouth of Marenda River - then in clouds over Mostar - Sarajevo - Brod - Lake Balaton to Wiener Neustadt. Arrived 1430.

News that transfer of GHq postponed because of the negotiations in Yoannina. So back to the old place.

1700 Talk with ObdH, who describes the agonizing seesaw during my absence. My suspicion that the Fuehrer, against our warnings, tried to get around the Italians in the negotiations from the start, is confirmed. Apparently he hoped to doublecross his "friend". When the scheme misfired, the muddle started. Incidentally, it is reported the Fuehrer had Field Marshal List expressly informed that he would have acted the same in List's place. Such pats on the back behind the scenes do List no good, as long as he remains publicly disavowed.

The question of an airborne operation against Corinth to prevent destruction of the Canal is once more raised by the OKW with fretful nervousness.

Exchange of views on the Peloponnese. I do not believe that the British are going to defend it. They would have no ports, that are needed as bases.

1800 Report stating that OKW has ordered Air Force to prepare VIII Air Corps for an immediate airborne operation against Corinth. Fuehrer will give word when to start.

That, of course, implies the risk of missing the critical moment.

Quite interesting are the Hungarian demands for compensation of all war costs and their claims to the Yugoslav booty, which would be a credit to a Jew.

2000. Telephone Talk Keitel (OKW)/Oberr: The Fuehrer does not give up the idea of letting the Greeks and Italians settle their war between themselves west of the line Pindus Mountains - Achelooos Valley, and to seal this line by German troops. He will not make his decision contingent on Jodl's return. The SS Adolf Hitler must be taken back to the Metsovon Pass.

2100. Gen. Greiffenberg Hq Twelfth Army ( on phone):

- 1.) Orientation on impending directive along lines of conversation with Keitel.
- 2.) Hq Twelfth Army reports:
  - a) The Greeks agree to sending a parlementaire to the Italian front.
  - b) Greeks and Italians agree to a demarcation line running west along the Kalamas river from a point 5 km north of Yoannina.
  - c) SS Adolf Hitler has been ordered to withdraw behind this demarcation line.
  - d) Greek CG or a plenipotentiary will arrive for final signing in Army Hq, Saloniki, tomorrow noon. Gen. Jodl will remain in Saloniki until that time.
  - e) (in response to my question). Hostilities between Greeks and Italians have not yet ceased everywhere.

23 April 1941.

(Departure from  
Wiener-Neustadt).

Negotiations with the Italians and Greeks dragged on till noon. In the afternoon at last the capitulation was signed. Earlier, however, the Italian Radio blared out reports of the capitulation as an accomplished fact, causing annoyance in the OKW.

Our troops push close to the Thermopylae Pass via Lamia, and strike at Euboea from the Volos area. In the Thermopylae Pass, the enemy is still holding, but apparently only with weak rearguard elements. Tanks abandoned in the Lamia area were burned out by the British.

Up to noontime, there is a continuous seesaw as to whether or not we should move GHq. A decision is finally reached when I declare that I would go.

The reason for my insistence is the North African situation. It is worrying me, and the pertinent information is available only at Zoppelin. \* Rommel has not sent us a single clear-cut report all these days, but I have a feeling that things are in a mess. Reports from officers coming from his theater as well as a personal letter show that Rommel is in no way up to his operational task. All day long he rushes about between the widely scattered units, and stages reconnaissance raids in which he fritters away his forces. No one has a clear picture of their disposition and striking power. Certain is only that his troops are widely dispersed and that their striking efficiency has considerably deteriorated. The piecemeal thrusts of weak armored forces have been costly. Apart from that, his motor vehicles are in poor condition from the action of desert sand. Many of his tank engines need replacing. Air transport cannot meet Rommel's senseless demands, primarily because of lack of fuel; aircraft landing in North Africa find no fuel there for the return flight. In view of all this, it is essential to have the situation in North Africa cleared up without delay. After giving thought to the matter, I decline flying down myself. It would not do for me to go there merely for fact-finding purposes. If I go, I want to have authority to give orders. ObdH has his private objections on that score and pretends difficulties with the Italian High Command. The real reasons of course are others, but perhaps it is better to dispatch Maj. Gen. Paulus. He has good personal relations with Rommel from way back when they served together, and he is perhaps the only man with enough personal influence to head off this soldier gone stark mad. Representatives of Oper. Sec., Org. Sec., Gen. Qu., as well as Capt. Loyke and Soltmann, of the Navy, would accompany him.

Say good-bye to Irmingard--- 1600. - 1900. Return flight to Berlin, above the clouds ( up to 5,000 in altitude; very cold) in Heinkel machine of the OKW courier Staffel.

Evening at home. Georg Seiderer\*\* happens to have dropped in.

24 April 1941.

50th anniversary of Moltke's death. Return to Zossen.

0830. Leave Berlin.

0930 : Arrive at Zossen. Guard lined up for review; honor company of Guard Bn. Double sentry in front of my house; all flags out; flowers.

0950.: Conference with OQu I.

Following our phone talk from Wieser-Neustadt, OQu I has made the following preparations for sending aid to Rommel:

1.) Alerted:

- a) Five Bns. from several Divs. in the ZI issued special equipment for desert service and additional carts and some motor vehicles.

- b) Eng. Training Bn. specially equipped as Assault Eng. Bn. and fitted for desert service.
- c) Two Coastal Artillery Bns. (533rd and 523rd) with 15 cm guns.

Timetable for fitting these units for desert service:

- 2 May: Eng. Training Bn. and 533rd Coastal Artillery Bn.
- 7 May: III Bn., 347th Inf. Regt., and 523rd Coastal Arty. Bn.
- 12 May: Two Inf. Bns.
- 17 May: One Inf. Bn.
- 20 May: One Inf. Bn.

- 2.) Maj. Gen. Paulus will be accompanied by Staff Officers. Departure 25 April, evening via Rome. Duration of absence estimated at 8 - 10 days.

Outcome of conference: Preparations are approved. Railroad movements for getting Fifteenth Armd. Div. to Naples must be speeded up, so that Rommel's most urgent requirements would be actually on hand at Naples, when needed. It may become necessary to establish a Hq at Naples, to supervise these troops.

Liss reports on enemy situation in Eastern Mediterranean. Distribution of forces:

Greece: 4 Inf. Divs.  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div. Elements of (first) Cav. Div. (mec.) (some shipped out).

Tobruk: 1 Inf. Div. Elements of  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div.

Solun: 3 Inf. Divs. Elements of  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div.

Mersa

Matruh:

Nile Plain: 1 Inf. Div. plus one Inf. Div. being activated and two Egyptian Divs.

Palestine: 1 Inf. Div. Elements of (First) Cav. Div. (mec.)

Irak: 3 Inf. Divs.

Syria: 1 Inf. Div.

Abyssinia: 6 Inf. Divs.

---

|               |               |  |
|---------------|---------------|--|
| 21 Inf. Divs. | 2 Armd. Divs. | 1 Cav. Div. plus three Divs. not available for immediate commitment. |
|---------------|---------------|--|

OQu I: Appraisal of situation:

We have reached a crisis, not at Tobruk, but rather at Solun. Enemy in Tobruk at the least matches Rommel's strength and is



even superior in artillery, but we may hope, to contain him. A decisive attack is out of question at the time.

If Rommel is beaten at Solum, which is quite possible in view of the mounting reinforcements brought in by the British, he will probably have to raise the siege of Tobruk. That would be highly undesirable, particularly for propaganda reasons. Now, the only way to help him effectively would be by committing the Air Force. Sending more ground troops has little value, for they would only encumber operations of the Africa Corps, which are predicated on high mobility. Air Force, however, is severely hampered by the low state of fuel stores in Africa.

Up until 5 May we are unfortunately quite helpless, and can only sit tight and hope that Rommel will manage to pull through. After that date, the Fifteenth Armd. Div., moving on schedule, will begin to come in.

Sending airborne troops to Africa seems pointless, for they would be immobilized there \*. Better keep them for Crete; such an operation would relieve Rommel very effectively.

Instructions for Paulus:

- a) Get a clear picture of the situation: Disposition of forces, striking power, terrain conditions, ammunition situation, supply, care of wounded. What are the possibilities for defensive operations if Solum should be lost?
- b) Make Rommel understand that our resources for sending aid to him are very slender. Find out his intentions in the light of present circumstances.

Heusinger:

- a) Teletype to OKW, transmitting telegram from Rommel. (significantly addressed to OKW), in which he reports increasing pressure round Bardia and for the first time hints at possibility of serious reverses.
- b) Teletype to Rommel spelling out to him that he cannot count on any help and so must shape his decisions accordingly.
- c) Distribution of forces in Yugoslavia: new German-Italian demarcation line.
- d) Jurisdictional questions regarding the new Military Commander: Executive Power must remain vested in CG, Second Army.

During the day several telephone consultations with ObdQ on the situation in North Africa. At first he frantically cast about for a workable plan, but finally resigned himself to acceptance of the fact that we could not do any more than what has already been done.

25 April 1941.

Thermopylae Pass has been taken. The British are fighting apparently with portions of two Divs., of a total strength of about three regimental combat groups. Our Mt. troops (5th and 6th Mt. Div.) play a decisive part in the advance. The Thermopylae road is demolished in several places. No reports available on previously claimed crossing to Euboea.

Putting into effect surrender of the Greek forces seems to have run into a snag north of the demarcation line. In that area there is still a full Division, which seems to be disbanding itself to escape the Italians. South of the demarcation line, collecting and disarming of prisoners seems to be proceeding in good order. Now, of course, SS Adolf Hitler cannot strike south (Gulf of Patras) except with reconnaissance forces. Lemnos occupied.

The parachute operation against Corinth is scheduled for tomorrow.

At our request, OKW has released to us, as of today, two air transport groups, which will be ready in Naples tomorrow and can be used to ferry over the Engineers of Fifteenth Armd. Div., to be followed by Rifle units of the Div. They will fly to Derna, via Tripoli.

Gen. Buhle:

- 1.) Activation of new smaller units (independent Bns., etc.) for North Africa.
- 2.) Preparations for Barbarossa are proceeding according to plan. Motorization of units not yet entirely assured. Uniformity of armament (MG 34, Lt. Field How. 18), will be accomplished by May.
- 3.) Old-type 21 cm How. for Guderian; they are better for Armd. Groups than the new type which takes longer to get ready for action.
- 4.) Replacements for the elements of Fifteenth Armd. Div. lost by torpedoing will be ready around middle of May.
- 5.) Partial motorization and filling up of 22nd airborne Div. will perhaps be completed by next fall.
- 6.) No more furloughs after 5 May, when maximum railroad schedule goes into effect.
- 7.) 900th Brigade\* very weak as yet, only 2 Bns., with complements!
- 8.) Special : : Field Bns.\*\* Belong under BdE, not the Field Army.
- 9.) Technical Emergency Service \*\*\* will be integrated in Field Army after start of Barbarossa.

von Thoma: Report on inspection of Armd. Divs. in Second Army.

On the whole, good impression: Little wear and tear of vehicles low expenditure of ammunition. Maintenance and state of repair good, but rubber track blocks badly worn by mountain roads (1 Div. 1900 rubber track blocks). Three weeks will be sufficient for rehabilitation of all units. Resupply of spare parts was difficult due to the speed of operations. Commanders want supply by air (3 Junker transports for each Armd. Group). He inspected Fourteenth, Eighth and Eleventh Armd. Divs., and 60th and Sixteenth mot.; 60th mot. made a particularly good showing.

von Bernuth: Report on chemical smoke demonstration. Results seem to be quite promising if for both river crossings and area blanketing.

Training film program Motion-picture units for Africa.

Gercke: a) Lagging performance of railroads. - Coal shortage.

b) OKW request for rail transportation for Seventh Air Div. and 22nd airborne Div. turned down.

c) Barbarossa: On the whole progress is good.

d) Railroad situation in the Southeast. Bridge across Sava River at Belgrade will be restored by middle of June.

e) Railroad program "Otto" completed; improvised, but geared to full capacity.

f) Road program for "Otto" completed.

26 April 1941.

Morning situation: In North Africa situation seems somewhat eased by beating back of British tank attacks at Solum. At Tobruk enemy continues sorties. Our Air Force seems to have scored successes. Italian submarines, capable of operating only during night time, however, cut into supplies for Tobruk.

In Greece, our advances continue. Thebes taken. Advance toward Corinth (Fifth Armd. Div.). Parachute operation in progress. Bridge blown up. Offer of Greek Commander-in-Chief to form a new Government.

Kinzel: Russia: Overall situation unchanged since 1 April. Since that date strength in the West has been increased by 10 Divs. Expanded peacetime Army (about 170 Divs.) may now be regarded as being up to war strength. It is doubtful whether supply units have been activated. Trains are constantly moving up additional materiel (e.g. 250 trains to the Vilna area), to all evidence to bring equipment up to war strength; up to now many Divs. were still short, especially in artillery. Krebs reports that many units still have very large shortages in equipment.

As to personnel, Complaints are heard on lack of commanding officers. Regiments are being commanded by young Majors,

Divisions by Colonels. Strengthening of the Western front (by arrival of 10 new Divisions) is noticeable above all round Bialystok and Lwow. Behind the front, which is very close to the western border, are stationed four Armd. Groups of varying strength:

Bessarabia  
Near and to the west of Zhitomir.  
Vilna.  
Pskov.

CQu IV If U.S.A. entered the war now, we would have to reckon only with the peacetime Army, i.e. at most five Inf.Divs., two Armd. Divs., one Paratroop Bn, one or two Marines Divs., 30 Bomber Squadrons, 10 Reconnaissance Squadrons, 20 Fighter Squadrons.

Wagner (Gen Qu) with Finkh:

- a) Readyng and allocation of truck columns for Barbarossa. As result of activation of new MT. Regts., drawn from resources of industry and Nat. Soc. Motor Corps, our requirements seem to have been amply met. Of the old MT Regts. two, i.e., 605th and 616th, are at present in the Vienna area, and one (602nd) in Saxony, for overhauling. The distribution plan provides for allocation of transport to Armd. Units, Armies and Forward Gen Qu Hqs. \*.

Allocation of transport:

|             |                |             |                                       |
|-------------|----------------|-------------|---------------------------------------|
| Barbarossa: | AGp. South     | 15,880 tons | ) including<br>Forward Gen Qu<br>Hqs. |
|             | AGp. Center    | 25,020 tons |                                       |
|             | AGp. North     | 12,750 tons |                                       |
|             | Gen Qu Reserve | 13,590 tons |                                       |

Libya 2,190 tons

Southeast 480 tons

West 2,970 tons

To be made available  
from various sources  
(Chief of Ordnance,  
Construction Program East,  
Snow Clearing Southeast)

2,040 tons

74,920 tons

- b) Fuel situation. Request additional 10,000 cubic meter \*\* for training purpose from OKW.
- c) Lack of truck replacements. Gen Qu has nothing. All goes to the newly activated units.
- d) Future organization of the Southeast under C in C Balkans.

Noon report: Greek Commander-in-Chief's offer to form Government is supported by all Commanding Generals of the Greek Army. Corinth has offered surrender.

Heusinger: Last daily reports. -- Transfer of units from the Balkans. -- Notes for report to Fuehrer.

27 April 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).  
Athens taken.

Morning reports indicate new advances of Fifth Armd. Div. against enemy rearguards on two roads leading to Athens.

Greece: Embarkation of enemy troops \* on the east coast of Attica, at Piraeus and on the Peloponnese continues. Highly effective attacks by our Air Force on enemy transports at sea. The parachute operation has been successful and Corinth is taken. West of Pindus Mountains, SS Adolf Hitler is advancing southward through Arta. Consultations between Italy and Germany on the formation of a new Government under Greek Commander-in-Chief.

Libya: Arrived by air: 1 Bn., 2 Rifle Cos of Fifteenth Armd. Div. (46 airplanes). Scheduled for today: Remainder of Rifle Bn., 2 Eng. Cos. of Fifteenth Armd. Div. (50 airplanes). Another Rifle Bn. and Oasis Assault Cos to follow later. Afterwards replacements for lost portions of MG Bn., before 6 May.

Other reports during the day:

Athens occupied by Motorcycle Rifle Bn. of Second Armd. Div. Enemy retreating to Peloponnese. SS Adolf Hitler crossed Gulf of Corinth and took Patras after short fighting. An eight-ton bridge has been struck across Canal of Corinth.

28 April 1941.

Morning situation: Capture of Athens, Corinth, Patras confirmed. OKW directives on occupation of Crete. Argument with OKW over transfer of 22nd airborne Div. to Greece by trucks. Using our road transport for this purpose would rob us of 602nd MT Regt. for Barbarossa, where it has been apportioned among the Armd. Groups.

Operation "Merkur": \*\*ObdL will have operational control of airborne troops and air transport units operating already in the Mediterranean theater. Army only will have to hold in readiness reinforcements including a Mixed Tank Bn.

Navy makes all preparations for sea communications. Protection of communications etc. jointly with Italian Navy.

Libya: The first reinforcements ferried over in planes have arrived. A situation estimate by Rommel describes the situation as tense, but despite the alleged inefficiency of the Italian troops he has decided to attack Tobruk. He will concentrate all German forces for this task, leaving defensive operations around Solum to the Italians. In my opinion this is all wrong.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Experiences on Greek fortifications. Investigate and submit report on Greek and Yugoslav fortifications.
- b) Russian land mines. The Russians are said to have only old mines in wooden boxes. That I don't believe.-- Plastic mines render mine detectors ineffective.
- c) SS-ferries: Distribution and plans for use in Barbarossa. Very little seems to have been done in this respect. Assault boats: Distribution and use in Barbarossa.

Col. Ochsner: Report on chemical smoke demonstration on 7 and 8 April.-- Review of progress made in equipment and training of troops. Use of gas by Russians, and countermeasures.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Liaison between advancing spearheads and OKH through Liaison Officers equipped with shortwave sets, \* assigned to these elements. Monitoring companies as relays.\*\*
- b) Tele-communications through Hungary.-- Tasks in the Eastern Mediterranean - Barbarossa.

Gen. Buhle: 15,000 Polish peasant carts as of 10 May.-- 10 GHq Aa Bns.-- 7,000 foreign legionnaires for Africa. \*\*\*

Gen. Brand: Distribution of coastal artillery on the various fronts.

29 April 1941.

Morning report: Tripolis-in-Peloponnese taken. The Italians now hold the islands of Korfu and Preveza. In Cyrenaika, the situation seems to have been relieved by the German thrust at Solum. Whether this has improved prospects for success of the attack on Tobruk remains to be seen. Airborne landing on Crete set for 17 May.

Gen. Brennecke: (C of S AGp. North). Brief discussion on the mission of his Army Group. No lateral diversion! Push straight ahead into the country! \*  
Report on progress of Gen. Staff work. Satisfactory.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Organization of Southeast after the end of the Balkans Campaign. High Command in Balkans to be assumed by Army Hq. 12. Under Army Hq. 12: Military Government Serbia, for administrative tasks, a new Corps Headquarters (reduced\*\*) for control of troops (3 Divs.). Corps Hq XVIII for control of troops (3 Divs.) in Greece. Civil administration of Greece by Italy. Plenipotentiary German General in Bulgaria to take care of German interests (transportation, transit of troops, Quartermaster Service). Romania will be placed under C in C Balkans, as soon as operations based on Romania have started.

Major Deyhle (OKW): Report on tour to Army Hqs. 2 and 12. -- Danube shipping lane will be reopened early in May. -- Croatia wants to activate 37 Bns. (800 rifles and 16 MG each), as a beginning.

Heusinger:

1.) New orders to be issued to Army Hq. 12:

- a) Ninth Armd. Div. (Lamia): tracked elements to depart from Florina-Saloniki as of 5 May. Land march elements \*\*\* will entrain at Belgrade. Arrive in Military District XVII # 27 May (joins Group Kleist in place of Fifth Armd. Div.).
- b) Second Armd. Div. will follow Ninth Armd. Div. in similar manner early in June. Arrive in Military District ## III by 21 June (!). Will try to speed up movement by using sea route.
- c) Fifth Armd. Div.: Redeployment uncertain now. Later to GHq Reserve.
- d) Fifth and Sixth Mt. Divs., 164th Inf. Div. will stay behind in Greece for time being.
- e) 50th Inf. Div. (Saloniki) and 72nd Inf. Div. (Katerini) to Central Moldavia, via Sofia. By rail, as far as possible; movement completed middle of June. 125th Inf. Regt. will remain for the moment. 46th Inf. Div. to be relieved by Bulgarians (report!) and shipped to Belgrade.
- f) Withdrawal of Corps Hqs. created no difficulties. To stay behind: XVIII Corps Hq. and one other Corps Hq., for Serbia.
- g) GHq troops begin to run off 4 May. Still some trouble with Army Hq. 12 over one Eng. Bn. and two GHq Arty. Bns.

h) AAA in Greece is assigned to AGp. South. Must not get stuck in operation "Merkur".

- 2.) Liaison Service for Barbarossa. Liaison Officers with shortwave sets to the Armd. Groups ! Liaison Detachments for the Army Groups. Use OKH Monitoring Cos. \*
- 3.) Eighth Armd. Div. now can revert to its original organization under Hoernpfer (Czech equipment). Tenth Armd. Div. goes to Gudorian.

Luncheon with CO and Officers of Guard Bn.

OQu IV:

- a) Formation of Government in Greece: Duce asserts. Demands territorial safeguards, needed by Axis against later territorial surprises. Benzler and Italian negotiators. Is to be concluded today.
- b) Yugoslav shipping in ports goes to Italy, elsewhere to Germany.
- c) Rumored meeting Fuehrer/Darlan at Munich, middle of May.
- d) Current business, including methods of Air Force reporting and relations with Intelligence Officers. -- Movements of members of Attache groups.

von Ziehlberg:

- a) Routine Gen. Staff personnel matters. Switch Salmuth/Greifffenberg/Foertsch. \*\*
- b) Reorganization of projected Liaison Staff North as a new Corps Hq (reduced), to serve as Hq for troops in Serbia.
- c) Liaison Officers for Operation Barbarossa.
- d) Awarding of Iron Crosses and out-of-turn seniority promotions of Gen. Staff Officers.

30 April 1941.

Morning situation: Libya reports lessened tension. Softening up operation for assault of Tobruk will start tonight, with main forces to attack on 1 May. In Greece, evacuation of the Peloponnese completed. 5,000 British captured. Mytilene planned for 4 May. Brief conference with ObdH; Question of switch Salmuth/Greifffenberg/Foertsch.

1500. Report to Fuehrer:

1.) Timetable for Barbarossa:

Transport Echelon III, peacetime railroad schedule,



8 April - 20 May: 17 Divs., GHq troops from ZI and West.

Transport Echelon IV A, maximum railroad schedule, 23 May - 2 June: 9 Divs. and GHq troops from West.

Transport Echelon IV B, maximum railroad schedule, 3 June - 23 June: 12 Armd. Divs. and 12 mot. Divs. from ZI, West and Southeast.

Greater speed impossible because of transportation difficulties and time needed for refitting of units. No possibility to shift in time: Two Armd. Divs. (Second and Fifth), one mot. Div. (60th).

2.) GHq. Reserves:

30 Divs., including 5 Divs. from West and Police Div. Of this total, 11 Divs. are at present still in the Balkans.

3.) Comparison of Russian and German strength:

Discussion of the expected border battles, especially in sector of AGP. South. Opportunities for Hungarian troops. Opportunities afforded by Pruth front, if we have enough troops.

Fuehrer:

a) Formula for talks with Hungary, Finland and Romania: "Major developments possible in the West. Hence protection of the East essential. Russia has treated us unfriendly on several occasions, and we had better provide against surprises". Talks may start probably around 23 May.

b) Need for safeguarding Ploesti,\* Cernevođa .\*\*

c) Schobert will take over command six weeks before the start of operations, i.e. on 15 May at the latest.

4.) GHq. troops: Review of need to have all forces on hand for Barbarossa. The 10 cm guns and siege guns sent to Libya will be badly missed. Only one 10 cm Battery is to leave, while developments are watched. In case Tobruk falls, remainder will not be needed. Temporary shift of railway Btrys. from West to East ( 7 out of 17 Btrys.). Approved !

5.) Review of line-up on completion of movements: Fuehrer informed of activation of 15 Replacement Brigades. Recommendation to send to Holland only one Div. of the reserves of C in C West, as second occupation Div. (OKW order !) is approved. Replacement units must not be used for guard duty! (Holland). Improvement of 82nd Div. impossible (Keitel).

Fuehrer: Appraisal of British possibilities for landings in Portugal and Spain (Northern coast and from Gibraltar), perhaps

also Spanish Morocco.

6.) Miscellaneous:

- a) Final policy for occupation of Aegean Islands. Italians will do the Cyclades. We do Mytilene, Chios and Samos.
  - b) Divs. to stay behind in Greece.  
Fuehrer: Captured guns for coastal defenses ( British 9 cm).  
Fuehrer hopes that less than 3 Divs. will do. Mt. Divs. must be freed for other missions.
  - c) Plans for reorganization of Balkans High Command. Military Government Serbia will be subordinate to it. (Fuehrer).
  - d) Outfit additional Armd. Corps for Libya. Required materiel by BdE.  
In the evening Gen. Paulus reports from Libya:
- 1.) In the event that Tobruk falls, he will instruct Africa Corps: Secure Cyrenaica along general line Siwa-Solun-Bardia with echeloned south wing to guard against enveloping attempts. No advance beyond line Siwa-Solun, except for reconnaissance forays, even if the enemy withdraws further eastward. Forces must be regrouped and filled up. Watch coast.
  - 2.) In the event that Tobruk holds out, he wants to instruct Africa Corps to prepare a position along the eastern border of Cyrenaica, with left wing at Ain El Gazala and deep echelonning on right flank; line is to be manned with newly arriving reinforcements. Investment of Tobruk will be upheld until onset of hot season or until the tactical situation at Tobruk or Solun make necessary the planned withdrawal to Ain El Gazala position.

1 May 1941. ( All-out attack on Tobruk )  
( miscarried ! )

Morning situation:

- a) Mopping up operation in Serbia round Propastica set for 3 May. -- Occupation of Mytilene set for 4 May. -- Parade in Athens (with Italians) set for 4 May.
- b) 23rd Convoy has sailed. No air shipments possible yesterday. Remainder of 2nd Bn. of Rifle Regt. will be shipped only today.

Brief conference with ObdH about Crete ( he wants to have some say about it and will talk to Fuehrer \*) and Libya; my travel

plans to the Pruth front.

Heusinger:

- a) Basic military-political data of an operation against Spain, Portugal.
- b) Movement of GHq reserves to be scheduled so that units in West will be drawn upon as late as possible.
- c) Wishes of AGp North concerning shifting of Divs. No objections.
- d) Preparations in the West for "Seelöwe". \*

Order to Paulus: \*\*

- 1.) I concur with proposed line Siwa-Solum, but possibilities of line Siwa-Mersa Matruh also should be studied. Under no circumstance should Rommel advance beyond Siwa-Solum line without order.
- 2.) Preparation of defense line on the eastern border of Cyrenaica is all right and, if necessary, could be held by skeleton garrison consisting of Italian Forces moved up for that purpose. Newly arriving German forces should not be immobilized in this line as long as there is a chance of using them for a new attack on Tobruk, protected by a covering force at Solum. Use only Armor at Solum.

Luncheon at Kopp's, afternoon at home in Berlin.

2 May 1941. (Outbreak of hostilities between Irak and Britain).

Morning reports bring nothing new except from Tobruk. The attack of 1 May has no doubt resulted in considerable gains at the important southwest corner and has breached the fortified lines against stiff resistance, especially by Australian troops. But for the time being it is doubtful that our forces are sufficiently strong to exploit this success and capture Tobruk. The 23rd Convoy with its precious cargo of tanks has reached Tripolis.

Operations on the Peloponnese are concluded. The take of British prisoners has risen to a gratifying figure. British losses in materiel seem to have been especially high.

ObdH on phone: Re Floesti, Cernavoda, Constanza and protective measures to be taken in connection with Barbarossa.

Field Marshal von Bock calls up concerning the switch Salmuth/von Greiffenberg. It is agreed that von Salmuth takes over XXX

Corps. Foertsch takes Greiffenberg's place.

Vogl (Armistice Commission) calls up:

- a) We get 3,000 - 4,000 trucks from French North Africa. Purchase Commission has left for Tunis. In return, the French want us to unfreeze the remaining trucks and release one Brig. General (Souhain) from prison camp.
- b) Combining transfer of the trucks with shipping vegetables to Tripoli is silly and would only delay the whole operation. It is essential for us to complete it with greatest dispatch.

Gen. Buhle :

- a) Organization of and directives for High Command Balkans and "German General at the Bulgarian Army High Command".
- b) Statement of policy by Gen. Staff regarding future development of the Engineer Corps.
- c) Allocation of the Polish peasants' carts from the Government General. About 2,000 for each Div.

Radke: Final disposition of the affair Tiedemann-SS \* concerning Grebbe line and of the unsettled issue of the SS incidents in Poland. -- Soldier mail censorship. -- Case Mieth. -- \*\* Heuerberg-Wichung incident. \*\*\*

OQu IV: Situation in Spain: Former disinclination of the generals to Spain's entering the war seems to be waning. British pressure must have let up. Monarchist tendencies. -- Attache tour to Rupel Pass. Russians, Turks, and Danes will be included. Return of Japanese Commission will not coincide with date of our attack. #

Hansen: New disposition of Turkish forces. Large elements in Thrace are being taken back to the Chataldsha Line. -- Troops in the Straits reinforced. -- Reinforcement of garrisons on the western coast not yet confirmed. -- Some troop movements from the interior to the southern coast.

von Etzdorf: Latest plan for the territorial division of the Balkans provides for:

- 1.) An autonomous Slovenia under Italian protection. The German language enclave of the Gottschee is to be liquidated by exchanging the German inhabitants for Slovenes from the territory taken over by us.
- 2.) An autonomous Croatia under a Prince of the House of Savoy, with a coastal strip from Spalato to Cattero.
- 3.) Montenegro as well as an enlarged Albania, in personal union with Italy.
- 4.) A severely truncated Serbia, with a capital as yet undecided (Krushevac, Nish or Belgrade).
- 5.) Bor district ## under German rule. We also acquire mining concessions for non-ferrous metals in Croatia and in the territory annexed by Bulgaria.

- 6.) Backa goes to Hungary, which also wants access to the sea in Croatia (free port) in return for relinquishing the triangle between the Drava and Mur rivers to Croatia.
- 7.) Banat, for the time being, remains under German rule. May be turned over to Hungary later on, if Romania could be compensated by the return of Bessarabia. (1)
- 8.) Saloniki is to become a free City ( the Danzig of the Mediterranean.)

Liss submits intelligence digest on British Army in Greece.

Apparently Seventh Australian Div. had not yet arrived in the theater. ( Only advance detachments were present, with the remainder in Tobruk and Egypt.)

Positively identified: "

Sixth Australian Div. ) with complete Arty. and  
 Second New Zealand Div. ) three Regts. each  
 30th Brig. (Homeland), probably independent, plus 1 Armd.  
 Regt. (Second Armd. Regt.)

Prisoner take to date: 2,000 British from the U.K. (including many construction workers), 1,300 Australians and New Zealanders, 1,200 Cypriots, 1,350 Jews and Arabs, 150 Indians, 2,000 Yugoslavs.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Instructions regarding radio training and maintenance of radio discipline during the waiting period in the East.

3 May 1941.

Morning report indicates:

- 1.) The mopping-up operation in Serbia near Propastica turns out to be a minor matter, which seems to be running itself.
- 2.) Our troops operating from Attica have occupied the island of Skythos.
- 3.) Paulus radios that the Tobruk operation must be regarded terminated, bringing only inconclusive local gains . Troops in bad shape. He has instructed Rommel not to resume the attack unless it offers chances of a quick success without major expenditure of forces, i.e. if the enemy leaves of his own accord. For the rest, pursuant to our directives he has instructed Rommel to regard the holding of Cyrenaika his primary mission, regardless of whether or not he had Tobruk, Bardia and Solum. To this end he was to reinforce the line Giala-Solum with mobile forces forthwith, regroup and dispose his troops in depth around Tobruk, and prepare a defense line along the eastern edge of the Djebel (El Gazala and southward).

Whether the arrival of Fifteenth Armd. Div. will permit resumption of the attack on Tobruk, is contingent on developments in the near future.

Talk with ObdH: He approves Paulus' instructions. Telegram is sent to Rommel, confirming Paulus' instructions as an official order of ObdH. \* — Prepare for sending to Libya: Two heavy Bns. requisitioned from OKW, 5 independent Bns. and replacements. — Speed up transfer of trucks from Tunis to Tripoli; send captured British motor vehicles from Greece to Libya.

Wagner (Gen Qu): Query regarding "Haifisch" and "Seeloewe". Answer: Must be geared to what is available on the spot. — Bordeaux Supply Base for Spain and Portugal. — Projected administrative set-up in Greece. — Advance supply bases probably will have to be established at Saloniki and Athens.

Heusinger:

- 1.) Navy: We have 12 destroyers: 3 in the Channel, 5 in the Baltic, 4 laid up for repairs. 30 Motor Torpedo Boats: bulk round Britain, rest in the Baltic. Use in Eastern Mediterranean too complicated because of need of setting up refuelling stations. For Crete, Italy will furnish 1 $\frac{1}{2}$  Motor Torpedo Boat flotillas.
- 2.) Army Group B. Russian airplanes reported over German territory.
- 3.) "Haifisch"—"Seeloewe".
- 4.) Army Hq 11 to Romania middle of May. At the same time CG, Second Army with skeleton Staff to Munich, to look after the Divs. in South Germany (which are being refitted after the Balkans campaign). Staff of Army Hq can carry on present duties under Corps Commander pending List's arrival. Army Hq 12 will not be installed as High Command Balkans until after conclusion of operation "Merkur".
- 5.) Redeployment from the Southeast:  
SS Adolf Hitler, 25 - 29 May, from Saloniki. Will have completed refitting by 21 June, and so come in time for jump-off of Group Kleist. .  
Second Armd. Div. sails 14 and 15 May: Tracked components from Patras, wheeled components from Spalato. Refitting in Munich, beginning 31 May; ready to move from Munich as of 20 June; accordingly will be in time for the start, if needed. Fifth Armd. Div. will depart with tracked components from Saloniki, on 31 May, with wheeled components from Belgrade, on 6 June. Arrives in Mil. District III for rehabilitation on 25 June. Too late for jump-off.
- 6.) Disposition of Reserves:

|              |         |           |             |
|--------------|---------|-----------|-------------|
|              |         | allocated | allocated   |
|              | 2 roads | 1         | AGp. North  |
| 16 Divs. un- |         |           | AGp. Center |
| allocated *  | 2 roads | 2         | AGp. South  |
|              | 2 roads | 2 x 2 **  |             |

---

|                        |                          |                         |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|
| 16 Divs. as of 10 July | 7 Divs. prior to 10 July | 7 Divs. prior to 1 July |
|------------------------|--------------------------|-------------------------|

Spot must be found yet for Second Armd. Div. !

Goes to AGp. South at early date.

4 May 1941.

(Sunday, Berlin)

Reichstag: Serbian Campaign.  
Tribute to work of Gen.Staff.

OKW directives:

- a) Occupy the islands of Chios and Melos before start of "Merkur".
- b) Directive on preparations for a military operation on Iberian Peninsula in the event of British moves against Portugal and Spain (or Spanish Morocco). Our implementation orders \*\*\* were ready( e.g. Bordeaux Supply Base).
- c) Directive on conversations with Finland, Hungary, and Romania.

For Finland, with whom conversations are to start very soon, a program has been drafted, providing for OKW to initiate the talks, which then are carried on by the several branches of the Armed Forces. OKH's responsibility for talks concerning Finnmarken and Southeast Finland is still undefined.

By the end of May Hungary will be warned of the possibility of a Russian threat and told of our readiness for defense; this will be coupled with the request for getting set to step up her defense measures.

Romania will be informed only at the last possible moment, and even then we must speak only of defensive warfare.

It is apparent from various indications that both Horthy and Antonescu had hints of the plans directly from the Fuehrer, which these two gentlemen interpreted as pointing to an imminent German attack on Russia.

Paulus remains in Africa in compliance with my teletype message. I am glad he is there to act as a guardian of our ideas, which have also the blessing of the Fuehrer.

5 May 1941.

0900 Rabenau, Erfurth, von Ziehlberg: Proposals on development of the Reich Archives into a "Mecca" of German military historians.

Two plans are submitted:

- 1.) "Cowstable" ground plan, i.e. closed quadrangles with plain exterior, and
- 2.) Castle type, with more elaborate ground plan, especially a portico to the South, and a finely proportioned inner courtyard. The latter solution is more desirable in principle.

Questions of motion picture archives.

Questions of central information service.

Erfurth, Ziehlberg: Objective of military history research after the fall of 1941, when our job in Europe is completed.

Situation conference:

West: British react to our movements \* to the West and anticipate imminent invasion.

Libya: German casualties 30 April - 3 May :

8 Officers, 102 NCO's and EM killed  
16 Officers, 267 NCO's and EM wounded  
1 Officer, 64 NCO's and EM missing.

24th Convoy has sailed with remaining tanks and vehicles of the units transported by air.

Southeast: Second Army: Mopping-up operation proceeding without losses. -- Misconduct of Hungarians in the Banat. \*\* -- Desertion to us of Romanian soldiers of Racial German extraction must be discouraged !  
Twelfth Army occupied Mytilene and Chios, meeting only light resistance. 50th and 72nd Inf.Divs. have started redeployment.

Italy: The remainder of the islands, Naxos, Cyclades etc. will be occupied by the Italians. Proposal on demarcation line between the Italians and ourselves on the mainland forthcoming.

Gen. von Salmuth:

- a) Claims there is not enough photographic reconnaissance in the East.
- b) Border still guarded by Reinforced Border Guard Service. Are they to stay? Russians are getting cocky. Reply: Yes.
- c) Operational details.
- d) Personal matters: Handing over of functions and taking over of XXX Corps. \*\*\*



Gen. Buhle:

- a) Motor transport situation still tight, but better than a year ago ( before campaign in the West).
- b) Outfitting of Supply Troops for Barbarossa completed.
- c) Combat Troops: Artillery: Ready except for 10 Arty. Bns., which are only partly mobile.  
Not yet ready: Four 10 cm Gun Bns. ; } Activation not yet  
   } ordered because of  
   } lack of towing  
   } vehicles.  
AA and Siege Gun units, partially mobile \* - ready.

Engineers: Activations, as specified by Gen. Staff, completed. Of the 34 30-ton Truck Columns demanded for Engineer and Railway Troops, 20 are ready. Timber trailers for Engineers are still lacking. Equipment of Signal Troops with trucks and special motor vehicles still deficient.

- d) BdE thinks activation of units earmarked for Barbarossa would be completed by beginning of June. Whatever comes later is to be used as filler and loss replacements.
- e) Two Med. Arty. Bns. for Rommel not before 20 May.
- f) Directive for C in C Balkans.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Report on tour to Libya.

- a) Overall impression not bad. Morale good. Food situation good, health good; troops suffer from night cold; ammunition situation tight.
- b) Italians absolutely unreliable ( shooting of two officers demanded, others ought to be put, before a court-martial).
- c) Coastal shipping all right as far as Bengasi; past that point only "in dribbles", but, in any event, possible. Absolutely safe and dependable is only the overland route, but it is continually harassed by enemy aircraft at night. As long as we have no AA and fighter protection for Bengasi, we cannot take a direct sea course to that port. \*\* A present Bengasi waterfront damaged by enemy air action, and unloading impossible; unloading at Tripoli hampered as result of waterfront explosions. \*\*\*
- d) As long as the British have Malta, Rommel cannot stage an offensive to the East.

Krumpelt: (OQu 2) # reports on his experiences in the Serbian campaign. Armd. troops show enormous rapacity ##. Good results obtained with bicycle-mounted. Regional Defense troops, which act as collecting organization right behind Armd. troops relieving them of prisoners and securing captured materiel.

Ehlfeld reports on plan for distributing coastal artillery: We must economize on the Balkans in order to be strong enough in the Baltic and the Black Sea, and have reserves for Spain. Transfer of Railway Artillery from the West to the East (Barbarossa) will weaken the West for about three weeks. \*

Evening, 2000. - 2100. Conference with ObdH:

- a) Open questions Greece: Troop requirements and coastal artillery.
- b) Unsettled questions in Barbarossa: Talks with Bock, Reichenau, Kleist.
- c) Assignment for Army Hq 11. Directive.
- d) Army Hq 11 will be relieved by Army Hq 2 from all duties relating to the Mission in Romania, until such time when List will be available to assume his duties as C in C Balkans.
- e) Completion of building for Potsdam Military Archives must get priority.
- f) Loyke's report on Libya and Malta.
- g) OKW directive on Finland. Many obscure points.

Col. Krebs returns from Moscow, where he substituted for Koestring. He found the Russians very conciliatory. Russia will do anything to avoid war and yield on every issue short of making territorial concessions. Russian Higher Officers Corps decidedly bad (depressing impression). Compared with 1933, picture is strikingly negative. It will take Russia 20 years to reach her old level. Rearmament is in progress. New fighter planes, new long-range bombers, but pilot performance and ability is poor. Long-range bombers apparently concentrated close to German border. Shipments of construction material for fortifications are kept rolling to the border. However, there is no evidence of troop concentrations.

Warner ( Gen Qu):

- a) Truck situation for Barbarossa. Least satisfactory in Seventeenth Army.
- b) Truck situation in Libya: Of French materiel we can expect: 250 serviceable trucks in about 3 weeks  
1500 serviceable trucks in about 12 weeks.  
Fifteenth Arm. Div. will have difficulties in getting spare parts for its numerous vehicle types.  
Repair facilities in Libya too limited. An MT pool for desert service will be activated by end of June, and can be in operation in Bengasi early in July.
- c) OKW has at last released 10,000 liter of fuel for training purposes.

d) Bordeaux Supply Base for "Isabella". \*

6 May 1941.

Morning conference: No significant news:

Reports from North Africa indicate that the British Fleet Air Arm has become remarkably active again. The story is that they were short of bombs for a few days.

Beginning 12 May, only X Air Corps, with 50 flights a week, will be available for ferrying troops to Libya. The value of these shipments is in any case problematic, for the troops arrive without any equipment.

Italians want to have the use of Tunis. Memorandum by Guzzoni. They maintain, that with the shipping situation being what it is, they could not hold Libya, let alone prepare an offensive, without that port. It becomes increasingly evident that without Malta we'll never have a safe supply route to North Africa. But the Italians hold that Malta cannot be attacked and so want us to mount a drive on Suez, via Turkey.

Question of the Attaché for Irak is discussed. Two officers are to proceed to Mosul by different routes.

Gen. Wagner (with Lt. Col. Wagner): Report on impression in Libya.

There was apparently serious concern for Solum and Tobruk, but situation has eased since the British withdrawal from Solum.

Supply: Shipping to Bengasi by the coastal route suffices only for current needs. No possibility for stockpiling.  
Reasons: Getting supplies through to Tripolis contingent on naval and air protection, which at present is inadequate. Lack of air defense at Tripoli and Bengasi. Navy treats coastal shipping route as a secondary supply line instead as the vital main supply artery which it is.

Supply situation at the front: Ammunition on hand:  $1\frac{1}{2}$  basic issues; generally sufficient; relatively lowest is ammo for heavy Infantry weapons (0.5 - 0.7 basic issue). Supply of tank ammunition good (2 issues) AA ammo supply has again improved (now  $2\frac{1}{2}$  issues).

Rations: On the whole all right. Our field rations are said to be too rich for warm climate.

Fuel: Adequate; new tanker for bulk deliveries in prospect; tires, no complaints.

Spare parts: Requisitions are filled only up to 10-15%. Needed: Setting up of a spare-parts depot at Bengasi.

Relations between Germans and Italians in Rommel's Hq apparently rather strained; good in Air Force.

Rear Services hard to control because of enormous distances involved. An Admin. Hq is needed for Tripoli.

Naples apparently all right. Ample stocks.

Heusinger:

- a) Siege Gun Bns. for Tripoli (Libya).
- b) Parachute and Airborne Troops will not be available in early phase of Barbarossa because of operations on Crete.
- c) When Hansen leaves his post as Chief of Military Mission Romania, Speidel (Air Force) is to take over that agency as an Armed Forces Mission. Haufler can carry on his work as Ground Forces Mission, independently of Speidel.
- d) Outlook for giving AGp. Center one Div. from GHq. Reserves.
- e) Report of Second Army concerning revision of the southern boundary of the new districts to be incorporated into Styria and Carniola.

Koestring and Krebs: Review of Russian capabilities in face of impending developments. No important new viewpoints. Luncheon.

Lt. Col. Doerr, lately Liaison Officer to Second Italian Army calls en route, is going to Air Force Gen. Staff as instructor for two-week course on problems of ground operations.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Nothing essentially new to be learned from Southeastern Campaign.
- b) Build-up for "Barbarossa" well under way. Will pose no overwhelming difficulties. The individual Army Hqs already have their Rcn. Staffeln assigned.
- c) Close range Rcn. Staffeln have an average of 7 planes (Reserve of 120 Henschel planes).
- d) Long-range Rcn. Staffeln have 9 Me 111 (Twin-engine fighters). \* Activation completed. Assignment to respective Army Hqs now under way. Distribution:

|  |          |
|--|----------|
| ObdH                                       | 2        |
| AGps. South and Center, 2 each             | 4        |
| AGp. North                                 | 1        |
| Armd. Groups                               | 4        |
| Eighteenth and Eleventh Armies, for flanks | <u>2</u> |

total: 13

3 night Staffeln,

grand total: 16.

- e) Truck situation has improved, but there are some weak spots still. We'll do the best we can with making up deficiencies from the Greek booty.

Major Hansen: Outcome of OKW conference on Irak. France agrees to transfer of arms from Syria to Irak (Mosul). German planes will get permission to land in Syria. Fuel must be supplied by France (Beirut). German bomber operations depend on delivery of this fuel. Dispatch of German Officer to Syria necessary.

Gen. z.b.V. Mueller, with Judge Advocate General.

- a) Order to troops along lines of last Fuehrer address to the generals. Troops must do their share in the ideological struggle of the Eastern Campaign.
- b) Questions of administration of justice in the AGp. Rear Areas.
- c) Easing of rules concerning channels for approving death sentences against army personnel during operations. \*

7 May 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Greece: Greek prisoners are now being discharged. (Difficulties can be expected when the Italians enter the country.) Corinth Canal will not be cleared for another 20 days.
- b) Libya:
  - 1.) At last a decent situation map; it shows that Rommel has broken up his units in a wild pattern and conducts a campaign with very scanty forces on a widely extended front which cannot be measured with European standards.
  - 2.) Tripoli: Air attack and explosions during the night of 3/4 May caused heavy damage and losses in the port. Unloading capacity of Bengasi considerably reduced and unloading of ships will be delayed: 24th Convoy cannot be cleared before 9 May. 25th Convoy cannot follow before 10 or 11 May.
  - 3.) Fourth Air Fleet (Greece) now takes over night operations against Tobruk.
- c) Irak: Local clashes with occasional use of arms over wide area; not a war as we know it. May last a long time! Combat action apparently only near Habbania, where Irak troops have been in the attack. German Mission being formed (probably Felmy, Niedermayer).

- d) Russia: Stalin becomes Chairman of Soviet of People's Commissars, which means strengthening of his position.

Gercke: 1.) Yugoslavia:

- a) Danube traffic now unobstructed. Danube, Tisza, Sava mined (being cleared).
  - b) Bridge at Maribor will be completed probably by middle of June. Bridge Zemun-Belgrade can be expected for 10 June.
  - c) In Belgrade we want a Hq with special powers, instead of a civilian Railroad Directorate.
- 2.) Hungary: Cooperation smooth. Frictions between Romania and Hungary can be settled by the Deputy of Chief of Transport. Road construction projects in the northern border area, which were originally shelved by the Hungarians, are now carried out by them of their own accord.
- 3.) Railroads and roads for "Barbarossa" making satisfactory progress.
- 4.) Build-up for Barbarossa: 17,000 trains. After completion of assembly, reserves will be moved plus 106 supply trains, daily, beginning 24 June.
- 5.) Air protection of railroads in "Barbarossa":
- 15 2 cm Railway AA Batteries (16 guns each):
- |                                     |          |
|-------------------------------------|----------|
| AGp. South (from Air District VIII) | 3 Btrys. |
| AGp. Center ( from Air District II) | 7 "      |
| AGp. North ( from Air District I )  | 5 "      |
- 6.) Spain. Iron bridge must be restored for "Isabella".

Col. Metz (C of S XIV Corps), calls en route and asks for transfer to another organization ( wants a Rifle or Armd. Brigade).

OQu IV:

- a) Question of Anglo-Indian PWs (1,100 in North Africa). Ship to Germany. Will be used for propaganda purposes. \*
- b) Darlan very accommodating in the Irak question. Only minor counter demands ( asks that postcards be allowed in inter-zonal mail).
- c) Attaché tour, Mellenthin in charge, 11 - 22 May, Athens and Greek battlefields.
- d) Difficulties in the Crete operation ("Merkur"). One New Zealand Div. 40 airplanes; shore Btrys., etc.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Directive for C in C Balkans and subordinate Liaison Officers, etc.
- b) Coastal artillery for Barbarossa available middle of June:

|                           |   |          |
|---------------------------|---|----------|
| 3 Bns. for Baltic         | ) |          |
| 3 Bns. for Black Sea      | ) | without  |
| 3 Bns. GHq Reserve (plus  | ) | traction |
| 3 more by middle of July) |   |          |

For activation of GHq reserves we need the third Btrys.\* of 211th, 15th, 223rd Divs. (light Btrys.), and 205th, 212th, and 218th Divs. (medium Btrys.), all in the West. Remaining Batteries get 6 pieces each.

- c) Medium GHq artillery: Ready by end of June:

4 10 cm Gun Bns.  
2 med. Fd.How. Bns.

- d) Buy up French coastal artillery in Tunisia for North Africa ( 16 7.5 cm Gun Btrys. , 8 10,5 cm Gun Btrys., 12 22 cm Gun Btrys.).

Evening: Party given by Gen. Yamashita of the Japanese Army commission at the Adlon Hotel. Talk with Osterkamp, Leeb, Fromm.

8 May 1941.

Situation conference:

- 1.) Effective 10 May, the area west of the Pindus Mountains will be taken over by the Italians.
- 2.) Operational control for Crete. ObdL will have overall responsibility. Ground forces will operate under him, to the complete exclusion of OKH (Dangerous business !).
- 3.) A teletype from Army Hq 12 states that ObdH has authorized them to keep the following components of Fifth Armd.Div. until further notice:

One Motorcycle Rifle Bn. (was to ship out 31 May). There is no way of getting it replaced.

One mixed Tank Bn. which, however, has already been assigned to Seventeenth Armd. Div. (Guderian), and would leave a hole there. If this Tank Bn. is committed in Crete, it can be replaced in "Barbarossa" only by a group of five mixed Armd. Platoons (captured tanks), which are now being activated and will be ready for shipment as of 18 May.

Detachment of these elements renders Fifth Armd. Div. practically unusable, i.e., it reduces the Div. to a reinforced Armd. Regt.

- 4.) Redeployment of troops from the Balkans is proceeding according to schedule.
- 5.) Nothing new in Tripoli. Supply is the main problem, as before. Unloading capacity of Tripoli harbor still four ships at one time. Strong British convoy escorted by 2 battleships, several cruisers and aircraft carriers (apparently troop transports) reported between Gibraltar and Malta, moving East.
- 6.) Irak situation still hazy. Unconfirmed report of successful British sortie from Habbania. Darlan makes far-reaching offers:
  - a) German submarines and merchant ships may use bases on the African West Coast in return for release of small forces for West Africa.
  - b) Exchange of unreliable leading personalities in North Africa (including Nogues). Wants return of Giraud.
  - c) Arms in Syria to be released for Irak against replacement from sealed stocks, which Darlan would send to Syria.
  - d) Broad support for German activities in Syria. Permission to land, airfields, release of French planes for our purposes. In return: Easing of postal restrictions and interzonal pass regulations, and reduction of occupation costs.

- 7.) Railroad line Saloniki-Belgrade now operates on a regular schedule of 7 trains daily.

Crete: Air Force units for the operations:

XI Air Corps (without 22nd AB Div.)

VIII Air Corps:

Third Staffel, 121st Long-range Recon.Gr. } 2 Long-range  
Seventh Staffel, Second Tactical Exper. Wing } Recon.Staffeln

Hq Second Bomber Wing:

I Gruppe, 2nd Bomber Wing }  
II " 2nd " " }  
III " 3rd " " }  
IV " 26th " " } 2 Bomber  
(of X Air Corps) } Groups

Hq 51st Bomber Wing:

I Gruppe, 51st Bomber Wing }  
II " 4th " " }  
I " 1st " " }  
II " 1st " " }



|     |                                       |   |              |
|-----|---------------------------------------|---|--------------|
| Hq  | Second Divebomber Wing:               | ) |              |
|     | I Gruppe, 2nd Divebomber Wing         | ) | 1 Divebomber |
| III | " 2nd " "                             | ) | Group        |
| I   | " 3rd " "                             | ) |              |
| Hq  | 26th Long-range Fighter Wing:         | ) | 1 Long-range |
|     | I Gruppe 26th Long-range Fighter Wing | ) | Fighter      |
| II  | " 26th " " " "                        | ) | Group        |
| II  | " 76th " " " "                        | ) |              |
| Hq  | 77th Fighter Wing:                    | ) |              |
|     | II Gruppe 77th Fighter Wing           | ) | 1 Fighter    |
| III | " 77th " " "                          | ) | Group        |
| I   | " Second Tactical Exp. Wing           | ) |              |

Gen Qu Wagner:

- a) Early ruling on future administrative set-up of Army Hq 12 in Greece is imperative.
- b) Truck situation: Before start of "Barbarossa", 300 trucks will be received to cover in part the deficit of 1,430 vehicles in units, and 400 automobiles etc., to cover deficit of 1,256 automobiles.  
  
After start of "Barbarossa": 1,500 trucks, 1,500 automobile, 500 motorcycles for allocation by Gen Qu every month.
- c) Rommel is crying for more supplies, especially ammunition. Shipping space is the bottleneck!
- d) Experiences in sector of Second Army in Yugoslavia: Advance Supply Point \* system proved very good, if forwarded far enough. Organization of requisitioning must be organized at an early stage \*\*. Determination of supply-roads to be built must take into account supply needs as well as troops movements.
- e) Items for OQu conference: Balkan experiences, signal communications in the Gen Qu service, dumps, maintenance of motor vehicles, Air Force supplies, supply arrangements for Armies in "Barbarossa", etc.
- f) Administrative Orders for C in C S. East.

Major Soltmann: Observations in North Africa. It is important to note that Indian troops apparently are poorly armed and very badly treated by the British. Indians show positive attitude toward Fuehrer.

Prisoner of war matters. Insolence of the British. Italians sneering.

Counterintelligence questions; counteract enemy espionage, expand our own.

Crushing verdict on Italians, who lack moral fibre and any interest whatever in the war.

Major von Merz: Observations in North Africa. Organizational questions. Substantially confirms what I have heard from other sources.

Maj. Gen. Paulus calls up from Catania. Crux of problem in North Africa is not Tobruk or Solum, but organization of supply.

Heusinger:

- a) Assembly of reserves. New schedule. Its first reserves following directly behind Transport Echelon IVb. First and second wave already assigned to Gps., remainder is available for flexible planning. Overall picture satisfactory. We can make the Southern wing strong, and still have ample reserves for Center, which is very strong already, and for the Northern wing.
- b) Political instructions for Greece \* have not yet come in. Remind OKW.
- c) Effective 15 May unit war journals must again be kept.
- d) Order of battle of "Combat Group North" of the SS: one full Div. mot. of three Regts., only one of which will not take part in operation "Silberfuchs".

Talk with ObdH, on his return, about conditions in Greece and operation "Merkur".

9 May 1941.

Situation report:

- 1.) Africa Corps reports loss of 53 Officers and 1,157 EM and NCOs in offensive operations at Tobruk. Very high.
- 2.) Rommel's distress calls for supplies are getting more urgent.
- 3.) Abyssinia: Italian resistance seems to be drawing to a close. British officially still reckon with 30,000 men.
- 4.) Situation in Iraq confused. It would seem even now that the attempted uprising against the British is about to break down.

Conference with ObdH: His notes on Greece:

- a) Elements of Fifth Armd. Div. staying behind in Greece for operation "Merkur".
- b) GHq troops for List; he must organize his own mot. units.

- c) List must arrange with Fourth Air Fleet for re-transfer of command of ground troops after landing in Crete.
- d) Date for "Merkur", 17 May, if serious resistance anticipated; otherwise, 11 May.
- e) Transfer of Army Hq 12. Location of new Hq still undecided.
- f) Bulgaria/Turkey: Bulgaria is already getting impatient to discharge her troops. As long as Turkey's attitude is not entirely clear, only furloughs can be authorized.
- g) Alleged high-handedness of the Bulgarians on the line Sofia-Nish-Saloniki (a Bn. is reported in Nish and Saloniki).\*
- h) Relations of Greeks with Italians and with ourselves.
- i) Food situation in Greece. (First aid of 30,000 tons of grain. Mobilize Hungary and Turkey.)
- k) Greek Government has no money. Interim credits necessary.
- l) Development of situation on the Balkans (jurisdiction of C in C Balkans; status of the Italians).
- m) Army Hq 2 needs a mobile reserve in the final set-up.
- n) Seventh Air Div. will be moved from Bucharest to Greece by overland route, using 4,800 trucks!\*\*

Paulus (on phone):

- 1.) He has talked with Italian Chiefs of Gen. Staffs of Armed Forces and of the Army. They assure him that all aid requested will be furnished.
- 2.) Fighter and AA protection for Bengasi is yet to be pushed through.

Guests at luncheon: Gen. von Greiffenberg, Gen. Scherer, Baentsch, Liss, Wanka. The latter reports on North Africa.

Afternoon, dentist. Afterwards Navy film: Submarines against the West (1700.-1930.)

Back in the evening and paperwork into the late hours of the night.

10 May 1941.

#### Situation report:

- a) Clamorings of the Africa Corps for supplies increase and grow more urgent.\*\*\* All we can do for them at the moment is sending a few more SS ferries (10 ferries are already

down there, together with 20 surf boats without motors).\*

- b) Situation in Irak still obscure. British appear to be getting the upper hand.
- c) Conference Darlan/Fuehrer set for 11 May.
- d) Railroad situation in the East again tight. Backlog 500 trains in the East alone. Beginning 16 May no more trains will be run for less-than-trainload shipments.

Buhle: Africa:

- a) Foreign Legion: \*\* 2 Bns. and 1 Bn. Mt.Arty. possible in July.
- b) Add one Regimental Hq and one more light Artillery Bn. to Fifth Lt.Div. by end of June.
- c) Add one Rifle Regt. to Fifth Lt.Div. from an Armd.Div. earmarked for Africa, in exchange for MG Bn. (Convert to Armd.Div.)

Matzky-Mellenthin: Question of Attachés accredited to Balkan States. Foreign Office representatives at Army Hqs. Orientation of Washington attaché. -- Problems of Gen.Staff intelligence service.

Fellgiebel:

- 1.) Tele-communications in Southeast:

|  |   |            |
|--|---|------------|
| Sofia - Saloniki   | } | all right. |
| Belgrade - Saloniki via Nish   |   |            |
| Belgrade - Saloniki via Bitolji  |   |            |
| Saloniki - Athens, 5 lines plus decimeter radio connection via Mt. Olympos - Euboea. |   |            |

- 2.) "Isabella": Keep ready 8 Cos of the Signal School.
- 3.) North Africa wants one more Corps Signal Bn. Can't be done. Perhaps smaller organizations to help them along.

von Ziehlberg:

- 1.) Special aide for Propaganda \*\*\* to ObdH, Schwatlo-Gescerding.
- 2.) Problem of decorations for Hq personnel and Gen.Staff Officers.
- 3.) Current business of Central Branch.

ObdH (on phone): Concern over supplies for North Africa. - Worries over thoroughness of preparations for operation "Merkur". - Stop redeployment of 73rd Div. as a precaution, in order to have reserves on hand in case "Merkur" fails.

11 May 1941.

(Sunday - Berlin).

Luncheon at Kopp's. - I meet Lutz (father).

1700.-1930., Paulus: Report on his  $2\frac{1}{2}$  weeks' stay in North Africa. Stopped in Rome and paid call to Mussolini.

Situation in North Africa unpleasant. By overstepping his orders, Rommel has brought about a situation, for which our present supply capabilities are insufficient. Rommel cannot cope with the situation.

12 May 1941. (The R.Hess affair breaks.)

Morning conference: Libya: Solum reinforced by one Armd.Bn. and one Motorcycle Rifle Bn. Italian submarine with 79 tons of ammunition en route to Derna, another one being readied.

Italy: Conference Guzzoni-Rintelen. Transfer of X Air Corps to Greece possible under Italian convoy escort. On the return voyage, the convoy will ferry over Second Armd. Div. to Taranto and then completes the transfer of the second half of X Air Corps. Loading of Second Armd.Div. for Taranto starts 13 May.

OKW conference, Salzburg (today 1800.):

- a) Operation "Merkur" and its repercussions on Barbarossa. We are asked to release for "Merkur": 2 mixed and 4 light AA Bns. We can release them only until 25 May, and at that only for the protection of the jump-off air fields.
- b) VIII Air Corps (Richthofen) was to be transported by rail to Oderberg; now Air Force wants rail shipment all the way to East Prussia in order to arrive in time for "Barbarossa". This means that we would need seven more days to complete assembly of troops for Barbarossa.
- c) Air Force has demanded 100 more materiel trains for the East. That would make another delay of two days. They will have to make up their minds whether or not they want to do "Merkur". The delay for Barbarossa resulting from this operation is very awkward. Since 23 May must remain the date for start of the maximum railroad schedule, the time during which the Russians can react, is stretched to six weeks. In that period they could effect drastic changes in the disposition of their forces.

Conference with ObdH: Situation in Libya. - Form a new Hq:

"Commander of German Troops in North Africa". Question of head (Kirchheim, von dem Borne, Ehlert).

Gen. Osterkamp: Difficulties with meat supply. Hog population has dropped from 27 to 20 million. Since existing cattle holdings

are not to be touched, it will be necessary to check the drain on reserves. Meat consumption, also in the Army, will have to be cut even before start of campaign. Reduction from 1550 to 1350 gram in the Armed Forces, from 500 to 400 gram for the civilian population.

Heusinger/Gehlen:

- a) Report on Air activity against Suez Canal.
- b) Five mixed Tank Platoons for Crete leave 18 May and arrive in Saloniki, 23 May.
- c) Gehlen reports on final grouping for jump-off in "Barbarossa", and disposition of GHq reserves. Army Gps. North and Center have made their dispositions largely in accordance with our plans. In Army Gp. South, Reichenau has chosen a line-up, which does not effectively take advantage of the striking power of his Armor. The arrangement, whereby Kleist will not have control of the tanks until after the breakthrough, is fraught with danger. Reinforcing Seventeenth Army has produced good results.

Question of using long-range artillery in Seventeenth Army sector.

Gen Gu Wagner:

- a) Supply situation North Africa: At the moment, 6 steamers with a total of 6,500 tons, 16 medium-sized sailing vessels with 3,200 tons are operating the coastal route (capacity is 29,000 tons a month). The German Forces need 1,000 tons a day. Together with Italians 50,000 tons a month are needed.  
Ration strength of German Forces 25,000 - 45,000.  
Losses since 1 May: 2,500 tons on the coastal route to Bengasi.
- b) Military Hq Serbia: Conference at Agram. -- Reich Fortress Belgrade. -- Relationship between Army Hq 2 and Military Commander no simple matter. -- Troop requirements of Military Hq for partisan fighting. -- Beginning next August, Bor will produce copper at a rate of 40,000 tons a year (can be increased to as much as 80,000 tons).

13 May 1941.

Morning conference: Outcome of OKW conference at Salzburg on 12 May has been entirely satisfactory for the Army.

Of the 4 Light AA Bns. of the Army, only one will go to Crete. The question of how this loss is going to be made up to OKH is still open.

VIII Air Corps will not be shipped by rail all the way to East Prussia except for five trains; bulk goes only as far as Oderberg.

Of the 400 trains which Air Force finally wanted for moving materiel, only 100 will be run.

Redeployment of Second Armd. Div. by sea starts in 16 May, instead of 15 May.

"Merkur:" OKW teletype to Italy. Target date is 18 May, weather permitting. Responsible for the operation: Fourth Air Fleet with support of Army Hq 12 and Admiral Southeast. Italy furnishes Motor Torpedo Boat escort and provides protection of flanks against British naval attacks. Italy also furnishes mine-sweepers for Suda Bay.

Libya: One Light AA Bn. from Sicily goes to Tripoli, 2 are withdrawn from Sicily. No major action at Tobruk. Main British forces apparently assembled west of Tobruk. This means they are thinking only of defense! Enemy has a total of 11 Bns.

Italy: Favagrossa to become Economic Dictator (fuel control).

Irak: Italian fighter planes and MG for Irak arrive in Rhodes on 15 and 16 May.

Turkey and Bulgaria are negotiating about withdrawal of their respective forces from border.

France: Street demonstration in front of Army Hq 7 in Bordeaux.

Belgium: Strike in the coal mining district (50,000 out).

von Ziehlberg: Recommendations for new High Command Africa: C of S Gause; Ia, Westphal; Ic, Mellenthin; Ehlert\* to be replaced by Wuestefeld.

Gen. Brand:

- a) Coastal Btrys. on Channel Coast: Progress seems satisfactory. More practice needed for firing on sea targets. Demonstration Battery! Fifteenth Army wants to activate 15 coastal Btrys. with captured materiel; guns are available. Seventh Army wants to organize 8 coastal Btrys. with captured enemy materiel. Trials with small mobile Observation Bns. for operational use in the sector of AGp. D.
- b) Heavy artillery in the East. No heavy artillery wanted in the Suwalki tip: Hq Seventeenth Army also objects to K 5 and K 12 guns. \*\*
- c) Training of Arty. officer candidates. This summer still at Jueterbog. Later we need a new training center.
- d) R projectiles: \*\*\*4,000 on hand, current monthly production 5,000.

Radke:

- a) Rudolf Hess affair. Political blow of the first order. Danger of an extremist political course.
- b) Strength through Joy \* activities in the East; Combat troops are taken care of by Army Hqs. Replacement Army, by Mil. District Hqs.

Conference in ObdH's office on latest reports from Army Hqs regarding jump-off preparations for "Barbarossa". No new viewpoints.

Other points discussed: International situation (Russian attitude in the Irak question). -- Situation created by Hess' flight. -- Wish to reinforce Fifth Light and Fifteenth Armd. Div. with 10 cm Guns.

Security forces in Serbia: After arrival of 15th Draft, mobile reserves will be organized, using captured enemy tanks where-ever possible. Troops not under command of Foerster, but under Army Hq 12. Instruction to this effect to Army Hq 12.

14 May 1941. (ObdH with .....) \*\*

Morning conference: Nothing of importance. Air shipments to North Africa still going on. (Sheer nonsense). -- Werth is touring Hungarian border.

Gen. Leeb (Ord. Office): AT guns: Exchange \*\*\* 3.7 cm (2.7), 5 cm (3.7). Tapered bore tubes on old gun mounts. Maximum muzzle velocity of AT projectiles 1400 meter per second.

Inf. weapons: Longer life for rifle barrels by addition of chromium (MG).

Trials with 1.5 cm AT rifle (7.9 mm and 28/20 mm exist already).

Recoilless guns, Krupp and Rheinmetall: Owing to high powder consumption only as special-purpose guns.

Extension of range:

Lt. Fd. How. to 11,750 ) muzzle brake and special projectiles.  
Med. Fd. How. to 15,000 )  
With Roechling projectile to 19,000.

Dora Gun (80 cm) range 40,000 m; now in early stages. Ready for operation spring 1942.

Helicopter (improved observation): progress of development much too slow.

Sybel Ferry: 100 units ordered for AAA. #

Motor vehicles for use in tropics: Tracks, Storage of ammunition ##; firing trials in the tropics necessary. Experimental station in Libya.



Flatbed trailers: Monthly output by fall, 1941, 50 units, i.e. equipment for one Regt. every three months. By end of year, rate of output will be stepped up to 100 units. — By end of April we shall have:  
388 10-ton,  
143 20-ton (plus 36 lacking tires).  
On order: 700 22-ton trailers.

Czech 4.7 cm gun on Renault SPM: 18 May, 60 ready (Paris).

Fuel trailers for tanks with built-in pump: By 10 June, 1,860 units (increase range of tanks 100%).

Dieherrenfurth:\* Gelan (chemical agent causing paralysis)  
1 Oct 1941.\*\*

Tank building program: Engine bottleneck.

AA gun production program: Output 1,000 AA guns, one million projectiles a month.

French chemical warfare agents: Nothing new. Our effects not reached. Bacteriological warfare agents (cattle plague).

von Bernuth: Organization of Officers' Training (program for post-war setup).--- Current matters.

Buschenhagen: reports on operation "Silberfuchs". Conversations with Finns have not yet started, because OKW wants to keep all strings in its own hands. Timing is so complex, that coordination with the Barbarossa schedule appears impossible. The whole undertaking is an expedition, not an operation.--- It is a shame to waste the men allocated for this purpose.

Buhle: List of Divs. showing level of readiness for operations. Motor vehicle situation in the mot. and Armd.Divs. (We shall be lucky if they get all the equipment together in time; training of the Divs., equipped last will be incomplete in any event.)

Situation report on Africa Corps: Very high tank losses.--- Drivers for trucks bought in Tunisia.---

Report from 22nd AB Div. Their demands cannot be met at the moment. Solution of the problem is off in some future when there will be enough transport Staffeln to ship by air all mot.Divs.

BdE is forming for Government General 4 Brigades of 6 Bns. each, without artillery etc. from Replacement Reserve II,\*\*\* in order to release the two Divs. of the 15th Draft.---

Serbia 1 - 2 Bns. can be made mobile with 12 - 13, 30-ton, truck columns released by Gen Qu: 10 Tank Platoons are being prepared. - No coast Defense Bns. available to Army Hq 12 for manning captured enemy guns; must be furnished by Army Hq 2. - Military Police army patrols.

von Ziehlberg proposes Hanstein (Army Hq 10) for out-of-turn seniority promotion. Von Blottnitz, XVII Corps Hq, is to be relieved.

Conference with ObdH on results of conference at Fuehrer's:

- 1.) Hess case. Attempted unification of the Germanic races.
- 2.) Fuehrer concurs with OKH measures in Tripolitania.
- 3.) Set-up in North Africa is to be revamped by attaching a "German Chief of Staff" to Gariboldi's Hq.
- 4.) General review of political situation produces nothing substantially new. (Spain, Northwest Africa.)
- 5.) Continuance of operations in Libya next fall is believed to require 4 Armd. Divs. and 3 mot. Divs.

Radke: Press report on Yugoslav Campaign.

Wagner:(Gen Qu): Shipping situation in the Mediterranean can be eased by using tonnage available at Marseille.

15 May 1941.

Morning conference: Number of strikers at Liège has decreased (only 35,000 as against 50,000). — Naples so crowded with German troops, that further inflow must be stopped until outflow runs more smoothly. — One supply vessel for Lemnos torpedoed by the British. — Hq of the Italian Army Group Albania will be deactivated 25 May. Army Hq 9 takes over command.

- OQu IV:
- a) A shipment of German ammunition has arrived in Irak on the Bagdad Railroad (Rahn reports). Enthusiastic reception.
  - b) Two German Staffeln in Rhodes ready to take off for Irak. Advance parties in Syria.
  - c) Personnel changes in Romania (Chief of Gen.Staff, War Minister).

Chief of Transportation:

- a) Railroad situation unsatisfactory. Gercke will send personal letter to Minister of Transportation.
- b) Ever new changes in transport requisitions. — Civilian freight mixed with army freight.
- c) In Bulgaria, 100 railroad trains with Army freight are standing around with no one knowing their destination. (60% Air Force shipments.)

- d) Army cannot build railroad line to Athens. Viaduct, which would tie up 500 meter of military bridge equipment, must be built by civil contractors.

- OQu IV:
- a) Section Foreign Armies West must stay behind in Berlin during Barbarossa. Liaison officer.
  - b) Exchange of OQu IV with corresponding Air Force organization (Col. Schmidt) requires Liaison Officer.

Chief Op. Sec. (OQu I): North Africa:

- a) French grant permission to use sea route to Tunis area (small port). Tunisia trucks may then be used to trans-ship cargoes.
- b) Fuehrer holds we would need 4 Armd. Divs. and 3 mot. Divs. for continuation of operations against Egypt.
- c) New command set up in North Africa. Under "Chief of the German General Staff at the Italian Hq": Commander of the Rear Area, Coast Defense, Defense of Desert Oases.
- d) Preparations for conference with Army Group Rundstedt on 19 May.

Conference with all OKH Section Chiefs: Case Hess !

- I. Fuehrer's account of events to the ObdH is in agreement with the second, more detailed press communique.
  - 1.) The Fuehrer was taken completely by surprise.
  - 2.) Facts previously known:
    - a) Hess' inner conflict growing out of his personal attitude toward England and his grief over the fratricidal struggle between the two Germanic nations.
    - b) Depression brought on because Fuehrer had barred him from active war service; repeated requests to be sent to the front had been denied.
    - c) Mystical tendencies ("visions", prophecies, etc.).
    - d) His daredevil flying, which had prompted the Fuehrer to bar Hess from any flying.
  - 3.) New facts discovered:
    - a) Since August last year, Hess had a standing order for reports on weather over England.
    - b) Attempt to procure radio direction information through Terboven in Norway (radio traffic).
    - c) Systematic training by Messers-mitt, after Udet had refused.

- d) Planning of technical preparations for flight (reserve fuel tanks).

4.) Chronology of events:

- a) Saturday: Fuehrer received package containing documents and put it aside, thinking it was some memorandum. Later opened it and found a letter informing him of the plan, and explaining the reasons. Glasgow was given as his destination. Wanted to visit Duke of Hamilton (President of the British Veterans' Association \*).
- b) Consultation of Fuehrer with Reich Marshal and Udet to determine if Hess was likely to reach his destination. The result being affirmative and with the British bound to exploit the incident, a brief communique was issued to the press. Ribbentrop sent to Rome to inform Il Duce (separate peace offer).
- c) Meeting called of all Reichsleiter and Gauleiter and documents relative to the case read to them.

II. All present are requested to pass on this information and deny all divergent versions.

1230. Conference in Gen Qu's office with the Chief Supply Officers of the Armies in the East:

- a) Ruling on relations between Adv. Gen Qu Hqs and AGp. Hqs.
- b) 60-ton truck columns must not follow the advancing troops too far forward.\*\* Keep roads free (supply artery to the Zi). No 60-ton truck columns on secondary roads\*\*.)
- c) Armd. Groups are echeloned in great depth! # Supply arteries secured by Advance Combat Teams of the Inf.Corps.
- d) Traffic control must be organized more uniformly. (Separate briefing ! )
- e) Establishing of ammunition etc. dumps near border should not be overdone. Consequence of accumulations of excessive stocks is pointed out; jamming of railroads, etc.
- f) Truck column requirements of Chief of Eng. and Chief of Signal Corps. (Separate briefing.)
- g) Road building in Army area not yet what it ought to be. (Separate briefing.)
- h) Indoctrinate lower Gen Qu agencies and brief them on impending missions. - Measures to combat hoggish hoarding by units. ##
- i) Maps and road information service; reporting on prisoners and booty.
- k) Briefing about Hess case.

- von Ziehlberg: a) Speth recalled from Italian Army Group Albania.  
b) Replacement for Metz - Bluemke. See ObdH.  
c) Gause to be promoted to General. \* --- Summoned to report for briefing.  
d) Alternate GHqs (Spala and Reichshof).\*\*  
Preparations for transfer to Askania.\*\*\*

Heusinger: a) Col. General Grauert shot down near St. Omer.  
b) Solum reported lost.

Afternoon in Berlin, Bulgarian Legation (King's name day). - Evening with Kloenne # at Adlon Hotel.

16 May 1941.

Situation conference: West: Number of strikers in the Verviers and Huy districts has again increased (51,000). Food shortage.

Mediterranean: Canal of Corinth again navigable for ships drawing 6 meter (at low tide 5 meter). Air Force drops 15 ton of bombs on Suez Canal (including 10 mines from lowest altitude).

Irak: German auxiliary cruiser destroyed in Persian Gulf.

Damascus: 2 Ju 90; 16 Me and He planes and ## 27 carloads of arms and ammunition. More German planes in Rhodes.

Fighter Experimental Wing assigned to submarine hunt in the Aegean.

North Africa: 14 May. Rommel has informed Air Force Commander Africa that he plans to concentrate the bulk of his forces near Solum, and will leave siege of Tobruk to the Italians. Air Force Commander has refused to order requested shift of Air Forces to the area west of Solum.

15 May. Solum attacked by 5 Rifle Bns., 2 light Arty. Bns. (horse) and 1 medium Arty. Bn., Armd. Rcn. Bn., Antitank and Armd. Bns. (1-3).

Crete: Preparations under way. The small island of Antikythera is to be occupied (jump-off basis for Crete). No positive information available on conditions in Crete and the difficulties likely to be met.

All AAA. except one Bn. probably will get out of the Crete operation in time for "Barbarossa". AA MG Bn. must be assigned for the Crete operation, but substitute will be furnished by 22nd AB Div.

Second Armd. Div. sails from Patras as scheduled. Difficulties caused by excess loading.

The situation of the British in the Eastern Mediterranean is becoming progressively more difficult as regards available forces. Irak ties down British forces, instead of sending them to the theater. Palestine is in a state of unrest, Abyssinia is not yet liquidated. The situation at Tobruk appears to be so difficult that high stakes are risked to raise the siege (attack on Solum).

OQu I: OKW proposal for command set-up in North Africa has been received. An utterly vague ambiguous concoction! Counter-proposal.

Col. Spalke:

- a) Arms deliveries to Romania: First instalment, 15 June; Second instalment, 15 September (4.7 AT guns with ammunition, etc.).
- b) Food situation in Romania fairly good. Good crops in prospect. Acreage sown to wheat larger than before.
- c) Armament economy: Problems of manpower and capacity.
- d) Supply of oil drums: 10,000 drums by June. Zinc for drums from Hungary.
- e) Political currents.

von Ziehlberg: Current reassignments.

Jacob: 1.) Progress in preparing equipment: First Sybel ferries; 58 for August, 100 later. — After assembling in Vienna, they will take two weeks to get to Braila, arriving 20 June. Can operate 16 hours at 25 km an hour before refueling. Form a bridge 800 meter long.

24 ferries made up of Danube b. es form bridge 600 m or long.

5 Assault Boat Cos, 81 boats each.

One for each Armd. Group.

One Co. as reserve for Southeast.

Also one detachment on Channel Coast.

Mines: Rommel 25,000 T, 15,000 S Mines\*.

Three Army Gps.: 295,000 T, 496,000 S (i.e. 3 T mines or 2 S mines per linear meter of frontage in East), plus stocks in depots: 288,000 T, 497,000 S mines and the mines carried by Engineer units.

Reserves of barbed wire are ample.

Emergency bridge construction materiel sufficient for jump-off.

2.) Road-building organization.

- 3.) Required for Danube bridges in Hungary: One Construction Bn. from the ZI. plus one Eng. Co. from Replacement Army.
- 4.) Army Hq Norway: Engineer Officer and Construction Unit from the West Wall.
- 5.) Russian mines: Instruction leaflet will be issued.

Paulus:

- a) New Libya see mem. Counterproposal to OKW.
- b) Position of OQu I. At present apparently overworked, but no reason for radical change.
- c) Operational orders for "Haifisch". I am against referring to individual Divs., because this deception would only create confusion on our own side.

Liss: a) New information on disposition of British forces in Irak. Latest reports on Tobruk.

- b) British air raid on Syrian airdromes; French defense; British leaflets dropped in Syria.
- c) Gen. Dentz' attitude in Syria very friendly toward us. British Consul expelled.

Major Heymer (Long-range Rcn. Staff of the Africa Corps) reports on his work in North Africa. Nothing substantially new. (Evening at the Officers' Club, with Bogatsch).

17 - May 1941.

Situation conference: Libya: Sidi Suleiman retaken by Africa Corps, also Sidi Suleiman. 100 prisoners. On the Tobruk front successful engagements of assault detachments (some prisoners, tanks destroyed, etc.).

Greece: Fuehrer orders occupation of Antikythera. Army Hq 12 thinks, this would compromise surprise. "Merkur" probably will be postponed to 20 May.

|                                |                      |             |
|--------------------------------|----------------------|-------------|
| <u>Suez:</u> 13 May: Shipping: | Suez outer roadstead | 256,000 ton |
|                                | Suez harbor          | 200,000 ton |
|                                | Port Ibrahim         | 72,000 ton  |
|                                | Port Said            | 118,000 ton |

Syria: British air attack on Damascus. French ground and air defense in action against the British !!!

West: Strike situation unchanged. The strike leaders have been called together. Settlement expected for Monday. Cause is exclusively the food situation (potato shortage).

East: Transport echelon III for "Barbarossa" starts moving on 21 May. Todate average of 300 trains daily.

- Buhle:
- a) Status reports: Eighteenth Div.mot.; Thirteenth Armd. Div. Training of these Divs., activated at the last moment will be rather sketchy; have no unit training.
  - b) Additional personnel for Army Hq 10 and AGp. D.
  - c) Fourth, Tenth, Seventh Armd. Divs. will get their fourth Armd. Companies yet before start of "Barbarossa".
  - d) Observation Btry. for North Africa; tide them over with small detachments for Tobruk; a full Bn. next fall.
  - e) Transfer of replacement units to France not before 15 July. Must do without them if "Isabella" comes off earlier.

Matzky/Schildknecht: Review of changes in Russian dispositions in the border area (Western Russia), from the beginning of the war todate, by three-month periods.

Paulus - Heusinger - Pistorius: Draft of operational plan for "Isabella" (Army Group D) with suggested modifications; ten-day alert period.

Heusinger:

- a) OKW has again been asking for a second Div. for Holland. We have not got it.
- b) 169th Div.(destined for Finland) entrains for Stettin, beginning 23 May.
- c) Finland: No progress to report.
- d) Request of 22nd Div. cannot be granted. Div. should apply for reassignment to Ground Forces. We cannot move their ground elements \* behind them.
- e) Crete postponed to 20 May. - Fuehrer insists on occupation of Antikythera, against advice of Air Force.
- f) Regt. Brandenburg details one Bn. each to AGps. Center and South, 2 Cos. to AGp. North.\*\*
- g) Subversion plans for Ukraine and Baltic States.

Evening conference with ObdH on his return from the East. Important points:

AGp. North: Preparations for Oesel. Bridge construction material will do in a pinch.--- Bring up supplies on the Niemen river as far as Kowmo. - Collect barges for Niemen bridges beginning 20 May (2 bridges at Memel; 3 bridges can be built of other materials on hand.)



General matters:

- a) Refugee problem --- Evacuation of border regions?!
- b) Tighten border protection (S mines.)
- c) Evacuation of 60,000 children. \*
- d) Evacuation of Reich Labor Service girls and of the Labor Camps (must be freed for military occupancy).

Army Gp. Center frames its orders in accordance with our ideas. Inactive fronts secured by mines. Regrouping toward the right wing is in progress. Inf. reserve close to the front, mot. reserve kept in rear. AA protection along the Vistula very thin.

Army Gp. South: Seventeenth Army wants no heavy artillery for the jump-off. Reserves will be put behind left wing. What shall we do about Slovakia? (2 Divs.)

Proposed Zero Hour: 0305 hrs. No coups de main before.

Air Reconnaissance: Rowehl is urgently wanted.

18 May 1941. Berlin. ("Mother's Day").

No substantial changes in situation. Solum Fort Capuzzo again in our hand.

Private Correspondence. --- Visit from Adenauer.\*\* Gerti calls with her children. --- Evening at theater "Veilchenredoute".\*\*\*

19 May 1941.

Situation report: Russia: Ban on all travel by foreigners and indigenous non-residents in the border districts.

Belgium: Strike has spread to Hasselt (54,000 out now).

Libya: 26th Convoy again turned back to Palermo. --- Casualties at Solum apparently alike on both sides. Enemy lost much materiel.

Irak: Reinforcements for the British at Habbania have arrived, apparently from the West.

Gen Qu: Review of OtdH's findings on eastern tour, which have bearing on Gen Qu. SS units for Rear Areas. The missions requested by these units must be refused. # The first 120-ton column has arrived from Tunis.

Conference with ObdH on plans for "Isabella". ObdH holds that concentration of forces in the South will rouse comment in France. Other items:

- a) MT situation in the Armd.Divs. activated last. - Decides to move them by road instead of by rail, to give them at least good road march training.
- b) Strike in Belgium.
- c) Hanstein's out-of-turn promotion delayed.\*

Buerker (Ing.Sec.): Ordered to go immediately to the Armd.Divs. which are coming out last, to find out, what could still be done for their training (allocation of fuel, etc.).

- Housing:
- a) No basic directives from OKW on command set-up in Romania, since the question has not yet been discussed with Antonescu.\*\*
  - b) OKW dismisses our recommendation on a "German Chief of Staff in the Italian Headquarters" and wants, instead, to give Rommel a second Chief of Staff supposed to run the rear services for him. Idiotic!

1500.-1730. Conference at ObdH, with von Rundstedt/Sodenstern, later Reichenau/Heim, then also Kleist/Zeitzler\*\*\*and, finally, von Schobert. Questions relating to assembly of AGp. South. No fundamental difficulties with High Command of Army Group. Lively arguments with von Reichenau, who at last decides to group the three center Corps under Kleist's command right from the jump-off. Only tentative discussion on dispositions with Schobert, since we still have not received any political directives on the command set-up. (Von Schobert will get his instructions at Obersalzberg on Thursday). Afterwards short talk with Heim.

Paulus (on phone) about his conversation with Jodl on the command set-up in North Africa. All the Fuehrer cares about is that Rommel should not be hampered by any superior Hq. put over him. Jodl will send us another plan.

Col. Schaeffler (Chief Artillery Officer OKH): Use of heavy artillery in the sector of AGp. South. -- List needs a Coastal Arty. Bn. for Crete.

Evening: Receive "directive" with orders for Greece and C in C Balkans.

Gen. Wagner reports on a conference with Thomas, Fromm and Gercke, (afternoon), at which it came out that OKW now thinks it can furnish only 16 fuel trains, daily, instead of the 22 expected. Also the Com Z fuel depots in the East, which should be 50% full, are said to have dropped to a 20% level.

20 May 1941. (Attack on Crete).

Morning conference:

- 1.) 0500. - 0713. Landing on Crete prepared by bombing attack. Subsequent unopposed drop of paratroops and landing of gliders on Chania, Rethymnon and Iraklion airfields. The "airborne landing" of airborne troops will not come off before tomorrow.
- 2.) First echelon of Second Armd. Div. (3 ships) has landed at Taranto.
- 3.) Unconfirmed reports that British Second Chief of the Gen. Staff, Gen. Haning, has taken over command in Egypt.
- 4.) Syria: The French on the border are getting set to fight the British.
- 5.) In recognition of the French attitude in the Syrian question, Germany will return 80,000 prisoners.
- 6.) Maribor Tunnel reopened for traffic. Bridges at Maribor and Belgrade will be reopened by 15 June.
- 7.) Difficulties in fuel supply during July. In August, oil will be delivered to theater of operation directly from Romania, across the Pruth river. - Italy's needs are filled by OKW at the expense of our own quotas. Gasoline supply for civilian use is bogged down.

Bahle:

- 1.) Truck situation: French trucks are praised. Tools and spare parts as yet not in sufficient quantities. - The mot. units will not be ready in time. Extension of assembly date will not be necessary. Only in the case of Fourteenth and Eighteenth Divs. it may perhaps be necessary to set a later date for departure (which would not be serious).
- 2.) "Isabella" Divs. will be 100 % equipped with mortars and antitank rifles by 20 June. Artillery will be re-equipped with Lt. How. 18 and med. Fd. How. 18 by 20 June.
- 3.) Corps Hq LIV will be ready by 1 June (Romania).
- 4.) "Armd. Replacement Division" Barb. Bossa: Refitting feasible within four weeks after start of operations.

Col. General Fromm:

- 1.) Loss replacements : 90,000 in Field Replacement Bns. 475,000 in the Replacement Army (less 90,000 for Air Force, leaves 385,000). Anticipated losses in the initial border battles: 275,000; for September 200,000. This would leave nothing for October, unless we induct age group 22 on 1 August (last reserve). Forty percent

of age-group 22 is in the Labor Service, sixty, in civilian occupations. Should not be called before the end of the year (Nov.), when men can be released from the front to replace them. We can take the risk of having no trained reserves in October.

- 2.) Fuel situation: June requirements covered, 10% short for July. In August the situation will be relieved by direct deliveries of fuel from Romania to AGp. South.
- 3.) Current problems of his Section.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- 1.) Replacement for Signal Replacement Bn. of Fifteenth Armd. Div. lost at sea arrived in Naples.
- 2.) Two Cos, for Rear Communications ready in Germany by 15 June; can be in North Africa early in July.
- 3.) Various current matters.

Col. Gause: (ordered to North Africa ) reports. Since situation precludes decision on his assignment at this time, I furlough him to Berlin.

Gen. Hiner, being in Berlin, calls on me. Reviews conditions in Hungary. Gets briefing on line to be followed in the coming months.

\*

von Thoma: Traffic control.-- Fifth Armd.Div. still tied up.-- Good work of the Tank Maintenance Groups. -- Preparations for the East: Ethylization center to adjust octane number for our purposes by addition of benzol. -- Track blocks made of Buna rubber. -- Collection of booty in Greece. -- 3690 tanks are now at the German front. -- Spare parts supply for Barbarossa.

von Etzdorf: France: Cooperation in Syria. -- Cooperation in North Africa. -- Supply line via Toulon (?!)\*\* - Cooperation in West Africa. -- North Africa: Use of port of Bone. In return: New regulation of travel into restricted zone (officials, industrialists, farm managers.)-- Easing of traffic restrictions for Demarcation Line. -- Furloughs for Prisoners of War (up to 100,000 at a time). -- Occupation costs (prompt negotiations, aiming at reduction from 15 to 12,5 billion franc ). Coastal Btrys. in North Africa. -- Improvements of the Navy. -- Specialists for North Africa.

Plan to tie Turkey closer to us by a p . Transit to Syria (against Turk). Papen protests against his mission. \*\*\*

Japan: Matsuoka warns he will have to take a "zig-zag course". American offers to Japan. -- Also: Status quo for Philippines . Offer of mutual undertaking not to enter European conflict (defense only).

Rome: Visit of our Foreign Minister: Hess -- Darlan -- Japan.

Spain: Crisis apparently put off for the moment. Concession to the Falange (two new ministries).

Crete: Dropping of paratroops (2 Regts.) seems to have been successful, but strong enemy resistance seems to have developed soon afterwards at Chania. Airfields, on which airborne forces were to land, are reported to have been rendered unserviceable.

21 May 1941.

Morning reports: In Crete the situation is satisfactory. More paratroops have been dropped. Stubborn British resistance in some places. Report of landing of Mountain Infantry has not been confirmed. No new information on disposition of British troops in the Middle East. Situation still strained and forces as widely dispersed as ever. Report of British in Irak advancing on Bagdad (Al Falluja) are unfounded.

Col. Ochsner: Report on eastern tour. — Armies want flame oil ammunition and HE ammunition, at ratio of 1:1. — Enforcement of safety regulations for Rocket Projector Troops.\* Each Rocket Projector Bn. now includes one Btry. of the new rocket projectors with 6,000 meter range. — Preparations for new Decontamination Service. — Channel for reporting of intelligence on enemy chemical warfare service. — Dogs as gas detectors. —

Enemy intelligence: Britain is preparing flame oil for defense of beaches.

Russia is activating Ossoaviakhim\*\* to fight parachutists. Reported to have prepared 7% gas ammunition. France: Preparations for bacteriological warfare (cattle plague).

Heusinger:

- a) At request of Army Hq 12, Fifth Armd.Div. will be left in Athens for a few more days.
- b) Letter to Jodl on pending questions, e.g., on undesirability of having German forces strike from Hungary, as such a move would be at the expense of the main concentration of AGp. South\*\*\*.
- c) SS-Ferries: 6 for Africa Corps (newly arrived), 44 for Black Sea; 25 ferries coming off the line in June will go to AGp. North for Baltic.
- d) Let AGp. Center have Corps Hq XXXIII or Corps Hq XXXV (reduced !). Then they will get no Corps Hq later on with the GHq reserves.

- e) Changes in plans for road movement for Barbarossa, due to delays in arrival of trucks for newly activated Armd. Divs.
- f) Inquiry relating to preparatory work for new Rules of Sea Warfare: Limited or unlimited blockade zones on high seas? I am for latter alternative (Bluff).

von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters (among others, von Loeffelholz, Army Hq 9).--- Ban on flying for higher officers within range of enemy fighters. --- Transfer of GHq to Askania. --- Conference of Chiefs of Staff after the Whitsun holidays.--- Current business.

Army Hq 2: reports on the possibility of unrest in Croatia and requests ruling on whether they could use German troops at own discretion. Reply: Use troops only at the request of Croat government authorities, unless our military interests are involved.

Gen. Bogatsch (with Ziehlberg): Allocation of courier planes for Hqs (reasonably satisfactory).

(with Buhle: ) Allocation of motor vehicles to air reconnaissance and signal units.  
One light AA Bn., which was assigned to Ground Forces for "Barbarossa", is being taken away and goes to Crete.

Gen. Wagner (with Baensch):

- a) Sea route for supply base Baltic:  
Memel: 2 convoys of 5 ships of 300 tons each.  
Koenigsberg: 4 convoys of 5 ships of 300 tons each.  
Also river barge trains of 15 - 20 ships of 75 - 100 tons each, for Memel river.

- b) Message procedure in Quartermaster service.

Wagner alone:

- a) OKW directive on Greece. --- OKW directive on Rear Areas Barbarossa. --- Order of battle of Himmler's SS Army.
- b) Supply columns: The organic Troop Supply Columns have all arrived in first half of May.

In second half of the month (20 - 30 May), we shall get the 30-ton truck columns.\*

Ready before start of operations: 60-ton truck columns.\*\*  
After start of operations: 8,000 tons (616th Regt.) (OKH reserve) plus additional 4,000 tons.

- c) Fuel for training purposes: One quota (equal to 100 road kilometers) released for each mot. Div.
- d) Noticeable drop in the clothing output (by one-third).  
Very heavy drain on stocks.

- e) Are Field Hospitals to become GHq troops? Chief Army Surgeon is against it. However, the Divs. must be compelled to relinquish their Field Hospitals. Once this policy has been established, they may be compensated by Corps and Armies.
- f) Issue of Iosanthin. Efficacy: If used within five minutes no injury; within 10 minutes, injury is light, after 15 minutes, ineffective.

Gen. Paulus calls up from Paris: Outcome of conference with C in C West, on the whole conforms with my demands. \* I instruct him that in locating troop reserves, account must be taken of fact that the West-East railroad system might be in use both ways at one time.\*\*

Heusinger: Crete: 4 Mt. Bns. have landed in Crete. 2 west of Chania, 2 near Iraklion.

Situation at Chania improved. Town encircled. Contact established between isolated paratroop groups. Attempted sorties repelled.

Air transport hampered in area west of Chania where landing field is unserviceable. The transport planes land on the beach where they cannot take off.

Rethymnon in our hands. No reports received on Iraklion.

British naval forces northeast of Crete have disappeared, west of Crete still on the spot (under attack by our planes).

Shipments by sea will start tonight.

Army Hq 12 thinks that the show in Crete may drag out quite a while .

During the night a signal indicates that two transport vessels of Second Armd.Div. have struck mines in the western end of the Gulf of Corinth.

22 May 1941.

Morning conference: Second Armd.Div. (which sailed from Patras) reported to have lost in sinking: 122 tanks, 200 motor vehicles, 29 motorcycles, 1,328 men.\*\*\*

Crete: Troops landed: Malenes: One Assault Regt. (Gen. Meindl), one Paratroop Bn., one Mt. Inf.Bn.

Chania: 5 Bns.

At Malenes and Chania our troops are opposed by 6 New Zealand Bns. and one Arty.Regt.

Rethymnon: Town apparently not yet taken; the Bn. set down by us may be in trouble by now.

Iraklion: 3 Paratroop Bns., Airfield and town apparently taken.

Libya: Rommel states he cannot take Tobruk with the forces now at his disposal.

France: has 214,000 tons in the Western Mediterranean.

Belgium: Strikes dying down.

Syria: Reported invasion of Syria by DeGaulle's troops highly doubtful.

Irak: Mosul attacked. No British at Al Falluja.

Egypt: Attempt to get Chief of Egyptian Gen. Staff, who is collaborating with Germany, out of the country. Attitude of Egypt on the whole not friendly to Britain.

Transp. Chief: Situation improved. Easing in the East. Shipment of gasoline to Com Z depots now included in supply program of Field Army, as requested by BdE.

Buhle: Considers replacing lost elements of Second Armd. Div. with Tank Demonstration Bn., originally earmarked for Seventeenth Div.

Maj. Westerberg (Photo Sec. in staff of Chief Air Officer): Submits air photographs taken by Rowehl's Staffel in the Russian border area. They clearly show extensive construction activities for strengthening border defenses (especially anti-tank ditches). Numerous cable trenches indicate preparation of a continuous defense position.

The photos corroborate our view that the Russians are determined to make a stand at the border.

Maj. Schildknecht (Foreign Armies East) reports on disposition of Russian Army along German border. For the most part closed up to front.

Defense build-up comprises three major groups:

Baltic: One Army Gp. of two Armies, with one group of operational, and one group of strategic reserves in the rear.

Center: One Army Gp. of three Armies, with one group of operational, and one group of strategic reserves(?) in the rear.

South: One Army Gp. of three Armies, one group of operational reserves.

Independent Pruth front: One Army Gp.

Heusinger: Reports from Greece:

- 1.) The announcement of loss of tanks off Patras has proved erroneous. The tanks of Second Armd. Div. have already been landed at Taranto. The losses seem to be largely in light and med. Artillery of the Div. Very hard to replace because of shortage of prime movers. Personnel losses: morning figures confirmed.
- 2.) The transfer of the light AA Bn. to operation Crete was ordered by Army Hq List and cannot be reversed at the moment. Must try to get replacement for "Barbaroosa" from Air Force.



- 3.) Situation in Crete seems rather complex. The British are in undisputed command of the sea north of Crete and seem to have scattered or sunk a convoy of small craft attempting to make the crossing. Reinforcements for Crete can therefore be sent only by air. It now looks quite doubtful that the Air Forces committed in Crete would be available for "Barbarossa" at the appointed date. Perhaps it will be necessary to postpone start of "Barbarossa".

Buhle:

- a) Artillery replacements for Second Armd.Div.: A Bn. now nearing completion, re-equipped with light Fd.How., plus Demonstration Bn. of 900th Brig. Med. Arty will be allocated when Div. goes into action.
- b) 1,800 fuel trailers for Tank III will be ready by 9 June; trailers for Tank IV not until later in June.
- c) 100th Armd.Brig. will be reasonably mobile by 15 June.
- d) Eighteenth and Seventeenth Armd. Divs. will complete outfitting just about in time. Seventeenth Armd.Div. has 240 different types of motor vehicles !
- e) Activate a Rocket Projector unit in Replacement Army, for "Haifisch".\*
- f) Improvements of Army Group D, "Isabella".
- g) Regulation of furloughs to Biarritz.

von Glaise-Horstenau: Situation in Croatia. Croats want their Army to stay in country; clamor for partial motorization. Also want transport for civilian economy. Glaise's future role. Future strength of the Croat Army: 3 Mt.Divs., 2 Inf.Divs., 6 Air Gruppen of 22 planes, each.

Maj. Ehlert: Have a serious talk with him on the reasons for his separation from the Africa Corps.

Heusinger: One Bn. of Fifth Mt.Div. wiped out in crossing to Crete. Current questions (med. Arty. for Kythera on Sybel ferries). Probable necessity to postpone date for Barbarossa.

von Ziehlberg: Commission for Irak. Recommendations for out-of-turn promotions.

Evening to Berlin:

23 May 1941.

By plane (with intermediate landing at Brieg) over Galicia, Tatra (Zakopane) to Cracow, Hq AGp. B. Sightseeing. Evening at Hq. AGp.B.

24 May 1941.

Conference with AGp.B:

- a) Depth of left wing of Seventeenth Army.
- b) Send XIV Corps through Seventeenth Army sector to widen Kleist's jump-off frontage.

1000. - 1200. Ride to Reichshof.\*

Conference at Hq First Army : Disposition of forces. ---  
Employment of artillery (heavy Artillery).--- XIV Corps will go into line through IV Corps.  
Meet the Gen.Staff Officers.

By plane from Debica to Lublin via Bilgorai - Zamoss - Chelm and Wlodawa. Arrive 1700.

Conference with CG III Corps (von Mackensen).

Evening with Gen. Staff Offs. of III and IV Corps (Vierow) at Hq III Corps.

25 May 1941. (Sunday).

Ride with Faeckenstedt (C of S III Corps), later joined by Wagner (LV Corps) from Lublin ( 0700 to Krystinopol, through Chelm, Hrubieszow, and Sokal. At Sokal, Triebe (C of S, XXXXVIII Corps) reports and Heim (C of S, of Staff, Sixth Army) joins us.

Inspection of jump-off terrain of III and XXXXVIII Corps. It has the peculiarity that movements must directly follow road network.

Problems resulting from lack of cover for assembly of artillery.

Conference with Heim: Jump-off of XIV Corps alongside XXXXVIII.

Return from Krystinopol via Hrubieszow to Zamosc. From there, to Berlin by plane; arrive 2000.

2000. - 2100. Talk with Gen. Paulus on the airfield. Overnight in Berlin.

26 May 1941.

Arrive Zossen 0900. Discuss with OQu I and Op. Off. on material for conference with the Finns.

0900.- 1000. Gen. von Tippelskirch calls (30th Div.). Bluenke reports (new C of S XIV Corps). Meyer-Ricks reports out (off with Irak Commission).

1130. Conference with ObdH on Finland.

1230. Welcome of Finns, headed by Chief of Gen.Staff, Heinrichs.

Luncheon.

After luncheon conference with Finnish Gen.Staff:

Along lines of OKW conference: Operational possibilities are discussed. Attack west or east of Lake Ladoga. With appropriate disposition for assembly, they strike east of Lake Ladoga on a 6 Div. front.

Mobilization near border camouflaged, in rest of the country only after passage of German troops for operation "Silberfuchs" (16 June).

Hangoe: The Finns must do this by themselves.

Aaland: This is likewise a job for them; at least they must make all preparations on this assumption. (German help needed: 2 Regts.)

Long-distance call from Gen. Vogl (Armistice Commission) about negotiations with France. No important news.

Fromm on phone. Re Holland: He told Keitel that 82nd Div. will have its equipment by 1 June, the same as all Divs. of the Sixth Draft (i.e., without Inf. guns and only part of the AT Bn.). The Div. has been issued 6,000 bicycles. Trucks prepared. -  
Relocation of Replacement Units.

Afternoon: Talk with ObdH about Finland. -- Occupation in Holland. -- Command set-up in North Africa. -- Tour in Eastern border area.

27 May 1941.

(S.S. Bismarck sunk).

Situation conference: S.S. Bismarck under heavy attack by superior British naval forces in the Atlantic. Reported to be making only 7 knots (down from normal 30). At noon, British report that Bismarck has gone down.

27th Convoy sailed for Libya( Coastal artillery).

Thasos and Samothrake turned over to the Bulgarians.

Situation on Crete improved. The Western part of the island now cleaned up; eastward advance continues.

OKW insists that original date for Barbarossa must stand: No objections on the part of the Army, except that AAA might not be ready; 2 mixed AA Bns. and 3 light AA Bns. still engaged in Crete. The 2 mixed Bns. were taken out of Army Hq 11, the three light Bns. out of Armd.Divs. Air Force must make up deficiency! Air Force, however, will have a hard time keeping the date.

Italy will touch bottom of her oil supplies unless oil deliveries can start early in June. Total required: 260,000 ton.

100,000 are to be shipped by rail \*  
5,000 through Canal of Corinth  
25,000 from Germany. The remaining  
60,000 have yet to be found.

Count Sponeck (CG, 22nd Div): Discussion of status of 22nd Div. In order to be committed as airborne troops, they need 1,400 planes. Since that number is not unavailable, it would be inexcusable to let the Div. hang around idle. Submit proposal to OKW.

Gen. Brand: a) Idea of Fuehrer about mixed med.Artilletry Bns. (runs counter to our experience and the wishes of the troops).  
b) Report on tour in East, AGp.B.  
c) Miscellaneous minor matters (including level of training of GHq Artillery).

OQu IV:

- a) With Chief of Attaché Sec.: Various Attaché questions. Hungary, Krabbe.
- b) French Transitional Army (Memorandum).
- c) Negotiations with Darlan: 75 per cent of the French materiel frozen in Syria is to go to Irak; vehicles, port facilities, railroads, roads.

Movement of supplies to Irak to be handled by French in French ships from Cyprus waters. Training for Irak under French in Syria. \*\* Exchange with us information on British in Middle East.

North Africa: We are getting 1,740 trucks now, 400 more later. French take our supplies to North Africa in their ships and forward them to Libyan border. Bizerte will be available for our use.

French med. guns, including ammunition, for us in North - Africa. West and Equatorial Africa: Dakar available for German naval operations, effective 15 July.

Summary:

- d) Spain: Mobilization takes 8 days. Alert period for march readiness 12 hours. Ammunition for one to three months (varying for different weapons); tight on AA ammunition. Fuel supplies for 2 months. Fighting quality of Spanish troops against British supposed to be good.
- e) Portugal: Will fight better against the Spanish than against the British.

- Gen. Buhle:
- a) Second Army Div.: Replacement of Artillery with newly activated units by 1 July; likewise Bridge Cpls. from GHQ Reserve.
  - b) Activation of four Wehrmacht Befehlshaber Hqs for East, as specified by OKW. \*
  - c) Conclusion of drive to reduce number of types of motor vehicles. A flop.
  - d) 82nd Div. Condition, filler replacements before going to Holland. Report to OKW.
  - e) Activation of four Divs., Sixteenth Draft; 6 Bns. of 4 Cos. (Regional Defense troops) begins 15 June. Activation will take two weeks.
  - f) Other current business.

Col. Heusinger: S.S. Bismarck. -- 22nd Div. -- Paulus' conference on "Haifisch" and "Isabella" in Paris (ground disposition). -- Weather prediction for the East for period from now until next fall. -- Armored trains. -- Preparedness for defense in the East. -- Other current questions.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Selection of personnel for Liaison Staff Finland and Liaison Staff Bulgaria. -- Preparations for C of S meeting.

28 May 1941.

Newly promoted officers in Gen.Staff (Majors) introduce themselves.

Situation conference:

Crete: Paratroops seem to have suffered high casualties. -- The Italian want to make a landing with one reinforced Inf. Bn. and tanks from the Rhodes base on 28 June.

22nd Div. OKW wants to transfer 22nd Div. to the ZI. The Div. can be assembled either in Bucharest or in Troppau by 26 May. If the Div. does not belong to us, we are not interested in it. (Braunschweig out of question.)

Syria: French flyers from North Africa en route to Syria, with intermediate landing at Catania.

U.S.A.: "Fireside talk" by Roosevelt: State of unlimited emergency.

Lt. Col. Radke: SS Div. Reich will go to the southeastern theater by motorized movements across Germany. \*

Fieldpost censorship must be instituted because military matters are being discussed in letters.

Civilian morale in the ZI bad : a) in Party circles: Hess case; shortcomings of Party leaders; lawlessness (religious orders).\*\* b) General population: Religious question. -- Relations with Russia. -- Failure to strike blow against England.

Current business.

Gen. Stumme (XXXX Corps) calls en route. -- Col. Buelowius reports out (Co. of Regt.).

Schwatlo-Gesterding: Propaganda questions. -- Press. -- Entertainment films and documentaries.

Heusinger - Bork: Repercussions of "Merkur" on "Barbarossa": 2 mixed and 4 light AA Bns. unavailable because of Crete.

The 2 mixed Bns. belong to Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. Must be in Saloniki for shipment by 8 June, to be in time for "Barbarossa." Need no rehabilitation.

The 4 light Bns. went to:

|                    |                 |
|--------------------|-----------------|
| Seventh Armd. Div. |                 |
| Nineteenth "       | "               |
| Second "           | " (lost at sea) |
| Fifth "            | " (Crete).      |

These Divs. are GHq Reserve and therefore not required for the jump-off. Probably there won't be any chance to get them replaced.

VIII Air Corps must leave Rumania on 7 June, in order to reach Suwalki by 20 June.

Lt. Col. Stieff: Observations made on tour in Greece: Hq Twelfth Army -- Crete Development slower than anticipated by Air Force. Air Force was quite off in assessment of enemy: they expected the British to bolt.

British are in undisputed command of the sea. We are in equally undisputed command of the air.

Mistakes of tactical planning: Troops were set down, in three equal forces, in three places. Lack of reconnaissance of the landing area (olive groves). Landing of planes very difficult (olive groves, mountains).

Sailing of first sea-borne echelon was timed too late, to begin with, and then postponed once. This robbed us of the element of surprise.

Critical stage was over on 25 May. Gen. Ringel has situation under control. Most urgently needed: heavy weapons.

British were expecting airborne landing since 26 April and made effective preparations for defense, especially against parachute attacks. This explains our very heavy losses. Combat strength of Seventh Air Div. down to  $3\frac{1}{2}$  Bns., from 9 Bns. Assault Regt. lost 50 officers and 1000 men, killed.

Transport considerably depleted. Out of 600 transport planes, 170 unserviceable, mostly total loss.

Losses in Convoy 1 were 500 out of 2,300 (Fifth Mt.Div., light AAA).

Hq Twelfth Army ventures no estimate of the duration of fighting, as that largely depends on what the British are going to do. During night of 24/25 May, they brought five freighters to Suda, and two freighters to Iraklion; it is not known whether with reinforcements or supplies, or for evacuation.

Twelfth Army thinks it will be necessary to keep elements of Fifth Armd.Div. in Athens for time being. Atmosphere in the city critical. The Italians are not doing anything about it, nor have they started any arrangements for looking after the country. \*

Also says it must keep six GHq Bridge Clms in Greece (for Crete). Wants to leave 164th Div. in Saloniki, Sixth Mt. Div. in Athens, and Fifth Mt.Div. in Crete.

In order to hold Crete against any British attacks, it is essential to secure domination of the Aegean from the air.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Africa. Logistical planning for future operations. Offensive by middle of October (?).
- b) Greece: Ideas on future administration of the Saloniki district, which is to remain under military occupation.
- c) Gas warfare.
- d) Needs of 22nd Div.

General Ott:

- a) Report on his activities as CG XXX Corps in Greek Thrace. Personnel difficulties in 50th Div.
- b) Questions of organization: Infantry can get improvised equipment for hill country operations, i.e. 250 pack saddles per Regt. This works only for minor operations of short duration. For major operations they would be lacking Mt. Artillery.

He wants more smoke ammunition issued to troops. That is a question of long-range planning by supply organization, not one of changing basic issues.

von Bernuth -- Buerker: Findings on return from inspection of the new mot. units, activated the last. They will just make the jump-off (as Org.Sec. reported). Inspection of Security Division gave gratifying impression. Command has the right idea about their mission. Mobile.

Use of radio direction beams for night ground operations in Africa (840 sets ordered for delivery next fall).

29 May 1941.

Situation conference: Crete: Suda Bay cleared. --- First tanks landed at Kastelli. --- Iraklion airfield not yet mopped up.

Rintelen reports: Italian Eleventh Army has 12 Divs. ready for occupation of Greece, of which 1 Div., for Attica, and 1 Div., for Peloponnese are available at once. Italian crack Guard Regt. is also assigned to the Peloponnese.

British attack on Sfax. British air attack on convoy.

Syria: Hansen reports: France is changing her plans from defense of the Lebanon Mountains to defense of the southern border, i.e. defense of the whole of Syria. Strength of French forces: 50,000, mostly colored troops, 40 fighter planes from the homeland, 3 destroyers, 3 submarines. British: 50,000 in Palestine and Trans-Jordan. British are anxious about Cyprus.

Irak: According to Hansen's report, situation not unfavorable, but no decisive turn for the better yet. Lack of fuel.

Keitel (Personnel Div.): Officer reserve small. --- Problem of the officers of the 100,000 men Army, who feel slighted. (As a matter of fact, their promotions have not been slowed by the influx of E-officers.) \* Reactivation of E-officers. --- Problem of decorations. --- Members of former ruling houses in the Armed Forces. --- Officers reserve pools will be set up directly in AGp. Rear Areas.

Gol. Ochsner: Safety regulations for Hv. Rocket Projectors. --- Radio direction beam (170 transmitters, 800 receivers); training required. --- Use of poison gas in "Barbarossa".

Gen. Wagner: Railroad tractors (three for each Army and Armd. Gp.)\*--- Tank spare part depots, 400 tons are carried by AGps. for each Armd.Gp. In addition a depot for parts in short supply near Magdeburg (parts will be flown to the front). --- Field Hospitals must become GHq troops.



Conference with ObdH: North Africa (Cause assignment settled).—  
Greece (C in C Balkans). — Meeting of Cs of S, 4 and 5 June.

Calls: Col. Gause, appointed "Liaison Officer at Italian High  
Command Libya". — Kinzel, prior to taking off for Finland.

30 May 1941.

Morning conference: In Crete, things are now starting to run smoothly. The British are trying to make a getaway from the south coast. The Greeks are offering capitulation. The Italian have landed in the eastern part of the Island. Large take of prisoners and materiel, including a satisfying number of guns.

22nd Div. will revert to Ground Forces after all. Ruling of the Fuehrer.

Irak: Owing to deficient preparation and the impossibility of sending effective support, the Irak show, which is more in the nature of a political uprising than a conscious fight for liberation, must eventually peter out. Whatever the outcome, however, it did force the British to spread themselves critically thin, both during the Crete operation, and at a time when our situation in North Africa was rather precarious.

Transport movements for build-up are proceeding in gratifying manner.

Fuehrer's decision that 22 June date will stand.

- Buhle:
- a) Jurisdiction of Army Mission Romania. — Official instructions.
  - b) Conversion of med. Arty. Bns. in most Armd. Divs. to mixed Bns.
  - c) Current business: Jurisdiction of List. — Field Hospitals as GHq troops, etc.

OQu IV: Current matters.

- Heusinger:
- a) 20 SS-ferries are going to be assembled in Gdynia starting 15 June.
  - b) "Haifisch" and "Harpune". \*
  - c) Proposals by AGp. North and Center on disposition for jump-off.
  - d) Current details.

von Ziehlberg: Current personnel matters. — Reassignments. — Decorations.

31 May 1941.

Morning conference:

- a) Strike in Belgium. -- Local food strikes continue.
- b) Sinking of ship in Piraeus harbor, allegedly due to spontaneous combustion.
- c) Fifth Armd. Div. (less one Armd.Bn., 1 Motorcycle Rifle Bn., 13th Rifle Regt.) will start movement on 7 June.
- d) Ban on reconnaissance flights along the Eastern frontier lifted.
- e) Situation in Irak is taking a progressively bad turn. Any decisive military help by us is out of question. But this does not mean, the end of trouble for the British in that corner of the world, even if they return the old government to Baghdad.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) with Col. Baentsch:

- a) Supply preparations for AGp. North. Result of Baentsch's tour in the East.
- b) C in C Balkans and administrative problems in Greece.

Gen. Bogatsch (with Gen. Buhle): Motor-transport in Air Reconnaissance units very difficult. Try to remedy situation by taking some away from ground troops.

Col. Speth (C of S LIV Corps) reports completion of his mission in Italy and assumption of new post.

Heusinger: After talk with OKW: 22nd Div. now under exclusive OKH control. Holland gets one Div. out of our Northeast line.

Report to OKW in reply to their inquiry concerning North Africa.

Evening at Kopp's in Belitz.

1 June and 2 June 1941. (Whitsun)

Whitsun. Work in Berlin. On Whitmonday, visit the Koppes in Belitz, with Gerti.

3 June 1941.

During the morning, visitors:

Ht. Col. Doerr reports as new C of S LII Corps Hq. Major Abelein, to express his thanks. Lt. Col. von dem Borne, C of S, Africa Corps; comprehensive discussion of situation and divergent views.

OQu IV: a) General political situation all over the world.

b) Joint action by Axis Powers on Roosevelt's speech.

c) Turkey: Since we are no longer interested in arms transit to Irak, it will probably be possible to conclude a non-aggression pact and a guarantee treaty.

d) Greece: Pro-German public sentiment is cooling. Reasons: Arrival of Bulgarians and Italians; alleged harshness of German occupation troops; food problem. British agents.

e) Ireland: German bombs on Dublin.

f) Russia: Stalin had a conversation with the Finnish envoy, stressing good relations. Offers 20,000 tons of grain.

g) Italy: After Starace, Sebastiani, Mussolini's party secretary for many years, has been fired also.

Op.Sec.: a) 22nd Div. now under our control. — Fuehrer will soon have conference with Antonescu.

b) 719th Div. from Northeast line to Holland; 710th Div. to Norway.

c) Coastal Artillery: 3 Bns. for Eleventh Army (Black Sea Coast). Initial location at Galatz. 3 Bns. in East Prussia prepared for Russian Baltic ports (will go by sea). Coastal artillery for Murmansk and Archangelsk.

d) Captured enemy tanks: Six Platoons are leaving for Serbia. Six Platoons for Crete are in Saloniki.

e) Syria: Fuehrer order: Stop troops alerted for shipment. Commission will stand by.

f) Greece: Peloponnese will be occupied immediately by the Italians; Thessaly on 8 June, Attica and Euboea on 12 June.

Gen. Jakob: a) Industrial plants may now be built in the Rhine defense zone near Kehl.

b) Distribution of Sybel and SS-ferries.

c) Construction Bns. for Navy.

4 June 1941.

Meeting with Army and AGp. Cs of S:

Morning: Eastern questions with Eastern Cs of S: Only noteworthy items: Teamwork of Inf. and Armor at jump-off; Artillery preparation.

Afternoon: General questions with all Chiefs.

Evening: Social at the Gen Qu Officers' Club.

Strike: Lille, 80% of the French coal mines.

5 June 1941.

Lille strike situation unchanged. Very inconvenient now !

Morning: Conference with the Western Cs of S. On the whole, we go over old ground. It would probably be a good idea to establish once for all the number of "ideal" vehicles that would be needed in the "ideal" situation". \*

Gen. Fellgiebel: Current matters: Assignment of radio bands Decimeter circuits in the East. -- Demands of CG of Railway Troops. -- Italian radio traffic can be intercepted. -- Direction beam equipment. -- Signal communication lines running through Sweden. \*\*

Talk with ObdH: Visit of King Boris of Bulgaria. -- ObdH's talk with Rosenberg. -- New Balkans set-up; Hq List. Fuehrer is afraid the British might emulate on the Channel Islands our airborne landing in Crete. -- Russians (Romania).

Wagner, Gen Qu:

- a) Rosenberg and territorial divisions in the East.
- b) Air transport: Out of 500 transport planes used for Crete 250 cracked up (130 total loss). Two Transport Groups will be deactivated. Twelve groups of 40 planes each, totalling 480, will remain. Of these, 8 groups of 40 each, totalling 320, are allocated to "Barbarossa". Available for troop and supply shipments (distributed among Air Fleets). Another 42 planes might come in from production.
- c) Effective 1 June, the Air Force will get no more automotive tires from Army.

6 June 1941.

Morning conference:

East: Increasing Russian air activity.

North Africa: British again getting frisky, especially opposite Bengasi; aircraft carrier reported en route.

Navy: In sea battle resulting in the loss of the SS "Bismarck", the ship was under simultaneous attack by 50 torpedo planes, 12 of which were shot down (great work!). It appears likely that acoustic torpedoes were used. British apparently have a radar instrument with 35 km range (ours has only 20 km).

Navy: SS Prinz Eugen ready to go to sea in 8 days. SS Luetzow will carry out feints from Norway. SS Scharnhorst now completed, will probably leave for the Atlantic through the Channel, under cover of diversionary maneuvers. \* SS Hipper will be ready in July, SS Gneisenau in October. Tirpitz now on shakedown cruise, will enter service in August.

Romania: Increasing Russian movements along the border. -- Communist propaganda.

Hoelter: Liaison Staff North, reports. Briefing on cooperation with Finns.

Kralle: Formerly Attaché in Hungary, calls before leaving for Madrid.

Conference with Col. General Guderian:

Armor has its main task not at the jump-off, but finds it in exploitation of the breakthrough. All strength must be conserved for the tasks that follow. At jump-off, maximum advantage must therefore be taken of Inf. support. 267th and 293rd Inf. Divs. must be placed under control of Armd. Group 2. They will be committed not as Divs. but rather as regimental teams without trains, under the command of Armd. Divs. An order to this end will be issued by the OKH at once.

Maj. Gen. Buhle:

- a) Tank repair centers for period after conclusion of "Barbarossa." We have one for German tanks (Warsaw or perhaps also Mil. District VIII) and one for Czech tanks. Setting up repair centers for other Divs. which must be taken out of the front, would require 10 days, but that is about the time it takes for a Div. to be shipped back.
- b) New Balkans set-up. New directive (Nr.31) and supplement on political function. \*\*

- c) Reorganization of the Army after fall, 1941.
- d) Army set-up Bulgaria.
- e) Questions relating to Army officials.\*
- f) 22nd Div.; special equipment for airborne operations will remain under guard in Romania for time being.
- g) AAA situation improved. All that is lacking now are some prime movers and truck columns.
- h) Table of Organization authorized for Commandant of British Channel Islands.
- i) 16th MG Bn. becomes static on the Channel Islands.
- k) Rest leaves in North Africa.

Heusinger - Stieff Ruling scale of maps for daily reports in "Barbarossa."

Dankwerts: Report on strike situation at Lille: Obviously politically inspired by Britain, De Gaulle movement and America (money). But the basic reason probably is the food situation, for which the German Ministry of Economics, more than anyone else, is to blame.

Measures taken by Military Government sound and energetic, without need to resort to arms. The main thing is to get the food situation ironed out promptly. Local Government agencies, police and employers are cooperating with us. The peak seems to have been reached, and the strike movement may be expected to fold up in about 8 days.

Heusinger:

- a) All AA Bns. have been recalled from Greek theater.
- b) GHq AA Bns. will be fully motorized.
- c) Mine Clearing Bn. already on way to AGp. Center. Will be employed as a unit under Hoth.
- d) Styria, etc., keep the old borders with Croatia.
- e) Latest estimates show that all troops in Naples will be transferred to North Africa in June, leaving only one Coastal Arty. Btry., one Field Hospital, etc. Six convoys with four Italian and one German ships, each.
- f) Hungary: Requires 12 days to complete assembly of troops. Our intentions will not be divulged before middle of June. Hence, an Hungarian attack cannot come off before B plus 5 \*\* or B plus 6; provided, that is, that they mean to be in on it. Our preparations then have to be this: Fourth Mt. Div. and 125th Inf. Div. will be moved as GHq. Reserves to AGp. South; 294th Div. which will be ready to ship out by 18 June, can be sent to Presov\*\*\*,

where it would be unloaded, beginning 20 June, to constitute the link between Romania\* and Hungary; again provided that Hungary is serious about joining the attack. If not, the Div. will be moved behind AGp. Center, as GHq reserve.

Kinzel: Reports back from his visit to the Finnish Gen.Staff.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen.Staff personnel matters.

7 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) At Solum, the British seem to be building up a new concentration. Something seems to be up also in the direction of Sidi Suleiman.
- b) We shall not approach Slovakia before middle of June (same as Hungary).
- c) Maximum railroad schedule on net west of Elbe river will be cancelled effective 16 June, 0000 hours. Likewise in occupied territory.
- d) 150,000 Croat workers will come to Germany (for war industries).
- e) Gen Qu reports supplementary requisitions for 190 trains for period between 17 and 23 June. That again !

Inspection of CP motor caravan ( organized by Central Branch ).  
30 office vans.

Lt.Col. Sperl, C of S L Corps calls. Reports on experiences in Serbia.

Col. Ochsner: Employment of smoke in Africa. (British are using phosphorus...).. Ammunition issued for "Barbarossa".

Col. Kinzel, Heusinger, Hoelter: Kinzel's report on tour to Finland. Conversations with Heinrichs. The Finnish High Command has squared their plans with ours, and seems to be going at it with every ounce of energy.

V Corps (Fins) , with two Divs., is assigned to the Kandalaksha operation.

Aaland will be handled by one Inf.Reg., which is not needed elsewhere.

For Hangoe they have set out one Div.

Assembly of troops:

|   |              |
|---|--------------|
| On border facing Leningrad                            | 4 Divs.      |
| North of Lake Ladoga                                  | 2 Divs.      |
| In central sector                                     | 5 to 6 Divs. |
| (Operational group for offensive east of Lake Ladoga) |              |

|                    |        |
|--------------------|--------|
| Reserves: Helsinki | 1 Div. |
| Turku              | 1 Div. |

(Would be available for follow-up.)

Time requirements: Mobilization and assembly, 12 days, including five days' warning on contemplated direction of attack.

The following target days have been fixed:

10 June: Call-up of Border Guard and third Bns. of Army units.

15 June: Mobilization of V Corps.

20 June: Ready to cross over to Aaland and attack Hangoe.

Full mobilization only after we open hostilities. They can start operations when we have crossed the Dvina.

Finnish Gen.Staff urges attack east of Lake Ladoga.

Col. Baentsch: Report on inspection at AGp. South. Assignment of MT Regt., disposition and employment in AGp. South. Points for briefing of QM Hqs in impending tasks.

Keitel OKW (on phone):

- a) Crete cannot be made an exclusive Air Force domain. Question of Executive Power.
- b) In Finland, Army Hq Norway can only look after its own, and cannot take care also of the southeastern operation.\* An assignment for Erfurth.
- c) Fuehrer's talk with von dem Borne on North Africa. Tactical details.
- d) Keitel's talk with Cavallero. Italy's plans for shipping troops to Africa are reaching too high. What the theater needs are not large masses of troops, but small contingents of crack troops with the best of equipment. Africa is a problem of logistics and equipment, not of mass concentrations.

Importance of protecting unloading operations in Benghazi (coastal artillery, escort planes, fighters, AAA).

Increase in Africa Corps' artillery fire power. -- Safeguarding of coastal shipping lane and cutting of British supplies to Tobruk.

General Bogatsch:

- a) Presents Rowehl's latest reconnaissance photos. Some gaps left around Kovno.



- b) Timing of long-range reconnaissance. Staffeln must be held back at first; probably will not start operations before second day, in AGP. Center.

von Bernuth (with von Ziehlberg):

- a) Relationship of "Staff School" to War Academy entrance examination in peacetime. Gen.Staff must insist on the special preparation and administrating of the Academy examinations. Selection of future Gen. Staff Officers must remain in our hands. The scores given by Staff School naturally will have to be given due consideration. On the other hand, the graduates' rating sheets will have to incorporate criteria which can serve as basis for the selection of War Academy candidates.
- b) Academy courses starting next fall. Hard to tell as yet whether emphasis will be put on training of young Staff Officer Candidates, or on refresher training of World War I Gen.Staff Officers. The latter courses will be necessary in any event.
- c) Motion pictures. Assignment of Motion Picture units. Developments in color films.
- d) Defense measures against flame throwers.

Evening at Kopp's in Belitz.

8 June 1941. (Sunday).

British invade  
invade Syria.

Berlin. — Leyherr comes for a visit. — Color pictures taken.

9 June 1941.

By air to front. Warsaw (von Hobe\*), Biala, Brest-Litovsk and Tilsit. Return via Frisches Haff — Danzig — Gdynia.

Conferences with Cs of S XII Corps (von Waldenburg) and XXXXVII Corps (Bamler), and the Div. Gen.Staff Officers. All know their jobs and are in high spirits. Preparations for 22 June completed.

The imposing vastness of the spaces, in which our troops are now assembling, cannot fail but strike a deep impression. By its very nature it puts an end to the doctrine of "Tuchfuehlung" \*\*. The Division as a self-contained operational unit becomes a dominant factor. All the work of decades \*\*\*, which was undertaken to train the Div. Commanders for independent leadership, must pay dividends here. Artillery support at

the jump-off will not be spectacularly strong, but must do. Engineer work and signal communications seem to be well prepared.

10 June 1941.

Situation conference:

North Africa: The British have finished regrouping their forces at Solum; not yet clear whether for defensive or offensive operations. (Radio intelligence has located one more Div. Hq and one more Regt.)

Crete: Command set-up still unsettled. On top of all the combat missions which Air Force must carry through from its Crete base, they insist on having administrative control. (On his own authority, the CG of XI Air Corps has styled himself "Governor".)

Balkans: Transfer of GHq troops from Saloniki to Eleventh Army is slow. Russians report presence of seven German Divs. in Moldavia.

Syria: Minor advances of British. The French view the situation optimistically.

Turkey: Conclusion of pact likely.

Croatia: Reported to be about to join Tripartite Pact (15 June, in Italy).

Heusinger:

- 1.1.) Finland: Reinforcement of Border Guard between 103-1130. June. Mobilization: Troops allocated to Hangoe and Aaland operations, 12 - 20 June. -- V Corps (Northern Group), 15 to 25 June. -- Bulk of Army, 16 to 28 June.
- 2.) 710th Div. (second occupation Div. for Norway) will be shipped between 14 and 17 June.
- 3.) "Haifisch II" \* cannot be carried out in the form planned by High Command West, because Navy has not got the required shipping available for immediate tasks.
- 4.) Crete-Greece: Foolish plans of OKW in Crete, for which they want 4 Regts. Put up strong opposition! Also, we must get out again one of the Mt. Divs. tied up in Greece.

Major Hansen reports on his tour in Turkey, Syria and Irak:

Turkey: Popular sentiment on the whole is favoring us. The Turks went over to England because they were afraid of the Italians. Realizing now, that their fears are unfounded, they would like to come around, but must wait a while for

the public to get used to this change of front. The Turks have no political claims for the future.

Irak: Impotent as a military factor. Internal situation chaotic. British forces in that theater will remain tied up for some time to come.

Syria: Dentz apparently a good soldier and determined to resist. Popular sentiment in the southern part of the country anti-British, in the North it seems to be partly pro-De Gaulle. Forces available in the South against British: 20 Rifle and 6 Arty. Bns.; ought to be enough.

OQu IV:

- a) Preparations for intelligence service in "Barbarossa". All intelligence sources must be cleared through Ic officers.
- b) Preparation for intelligence service in future operations in Eastern Mediterranean.
- c) France: Exploit channels for exchange of information on Britain.
- d) Exchange of cables Boetticher/Foreign Office.
- e) Conversation Fuehrer - Duce. Apparently an exchange of general ideas, without binding commitments. (Switzerland disgusting.)

Radire:

- a) Propaganda organization for "Barbarossa".
- b) New enemy campaign for undermining German morale by personal attacks on high army leaders on the radio (slurs on von Bock).
- c) Memorial Cemeteries and Soldiers' Monuments in France.
- d) Current matters.

11 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Delay in transfer of units from Army Hq 12 to Army Hq 11 affects: 2 med.Arty. Bns., 2 Eng.Bns. Arrival by 22 June now is doubtful.
- b) Eastern front all set. Build-up proceeds according to plan.
- c) Troop shipments running on schedule. Railroad accidents in the ZI will not affect them appreciably.

d) Strike in Belgium has collapsed.

CQu I:

a) Deception measures in West and East. No suspension of mail services in West now. Measures must be stepped up during July and possibly August. \*

b) Operations on the periphery of "Barbarossa" theater.--- Preparations.

Gen. Erfurth reports as C of S Liaison Hq North. Briefing on operational and personnel questions.

Adm. Schuster (Admiral Balkans) reports on Crete and Aegean, and inquires about "Barbarossa" (southern wing).

Luncheon with Gen. Ott, Gen. Paulus.

Gen. Wagner: Report on trip to Rome. Favorable impression of Italy and of Rintelen's work. The talks in Rome strongly indicate that build-up of stores may become possible during June. In terms of present strength of Africa Corps, the over-all supply picture is as follows:

| On hand  | Ship in June |
|--|--------------|
| Ammunition: 4 issues (1 with troops)                       | 5            |
| Fuel: $6\frac{1}{2}$ consumption quotas (bulk with troops) | 50           |
| Rations: 15 daily allowances (mostly Benghazi)             | 20-30        |

Required shipping space 44,000 tons.

These transport requirements, plus what the Italians need, can be supplied only by putting 20,000 tons to work on the French route Toulon -- Bizerte and then Gabès -- Zarzise -- Tripoli. Of course, this means reloading at several points.

Efficient operation can be assured only by establishing in Rome an agency equipped with sweeping powers, to route required supplies through France, Naples -- Tripoli, Naples -- Benghazi, or Taranto -- Peloponnese -- Benghazi, according as shipping and naval and air escort become available. Such a powerful agency does not exist as yet. Aerial and coastal protection necessary to insure safe operation of the routes must be furnished by Air Force and Army.

12 June 1941.

Situation conference:

North Africa: Minor changes in enemy dispositions, furnishing no clues to offensive intentions. Still, an attack need not be ruled out. It may well develop in the coming month.

bright nights.

Fifth Lt. Div., having now been taken out of line, is held in readiness for counterattacking southeast of Tobruk. Will work together with elements of Fifteenth Div., which were also withdrawn.

Syria: Local British advances, mainly along coast; in this sector, Dentz has no means for striking back.

Turkey: Will not intervene in Syria. It looks to them that Dentz has little chance to hold out long. Britain has not todate approached Turkey to take positive action in the fighting in Syria.

22nd Div., with Arty. and trains will arrive in operational area between 20 and 25 June.

Gen. Konrad: Reports back after illness. -- Dietl's wishes concerning Air Force support for "Silberfuchs" -- Uniformity in procedure for enemy reports in Air Force and Army. -- Exchange of information between the two Branches of the Armed Services and its organization. -- Exchange of maps. -- North-African supply problem and what Air Force can do for it.

- Gercke:
- a) Personnel questions: Recommendation for promotion of Bork and Ludwiger.
  - b) Railroad operation. Allocation of cars for industry and coal distribution satisfactory in spite of maximum railroad schedule.
  - c) Motor trucks for operations on RR tracks: Available 174. Can pull 3 trucks, with through-brakes.
  - d) Construction of bridge near Edirne makes no headway, because Turks want their own contractors to do the work. We are interested in having the work done quickly, for we may need that railroad line next fall.
  - e) Organizational questions: "Inspectorate of Railway Troops" is necessary also in wartime. Some Brigade Hqs required for control of these troops.

Inspection of CP motor caravan: One van for ObdH, one van for Gen.Staff.

Fellgiebel reports on his tour in the East: Suggestions:

- a) Dummy movements in Hungary and Romania, in coordination with AGp. South.
- b) Hqs must be instructed on proper radio procedure for traffic between rear and forward CPs.

Gen Qu:

- a) Organizational set-up of "Armed Forces Commander Southeast".\* -- Relationship between Military Commander "Serbia" and "German General Bulgaria". Take Army Hq 2 out of theater.

- b) Organization of supply services for Africa. Transport dictator.
- c) Road-rail automobile and rail prime movers.
- d) Issue no more orders involving basic changes prior to "Barbarossa".

Op. Sec.:

- a) Briefing of Corps Hqs of GHq reserves. Reception Hqs; assembly and transfer to front. \*
- b) Improve defense preparedness of Channel Islands.
- c) Ninth Armd.Div. has difficulties getting equipment together. Second Armd.Div. will help out, but as a result will complete own outfitting later than scheduled.

13 June 1941.

Situation conference:

Tobruk: Solum unchanged. Pavia Div.\*\* has taken over southern front at Tobruk. Fifth Lt. Div. taken out of line.

Romania: Readyng of ships for Bessarabia. Dismantling of tracks on railroad bridge.\*\*\* Radio communication with Navy. \*#

East: Movements on schedule.

Syria: French reports sound somewhat better now; apparently British advance along the coast and south of Damascus has been checked.

General Bogatsch:

- a) Missions for close-range reconnaissance Staffeln. I won't let him use also the OKH Staffeln at the start; their turn comes later.
- b) Allocation of AAA to Armies.

OQu IV (at first with Mellenthin): Position of Attachés in relation to the "German Generals" (in Bulgaria etc.,) Military Missions etc. Intelligence Center under Rohde in Middle East.

Col. Ziegler: (C of S XXXXII Corps) drops in while here for briefing of Corps Hqs of the GHq Reserves.

General Thomas (Armament Economy Office): Fuel reserves will be exhausted in fall. Aviation gasoline will be down to one-half, regular gasoline to one-quarter, and Diesel and fuel-

oil to one-half of requirements.  
Cooperation with Armament Economy Office.

Political questions: Operational plans cannot be tailored to suit economic planners.

OQu I: Dissension regarding relocation of replacement units in the West are settled between Army Hq 1 and BdE.

von dem Borne, Heggenreiner \* and Rommel are ganging up on Gause in his new post.

Gen Qu: C in C Balkans; legal and administrative tasks.

Buhle: a) Report on Eastern tour. Divs. on the whole in better shape than last spring. Very satisfactory over-all impression.

b) Repair facilities for Armd. troops. How much static and mobile?

c) Special Bn. Irak — To be formed with volunteers. \*\*

Conference with ObdH after his return from the East:

a) Over-all impression satisfying. Troops in good shape. Operational planning generally well thought through. Open questions: Timing of attack. Some of the Corps want dawn instead of 0330.

What to do in the event that enemy attacks before we strike. Proclamation to troops on attack on Russia. Must set forth reasons! \*\*\*

b) Review of the situation created on the Balkans by the new OKW order (with Gen Qu present).

c) Review of general situation.

Heusinger: Report on Eastern tour with ObdH. His impressions parallel those of ObdH.

Gen. Paulus: a) How to overcome the difficulties confronting the mission of Gause's Staff in Gariboldi's Hq.

b) Shift of replacement units of BdE to France.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

a) Dummy Radio traffic in Hungarian territory prior to "Barbarossa". Consultation with the Hungarians on 18 June.

b) Radio communications during shifts of CPs.

14 June 1941. (General conference in  
Fuehrer's Office).

Reports on "Barbarossa" by the GPs Army Gps., Armies and Armd.  
Groups.

1100 : Falkenhorst together with Stumpff (Air Force) report  
on "Silberfuchs". Northern Group, B plus 7; Southern Group,  
plus 9.

1300 - 1400. : Report of CGs. Armies and Armd. Gp. of AGp.  
South. The question of control of Romanian Army is clar-  
ified. Up to the start of offensive operations, Antonescu  
will formally exercise supreme control in Romania. Army  
Hq 11 will be attached to him as his "working staff", and  
thus will be in actual control, but orders to the Romanian  
troops must be issued through Antonescu. -- In this set-up  
the "Army Mission" will act as liaison staff between Army  
Hq 11 and Antonescu. Hungary will not be taken into  
confidence, but merely advised that Hungarian defense  
measures must take into consideration the mounting strength  
of Russian forces on her border.

Slovakia will not be informed for the time being. On start  
of hostilities, their Army Command will be requested to get  
their troops ready to move, in order to be able to repel a  
Russian advance into Slovak territory. (Employment  
desirable on the Russian border south of Seventeenth Army.)

After luncheon, the Fuehrer delivers a lengthy political  
address, in which he explains the reasons for his intention  
to attack Russia and evolves his calculation that Russia's  
collapse would induce England to give in.

1630 - 1830 : Report on measures in the Baltic (Adm.  
Schmundt), afterwards AGp. North and Center.

Prolonged debate on the dangers which threaten GHq \* from  
the Bialystok salient. Minefields !\*\*

It has now been decided to advance Zero Hour from 0330. to  
0300.

15 June 1941. (Sunday, Berlin).

Farewell visit to Gerti. -- Visit to Farbfilm-Foto\*\*\* to take a  
look at the color photo taken at home. -- Visit by Koppen-  
berg. #



16 June 1941.

Situation report:

- a) Superior British forces, striking far to the south and southwest, have been attacking Solum since Sunday morning. British throw in 150 - 200 tanks. Enemy has air superiority. 60 tanks knocked out, also 11 airplanes. Tank battle southwest of Capuzzo. All attacks have been repelled. British are transferring airplanes to the Eastern Mediterranean. Intensified British submarine activity in the Mediterranean (embracing Aegean).
- b) Operations area of Russian Navy. Russian patrol activity at Hangoe and on the western end of the Gulf of Finland.
- c) U.S. Navy shifts its main concentration to the Atlantic.

Jakob:

- a) Turun-Magurele bridge dismantled (11 June), will be moved to Cernavoda\* and replaced by large ferry.
- b) Sybel ferries have arrived at Cernavoda. Constanza: 23 ferries under construction (number to be increased to 47). Will not be ready before 25 June.
- c) Mine detectors for Eleventh Army.

Conference with Field Marshal List in ObdH's office regarding appointment of "Armed Forces Commander Southeast".

- Buhle:
- a) Reinforcement of Channel Island defenses: 3 22 cm Btrys., 3 15 cm gun Btrys., 6 siege gun 18 Btrys.
  - b) Assault guns and Tank IV. Use of assault guns as substitutes for lacking tanks IV.
  - c) Question of furloughs in Africa. 2% of furloughs in ZI, 3% in African rest centers. Replace married personnel.\*\*
  - d) Replacement situation: By 1 October Replacement Army will be 450,000 strong. Anticipated normal attrition losses (sickness, discharge for unfitness, etc.) 150,000. This leaves 300,000 plus 70,000 in Field Replacement Bns., a total of 370,000, as replacements for battle losses in "Barbarossa".
  - e) Current business. Also expression of views on organization program of Railway Engineers.

Briefing of Liaison Officers at Army Gp., Army and Armd. Gp. Hqs.

Afterwards Heusinger for current business; current matters turned over to Paulus.

Buhle: Get ready 900th Brigade. Will be committed around

Ostrolenka, under tactical control of AGp. B, to guard against any Russian breakout attempt from the Bialystok salient; otherwise GHq Reserve.

17 June 1941.

By plane to Wiener Neustadt -- Belgrade -- Bucharest (conference with Army Mission and Attaché) -- Constanza -- Danube Delta -- Bacau (Moldavia) and to Hq Eleventh Army.

18 June 1941.

Tour by plane and car along northern and eastern border of Romania. Defense positions. In the evening conference in Eleventh Army Hq. At dinner I meet the Romanian War Minister.

19 June 1941.

Rain during the night causes severe floods which complicate ride to Bacau airfield in the morning. Take-off delayed. Flight above clouds (4,000 m) to Budapest, where we are received by Gen. Werth; luncheon and conference. -- By air to Bratislava (conference with Gen. Ott and Military Attaché Becker). -- Return flight to Rangsdorf.

20 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) North Africa: Defensive success at Solum. Two enemy tank brigades at least badly crippled (200 tanks). X Air Corps transfers the following new units to Africa: 1 long-range fighter Staffel, and 2 divebomber Staffeln.
- b) East: Assembly of troops proceeding according to plan. Weather favorable. Rivers partly below normal.
- c) Replacement units in Mil. Districts II and III go to XX and XXI on 23 June, from Protectorate to Mil. District I \* on 15 July.
- d) Molotov wanted to see the Fuehrer on 18 June.

Heusinger:

- a) Fuehrer concerned about area west of Augustow,\* and about Romania. Augustow: Use SS and 900th Brigade.  
Romania: Parts of 5th Armd. Div. are to be sent over (Fuehrer's wish). Actually only components available are: two-thirds of 13th Rifle Regt. and 2nd Bn./31st Armd. Regt. Movement from Athens to Romania will take 8 - 9 days. For now they can go to Saloniki (2-3 days).
- b) East: Squabble between AGps. North and Center about jump-off time. Protection of Vistula bridges (AAA). SS Adolf Hitler will not be ready in time. Tracked components leave on 22 June, others not before 25 June.
- c) Romania: New Command set-up. Hq of Romanian Third Army steps down.\*\*
- d) 46th and 294th Divs. in Belgrade area ready to be shipped. Move 294th Div. to Saxony.
- e) AGp. South wants 4th Mt. Div. No! May follow up as GHq Reserve behind Seventeenth Army in its drive on Jaroslav.

Gen. Oehquist: Wishes of the Finnish C in C.

- 1.) Want to receive request of German High Command to start Ladoga operation at latest possible date.
- 2.) Operation east of Lake Ladoga is the one they want.
- 3.) Seven days' alert notice for start of operation (five days only in an emergency). Something new!
- 4.) Finnish High Command wants to have V Corps freed as soon as possible for operation Ladoga. Other items of information:
  - a) Difficult food situation.
  - b) Mobilization starts on 18 June. Completed 28 June.

Gen. Bogatsch: AAA protection of Vistula bridges. First use troops available on the spot. Nothing must be taken from the weak AAA of Ground Forces, at least not in the first days.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Transfer of GHq. Current Gen. Staff questions.

Conference with ObdH on my travel impressions and on "Barbarossa". No important new viewpoints.

In the evening we receive the Fuehrer proclamation to the troops for "Barbarossa". A longwinded manifesto, surprisingly in a predominant political tenor.

Late in the evening von Ziehlberg still has some reports on personnel matters (Ia, VI Corps).

21 June 1941.

Situation conference:

- a) Codeword "Dortmund" \* has come through.
- b) Materiel position of SS Adolf Hitler has improved. Div. may yet get ready in time.
- c) Losses at Solum are on a reasonable scale: Total 560 men, with proportion of killed considerably lower than at Tobruk. Number of missing large, but that is probably inevitable in such desert battles.
- d) Hungary has effected certain improvements in her border defenses (AT guns).
- e) The SS destined as security force on border north of the Bialystok tip, will go to Arys.\*\*
- f) Syria: Situation not unfavorable. Attitude of French airmen is becoming increasingly pro-German.

Gen. Brand, Gen. Buhle:

- a) Artillery developments. Gen. Staff comments on development program of Chief of Armament.
- b) Brand reports on his inspection tour: Artillery assembly in the East.
- c) Ratio of combined German and Romanian artillery to Russian is as 2.2 : 2.9.

Gen. Buhle: a) Current organizational matters.

- b) Tank developments program next fall (Schell).
- c) Experiences gained in refitting Armd. units after the Southeast operation.

Gen. von Kirchheim:

- a) Experiences in North Africa. Suggests forming of Camel Transport columns (6,000 camels equal to two 30-ton truck columns).
- b) Disbanding of Colonial Staff.
- c) Personal impressions on relations between certain personalities in North Africa.
- d) Requirements for attack on Tobruk: 9 Rifle Bns., 3 Combat Eng. Bns. 30 Rocket Projectors Btrys.

Maj. Gen. Paulus: Reorganization of office routine after start of operation. (Written instructions for internal Gen. Staff service).

Gen. Matzky: a) Britain: 42 combat-fit Divs. and 7 newly activated Divs. in the homeland.

- b) Resources for moving British troops to Senegambia.
- c) Time required for shipping one British Div. by sea: 3 weeks (assembly, loading and unloading) plus voyage.
- d) Rhode team for collection of intelligence in the Middle East installed in Ankara.
- e) Individual Army officers on special missions will be subordinate to the Military Attaches.
- f) 25 Romanian highschool graduates will enter the German Army as officer candidates.

Wagner - Baentsch:

- a) Possibility of transport difficulties in the Lublin corner. If necessary, make adjustments in troop transport ports.
- b) Suspension of Fieldpost from the ZI to the Army between B plus 1 to B plus 5.
- c) Oversea Staff (an OKW creation which in that form comes too late and is ineptly organized).

Wagner alone:

- d) Conferences of Gen Qu in France: "Attila", "Haifisch", "Isabella".
- e) French political situation. (Intrigues by our political agencies make Darlan's position very difficult.)
- f) Test mobilization of "Resurrection columns" was a full success. \*

Heusinger:

- a) Thirteenth Rifle Regt. for Romania? (arrives Saloniki 25 June, could reach Romania 29 June) OKW's interest slackening.
- b) Il Duce offers for Eastern operation: One Corps Hq, 2 Cav. Divs., 1 mot. unit (to operate on the Balkans?),\*\*
- c) Slovakia: No political steps intended.
- d) Air Force (Waldau) reports that it is ready.
- e) ObdH would like to have 164th Div. in "Barbarossa". Now "marooned" on Greek islands. Will not arrive in time. Could be used in Anatolia operation. Will be offset by a Div. of Fifteenth Draft.

Enemy intelligence: Heightened Russian alertness reported in some places (manning of positions facing VIII Corps).

Finnish mobilization proclamations reported to have been posted.

Conference schedule in "Barbarossa":

In my office: 0900 and 2000.  
ObdH: about 1000 and 2100.  
Report to Fuehrer after conferences.

Balance of strength:

Germany ("Barbarossa" front):

102 Inf. Divs. (incl. 4 lt. and 2 Mt. Divs.)  
19 Armd. Divs.  
14 mot. Divs. (incl. 4 SS Divs.)  
5 Special Divs. (i.e., 3 Security Divs. and 2 Divs.  
Fifteenth Draft  
1 Cav. Div.

Total 141 Divs.

Russia (entire European Russia)

154 Inf. Divs.  
25 $\frac{1}{2}$  Cav. Divs.  
37 moto-mcz. Brigs.

Total 213 Divs. (rounded figure).

## THE CAMPAIGN IN RUSSIA .

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22 Juni 1941. (Sunday) 1st Day.

The morning reports: indicate that all Armies (except Eleventh) have started the offensive according to plan. Tactical surprise of the enemy has apparently been achieved along the entire line. All bridges across the Bug river, as on the entire river frontier, were undefended and are in our hands intact. That the enemy was taken by surprise is evident from the facts that troops were caught in their quarters, that planes on the airfields were covered up, and that enemy groups faced with the unexpected development at the front inquired at their Hqs in the rear what they should do. More effects of the surprise may be anticipated from the assaults of our Armor, which have been ordered in all sectors. The Navy reports that the enemy seems to have been taken by surprise also in their zone of action. His reactions to the measures of the last few days were of a purely passive nature, and he now is holding back his naval forces in ports, apparently in fear of mines.

Paulus communicates to me 1100. State Secretary von Weizsaecker's appraisal of the situation: Britain will at first feel relieved by the news of our attack on Russia and will rejoice at the "dispersal of our forces". But a rapid advance of German troops will soon bring disillusionment, for the defeat of Russia cannot but lead to a marked strengthening of our position in Europe.

As to Britain's readiness for an accord with us he has this to say: The propertied classes will strive for a settlement leaving us a free hand in the East, but it would involve renunciation of our claims to Holland and Belgium. If these tendencies are to prevail, Churchill has to be overthrown, as he relies on the support of the Labor Party, which is not interested in a peace concluded by the propertied classes. Such a peace would bring the propertied interests back into power, whereas the Labor Party wants power for itself. The Labor Party therefore will continue the war until the propertied class is entirely eliminated. Under what conditions it would eventually be willing to come to terms with Germany, cannot be predicted. Probably vehement opposition to National Socialism, by reason of strong Jewish influence and Communist connections. For the time being, in any case, the Labor Party will not be disposed to put an end to the war.

In the Far East, an attack by Japan on Britain appears unlikely. Both Japan and U.S. will endeavour to keep from being drawn into the war. It is in Germany's interest to keep both out of the conflict; otherwise the war, both in duration and resources would be entirely out of control, and the making of an eventual peace would be infinitely complicated.

Kinzel, Matzky:

- a) Russian operational mot. Reserve Group Pskov has been located south of the Dvina river(!), 300 km southwest of the area where it was originally believed to be.

That's just right for us!

- b) Identity of various Russian units confirmed. Russian radio signal: Staff Third Army wiped out, send long-range fighters.
- c) Situation in Syria is becoming critical. Damascus fallen, British mot. forces advancing on Palmyra from the east.

1200. Report that Russians have resumed international radio communications, which were interrupted this morning. They have asked Japan to act as intermediary in the political and economic relations between Russia and Germany, and are in constant radio contact with the German Foreign Office.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): reports on war situation at sea. Russians surprisingly passive.

1330. Op. Sec.:

- a) Air Force reports 800 enemy aircraft destroyed (First Air Fleet 100, Second Air Fleet 300, Fourth Air Fleet 400). Leningrad sea approaches mined without losses. Own losses so far 10 aircraft.
- b) AGp. Center reports wild flight on the Brest-Litovsk - Minsk road. Russian command organization in complete confusion.
- c) AGp. South reports that own patrols have crossed the Prut river between Galatz and Husi and Jassy without encountering any resistance. Bridges are in our hands.

Afternoon: Reports on advances especially north of Brest-Litovsk (Hoth) and of Armd. Gp. 4 (Hoepfner).

Italy declares herself to be in a state of war with Russia.

The over-all picture of the first day of the offensive is as follows:

The enemy was surprised by the German attack. His forces were not in tactical disposition for defense. The troops in the border zone were widely scattered in their quarters. The frontier itself was for the most part weakly guarded.

As a result of this tactical surprise, enemy resistance directly on the border was weak and disorganized, and we succeeded everywhere in seizing the bridges across the border rivers and in piercing the defense positions (field fortifications) near the frontier.



After the first shock, the enemy has turned to fight. There have been instances of tactical withdrawals and no doubt also disorderly retreats, but there are no indications of an attempted operational disengagement. Such a possibility can moreover be discounted. Some enemy Hqs have been put out of action, e.g., in Bialystok, and some sectors so are deprived of high echelon control. But quite apart from that, the impact of the shock is such that the Russian High Command could not be expected in the first few days to form a clear enough picture of the situation to make so far-reaching a decision. On top of everything, the command organization is too ponderous to effect swift operational regrouping in reaction to our attack, and so the Russians will have to accept battle in the disposition in which they were deployed.

Our Divs. on the entire offensive front have forced back the enemy on an average of 10 to 12 km. This has opened the path for our Armor.

In AGp. South, Group Kleist was able to get its northern and central Corps moving in the noon hours. If, as seems likely, they reach the Styr river still today, they will have to fight it out with the enemy mot. Group east of the Styr tomorrow and the day after. The outcome will be decisive for their operational freedom of movement.

In AGp. Center, the right wing of Armd. Gp. Guderian (Third and Fourth Armd. Divs.) was for a time held up in difficult wooded terrain (which I believe could have been avoided) and will start rolling on the Brest - Minsk motor highway toward evening, if all goes well. The northern wing (Lemelsen) has pierced the opposing enemy forces and has gained operational freedom of movement. The two coming days will show in what way Guderian can dispose of the enemy mot. forces round Minsk. Once they are beaten, the operational success of this Armd. Group is assured.

North of Bialystok, Armd. Group Hoth scored quite a remarkable success. It has pushed through the forest and lake country to the Njemen river. The important crossings near Olita and Merkinė have fallen into our hands intact. Advance elements of eight Divs., thrown against it have been scattered and there is no organized enemy resistance in front of it. Full operational freedom of movement appears to have been achieved in this sector.

In the area of AGp. North, Armd. Gp. Hoepfner has battled its way to the Dubissa river and captured two crossings intact. Here the enemy will be able to throw fresh forces against us from his depth in the next few days.

The Army Gps. are pursuing their original objectives. Nor is there any reason for a change. OKH has no occasion to issue any orders. The time is not ripe yet for a decision on how to employ Eleventh Army. Our assault troops have crossed the Prut river at various points and have seized the bridges. But there are no signs that the Russians are yielding the area between Pruth and Dniestr.

Slovakia has offered for immediate commitment an Armd. Gp. in the strength of about a reinforced Regt., to be ready at Presov by 23, evening. The offered Group is accepted and assigned to Seventeenth Army. In addition, two Divs., to be brought up to war strength immediately, will be available by 25 June. They, too, will go to Seventeenth Army.

Hungary, which has stationed 2 Brigs. on her border and 3 Armd. Brigs. behind them under VIII Corps Hq, has closed her frontier. On the political side we make no request to Hungary. If the soldiers want to join us, let them prevail on their politicians to do so.

Air Force reports 850 enemy airplanes shot down. This number includes entire bomber squadrons, committed without fighter escort, which were taken on and destroyed in the air by our fighters.

23 June 1941. 2nd Day.

The morning reports of 23 June and the concluding daily reports for 22 June, which came in during the night, indicate that an enemy attempt at disengagement must be expected. AGp. North even believes that the enemy may have made this decision as far back as four days ago.

The assumption that considerable portions of the enemy are further in the rear than we assumed, and are partly being taken back even now, is corroborated by the fact that our troops, although they had to fight for it, did penetrate the border areas to a depth of as much as 20 km on the first day, and by the absence of any large take of prisoners and the singular absence of any major artillery activity; another indication would be the withdrawal of mot. Corps in the direction of Minsk.

In front of AGp. South also the enemy appears to be falling back eastward from the Hungarian border, in order to get his forces out of the pocket. The fact that troops are moving frontward in some places does not argue against these inferences, for these are spots where a rapid advance of German troops would compromise the withdrawal, e.g. opposite Armd. Group Hoth and Kleist's northern wing, and in the IV Corps sector of Seventeenth Army.

In view of all this we must adhere to our plan for the operations north of the Pripet Marshes, that is, to push the two Armd. wedges of Guderian and Hoth on Minsk and pinch off the Bialystok pocket. Prospects of success are good. If we succeed, the hole torn into the entire Russian front will be so large and elimination of so many enemy Divs. will have changed the balance of strength so greatly in our favor that we shall have full operational freedom.

The situation looks more difficult in the sector of AGp. South, because in abandoning the original plan of operation, based on Romania \*, we have thrown away our best strategic opportunity. We shall have to confine ourselves to probing for the soft spot and then drive an Armd. wedge through it as hard as we can. At the moment this soft spot seems to present itself on the motor highway in Kleist's central sector, north of Tarnopol.

1200. Himer (on phone): We gratefully accept every kind of Hungarian cooperation, provided it does not strain our road and rail communications with Romania.

1400. By plane to Elbing, and then by car to new Hq. \* \*

Development of situation: In AGp. South, in Romania, the Russians are attacking our Prut bridgeheads and are making reconnaissance forays against the Romanian Cavalry from Cernauti. That's very good ! \*\*\*

In Seventeenth Army sector enemy resistance seems to be slackening in the direction of Lwow. In Sixth Army sector, the faulty development of Thirteenth Armd. Div. has had the result that Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd. Divs. could not start off and are now waiting on the northward highway, until the Infantry has cleared the way for them. The farthest advance has been made by Eleventh Armd. Divs., after battling it out with enemy tanks. Unfortunately Thirteenth Div. is not now behind it. Another Div. will be moved up, but what a loss of time !

In AGp. Center everything goes according to plan. Hoth has made the farthest advance, whereas Guderian is being checked again and again. This occasions a discussion with AGp. B, as to whether Hoth should continue his drive on Minsk, or had better strike at once farther north, for Polotsk. As a matter of fact, von Bock, from the start, had objections against a joint operation by the two Armd. Gps. in the direction of Smolensk, and wanted Hoth to strike farther north. That, however, would have put an almost impassable strip of water and marshland between Hoth and Guderian, enabling the enemy to beat the groups separately. Such a possibility merits consideration all the more as the Russians are the originators of the idea of quick mass concentration (Budjonny), and inasmuch some reports of withdrawals would indicate that the Russians might be attempting to concentrate Armor far in the rear.

The over-all picture is best characterized by the report from Fourth Army: The enemy in the Bialystok pocket is not fighting for his life, but to gain time.

I very much doubt that the enemy High Command really has unified and organized control of the situation. It rather looks as if the local withdrawal movements both of the Ground Forces and of the Air Force are being carried out under the pressure of our advances, and that it is impossible at this time to speak of a planned withdrawal.

The only exception is perhaps the enemy in front of AGp. North. Here a withdrawal, probably behind the Dvina river, seems in fact to have been prepared long ago. We cannot yet see through the reasons for that. Perhaps the Russians thought we might demand disputed Lithuania and so were preparing to abandon the country to us. In spite of these preparations the enemy has remained in his positions near the border around Bialystok; this can be explained only by the deficient and plodding working of the Russian Command machinery.

At the evening situation conference, the question is discussed whether Hoth and Guderian should continue to drive on Vitebsk and Orsha. In any case Hoth's right wing must advance to the high ground around Minsk. If necessary, he must wait there for Guderian. ObdH discusses the situation in these terms with Field Marshal von Bock.

Midnight: Talk with Paulus and Bogatsch on having the OKH air Staffeln carry out reconnaissance on the upper Dvina and the upper Dniepr.

24 June 1941. 3rd Day.

Situation: The final reports for 23 June and today's morning reports confirm the picture we gained so far.

The enemy is making a stand almost everywhere in the border area. Our troops do not fully grasp this because resistance was disorganized and relatively ineffective in consequence of the tactical surprise achieved. In the country traversed by our tanks there are still substantial active enemy forces broken up in smaller groups. The number of prisoners, which on the first day ran to about 2,000 in every Army sector (i.e. a total of about 10,000), will increase only in the next few days, when the drives of our Arm'd. wedges will have taken full operational effect. There are no signs of an operational withdrawal of the enemy. Only in the North an attempt is being noted to take back forces; this may be done with a view to building up a Russian Dvina front, which might compel us to move over Hoepfner's Arm'd. Group nearer to Hoth, so as to cross the Dvina in its upper reaches. \*

The supply situation is taking a normal development. The first Advance Supply Points are being moved forward. Fuel and oil consumption very high. Expenditure of ammunition low.

Losses in wounded and killed are moderate. Remarkably high officer casualties.

Bogatsch: Submits report on Air effort. On the whole the same picture.

Wagner: reports on supply. Decision: Bulk of MT Regts. will advance toward Smolensk.

Fellgiebel: Digest of radio intelligence: The operational Reserve Groups surmised north of Schaulen, around Minsk and around Shepetowka, far from moving eastward, are even shifting forces to the battle front. Only isolated front Corps opposite AGp. Center are being taken back in small bounds.

Gercke: Change of gauge of railroad track east of the frontier has been started, as planned. \*

1530. ObdH returns from the Fuehrer:

- a) Fuehrer is worried that our ring around Bialystok is not close enough.
- b) The Italians, who will send one Corps to Romania, must in no case be allowed in the Crimea. \*\*
- c) Spaniards (Spanish Legion). Nothing definite yet about activation and arrival, but it will be best to equip them with arms ourselves.

Lt.Col. Kahlden, Liaison Officer to Hoth's Corps, reports.

Noon: Vilna, Kovno, Kedainiai taken. Interesting historical coincidence that Napoleon also took Vilna on 24 June.

The picture in the course of the afternoon is as follows:

AGp. South is advancing against counter-attacks, especially strong in IV Corps sector, north of Lwow. Very heavy enemy casualties. New heavy enemy tank! The right wing of Seventeenth Army has reached its objective, the high ground of Mosciska. Armd. Gp. Kleist now has 4 Armd.Divs. in line and has reached the Styr river. The enemy throws into the battle all reserves available in the rear, so that there is a chance that we might smash the entire enemy force in the Ukraine in the battles of the next few days. The stubborn resistance of individual Russian units is remarkable. Bunker crews have blown themselves up with their bunkers, rather than surrender.

In the sector of AGp. Center closing of the ring east of Bialystok, in the Minsk area, is nearing completion. Hoth, who against von Bock's opposition, has been ordered by OKH to strike through Molodeczno toward the high ground north of Minsk, is only 30 km from Minsk. He now stands in the rear of the last enemy Reserve Group which was thrown from Minsk toward Baranowichi against Guderian's advancing Armd. Group and, supported by reinforcements brought westward through Slazk, has engaged him in the Slonim area. If Guderian makes headway in the direction of Baranowichi, in the next few days the ring will be completely sealed. Air Force must prevent any eastward retreat of the forces coming from Slazk.

In the further development of the battle, Fourth Army must advance its left wing Corps toward Volkovysk, and Ninth Army its right wing Corps (XX) toward Lunna, in order to

form an inner ring of Infantry around Bialystok; this ring must be made as tight as possible by moving up additional Infantry from the west.

The time necessary to complete this will be utilized to allow the components of Guderian's and Hoth's Armd.Gps. to close up on the high ground around Minsk. Meanwhile strong Advance Combat Teams can secure the crossings on the Upper Dniepr at Mogilev and Orsha, and on the Upper Dvina, at Vitebsk and Polozk. Continuation of the offensive by the combined Armd. Gps. toward the high ground northwest of Smolensk only after consultation with OKH.

Army Group North has to fight off strong enemy tank attacks almost along its entire front; the only exception is the sector of 291st Div., which is advancing on Libau. These attacks are probably maintained by III Russian Armd. Corps, originally in the area, and by several moto-mez. Brigs. Nevertheless the strong right wing of AGp. has forged ahead to Vilkomir. Here, too, the Russians are fighting stubbornly and doggedly.

Generally speaking, it is now clear that the Russians are not thinking of withdrawal, but are throwing in everything they have to stem the German invasion. Throughout this effort, the High Command seems to remain entirely in the background. The reasons are not clear, but the absence of any large-scale operational reserves probably precludes its effective intervention. That the Russians had adapted their plans to an all-out defensive near the border, is also demonstrated by the large quantities of stores which were to be the logistical basis of the plan.

As to the previously known operational reserves, we have as yet no clear idea of the whereabouts of Armd.Gp. Pskov, which is reported to have been moved forward to the area between Schaulen and the Dvina river, but apparently has not as yet been committed against AGp. North. Such a policy would be in keeping with Russian tactics, always to keep back some forces against the possibility of the breakdown of the enemy attack.

The course of the entire battle evolves gratifyingly according to plan. A new feature in the sectors of AGp. South and AGp. North are the new heavy Russian tanks, reported to be armed with 8 cm guns and, according to another, but untrustworthy, observation from AGp. North, even 15 cm guns.

The enemy air force is completely out of the picture after the very high initial losses (reports speak of 2,000).

After the evening conference with ObdH the following orders are issued:

- a) Eleventh Army must get ready to attack (time needed: 5 days).
- b) 900th Brigade is made available to AGp. Center to

complete the ring circling Bialystok.

- c) Liaison Staff North receives instructions that Finland must make all preparations for starting offensive east of Lake Ladoga. The operation must be on a front of at least 6 Divs., with main weight on left wing and objectives deep in enemy territory.

Prolonged discussion as to the most efficient command set-up for continuance of operations by AGp. Center. Should Armd. Gps. 2 and 3, which probably can no longer be controlled by AGp. Hq, be placed under command of Fourth Army Hq? Second Army Hq then would take charge of the investment of Bialystok. Or should Guderian assume command of all armored operations? -- Talk with OQu I and Gen Qu.

I believe it would be impossible for Fourth Army Hq to direct the offensive of Fourth Army and at the same time conduct the operations to reduce Bialystok. Since von Bock cannot get through to Minsk on his signal communications, the best plan would be for von Kluge, as he once did in the West, to take over control (in addition to Infantry, i.e. the two Corps on the right wing of his Army) of the two Armd. Gps. together with responsibility for their supply. It might be desirable to leave Supply Officer Fourth Army at Bialystok, under control of Second Army Hq, which will be in charge there, and reassign Supply Officer Second Army to Fourth Army instead.

I object to putting Guderian in command of the combined Armd. Gps.

Sweden will raise no difficulties about transit of 163rd Div. through Swedish territory. Entraining at Oslo may start on 25 June, evening. Authorization will also be given for our planes to fly across Sweden. Russian planes will be fired at.

25 June 1941. 4th Day.

Review of the situation in the morning generally confirms the impression that the Russians have accepted the great border battle and are taking back only those positions of the front, which are being pushed back under the enormous impact of our attack.

This, for instance, is the case in the sector of AGp. North. It is hard to tell whether I Armd. Corps (Pskov), which in the last few days was moved across the Dvina river to the area south of Riga, has been committed against Leeb's northern flank, in its entirety or only in part. Certain is, that III Armd. Corps, which had been in this area from the start, has been beaten by Reinhard's Armd. Corps, and that von Manstein's Armd. Corps has advanced so far to the

east that the Russians have been compelled to take their forces behind the Dvina. They are trying to do this by striking at us with their Armor, and meanwhile run a large transport movement from the north to the far bank of the Dvina, between Riga and Jakobsstadt.

On the front of AGp. Center., the inevitable critical situations develop, which are the normal accompaniment of any turning movement preparatory to a battle with inverted front. The Russians are making strong, if uncoordinated attempts to gain elbow room by attacking in the direction of Grodno, in the north, and on the front of Fourth Army, in the south, and so check the sweep of our eastward drive. These attempts have failed everywhere, despite an occasional critical situation in VIII Corps, whose western wing is being attacked also by strong Russian Cavalry. But it is necessary to supplement the pressure by Fourth Army, from the south toward Volkovysk, by corresponding counter-pressure by Ninth Army, from the north, in order to form an inner encircling ring of Infantry Corps south of the confluence of Szczara Njemen rivers, while Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. form an outer ring by linking up at Minsk. This will keep the enemy bottled up in the Bialystok pocket and prevent repetition of what happened on the Bzura in the Polish Campaign, that is, his pressing eastward (toward Novogrodek), which would delay and hamper liquidation of the pocket.

The attempts of the encircled enemy to fight his way back to Minsk through Slonim have resulted in local crises at Slonim (Seventeenth Armd. Div.).

In the sector of AGp. South, the enemy is bringing new forces toward Kovel from the east by rail and toward Rovno, by motorized movements. West of Rovno, Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd. Divs. are still in aggressive action to force their way to the Styr river. On reserved roads in the central sector, Eleventh Armd. Div., which is now followed by Sixteenth, has got as far as Dubno across the Styr. Against this Div., the enemy already yesterday brought Infantry on a broad front from the south. It seems that he is moving new forces also from south and west against von Briesen's Corps, and IV Corps which now is slowly gaining ground toward the east after heavy fighting; The purpose apparently is to absorb the beaten elements and build up a new front - perhaps on the line Sambor - Lwow - Dubno. It is worth noticing that High Command of this front has moved Hqs up front, to Tarnopol.

Morning conference with ObdH shows full agreement of views.

AGp. Center must be instructed to go out to meet right wing of Fourth Army (VIII Corps), so as to form an inner encircling ring.

Conference ObdH with Fuehrer: Fuehrer is now less worried about the eastern closing line of the Bialystok pocket.

Bogatsch: Our air reconnaissance will cover the area between Pskov, Dvinsk, Rositten, Dvinsk, Upper Dvina and Upper Dniepr, Kovel.



Finnish Gen. Oehquist comes in for orientation on our ideas concerning the conduct of the Finnish offensive east of Lake Ladoga, and is informed of the instruction issued to Erfurth. \*

Major von Below reports on his assignment as Liaison officer to Guderian. He confirms that 45th Div. suffered unnecessarily high casualties at Brest-Litovsk.

Order to Gen. Brand (Arty.):

- a) Collect data on effect of the "Karl" gun at Brest-Litovsk.
- b) Investigate conduct of Commander of 45th Div. at Brest-Litovsk.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) receives instructions to adapt supply arrangements to the following new command set-up in AGp. Center:

- a) OQu 4 is placed under Hq Second Army (the encircling Army).
- b) OQu 2 will make preparations for establishing a supply base at Minsk, and later become part of Hq Fourth Army.
- c) Fourth Army assumes control of Armd.Gps. 2 and 3.

Telephone talk with AGp. Center (von Tresckow): Swing 28th and 161st Div. southward, to have the ring east of Bialystok closed by Infantry Corps.

Detailed data are coming in on new Russian tanks, now committed on the front:

Weight 52 tons; front armor 37 cm (?), side armor 8 cm.  
Armed with 15,2 cm gun and 3 MGs. Crew of five.  
Speed: 30 km per hour; range 100 km.

Vulnerability: 5 cm AT gun penetrates at lower seam of turret. 8.8 cm AA apparently also penetrates the sides (still doubtful).

Another new type is reported with a 7.5 cm gun and 3 MGs.

1800. Gen. von Greiffenberg (C of S AGp. Center) reports on the execution of my order given to Tresckow. 28th and 161st Divs. will be turned southward in the direction ordered, to close the ring round Bialystok. Correspondingly, V and VI Corps of Ninth Army will move to the right, against the line Lida-Vilna. In order to prevent a gap to AGp. North, 900th Brig. will move to the left wing near Vilna. This meets our specifications. It is characteristic that Field Marshal von Bock expressly demands a written order, as he does not agree with us. (He does not want to do anything about the pocket forming to the south, and would rather press on to the east.)

OQu IV reports on the Fuehrer's letter to Il Duce of 21 June, immediately before the start of "Barbarossa". Noteworthy points in that string of disjointed ideas:

Attack on Russia explained on grounds of Russian troop dispositions. Lessons drawn from Crete operation: In attacking an island air strength must be employed to the last plane.

War against Russia is aimed at England.

Syria will not be able to hold out long.

Attitude of France doubtful. Italy is requested rather bluntly to keep herself ready against France.

Egypt cannot be attacked before next fall. In that undertaking, Italy must be prepared to safeguard her western border in North Africa and if necessary also launch an attack in westward direction. Stepping up of submarine warfare in the Mediterranean is demanded.

#### Evening situation:

Russian strength front of Eleventh Army is estimated at 11 or 12 Divs. -- Eleventh Army can be ready to attack on 2 July. Air raids on Constanza are becoming heavier. -- German fighter Staffeln have been brought in for protection of the oil fields. -- Braila and Galatz also were attacked by Russian planes.

AGp. South: The battle has not yet reached full strength; it will be a few more days. Kleist has taken Dubno after hard fighting. Tank battle west of Luck still going on. Troop movements from the east through Kovel and Rovno, also movements to the front at Tarnopol and points west. Slovak Divs. (Corps Hq and 2 Divs.) ready around Presov on 28 and 29 June for assignment to AGp. South. Hungary's cooperation would be desirable, but Hungary wants us to extend an official request. That the Fuehrer does not want to do for political reasons.

AGp. Center: Situation at Slonim has been resolved. Action by 29th Div. mot. has freed Seventeenth Armd. Div. at Slonim for operations toward Minsk. Third Armd. Div. has started drive on Sluzk. Eighteenth Armd. Div., with parts of Third, has taken Baranovichi. Situation south of Grodno stabilized. Attack repulsed. Hoth has taken Voloshin and thus gained a foothold on the hill mass of Minsk.

AGp. North: In various sectors of the front local encirclement of strong enemy elements reported. Orderly movement at good pace in the planned direction. Hoepfner continues northeastward through Vilkomir.

In the evening an order is issued to Army Gp. Center on sealing the Bialystok pocket and on preparations for the new command set-up. By this order Hq Second Army (with OQu 4) will take over command of the encircling forces. Von Kluge will assume control of the components of Fourth Army, which are not needed for this job, viz., Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 (together with OQu 2, who is directly briefed by Gen Qu on building up an intermediate supply base around Minsk).

Later in the evening we receive a Fuehrer order on direction of operations of AGp. Center and South. It betrays concern that we are operating too far in depth. The old refrain !

But that is not going to change anything in our plans.

26 June 1941.      5th Day.

The closing situation on 25 June and the morning reports of 26 June show:

AGp. South is advancing slowly, unfortunately with considerable losses. The enemy on this front has energetic leadership. He is continuously throwing new forces against the tank wedge, attacking frontally, as before, and now also the southern flank, and, on the railroad to Kovel, apparently also the northern flank. The latter attack will hardly develop to anything serious, but the southern flank at present is still vulnerable, because we do not have sufficient forces available to give it adequate Inf. protection. (the conveyor belt system would be necessary here \* ), and also because Armd. Corps von Wietersheim, which is still far in the rear, cannot get to the front at the moment because the bad roads are crowded with vital supply traffic. It will be the overriding task of OKH to maintain a steady flow of reinforcements behind AGp. South.

AGp. Center: Development just as desired. Situation at Slonim cleared up. Guderian now is in a position to continue the attack with his right wing on Bobruisk, through Sluzk, and with the bulk of his forces through Baranovich. Hoth, with 3 Armd. Divs. in front, is making good progress toward Minsk, so that the ring in this area probably will soon be closed and concentration of a strong armd. force for the thrust on Smolensk would appear assured.

The inner ring is closing according to plan. It seems that we might not be able to close it around Piaski, through Volkovysk, and would have to include the area around Novogrodek. For it is in that direction that enemy elements threatened with encirclement apparently are still trying to escape. Behind \*\* them, however, Hoth has already advanced toward Minsk, so that there is no danger of their escape. Nevertheless, it would be desirable to eliminate these forces with Inf. Divs. alone, without having to call on Hoth's Armd. Gp.

AGp. North is advancing eastward according to plan, encircling enemy elements in its path. The reported rail movement to Jakobstadt (through Riga) seems to be without any special significance.

A very large retrograde rail movement from Schaulen to Riga is new evidence that the Russians are swinging back their entire northern wing.

Gen. Fellgiebel reports that signal communications to Minsk, through Kovno and through Baranovich could be set up in

three days. This would make it possible for Hq AGp. Center to follow the eastward moving front.

Gen Bogatsch: Detailed air observations. Our reconnaissance organizations keep closed up to the front. Sporadic attacks on our airfields. -- Distribution of AA conforms with situation. -- Reconnaissance missions for OKH. Staffeln.

Lt. Col. von Ziehlberg: Personnel matters. -- Clausius affair\* ( was Briesen's C of S).

Bogatsch: Important development: Heavy retrograde movements have been observed since this morning :

- a) 0720. : Minsk - Borissov ( 20 trains), Minsk - Orsha (10 trains) moving eastward. On the parallel motor highway dense motorized movements (two columns abreast) in same direction.
- b) 0645.: From Molodechno to Polotsk: 10 trains going east.
- c) Enemy air strength: In sector of AGp. South 1,200; Center 400; North 300 planes.
- d) At Orsha large tank and vehicle parks. Photographs show over 2,000 tanks, reconnaissance cars and trucks.

1415 Report AGp. North: Monitored radio signal from Eighth Armd. Div.: Dvinsk taken after hard fighting. From Armd. Gp. 3, through Liaison officer: Increasing enemy pressure on south flank impedes advance. Armd. Gp. 2 has taken Sluzk.

1815. Confirmed report passed on to Fuehrer: Eighth Armd. Div. penetrated into Dvinsk at 0800., occupied town at 1250 after hard street fighting (railroad bridge and vehicular bridge).

The evening reports indicate no important new developments.

In the sector of AGp. South the expected attack of strong tank forces against the south flank of Armd. Gp. 1 has started. Local enemy successes, but apparently no crisis. Armd. Gp. 1 is under direct tactical control of AGp. By moving Thirteenth Armd. Div. behind Eleventh Armd. Div., Armd. Gp. has shifted its main concentration to the right shoulder. Moving Armd. Divs. to the south flank from the rear has been initiated.

In AGp. Center, the attempts of the enemy to escape from the Bialystok pocket to the northeast or east, are now becoming strongly felt, as are those in the direction of Armd. Gp. Hoth's right flank. It will be necessary not only to push east with elements of Guderian's right wing, (Third Armd. Div.) which now has reached Sluzk, but also to send other elements (Fourth Armd. Div.) northward into the area between Baranovichi and Minsk, in order to seal this last gap through which encircled enemy elements

are escaping, and simultaneously to crack the Minsk barrier. Orders to this effect to AGp. Center.

In the sector of AGp. Center, extensive rail and road evacuations from Minsk and Vilejka toward the east and northeast. Evidently strong mot. elements are being taken back in order to build up a mot. Group in the area west of Moscow.

In the sector of AGp. North the enemy is falling back behind the Dvina river. Strong wedged-in enemy elements are causing our Inf. Divs. a lot of trouble even far behind the front.

For the first time our radio intelligence picture shows Moscow functioning as operational High Command.

Finland has been attacked by Russian air forces (10 ports and airdromes). She considers herself in a state of war with Russia.

Hungary has been attacked by the Russians from the air in the vicinity of the frontier. An official declaration of war is not intended, only retaliation for the air attack.

Croatia has made known its desire to participate with military forces in the war against Russia.

Romania: Russians have made a local thrust and started construction of a bridge across the northern arm of the Danube Delta. Our fighters attack Odessa, inflicting heavy losses.

27 June 1941

6th Day.

Daily reports of 26 June and morning reports of 27 June present the following great picture:

In the sector of AGp. South, von Kleist has not only repelled all enemy thrusts against his south flank, but his right wing has even gained ground toward the southeast. The front has moved a little eastward and with its 3 Armd. Divs. is now strong enough to warrant expectation of major advances soon.

The Russian formations thrown against the south flank have apparently been scraped together pell-mell. The Zhitomir Group probably has been committed against Kleist's front, the Russian Armd. Gp. Cernauti against his south flank. The Russian Armd. Group Tiraspol, transferred from Southern Bessarabia some days ago, is being moved northwest by rail and probably will soon turn up in front of Kleist's right shoulder, to be thrown into the battle as a last resort. After that we shall have smashed everything that can be brought to bear against AGp. South by the Russian Command in the Ukraine( which, one must admit, is

doing a pretty good job ), and we shall then be free to swing to the south in order to force the enemy still holding around Lwow and on the Hungarian border to a battle with inverted front. This probably will come about at the time, when the Romanian assault army will just be ready to come out to meet us.

In the sector of AGp. Center everything is going as anticipated. The Bialystok enemy is moving more and more to the east. Our western front slowly follows him. Concentrations in the Novogrodek area, whose presence is now becoming more strongly felt, are pressing on Hoth's right flank and make it necessary for elements of V Corps (Ninth Army) to turn south, since enemy forces have also appeared north of the Njemen river. Fifth Div. thus detached from V Corps, will be replaced by 161st Div. VI Corps is being moved to the front well to the south of Vilna, and in its place 900th Brigade is thrown against Vilna, in order to safeguard the gradually widening gap to AGp. North.

AGp. North is moving strong Armor to Dvinsk and pushes Reinhard's Armd. Corps on Jakobstadt. The left wing of the Inf. Corps is advancing on Riga. Thus everything is proceeding according to plan. The penetration at Dvinsk has set off heavy panic movements on the enemy side. The impression is that strong forces are streaming east away from the Dvina.

On the whole, therefore, the picture is satisfactory in AGp. South as also in AGp. Center, though by now it is high time for Second Armd. Group to make headway on Minsk. In AGp. North the situation is very satisfactory.

At the morning conference, ObdH shows irritation because various movements in the Army Group sectors did not come off as agreed upon yesterday between ObdH and the Cs in C South and Center. This is the natural consequence of interference in the command of Army Gps. and Armies. Back here we cannot have a clearly detailed picture and so should confine ourselves to assigning broad missions and not try to direct the movements of individual Corps or even Divisions. At the front, under the pressure of events road conditions, etc., things take a different turn and the result is the erroneous impression that OKH orders are being ignored.

OKH air reconnaissance effort is employed over the strategic triangle Orsha, Vitebsk, Smolensk, in order to ascertain whether the enemy elements streaming back from Minsk and Polotsk are being formed into a new operational group between Minsk and Moscow. The plan may exist, but the capabilities for carrying it out appear to me slight.

Col. Ochsner:

- a) Report on the effectiveness of the Rocket Launchers in the assault on Brest-Litovsk. Apparently very satisfactory.

- b) Review of potentialities of bacteriological warfare against Britain (foot-and-mouth disease) and by Britain against us (cattle plague).

Gen. Himer (on phone, 1245 ): Hungary has announced on the radio that she is in a state of war with Russia. The Hungarian Gen. Staff knows nothing of a state of war.

Two days ago the political authorities inquired at the German Foreign Office whether Hungary's participation was required. The reply of the Foreign Office is still outstanding. It is not believed that the military authorities could readily comply with OKW and OKH's proposal that Hungary come in on her own accord. The Hungarian Gen. Staff has assembled the Mobile Corps (two mot. Brigs. and one Cavalry Brigade) in the neighborhood of Marmoros-Sziged and is standing by for employment on the right wing of the Hungarian Carpathian front. I tell Himer that the Carpathian Mountains cannot be forced by armor alone. To accomplish this it would be necessary to attack along the entire front. We would welcome a Hungarian thrust toward Kolomea-Stanislawow. I tell him to discuss these possibilities with Laszlo.\*

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance and air situation. No important news. Emphasis on reconnaissance in the direction of Smolensk.

New reports: AGp. South: On Kleist's right wing, Sixteenth Armd. Div. has reached Krzemianiec. Here the Armd. Div. thrusts into the soft spot prepared by yesterday's air assault. Eleventh, Thirteenth, Fourteenth Divs. in tank battles between the Styr river and Rovno.

AGp. Center: Seventeenth Armd. Div. has reached Stolpce in its advance on Minsk.

1400. Keitel (OKW) on phone: Fuehrer wants to throw the whole weight of Armd. Group Hoepfner on Dvinsk. Possibilities of a crossing at Jakobstadt problematic.

As soon as there is a chance, Jakobstadt to be opened for the Inf. Corps from the rear by a raid on the northern bank.

Hoepfner's Armd. troops, massing for thrust on Dvinsk, are at the earliest to push through to Ostrov from the east bank of the Dvina, safeguarding the flank toward Jakobstadt, in order to prevent escape of the Russian forces in the Baltic area to the country south of Lake Peipus.

1420. phone talk on this subject with ObdH (who is at Hq AGp. North): He tells me that only 36th mot. Div. is being sent against Jakobstadt, while the bulk of Hoepfner's Armd. forces is striking for Dvinsk.

At noon to Angerburg and motorboat ride across Lake Mauer.

Heusinger, Grolman, Koerner: Moving of the last wave of GHq Reserves to the front. They must be so disposed that we get one Armd. Div. (Second Div.) and one mot. Div. (60th Div.) and three more Inf. Divs. behind AGp. South, the other reserves behind Center, between North and Center. Later on we shall need reinforcements on the Lower Dniepr and the dry route \* Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk. One Div. must be sent to Romania.

Buerker (Tng. Sec.): Experiences in Crete -- Information Pamphlet for air Transport. -- Utilization of radio direction beams (Mt. Troop School, Engineer Corps.)

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports large dumps captured at Dubno (AGp. South). Oil and gasoline in larger quantities. 42 21 cm Hows. 65 MG, 95 trucks, 215 tanks, 50 AT guns, 18 Btrys.

Evening reports indicate crumbling of enemy resistance in front of AGp. South and distinct withdrawal movements in front of the Seventeenth Army. Accordingly, already at noon, C in C AGp. South ordered Seventeenth Army to attack forthwith in pursuit of the retreating enemy. Seventeenth Army has ordered main pursuit effort in direction Zloczow, Armd. Group 1 has ordered penetration beyond the Horyn river, without regard to flank and rear security.

In the sector of AGp. Center the operation continues to develop according to plan. The enemy has abandoned Bialystok. As a result the western end of the pocket is getting narrower and the enemy is trying to fight his way out to the northeast and southeast in the Novogrodek and Roszna areas. Apart from creating local tensions, these attempts are fruitless.

AGp. North is reinforcing and expanding the Dvinsk bridgehead and continues to press on to the Dvina river with Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies.

28 June 1941. 7th Day.

Daily reports of 27 June and morning reports of 28 June in the main only verify the reports received yesterday.

In the sector of AGp. South the impression is gained that the strong local efforts of the enemy are only attempts at extricating himself, and not an operational or even strategic disengagement. A singular feature is a railroad movement from Znitomir toward Kiev, for which we have no reasonable explanation.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the inner ring is now closing east of Bialystok; in the Bialystok Forest, southeast of the town, there is violent fighting which quite unexpectedly has engaged the entire central portion and parts of the right wing of Fourth Army.



The outer ring, formed by the Armd. Gps., is strained to breaking point north of Novogrodek (Hoth); between Minsk and Baranovichi it is still not closed. Fourth Armd. Div. is now advancing from the area of Sluzk on Minsk, to close this gap.

The movements of AGp. North continue to develop according to plan. In front of the right wing of Busch's Sixteenth Army, an enemy group of several Divs. is still fighting; let us hope it will be cut off soon, before it manages to get across the Dvina. With Armd. Group Hoepfner far in their rear, and newly arrived GHq reserves being moved up behind the left wing of Strauss' Army, to the south, there is a chance that this enemy group, too, will be liquidated while still west of the Dvina.

1100 Field Marshal von Leeb ( on phone): AGp. North has arranged with AGp. Center that it, instead of Center, will move Hq I Corps to the area north of Vilna, where it would remain at disposal of OKH. It also wants to place 206th and 86th, instead of 253th and 306th Divs. under this Corps Hq\*. Such a change makes no difference to OKH, and proposal is approved.

Gen. Wagner reports on supply situation:

- a) The most urgent task now is to build up the supply bases Minsk, Molodeczno (3 July) and Dvinsk. Some sections of the railroad lines can be utilized for the purpose, using Russian rolling stock. Assigning railroad operating organizations to the Armd. Gps. has been a great success.
- b) Distribution of Security Divisions remains as planned. Movement from the rear initiated; needed particularly in Minsk area.
- c) At Tauroggen we have found enormous food stocks (export organization); e.g. 40,000 tons melted butter, 20,000 tons bacon, very large quantities of meat and of tin-sheet for canning. Will be turned over to State Secretary Backe. \*\*

Also at Kovno the large food depots and processing plants of private industry were captured intact. They had been guarded by Lithuanian Home Guards.

Reports at noon: Center: Minsk taken. Guderian's right wing close to Bobruisk. In the sector of AGp. South, the Russian Eighth Armd. Corps is advancing behind our Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. from Brody on Dubno. We can only hope that that way it is walking right into destruction.

Gen. von Greiffenberg ( on phone):

- a) We settle the procedure for bringing up GHq Reserves on the boundary of AGps. North and Center.
- b) Build-up of the supply bases Molodeczno and Minsk.

Bogatsch: Air observations show tanks assembling north and east of our Dvinsk breakthrough.

Gen. Brandt: Report on the fighting at Brest-Litovsk (31st Div.) Heavy Rocket Projectors and the "Karl" gun very effective, but defense was conducted by numerically superior, fanaticized troops, which accounts for the heavy casualties in 31st Div. Commander apparently is not at fault.

Keitel (OKW) on phone: Use Rocket Launchers in Eleventh Army? (Fuehrer is considering the question.) -- I give a brief review of recent progress at the front.

Noon: Major von Below (Liaison Off. Armd. Gp. 2) returns and communicates Guderian's statement that he would ask to be relieved from his command if he is placed under Field Marshal Kluge in the new grouping of Armd. forces.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Order of battle of Italian Divs. destined for Eastern theater. -- Poor in Div. troops.
- b) Fifth Armd. Div. will be ready:  
First echelon (reinf. Inf. Regt.)  
not later than 9 July  
Supply elements for first echelon " " 15 July  
Entire Div. " " 1 Aug.
- c) Replacement situation: Casualties heaviest in Seventeenth Army; normal in all other Armies. On the whole, losses are slight compared with those in World War I.
- d) Procurement and assignment of Polish peasant carts for GHq Reserve Divs.
- e) Subordination of Mil. Hq in Government-General under AGp. B must be promptly removed in view of changed conditions. \* -

Reports: Rovno taken. -- We have broken into Libau. -- Bobruisk reached. -- Substantial elements of Russian First Armd. Corps positively identified on Eighteenth Army front.

Gen. Paulus (OQu I): Organizational problems in North Africa. (Best arrangement would be to form an Armd. Group Rommel under Italian High Command.)

Evening reports confirm the withdrawal of the enemy forces opposing AGp. South. For the past two days uncoordinated motorized movements have been running from southeast and east to the rear of the slowly crumbling front. Apparently the enemy is making an effort to organize resistance in the previously known fortified line Novograd Volynskij -- Proskurov -- Dniestr. But in taking back his forces to that line he is consuming much of his strength in counter-attacks. Seventeenth Army is at the gates of Lwow.

Kleist has taken Rovno.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the desperate attempts of the enemy to break out from the Volkovysk and Novogrodek pockets cause many tight situations, which necessitate e.g. in Fourth Army sector, a northward thrust of XII Corps, in Ninth Army, a southward thrust of V Corps. But these tensions will be overcome. The gap between Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Groups is still not entirely closed, but Guderian has arrived with his right wing at Bobruisk, and has perhaps still a chance to strike quickly across the Dniepr. at Mogilev or Rogachev. That would be a decisive success.

AGp. North reports Dvinsk bridgehead expanded, and Jakobstadt taken by left wing of Armd. Group Hoepfner. The Dvina bridge at that town, however, has been blown up by the enemy. AGp. North has trouble with the many scattered enemy groups roaming the forests, some of them still with their tanks, which burn and loot villages. Application of effective counter-measures is frustrated by the expanse of the country and the limitation of our manpower resources. Libau has been taken. Motorized movements are reported from the Lower Dvina to Leningrad, the purpose of which is unclear.

What strikes one in all these battles is the singularly small number of prisoners compared with the large booty (including fuel), e.g. 35,000 prisoners along with 1,300 tanks.

29 June 1941.

8th Day.

Summary of the daily reports for 28 June and the morning reports for 29 June:

Army Gp. South reports still heavy fighting. On the right shoulder of Armd. Gp. 1, behind the sector of Eleventh Armd. Div., a deep penetration by Russian Eighth Armd. Corps in our lines, apparently has caused a lot of confusion in the area between Brody and Dubno and temporarily threatens Dubno from the southwest. This would have been very undesirable in view of the large dumps at Dubno. Also in battle zone of Armd. Gp. 1, enemy elements with tanks are still active behind the front, sometimes covering even large distances.

We must continually keep our minds on what must be done to arrive in time at a practical disposition for the operations of AGp. South. The present disposition is not particularly adapted to the impending tasks. In the next moves, the main objective of Army Gp. must be to break through the Russian rear position on the line Belokorovichi - Novograd Volynskij-Mogilev Pod. - Mouth of the Dniestr, without engaging in major frontal attacks, and then swing south still west of the

Dniepr. Two points are suitable for a breakthrough. One, in the north, where the main effort should be made, is between Novograd Volynskij and Zhitomir. The other, further to the south, which can be tackled with a smaller force, though it must be strong enough to effect a breakthrough, is in direction of Starokonstantinov, where there seems to be a gap in the fortified line. If we succeed in punching through here, the northern assault wing can swing south on this pivot with cover against Kiev and the north.

AGp. South must now regroup its forces for this breakthrough through the Russian rear position, which we must anticipate the Russians will be able to reach and man with the frontally retreating front armies as well as with reserves, which they can move up on a fairly undisturbed railroad network. For this breakthrough Armd. Gp. 1 must be furnished with Infantry (which apparently was deliberately excluded when Armd. Gp. 1 and Sixth Army were split off from each other). Also, Seventeenth Army will have to dispose its forces in greater depth and will transfer some of its Divs. to Sixth Army and Armd. Gp., in order to give sufficient strength to the right wing, which will be open to attack from the north, i.e. from the eastern part of Polesia\*, after it has passed through the Rovno area. Additionally, Artillery and Engineer and Signal troops must be placed suitably to fit into the new plan for the assault on the Russian rear position. Op. Sec. has been instructed to discuss these plans with AGp.

In AGp. Center, the situation continues to develop as anticipated. The Fuehrer's worry that the Armd. forces would overreach themselves in the advance has unfortunately prompted ObdH at a conference with AGp. Center to refer to Bobruisk as nothing more important than the objective in a flank cover. Guderian, however, quite soundly from the operational point of view -- is advancing on Bobruisk with two Armd. Divs. and is reconnoitering in the direction of the Dniepr; he certainly does that not just to cover the flank, but indeed in order to cross the Dniepr as soon as there is an opportunity to do so. Were he not to do that, he would be making a grave mistake. I hope that he will take the Dniepr bridges at Rogachev and Mogilev still today, which would open for him the road to Smolensk and from there on the country to Moscow. This is the only way right off to get around the dry gap between the Dniepr and the Dvina, now fortified by the Russians, and so block the way to Moscow for the enemy forces in the gap. Let us hope that CGs. of Corps and Armies will do the right thing even without express orders, which we are not allowed to issue because of the Fuehrer's instruction to ObdH.

AGp. North by now should be strong enough at Dvinsk to push ahead on Ostrov, perhaps also facilitate construction of a bridge at Jakobstadt by a raid in that direction. The withdrawal movements by rail and road, which are reported to be rolling day and night from Riga toward Lenin-grad, are probably for the most part evacuations. It seems the Russian High Command is abandoning Lithuania,

perhaps also the other Baltic states. Radio intelligence reports transfer of the high Hqs to the rear.

Bogatschi: Air reconnaissance furnishes no important new information, mainly because of bad weather. Trench digging at Orsha - Vitebsk.

Talk with Keitel (OKW) (on phone) again indicates that the Fuehrer is worried:

- a) About the tight situation of Armd. Gp. 1 south of Dubno.
- b) About the threat from the Pripet Marshes.
- c) About the possibility that AGp. Center might strike too early beyond the line Minsk -- Bobruisk, before the "pocket" is completely liquidated.

I give him reassurance on all these points.

Reports from all fronts confirm previous indications that the Russians are fighting to the last man. Sometimes treacherous methods are used, especially where Mongolians are among the troops (Sixth Army, Ninth Army). A singular note is, that as a rule only very few soldiers are taken with captured Batttrys, etc. Some let themselves be killed, while others run away, get rid of their uniforms and try to make their way back as "peasants". Morale of our troops everywhere is described as very good, also where they had to go through hard fighting. Horses very tired.

Gen. Ott (Inf.) reports in particular on his impressions on the battlefield of Grodno. Now, for once, our troops are compelled, by the stubborn Russian resistance, to fight according to their combat manuals. In Poland and in the West they could take liberties, but here they cannot get away with it. Enemy air effort against our troops appears to be on a very minor scale.

1700 Keitel (OKW) informs me that a Group of long-range fighters will strike today in front of AGp. South.

Messages: Left wing of AGp. North has penetrated into Riga with the Advance Combat Team of I Corps. Another Advance Combat Team, of VIII Corps, is following up. Railroad bridge intact, road bridges destroyed.

Evening situation: In the sector of AGp. South, an unexpected battle has developed south of Dubno, in which Sixteenth Armd. Div. joined from the south (after abandoning the high ground of Krzemieniec), 75th Div. from the west, Sixteenth mot. Div. from the northwest, 44th Div. from the north and 111th Div. from the east. The enemy involved is Eighth Armd. Corps. The situation at Dubno evidently is tight.

Also in the northern part of this sector, a lot is happening on the northern flank of Armd. Gp. Kleist. All attacks by the (tentatively identified) Russian XVII Corps from the Pripet Marshes were repelled. Behind Thirteenth Armd. Div., forming the spearhead at Rovno and advancing as far as the

Horyn river, follows 25th mot.Div. Fourteenth Armd.Div. covers the north flank, and is in turn followed by 298th Div.; behind this Div., XVII Corps is moving up from Kovel.

Near Lwow the enemy is taking back his front step by step to the east. Here for the first time many bridges are found destroyed.

In the central sector of AGp. Center, a wild medley of Divisions is busy sealing the inner ring around the enemy, who is breaking out in all directions. The outer ring, formed by the Armd. Divs., is closed, but still fairly thin, of course. It will take several days before the disposition of our forces, which in its present form is the outcome of the developing of the situation, can be sufficiently reorganized to allow us to continue the attack toward Smolensk on the dry route Orsha - Vitebsk. (Not before 5 July.)

AGp. North everything is pressing in the ordered direction, toward the Dvina, as planned. All crossings have been occupied by our troops. At several other sites bridges have been struck by Armd. Corps Reinhardt. Of the enemy forces which originally opposed AGp. North, considerable body of Infantry must still be south of the Dvina. Only a small proportion will succeed in escaping east through the lake country between Dvinsk and Minsk, in the direction of Polotsk.

Air reconnaissance has not been very productive today because of bad weather.

New plans. AGp. South - as has been discussed with them - will have to strike with a strong northern wing for the big Russian rear position north of the Dniestr. This northern wing will be on a wide enough front to take advantage of any gaps, and deep enough in order to cover the flank toward the north and, on wheeling southward later on, have sufficient strength to have forces to protect the wheeling wing toward the north (Gomel) and Kiev.

It is a question whether the tank spearheads of the northern wing will manage to break through by themselves; if not, and if they must wait for their Inf. components, a decisive success cannot be expected before 10 to 15 July.

AGp. Center wants to place Armd. Groups 2 and 3, which will certainly take at least until 5 July to reform (for supply reasons alone), under von Kluge's Fourth Army Hq and reinforce the Army with two or three Inf. Corps. The Divs. still tied down in the battle of the pocket in the rear, will be moved up by Army Hq 2 (instead of Army Hq 4) and by Army Hq 9.

AGp. North wants to advance with Armd. Gp. 4 from Dvinsk on Ostrov and Opochna, on 2 July, so as to cut off the area south of Lake Peipus. Perhaps this operation could be started even earlier on 1 July. The Inf. Divs. will not be

able to cross the Dvina in any strength before 3 July.

Enemy intelligence: In the South on the front of AGp. South, there are no reports of new frontward movements of the enemy. It must be assumed that all Armd. commands operating south of the Pripet Marshes were committed in the attacks of the past days against the front of AGp. South. (Their designations are absolutely different from what we thought they were, e.g.; Cav. Divs., mot. Brigs., etc.) On the Romanian front the enemy is believed to be withdrawing behind the Dniestr. On the front of AGp. Center, enemy road movements are reported south to Smolensk (formation of a defense group for Moscow); the railroad movement from Dvinsk to Pskov is still in progress; probably many evacuation trains. High Hq shifted to the rear from Dvinsk to Rositten. \*

Hungary reports that the "Carpathian Corps" will be ready to start operations on 2 July. Command set-up is still to be clarified. Control by AGp. South would seem the best arrangement.

Italy communicates order of battle of the Corps of 40,000 men, slated for operations in Russia.

Slovakia participates with two Inf.Divs. and one mot. Brig.; the latter is already committed on the right wing of Seventeenth Army.

Spain wants to send a "Legion": 15,000 men. They will be assigned to Rombertow \*\* (Warsaw), where we shall issue them arms.

In Norway, Dietl's Corps has started out from Petsamo towards Murmansk. Air raid on Murmansk.

Finland presents a new plan of attack conforming to our wishes. It provides for an offensive on a front of at least 6 Divs. east of Lake Ladoga. A German Div. recently brought over from Norway is to be moved behind this important wing, to strengthen it. It will be supplied by Falkenhorst's Army, but operated under direct control of Field Marshal Mannerheim.

In the afternoon, my three adjutants offer their congratulation on my birthday.

30 June 1941. 9th Day.

The situation last night rounded out by early reports in the morning, presents the following picture:

In AGp. South, the fight continues successfully despite local crises. The enemy allows himself to be pushed back step by step.

Lwow was taken by First Mt. Div. this morning, at 0430.

XIV Corps is not yet in line, but its arrival can be counted on in the course of the day. The situation at Dubno is straightened out. Still, Sixteenth Armd. Div. and Sixteenth mot. Div. were not inconsiderably delayed by the episode, and 44th, 111th, and 299th Divs., which were brought up behind Third Armd. Corps, will be stalled for some days; this greatly delays and hampers the follow-up of Infantry behind III Corps. There is, however, an endeavor on all hands to make up for this dislocation in every possible way.

No arrivals of new enemy reinforcements from rear areas are reported on the Army Gp. front. Most likely, the enemy has already committed the greater part of the forces he was able to muster.

In AGp. Center, cleaning out of the "pockets" is tying down considerable forces. Army Gp. must in particular see to it that Infantry forces are brought up behind Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. around the pocket. Bringing together the forces, including Inf., for a strong northern wing in continuing the offensive past the line Mogilev - Orsha - Vitebsk - Polotsk, will be the joint concern of AGp. Center and OKH.

AGp. North is sweeping ahead with its Inf. Corps to the Dvina. It has announced that its initial mission, viz., to beat the enemy this side of the Dvina, has been completed. Its next mission, viz., to push through to the high ground northeast of Opochna with a strong right wing, is well prepared by the disposition of Army Gp.

Bogatsch brings no important new air observations. The rearward movements to Leningrad, behind the northern wing, continue. Between Vitebsk and Orsha, fortifications (anti-tank ditches) are being built in great haste. In the Pripet Marshes, the situation is still somewhat obscure. Apparently the enemy is pulling out some of his strength, but we probably must still reckon with one Inf. Corps and some Armor.

To celebrate my birthday, the men of my lower staff held a formal review early in the morning and offered their wishes before breakfast. The breakfast room was decorated for the occasion. ObdH sent red roses and strawberries, accompanied by a very cordial letter. At the morning conference, Paulus made a speech. Congratulations by ObdH, who told me that the Fuehrer's visit in the afternoon is primarily on my account.

Other well-wishers: Scherer, Hq Commandant, accompanied by a man of the guard unit, who brings a bunch of wild flowers; von Ziehlberg, Loyke, Gehlen, Gen. Keitel (Personnel Div.), von Etzdorf, Frau von Brauchitsch, on the phone.

1300 Major Nagel (formerly in Moscow) is briefed as Liaison Off. to Fourth Army (von Kluge), which now takes over control of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3.

Order to AGp. South: Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 will secure line Rogachev -



Mogilev -- Orsha -- Vitebsk -- Polotsk with combat forces \* at the earliest.

Afternoon (1630) Visit by the Fuehrer to the camp.\*\* Report presented at ObdH's house. Afterwards tea.

Report by me on progress, with estimate of the situation and the resulting operational possibilities.

The Fuehrer stresses the following points:

- a) Mastery of the Gulf of Finland must be secured at the earliest. For only elimination of the Russian Navy will give us free communications through the Baltic (iron ore shipments from Lulea). After seizing the Russian seaports from the landside, we must allow three to four weeks for all enemy submarines to be positively out of action. Four weeks mean 2 million tons of iron ore.
- b) Ukraine: Significance for food supply and industry.

He attaches great importance to reaching Leningrad as soon as possible with the Inf. Divs. of AGp. North, but Armor need not wait for their advance. He does not see clear yet whether Leeb's strength, especially his Armor, is sufficient for the purpose. He expects that after reaching Smolensk in the middle of July, we would not be able to take Moscow by Infantry assault before August; Armor alone cannot do it. The time it takes for the Inf. to get to Moscow, he believes could be utilized by our Armor to make a clean slate in the north. Then we could mass Armor east of Moscow. Speeding of gasoline supply to Hoepner and Hoth is emphasized.

At tea, the conversation turns mostly to purely political subjects: European unity as a result of common war against Russia. -- Britain's domestic political scene: Possibility of Churchill's overthrow by Conservatives with a view to forestalling a Socialist-Communist revolution in the country. Lloyd George, Hoare. -- Possibilities of improving our relations with Turkey are viewed optimistically. Also Afghanistan and other small nations will actively collaborate with us if they feel they need not be afraid of Russia any longer. Continental character of Germany's future mission is emphasized, without renouncing claims to a colonial empire, which might include Togo and the Cameroons, plus the Belgian Congo. East Africa desirable, but not essential.

Evening Situation: Slow but steady developments in all Army Gps. In AGp. Center, however, enemy forces have broken through Guderian's Armd. Gp. between Slonim and Minsk. This is awkward, but probably is of no major importance. In AGp. North, the Riga railroad bridge appears to have been blasted by enemy elements, who penetrated into our lines in the confused fighting.

Hoepfner thinks he will be ready to advance on 2 July. Coming behind him, AGp. North will be ready to cross the Dvina on 4 July. Hoth reports that he likewise will be ready to continue advance on 2 July. But Guderian is still lagging behind, south of Minsk, where his forces are partaking in the encirclement of the Novogrodek pocket. He so will take several days longer than the others to get ready for new operations. Irrespective of these plans, Guderian's right wing could secure the Dniepr crossings at Mogilev and to the south.

Air Force is being reinforced in the sector of AGp. South and on the Romanian front. In AGp. South, very effective action by our Air Force against enemy Air Force and enemy columns retreating before our troops (as many as three columns abreast are reported). A total bag of over 200 aircraft shot down during this day. Enemy reported to be already reduced to sending very old four-engine models into the battle.

1 July 1941.      10th Day.

Situation: In AGp. South, Seventeenth Army is having good going. On its left wing XIV Armd. Corps is coming to the fore and is gaining freedom of movement toward the east. The Dubno episode seems to be over. The Russian VIII Corps is bottled up. Some of their tanks seem to have run out of fuel; they are being dug in and used as pillboxes. On the northern wing, Fourteenth Armd. Div. and 25th mot. Div. are following behind. Moving of the Inf. Divs., which will be needed both for attack at the front and for flank cover to the north and east in case of a turning movement to the south, is not at all proceeding well. AGp. South will need some vigorous prodding to get action. Eleventh Army believes to have positive indications of a systematic withdrawal on its front. I don't believe it is so. I, too, am almost certain that the enemy will try to defend his rear position, but a planned withdrawal would have required a long-range decision, and we have no reason to believe that such a decision was ever taken. The enemy is just being pushed back by us.

Russian atrocities at Lwow.

In AGp. Center further progress has been made by Ninth Army and Armd. Gp. Hoth in the build-up for the new attack. Progress is less in Fourth Army and Armd. Gp. 2. In the case of the former the reason is that it has to bear the burden of liquidating the Bialystok pocket; in the case of the latter, the delay is due to the fact that Armd. Gp. 2, in disregard of its orders, has neglected to attend to the mopping up of the territory traversed by it and now has its hands full with local enemy break-throughs. To our surprise, nothing is heard from the area around Bobruisk which only yesterday was the focal point of Russian anxieties, with

SOS signals to all forces in the vicinity and finally the hasty and extremely costly commitment of Russian planes. Either our troops are not getting anywhere, or they want to surprise us with big results. -- A teletype order is necessary to make AGp. Hq move one Div. toward Pinck, for protection of the right flank.

In AGp. North everything is going according to plan, except at Riga, where the Advance Combat Teams of I and XXVI Corps seem to have had some trouble; the situation was saved by the timely arrival and crossing of a reinforced Inf. Regt. The railroad bridge evidently is a total loss. 291st Div. has been detached to take Windau and clean up the country west of Riga. The new attack of Armd. Gp. 4 from the line Dvinsk - Jakobstadt is set for 2 July.

The Hungarians will launch offensive against the line Kolomea - Stanislawow on 2 July.

Eleventh Army has set 2 July as the date for its attack. It expects the Russians to withdraw behind the Dniepr. Disturbances have broken out in Romania, involving also some localities in the assembly area. (Iron Legion?)

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance in the sector of AGp. South no longer shows any large-scale movements. Heavy concentrations of immobilized railroad cars have been observed everywhere. A possible explanation is that the trains, which are arriving in closest succession, are simply left standing on the tracks by the Russians, with only the locomotives going back to fetch more trains. A striking feature in the southern sector is a heavy concentration in the Proskurov "bastion", forward of the Russian rear position, and a certain loosening up around Cernauti.

In sector of AGp. Center earlier reports of troop concentrations in the Orsha-Vitebsk-Smolensk triangle are confirmed. The enemy assembly area seems to extend as far as Mohilev, in the south.

We still have no completely clear picture about what is going on in the Gomel area and the Pripet Marshes.

In AGp. North, no new observations.

Transport movements from the east, perhaps also from the west into the Nevel area, apparently intended for the build-up of a defense line in the corner between the Dvina and the old Russo-Estonian border.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) The supply situation in AGp. North is satisfactory. Armd. Gp. 4 will start operations on 2 July with a full issue of ammunition and fuel for 400 km. By 7 July, the bulk of Army Gp., will have on hand in the Dvinsk supply base, in addition to complete issues to the troops: one additional full issue of ammunition, three fuel quotas and two days' rations. (Start of operations by

this AGp. scheduled for 5 July.)

In AGp. Center 17,000 tons of supplies, in addition to the hand supplies of Armd.Gp., will have been accumulated in dumps, representing a total of 24,000 tons. An advance detachment of Krumpel's staff goes to Minsk to prepare everything. The stockpile is to be increased to 73,000 tons (one issue of ammunition, five fuel quotas, five days' rations).

AGp. South reports considerable booty found at Lwow; including fuel in surface and underground dumps. By 1 July, several large Forward Supply Points will be moved closer to front, including one to Rovno.

- b) Fuel situation: Estimated daily consumption 9,000 cbm, or, 250,000 cbm, per month, i.e., 22 trains daily. Actual consumption has been 11,500 cbm. per day, or, 330,000 cbm. per month, quite a lot more than expected. About one-third of this comes out of booty. Daily requirements until 6 July, 7 trains; beginning 6 July \* we shall again need 14 trains, daily.
- c) Pacification of the Rear Areas is a matter of serious concern. Owing to our method of advance, our communication lines are liable to serious disruption by isolated enemy elements. The Security Divs. alone cannot do the job in this vast territory. It will be necessary to detach combat Divs. for these operations.

Gen. von Waldau (Op. Chief Air Force): We review the probable lines of development and the operational tasks resulting from them. OKL planning for the massing of air strength\* is again in an absolute muddle, due to misconstrued talks of the Fuehrer with ObdL.

The Air Force has greatly underestimated the numerical strength of the enemy. It is quite evident that the Russians initially had far more than 8,000 planes. Half of this number probably has already been shot down or destroyed on the ground, so that numerically we now are about equal with the Russians. But Russian flying efficiency cannot nearly compare with ours, owing to the poor training of their pilots and crews, and that is why entire enemy squadrons, or large parts of them, get shot down so often in combat, as, for instance, happened yesterday over Dvinsk and Bobruisk.

At present, Air Force estimates Russian air strength opposite AGp. South, at 800 to 1,000 operational first-line craft; in AGp. Center, at 400 - 500; and in sector of AGp. North, at 400 - 500. In the battles of the last few days, the Russians have been using obsolete planes side by side with latest models.

Gen. Oehquist (Finland): Orientation on our plans for the impending operations. -- Discussion of Finnish operations. -- Experiences with the Russians.

Col. von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters. --  
Decorations for GHq personnel ( 10 July and 1 August). \*

Evening reports indicate that Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 could start off on 3 July. Approve date, Some features of the plans of AGp. South cause me to ring up their Hq, in order to emphasize the necessity for feeding more Inf. Divs. into the northern wing.

Allocation of Inf.Divs. to the Commanders of AGp. Rear Area is being arranged.

Concern about the threats that may develop from the Pripet Marshes for the inner wings of Army Gps. Center and South, prompts issuance of an order directing initiation of joint supervision and offensive mopping up of the area. According to radio intelligence and air observations we must reckon with 2 Corps Hqs, with 7 Divs.

2 July 1941. 11th Day.

Eleventh Army launches offensive from Romania, Fourth Armd. Gp. from Dvinsk, in direction of OPOCHKA-Ostrov. Also the Hungarians start operations.

In AGp. South, the situation reports prove the correctness of my view concerning the northern wing of Armd. Gp. 1. Only yesterday, on 1 July, Russian Inf. from Pripet Marshes west of Rovno, made quite a deep penetration into the flank of Armd. Gp. 1, in the general direction of Dubno. I do not think this penetration imperils our operations, but the nearby Inf.Divs., which I would like at last to move up behind the Armd. spearheads in an eastern direction, are again kept back to deal with this enemy thrust.

In AGp. Center, the Bialystok pocket is in the final stages of liquidation. ObdH now is worried about the Novogrodek pocket.

In AGp. North, I Corps should better not move off to the east.\*\* Parts of it must first clean out the forests south of Riga. 291st Div. must comb out the northern part of the coast, west of Riga.

Bogatschi: Air reconnaissance shows something new: A movement, apparently from around Odessa, towards and east of Kiev, and then to the north. Air also confirms earlier reports of dense movements from the east in the direction of Orsha-Vitebsk and, further north, in the direction of Navel.

The resulting picture would indicate that in addition to the new group, assigned to the defense of the dry route Orsha-Vitebsk, whose sector extends perhaps to Mohilev in the south and to Polotsk in the north (Dvina bridges there are blown up), another new group is being built up northeast of

the triangle formed by the old Russo-Estonian\* frontier and the Dvina .

Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) The base at Dvinsk will be ample to maintain our Inf. Corps up to the line OPOCHKA - Marienburg, and the Armd. Gp. as far as Leningrad.  
For that purpose we need:  
From Kovno to Dvinsk, 10 trains, daily.  
From Siauliai, 6 trains, daily, until 6 July, and  
12 trains, daily, after that date.  
In addition to trains, 14,000 tons of trucking space.  
( Is available !)
- b) In AGp. Center, big fuel depots were found near Baranovich and Molodeczno.
- c) Question of tank replacement. On hand: 35 tanks 38 (Czech), 50 tanks III.

Additionally, to form a unit (materiel only) at Sagan:  
35 Tanks 38 (Czech), 71 Tanks III, and 30 Tanks IV.

By 15 July we shall have received from new production:  
60 Tanks III, 30 Tanks 38 (Czech), 15 Tanks IV.

By 30 July additional 60 Tanks III, 30 Tanks 38 (Czech),  
15 Tanks IV.

Field Marshal von Leeb (on phone):

- a) Necessity to comb out forests south of Riga; 271st Div. turned off to the area.
- b) von Leeb wants to move up XXIII Corps\*\* behind his right wing under his command, whereas we have already assigned the Corps to the neighboring Ninth Army. This wish cannot be complied with. Ninth Army itself is very much interested in moving this Corps to the front along AGp. boundary line.

At noon ObdH is called to the Fuehrer:

Apprehensive about the Novogrodek pocket. The Fuehrer thinks the ring must be contracted and tightened, and wants it bolstered with reserves. It seems there was still some discussion about launching the new operations by Armd.Gps. 2 and 3, which have already been authorized by us.

There they go worrying again.

ObdH makes various suggestions on how to compress and crack the pocket. He wants to use Eighteenth mot. Div. and Tenth Armd. Div., which belong to the assault wave of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3, set to strike on 3 July. I object. I call up AGp. Center to discuss that with Greiffenberg.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone! In reply to my talk with his Chief of Staff he states: An enemy breakthrough from the forest pocket of Novogrodek to the northeast is highly unlikely. Behind Fourteenth mot. Div., 900th Brigade will be brought up from Vilna tonight. Pressure on the front of Fourteenth mot. Div. is also eased by arrival of 161st Div. on its right wing. Moreover, the northeastern edge of the forest area has been amply mined by Hoth.

Of V Corps, 35th and 5th Divs. have reached the forest region. VIII Corps, south of the Njemen, has crossed the Baranovichi-Lida railroad.

The situation is more difficult for Fourth Army and Guderian. Armd. Group 2 is under order not to withdraw any units from the encircling ring, without orders.

Armd. Groups 2 and 3 are ordered to push their inner wings ahead to the forest edge (eastern edge of the big forest), if the situation permits. The process is most difficult between the big forest and Slonim. This area would afford the enemy with the best operational opportunities; but there are no signs that he is trying to take advantage of them. This Novogrodek pocket cannot be compared with the Volkovysk pocket, where the enemy suffered very heavy losses. Any unit that escaped into the Novogrodek pocket, is badly mauled, and the enemy has no ammunition nor food. This accounts for his passivity. \*Nevertheless it will be impossible to prevent some smaller enemy bodies seeping through to the southeast.

IX Corps has already crossed the Szczara river and will reach Molczadz tomorrow.

XII Corps is one day's march, LIII Corps two days' marches behind schedule. But advance elements of these Corps are already committed next to Regt. Grossdeutschland to reinforce the ring encircling the Slonim area.

Fighting on the southern outskirts of Minsk. Von Kluge cannot move up his troops.

After this conversation, I report briefly to ObdH and talk with Jodl (OKW) to ease the Fuehrer's mind.

Major Golling (Liaison Off., Armd. Gp. 4) reports. Hoepfner is nervous that Inf. Corps behind him might be moving across his lines of communications. It will be impossible to avoid that. There also seem to be certain differences in von Leeb's and Hoepfner's views of what the next moves should be. That, however, depends on our directives, which have not yet been given, but are due now.

Armd. Gp. 4 must proceed to block the gaps south and north of Lake Peipus and encircle Leningrad. von Leeb's Inf. Corps must sweep Estonia clear of enemy forces and occupy the coast, meanwhile pushing all forces they can spare on Leningrad and the southeastern shore of Lake Ladoga, and guarding their right flank against Nevel.

Computation of enemy strength. My own computations and those of Foreign Armies East show:

On the fronts of von Leeb and von Bock, 15 to 20 Inf. Divs. and about 6 Armd. Divs., of which three may have been withdrawn (mauled?). To these 3 front Divs. must be added, new:

1 (18th) from Moscow

3 from Volga-Ural

4 from Siberian Railroad

1 from Crimea

12 Armd. Divs. plus Divs. in

Estonia and Leningrad.

Estimated total tank strength, 15,000, or 35 Armd. Divs., of which 22 have been identified. In the Far East are five Divs., which leaves eight Divs. unaccounted for (Third in the north, one from Moscow area, and Sixth Div. of II Corps). Excluding the three Divs. in parentheses, five Divs. would be left available as operational reserve.

Evening reports.

AGp. South: A heavy enemy attack was repulsed with severe enemy losses, west of Rovno; III Corps (northern wing of the Armd. Gp.) temporarily stalled; central sector and southern wing advancing. In Romania, the Pruth river has been crossed and our forces have penetrated about 12 km into enemy territory. On the front of Seventeenth Army, the enemy is effecting a planned withdrawal, apparently under cover of strong Armd. forces. Our Divisions are in close pursuit.

In AGp. Center strong elements of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3 have started to move forward in order to be as close as possible to the Dniepr and Dvina line on jump-off day (3 July). Good progress. Stubborn enemy resistance on the Beresina is broken by Armd. Gp. 2. The other components of Army Gp., after the close of the Bialystok battle, are regrouping for a new offensive against the line Mhilev-Polotsk. The ring encircling the forest pocket east of Novogrodek is now complete.

In AGp. North, Armd. Gp. 4 has started operations and advanced halfway to Pskov. The Inf. Divs. are following close behind.

At the Fuehrer's Hq they now seem to be reassured about the situation in the Novogrodek pocket. Start of new offensive by Armd. Gps. is approved.

3 July 1941. 12th Day.

Daily reports of 2 July and morning reports of 3 July indicate that the enemy fronting Eleventh Army has apparently withdrawn behind the Pruth river, but is still fighting strong rear guard actions. Our advance is slowed by pouring rains, which turn roads into bogs.



The Hungarians are still fighting at the mouths of the mountain passes and have made no important advances. Seventeenth Army, where two Slovak Divisions have been introduced on the right wing, is pressing on "in pursuit" behind the yielding enemy. This pursuit is repeatedly checked by counter thrusts of individual enemy groups, mostly against the flank and as a rule with tanks. Tarnopol is taken.

As a result of this advance, Seventeenth Army has developed greater depth, which is all to the good, and now has its main concentration on its left wing, in conformity with the basic operational dispositions of Army Gp. Next to it, Sixth Army with its main concentration on the right wing, has continued its southeastward movement in good formation. This puts its main weight between Ninth Armd.Div. and Sixteenth Armd.Div. on the right, and III Corps (11th, 13th, 14th Armd.Div.), on the left. AGp. so has developed a definite wedge pointing at Berdichev. To the north, Armd. Gp., that is, its left wing (III Corps), is still severely hampered in its movements by attacks from the Pripet area, which the enemy now is launching west of Rovno.

This threat to the northern flank from the Pripet area has been a matter of concern for days. Everybody is vying for the honor of telling the most hair-raising tale about the danger from the north. Foremost are the radio intelligence people, who claim to have located a large number of enemy troops, namely three Armd. Corps and two Infantry Corps under the command of an Army Hq. This assertion is baseless and therefore dangerous. The events over several days do show that there are enemy forces in this maze of swamps and forests, but they certainly are not stronger than 2 or three Divisions; there cannot be any doubt that they include some mot. elements and tanks. The attacks are conducted in a manner which plainly shows that their command is completely confused. Also the tactics employed in these attacks are singularly poor. Riflemen on trucks abreast with tanks drive against our firing line, and the inevitable result are very heavy losses to the enemy. Such desultory attacks cannot be regarded as a threat to our operations. Nevertheless it would be intolerable to allow this factor of uncertainty to persist unchallenged on our flank. It must be removed by offensive action and systematic combing out of the marshes.

In AGp. Center, the Novogrodek pocket has been further contracted and sealed, as agreed upon yesterday. The moves of Second and Ninth Army are continuing according to plan, and with forced marches, in order to introduce Infantry with greatest rapidity behind the Armd. Gps., which are launching the offensive today. Both Armored Gps. have already started off. Guderian forced the Beresina river this forenoon, Hoth's left wing reached the Dvina northwest of Polotsk by noon.

In AGp. North Hoepfner advanced but slowly, owing to very bad weather which give him the worst road conditions. Still,

his left wing is already midway between the Dvina and Pskov. He has been directed by teletype orders issued last night, to occupy the areas between Velikie Luki and Lake Ilmen and between Lake Ilmen and Lake Pskov, with a view to safeguarding them toward the east, and to advance northward beyond the line Lake Ilmen-Lake Pskov only on order of OKH. The latter advance will have the twofold aim of closing the gap between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Peipus, and of cutting off Leningrad between the Gulf of Finland and Lake Ladoga. Sixteenth and Eighteenth Armies, by forced marches, are moving on in excellent formation, with a strong right wing behind Armd.Gp., toward the Dvina. On the Army Gp. boundary close contact is maintained with the vigorously pushed left wing of Ninth Army.

Enemy intelligence (Kinzel and Bogatsch) brings no important findings. In front of our southern wing (AGp. South) the enemy has ceased reinforcing his front. In Center (triangle Orsha - Vitebsk - Smolensk) there is still some movement, but with the movement which apparently came from the Caucasus brought to a close yesterday, it is on a much smaller scale than in the past few days. In the "dry route", trench digging is in progress. Owing to bad weather there are no new developments in the Nevel Group.

The enemy situation in the Pripet Marshes remains obscure. We must not overrate the strength of this enemy. On the whole, with no more signs of enemy activity in the Novogrod-ek pocket, we may be fairly sure that the enemy in the Bialystok sector, who was estimated at 15 - 20 Divs. by a captured Russian Corps CG, is annihilated except for some negligible remnants. On the front of AGp. North we may also figure with 12 - 15 Divs. completely wiped out. On the front of AGp. South the enemy's withdrawal and the crumbling of his front certainly cannot be interpreted as a disengaging movement planned by his command; it must be explained by the fact that his troops have been cut up and for the most part scattered by our unceasing, massive blows.

On the whole, then, it may be said even now that the objective to shatter the bulk of the Russian Army this side of the Dvina and Dniepr, has been accomplished. I do not doubt the statement of the captured Russian Corps CG that, east of the Dvina and Dniepr, we would encounter nothing more than partial forces, not strong enough to hinder realization of German operational plans. It is thus probably no overstatement to say that the Russian Campaign has been won in the space of two weeks.\* Of course, this does not yet mean that it is closed. The sheer geographical vastness of the country and the stubbornness of the resistance, which is carried on with all means, will claim our efforts for many more weeks to come.

#### Future plans:

- a) For the continuance of the Russian operations it will be of primary importance to gain a new jump-off line

between Smolensk and Moscow, and another bast around Leningrad. From here we could proceed to the capture of Northern Russia and the industrial region around Moscow, and subsequently, in conjunction with AGp. South, of the Donjets industrial region.

Once we are across the Dvina and Dniepr, it will be less a question of smashing enemy armies, than of denying the enemy possession of his production centers and so prevent his raising a new Army with the aid of his gigantic industrial potential and his inexhaustible manpower resources.

- b) As soon as the battle in the East changes from an effort to annihilate the enemy armed forces to one of paralyzing the enemy economy, our next tasks in the war against Britain will come to the foreground and require preparation:

Preparations must be made for the offensive against the land route between Nile and Euphrates, both from Cyrenaica and through Anatolia, and perhaps also for an offensive from the Caucasus against Iran. The former theater, which will always remain dependent of the quantities of supplies we can bring across the sea, and so is subject to incalculable vicissitudes, will assume a secondary role and for the most part will be left to Italian forces. We will have to assign to it only two German Armd. Divisions (Fifth light and Fifteenth), which will be brought up to full strength and reinforced by small additional complements. As an initial move for the operations through Anatolia against Syria, possibly supported by a secondary thrust from the Caucasus, we shall have to initiate concentration of the necessary forces in Bulgaria, which at the same time may serve as a means of political pressure to compel Turkey to grant transit for our forces.

- Wagner (Gen Qu): a) Summary of casualty reports, booty reports etc.  
b) Organization of Rear Areas and assignment of troops to these.  
c) Review of plans for moving forward our supply bases after the Dvina Dniepr line has been gained.  
d) Spare parts for tanks and tank replacements.

1200: Through ObdH and Op. Sec. we hear again the usual buzzings from the Fuehrer's Hq. Now again the whole place is in a state of jitters, because the Fuehrer is afraid that the wedge of AGp. South now advancing eastward might be threatened by flank attacks from north and south. Tactically speaking, of course, this fear is not at all unwarranted, but that's what we have Army Corps CGs for. What is lacking on top level is that confidence in the executive commands which is one of the most essential features of our command organization, and that is so because it fails to grasp the coordinating force that comes from the common schooling and education of our Leader Corps.

I call up AGp. South (Lt.Col.Winter, Ia) to make suggestions on how the threat to the northern flank could be removed once and for all by employing Advance Combat Teams and moving the GHq Reserves toward Rovno. Any threat to the southern flank, which will soon effect a link up with the Hungarians, must be forestalled by Seventeenth Army with its own forces, by organizing Advance Combat Teams amply equipped with AT units and obstacle construction material.

1600 AGp. South reports compliance with my suggestions. It is really heartwarming to see the readiness with which the Field Marshal and AGp. Commanders cooperate with us and adopt our ideas.

Casualties. Total for period 22 - 30 June: 41,087 (or 1.64% of actual strength of 2.5 million).

Killed: 524 O, 8,362 NCO and EM

Wounded: 966 O, 28,528 NCO and EM

Officer casualties:

Wounded 3.3% (Campaign in West 3.10%)

Killed 7.2% ( " " " 4.85%)

Missing 1.5% ( " " " 2.00%)

4 July 1941.

13th Day.

Situation: South: Eleventh Army is advancing slowly. Difficult road conditions, owing to recent rains. The Mt. Brigs. of the Romanian northern front have started the attack against Cernauti.

The Hungarian right wing has reached the northern rim of the Carpathians.

In spite of difficult road conditions, Seventeenth and Sixth Armies are getting on well. Main weight on the inner wings. On the northern wing of Sixth Army, our safeguarding measures against the Pripet Marshes are beginning to show results. The enemy is withdrawing in the Marshes to the east before our pressure from southwest and west, but at the same time is bringing reinforcements from the east. We must expect that Reischau will feel continued pressure on his left shoulder, at first from the area north of the line Rovno-Korez and later from the area between Korosten and Kiev.

Center: The right wing (Third Armd.Div.) of Guderian's Armd. Gp. has crossed the Dniepr at Rogachev, establishing so far only a bridgehead. Further north Armd.Gp. has forced the Beresina at the destroyed crossings and is battling its way to the Upper Dniepr.

The northern wing of Armd.Gp. Hoth has reached the Dvina at Drissa, where it is encountering stiffer enemy resistance. Road conditions difficult. High tank casualties from bad roads. Hoth reports 50% combat strength.

Second and Ninth Armies are pressing on behind Armd.Gp. in rapid marches. But owing to the delay in the encirclement operations at Bialystok, the distance between them and Armd. Gp. has become so great, particularly behind Guderian, that special measures will be necessary to bridge the gap. Combined Advance Combat Teams of the Inf. Corps must be moved ahead behind Guderian's Armd.Gp.

Von Bock has moved his Hq to Baranovichi. Von Kluge who, on our orders and over their objections, assumed command of the two Armd.Gps., has moved his Hq to Minsk.

North: Armd.Gp. Hoepfner is advancing rapidly, and is approaching Ostrov with its left wing. Right wing encountered stronger opposition shortly after crossing the Dvina, but thanks to Field Marshal von Leeb's foresight, Inf. forces were brought up here in time (on trucks), so that this enemy constitutes no threat; on the contrary, he is already being forced back by the troops originally on the scene. During this fighting, the Commander of 121st Div., Gen. von Lancelle, was killed. The bulk of the Inf. Corps is advancing briskly and has started crossing the Dvina. On the northern wing, almost an entire enemy Division was captured in the forests north of Riga.

Enemy: On the front of AGp. South local resistance, which leads to formation of pockets, in some places; but on the whole we discern distinct withdrawal movements, covered by armored counter-thrusts. Some troops are still arriving through Kiev from the east, but to all appearance they do not represent a large-scale coordinated movement. The large number of trains cramming the railroad stations and some eastward train movements probably must be interpreted as evacuation measures. Movements of fresh troops toward Korosten are observed, but apparently they are not on an operational scale.

On the front of Center the situation is unchanged. Movements run from Smolensk to Orsha, but also in the opposite direction. The large quantities of railroad cars around Bryansk seem less an indication that the Russians are forming an operational reserve - they would not have sufficient forces for that - than, merely the accumulation of rolling stock used in the frontward movements of the last days, left on sidings for technical reasons.

In North, two movements are reported on the way from the area around Moscow. One is running into the area west of Velikie Luki, i.e. between Hoth's and Hoepfner's inner wings, the other one is swinging northward around Lake Ilmen, to the vicinity of Pskov.

Over-all picture: The situation supports the assumption that the enemy does not have sufficient forces left for a sustained defense of the line running from the old Russo-Estonian frontier along Dvina and Dniepr to the south. This theory is borne out also by a Russian order, intercepted yesterday, to the effect that the Dvina river will be held only by groups concentrated at the crossings. \*

As our Armies advance, any attempt at further resistance probably will soon collapse and we shall be confronted with the question of reducing Leningrad and Moscow. It remains to be seen whether Stalin's proclamation calling for a people's war of all workers against us, will be successful. On the result depends the method by which we are going to sweep the enemy out of these extensive industrial areas. The main thing is to deny their use to the enemy at an early date.

As to the date when the Finns will strike, a decision will have to be made today : ( 6, 7, or 8 July).

Col. Ochsner reports on the outcome of his tour to the fronts of Ninth and Sixteenth Armies:

Some units still show a certain reluctance about using smoke. Heavy Rocket Launcher and Do Projector \* apparently highly effective wherever employed. The ammunition still seems to have some bugs.

Question of propaganda about the new flame ammunition. I am against it. It would only afford later opponents an opportunity to prepare counter measures.

At noon the first break in many days, which allows me to spend an hour on horseback.

Gen. Wagner, Gen Qu:

- a) Settling cooperation of "Gen Qu Command Post" - Chiefs with Bn. TO.\*\*
- b) Difficulties in supplying AGp. North by rail (Siauliai).
- c) Transport situation at present permits maintenance of offensives in
  - AGp. South: Armor to Kiev, Inf. to the line Zhitomir-Berdichev.
  - AGp. Center: Armor within close distance from Moscow\*\*;
  - Inf. across Dvina and Dniepr.
  - AGp. North: Armor to Leningrad, Inf. to area Velikie Luki - Dno' - Pskov - Dorpat.

Gen. von Thoma reports on observations on his tour to front of Armd.Gp. 3:

- a) In fighting the enemy's giant tanks, 10 cm 8,8 cm AA and 5 cm AT guns are very effective.
- b) Tanks I are a liability for the troops and should be taken out for home defense, coast defense and training purposes.
- c) Very tough fighting with Russians. Only few prisoners are taken.

von Ziehlberg: Current Gen. Staff personnel matters -- Preparations for transfer of GHq.

Evening reports from the South again indicate that we are advancing along the entire front. Road conditions, which must be very difficult in some sectors, are slowing the advance. The Drohobycz oil fields have fallen into our hands with very little damage. On the northern wing, the attacks against the north flank have ceased.

In Center, crossings over the Dniepr have been forced in heavy fighting at Rogachev by the right wing of Guderian's Group, and over the Dvina, at Drissa, by Hoth's left wing. Elsewhere the two Armd. Gps. are battling their way to the Dvina and Dniepr against occasionally stubborn enemy resistance. The Inf. Corps are following in rapid marches all along. All is quiet in the pocket west of Minsk.

In North, Hoepfner has pushed as far as Ostrov \* while beating off attacks against his flank just north of the Dvina. The heads of Inf. columns are crossing the Dvina river.

Enemy intelligence report on the whole contains nothing new. Only one observation is striking viz. unusually larger numbers of trains crowding the stations around Briansk and Orel, and trains moving northward in this area. Normally such a picture would indicate a build-up of an operational reserve, but the enemy does no longer have enough strength available for such a policy. In any case, a close watch will be kept on these movements.

5 July 1941. (14th Day.)

Situation: The entire front is advancing in accordance with our intentions. In AGp., South, in the Southern Ukraine, road conditions are very difficult as a result of cloud-storms, and rate of advance is slow. Apparently the enemy now is withdrawing eastward from the Pripet Marshes opposite Reichenau's left shoulder. In consequence, GHq Reserves can be moved eastward beyond the line Dubno - Luck.

In AGp. Center, Guderian's right wing (Model) has held its bridgeheads at Rogachev. But the central sector of the Armd. Grp., fighting all the way, is making little headway between the Beresina and the Dniepr. In addition to the Drissa bridgehead, Hoth now has gained another firm foothold at Ulla, on the northern bank of the Dvina, upstream from Polotsk. -- The "pocket" west of Minsk is slowly burning out. Since yesterday morning 52,000 Russians have surrendered.

In AGp. North Hoepfner's Armd. Gp. is sweeping the area assigned it clear of the enemy. The Inf. Corps are closing

up a satisfactory rate, especially on the right wing.

Report on enemy situation. Our troops have more or less lost contact with the enemy on the fronts of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies. Air reconnaissance shows that the enemy is retreating in disorder before Seventeenth Army and the Hungarians, with several columns packed together on one road in some instances. We may assume that these movements are withdrawals, getting mixed up with refugee columns. Enemy AA protection generally covers the rear position west of Kiev, enemy fighter protection covers the area round Kiev. Behind the northern part of the position parallel troop movements and arrival of troops from the north.

On the front of AGp. Center, confirmation is obtained on unloading of troops round Orsha, from where they move westward to Guderian's front. AA protection makes itself felt west of Orsha, fighter protection round Orsha and to the east. Strong fighter cover above Briansk and Orel. The enormously large number of railway cars left standing on the sidings has again been observed. The purpose of these accumulations of rolling stock and of the movements into this area, apparently from the south, is not clearly understood. Operational reserves? Group for a flank thrust?

Air reconnaissance again confirms the existence of an enemy concentration round Velikie Luki. No indications that it has been committed in the fighting. It might become effective against Hoepfner's right flank, as well as against Hotin's left flank, especially if the latter should strike eastward from his crossing points at Drissa and Ulla. The enemy's fighter cover is above Velikie Luki, his AA protection is moved further west in the direction of Dvinsk.

Enemy's command set-up is as follows:

|              |      |                            |
|--------------|------|----------------------------|
| Russian AHq  | 8 )  |                            |
|              | 27 ) | forming AGp. Northwest     |
|              | 11 ) |                            |
| Russian AHq  | 13 ) |                            |
| Unidentified | )    | forming AGp. West          |
| new AHq      | )    |                            |
| Russian AHq  | 5 )  |                            |
|              | 6 )  |                            |
|              | 12 ) | forming Southwestern Front |
|              | 2 )  |                            |
| Odessa Army  | )    |                            |

Heusinger (1300):

- a) A teletype from Erfurth indicates that on orders of OKW (apparently the Fuehrer himself) the last Regt.\* of 163rd Div. now moving up behind Heinrich's assault group, was diverted for Falkenhorst's combat group at Salla. Apart from the fact that this Regt. cannot be



of any help in the Salla operation, the Div. as a result is disrupted and its striking power impaired where it was needed most. This clearly shows up the dubiousness of this entire Murmansk operation, which serves only political ends and is open to gravest censure from the operational point of view.

- b) In the episode with the Mongolians hordes (allegedly Stalin's bodyguard) trapped behind the front of Sixth Army, 168th Division is reported to have broken down completely. Relief of COs is demanded.

Wagner (Gen Qu) and Gercke (Transport Chief): Discussion of train requirements for supply and of the most practical procedure for cooperation between Gen Qu and Transp. Chief. (North needs 14, Center 21, and South 12 trains; overall planning by Transp. Chief; details of execution, by BvTO.)\*

Buhle (Org.):

- a) Condition of Divisions. 168th has lost part of its Artillery! Cav. Div.: condition of horses good; organization has proved unworkable ! \*\*
- b) Suitable for new missions (i.e., possible employment on Balkans, etc.)\*\*\*:
- |                |    |   |
|----------------|----|---|
| From Armd. Gp. | 1: | 5th, 11th, 16th, 14th Armd. Divs.         |
| " "            | 2: | <u>3rd</u> , 4th, <u>17th</u> Armd. Divs. |
| " "            | 4: | 1st Armd. Div.                            |
- Those underlined are the best suited. All other Armd. Divs. have French vehicles or Czech tanks.
- Also available: 16th, 20th, 60th mot. Divs. All other mot. Divs. have mixed or French vehicles.
- c) Africa: Two new Field Repl. Bns., i.e., 3,000 men, needed; adding 5% normal furloughs, makes a total of 5,000 men to be sent over.
- d) Chenillettes ## and Renault trucks lost in operations.
- e) Requests from Army Hq. Norway for Northern Norway, where signal equipment and supply installations have been diverted (!) ##
- f) Croat Legion: 1 Regt. of 6 Bns. Activation in Croatia 10 July. Will not be at training centers before 20 July; then training; ready for commitment by middle of August.

Situation in the evening: In South, advance slowed by terrain difficulties and enemy opposition. The report that AGp. South has lost contact with the enemy, is not confirmed. Armd. Gp. Kleist seems to have punched through the enemy defense system. In Center, a victory of Guderian's and Hoth's outer wings is in the making. Very bad roads. In North, the attempt of the enemy to build up a front against Hoepfner with forces hurriedly thrown together, does not seem to come off. The "intentions" set forth in the AGp.

reports are in line with the ideas of OKH.

ObdH back from tour to AGp. Center, Army Hq 4 and Armd. Gp. 2:

Eighteenth Armd. Div. suffered heavy losses in the forest area. -- PW problem is beginning to get troublesome. -- Insecurity of Rear Areas. -- Population movements on the roads.

OKW interferes in the moving of 163rd Div. to Finland with a direct order by the Fuehrer. The Division was supposed to go to Heinrich's group east of Lake Ladoga and is now ordered to go "as a whole or in part" to the Salla front. Reason: SS Brigade "Nord" committed at Salla, has been a failure.

C of S, AGp. South sends an interesting situation estimate. It shows how widely AGp. South, which has decided to direct its main effort against Berdichev (non-existent gap in the fortified line) diverges from our plan (main concentration on the northern wing).

6 July 1941. (15th Day.) Sunday

Situation: The final reports last night and the morning reports bring no important news.

In AGp. South, the situation of Armd. Gp. 1 develops generally fair, both at the front and on the northern flank. The right wing of Sixth Army has come up against an enemy front consisting of field fortifications laid out in difficult terrain, east of Yampol. Seventeenth Army has generally made fair advances, Eleventh Army only slight ones. It is still an open question whether the enemy will succeed in the timely organization of unified resistance in the fortified line west of Kiev, on which we now have accurate air reports. The energetic leadership of the enemy south of the Pripet Marshes would make this appear quite likely; against it is the attrition of forces bled by the recurrent counter attacks and the disruption of withdrawal movements by our air effort.

In AGp. Center, the only change from last night's situation is that Seventeenth Armd.Div., north of Eighteenth, without any orders has started moving away from Minsk, and that strong elements of Fourteenth mot.Div., which was in the "pocket" guard", has been set in motion behind Hoth.

In AGp. North, the forward movement of the Infantry right wing north of Dvina is thoroughly satisfying.

Gen. Bogatsch:

a) Air observation shows nothing new of any importance as regards enemy movements.

- b) Photographic reconnaissance furnishes the explanation for the huge number of cars standing on sidings in the Briansk-Orel area. In this area the Russians have enormous, evidently brand-new industrial plants with vast railroad sidings. To all appearance they represent rolling stock factories and major railroad shops.

Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern ( C of S AGp.

South) on his situation estimate submitted on 3 July. OKH Reserves were brought up behind the northern wing (III Corps) not because of any anxiety about the flank in the Rovno area, but with a view to supplying III Corps in its further advance with ample Infantry against any possible threat in the area north of Korosten from the direction of Mozir, thus giving III Corps freedom of movement toward Kiev or to the southwest.

Army Gp. states its intention to advance with III Corps on Kiev in order to form a bridgehead. The other elements of Armd. Gp. 1, after breaking through at Berdichev will strike west of the Dniepr through Byelaya Tserkov in the direction of Kirovograd, while the strong forces concentrated on the inner wing of Sixth and Seventeenth Armies, after breaching the line at Berdichev will drive on in south-eastern direction for tactical cooperation with Eleventh Army in the encirclement of the enemy.

Gen. Ott reports on visit to front. (VII and XXXIX Corps.) He

describes pillbox fighting which he witnessed at VII Corps (heavy howitzers are very effective against them; also gasoline poured in ventilator shafts). In sector of XXXIX Corps, heavy losses were sustained by First Mt. Div. Morale of troops very good; all are imbued with a sense of superiority over the enemy.

It was good to see the general convictions among our troops that they can get the better of the enemy tanks. In some instances, enemy crews are reported to abandon the tanks, in others they keep on fighting until they are burned to death in their tanks. As over against the campaign in the West, our troops seem at last to have learnt to make effective use of their heavy Inf. weapons against a stubbornly resisting enemy.

Inf. Supply ~~Clas~~ have proved very useful. — Everybody wants semi-automatic weapons and telescopic sights. — Close combat training has paid its way.

Russian attack method: three-minute artillery barrage, then pause, then Infantry attacking as much as twelve ranks deep, without heavy weapon support; the men start hurrahing from far off. Incredibly high Russian losses.

Casualties up to 3 July:

|         |        |                           |   |
|---------|--------|---------------------------|---|
| Wounded | 38,809 | (including 1,403 Officers | ) |
| Killed  | 11,822 | (including 724 Officers   | ) |

Missing 3,961 (including 66 Officers)

---

Total losses about 54,000 = 2,15% of 2,5 Million.

The large number of medical casualties, (almost 54,000), practically equalling bloody casualties, is quite remarkable.

Larger proportion of officer casualties than in preceding campaigns.

Proportion officer casualties in the Russian campaign to-date: 3,8% wounded, 6,6% killed, 1,7% missing.

In the Western Campaign: Officer casualties were 3,1% wounded, 4,85% killed, 2% missing.

In the Polish Campaign: Officer casualties were 1,95% wounded, 4,6% killed, 1,35% missing.

In the afternoon, long talk with Gen. Gause, OKH Liaison Off. to - Italian High Command Libya, summoned from North Africa.

Summary:

a) Personal relations are complicated by Gen. Rommel's character and his inordinate ambition. The desired relationship of mutual confidence between Gause and Rommel has not been established. Rommel's character defects make him extremely hard to get along with, but no one cares to come out in open opposition, because of his brutality and the backing he has on top level. The Italians at first met Gause with suspicion, but now are friendlier. Incidentally, Roatta's insincerity also was an aggravating factor in this connection.

This obviously bungled situation might be rectified by modifying the mission of Gause's staff in the process of changing the command set-up (formation of an Armd. Gp. Rommel).

b) The situation at Bardia and Solum continues tight. The British have withdrawn after their last defeat, but it appears entirely possible, that they might repeat their attack toward the end of July. The weather then is said to be no worse than it was at the time of the last attack, when the British used 400 tanks and 2 Inf. Divs. By the end of July they may be in a position to put into the field 600 tanks and 3 Inf. Divs. It is a question whether the German forces then will be able to hold, for even at the last British attack it was touch and go. If there is another offensive, we shall have to reckon with attacks out of Tobruk, too.

c) The problem of transport now as ever is the dominating factor in the North African situation. Nothing has materially changed. We now do use the direct route to Bengasi, but German-Italian shipping space is

visibly diminishing. Strangely, Gause thinks it would be possible to substitute land transport for our dwindling shipping tonnage. I thoroughly disagree.

#### Evening situation.

South: In Romania \* there has been a sudden change to optimism. Eleventh Army is reported to be advancing briskly and has pushed Advance Combat Teams toward the Dniestr in the XI Corps sector. A surprise thrust is planned against the bridge at Mogilev Podolsky. XXX Corps is to continue its attacks. The Romanians are to swing eastward south of the Dniestr. With road conditions improving, Seventeenth and Sixth Armies are pressing on in frontal advance. The northern wing of Armd. Gp. 1 is fighting inside the enemy positions.\*\* The German Divs. advancing in the Pripet area are moving ahead at a fair pace, without enemy contact.

Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is encountering stiff opposition on its right wing, at Rogachev. Attack from the direction of Gomel against its right wing. On its left wing there is still fighting between the Beresina and the Dniepr. Central sector of Armd. Gp. is on the Dniepr.

North: Highly gratifying progress. Hoeppner has gained more ground to the north and has inflicted heavy losses on the enemy. Sixteenth Army is moving to the right, to safeguard the right flank already now. Eighteenth Army is turning off its left wing northward, to occupy Estonia.

Finland: Unchanged. Of 163rd Div., only the last Regt.\*\*\* has been detached to Salla.

7 July 1941. (16th Day.)

Situation: South: Yesterday's optimism in Eleventh Army, has vanished. XI Corp is again held back. The reasons are not apparent. Seventeenth Army is getting along well and is concentrating its Advance Combat Teams against Proskurov. Wietersheim's Corps, leading the Army, has spread itself surprisingly far to the south (road conditions?).# Sixth Army continues to advance, led on its left wing by Armd. Gp. 1, of which only the southern wing appears to have made any sizeable penetration into the enemy position west of Minsk, ## whereas its northern wing is still fighting in the pillbox line. The Inf. wing of Sixth Army on the southern edge of the Pripet Marshes is advancing nicely.

The enemy is trying with all means to extricate his forces out of the pocket in the process of being formed by Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. It seems that he is retreating behind the Dniepr, but we have no conclusive

evidence as yet. The numerous movements in the rear area between the Dniepr and the position to the west could well be shipments of materials and the concentration of large reserves, which would have to be assembled in the area south of Kiev, if he intends to hold the position.

Center: The enemy on our Dniepr front is still fighting hard and stubbornly against Armd. Gp. 2 at Orsha, and is shifting reinforcements from the south to the Dniepr Line.

On the Dvina front, Hoth's left wing has gained elbow-room on the northern bank of the river and, by swinging up-river, is endeavoring to move its entire front across the river. This situation offers the big chance for carrying forward our operation. Second and Ninth Armies are following closely behind the Armd. Gps.

North: Operations are proceeding according to plan, which means that a strong right Inf. wing is taking over flank cover against Nevel, thus freeing Armor for the regrouping against Leningrad.

Enemy: Apart from our uncertainty about enemy intentions in the South -- is he or is he not retreating behind the Dniepr -- there is still the open question whether the observed larger enemy movements in the Briansk -- Orel -- Kursk area are for the purpose of massing strength or are destined for the evacuation of industries. Radio intelligence indicates that there are still four enemy Corps Hqs in the Pripet Marshes in front of Reichenau's left wing. However, we have no clear idea of the location of the combat troops, as XVII Corps, advancing through the marshland has lost contact with the enemy.

Summary: At the moment the best chances of success are on the front of left wing of AGp. Center (Armd. Gp. 3). To the north, the enemy group Velikie Luki is less active than one would have expected after the large movements to that sector in the past few days. Since, moreover, the right wing of AGp North is advancing well, and so holds this enemy group in check, Hoth may have a chance to roll up the Vitebsk positions from the north, and so open up a great operational opportunity.

If the enemy in the South falls back behind the Dniepr, such an opening might prove very valuable, since it could initiate a north-south operation east of the Dniepr.\*

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance We are beginning to run short of aircraft for long-range reconnaissance. OKH Staffeln take over the Estonian area to relieve AGp. North. In return, AGp. North does reconnaissance in the area between Leningrad and Moscow for us. OKH aircraft continues to cover the area Briansk -- Orel -- Kursk and the Pripet Marshes.

Lt. Col. Buerkner (Eng. Sec.) reports on current business of his section. New Artillery School to meet replacement requirements for Artillery officers. -- Courses for selection of

officer candidates from NCO ranks. -- Analysis of results of final examination of Officer Schools, for selection of War Academy candidates. -- Supply of periodical military publications to the front will be suspended during operations.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Trunk-line net-work is well organized up to Dvina and Pripet line; there is of course the gap made by the Pripet area.
- b) Withdrawal of signal units from the "Barbarossa front" for eventual assignment to Libya and Syria.  
Refused for the present !

Heusinger comes with a report that the breakthrough in the central sector of AGp. is now under way. Eleventh Armd. Div. is clean through the enemy positions east of Polonnoje and is pushing right through fleeing Russian columns in the direction of Berdichev. Sixteenth Armd. Div. is at Starokonstantinov (fighting in progress). Ninth Armd. Div. now is engaged in a major tank battle at Proskurov. -- Question of future command set-up. On the northern wing unified command is necessary for VII, XXIX, III (mot.) Corps. Sixth Army and Armd. Gp. 1 must swing to the south-east. Eleventh Army has crossed the Dniestr near Mogilev (railroad bridge has been made usable for the crossing). 22nd Div. had heavy losses by a tank attack.

1700 Message that Eleventh Armd. Div. has reached Berdichev. A very gratifying success. Whether this will furnish an adequate basis for the enveloping movement to the south-east, is not yet quite clear at the moment.

1900 Talk with Heusinger on consequences of the breakthrough to Berdichev for our plans. Bridgehead of Eleventh Army across the Dniestr has been lost again (only parts of Regt. Brandenburg).

Situation in the evening: The movement in AGp. South seems to be getting on very well. The possibility of an operational breakthrough is developing. Nothing new from the fronts of the other Army Groups. Rain has started again in AGp. Center. Resistance by numerous stray enemy elements west of the Dniepris also reported.

ObdH back from AGp. North brings nothing new. Good impressions of morale and efficiency of troops.

2300 Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (AGp. South) on next moves. The thing tomorrow is to move Armd. Gp. Kleist in such a direction, that we can turn to form the "inner ring" forthwith, resorting to an "outer ring" only if we are compelled to do so. The trouble is that the farther Armor penetrates into enemy territory in such a case, the quicker our Infantry loses contact with them and the enemy forces marked for destruction escape in masses through the resulting gaps.

8 July 1941. ( 17th Day. )

Situation: On the Romanian front our offensive is advancing slowly. Seventeenth Army is pressing on. Armd. Gp. 1 wants to move XIV Corps to Eleventh Armd. Div. in order to use it for the encirclement of the enemy in front of Seventeenth Army. III Corps is fighting its way through the fortified line at Zvyagel and to the south. Sixth Army is pushing on close behind.

AGp. Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is battering its way to the Beresina, partly against aggressive enemy resistance. It reports bitter enemy counter attacks with tanks particularly against its northern wing from the direction of Orsha. Advance elements of Armd. Gp. 3 have crossed the Dvina at several points and are fighting for maneuvering space in the direction of Vitebsk while repelling counter-attacks from the north. The Inf. Armies are following, with strong forces on the outer wings and commendable depth in center.

AGp. North is fighting hard and soon will have gained freedom of movement to the north (Armd. Gp. 4), and now is committing Inf. arriving from the right wing, to replace the forces of Armd. Gp. 4 detached for covering the east flank.

The Inf. Armies are pressing on in rapid marches on a wide front and with great depth, with their Advance Combat Teams following closely behind the Armor. On the left wing of Eighteenth Army, it was possible to use sections of the railroad in moving Inf. quickly to the north, into Estonian territory.

1100 Kinzel: Review of enemy situation:

Of 164 identified Rifle Divisions, 89 have been totally or largely eliminated:

46 Russian Combat Divs. are on this front.

18 are tied down in other theaters (Finland 14, Caucasus 4).

11 are possibly still in reserve, in the rear.

Of 29 identified Armd. Divs., 20 have been totally or largely eliminated ; 9 still have full fighting strength.

The enemy is no longer in a position to organize a continuous front, not even behind strong terrain features. At the moment the apparent plan of the Red Army High Command is to check the German advance as far to the west as possible by draining our strength with incessant counter attacking with all available reserves. In pursuing this policy they evidently have grossly overestimated German losses.

Meanwhile we must reckon with the attempt to activate new units, with which they might eventually stage an offensive. The plan of a large-scale disengagement is nowhere discernible.



Activation of new units, certainly on any larger scale, will fail for lack of officers, specialists and Artillery materiel. This holds particularly for their Armor, which even before the war was sadly lacking in officers, drivers and radio operators, as well as signal equipment.

In the individual Army Groups, the situation works out as follows:

North, which at the start of the campaign was numerically equal to the enemy, definitely outnumbered him after annihilation of numerous enemy Divs. on its front; this superiority applies to both Inf. and Armor.

Center which was stronger from the start now has a crushing superiority and can maintain it even if the enemy, as is expected, should bring new units to that front.

South, which in the beginning was noticeably weaker in numbers, now has equal strength, due to the heavy losses inflicted on the enemy, and soon will add numerical to tactical and operational superiority.

1230 Report to the Fuehrer ( at his Hq):

ObdH first presents the latest tactical reports. I follow with an estimate of the enemy situation and an operational appraisal of our situation, and review the operational questions on which a decision must now be made: Continuance of the encircling operation in AGp. South. Start in AGp. Center of the battle of envelopment with strong outer wings against the Dniepr - Dvina line, calculated to crack the triangle Orsha - Smolensk - Vitebsk. Conduct of operations by AGp. North against Leningrad and start of operations by the Finns. A discussion follows.

Result:

- 1.) The Fuehrer has in mind the following " perfect solution", which should be aimed at:

AGp. North accomplishes with its own forces the missions assigned it in the original operational plan.

AGp. Center, by a pincer attack, will force the last organized resistance group north of the Pripet Marshes out of the overextended Russian front and thus opens the road to Moscow. Once the two Armd. Gps. have reached the areas assigned to them by the operational plan,

- a) Hoth can be halted (to assist von Leeb, if necessary) or else continue operating in an eastern direction, e.g., with a view to investing Moscow, but not proceeding to an assault of the city).
- b) Guderian can strike in a southern or southeastern direction, east of the Dniepr river, cooperating with AGp. South.

2.) It is the Fuehrer's firm decision to level Moscow and Leningrad, and make them uninhabitable, so as to relieve us of the necessity of having to feed the populations through the winter. The cities will be razed by Air Force. Tanks must not be used for the purpose, "A national catastrophe which will deprive not only Bolshevism, but also Muscovite nationalism of their centers."

3.) Details:

- a) The draft operational plans of the Army Groups are approved. An added feature is the stressed importance on cutting off the Leningrad area from the southeast and east with the strong right wing of Hoeppner's Armd. Gp. This idea is sound.
- b) After destroying the Russian Armies in a battle at Smolensk \*, we shall block the railroads across the Volga, occupy the country as far as that river and, after that, proceed to destroy the remaining Russian industry centers by Armd. expeditions and air operations.
- c) Preparations must now be made for housing our troops during the winter. Our troops must not be quartered in villages and towns, because we want to be able to bomb them at any time in the event of uprisings.
- d) Reduction of the Italian contingent for the East is opposed (it was to be reduced in favor of Libya). A special point should be made of giving the Italian troops a big reception on arrival. With Italian troops at the German front, a visit by Mussolini to the Fuehrer's Hq may be expected.

4.) Tanks: The Fuehrer explains why he is keeping the new tanks coming off production concentrated in the ZI. He wants to make sure that we would have brand-new equipment for the missions still ahead, for these will again extend over thousands of kilometers. The tank losses suffered since the beginning of the campaign therefore necessitate a reduction in the number of Armd. Divs. The personnel so freed will make up the crews for the new tanks in the ZI. He envisages the following operations:

- a) Norway: Safeguarding of the "Norwegian flank". Required for this purpose: two Armd. Divs. Could use captured tanks.
- b) Anatolia. Against the British land route in the Middle East. For this purpose we need at least four Armd. Divs. One of these (2nd Armd.Div.?) should be sent as soon as possible to the Bulgare - Turkish border, as a warning to Turkey, which is again getting too frisky.

c) Spain /Portugal. Against the potential British threat. To counter this threat, at least four Armd. Divs. are required. One should go to France soon, to bolster our prestige there and show the world that Germany still has forces available over and above what is needed in the Russian theater.

d) In North Africa we shall confine ourselves to reinforcing the German Divs. there, improving supply and establishing a supply base. (Raise number of Tank Bns. in Armd. Div. to three.)

After we plead the urgent requirements of the front, Fuehrer releases from the tanks stored in the ZI: 70 tanks III, 15 tanks IV and the Czech tanks as materiel replacements for the Russian front.

Wagner (Gen Qu) reports on supply situation. It is fairly satisfactory everywhere. The railroads are handling more freight than we ever dared hope. Only on the line Brest-Minsk results fall behind expectations. The objectives of the next operations are logistically assured.

For the time being we have sufficient 60-ton Truck Cms.; rest days for attending to maintenance, so as to avoid excessive wear of the tracks, are necessary and we can afford them.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air reconnaissance: New heavy transport movements toward the Dniepr near Orsha, from the direction of Moscow and Briansk ( 1 - 2 Divs.).

Apart from rearward railroad movements in northeastern and northern direction on Hoepfner's front, no movements of operational significance.

Evening situation: New development: On the northern wing of AGp. South, the "Stalin Line" has been breached by III Corps. Advances continue in all other sectors.

In AGp. Center, fighting is still going on in the approaches to the Dniepr (Guderian). The offensive will start on 10 July. Hoth has made further good progress on the northern bank of the Dvina in the direction of Vitebsk.

Particularly gratifying are the advances of AGp. North, where Armor on the defensive front facing east is now being relieved by Inf., and Armd. Gp. is concentrating against the north. Hoepfner had made good strides in the northward advance, and has reached Pskov. On the western wing of AGp. (Eighteenth Army) Ullersperger has taken Paernu with the bridge intact. The entire AGp. is pressing on behind Armd. Gp. 4 in forced marches and with Advance Combat Teams far ahead.

Orders are issued to AGp. North on the next moves against Leningrad; to AGp. South on the closing of the pocket now forming on Seventeenth Army front and the advance of the northern wing on Kiev; to Finland, with the request to launch the offensive on 10 July.

Presentation of air photographs by the two pilot officers who flew over Briansk, Orsha and Gomel to day. (Long-range Recon. Staff of OKH).

9 July 1941. 18th Day.

Situation: South: Eleventh Army is forging ahead to the Dniestr according to plan, and is preparing for a crossing at Mogilev. In this operation the balance of strength is as follows:

The German XXX Corps ( 5 German, 3 Romanian Divs.) is opposed by three enemy Inf. Divs. (elements ) and II Armored Corps ( 2 Armd. Divs., one mot.Div.). The German XI Corps ( three German Divs., one Romanian Cav. Corps) is opposed by one Russian Division drawn up on both sides of Mogilev.\* On the flank of both Corps we must figure with two Russian mot. Divs. and elements of two Inf.Divs. This means, that apart from Armor, the German-Romanian assault force is stronger. The Romanians are fighting surprisingly well.

Seventeenth Army is advancing eastward against the Stalin Line \*\* in good and deep formation. Marching slowed down by cloudbursts and fatigue of our troops.

Sixth Army is pushing its right wing behind Armd.Gp. 1 on Berdichev, impeded by the transverse movement of XIV Corps, which is shifting from the south to Berdichev. Armd. Gp. 1 now has breached the Stalin Line with III Corps at Zvyagel , and is advancing on Zhitomir with three Armd.Divs., one behind the other. The northern wing of Sixth Army is following closely, with the objective Kiev.

Center: Armd. Gp. 2 is closing to the Dniepr, according to plan. On the northern wing, very bitter enemy counter attacks from the direction of Orsha against Seventeenth Armd. Div. Our troops repulsed them, knocking out 100 enemy tanks, with minor own tank losses but more serious losses in men. This engagement held up Seventeenth Armd. Div. and kept it from catching up with Guderian's main attacking force south of Orsha. It will now be relieved by Twelfth Armd.Div. of Armd.Gp. 3. Second Army is closing up behind Armd. Gp. 2 with Advance Combat Teams and follows with its Corps in good formation. Armd. Gp.3, north of the Dvina, is in rapid advance on Vitebsk and is now fighting 7 km west of the city. The enemy is bringing up reinforcements from Smolensk to Vitebsk by rail and on trucks, Ninth Army is closing up behind Hoth with remarkable speed and in good order. Also von Leeb's right wing is forging ahead with strong forces north of the Dvina in the direction of Hoth's left wing, to protect his flank in case of counter attacks from the direction of Nevel.\*\*\*

North is advancing and closing to Pskov. Eighteenth Army, which yesterday took Paernu, now has also captured Fellin.

Enemy: The large transport movement from the southeast and east to Smolensk, noted yesterday, is beginning to show its effects around Vitebsk. At Smolensk, where dense transport movements have arrived from three directions there seems to be a major traffic jam; the lines are choked with trains which apparently cannot be unloaded. Motorized movements from the east toward the Dniepr on both sides of Mogilev. No new developments in the sector of AGp. South.

AGp. Center submits a final report on the twin battle Bialystok - Minsk. AGp. states its opponents were four Russian armies, comprising 32 Rifle Divs., 8 Armd. Divs., 6 moto.-mcz. Brigs. and Cav. Divs. Out of this total it has destroyed 22 Rifle Divs. 7 Armd. Divs., 6 moto.-mcz. Brigs. and 3 Cav. Divs. The remaining Divs. were severely crippled by very high bloody losses. Figures counted up to 8 July: 289,874 prisoners (including several Corps CG and Div. Commanders); 2,585 captured and destroyed tanks (including heaviest types); 1,449 guns; 246 airplanes. Also large quantities of small arms, ammunition and vehicles.

Radio intelligence shows the following enemy command set-up (from north to south\*):

Russian AGp. Northwest, with 8th, 27th, 11th Armies (from north to south).

Russian AGp. West, with 22nd, 20th, 13th Armies.

Russian AGp. Southwest, with 5th, 6th, 12th and 2nd Armies and one Armd. Gp.

Report:

- a) Armd. Gp. 3 has taken Vitebsk. Twelfth Armd. Div. and 900th Brig. are now following up in that direction.
- b) Appearance of a strong and still growing enemy group between Orsha and Vitebsk has prompted an order from Army Hq. to Armd. Gp. 2 to put off planned attacks temporarily and instead take over cover of the left wing against enemy attacks and assure contact with Armd. Gp. 3. Armd. Gp. 3 is continuing in the attack.

Gen. Oehquist reports on his trip to Finland. Only minor local changes in the disposition of troops. Plan of attack entirely in line with our ideas. Road network east of Lake Ladoga thin; roads narrow. Air raid damage very small. Morale of the Finnish people is good. Troops are keen to attack.

OQu IV: Military-political matters:

Japan's intentions still obscure. Having first tried to whet Japan's appetite for Singapore we now are busy needling her against Russia. The new policy will take some time to show results.

In France, relations between Abetz and von Stuelpnagel are strained on the question of the volunteers.

Sweden still very reserved. Seems to be disposed toward a pact with Germany, but for the time being has no intention to join the Tripartite Pact.

From Faruk (Egypt) a report has been received that Britain is making preparations for a move from Irak into Iran to seize the oil wells and advance to the north. This sounds quite plausible, for besides giving Britain a better defensive position in the event of a German advance across the Caucasus, it enables her to build up, on Iran territory, an air basis for attacks on the Caucasian oil fields. Moreover, Turkey would then be bounded by British-held territory along her entire southern and eastern frontier and thus could be kept under pressure.

Elaboration of the necessity to capture Gibraltar soon and to begin preparations immediately. I don't think, this is correct. Preparations cannot be made until directly before we march in, that is, when we positively know that we are going to do it. Otherwise Britain simply lets the Spaniards starve to death.

U.S. has the following forces available for immediate action: 6 Inf.Divs., 2 Armd.Divs., 2 Cav. Divs.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Exchange of high power radio equipment between Armd. Gps. and Advance Gen Qu Hqs. -- Activation of signal formations for the Africa Corps. -- No new findings by radio intelligence.

1700 Heusinger: Current business:

- a) Further offensive operations of Fourth Army: Guderian must not be rushed, but should attack only when ready and with definite concentration on one wing, best probably south of Mogilev.
- b) Allocation of GHq Reserves. Part of them (now in AGp. South) must be used for pacification missions in the areas traversed by our advancing Armies.
- c) Exchange of views about the future organization and distribution of forces in occupied Russia after the Russian Armies have been destroyed. Winter preparations must be initiated now.

Gen. Buhle: Rating of Divisions by casualty figures. -- Availability of tanks and activation of new Divisions out of new production. -- "Rehabilitation Bns." \* have proved a good idea. -- Radio direction beams for Africa. -- Armd.Divs. may be replenished with personnel from Inf. Divisions (best from Divisions held back for occupation duty). -- Replacements: The Field Replacement Bns. are largely used up by now.

Gen. Paulus:

- a) Organization in North Africa when Armd.Gp. Rommel is formed. Use Gause's Staff in organizing Hq of Armd. Gp. ObdH wants the Armd. Gp. activated as soon as possible.
- b) Questions of the organization of road construction during the operation. I think that we must have a check-up on how plans are being carried out in the Army areas.

Evening situation: In AGp. South, no reports have come in from Eleventh Army and the Hungarians. Seventeenth Army's advance is slow because the roads are rainsoaked. Sixth Army is slowed down for the same reason; its northern wing is being moved round the southern edge of the Pripet forest area and will continue north when it reaches Korets. The forest area will be crossed directly only by mounted patrols. Reason: Run-down condition of the horses.

The burning question now is the further employment of Armd. Gp. 1. AGp. states its intention to strike with its northern group (III Corps) for Kiev and with the bulk of the Armd. Gp. for Belaya Tserkov, and then to push in southern or southeastern direction.

In the meantime the Fuehrer has called up ObdH and told him that he wants Armd. Gp. to swing the elements which have penetrated to Berdichev, to the south, in the direction of Vinnitsa, in order to effect an early junction with Eleventh Army. At the evening situation conference with ObdH, this leads to an agitated exchange about the direction in which Armd.Gp. 1 ought to be moved. My standpoint is as follows:

We must on no account ignore Kiev. There is so much evidence of enemy confusion, what chances to take Kiev by some sort of surprise thrust: look good; the enemy is building several ponton bridges there, which means that he is preparing a retreat precisely on Kiev. If this estimate, however, should prove wrong, then we must use no armor in the battle for Kiev. All Divs. moving behind Thirteenth Armd.Div. in the direction of Zhitomir could then be brought to bear advantageously against Belaya Tserkov and help block the roads and railroads leading to the Lower Dniestr.

For the Armd. forces advancing south of III Corps (mot.), the immediate objective is Belaya Tserkov, in order to strike from there to the south (not to the southeast at first) in the direction of Uman, into the enemy's rear. In that case it will be indicated to direct the right wing of Eleventh army toward Uman. Should it become necessary to advance from Berdichev toward Vinnitsa i.e. on the inner ring, the Armd. Divs. following behind Eleventh Armd. Div. could always do that on their commander's own initiative.

Thus the ring to be formed will run from Berdichev through Belaya Tserkov and to the sector of Eleventh Army. Sealing the ring is the primary objective. Kiev and the Dniepr crossings south of Kiev are secondary objectives.

ObdH outlines this scheme to the Fuehrer. He does not object, but apparently is not yet converted and emphasizes that he expects nothing from the Kiev operation.

AGp. Center: Armd. Gp. 3 has broken through the enemy's Dvina position in the direction of Vitebsk. Enemy movements from Vitebsk in the direction of Velizh and slackening of enemy pressure round Senno suggest that the enemy might be trying to disengage. I don't see it. Nor, in my opinion, can the reported heavy movements of the enemy from Orsha to Smolensk be interpreted as a positive indication that the enemy is abandoning the dry route Orsha-Vitebsk. In order to exploit the success of Armd. Gp. 3, to the fullest extent, XXIII Corps, with 3 Divisions and the Training Brigade (900th) are being moved behind it.

Owing to the easing of enemy pressure around Senno, the attack of Armd. Gp. 2 can be launched as planned, namely, on 10 July, with line of departure from Stary Bykhov to the north. Second and Ninth Armies are continuing their advance.

AGp. North: Armd. Gp. 4 is approaching the line Porkhov-Pog, but will not push beyond this line in the direction of Leningrad before LVI Corps has moved closer to XXXXI Corps by swinging northeast.

Eighteenth Army is to detach elements for a northward drive on Dorpat (airport). The right wing of Sixteenth Army will remain in the offensive in order to cover Armd. Gp. 3 against enemy attacks from the direction of Nevel.

Conference with Heusinger and Paulus on direction of the battle of encirclement of AGp. South. Their ideas are in substantial accord with mine.

Telephone conference with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S AGp. South) on my ideas concerning direction of the battle of encirclement. I give explicit orders not to turn initially southeast from Belaya Tserkov, but to let strike toward Uman to effect encirclement.

They should make a try at Kiev but, if surprise is not achieved, must not risk Armor against the city.

10 July 1941. (19th Day.)

Finns launch offensive.

0130 ObdH calls. The Fuehrer has again rung him up. He cannot put his mind at rest for fear that Armor might be committed



against Kiev and so needlessly sacrificed (Kiev has 35% Jews, we won't get the bridges in any case). The encircling ring is to run from Berdichev through Vinnitsa to Eleventh Army.

Accordingly, the following order goes out to AGp. South: The Fuehrer does not want Armor to be brought to bear against Kiev, beyond what is necessary for reconnaissance and security. Furthermore, he wants the immediately available forces of Armd. Gps. 1 to strike from Berdichev on Vinnitsa in order to link up with Eleventh Army as soon as possible and encircle the enemy forces fronting Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies. Only those forces of Armd.Gp. 1 which are not needed or not adapted for this purpose will strike for Belaya Tserkov and then to the south.

Total of Army casualties (excl. medical casualties) up to 6 July, 1941:

Wounded 42,755 ( 1,588 ); killed 13,869 ( 829 ); missing 5,010 (81); total 61,634 ( 2,498 ).

Figures in parenthesis refer to officers; they are not included in the totals.

Situation South: Slow progress. Russian II Armd. Corps (two Armd.Divs. and one mot.Div.) attacks from Kishinev into the flank of the Romanian Fourth Army in the direction of Jasy and Balty. The attacks are repelled. A Russian Cav. Corps is reported further to the south. Plans of Eleventh Army remain unchanged. No new developments elsewhere in AGp. South.

Center: Guderian: Third Armd.Div. has been relieved by Cav. Div. and three Advance Combat Teams, and so is free to join the assault group. Attack on Stari Bykhov has started at 0500. (Later report: lodgement gained on eastern bank; bridge construction in progress at noon). At Shklov, Eleventh\* and Seventh Armd.Divs., reinforced by Seventeenth Armd.Div. will attack on 11 July. Enemy at Ulla is trapped. Vitebsk railroad bridge is not destroyed. Hoth's left wing unchanged.

North: Stiffening opposition on front of the northernmost elements of XXXXI Corps. Otherwise operations continue according to plan.

Enemy situation: Many trains standing on the line between Vinnitsa and Kiev. Between Vinnitsa and Kalinovka alone, 10,000 railroad cars and 40 locomotives. Yesterday, between 0620 and 1800 retrograde movements from Orsha to Smolensk. Many trains standing still. Two more enemy Divs. have arrived from the Caucasus since 8 July.

Over-all picture introduces no new elements in our estimate.

1100 ObdH calls up from Hq AGp. South:

Early this morning, ObdH received the following teletype

from the Fuehrer:

"I think it advisable and necessary, on reaching the line Zhitomir - Berdichev, to swing the leading elements of Armd.Gp. 1 promptly to the south in order to prevent the enemy from retreating over the Bug river and to the south of Vinnitsa and, if possible, by thrusting across the Bug, effect a junction with Eleventh Army. -- The rear elements of Armd.Gp. must protect this movement against attacks from Kiev, but will not make any attack into the city. Should it become apparent that there are no large bodies of enemy troops left to cut off west of the Bug, Armd.Gp. 1 will be massed for an advance on Kiev and the Dniepr line to the southeast. Investment must be executed in such a way as to bar enemy reinforcements from reaching the city from the northwest."

Field Marshal von Rundstedt's analysis: Overtaking the enemy in pursuit means striking far ahead. If the ring runs through Vinnitsa it becomes too close. Seventeenth Army has completely lost contact with the enemy, which means he has already withdrawn far to the rear. On the other hand, Army Gp. believes that there are substantial enemy forces in the area southwest and south of Belaya Tserkov, which seem to be moving on Kiev and to the area southeast of the city. In taking Belaya Tserkov, we should be astride the retreat routes to Kiev. von Rundstedt hopes to engage large enemy forces there, and then to be able to advance in a southwestern direction, to link up with Eleventh Army. -- If this should prove inadvisable, we still would have two courses of action open to us: either advance in a southeastern and southern direction, west of the Dniepr, or across the Dniepr at Kiev and to the southeast and then drive on east.

This conception of Army Gp., with which ObdH agrees, differs from the solutions envisaged by the Fuehrer. It is a compromise between the two alternatives outlined by the Fuehrer. ObdH will make no decision that would not have the Fuehrer's approval. It is now up to me to get the Fuehrer to agree.

1130 After unsuccessfully trying to get the sleeping Fuehrer to the phone, I have Field Marshal Keitel called and explain the plans to him, emphasizing:

- a) that OKH has been directed by the Fuehrer to destroy the largest possible portions of the enemy west of the Dniepr, so as to prevent any possibility of a coordinated operation by large enemy forces east of the river, and
- b) that the capabilities of Eleventh Army must be rated so low that no plans could be made which rest on Eleventh Army as a dependable partner in a paired attack.

1230 Phone call from OKW (Christian): The Fuehrer approves the proposed plan, but wants us to make sure that nothing untoward happens on the north flank of Armd.Gp.

This answer is transmitted to ObdH at 1300.

Field Marshal von Bock on phone:

- a) Success of Guderian's attack; they are already building a bridge.
- b) Hoth is in Vitebsk with two Armd.Divs. This afternoon yet he wants to continue the drive with these two Divs. from Vitebsk, and with Twelfth and Thirteenth Divs., south of Vitebsk.
- c) Guderian will attack north of Mogilev on 11 July.
- d) The commitment of Fourth Army Hq complicates the command set-up.
- e) Condition of the troops: Morale excellent. Horses are worn out.
- f) Air action against railroad installations in the rear: Our urgings have caused bad feelings. That will straighten itself out.  
Air reconnaissance : Of the long-range Rcn.Staffeln of Army Gp. (apart from those at Armd.Divs.) one has only three operational craft left, the other one is down to nothing. Night Rcn.Staffel has two craft in operating condition. In the circumstances, Air Fleet has offered to combine Army and Air Force reconnaissance. I emphatically advise against such an arrangement and recall the controversies between ObdH and ObdL before the start of the offensive.

Col. Metz (Liaison Off., Eleventh Army). Report on situation on the Romania front: Road conditions very difficult. -- Russian tactics the same as in other sectors of the eastern theater; excellent in camouflage. -- Bad luck of 193th Div., where Inf. went ahead without waiting for its AT Bn., and ran into heavy enemy tank attack.

Description of the Russian Dniestr position. Ultra-modern installations, partly with steel cupolas. Behind it, on the railroad line Vinnitsa-Odessa a new position is under construction; the materials are brought to it by rail. Three more days will be needed to reach the Dniestr river, then two days to prepare for the attack. Accordingly the attack could not very well start before 15 July.

1700 ObdH returned from AGp. South. Short review of what he learned; nothing essentially new.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Material on Russia's economic production (new maps).-- Report on conference at Hq AGp. North.
- b) AGp. North: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the Dvina.  
AGp. Center: Main supply base has been shifted forward to the line Borisov-Dniepr.  
AGp. South: Situation at present not yet settled enough for firm planning.

- c) Cooperation of the AGp. Eng. Commanders with the OQu on road construction is apparently not quite what it ought to be.
- d) Worries about volume of traffic on railroad line to Minsk (has dropped off badly in the last few days).
- e) Sixty-ton Truck Clms. have 25% losses.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Enemy situation: Shifting and reduction of forces on front of AGp. Center. Clogged lines in the South.
- b) Strength of enemy air force: Of about 1,500 operational planes, about 500 are estimated to be committed on each of the AGp. fronts.
- c) Enemy AAA concentrated in triangle Vitebsk-Orsha-Smolensk, at Gomel and north of Korosten-Kiev.
- d) Major concentration of enemy planes: Lake Ilmen; north and south of Smolensk; Korosten; Kiev; Vinnitsa; Uman.

von Ziehlberg: Clausius affair.-- Decorations (Iron Cross, Cross of Merit, Bulgarian decorations).-- Current matters.

Evening situation:

No new developments in AGp. South. Intentions in line with today's conversation with ObdH.

In AGp. Center all battles are still in progress. Intensive enemy movements; for the time being one would be inclined to interpret them as troop movements to hard-pressed sectors of the front, rather than withdrawal movements.

Enemy rear position located on the Sozh river line. Air Force has for the first time succeeded in destroying important enemy railroad lines.

Later reports from Armd.Gp. 2 strengthen the impression that the enemy is withdrawing at least part of his forces from the Dniepr front, to the east. Movements observed on roads and railroads.

AGp. North. No important news. Intentions unchanged. Thrust on Leningrad and Estonian ports, with Sixteenth Army covering the east flank in the line Velikie Luki - Porkhov.

11 July 1941. ( 20 th Day )

Situation South: Russian pressure on Schobert's right flank and right wing has apparently resulted in a weakening of the Romanian contingent. Eleventh Army reports that it regards

these elements disabled for attacking. A "new operation" against Kishinev is considered necessary. We shall have to watch that this "operation" is limited at most to LIV Corps, and does not result in dissipation of strength.

Center: Guderian's attack has started and come through. We have no reports on Hoth's planned attack at Berdichev, but the over-all enemy situation indicates that hastily gathered elements is all the enemy can put up against us. It has been learned that broken Divs. withdrawing from the front are filled up with partly untrained replacements rushed to the front, and immediately committed to battle again. At Nevel the enemy has set up a big straggler collecting point which is feeding to the front-line Divs. totally disorganized masses of men, without officers and NCO's. Under these circumstances it is clear that the front, which also has no more reserves left, cannot hold much longer, despite the attempt to give that front apparently at least a backbone of energetic leadership by introducing a number of new tactical Hqs (AHQs). These new Hqs cannot make their presence felt and desperately radio thru the whole ether to establish contact with their Divisions. I do not share the opinion that the enemy in front of AGp. Center is falling back (this opinion evidently originates in the Armd.Cps., not at AGp. Hq). He is making an effort to hold, but he is cracking in the attempt.

But there is one question which neither this battle of Smolensk will settle for us and that is the question of the enemy's Armor. In every instance, large bodies, if not all, manage to escape encirclement, and in the end, their Armor may well be the only fighting force left to the Russians for carrying on the war. The strategy of that war would have to be visualized on the basis of operations by two or three major and perhaps some subsidiary groups of Armor, supported by industrial centers and peacetime garrisons, and by the remnants of the Russian Air Force.

North: Enemy attacks against Hoepfner have been beaten back and preparations are made for continuing the drive to the area southeast of Leningrad, with a strong right wing. In the Estonian theater, more advances against merely local resistance. At last we have succeeded in rousing in AGp. North some interest also in Dorpat. On the right wing, there is more tough fighting against the enemy group apparently based on Nevel, but this does not seriously interfere with the movements of AGp. for massing in a northward direction.

Enemy: Air Force now seems to have succeeded in wrecking Russian railroads also far to the rear of the enemy communication zone. The number of lines with immobilized railroad transport is growing most satisfactorily and the good work is being continued. A striking feature are heavy concentrations of rolling stock in the area east of Gomel (Unecha), as well as to the west and southeast of that point. These concentrations seem to consist largely of trains loaded with vehicles and tanks. Either this is an attempt to supply new materiel to crippled Armd.units or an attempt to shift

Armor.

In the area south of Kiev the large accumulations of railroad cars on the railroad lines probably must be interpreted as a blocked large-scale withdrawal movement, which I think is more of the nature of an industrial evacuation, than a troop movement. The enemy is evidently trying to by-pass the blocked lines by routing movements through Odessa and the North. But heavy jams can already be seen on the lower reaches of the Dniepr also (e.g., 34 trains south of Cherkassi).

Field Marshal Keitel calls up at noon. Anxieties of the Fuehrer:

- a) Ninth Armd.Div. and SS Div."Wiking"are closing up too slowly.
- b) The frontal battles of II Corps on von Leeb's right wing, which he wants to have cut short by action from von Bock's left wing. (As a matter of fact, the two Army Gps. do have perfect cooperation.)
- c) Hoepfner's operation (Armd.Gp. 4). He is afraid that it is losing contact with its own Inf. in its heedless push on Leningrad.

Gen. Bogatsch brings the latest aerial photographs. They verify the facts outlined under the heading "Enemy" above.

Col. Ochsner reports on his tour to Guderian's and Hoth's Armd. Gps. Facts worth noting:

- a) Russian air action at the Dvina crossings, southwest of Vitebsk.
- b) Enemy has good leadership. He is fighting with fanaticism and dogged determination.
- c) Our Armor has considerable losses in personnel and materiel. Troops tired.
- d) Leaflet propaganda highly effective.
- e) "Do" Rocket Projector is highly praised. Individual Btrys. go along with advance detachments.-- Large-caliber Projectors are not much used. Ammunition difficulties.
- f) Report that the border area of the old Russian frontier was dotted with barracks and airdromes of the most modern type. Demonstrates Russian gas protection and detection equipment.

Col. Heusinger: Current matters in Op.Sec.-- Supply getting tight in AGp. Center. -- Sector assigned to Italians: between Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies. -- Bridge at Giurgiu .

Telephone talk with Gercke and Wagner: I know about the supply troubles in AGp. Center. But the reason is not the limited

capacity of the railroad, but failure to unload supply trains (Russian rolling stock). In AGp. area, four trains for the Air Force, three trains with Engineer construction materials, and five trains for Armd.Gp. 3 have not been unloaded, with the result that rolling stock runs short. A Gen.Staff Officer of the Transp. Chief's Office will fly to the front tomorrow, to look into the situation. Quite apart from all this it seems that Eckstein's cooperation with Greiffenberg in Hq AGp. Center stands in need of some improvement.

I suppose the crisis will be resolved within two days.

Evening situation: South: The advancing wedge of Armd.Gp. 1 is subjected to heavy attacks from the south and southwest at Berdichev, and from the north at Zhitomir. Thirteenth Armd.Div. has penetrated to Kiev's inner ring of fortifications and turned southward.

Center: Guderian has crossed to the eastern bank of the Dniepr at both points of attack. The enemy is falling back. Hoth at Vitebsk is subjected to furious attacks from the southeast and east and is repelling them. South of Vitebsk, his Twelfth and Seventh Armd.Divs. have reached the Orsha-Vitebsk highway. On the northern flank his forces, put across the Dvina, are gaining elbow-room for him.

North: Hoepfner has made some frontal advances; and now, with the Inf.Divs. arriving from the rear having replaced the Armor on his flank, he is concentrating his forces northward in the direction of Dno. The Armies are following up. Dorpat, for which, alas, only a weak Advance Combat Team was detached (and that too late), is in flames. What a pity about that fine old German city!

Enemy:

- a) The quality of the Russian frontline units is progressively deteriorating. Badly mauled Divs., in many instances, have been reported filled up with untrained replacements.
- b) The best Generals have been sent to lead the Armies at the front: AGp. Northwest, Voroshilov; AGp. West, Timoshenko; AGp. Southwest Budyonny.
- c) Over-all picture:

In the sector of AGp. South, the enemy is trying to check Eleventh Army and Armd.Gp. 1 by counter attacks. In the sector of Seventeenth and Sixth Armies, rear guard fighting is reported. In the sector of AGp. Center no evidence of a general withdrawal, notwithstanding individual disengaging movements. In AGp. North, on the front of Armd.Group, fierce opposition of strong rear guards supported by planes and tanks. The bulk of the enemy forces apparently is being taken back to the east.

12 July 1941. (21th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, in the sector of Eleventh Army, the enemy now seems to be falling back behind the Dniestr also in front of the Romanian wing. As to mobile troops, the commands involved are II Armd. Corps ( 2 Armd. Divs., one mot.) and one Cav. Corps of four Divs.

On the front of Seventeenth Army it has been established that the enemy is making no attempt to hold the Stalin Line.\* Advance Combat Teams of the Army have penetrated into these positions.

Sixth Army has made progress on its southern wing; on its northern wing at Zvyagel, it has beaten off the attacks from the area around Korosten and apparently thrown back the enemy.

Armd. Cp. 1 is engaged in a battle around Berdichev, into which the enemy keeps throwing new elements from the south-east, south and southwest, for the most part Armor. Among these have appeared some units which evidently belonged to the Russian Fifth Army (Mozir) until now.

Fourteenth Armd. Div. has closely followed 13th Armd. Div., reaching out to the south of Kiev in the direction of Belaya Tserkov.

Center: Guderian is across the Dniepr in force. Now he must brace himself for a heavy attack from the south.

Hoth, at Vitebsk, has had to repel bitter attacks from north and east. Also his forces following up along the Dvina are constantly subjected to attacks from the north, from the area around Nevel and Velikie Luki. The enemy elements still fighting south of the Dvina, have been engaged by the Advance Combat Teams of Ninth Army, which, I am pleased to note, is following closely behind Hoth.

Second and Ninth Armies are following up.

North: On the right wing, continued stubborn enemy resistance ( group formed by forces at Nevel). Very difficult terrain.

Elsewhere in this sector the advance continues according to plan. Hoepfner, whose spearheads are growing increasingly tired and weak, has made no substantial advances in the direction of Leningrad. Army Cp's. report that the enemy is "withdrawing" in front of their eastern flank, probably must be taken only in a tactical sense.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air observation shows the effect of our interdiction effort against the enemy railroad system deep in the rear. Dense detouring movements and traffic jams in the railroad network south of Kiev. Jams in the area south of the line Orsha - Smolensk. Choked masses of rail-



road transport in the area between Vitebsk and Smolensk. Intense AA defense in the area around Vitebsk and to the south and southwest, and south of Berdichev.

Gen. Paulus submits aerial photographs of Kiev. The reported bridge constructions require very cautious interpretation: One of these bridges is apparently only under construction, and at present no more than a ponton bridge; two other bridges give the impression of being special installations, perhaps with narrow-gauge lines, for construction projects. A possible explanation is that plans were made for extending the fortifications of Kiev on the eastern bank and that the narrow gauge lines served this purpose. In any case, one does not get the impression of unusually extensive preparations for a large-scale withdrawal.

Reports (Kinzel, 1145):

- a) A field order by Timoshenko threatening court-martial for anybody talking of retreat.
- b) The enemy is moving new forces against both wings of Fourth Army.
  - 1.) From the direction of Gomel, where previous reports located a group of Russian Inf. Divs. which had not been in action so far, a road movement, 100 km long, is in progress in the direction of Mogilev.
  - 2.) It has been learned from a captured Russian order that the new Russian Nineteenth Army, comprising 6 Divs., is to be detrained east of Vitebsk. The Divs., whose Div. numbers are given, were previously on the front of AGp. South. The document, dated 8 July, contains the orders for AAA to safeguard the detraining area.

Reporting out as CO, Guard Bn.: Lt. Col. Kaumann, 3rd Bn. of 284th Inf. (96th Div.)

Reporting in as JO Guard Bn.: Major Mathes (from 162nd Div.).

Gen. Brand (Arty.) reports on his tour to AGp. South:

- a) Enemy Artillery activity slight. Mostly in direct support of Inf., sometimes broken up into platoons. No central fire direction. Fire with air and sound observation poor, with direct observation good. Effect of projectiles good, also moral effect. Many modern Artillery instruments of a design unfamiliar to us.
- b) Very bad roads make it difficult for the Artillery to follow the advance. Condition of horses varies; in some units severely strained. On several occasions Artillery was completely immobilized by rain for 24 hours.

- c) Mobility of Ground Forces AAA improved by allocation of prime movers. But they have no Supply Clms. Good results against pillboxes. Also successful in air defense.
- d) Partly mobile Heavy Howitzer Bns. are merged to make one Bn. mobile. Decision on employment of the remainder only after the fall of Kiev.
- e) In pillbox fighting, Artillery was not very successful, because there was not enough time. But good results in other places. No bursting layers.
- f) Anti-tank fighting: Only one tank type encountered with 130 mm armor; all others not over 70 mm. The heaviest tanks were knocked out by 10 cm guns; less often by 8.8 cm AA guns. Also lt. Fd. Hws. have put out 50-ton tanks with AP projectiles, at 40 m range. Russian tank drivers reported showing little driving skill. Many track failures. Crews nervous when under Artillery fire.
- g) Improper allocation of 15 cm Guns, which were erroneously put under Div.
- h) Karl Gun \* arrived at the front heavier than anticipated. Maximum weight 61 tons. This complicates rail transport and road travel (roadbeds collapse).
- i) Report on Island Fortress Kronstadt, which covers also the land approaches with its guns. The individual forts are built on small islands and so are very difficult to attack.

1400 ObdH calls up! The Fuehrer is again nagging about the slow development of the attack on von Leeb's right wing, and demands that Nineteenth Armd.Div. strike northward to encircle the enemy. In reply I explain: I am by no means advocating any eastward race of the two Armd. Gps. It is quite clear to me that Hoth might have to swing northward with a considerable body of his Gp., to get into the back of the new Russian Nineteenth Army and Group Nevel, and that Guderian might have to swing southward, to encircle the new enemy appearing on his southern wing, perhaps even to push on down to the Kiev area, in order finally to encircle and defeat the Red Fifth Army which keeps popping up in the south. But the prerequisite for either move is that Hoth and Guderian break into the open to the east and so gain freedom of movement.

1800 Heusinger:

- a) Planning on continuance of operations with the object of preventing frontal retreat of the enemy and ensuring liquidation of the largest possible enemy force. The operations are evolved from ideas outlined by me to ObdH, and crystallize first of all in plans for a new drive by Armd.Gp. 3, aiming at liquidating the concentration

of 12 to 14 Divisions now opposing von Leeb's right wing. By taking advantage of the marshland extending southward from Lake Ilmen, which is traversed by very few roads, we should be able to cut off the enemy facing von Leeb's forces. Accordingly, we should have to dispose Armd.Gp. 3 in such a manner that notwithstanding its original mission to reach the area north-east of Smolensk, it would be in a position, by advancing on Velikie Luki and Kholm, to cut off the enemy elements falling back before von Leeb's right wing.

Applying his scheme of thought to the area south of the line Orsha-Smolensk, the northern wing of Armd.Gp. 2 would have to strike for Yelnya, the southern wing, for Roslavl. This southern part would have to be followed in echelon formation by the Cav. Div., relieved by Advance Combat Teams.

- b) Report on intentions of AGp. South:  
The recurrent threat to the northern flank from the direction of Korosten has prompted the decision to push this enemy in a northward direction, away from the advance and supply route Zvyagel-Zhitomir. Von Reichenau wanted the entire III Corps for this mission. Von Rundstedt decided that Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler be placed under his command, while Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs. remain in Armd.Gp. to help carry out investment of Kiev from the south. This decision must be approved despite the consequent temporary disruption of the Armd.Gp.

1900 von Bernuth ( Liaison Off., AGp. South). Report on situation:

- a) At Korosten, a small group put on an attack from the north, on 11 July ( elements of three Divs., which were destroyed). On 12 July, the attack was resumed by considerably larger forces. Units filled up with recruits with two weeks' training. Signs of severe demoralization: White flags ! Attack in mass assaults, under enormous losses.
- b) Berdichev: Eleventh Armd. Div. and 60th mot.Div. have passed to the defensive in the face of heavy enemy attacks from east and south; Sixteenth mot. and Sixteenth Armd.Div. are gaining ground only slowly. -- Air reconnaissance and captured maps indicate existence of concrete road from the area between Zhitomir and Berdichev to Skvira. -- Armd.Gp. hopes to be able to bring the tank battle at Berdichev to a conclusion by 13 July, evening. -- Notwithstanding these enemy attacks, withdrawal movements are going on in direction of Kiev.
- c) Enemy on front of XXXXIV Corps is holding tenaciously in the Stalin Line. Further to the south, the situation is still obscure. Although the Stalin Line is manned, Artillery has not yet become active.
- d) Eleventh Army will attack with XI Corps on 15 July, with XXX Corps probably not before 17 July; the enemy is

evacuating the area between the Pruth and Dniestr.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Question of lateral communications. Next lateral communication line east of the Dniepr.
- b) Methods for overcoming technical difficulties in the use of short waves.
- c) Opposition to attempt of Police to take over control of radio counter-intelligence.
- d) Results of radio intelligence. (Nothing new)

Evening situation: South: Eleventh Army has reached the Dniestr. Based on the right flank. -- The Hungarian mot. Corps is to be assigned to Armd. Gp. Then the Italians will be inserted between Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies.

Center: In Guderian's sector, good progress. Also Hoth is getting on well and is expanding his front to the north. In doing so he is anticipating our wishes.

North: Movements of First and Sixth Divs. are severely hampered by bad roads. Resistance on front of right wing of Sixteenth Army appears to be weakening.

Air Stepped-up enemy activity on front of AGps. South and North. Attack on enemy air-bases ordered for 13 July.

Distribution of enemy air strength : On front of AGp. South, 1.043 planes, which are now scattered all the way to the area east of the Dniepr. On front of AGp. Center, 700, with the bulk in the Orel - Moscow - Vitebsk area. No report on North, on account of bad weather.

von Greiffenberg (AGp. Center ) on phone:

- a) Orientation of our ideas concerning further employment of Armd. Gps. 2 and 3.
- b) He reports that components of the Hq of the Russian Thirteenth Army have been captured. Interrogations of prisoners as well as maps make it clear that our attack across the Dniepr took the enemy completely by surprise. The Army was under orders to defend the river line.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu) on phone.

- a) Report on his flight to AGp. South. Highly satisfied. Armd. Gp. has enough fuel to carry it as far as Kirovograd, and enough ammunition to fight its way across the Dniepr. Continuous supply assured. Motor vehicle maintenance service deserves special praise. Large repair shops have already been set up at Tarnopol, Shepetovka and Rovno.

- b) Center: Situation is still tight. C of S, AGp. is now personally looking into the matter. Misguided initiative on the part of subordinate agencies and lack of compact centralization have resulted in the freezing of rolling stock. It is expected that this situation will be cleared up soon.  
Supplies will maintain Armd. drive to Moscow, Infantry as far as Smolensk (?). -Need 2,000 tons of 60-ton Truck Cms.
- c) North. Supplies adequate. Roads very bad.

13 July 1941. ( 22nd Day.) Sunday.

Situation: AGp. South: In Eleventh Army, pressure on the right flank is perceptibly slackening, as the Russians are falling back before the Romanian (Fourth Army. Now only local Russian attacks.

Seventeenth Army is following in frontal advance; the Stalin Line is said to be held only by weak forces. Contrariwise, reports coming in during the day indicate increasing Artillery fire. According to prisoner statements, the troops in the positions are a jumble of ill-assorted units.

Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1: Fighting at Berdichev continued and let up only toward the evening. It is not yet clear where the enemy, who attacked with strong Armd. forces, has disappeared to. The enemy penetration west of Berdichev has been wiped out. Our hopes, however, that Eleventh Armd.Div. might continue its swift advance in the direction of Belaya Tserkov has been disappointed. Further northward at and to the east of Zhitomir, repeated enemy attacks were repulsed at great cost to the enemy. Thirteenth Armd.Div. and, behind it, Fourteenth Armd. Div. have reached the area west and south of Kiev.

In AGp. Center, Guderian's attack is developing surprisingly well. Misdirection of some units in initial deployment (Third and Seventeenth Armd.Divs. ) is being straightened out. No clear picture yet on employment of the Cav.Div., which should be on the right wing.

Hoth is making gratifying progress east of Vitebsk , gets on well further northeast, but is almost at a standstill on his left wing (Nineteenth Armd.Div.).

AGp. North, has made only slight advances, owing to condition of the roads. The right wing is still attacking, without making headway (II Corps). Some progress in Estonia, but resistance there is stiffening noticeably. More Inf. is closing up in the direction of Lake Ilmen.

1230 Report to Fuehrer ( in his Hq): After ObdH reviews the advances made by the Armies, I report:

- 1.) In the enemy front, which is weakly held or manned by troops of dubious value in some sectors, but surely has no thought of giving ground, now that the new leaders have taken hold, we can make out the following grouping of forces:
  - a) Leningrad: Defense group consisting of forces hastily gathered up and strengthened by improvisations; showing no operational activity. As a first step, it will have to be cut off by a thrust into the Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga area.
  - b) Nevel-Volikiye Luki. This group is about seven Divs. strong, including fresh troops, some of which arrived from the Ukraine and from the interior of Russia in the past few days. It has taken in also some battered units, veterans of the border battles, which were filled up at the straggler collecting point at Nevel. This group is strong and it would pay to mount a special operation to destroy it for good.
  - c) Orsha - Vitebsk - Smolensk. This group includes the enemy elements opposing Armd.Gps. 2 and 3; it has been reinforced on several occasions lately. Nineteenth Army, now in progress of formation east of Vitebsk, also belongs to this group; it is doubtful whether the enemy will be able to complete organization. The group will be attacked and destroyed by the offensive of the Armd.Gps. merged under Fourth Army Hq, which was planned as a pincer movement but for the most part is taking effect as a frontal assault.
  - d) Group Gomel. Has not been attacked by us so far. Substantial portions seem to be moving against Armd. Gp. 2. Calls for no major attention, save that Armd. Gp. 2 must cover its right flank against it.
  - e) Group Korosten (about four Divs.) comes from the Pripet Marshes. It comprises elements which opposed our XVII Corps in the early border battles, and is reinforced by mot. forces. Its strength is occasionally put at as much as 4 Corps Hqs, but I have my doubts; the estimates are based on radio intelligence (deception?). This group as well as the one at Gomel can be cut off only in the course of the development of our movements, that is, with AGp. South also across the Dniepr, and Armd.Gp. 2 cooperating from the north. For the present we must confine ourselves to containing it.
  - f) Group Kiev. It must be liquidated by the envelopment operation started by AGp. South west of the Dniepr, or, if we see no prospects of success here, by envelopment east of the Dniepr.

- 2.) Next objects: We shall temporarily halt the dash toward Moscow by AGps. 2 and 3, with the object of destroying a maximum of enemy strength on the present front. To this end Armd.Gps. 2 and 3 will be headed for the area northeast and southeast of Smolensk in such way as to enable Gp. 2, by striking for Velikie Luki and Kholm, to cut off the enemy group mentioned under b), and Gp. 3, to swing southward.

In AGp. South, Sixth Army will try with 25th mot. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler to destroy parts at least of Group Korosten, and concurrently, with the bulk of Armd.Gp. 1, by pushing the enveloping tank wing on Belaya Tserkov, to liquidate the enemy southwest of Kiev.

The Fuehrer approves the plans submitted. Particulars stressed by him:

- a) A quick advance to the east is less important than smashing the enemy's military strength.
- b) AGp. North must see its foremost object in breaking through north of Lake Ilmen, to close the gap to Lake Ladoga, and south of Lake Ilmen, to block the route at Staraya Russa.
- c) The enemy Group opposite the right wing of von Leeb's AGp. (referred to above under b) must be attacked from the rear by mot. forces of Armd.Gp. 3. Leeb must not be allowed to become too weak. Can we give him reinforcements?
- d) Terror raid on Moscow is essential in order to prevent orderly evacuation of Government agencies and give the lie to enemy propaganda, which is speaking of exhaustion of German offensive capabilities.
- e) Transfer of Second Armd.Div. will be stopped. Political reasons dictate its presence in the West.

Gen. von Greiffenberg ( on the phone): C in C of his AGp. holds that the chances are very good for our tank spearheads to smash through to Moscow. Their immediate objective would be the high ground northeast and southeast of Smolensk. He objects strongly against detaching forces in northeastern direction; sees no chance of cutting off any substantial bodies of enemy troops. All forces must be kept together to strengthen the thrust to the east.

A teletype received in the afternoon (addressed to ObdH, over von Bock's signature) develops the same ideas.

ObdH rings up shortly after noon: Since we left, the Fuehrer has been harping away on the following line:

There is a large gap between Zhitomir and Thirteenth Armd. Div., he thinks. Concentration of weight in the zone of action of Thirteenth Armd.Div. is making no progress. Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler must be moved to Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs.; they in turn would have to be relieved by Advance Combat Teams, pushed into the area northeast of Zhitomir, which, for this purpose, must be temporarily combined into a force directed by Army or Army Gp.

This plan for solving the problems of Army Gp., with which ObdH is not at all in sympathy, has prevailed because nobody around there is capable of standing up to von Reichenau's obstinate aggressiveness. Advance Combat Teams must, therefore, be combined, with a twofold purpose:

- a) Protecting the north flank of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs.
- b) Relieving Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and SS Adolf Hitler.

The matter is discussed between Chief of Op.Sec. and Army Gp., which must report what measures it will take.

These ideas are communicated to ObdH during the afternoon in a written order of the Fuehrer (!) ( Passed on verbatim to AGp. South).\*

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Report on over-all condition of Armd. troops: Average tank losses, 50%. Personnel losses are equal to the strength of the Field Repl.Bns., which now have been completely absorbed. Six personnel Repl. Transfer Bns. for Armd.Gps. 2 and 3 will arrive in Warsaw on 20 July.
- b) Activation and reorganization program for fall, 1941.
- c) North Africa: Composition and order of battle of troops. Most of what is destined for North Africa, is now ready, but facilities are lacking to accelerate shipments. Fuehrer orders them equipped with Heavy Inf. Guns on selfpropelled mounts, which will be ready in September. ObdH insists on his demand, that both Armd.Divs. in North Africa should get third Tank Bns. Where we should get them is a mystery to me at the moment.
- d) Finnish requests for ammunition.
- e) Request of Army Hq Norway for Transport and Signal units can be met on a restricted scale.

Lt. Col. Kitschmann reports as Military Attaché at Kabul.

OQu IV: Current questions, including position of the Military Attachés on the Balkans in relation to List.



Bogatsch:

a) Air reconnaissance on the whole furnishes only confirmations: Choked railroad lines south of Kiev. -- Troop movements from Gomel to the north (on foot). -- Heavy road movements west and east of Smolensk largely to the east (transport Clms.) but some also to the west (troop movements). -- Troop movement to the western end of Lake Ilmen, from the northeast.

b) Total losses in Army Rcn. planes since 26 June:

|                                   |        |         |
|-----------------------------------|--------|---------|
| Staffeln. of Armies and Armd.Gps. | He 126 | 24%     |
|                                   | FW 189 | 15%     |
| Long-range Rcn.Staffeln           | JU 88  | 33 1/3% |
|                                   | Me 110 | 39%     |
| Night Staffeln                    | Do 17  | 20%     |
|                                   | Fi 156 | 13%     |

Losses are for the most part replaced from materiel reserve, but delivery always lags several some days.

Evening situation South: At Berdichev, situation has eased. No progress south of Kiev, where Thirteenth Armd.Div. is reported to have run out of AP ammunition.--- Enemy attacks from the direction of Korosten again successfully repulsed.

Center: Further progress of Armd.Gps. 2 and 3. The enemy Group at Gomel has not yet become active.

North: Road difficulties slow advance. Inadequacy of measures against enemy in Estonia necessitates an OKH order to have one Division strike in the direction of Dorpat.

Syria: Cease-fire. Signs of demoralization reported among French troops.

Irak: Heavy British troop concentrations in the north-east and east, in order to make Iran more tractable on the subject of establishment of a British air-base against the Caucasus.

AGp. South reports that the attack of Eleventh Army will probably not come off before 17 July.

Distribution of the enemy air force: Observed in front of enemy airplanes.  
AGp. North 354 (distributed in great depth).  
" Center 640  
" South 1,500  
Total ca. 2,500

Situation: South: The attack into the northern flank at Zvyagel turns out to be an all-out offensive which has made local gains and even compelled us to commit Twenty-fifth mot. Div. and SS Adolf Hitler, to drive the enemy to the north, away from the Zvyagel-Zhitomir highway, which he had already crossed. This road is the only supply and communications line to III Corps sector. Its being temporarily under enemy pressure was the reason for the ammunition shortage in Thirteenth Armd.Div. yesterday.

The battle around Berdichev, which at times was very bitter and turned into wholesale slaughter of the senselessly attacking enemy, is now also abating. Eleventh Armd. Div. has 2,000 casualties (!) Army Gp. thinks that the enemy was so severely beaten, that Eleventh Armd.Div. could start its eastward thrust today yet. In conjunction with the latter, Sixteenth Armd. Div., next northward, is to strike against Belaya Tserkov.

Thirteenth Armd.Div. has destroyed the two railroad lines running into Kiev from west and south. Fourteenth Armd. Div. is following up closely. A reinforced Bn. of Twenty-fifth mot.Div. and a Regt. of SS "Wiking" are following behind Fourteenth Div. The rest of SS Wiking\* is following Ninth Armd. Div., which is striking for Belaya Tserkov, from Zhitomir.

Center: Guderian's attack has made astonishing progress. Some of the enemy are running away in wild flight, some are making a stand. On the south flank, we have the first signs of a developing enemy counter attack, which will come from the previously reported Gomel group.

Hoth's central sector has made great strides with his right wing (Twelfth Div.), in heavy fighting. His left wing, (Nineteenth Armd.Div.) is still immobilized.

North: The drive of the southern group now seems to be making progress. Hoepfner has taken Reinhard off the road to Leningrad, moving him to the west, into the area east of Lake Peipus. This creates a gap between him and Manstein, who is striking at Novgorod (seat of Voroshilov's Hq). The Divs. of Eighteenth Army are following up at a good rate in the direction of Pskov.

Over-all picture: The big battle in the South must be fought out by Army Gp. with its own resources. AGp. Center had better look after its right flank. On its left flank, the advance of the right wing of the Sixteenth Army offers the chance of achieving a partial success west of Nevel. To take advantage of this opportunity, the operations of the Army Gps. must be closely intergrated. In the central sector of Sixteenth Army, another battle of encirclement is developing, which may lead to final destruction of the remnants of a Russian Army (two Divs).

fighting west of the big marsh area. AGp. North must do everything to keep its forces from dispersing and to mass them for the main thrust against Novgorod.

Talk with Gen. von Greiffenberg (on phone): Coordination of AGps. Center and North in the battle of Nevel. Nineteenth Armd.Div. must be pushed on Nevel, but from there not any further in the direction of Velikie Luki before the battle of Nevel has been brought to a successful close.

South of the Nevel battlefield, another battle of encirclement is developing at Polotsk. Here it is important not to tie down the Inf. of V and VI Corps, and to move them on as quickly as possible in a general eastern direction.

Talk with Field Marshal von Leeb ( on phone ): The subject also is coordination of the Army Gps. in the battle of Nevel. He is particularly anxious that Nineteenth Armd. Div. should become effective against Nevel soon.

Brief review of the situation on the fronts of Army Gp.: It is necessary for Inf. to close to Lake Ilmen in order to mass a maximum of strength in the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Ladoga.

Gen. Oehquist: Erfurth sends me a telegram stating that von Mannerheim is showing a certain passive resistance against the idea of an operation east of Lake Ladoga, which accounts for the insufficient strength of the attacking wing; this prompts me to dispatch Gen. Oehquist to Finland to clear up the situation. There are some misunderstandings, it seems.

Col. Gall ( C of S, Hq Mil. District I ) reports. He has a whole lot of minor worries about prisoners of war, mine clearing, dismantling of border fortifications, etc. His report gives a most distressing picture of German soldiers in Lithuania looting and sending their loot home.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Movements on the railroad line Leningrad - Bologoye, mainly in direction Leningrad, day before yesterday, and in direction Moscow, yesterday. Dense traffic on the Bologoye - Moscow line in northwestern direction, yesterday. These movements may indicate either a build-up at Bologoye or evacuation of Leningrad. The line must be watched and disrupted.
- b) The Orsha - Smolensk - Vitebsk railroad line is completely choked with trains. Little traffic from Viazma-Briansk to the east.
- c) On the Kiev-Kursk line, few moving trains; stations clogged with rolling stock (waiting troop trains or industrial movements).

- d) On the Kharkov-Kursk-line, industrial movements, apparently deliveries of tanks and motor vehicles.
- e) South of Kiev fewer standing trains, less traffic in the direction of Dniepropetrovsk.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Road Construction Organization: Manpower requirements at the front make it necessary to transfer units of the Todt Organization. (Inform Transp. Chief.) Todt forces will have to be increased to enable them to do all the work in the steadily expanding occupied area.
- b) Bridge at Giurgiu will be replaced by Herbert ferries ( material from Belgrade).\*
- c) Lanninger\*\* loading ramp for unloading at beaches.
- d) Russian mines.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu): South: Sixth Army can fight the battle for Kiev and the Dniepr with its own resources. It needs no additional transport from OKH. Seventeenth Army has enough to last it to Vinnitsa. Armd.Gp. is supplied up to Kirovograd. Eleventh Army finds large enemy stocks.

Center: Situation still tight. Volume moved by railroad line still insufficient. Fourth Army have enough to maintain them to the east of Smolensk. (Requirement 11 trains.)

In Second Army, supplies will not last far beyond the Dniepr, for the bulk of its troops, in Ninth Army, not far beyond the Vitebsk area.

North: Armd.Gp. 4 can be maintained up to Leningrad, as can be also some of the Infantry; the bulk will have just enough to reach the area around Lake Ilmen and Lake Pskov.

ObdH is back from AGp. South, where he discussed operational plans at Hqs Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1. Details related by him show how hard the fighting is, but on the whole there is nothing substantially new.

Evening. Guderian has been amazingly successful: Smolensk was reached as early as 10 o'clock this morning. Hoth's left wing also reports remarkable advances. I am baffled by the report that Hoepfner's left wing (Reinhardt's Div.) is rushing on to Narva, with the right wing concurrently advancing on Novgorod ( von Manstein's Div.). This splits his Armd. Gp. in two and prevents developing of any real striking power.

The fact that the Russians are still roaming the area between Pruth and Dniepr, on Schober's flank, brings on a long discussion regarding the need for protecting the oil region. To my mind, there is no such threat.

Gen. Brennecke ( on phone ): He says the splitting of Hoeppner's Armd. Gp. was necessitated by road and terrain conditions on and west of the Pskov-Leningrad highway. For the time being, AGp. will not allow Reinhard to break out of his bridgeheads across the Luga river.

The unusual movement executed by AGp. preparatory to the attack beyond Fellin is explained on the grounds that a) 217th Div. rushed off to the west \* and ) with the enemy at Dorpat believed to be weak, the plan has been adopted for an envelopment through Fellin (where railroads can be used) that would cut off his retreat to the Narva area. Following a talk of the Fuehrer with ObdH ( it must again have been on a rather sharp note) dealing with Hoeppner's movement, which displeases the Fuehrer. I request Brennecke to give me an estimate of the situation in writing, which I could present to the Fuehrer.

These futile telephone conversations continue until long past midnight; they only accomplish killing in field commands any desire to shoulder responsibility and waste everyone's time. The Fuehrer's eternal meddling in matters, the pattern of which he does not understand are becoming more than anyone can stand .

A Fuehrer order comes in, fixing the future total strength of Armd. Forces at 36 Armd.Divs. of 3 Bns. each, and 18 mot. Divs.

15 July 1941. (24th Day).

Situation South: Eleventh Army has gained elbow room on its right flank, but the enemy is still holding out south of the Dniestr.

Sevanteenth Army has made local penetrations in the Stalin Line, but is under counter attack.

Sixth Army and Armd.Gp. 1 have regrouped on their right wings, west of Berdichev.

The movement on Belaya Tserkov from Berlichev and Zhitomir has got under way and is already within a few kilometers of the objective. ( Ninth Armd.Div., behind it two-thirds of SS"Viking!")

West and south of Kiev the situation of Thirteenth and Fourteenth Armd.Divs. reinforced by mot. Infantry, is unchanged. At Zvyagel and to the east, the enemy has been pressed back so that the Zvyagel - Zhitomir road is clear again. Second Armd.Div. has been ordered halted; the other GHq reserves are following behind center and northern wing of Army Gp.

Center: In the territory passed through by Armd.Gps. 2 and 3, numerous local centers of resistance have become

active and must now be liquidated. On the left wing, the situation at Polotsk is now gradually coming to a head. Here, and west of Nevel, the formation of pockets is becoming discernible. At Polotsk, a number of Inf.Divs. can now be freed to follow up behind Hoth.

North: Hoepfner has been halted on the line reached today. The gap between his two Groups is now being filled by an Inf.Div.; he will have to wait for I Corps to come up behind von Manstein, before he continues his drive on Novgorod.

Enemy situation: The over-all impression is that the enemy, responding to the Commanders and probably also to British efforts, is doing all he can to prevent being pushed back any further to the east. The Russian troops now as ever are fighting with savage determination and with enormous human sacrifices. We can make out:

- a) A group at Leningrad, probably based on the marshlands southeast, south and southwest of the city, which is attempting to throw a wide defense ring around the city and the industrial region.
- b) A new group in formation apparently between Kalinin and Rzhev which, securing its flank with the marsh and lake country, will have the mission to close, at Ostashkov, the gap between that area and the Moscow Group. The defense positions at Rzhev are quite formidable.
- c) The Moscow Group in the area Sychevka-Vyazma, west of Kaluga, which has the mission of blocking any advance on Moscow.
- d) A central reserve, which apparently is maintained in readiness on trains in the area Bryansk - Orel - Gorbachevo - Sukhinichi. It is probably the source of the forces fed into the counter attacks against Guderian's right shoulder.
- e) The small Gomel group.
- f) The Korosten Group, and
- g) the Kiev Group, which embraces the entire region west of the Dniepr down to the Black Sea.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reports confirm the existence of the enumerated groups. In Group b), enemy positions have been reported on a 40 km front. In group c), between Vyazma and Gzhatsk, the positions extend over an 80 km front, with some systems five lines deep. A rail movement can be made out from the area around Bryansk in northwestern direction, which originates in the group mentioned under d) (mobile operational reserve on railroad trains).

Disruption of the railroad movements by our air effort makes itself felt in the Leningrad area and between

Smolensk and Moscow, also around Bryansk and especially in the sector of AGp. South. The bridges at Kiev are damaged; the bridge at Cherkassi has been badly hit.

Phone talk with Gen. Brennecke ( C of S, AGp. North ) to comment on the situation estimate submitted by him:

- a) The mission of Army Gp. is not to capture Leningrad, but at present merely to cut off the city.
- b) The enemy forces round Dorpat are estimated by OKH at two Divs. Brennecke thinks they are less.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) The new Fuehrer program for the activation of Armd.Divs. Before next fall, eight Divs., including Second and Fifth in the total.\* Of this number, four must be fitted for service in the tropics.
- b) Personnel, motor vehicles and complementary units of one Div. mot. and one Inf.Div. make up about two Armd. Divs. of, initially, 2 Armd.Bns., 1 Rifle Regt. of 3 Bns., and 1 Motorcycle Bn.
- c) In order to activate the six Armd.Divs. scheduled for fall, 1941, in the Fuehrer program, we must, if we understand "fall" to mean end of October, free within the next four weeks: Two Armd.Divs., two mot.Divs., two Inf.Divs., i.e., two existing Armd.Divs. and the makings for four new Divs.
- d) Two hundred trailers for heavy Chemical Mortars must be ordered.
- e) Condition reports and losses. The condition report of SS Norway plainly shows that the Commander of this unit was fully aware of its weaknesses.

Gen. Ott reports on his tour to Eleventh Army. The reason for what happened to 198th and Twenty-second Divs. was that, owing to bad roads, their AT commands were not with them when they were hit by the Russian tank attack. His opinion of the Romanian troops is not very complimentary, but he would not deny that they are trying hard.

Basic Fuehrer Directive on new T/O and T/E. Program of 14 July 1941.

Report: Polotsk taken (XXIII Corps); reported to be a fortress.

Wagner (Gen Qu) with Op.Chief and OQu I:

- 1.) Review of capacity of a supply base Minsk - Molodeczno, serviced by railroad lines operating at full capacity, for continuance of operations of AGp.Center.  
Conclusions:

Center has 45,450 tons of 60-ton Truck Clms; from this total we must deduct one-third laid up for repair, leaving 30,700 tons for continuous operation. Transp.

Chief guarantees 14 trains with 6,300 tons, daily, for base Minsk - Molodeczno. This is sufficient to maintain:

- a) Operational Group for offensive in the general direction of Moscow or in southeastern direction:

4 Armd. Divs.  
3 mot. Divs.  
10 Inf. Divs.  
GHq Reserves

or,

4 Armd. Divs.  
4 mot. Divs.  
6 Inf. Divs.  
GHq Reserves

or,

6 Armd. Divs.  
5 mot. Divs.  
3 Inf. Divs.  
GHq Reserves,

computed at T/O strength require  $8\frac{1}{2}$  trainloads.

- b) Remainder, for which supply can be maintained only as far as the Upper Dvina and the Upper Dniestr\*:

5 Armd. Divs.  
5 mot. Divs.  
25 Inf. Divs.


requiring  $5\frac{1}{2}$  trainloads.

|   |                   |
|---|-------------------|
| 60-ton Clms. for Operational Group        | 26,000 tons       |
| " " " " remainder (distribution only)     | 2,500 tons        |
| Still needed for transloading at Varena** | <u>1,600 tons</u> |
| Total                                     | 30,700 tons       |

- 2.) Effective 25 July, OKH can turn over to the Wehrmachts-Befehlshaber the Rear Area of AGp. North up to the Dvina, exclusive of Riga and Dvinsk.

Housing ( with OQu I): Operational disposition of enemy forces. My opinion ( see today's entry under enemy situation) is shared by both. But it must always be remembered that this disposition is hypothetical rather than actual, for the enemy is short of troops. Paulus suggests that the mission of the Kalinin group may be not only to secure the gap between Moscow and Leningrad, but also, to attack the flanks of the German forces advancing on Moscow, in conjunction with the Bryansk group kept mobile in trains. The great picture of the enemy groupings then would be as follows:





Legend:

L - Leningrad Group

K - Kalinin Group

M - Moscow Group

B - Bryansk Group

G - Gomel Group

Ko - Korosten Group

U - Ukrainian Group

Groups resulting from pressure of events

Groups provided for in the original plan of assembly as reserves far to the rear.

--- Possibilities of offensive thrusts.

The evening situation, in AGp. South, show slow advances toward Kishinev on the flank of Eleventh Army and breaching of the Stalin Line by the right wing of Seventeenth Army. The enemy is falling back before the right wing of Sixth Army, whereas on the front of its left wing, the pressure from Korosten is now so uncomfortable that Army Gp. wants to shift its weight to clear out this trouble spot. Armd. Gp. 1 has started operations out of Berdichev and striking from Zhitomir, has reached the immediate vicinity of Belaya Tserkov, while III Corps, curiously, has not made any progress, and it is still at its old spot.

Center: In the breakthrough area, a number of quite substantial enemy groups have been isolated; it will not be possible to liquidate them before the Infantry, which is marching without a break, has arrived. There will be many tight situations before these enemy groups have been disposed off. In front of the center of our breakthrough, many supply Clms. seen to be flight from Smolensk toward Moscow.

North: has now taken disposition in conformity with our wishes. The encircling movement by its right wing is slowly developing. The northern wing is closing up. Request for Artillery against Russian coastal fortifications.

Enemy: Heavy movements of columns (mot. and horse-drawn) from Smolensk to the east have the character of a rout. The same to the southeast.

Number of enemy aircraft observed: North, 208; Center, 855; South, 626. Major variations in these figures need not be interpreted as real shifts in the main concentration; discrepancies probably are due to incomplete information on individual areas.

Political: The French have sent us notes announcing that they regard the basis on which the military agreements were concluded as fundamentally changed and accordingly wish the Armistice Treaty superseded by a new agreement which expressly guarantees the sovereignty of France.

There is talk of a Cabinet reshuffle in France. (Interior, Pucheux, Foreign Affairs, Benoist-Mechin; Huntziger, as before ). Weygand still at Vichy.

An armistice has been concluded in Syria.

16 July 1941. (25th Day )

Situation: South: Enemy is evacuating Bessarabia. -- Seventeenth Army has broken through the Stalin Line on its entire front. -- The breakthrough wedge, which points at Kiev, is being attacked from the north. -- The Korosten enemy group has ceased attacking, and has passed to the defensive. Artillery is still strong, but there are no more tanks. Railroad movements from this group to Kiev.

Center: From the Gomel area, a force of seven Divs. is attacking the right shoulder of AGp. Center. This is the entire strength of the Gomel group which thus is pinned down for the moment. In the area passed through by Guderian's and Hoth's breakthrough there are still many enemy groups in fighting condition, which makes it necessary for our Armor to attack in all directions. Even west of the Dniepr there are still some active enemy groups.

Hoth's right wing has reached the big concrete highway to Moscow, near Yartsevo, while Guderian's left wing has battled its way to the sector of Smolensk. Here, then, the inner wings have linked up. Hoth's left wing apparently has pushed into an area only weakly held by the enemy. To check him the enemy may be forming a new enemy group in the Rzhev area.

On the northern wing of Army Gp., Nineteenth Armd.Div. has reached Nevel, but the planned junction with 12th Division has not been achieved, and so this pocket on the Army Gp. boundary has not yet been closed.

North: Regrouping continues in preparation for the drive with main effort against and beyond Novgorod, but is still hampered by the local demands on Sixteenth Army, which so is very slow in releasing troops for the northward thrust.

Radio intelligence indicates presence at Dorpat, of 3 enemy Divs. opposing our advance unit, I Corps (!). This situation is intolerable. Army Gp. will at least have to do something about this.

Enemy situation: Over-all picture: On the front of AGp. South, the enemy is softening. His front is crumbling before Seventeenth Army; here, it seems, he has nothing left in the rear. I do not believe that here there is any coordinated plan for withdrawal behind the Dniepr. Possibly the Russian Divs. falling back from Southern Bessarabia will show up yet deep in the rear of the crumbling front. It remains to be seen whether the enemy will try to bring parts of his strong Korosten Group to bear against our spearhead, through Kiev.

On the rest of the front the enemy no doubt intends to hold fast. I am entirely inclined to believe that the retreat movements from Smolensk to the east were momentary phenomena only. We have no clear picture yet of what is going on around Bologoye (southeast of Lake Ilmen) where unloading and movements of troops have been observed. Is an enemy group, gathered up in other places, forming in the Rzhev area? What about the Bryansk group? Does it really exist and what is it doing?

Gen. Brennecke (AGp. North) on phone:

- a) Reports on the pocket now being formed by Twelfth and Nineteenth Divs. on both sides of Army Gp. boundary.
- b) The situation at Dorpat. He receives instruction to move 93rd Div. to the Dorpat front with all available means and to report on compliance.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reports on 15 July:

- a) In front of the Seventeenth Army, positive withdrawal movements to Zhmerinka and north, on 16 July, p.m.
- b) North of Uman, 38 trains blocked; tanks are being unloaded and driven off eastward.
- c) Bridges at Dniepropetrovsk and Zaporozhe attacked by our Air Force.
- d) Area east and southeast of Kiev no important road movements.
- e) At Zhlobin and Rogachev the enemy is on the western bank of the Dniepr. The enemy is crossing the river; very much Artillery.
- f) Railroad movements from Moscow now go only as far as Viazma, and from Bryansk only as far as Roslavl.
- g) Last night mot. movements from the east toward Yartsevo.
- h) Moscow area: little railroad traffic.
- i) West of Staraya Russa, heavy AAA. Road from Staraya Russa to Dno is described by the Air Force as serviceable, by the ground troops as non-existent. Perhaps only the eastern section has been finished so far.

- k) On the road leading from the western end of Lake Ilmen to Luga, horse-drawn and mot. movements. At Luga, AAA.
- 1) Enemy air action against Reinhard's Corps and the Divs. on the eastern shore of Lake Peipus. East of the Lake, heavy fighter and AAA defense.

The whole pattern of the enemy air effort indicates clear-headed and aggressive leadership.

Lt. Col. Radke: Current business of his section.-- What is to take the place, in citations for bravery, of the individual's name, which now must be omitted from Wehrmacht communiques on order of the Fuehrer?

Maj. Buerker: Report on his tour to Tenth Armd.Div. The stubborn resistance of the many isolated enemy elements scattered behind our advance brings about many critical situations, but notwithstanding this, our troops feel self-assured and superior. However, the striking power of the Armd.Divs. is slowly declining. When the current objectives have been reached, a break will be necessary in order to give the units a rest, and if advisable to merge and refit several units. Gulerian thinks he can do that in three to four days. I believe much more time would be needed. The supply system of AGp. Center will not be functioning at full capacity before 25 July. By that time the Armd.Gps. will again be ready for new operations.

The performance of Regt. "Grossdeutschland" does not seem to satisfy higher Hqs.

Evening situation: South: Kishinev has fallen. Operations of Army Gp. continue according to plan. Before Kiev, situation seems to have tightened as a result of ammunition shortage. Enemy attacks III Corps from the north.

Center: The enemy front is breaking up into a several groups, with our Armd. Divs. cutting through between them. This complicates the picture for direction of operations. Local crises may yet develop, especially on the right wing of Armd.Gp. 2 and in the center of Armd.Gp. 3.

North: Movements are proceeding according to plan. At Dorpat, the enemy is regrouping for defense.

Air situation: In the South, the enemy air force is being taken back behind the Dniepr. In front of AGp. Center the enemy is apparently intensifying his air effort.

17 July 1941. ( 26th Day)

Situation: No important changes.

In AGp. South, the situation is developing along its logical lines. The enemy is attempting, with local forces, to counter the encircling moves against his northern wing at Belaya Tserkov and southeast of Berdichev, but by and large he appears to concentrate on extricating himself from the pocket developing between Eleventh and Seventeenth Armies.

On the northern flank ( Korosten-Kiev ), the jumble of enemy units previously reported in the area between Korosten and Kiev has been reinforced by two new Divs., one coming from the Caucasus.

What I cannot understand is the inaction of Thirteenth Armd. Div., which seems to be doing nothing about the enemy reported to be retreating right past it from Korosten in the direction of Kiev.

AGp. Center: Formation of the pockets is proceeding consistently. Guderian's right wing seems to have again full freedom of movement in the direction of Roslavl. Quite far to the rear, the enemy is trying to turn the situation by launching attacks into Guderian's flank and, further back, against Second Army, but without success.

AGp. North: Here, too, the formation of pockets is developing. On the right wing, at Nevel, the junction with Hoth's left wing has not been quite accomplished yet. Also in this sector, enemy elements appear to have escaped to the east and are now moving in the direction of Velikie Luki. The "eastern front"\* shows another promising pocket in the Opochna area; some enemy bodies initially got away to the east, toward Khelm, but appear to have returned to free their encircled comrades.

Situation of Hoepfner's Gp. unchanged. I Corps is closing up in rapid marches.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance shows:

- a) Confirmation of our picture of the situation on the front of AGp. South. Clogged railroad lines in the area west of Cherkassi.
- b) Mozir: AAA. -- Moving lights on the Pripet river, apparently troops crossing to the other bank.
- c) Gomel: Large quantities of rolling stock and locomotives on sidings. AAA and searchlights. Airdrome (fighters).

South of Mogilev, east of the Dniepr, no enemy movements to the north.

- d) From the area Gomel -- Bryansk -- Roslavl -- Dovsk, no movements.
- e) Continuous retrograde movements from Roslavl on Yukhnov, last night. From Yartsevo, heavy traffic to the east, through Vyazma. At Vyazma, AA searchlight concentration.

Message: Eleventh Army has started its attack, leading with XI Corps, as planned, and has crossed the Dniestr.

Gen. Wagner ( Gen Qu ):

- 1.) Rosenberg is Reich Minister for Occupied Territories. Under him four Reich Commissars: Lohse, for the Baltic States; Kasche, for Russia; Koch, for the Ukraine; Schickedanz for Caucasia. As soon as the tactical situation permits, the Four Year Plan will set up its organization in the occupied territory. An agreement has been reached with Himmler, clarifying when the Police will get its instructions from the Reich, and when from Rosenberg.
- 2.) Transfer of western portion of Rear Area AGp. North to the Reich Commissar for the Baltic States. Between 18 and 25 July, the Wehrmachtsbefehlshaber Baltenland will take over the area from AGp. North. Basic questions of command organization ( coast defense, control of troops). -- Transfer instrument receives signature.\*

3.) Supply situation:

North: Assured until 18 July. Main supply base Riga. Action radius: Armd. Gp. 4, as far as Leningrad; Armies, to the line Lake Ilmen - Narva. One-half issue ammunition, two fuel quotas, 2 days' rations.

Center: On 15 July, Dniepr base had: one-fifth issue of ammunition, one-half fuel quota, one half day's rations. Troops have three-quarters issue of ammunition, three fuel quotas, 7 days' rations. Action radius: Armd. and mot. Divs., as far as Smolensk, Inf. to the eastern banks of Dniepr and Dvina. To meet all supply requirements we have available: As of 18 July, 14 trains; 22 trains are necessary to catch up with the three Armies into the areas newly occupied by us. Bulk of 60-ton Truck Clms. still on the shuttle run between frontier and Dniepr. Scheduled to be taken off as 20/23 July.

South: On 15 July, Seventeenth Army used up one-half to three-quarters issue of ammunition, more than that for their light and med. Fl. Hws. Temporary interruption of railroad line at Tarnopol (washouts); shuttle service already in operation, as far as Berdichev.

Casualties: Total from 22 June to 13 July: 92,120 = 3.68%. Officer losses in per cents of NCO and EM losses: Wounded, 3,4; killed, 3; missing, 1,7.

Major Schuchardt, formerly Paris, assigned to post at Ankara, reports to me. Situation in France. Nothing significantly new.

Col. Kinzel:

- a) Railroad service in Russia: Material was abused even in peacetime, and probably will be all the more so under war conditions. Captured documents indicate that railroad situation is catastrophic. Railroad movements confused; they show no clear pattern, one reason perhaps being that we cannot watch them continuously.
- b) Probable disposition of enemy forces, after the current battles have been fought. Of course it is impossible to foresee everything in detail, but we may assume that after the cleaning up in Estonia there will be available:

Front of AGp. Leeb:

Around Leningrad: 15 Inf. Divs. and 2 Armd. Divs.  
Around Bologovo: 3 Inf. Divs. and  $\frac{1}{2}$  Armd. Div.

Front of AGp. Bock:

Opposite Hoth \*2 - 3 Inf. Divs.  
Opposite Guderian's  
northern wing and center \*2 Inf. Divs. and 1 Armd. Div.  
  
Opposite Guderian's southern  
wing 4 Inf. Divs. and 1 - 2 Armd. Divs.  
  
Between Bock and Rundstedt,  
in the area around Gomel \* 3 - 4 Inf. Divs.

AGp. Rundstedt:

North of Kiev, opposite northern wing  
of Sixth Army and Armd. Gp. 1 8 Inf. Divs. and  
1 Armd. Div.

Opposite right wing of Sixth Army,  
Armd. Gp. 1 and Seventeenth Army \*2 Inf. Divs. and  
1 Armd. Div.

Opposite Eleventh Army 8 Inf. Divs.,  
1 Armd. Div. and  
1 Cav. Div.

This would add up, on the enemy side, to a total of about  
50 Inf. Divs. and 7 Armd. Divs. (apart from Cav. Div.).

In the groups marked \*, I consider the estimates distinctly  
on the high side.

ObdH, back from AGp. North, relates:

- a) Enemy air superiority. The strength of our frontline Divs. has greatly declined.
- b) Eighth Armd. Div. had to be taken back. SS has moved up and is covering its flank. I Corps starts its attack

today at 1600 and will take pressure off the flank; it is under tactical control of Armd. Gp. 4.

- c) Attack at Fellin (Eighteenth Army) set for 18 July (perhaps not until 19 July).
- d) Intentions: First bring to a conclusion the actions now in progress on the right wing, then regroup for attack with one Corps south of Lake Ilmen, with two Corps northward along Lake Ilmen, with one Corps between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus, and with one Corps along Lake Peipus (eastern shore). One Corps must then watch the area north of Army Gp. boundary, and, if necessary, take aggressive action.
- e) On 25 July we shall probably be able to attack across the line Novgorod-Narva.

Major Count Stauffenberg gives a highly informative report on his visit to Guderian's Group. Peculiar character of the breakthrough battles demand great skill in maneuvering Armd. Div. Troops subjected to great strain. Striking power is gradually diminishing, self-assurance is continually growing. Third Armd. Div. !

Evening situation South: Crossing successfully accomplished by Eleventh Army. Also the Romanians, crossing on its left wing, have reached the eastern bank. Seventeenth Army, in wedge formation, has pushed into the depth of the enemy position. Eleventh and Twelfth Armd. Divs. of Armd. Gp. 1 are now abreast of Ninth Armd. Div., and Armd. envelopment movement can be started. Must move 75th and 111th Inf. Divs. up to III Corps. SS Adolf Hitler will replace Third Armd. Div., which in turn will strengthen the Armd. enveloping wing. --- Advance at Korosten.

Center: Enemy pockets are beginning to show up more clearly. Guderian is gaining ground and his forces have linked up further east. Southeast of Gomel, troops are being detrained on the open tracks. Enemy is falling back under pressure from Cav. Div. --- Trouble at Hoth's and Guderian's boundary.

North: Report shows nothing significantly different from ObdH's account. Coastal blockade Btry. on shore of the Moon Straits taken back because of threat from the landside.

Gen. Wagner reports on result of Baentsch' tour to AGp. Center: Organization now running smoothly. Railroad difficulties will be resolved.

North: Six more ships en route to Riga. AGp. North is all right and can temporarily help out Ninth Army (rations).



Situation: AGp. South's operation is becoming increasingly shapeless. The front against Korosten still absorbs large forces. The appearance of new, strong enemy forces attacking from the north near Kiev, compels us to move Inf.Divs. to that sector, to relieve and replace Armor (III Corps). This pins down greater strength on the northern front than is desirable. The turning wing of Armd. Gp.1, too, does not seem to get started on its southward drive. It is still hanging back around Berdichev and Belaya Tserkov. Meanwhile, the breakthrough wedge of Seventeenth Army has advanced so far that right wing of Sixth Army ( operating under Armd.Gp. 1 ) might as well be switched from the encircling operation, for which it was slated, and sent on eastward to the area south of Kiev, to be on hand for the Dniopr crossing.

The Fuehrer has now given orders to take Odessa. For that mission we have only Hansen's Corps with two German and several Romanian Divs. This move which, I agree, is necessary, would divert strength from the big envelopment now initiated.

In AGp. Center, the Armd. Divs. are reforming for the fronts to be established to the northeast and southeast. Inf.Divs. are moving close behind. The organizations forming the rings around the pockets are continually changing, and it will be interesting to see how long this can go on without impairing the tightness of the encirclement. On the southern wing, east of Mogilev, the enemy keeps up his heavy attacks, which is precisely what we want him to do (Fifth Russ. Army).

North of the line Smolensk-Orsha, on the northern wing of Army Gp., the northernmost pocket seems to have been securely closed by Twelfth Inf.Div. moving down from the north and linking up with Nineteenth Armd.Div. Tension seems to be easing also in the process of forming the other pocket, but we cannot be quite sure yet.

In AGp. North no important changes. At OPOCHKA, the enemy is struggling to extricate his encircled units by attacking us from the outside; he is being repulsed.

At Gdov (eastern shore of Lake Peipus), a "Special Division" has been captured; it is composed of, respectively, a unit of women, of convicts, and of Communist Youths.

Gen. Bogatsch:

- a) Photographs of Moscow. Very extensive industrial installations, with vast railroad system. Strong AAA defense. Numerous balloon barrages, no fortifications.
- b) Photographs of Bologoye; according to captured documents a supply center ( Artillery parks, Chemical Defense depots).
- c) 1.). Observed enemy movements (from north to south): From

Staraya Russa and Velikie Luki to Bologoye.

- 2.) West of Moscow, Vyazma is apparently the railhead for supply of troops.
- 3.) South of the line Smolensk-Moscow movements to the northeast (evacuations?).
- 4.) Vast train movements from the West to Kremenchug.
- 5.) Reconnaissance east of the Dniepr unfortunately unavailable; the same for area around Bryansk.

Gen. Fellgiebel

- a) Extension of the OKH trunk line first to Belaya Tserkov to be continued, according to the development of the situation, either northward to Kiev or across the Dniepr, south of Kiev.
- b) Regulation of signal communication service in the areas of the Civil Commissars for Occupied Territories, to be set up under Rosenberg.
- c) Findings of radio intelligence confirm data extracted from captured documents and PW statements.
- d) Moscow's role as center of the Russian communications system. With the elimination of Moscow, the entire Russian communications network collapses.

von Greiffenberg:

- a) Over-all mission: Smash all enemy forces that can be reached now. We must be sure to finish the job. On this account, and to ensure thorough mopping up, the area conquered must be safeguarded from incursions; further extensions only insofar as necessary to consolidate these gains.
- b) Possible future tasks: Form frontal group with Ninth Army and right wing of Second Army; on its northern wing, Armored Gp. 3. Another group for turning movement to the southeast, comprising the bulk of Second Army (inner ring) and Armd. Gp. 2 (outer ring). Movements of reserves and bringing up of GHQ Reserves must conform with these ideas. What should be the command organization for this operation?
- c) Direction of the mopping-up operations in newly-conquered territory. Cover right flank.
- d) Striking power of the Armd. Divs.: 60%.

Col. Gen. Fromm: Recommendations on the implementation of the Fuehrer's Armd.Divs. program: Activate the 36 Armd.Divs. initially with 2 Bns., each (except the Africa Divs., where 3 Bns. are specified), each Bn. of three, if possible, four Cos. To enable us to activate the eight Armd.Divs. ordered completed by next fall (incl. two for Africa), the Field Army must give up, by the end, if possible even by the middle, of August, two Armd.Divs. (Third and Seventeenth) and two mot. Divs. (both in Guderian's Gp.).

The 18 Inf. Divs. mot. we shall get together by taking the ten already existing plus Inf. Regt. "Grossdeutschland", SS Adolf Hitler and three SS Divs. mot., and then activate two Inf. Divs. mot. and one SS Div. mot. (or rather one more regular Inf. Div. mot. instead) by reducing Divs. to four mot. Bns., one mot. Rcn. Bn., reorganize the Motorcycle Bn. to a mixed Bn. (?) and cutting the Antitank Bns. of the Divisions to two Cos. etc.

The motor transport requirements (transport, not tanks are the bottleneck in the new activations), it is hoped, can be covered from GHq Reserve Arty., Engineers (!) and Observation Bns., and by centralizing supply services.

Comment: Inasmuch as reduction in strength of the Inf. Divs. mot. and of the Rifle formations of the Armd. Divs. in favor of the newly activated units involves no reduction in fire power (the number of MGs and mortars, except light mortars, remains the same or is even increased), I have no objection to the principle of the proposal. I only want to have my say in the reduction of GHq Reserves (ratio of Artillery to Observation Bns., requirements in Engineers, Construction units, Railroad Engineers).

von Ziehlberg: Gen. Staff personnel matters (including medical opinion on Clausius) -- Decorations (Bulgaria) -- Current matters.

Col. Liss with OQu IV:

- a) Distribution of forces in the British homeland according to captured Russian documents. Figures on the whole square with our information. These documents assume that the units are still Brigs. and mot. Divs., because of lack of Artillery. (This probably does not hold true any more at this date.)
- b) Distribution of British forces in Irak (two Divs.), one more Division must be expected from India.
- c) Distribution of British forces in India. Indian troops now on the battle fronts have been replaced by newly activated units. Apart from the one Indian Div. destined for Irak, there probably can be no further withdrawal of troops from India.

Conference with ObdH on situation in AGp. South and the necessity to have the Inf. Divs. now arriving in the rear of the Sixth, moved to the area south of Kiev. The following two points must now be borne in mind by AGp. South:

- 1.) The encircling ring by Armd. Gp. must not be drawn too close, and if possible along the Dniepr.
- 2.) A strong group must be brought up to the Dniepr south of Kiev from the rear now for an early crossing.

The evening situation shows no essential changes in the picture.

In AGp. South a pocket is apparently forming at Vinnitsa as a result of Seventeenth Army'd breakthrough. In the central sector, Armd.Gp. is beginning to make headway in southeastern direction, and on the northern wing Sixth Army has gained ground against the enemy at Korosten and has pushed him away from the supply route.

In AGp. Center, the battle with the encircled enemy bodies continues, but resistance varies in degree. South of Orsha little is going on, but north of the line Orsha-Smolensk, the largest group staged a break-out attempt in all directions; it was driven back.

In AGp. North our forces continue to close up to Armd.Gp.4. The enemy is throwing new forces against Hoepfner's left and right wings, but with our Inf. on the spot now, there is no danger.

Talk with Gen. von Sodenstern (AGp. South, on phone):

- a) In my opinion the envelopment will not be ample enough if Armd. Gp. strike for Uman; the Group must advance southeastward to the Dniepr in direction of Krivoi Rog. Army Gp. has reached the same conclusion. Only a weak right wing of the Armd.Gp. needs to drive in the direction of Uman. An intercepted radio signal of the Russian Twenty-sixth Army indicates that we are going to be attacked by 4 Inf.Divs. and 2 Cav. Divs. from the area south of Kiev, tomorrow.
- b) Prepare a strong group with bridging equipment, Artillery, etc. south of Kiev for the Dniepr crossing as soon as possible. Army Gp. has earmarked for this mission LV Corps, with 111th, 75th and 71st Inf.Divs. I add 132nd and 94th Inf.Divs. from Gp. Reserves. Under consideration is also XXXXIV Corps, with 57th and Ninth Divs.
- c) Political friction between Hungarians and Romanians makes it desirable to separate the Hungarian Armd Corps from the Romanians; Army Gp. should think up an elegant way of doing it.

19 July 1941. ( 28th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South all planning is dominated by the discovery of the imminent attack by the Russian Twenty-sixth Army; captured orders indicate that it consists of 6 Inf.Divs. and 2 Cav. Divs., under two Corps Hqs. Three of these Divs. are supposed to come from the Lithuanian front, whereas the rest ( VI Corps ) are said to have fought in the Ukraine from the start.

The weather continues bad, which will probably slow the movements of AGp. South to a considerable degree. If we add to this the effect of the impending enemy attack by quite a sizeable force, it appears likely that the start of

this large-scale Armd.Gp. offensive will be cancelled or delayed again.

AGp. Center: Reports capture of a Russian order indicating that the Russian High Command is aiming at separating the German Armor from supporting Inf. units by driving attacks between them. In theory this is a very pretty scheme, but in practice it is something that can be carried out only by an opponent superior in number and generalship. Against our Armies, and with the Inf. Corps never slackening in closing to the Armor, I do not see a chance for applying such a policy. On the southern wing of the Army Gp., enemy pressure continues.

AGp. North: No new trends discernible in the development. The appearance of a Bn. of Moscow factory police demonstrates that communications between Moscow and Leningrad must still be open; it would be desirable from the operational standpoint if the enemy were not able to maintain communications between Lake Ilmen and Moscow. But I am beginning to wonder if we are not being confronted here with the incipient formation of a strong group between Bologoye and Rzhev, which eventually might make it necessary for Leeb's right wing to advance beyond the northern edge of the Valdai Hills.

In Estonia, the situation is developing favorably due to the enemy's inaction. The possibility of a crisis is fading.

Navy thinks that the enemy is becoming increasingly aware of our weakness and passivity in the Baltic; we must therefore expect intensification of enemy activity and a mounting threat to the sea route to Libau and Windau. These ports are essential for our supply.

Air Reconnaissance has no results worth noting due to persistent bad weather.

Gen. Buhle:

- 1.) Discussion of the BdE's plan for implementation of the Fuehrer's Armd. Forces program ( fall reorganization of the Army ).
  - a) Armd.Divs. On the whole no objections. The combination of motorcycle-mounted Inf.Bns.with Armd. Ren. units must not result in absorption of the unit in the Infantry. It must remain a reconnaissance unit . With Divs. becoming smaller, they will need fewer Truck Clms.
  - b) Inf.Divs. mot. The proposed organization of the Inf. Bn. eliminates the Bn. Commander almost completely. By transferring to the Co.all weapons necessary for forming a main effort it would strip him of any real control over the situation. Cutting Artillery down to two light Btrys. for each Bn. can be approved only as an interim measure, designed to prevent the excessive depletion of GHq Artillery

by allotments to the new Divs. Later on, the Btrys. must again be increased to the normal number of three for each Bn.

- c) GHq troops: Artillery: We shall still have to put up a fight to retain a substantial GHq Artillery, incl. Observ. Bns. and Corps Artillery Hqs, to facilitate exercise of control over operations. The argument that modern war is waged no longer with Artillery, but with tanks, is fallacious.

Engineer troops: It would be absurd to allocate 17 of the 20 existing GHq Eng. Bns. to the newly activated Divs. Modern motorized warfare has made the Engineers more indispensable than ever. The requirements of the new Divs. must be met by allotting to them the mot. Eng. Cos. of deactivated Inf. Divs.

Railroad Engineers: Their number must be increased. If the new organization of the Army is to be adapted to the needs created by operations over vast spaces, the Railroad Eng. units must be accorded an important place in the program.

Supply Services can probably be rendered more efficient and economical for movements in vast areas by centralizing and consolidating transport.

Heavy Artillery. Reduction will have to wait until Gibraltar is completed. These big guns tie down too much transport.

- 2.) A special organization under Balck\*for the checking and revising T/Os with a view to reducing them to essential war needs will be set up at BdE, with the cooperation of Gen. Staff.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu.):

- a) Demands by the Reich Marshal regarding safeguarding of native stocks in the operational theaters. Insofar as possible they have already been met on our own initiative.
- b) New boundaries for Rear Area AGp. Center: Joining AGp. North at the Dvina, the boundary in the main is formed by the Dvina-Dniepr line as far as Gomel. Rear Area AGp. South will eventually also be advanced to the Dniepr.
- c) AGp. North's request for motor transport to move 93rd Div. must be rejected.
- d) Arrived at Riga by sea: Convoy I, 900 tons; convoy II, 2,000 tons.
- e) Supply situation: South: Very high fuel consumption.

Not much fuel captured.

Sixty-ton truck columns only 50% operational owing to unseizable roads. Supply of AGp. nevertheless assured.

Center: The tense situation seems to be easing due to the smooth cooperation of Baentsch and the Railroad dictator dispatched by Gercke. The transport situation has improved. Little booty.

North: Owing to movement of troops ( 93rd Div. ), three trains less are available daily for supply. Transport needs amply covered nevertheless .

Kinzel ( Foreign Armies East ): Command set-up on Russian front.  
• ( from north to south):

Field Command Hq Northwest (Voroshilov ): Eighth, Twenty-seventh, Eleventh, Twenty-second (?) Armies. It is not yet clear whether Twenty-second Army belongs to Northwest or to West; the former is more likely. Important for operational appraisal of the area Rzhev-Bologoye.

Field Command Hq West ( Timoshenko ) : Nineteenth, Twentieth, Thirteenth and Twenty-first Armies. Behind them there seems to be additionally an Army Hq 4, which formerly operated in the Bialystok pocket and apparently was taken back.

Field Command Hq Southwest ( Budyonny ): Fifth, Twenty-sixth, Sixth and Twelfth Armies.

Field Command Hq South (?) : Eighteenth (?), Second, Ninth (?) Armies. The existence of this Hq appears to me doubtful. Probably it is the Hq of the Odessa Military District. If a strong operational Hq actually were committed here, we surely would know the name of the CG, just as we know the names of the three Marshals. Army Hqs 18 and 19 are known to us only through radio intelligence, and have for practical purposes not appeared at the fighting front. If they exist at all, they may be Hqs for coast defense or have other special functions.

von Thoma reports out to take over the command of Seventeenth Armd.Div.

Gen. Jacob:

- a) Report on his findings in touring the supply arteries in the sector of AGp. North. With some Roadbuilding and Construction units being better equipped with transport than others, the situation has developed where all mobile units have been ordered up front and the less mobile units, left behind, never finish marching. They are continuously on the move to catch up with the others instead of doing their work. We need static organizations, which would employ PW and indigenous labor. Orders to this effect have been issued.

b) GHq Engineer and Constructions units needed in relation to the Armd. Divs. organization program.

Conference with Gen. Brand (Arty) and Gen. Gercke: Their demands within the Armd. Divs. organization program, which will require my backing.

Evening situation. No important news. Slow progress on all fronts along the lines of the development laid down by us.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu): The North African supply situation is increasingly deteriorating. Schleusner reports that Fifth Light Div. is so short of fuel that in the event of an attack on Solum it would just manage to get to the battlefield. Recommends to send additional 1,000 tons of truck transport to Africa. They can be taken only from Brussels. I turn down a proposal to obtain supposedly more suitable transport for Africa by an exchange with Romania, a process that would take four weeks. If Africa needs the stuff, send it down the quickest way possible!

Casualties: Total up to 16 July 1941 (excluding medical casualties): 102,588, i.e. 3.05% of a strength of 3,35 million.

Officer casualties in per cents of total losses: Wounded, 3,4; killed, 5.2; missing 1.6.

20 July 1941. (29th Day) Sunday.

By plane to Hq AGp. South.

0700. Situation report by Lt. Col. Grolmann. No important change in the situation since yesterday.

0730. Leave by car; 0830, take-off at Loetzen; 1130, arrival at Staro Konstantinov.

Army Hq is housed in a Russian Military School. A characteristic feature are the tokens of "culture"; on the outside, colossal plaster columns with Corinthian capitals, on the inside heroic-sized plaster statuary (sitting group Lenin-Stalin, soldiers of Army and of Air Force).

Conference with IA: Lt. Col. Winter sketched the situation for me. The over-all picture agrees with that we have at OKH. A new feature are the enormous difficulties besetting the movements of Armd.Gp. Kleist. E.g. Eleventh Armd.Div. is advancing on Uman in three distinct groups;

- 1.) Tracked vehicles, with Infantry on top.
- 2.) Polish peasant carts carrying Infantry, following behind the tracked vehicles.
- 3.) Wheeled motor vehicles, which cannot keep up on the



rainsoaked roads and so must be left behind in towns.

The main problem now is how to get Kleist's Group where we want it to go. Its main body together with elements of III Corps, brought down from the north, where they were relieved by Inf. now is fighting the Russian Twenty-sixth Army, which is attacking with its northern wing just to the south of Kiev, and with its southern wing, at Tarashcha; each wing has one fresh Division, while the rest are chipped in earlier battles. The attacks have all been repelled, but they pin down the bulk of Kleist's group so that actually only a weak Armd. force, Eleventh and Sixteenth Armd. Divs., remains available for tactical envelopment in the rear of the enemy now retreating before Schwedler's drive. The operational envelopment in the direction of Kirovograd has not yet got under way and will probably hang fire for some time yet. The assumption that the Russian Twenty-sixth Army will soon be defeated, looks to me too optimistic.

The next question, concerning Reichenau's Army, is answered to the effect that in consequence of the events at Zvyagel, his left wing has become comparatively strong. He is still confronted by a strong enemy, whose Artillery is now less active. The right wing, which is a long way off to the east, is gaining ground, but it looks as if it will be impossible to give that wing the strong forces that would enable it effectively to interpose itself between the enemy's Korostov Group and the Dniepr. Army Gp. rather expects that the enemy will be pushed against the Dniepr, which will successively be crossed by von Reichenau north of Kiev. The city then would be taken from the east.

For forming the group which we would like to build up south of Kiev, Army Gp. has available only the GHQ Reserves standing far in the rear, now that LV Corps has been committed to relieve III mot. Corps. We thus get the following picture, which is also presented in a sketch submitted by Army Gp. The forces of Army Gp. fall into two groups moving in divergent directions: The big enveloping operation south of Kiev, in which Kleist will push with his main concentration in the direction of Kirovograd, and von Reichenau's attacking operation. The link between them is a weak group, LV Corps, which will have to be satisfied if it accomplishes as much as blocking enemy action from Kiev against the two large offensive groups.

Von Reichenau's prospects of success are not too rosy, for his attack will back the enemy against the Dniepr, instead of pushing him away from it and so cut him off. The Russian Twenty-sixth Army, which Kleist must shake off, before he can strike southeastward with sufficient forces, will likewise be pressed back frontally behind the Dniepr. To cross to the other side, it has four military bridges available between Cherkassi and Kiev. It is altogether uncertain what Kleist's offensive against Kirovograd, which is already behind schedule, would be able to catch. Undoubtedly there are still some strong enemy groups in the area west of Uman, but whether they can be cut off depends on how much time is lost in fighting the Russian Twenty-sixth Army.

I stress the following points:

- a) von Reichenau's operation must be conducted in such a way that the enemy will be pushed away from the Dniepr. As of 25 or 26 July, it will be possible to have cooperation of XXXV Corps out of the Mozir area.
- b) Everything must be done to form a strong group south of Kiev. In addition to the GHq Divs. earmarked by Army Gp., it must be allotted also parts of von Reichenau's and Schwedler's forces at the very earliest.
- c) Everything must be done to avoid pushing the Russian Twenty-sixth Army to the Dniepr in purely frontal fighting and to prevent its withdrawal to Kiev with elements still capable of giving battle.
- d) We must soon be able to exert strong Armd. pressure in the direction of Kirovograd.

Particulars taken up at the conference:

- a) Future missions for Hansen's Corps. It must cross the Dniestr, east of Kishinev, using whatever he has got.
- b) Employment of the Italians. It will be best to commit them on the northern wing of Eleventh Army.
- c) Separation of Romanians and Hungarians. AGp. sees no difficulties.
- d) Opportunities for future operations east of the Dniepr.

Worries of Army Gp.:

- a) Horse replacements are becoming a burning question. Army Gp. has heard that there are still plenty horses to be had in Poland.
- b) Army Gp. reckons with the possibility of the enemy organizing a defense west and south of the Dniepropetrovsk industrial area, by forming a line of resistance on its western outskirts, i.e. yet west of the Dniepr.
- c) Tank strength of individual Divs.: Sixteenth Armd.Div., less than 40%; Eleventh Div., around 40%; Thirteenth and Fourteenth Divs., better.
- d) The number of operational reconnaissance planes is seriously diminishing ( 2 - 3 per Staffel ).
- e) The enemy pockets in our rear are still a most vexing problem. We have no troops in the rear to clean them out.
- f) Bridge-building equipment for Dni crossing: Army Gp. believes that it will be able to build only one 16-ton bridge and one 8-ton bridge across the river.

Take-off from Army Gp.: 1530. Arrival Loetzen, about 1830.

After my return, brief report to ObdH: The great picture of the operation is not very cheering; Army Gp. is being split into two diverging directions, and a decisive major success in either direction is doubtful. After the Dniepr has been reached at least a short rest period will be needed by the troops, especially for refitting of tank units.

Development of the situation: In the meanwhile, the enemy on AGp. Center's front has succeeded in breaking out of the Nevel pocket. We cannot say as yet whether this is the result of Nineteenth Armd.Div. swinging toward Velikie Luki too soon; in any case, this is a distressing development. The escaped elements will hurl themselves against Velikie Luki and will make life miserable for the elements of Nineteenth Armd.Div. in the area, which have very tough going even now. And there are many more sore spots on the front of AGp. Center. On the southern flank, for instance, the enemy has been able to penetrate at several points; and on the eastern front of von Kluge's Army, which is forming north and south of Smolensk, several sectors are under heavy attack. Notwithstanding all this, we shall probably succeed in stabilizing our position east of Smolensk and so ensure an early liquidation of the big enemy pocket west of Smolensk.

The costly battles involving some groups of our Armd. forces, in which the Inf. Divs. arriving from the west can take a hand only slowly, together with loss of time due to bad roads which restrict movement and the weariness of the troops marching and fighting without a break, have put a damper on all higher Hqs.\* Its most visible expression is the severe depression into which ObdH has been plunged. But in matter of fact there is really no reason for any such thing. We must let the great break-through battle take its course and judge its result later.

In AGp. South much ground has meanwhile been gained toward Uman, but the successes of our troops in the battle with the Russian Twenty-sixth Army are on the whole of a defensive character. AGp. North continues shifting its troops to the north as has been planned, without too much interference from the enemy now. AGp. Center reports a mounting bag of prisoners: Nearly 100,000 since 10 July.

21 July 1941. ( 30th Day ).

Situation. AGp. South: The offensive of the Red Twenty-sixth Army indeed has pinned down the bulk of Armd.Gp., as was to be expected. The advance on Uman is executed by parts only of Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd.Divs. Owing to bad weather, the other Armies are advancing slowly.

AGp. Center: Velikie Luki, on the northern wing, unfortunately had to be abandoned. This is bad; many of the retreating enemy elements will get away as a result. On the southern flank of Armd. Gp. 2, at Propoisk the enemy has had local successes, which were checked by attacks of Fourth Armd. Div. Moreover, the situation is still quite precarious in the Smolensk area, where we have not yet succeeded in completely sealing the ring around the enemy.

In AGp. North, continuation and smooth completion of the initiated movements.

1100 - 1200. Telephone conversation with Gen. von Sodenstern (C of S, AGp. South):

- a) Splitting of Armd. Gp. 1 ! : \* As long as the Russian Twenty-sixth Army south of Kiev has not been defeated, Armd. Gp. 1 cannot strike out for any new objectives to the south. Armd. Gp. will be lucky if, by tactical envelopment of the enemy falling back before Seventeenth Army, it can reach Uman with some elements.
- b) If Armd. Gp. 1 fails to batter its way beyond Uman, Eleventh Army must go out to meet it with at least strong Advance Combat Teams. Hungarian Cavalry alone is not enough.
- c) Reichenau's Army is splitting in two. It must put more punch in its right wing and let up on its left wing, in order to push the enemy away from, and not against, the Dniepr.
- d) Forming of a strong group south of Kiev for the eastward advance across the river must be initiated as soon as possible, or we shall be too late ! In addition to reserves and troops now far to the rear, it must comprise parts of Reichenau's and Schwedler's armies.

Gen. Brennecke (C of S AGp. North):

- a) Thoughts on the next operations of Army Gp.'s right wing. I have become increasingly convinced that the right wing of the AGp. North must be detached from its command and combined with AGp. Center; the boundary would run on Bologoye, through Kholm, with these two towns passing to AGp. Center. I request examination and comment by Army Gp.
- b) Thoughts on the eventual reduction of Kronstadt and Leningrad. Army Gp. will let us know its ideas on the subject.
- c) Condition of roads through the marsh area south of Lake Ilmen. Aerial photograph.

Otzen (Rome): Heggenreiner affair. Let him stay with his organization.

Gen. Bogatsch reports on air situation. No essential new findings apart from additional indications that the movements from

Bologoye to Leningrad, Staraya Russa and Velikie Luki are apparently being carried out under unified direction. This would support the assumption that Twenty-second Red Army after all is a part of the northern Group.

There is increasing evidence of a new rear position running from the Lake district of the Valdai hill complex through the headwater region of the Dniepr to Roslavl and the Desna.

The operational strength of the air reconnaissance units is temporarily quite low. Difficulties in material replacement. Losses.

The AA units, committed are closing on the combat troops with commendable speed.

Gen. Oehquist reports on his journey to Finland. Erfurth's suspicion that Marshal Mannerheim is opposed to the operation east of Ladoga, is unfounded. Talked with Mannerheim and Erfurth. The underlying cause of this storm in the teacup seems to be that Erfurth, having little to do and to say, suffered an attack of inferiority feelings.

The successes of the Finnish troops in the advance are very gratifying.

Gen. Matzky reports on current business in his section.

Gehlen reports on the Fuehrer's visit to AGp. North. All seems to have gone well at the conference. Someone, apparently Keitel, is constantly egging on the Fuehrer that Armor should be shifted from Center to AGp. North, that is, to the high ground east of Lake Ilmen. Doing that would be quite a mistake.

True, it might prove necessary to divert some of our steadily dwindling Armor to the Bologoye area in order to eliminate this railroad center, but farther north von Leeb now has all he can use. The Bologoye mission would best be carried out as an AGp. Center operation (after shifting the boundary ! ).

Major Buerker (Training Sec.): Training instructions for airborne troops, and other current questions.

Major von Ondarza reports on his trip to Guderian's Armad. Gp. Nothing new of any consequence.

ObdH went to AGp. Center, accompanied by Heusinger.

He relates his observations, and then I discuss with him my ideas on the future command organization in Center: von Kluge must take over the right wing (southern part of Second Army and Guderian's Group) to move it out of AGp. Center in a southeastern direction and then, under direction of von Rundstedt, advance with Ninth's left wing in direction of Stalingrad. Von Weichs must get the right wing of Ninth Army attached his present left wing, Strauss\*, von Leeb's left wing. Von Bock would then conduct the

offensive south of the line Kholm - Bologoye (these towns included) in an eastward direction outflank Moscow on both sides (and reduce the city) and then continue with axis of advance on Kazan. As the spearhead of his front or his left wing, Hoth would lead with his tanks under von Bock's command.

This regrouping must in general be deferred until the objectives specified in the initial directives for the attack have been reached. \* We can and must go beyond them in tactical operations, wherever that is necessary in overrunning those parts of the new Russian position which are situated directly in front of the objectives.

Gen. Koestring (Mil. Attaché Moscow) reports back. He gives an account of his experiences at the start of the war and is very sharp in criticizing the air and Naval Attachés for leaving their posts.

Evening situation: AGp. South: Due to more heavy rainfall, only minor changes in our positions. Uman has not yet been taken, but to the north, Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. pushed from the north into an enemy retreat movement going east and are now apparently engaged in heavy fighting. Eleventh Armd.Div. has blocked several trains loaded with troops and is fighting it out with them now.

Center: Easing of tension at Propoisk. At Mogilev there still is bitter enemy resistance. At Smolensk we have not yet succeeded in slamming the door on the last escape route. Fighting is continuing at Nevel, where considerable enemy elements obviously have fought their way out. Velikie Luki had to be abandoned. In spite of these local setbacks, von Bock's haul of prisoners in the second series of battles\*\* has already risen to more than 100,000; over 1,000 guns have been captured.

AGp. North: On Lake Ilmen, the enemy is being driven back slowly. On the right wing of Army Gp. the movement to the north is getting under way. No other change.

22 July 1941. ( 31th Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, heavy fighting is in progress at Uman, where Sixteenth and Eleventh Armd. Divs. have clashed with strong forces of the enemy. Apparently the enemy is concentrating units taken out of his withdrawing front against our tank wedge, in order to save as much as he can of the perhaps substantial force in the area, now threatened with encirclement. This policy may of course produce some tight situations for our Armor in the Uman area, especially as the operation against the Red Twenty-sixth Army looks as if it might drag on a while.

In Reichenau's sector, adoption of our suggestion is showing

results. He is now making his main effort on the right wing in order to push the Korosten enemy away from the Dniepr. Also formation of the assault group south of Kiev has now been initiated.

In AGp. Center, the Smolensk pocket is actually not yet closed. Seventh Armd.Div. is apparently not on the great motor highway to Moscow, but north of it; fighting is continuing also in that area. Now with the Nevel pocket burst open and Velikie Luki abandoned, the prospects of an overwhelming success in terms of enemy destroyed, are dwindling. Also on the Dniepr, at Novi Bikhov, the enemy is still holding firm and fighting.

In AGp. North, the movements are developing according to plan.

Air: Bogatsch: a) Destruction of railroads. Railroad movements.  
b) Aircraft destroyed to date: 7,564.  
c) Assault on Moscow: 200 aircraft, using also the new 2.5 ton bombs.

Gen. Fellgiebel:

- a) Plans for future operations and new locations of Hqs of Army Gps. and of OKH.
- b) Signal troops for railroads: To date, Gercke has received one Bn. and five Cos. to strengthen his own railroad formation.
- c) Radio intelligence: Three Corps at Odessa. Leningrad: One new Army Eq., one Armd. unit southwest of Leningrad, two Divs. at Luga.
- d) Twenty-ninth Red Army at Rybinsk.
- e) Twenty-eighth Red Army at Sukhinichi.

Capt. Loyke (Navy): Report on naval situation: The Russians are becoming more active under British influence. Control Gulf of Riga with light naval units. Our mine barrages cannot be adequately replenished. Riga is being used by our light naval units, but is not yet usable as a permanent base. Windau is under attack by enemy air force. Consequently, Memel and Libau are depended on as bases for our shipping in the Baltic.

France: Necessity of cooperation with France. Our problems in Mediterranean cannot be resolved any other way.

Mediterranean: Problem of shipping space can be conquered with the aid of French. The Italians are in no position to furnish the escort required.

Atlantic: No battleships in the Atlantic before next fall. Until then only submarines (at present 20, in fall 40, at the end of the year 60 operating); their effort greatly obstructed by intensified air patrolling: U.S. activity is making itself felt !

In the afternoon, ObdH returns from the Fuehrer, who is again in a state over AGp. North. It is not concentrated anywhere and does everything wrong. As a matter of fact, things up there are not quite as good as in other places, and cooperation with us is a little less smooth.

In the afternoon, work on the directives for the coming operations of the Army Gps.

Evening situation: Good progress on the southern wing of AGp. South. Otherwise no change.

Evening: Conference with ObdH, Heusinger, Wagner on conduct of operation "Barbarossa" in the weeks to come.

With Paulus, on preparations for likely operations in the West and in the Mediterranean.

23 July 1941. ( 32nd Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, the wedge of Arm. Gp. 1, pushed on Uman, is under heavy attacks from all sides. Our other offensive operations, also the one against the Red Twenty-sixth Army, are proceeding according to plan.

AGp. Center: The Inf.Divs. are rapidly closing up. The flanks of Army Gp. are now coming under attack.

AGp. North: When Sixteenth Army has brought the current battle to a close, it will be transferred to its jump-off sector.

Gen. Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance indicates start of movements against the flanks of von Bock. Kalinin and Bologoye bear continued watching. Also Rzhev! Heavy AAA on the Smolensk and Bologoye fronts.

Gen. Wagner:

- a) Supply situation. Still tight in Center, where consumption of ammunition is at a mounting rate. Instead of the required steady flow of 14 trains, arrivals vary between 8 and 15.
- b) Continuance of the operation. It will be impossible to start off three groups simultaneously in AGp. Center on 3 August. The best plan will be to move up Ninth Army first, bring Second Army up to full strength in the meantime, and after that concentrate on filling up Ninth Army. Bobruisk probably will be sufficient for von Kluge's new group.\*
- c) For supply purposes, Armd. Gp. 3 must be transferred to Ninth Army (Dvinsk).



Gen. Buhle: Tank losses generally reasonable. Total losses comprise on an average. 20% of tank casualties. Personnel losses vary with Divs. ! Worst hit are Eleventh, Sixteenth, Third, Seventeenth, Eighteenth, Nineteenth, First and Eighth Armd. Divs. Officer casualties in some units as high as 50% !  
Truck situation generally satisfactory. Armd. Commands want 8 to 10 days for reconditioning. Impossible at present !

1800 Report to Fuehrer: I summarize the enemy situation and raise the question of the ultimate objectives of the operation. He has settled in his mind the objectives specified in yesterday's OKW directive and sticks to them, enemy or no enemy, or any other considerations.

Von Bock so will have to release his Armd. Gps. and move on Moscow with Inf. alone.

Moreover, the Fuehrer right now is not interested in Moscow; all he cares about is Leningrad. This sets off a long-winded tirade on how von Leeb's operation ought to have been conducted and why Armd. Gp. 3 now has to be thrown into the battle to destroy the enemy at Leningrad.

The chief object of the operations is viewed by him in the smashing of the enemy, a task which he believes would probably be accomplished by the time we are abreast of Moscow. Subsequently ( and into the rainy fall season!) he imagines one could drive to the Volga and into the Caucasus with Armd. Divs. alone.

Let's hope he is right -- but all one can say is that time spent in such a conference is a sad waste.

Evening situation: At Uman, the situation is still tight. -- In AGp. Center, large numbers of prisoners are beginning to come in from the pockets. \* The coming attack on von Bock's flanks is becoming more sharply outlined.

24 July 1941. ( 33rd Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, the situation in Eleventh and Seventeenth Armd. Divs. is growing increasingly acute. The two Divs. are much too weak to withstand the onrush of the enemy driven back by Schwedler and Seventeenth Army, and it is difficult to get reinforcements to them from the main body of Armd. Gp., which is pinned down in fighting right now. Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies are making good progress; but Eleventh Army is pointed very far to the southeast instead of hard to the east ! Sixth Army is still scattered all over the map. No concentration anywhere !

Center is closing up. Enemy pressure against the flanks is preparing or ( in the north ) already developing. Difficulties on the extreme right wing of Second Army.

North is regrouping for new advances. So far it is still impossible to make out at what point the main weight is going to be concentrated.

Gen. Bogatsch reports transport movements: rearward on the front of AGp. South, and frontward, in the sector of AGp. Center.

In the evening, another movement is reported running eastward from Gomel.

Radio intelligence has indications that Timoshenko's Hq has been divided into two sections, whereby it may be expected that his personal influence will be felt on the right flank of AGp. Center, and that of his C of S, on the left flank.

Gen. Buhle

- a) Ten days' pause for overhauling before Armd. Divs. start on the new offensive. Then we can count on 60 - 70% tank striking power. Dust is to blame for rise in engine casualties, since the crossing of the Beresina.
- b) Some Armd. Divs. should be stripped to fill up other Divs. That would get us to Kharkov with about 50% operational tanks.

We would release for that purpose Sixteenth Armd. Div. in Armd. Gp. 1, Seventeenth in Armd. Gp. 2, and Twentieth in Armd. Gp. 3. The Divs. destined for cannibalization will surrender the bulk of their materiel and all personnel save their Hqs. These skeleton Divs. comprising 50% of the NCO and 10% of the enlisted personnel and at least one officer of each tactical unit, will be returned to the Zi\*.

Gen. Keitel (Personnel Div.): Our reserve of 2,000 young officers is used up except for a few Anti-Tank, Artillery and Engineers officers; of the 4,700 remaining in the Replacement Army, not all are fit for frontline service. -- System of direct requisitions from Mil. Districts will be discontinued. All requisitions for officers must go through Personnel Div. -- New officer training courses begin on 20 Aug; 5,000 candidates. -- Bn. COs are getting scarce. (Take good men of company rank ! )

Heusinger: Current matters and preparation for the C of S conference on 25 July.

Liaison Off. AGp. North: Talk about situation in AGp. North and orientation on new operation.

Gen. Paulus: Navy does not want to continue assignments for "Haifisch". OKW will not reopen the English question before the spring of 1942, but it is essential to have something going in the West, to keep the interest of the troops alive.

Field Marshal von Bock: Had a talk with the Fuehrer:

- a) Concerning the "hole" at Smolensk.

b) His worries about the right wing of Second Army.

Evening situation shows nothing new. The situation on the right wing of Second Army has eased. ( Apparently only reconnaissance thrusts).

25 July 1941. ( 34th Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, some progress in the development of the situation on the northern wing and south of Kiev. On the southern wing of Armd. Gp. 1 the situation is still a little uneasy. On the whole, things are clearing up, though.

In AGp. Center yesterday's air reconnaissance shows that the enemy is bringing up forces against the right flank of Army Gp., apparently also by rail. Here we shall have to expect an attack soon.

On the northern flank of Army the enemy seems to be re-grouping with the idea of using only Armor to protect his rear position at Rzhev, and building up his front in the Valdai Hills with Inf.

In AGp. North no important developments.

1130 - 1600 Conference with the C of S of the Army Gps.: von Sodenstern, von Greiffenberg, Brennecke.

- a) Brief opening address by ObdH (thanks, interference from top level, need for adapting to the character of country and enemy; demand for energetic leadership; warning against overdispersal by lateral expansion; \* maintenance of depth; resupply; need for clear-cut dispositions by sectors\*\*). Discussion:
  - a) Brief retrospect. We review tactical and operational experiences.
  - b) Present situation. Resources for developing opportunities and necessity for Army Gps. to take a hand, especially in North and South\*\*\*.
  - c) Plans for conduct of new operations, with particulars on possible execution.
  - d) Supply matters. (Presentation by Wagner.)
  - e) Organizational matters. (Presentation by Buhle.)

The AGp. Cs of S briefly comment on the possibilities envisaged by them, and on timing.

Allowing for a period of rehabilitation, AGp. Center could be ready to start the new offensive on about 10 Aug. Right wing, if necessary, could start off sooner. Also left wing, where less opposition is expected, could start

operations at an earlier date ( 3 - 5 Aug).

AGp. North believes it will be able to start at the end of the month, with main effort at Lake Ilmen (Busch).

AGp. South thinks that, by the end of the month, it will have everything ready for Reichenau's offensive across the Dniepr north and south of Kiev. It also hopes that Armd. Gp. 1 will have completed its mission west of the Dniepr by that time, so that it could proceed to the crossing of the river at Kromenchug and Cherkassi with a view to an eventual junction of Armd.Gps. 1 and 2 in the area northwest of Kharkov.

It remains to be seen if local cooperation with AGp. Center west or directly east of the Dniepr at an earlier date ( end of July ) offers any chances of success against the Russian Fifth Army.

Supply will be quite difficult, even if railroad capacity improves over present levels. Overwhelming problems need to be overcome in supplying northeastward advance of Armd.Gp. 3, toward the Valdai Hills.

Frontline messages report heavy attacks into southern flank of AGp. Center (Regt. Grossdeutschland and XII Corps).

The evening reports offer no important news apart from confirming the transport movement from Gomel on Orel through Bryansk, which started on 24 July and continued through 25 July.

In the sector of AGp. Center, the enemy put on particularly heavy attacks east of Novi Bikhov, a Vidara and northwest of Roslavl today.

In AGp. South, the unsettled situation at Uman has been stabilized.

In AGp. North, no important new developments. The attacks on Lake Ilmen are making only slow progress.

Statistics on prisoners and booty in AGp. Center: Since battle of Minsk, 185,487 prisoners, 2,030 tanks, 1,918 guns.

26 July 1941. ( 35th Day )

Situation: South: The enemy is still finding means to escape the developing encirclement. Savage counter attacks against the advancing pursuit forces cover the effort of extricating troops from the threatened area, which is accomplished with exceeding skill, by both rail and mot. movements. The Red Twenty-sixth Army has been severely compressed; the Red Fifth Army is shifting its main weight to the east.

Center: On the front of von Bock's extreme right wing, the enemy is giving ground. The strong forces which recently

were at Gomel apparently are being shifted northward, to the area of the Roslavl - Smolensk highway. At Yelnya, the enemy is continuing his attacks with new Divs. and new tanks, brought up from the east.

Attacks also from northeastern direction against Hoth's northern flank. Our Inf. is closing up.

North: Enemy resistance by many small enemy bodies fighting stubbornly on the front of the southern wing and on both sides of Lake Ilmen. In Manstein's sector, slow progress in very difficult terrain. West of Lake Peipus, the enemy forces are being pinched off at Dorpat.

Over-all picture: Enemy defense is becoming more aggressive; more tanks, more planes. In addition to ten new Divs. previously listed, fifteen more new Divs. have been reported.

Morning conference with ObdH. I outline the proposals of the Army Gps. for the next moves, adding my critical comments. I am surprised by his emphasis on the necessity of an early attack against the strong enemy group at Gomel. It becomes soon apparent that this is one of the Fuehrer's notions.

Such a plan implies a shift in our strategy from the operational to the tactical level. If striking at small local enemy concentrations becomes our sole objective, the campaign will resolve itself into a series of minor successes which will advance our front only by inches. Pursuing such a policy eliminates all tactical risks and enables us gradually to close the gaps between the front of the Army Gps., but the result will be that we feed all our strength into a front expanding in width at the sacrifice of depth and end up in position warfare!

ObdH calls up von Bock\* to talk over the possibilities for an offensive against the Gomel group. von Bock vehemently opposes any attack with tanks from the east, holding that such a diversion of Armor would sabotage the very operational conceptions underlying the plan for the new phase of the campaign.

Major von Below (Liaison Off. to Guderian) reports on enemy picture and situation. Combat strength of our own troops after five days of refitting will be an average of about 50%.-- Memorandum in justification of himself.

von Etzdorf: Japan: New Cabinet apparently continues pro-Axis orientation. Timing may be changed. -- Indochina. -- Vladivostok.

France has been put on ice. No reply to their notes before two or three weeks. Question of Bizerte is being worked on.

Turkey: Papen reports that things will follow their logical development if we make progress against Russia. German offers postponed until some later date. The Turks are thinking of the creation of buffer states in Caucasia and Turkestan.\*\*

Iran: Government virtually under British control. (gold!).

U.S.A. Entry into the war unlikely at the moment. --  
Still, Roosevelt's "hectic policy" admits of surprises. --  
Efforts to give assistance by supplies are indicated by  
stepped-up shipments to Basra.

Finland fights shy of breaking diplomatic relations  
with England. Seizure of Finnish ships by England will  
perhaps speed up the matter.

Sweden has refused joining the Axis. We shall ignore her  
in the future.

Balkans: Bulgaro-Romanian conversations on frontier read-  
justment and resettlement of populations.

Italy: War unpopular. Strong voices against the policy  
of Colonial and Empire expansion. Fuehrer's letter to Il  
Duce, reminding him to keep watchful eye on France. (The  
motive probably is to dissipate Italian suspicions.)

Gen. Konrad:       a) The Reich Marshal is critical of the Army.\*  
                      b) Air Force wants Army to tell where it  
                          wants main effort.  
                      c) Review of coming operations.

1800 - 2015 Report to the Fuehrer on plans of the Army Gps.  
Longwinded, at times warm, discussion on missed opportu-  
nities for encirclement. He wants:

- 1.) AGp. South must abandon the plan of an operational  
envelopment west of the Dniepr, if prospects of success  
are seen diminishing. All Armd. Divs. must then be  
put across to eastern bank.
- 2.) Disposition of Gomel by a purely tactical operation  
conducted by a new group to be formed under von Kluge.  
The operation must be launched at the earliest, regard-  
less of the timing of other attacks, and if possible  
be developed into encirclement of the Korosten group.
- 3.) Von Bock's group for the frontal offensive on Moscow  
should start pushing ahead slowly as soon as ready.\*\*  
No hurry.\*\*\*
- 4.) Hoth should start his drive on the Valdai Hills as  
soon as possible, so that he would get there no later  
than the right wing of Sixteenth Army.
- 5.) In AGp. North main effort on Lake Ilmen.

The Fuehrer's analysis, which at many points is unjustly  
critical of the Field Commands, indicates a complete break  
with the strategy of large operational conceptions. You  
cannot beat the Russians with operational successes, he  
argues, because they simply do not know when they are  
defeated. On that account it will be necessary to destroy

them bit by bit, in small encircling actions of a purely tactical character.\*

Of course, there is something in these ideas as regards the Russians. But following such a course implies letting the enemy dictate our policy, and reduces our operations to a tempo which will not permit us to reach our goal, the Volga. We must remember that the Russians have plenty of manpower, and it is very unlikely that we could pursue the new policy to the point where the enemy cracks and the way is clear again for operations on a big scale.

To me, these arguments mark the beginning decline of our initial strategy of imaginative operations, and a willingness to throw away the opportunities offered us by the impetus of our Inf. and Armor.

It remains to be seen whether this radical change in strategic conception, which at first certainly will come as a surprise also to the enemy, will bring the desired success. My representations stressing the importance of Moscow are brushed aside without any valid counter evidence.

Gen. Paulus reports on his visit to AGp. North. Hoepfner, Manstein and Reinhard concur that the area between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus is unsuited to operations of Armd. units. All we can do at Lake Ilmen is to attack with Infantry while keeping in readiness the Armor not yet committed (Manstein's Corps.), for a follow-up where Infantry has cleared the path. As a consequence development of the battle will be very slow.

The situation of Reinhard's Corps is very uncomfortable. Reinhard vehemently demands to be given the go-ahead signal. But this is out of the question as long as the offensive from the direction of Luga has not become effective.

Greatly intensified enemy air activity is reported also in that area.

Evening situation: No major changes. Heavy enemy attacks in the sectors previously subjected to enemy action: In AGp. South, against the tank wedge, where the enemy evidently had a local success against Eleventh Armd.Div.; and in AGp. Center against von Kluge's wings and flanks.

Increased enemy air and tank activity, especially against Hoth's left shoulder.

The enemy shows intense activity along the entire front, evidently in the hope of freeing yet the elements encircled at Smolensk. Two or three Army Hqs are believed to be trapped in the pocket. New Army Hqs are taking their places on the front of AGp. Center.

27 July 1941. ( 36th Day )

Situation: In AGp. South, disastrous rainstorms have paralyzed all movements. All we can try to accomplish now is to push the tank wedge aimed at Uman sufficiently far to the south, so as to cut at least the railroad and roads going east through Uman.

In AGp. Center weak enemy attacks are reported on the Dniepr, at Gomel, heavier ones at Roslavl. All were repelled, at great cost to the enemy in prisoners and guns. At Yelnya, the front has quieted. In Hoth's sector, the enemy launched local attacks mostly in Bn. or Regt. strength, without success. Attacks were also repulsed on the left wing, south of Velikie Luki. Enemy air activity is on the increase and in part quite uncomfortable.

AGp. North. Nothing new. Stiff enemy resistance on the front of our Lake Ilmen group; on the rest of this front no major actions. West of Lake Peipus, part of the enemy force is encircled north of Dorpat. The other sectors are quiet.

Gen. Wagner:

- a) Transport of wounded -- Hospital trains. A process is now underway to have all hospital cases evacuated by 10 August. To this end we need one train per Army; Sixth Army needs more.
- b) Arrival of supply trains satisfactory in South; just enough in Center; not enough in North.
- c) OQu conference on 28 July ! Program for conference. Our aim must be to fill up the first issues everywhere by 3 Aug.; after that we can begin stockpiling ammunition.
- d) Briefing on operational plans.
- e) Military Government: Ukrainians and nationals of the Baltic States are being released from prison camps. In AGp., South the boundary of the Rear Area is being moved forward.  
On 1 August, Vilna will be taken over by the Wehrmacht-befehlshaber; Bialystok will be incorporated in East Prussia and Lwow passes to control of Military Commander in the Government-General.
- f) Hungarians will be taken out of the areas temporarily administered by them, which go to Government-General, on 1 Aug.
- g) Slovaks will remain in the area now taken over by Government-General, with Army Gp. retaining formal control of them. They are merging two Divs. into one and carry out a training program.
- h) Army mail. On the whole no complaints. Delivery either



way 6 - 8 days in Sixth Army, 10 - 14 days in Fourth Army.

- i) Tank spare parts situation improved, also as regards engines.
- k) Occupation costs in France reduced from 20 to 10 billion francs.

Gen. Brand (Arty.):

- a) Coastal artillery: To date only nine Btrys. along coast to Riga; three more in preparation for shore east and west of Pernau. Project for coast of Gulf of Finland: one 17 cm Bn., two 10 cm Bns.
- b) Kronstadt: Artillery armament of fortress and possibilities for attack. Pictorial map.

Gen. Buhle:

- a) Loss of materiel through enemy surprise attack on Sixteenth Armd. Div.\* Motorcycle Co. and a 5 cm AT Plat. must be activated.
- b) Organizational plans for the activation of first-class Divs. (present First Draft, strengthened), second-class Divs. (for all defensive missions); and of third-class Divs. (occupation duty).
- c) In each Division immobilized in the rear area, one Plat. of captured tanks will be activated for the Anti-tank Cos. (i.e., 6 tank platoons per Div., each with 4 or 5 tanks); in Security Divisions, one Plat.
- d) Himer's Staff will be recalled, Erfurth's Staff reduced.
- e) The post of a "Staff Officer in charge of Armd. Trains" must be created at OKH. Will be assigned to the Staff the Armored Troops Chief.\*\*

Gen. Jacob :

- a) Distribution of Bridge Clms. Reallocation gives the following distribution:

|                   |                           |       |    |
|-------------------|---------------------------|-------|----|
| Armd. Gp. 3:      | 13 Bridge Clms. B (add 2) | total | 15 |
| Second Armies:    | 18 Bridge Clms. B         |       |    |
|                   | 4 " " T                   | total | 22 |
| Armd. Gp. 2 and   |                           |       |    |
| Second and Fourth | 30 Bridge Clms. B         |       |    |
| Armies:           | 3 " " G                   | total | 33 |
| Army Gp. South:   | 66 Bridge Clms. B         |       |    |
|                   | 3 " " G                   |       |    |
|                   | 5 " " "                   |       |    |
|                   | 1 Bench "                 | total | 79 |

|                 |    |          |       |   |           |
|-----------------|----|----------|-------|---|-----------|
| Army Gp. North: | 33 | Bridge   | Clms. | B |           |
|                 | 4  | "        | "     | G |           |
|                 | 3  | "        | "     | T |           |
|                 | 8  | Austrian | "     |   | total 48. |

b) River mines for the Dniepr; mines and wire carried by Eng. units.

ObdH visited AGp. Center: Review of the plans for Gomel, offensive against Moscow, and Hoth's operation against the Valdai Hills:

Guderian must take out time for rehabilitation of materiel and personnel. Will be finished about 3 or 4 Aug. VII and IX Corps will be placed under Guderian's command to relieve his Armd. forces. VII Corps will strike on Roslavl; this attack should, if possible, be conducted as a preliminary to the attack on Gomel.

Hoth will come under control of Strauss. Von Kluge will be withdrawn and take over Hoth's assault group now under Hq Second Army.

Evening: In South, bad weather. Bridge is being constructed at Dubossary. Eleventh Army wants a break of three days. (Impossible, paired attack with Armd. Gp.). Kleist again wants to run off to the southeast instead of swinging southward. -- Russian Cavalry north of Korosten.

On front of AGp. Center, appearance of two Divs. previously identified at Korosten. Cavalry west of Gomel, in the Bobruisk area. Some of the Russian Inf. attacking at Roslavl had no rifles; were guarded by partisans.\*

AGp. North. Lake Ilmen sector. In front of von Manstein, the enemy is holding doggedly. The time is ripe to take Narva. North of Dorpat, a Russian pocket has been cleaned out: 1,600 prisoners, over 50 guns. 9 enemy bridges north of Luga.

28 July 1941. (37th Day)

Situation: No important new developments. An order has been issued to AGp. South to swing Armd. Gp. 1 not to the southeast, but to the south, on Uman.

In AGp. Center the Russian Cavalry behind the right wing of AGp. Center is still active and is reported to have even damaged the railroad line to Bobruisk. Counter-measures have been initiated.

The Mogilev pocket is now completely cleaned out. The numbers of prisoners and guns corroborate our original estimate of 6 enemy Divs.

In AGp. North. Good progress toward Staraya Russa. Otherwise no change. AGp. asserts it can launch the Narva attack only if Reinhard's entire group is swung forward on the hinge of First Armd. Div. Sounds quite unfeasible. To my mind, the whole attack is no more than a Combat ng. assault.

Field Marshal von Bock ( on phone ) 1030:

- 1.) Terrain east of the Sosh river impracticable for Guderian's attack.
- 2.) Roslavl must be taken. To do this, Guderian need not advance in direction of Bryansk, but can turn off to the Iput river. Roslavl is in any event necessary as a jump-off base\* for the right wing of von Bock's Group in its eastward advance, as well as for Guderian.
- 3.) Von Bock's forces too weak for further advance to the east, since he needs large forces on his right wing (echelonned flank protection)\*. In that he is right!
- 4.) Action taken by Army Gp. to eliminate Russian Cav. force in its rear. (Fegelein, Schenkendorf; elements of rear Divisions are brought up for a concentric drive; Air Force is alerted).
- 5.) Guderian needs until 3 or 4 August.

Grouping of enemy:

New Front Hq South (Odessa): Ninth, Second, Eighteenth Armies.

Old Front Hq Southwest: Twelfth, Sixth, Twenty-sixth and Fifth Armies

New Army Hq near Leningrad.

Bogatsch:

- a) Unidentified transport movements from the area of Ribinsk to Leningrad. (From Moscow?)
- b) Narva bridge apparently made unusable for trains.
- c) New: Railroad line under construction from the Baltic ports south of Leningrad to the Ribinsk railroad line. Right of way and structures finished. Tracks have not yet been laid. Perhaps of service for moving troops.
- d) Extensive destructions in Bologoye-RR station (aerial photograph).
- e) Activities interpreted as attempts to prepare the Estonian ports for defense from land side. Land fortifications south of Kronstadt? \* \*
- f) Behind sector fronting AGp. South, industrial evacuations. For the most part the rail network appears to

be jammed at critical points. No operational movements observed.

von Ziehlberg: Current reassignments. Decorations for Gen.Staff personnel.

Report 1300: Enemy attacks south of Luga result in penetration in the sector of 289th Div. Parts of Eighth Armd.Div. must be committed.

Col. Ochsenri: Reports on his tour to AGp. South. The "Do" units and the Heavy Rocket Launchers\* have been exceedingly effective everywhere. We must see to it that this evidently very effective weapon is put to even more extensive use. The difficulty lies in ammunition supply.

Gen. Fellgiebel: Axes of communications for von Kluge and Hoth's Armd.Gp. in the projected operations. -- Cipher operations procedure.\*\*

Lt. Col. Stieff reports on his trip to Armd. Gp. 3. -- Road problems and combat conditions. -- Ammunition difficulties. -- Resentment against Armd.Gp. 2. -- Condition of vehicles. -- Directives, not orders !\*\*\*

Major Mueller-Hillebrand reports on his visit to Ninth Armd.Div. Combat conditions. -- Leadership. -- Roads. -- Traffic control.

Evening situation: South: With roads still very bad, Army Gp. is moving its Armd. Gp. harder to south-southeast. (Should be still more to the south!)

Center: Enemy encircled at Smolensk still fairly strong. An enemy attack (allegedly a Cav. Corps of three Divs.) has broken into the southern flank. Heavy attacks at Rogachev and Roslavl, and also on the front of Armd.Gp.3, where five Rifle Divs. and three Armd.Divs. have been identified.

North: Break-through at Luga has been sealed. Advances on the right wing and toward Staraya Russa.

At the evening situation conference I again point out the absurdity of the operation now decided on. They are bound to result in dispersion of our strength and checking of the drive on Moscow, the crucial objective. Von Bock's Group obviously has been weakened to a point where he is barely able to replace his Armor with Infantry, let alone mount any offensive. Attack impossible before 10 Aug.

29 July 1941. ( 38th Day ).

Situation: South: New restricted gains. Pockets are developing between Armd.Gp. 1 and Seventeenth Army, also between Seventeenth and Eleventh Armies.

Center: Local attacks. Enemy situation on the whole unchanged. Another new Army Hq has been inserted in the front; it controls three new Rifle Divs., one of which is made up mainly of untrained Moscow industrial workers.

North: Amazingly good progress on Kholm. Also advances in the direction of Staraya Russa. The enemy penetration in the Luga area has been contained. West of Lake Peipus two small enemy pockets have been formed.

Gen. Wagner (Gen Qu):

- a) Arrival of trains is good in North (18) and Center (10), insufficient in South (10).
- b) It will take until 15 Aug. to replenish the first ammunition issue in all organizations; stockpiling will be possible only after that.
- c) Spare parts situation: Repair installations in the Orsha base have been centralized. Engines have arrived for 80 Tanks III and 30 Czech 38 Tanks. (We requisitioned 250.) Specialist workers have arrived at the front.
- d) Truck replacements urgently needed.
- e) New operations:

North thinks it can carry out its operations with 18 trains, daily. Armd. Gp. 3 thinks its best plan is to advance along the railroad line. Railroad line usable as far as Novo Sokolniki; 8,000 tons of Truck Ctm. space (including 4,000 tons for immediate needs\*).

Eighteenth Army is supplying Reinhard's Corps through Pskov (Gen Qu base). Transport capacity of Eighteenth Army has declined 40%, owing to immobilization of trailers.\*\*

Center: Bridge \*\*\* under construction at Ulla.

South still needs more Truck Ctm. to transport supplies from the jump-off base to the front; railroad line cannot handle the volume. Dniepr crossing planned for 5 Aug. It will be possible to move up  $1\frac{1}{2}$  ammunition issues for the operation. 2,000 tons have been allocated for the preparation of the crossing at Cherkassi. Balta is Army base, with fuel depots and medical services. Base in the Dniepr bend planned for later on. Preparations initiated for sea route to Nikolayev (Merk).

- f) "Administrative Orders" appendix to the Operational Orders for the new offensive.

Col. Breith (Armd. Troops) reports on his visit to Armd. Gps. 2 and 3. Nothing new of any importance. Traffic discipline and control # deficient. Control Dets. too weak. Hqs of Armd. Divs. and Corps need organic Hq guards.

Gen. Paulus, Gen. Gause: Command organization in North Africa.  
Plan for attack on Tobruk.

Gen. Osterkamp ( Chief, Army Rations Office ):

- a) Preparations for the winter. Everything ready, expect cooking kettles.\* General conference at Gen Qu's Office today.
- b) Rations for North Africa set aside: 50,000, for 50 days.
- c) Crop prospects:
  - Bread cereals: Last year, 11.6 mill. tons, this year 12.8. Average of last five years, 13.9.
  - Fodder grain: Last year, 12.08 mill. tons, this year, 11.13. Average of last five years, 12.07.
  - Total grain crop: Last year, 23.07 mill. tons, this year, 23.9. Average of last five years, 25.9.
- d) Total crop: Good average crop. New East produced 0.6 mill. tons more than last year. Protectorate 0.2 mill. tons under last year's production.
- e) Farm labor:
  - From other countries 210,000
  - PWs 1,500,000
  - Russian PWs 200,000
  - round 2,000,000
- f) Potatoes: Late, but not bad.
- g) Hay: First mowing good average in both quantity and quality.
- h) Livestock: Cattle, stationary; hogs, somewhat more.
- i) Comparison between food rations in England and in Germany: Meat, same; bread, better in England; jam, cheese and fat, better in Germany; sugar, coffee, tea, better in England.

Heusinger: a) Problems likely to be encountered by AGp. North in fighting coastal fortifications. Artillery!  
b) Anticipated strength requirements after successful completion of operations in Russia. Memorandum on disposition of forces.

Paulus: Report on his conference with OKW:

- a) Any restrictions imposed on Army Gp. North by OKW? Answer evasive! VIII Air Corps employed in support of push of Lake Ilmen Group, without notifying OKH.

- b) North Africa is an Italian theater of operations. Bastide is in full charge there.— High Command Armd. Gp. must be organized. Will control defensive front at Sidi Barrani and the mobile wing. The Italians will decide about attack on Tobruk.
- c) Safeguarding of transport on North African route is the responsibility of the Italians. In the present situation it would be a crime to allocate German planes for this purpose. OKW has nothing left to help out with.

Evening situation:

- a) Straits of Eleventh Army due to lack of ammunition and attacks from the south.
- b) AGp. South plans to have Schwedler's strike eastward toward the Dniepr and against Kiev.
- c) Center: Enemy river boats on the Pripet are harrassing our troops. — Enemy Cav. Corps is still kicking up in the rear of the Army Gp. VII Corps is brought to bear against Roslavl. Enemy attack achieves minor penetration in Nineteenth and Twentieth Armd. Divs. Unusually heavy attacks against VI Corps and Fourteenth mot. Div.
- d) In AGp. North, enemy puts on powerful attacks on Velikie Luki. Our troops are in a precarious position owing to lack of ammunition. II Corps makes very good progress in the direction of Kholm.

The situation on the boundary between Army Gp. Center and North makes it necessary to combine the forces in the area for unified action. Order to this effect has been issued. The combined force will be under command of Ninth Army. I wanted to have this done several days ago, but was vetoed then.

30 July 1941 (39th Day)

Situation: In AGp. South, the weeks of grinding at the Russian front in the Ukraine are beginning to tell. The enemy front is crumbling. Notwithstanding, we must expect that owing to the absence of any pressure from the Romanians and the existence of several well-preserved enemy Divs. in the sector of the Front Group South, an attempt will be made to hold the coastal district around Odessa. Odessa may become a Russian Tobruk. There is only one way to prevent this: Armd. Gp. I must strike due south through Pervomaisk.

Schwedler has reformed a large portion of his group. It would be inadvisable at this time to send him off in north-eastern direction for a crossing of the Dniepr south of

Kiev, instead, it must be moved due east so that it remains available a few days longer for operations to the south.

Sixth Army has now completely detached its left wing. Von Reichenau with his right wing is probably pressing on to the Dnieper, north of Kiev. He has his orders to destroy the enemy group at Korosten, and must be kept from doing anything else.

Center: Attempts to withdraw the Armd. Divs. from their sectors\* must be abandoned owing to the incessant enemy attacks. Fourth Armd. Div. had to be committed again at Kriukov, "Grossdeutschland" at Roslavl.

South and southwest of Toropets, heavy fighting is reported. Here we have a chance to catch a large enemy force, and would need cooperation of AGp. Center, attacking with Fourteenth mot. Div. from the south, and AGp. North, attacking with I Corps from the north, and with Schubert's Combat Team from Velikie Luki. The order for such an operation must come from OKH.

North: It is becoming evident that OKW is revising its erstwhile notions and no longer insists on the impossible demand for AGp. North to cut off the eastward retreat route of the enemy around Leningrad. For the time being the commitment of VIII Air Corps in the sector of AGp. North has been cancelled.-- Eighth Armd. Div. has gone into action at Luga.

Telephone talk ObdH/van Bock: Second Army claims that the enemy fronting it has softened. It proposes a small-scale operation from the west and north for clearing the enemy out of Rogachev and the surrounding country.

Army Gp. wants to do Roslavl on 31 July or 1 Aug. Twentieth Armd. Div. is up against a very tough situation (40 enemy Btrys.); XXIII Corps has passed to the defensive; Fourteenth mot. Div. is not up to its full fighting strength.

Bogatsch: Air reconnaissance:

- a) Westward movements on Leningrad, also from Moscow to Leningrad. Wrecking of railroad lines apparently was not complete enough.
- b) Plane replacement for Long-range Rcn. Staffeln has completely ceased.
- c) It has become necessary to withdraw the Close-range Staffeln from the Army Gps. Plane strength of units severely diminished, and no replacements available. Out of ten Staffeln, six at least must be reorganized as workshop formations for the period of rehabilitation\*\*; they will be under control of the AGp. Air Officers.
- d) By scraping the bottom of the barrel, we would have replacements for our Henschel planes only until 1 Sept. Then this type will be exhausted, and there will be no replacements. In the Night Staffeln things are not



much different. Here the bottleneck is more on the personnel side than in materiel.

Gen. Ott reports on his visit to Armd. Gp. 4. He canvassed Commanders on the form Armd. Divs. should be given in the fall reorganization. Balk's proposal to give everything to the Cos., which would deprive the Bn. CO of all means for exercising control over operations, is generally rejected. Discussion on employment of the Motorcycle Bn. for reconnaissance.

Gen. Wagner ( on phone ): Reply to inquiry concerning possibilities to supply Hoepfner's right wing (Reinhard's Corps):

Pskov - Gdov road serviceable only for motor vehicles without trailers. Shipping on Lake Peipus has been instituted with 300 tons, navigation head Gdov. No definite data yet on time required. Available shipping space estimated at 1,500 tons. Towing vessels are few. Assault boats can help out. Within three days the road from Pskov to Gdov is expected to be much improved; we shall see then to what extent 60-ton Truck Clms. could be brought into use to relieve the situation.

Major Meyer-Ricks has returned from Libya.\* Report on the work of Felmy's Staff and on his impressions in Syria.

Wagner (Gen Qu) - Schmidt-Altenstadt:

- a) Employment of Security Divs.
- b) Supply position of Reinhard's Corps.
- c) Care of wounded. Senior medical officer must be assigned to the Gen Qu Hqs at the Army Gps.
- d) Separation of Russian and German wounded.
- e) The Fuehrer has not signed the agreement with France on reduction of occupation costs.

Gen. Rommel comes in. Discussion on the importance of the African theater of operations. -- He does not expect an English attack before next September; I consider August more likely. -- Reviews situation in North Africa.

von Ziehlberg: Decorations and current Gen. Staff personnel matters.

Major Philippi (Op. Sec.) reports on his observations in Eleventh Armd. Div. and Hq of Kempff's Corps.

1600 Gen. Jodl calls up: The Fuehrer has arrived at a new conception of the next phase of the campaign:

AGp. North must defeat the enemy at Leningrad; is left discretion in choosing direction of main effort. Plan of thrust to cut the Moscow-Leningrad railroad is dropped.

Center: Here we must pass to the defensive. Only security measures on the line Lake Ilmen - Kholm - Toropets! Withdraw Armd. Divs. for rehabilitation.

South: For the time being we must leave Gomel alone. Whether we shall do Roslavl is not yet decided at the moment.

Air Force: Shift main strength to AGp. North, for close support in eliminating the enemy in Estonia. Will not be withdrawn before accomplishment of mission of AGp. North is assured.

1720 von Greiffenberg (on phone):

- 1.) Cooperation with AGp. North at Velikie Luki -- Toropets, to cut off the enemy.
- 2.) Rogachev. Army Gp. wants to do this job, as a preliminary to the eventual capture of Gomel. Can be ready within two days.
- 3.) Roslavl not conceived as an independent operation but as part of the later operations against Gomel.
- 4.) I Corps will be completely out of Artillery ammunition day after tomorrow!

Evening situation:

- a) Very promising break-through of Armd.Gp. 1 in southern direction, toward Pervomaisk.--- At last!  
On the eastern front \* many enemy attacks, at some points eleven times in succession; all repulsed!
- b) Operation Rogachev can start in five days ( 4 Aug. ).
- c) Roslavl can start on 1 Aug.; XXIV Corps, with VII Corps to its left.

2400. Heusinger: OKW has signed new "directive" which adopts our proposals! Limited objective: Rogachev. Not more than one Armd.Div. will be employed. At Roslavl, 263rd Inf.Div. will help. Toropets must be done. All necessary orders will be contained in the forthcoming Fuehrer order.

This decision frees every thinking soldier of the horrible vision obsessing us these last few days, when the Fuehrer's obstinacy made the final bogging down of the eastern campaign appear imminent. At long last we get a break!

Memorandum of the Naval Operations Staff on the Battle of the Atlantic. Very gratifying, but also sober in its appraisal of the situation.

31 July 1941. ( 40th Day )

Situation: South: No report yet on the fresh enemy forces observed south of Eleventh Army; it may be assumed to be still in the area.

The forming of pockets west and northwest of Pervomaisk is developing satisfactorily. Armd.Gp. 1 has pushed into the assembled forces of Twelfth Army as they were being taken out of the line. Apparently the left wing of Armd. Gp. 1 simply rolled over an enemy Div.

The movement of the Inf. Div. \* from the rear toward the Dniepr crossing site south of Kiev has got under way. The attack against the strong enemy force directly south of Kiev is in progress. Sixth Army still shows no clear intentions.

Center: Local enemy attacks. Otherwise nothing new. The fighting power of the enemy seems to be declining. The enemy is intensifying construction of positions on the front of Army Gp.

North: Army Gp. is resisting detachment of forces from the Kholm group in the direction of Toropets.

Progress at Lake Ilmen. The southwestern shore of the Lake has been reached. Next to Eighth Armd. Div., Third mot. Div. has now been committed in the direction of Luga. Manstein seems to be pressing in that direction.

No change on the northern wing and in Estonia.

A captured Gen.Staff Officer has stated that the enemy is shifting troops from the Leningrad front to the area south of Lake Ilmen (?). Railroad movements between Leningrad and Moscow (evacuations?).

Gen. Bogatsch: Air observation shows nothing new of importance. Tactical reconnaissance apparently suffers from the fact that fighter protection on reconnaissance sorties has become thin.

Radio intelligence suggests the following enemy command set-up:

|                    |   |            |
|--------------------|---|------------|
| Baltic Front       | ) | Voroshilov |
| Northwestern Front | ) |            |
| Western Front      | ) | Timoshenko |
| Central Front      | ) |            |
| Southwestern Front | ) | Budyonny   |
| Southern Front     | ) |            |

The "Armies" comprised in the "Fronts" seem to be some sort of Corps Hqs, each commanding several Divisions.

Radke: a) Serious loss by 52nd Rocket Proj. Regt.: A large quantity of secret material has been captured by the enemy. Basic order\*\*.

b) Propaganda leaflets. Commands want more leaflets. Arrangements made for continuous supply.

- c) Himmler states in a letter that last year's Polish incidents are now finally closed\*.

Talk with Wagner ( Gen Qu ):

- 1.) Ammunition shortage in Ninth Army was caused by assignment of I Corps to Army, for ammunition supply.
- 2.) AGp. North will have a complete first issue in the hands of troops on 5 Aug. Armd.Gp. 4 already has its ammunition. Eighteenth Army is filled up.
- 3.) Conditions for supply of the Narva Group will be investigated. Seems to have road trouble.

Major Schroetter ( Central Branch ) reports on his experiences with Thirteenth Armd. Div. (Duevert) at Fastov (southwest of Kiev). Very good impression.

Surgeon-General Dr. Handloser:

- a) Epidemics: Only in Romania a short outbreak of mild dysentery; no fatal cases. Otherwise we have been lucky everywhere so far.
- b) Medical casualties:  $\frac{1}{2}$  %. Very good !
- c) Allocation of "Special Groups" for blood transfusion and epidemics control.
- d) Conditions in the Field Medical Service. Transport problem. Questions of organization. One-sixth of all doctors come from the regular Army; five-sixth belong to the Reserve.
- e) ZI: Of 254,647 beds, 180,038 are occupied. We must procure additional 17,000 beds; to raise the number of free beds in the ZI to 100,000. In the light of our experiences this will last us for about a month (i.e. till early in September).

OKH issues its implementation order to the last Fuehrer "directive". Unfortunately I cannot induce ObdH to inject into this order the slightest overtone expressive of a will of his own. Its wording is dictated by an anxiety to avoid anything that could be suspected as opposition to his superior.

Evening situation: South: Eleventh Army is attacked from the south; on the front of Seventeenth Army, tough enemy resistance. Armd.Gp. 1 is wheeling into the rear of the enemy fronting Seventeenth Army; in this process its right wing is being attacked from the inside, its left wing from the outside. Echelonning on its left is deep enough to obviate any danger. Here for the first time we have a battle with inverted front, in which the attacking front is not a flank of armored Divs., but a front of wheeling units.

Sixth Army is operating in difficult terrain and against a stubborn enemy, and so its progress is slow. The group northwest of Kiev has little chance of success in the country between the wide forest areas. Massing against the enemy at Korosten is getting under way, but it probably will be a long time before the process is completed.

Center: Attack against southern flank and front. Yelnya especially is subjected to assaults from all directions.

In the Smolensk pocket everything seems to be quiet.

Three enemy Divs. on the northern flank at Velikie Luki. South of Toropets two enemy Divs. Report on enemy movements both against the southern flank and the front of Army Gp.; road movements from Moscow toward the front of the Army Gp.

North: II Corps has to overwhelm bitter enemy resistance at Kholm and therefore is still pinned down in fighting. Accordingly transfer of Twelfth Division to the south, will be impossible for the moment.

Nothing new between Lake Ilmen and Lake Peipus. Some progress in the area of Lake Ilmen.

Estonia: Awkward enemy raids behind the front. Ground gained to the northwest.

Gen. Wagner calls up:

- a) Road conditions east of Lake Peipus prevent sending larger reinforcements to the Narva Group. On Lake Peipus, navigation difficult. Daily capacity only 300 tons.
- b) Eckstein reports heavy requests for ammunition from AGp. Center. Field Marshal von Bock, who has been looking into the ammunition question himself; thinks Hq Ninth Army too easily upset. Army Gp. expects to replenish the first issue of ammunition by tomorrow or the day after. Only after that can they think of stockpiling. If railroad service to AGp. Center remains as it is now, we can meet current demands, but cannot accumulate reserve ammunition.
- c) Arrival of trains on 31 July: North, 10; Center, 16; South, 6 trains.

Concluded: 31 July 1941. Initial: H.

/ End of volume VI, without date: \*/

Conference of Chiefs of Staff: Use of smoke in river crossings. Not a question of organization, but of fore-sighted supply! \*\*

Traffic control.

Evacuation of a border strip in the East.

Liaison Officers and monitoring.

Utilization of Truck Cms. (Engineers, CQu etc.).

Relationship Armor/ Inf.

For tactical jump-off, all men on board.

Artillery of rear Divs. --- Engineers of rear Divs. must build emergency bridges. --- Signal units of rear Divs., to attend to what is needed in crossings of rivers.

Chemical warfare units, airborne troops.

AT defense ( Russian doctrine of tank attack. A little everywhere! ) Air defense.

Attack and pursuit at night (lessons of the Greek Campaign).  
Surprise.

Field Hospitals.

All notes on this page crossed out with pencil.

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**THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL  
OF  
GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER**

**Chief of the General Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)**

**14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942**

**FOOTNOTES**

**VOLUME VIII**

# CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

- Volume I:** Prefatory Note  
Editor's Foreword  
Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms  
Military Districts  
The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939
- Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939
- Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940
- Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940
- Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941
- Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.  
Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941
- Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942
- Volume VIII:** Footnotes
- Volume IX:** Maps

FOOTNOTES TO VOL. I

p. 1     \* (France ... AGp.:5)  
Tabulation could not be explained.

p. 1     \*\* (France ... (possibly 44))  
Uncertainty regarding North African units.

-----

p. 2     \* (4.) ... 106 Divs.)  
The total number of Divs. that France was expected to put in the field at the outbreak of war. 106 - (44+15) = 47.

p. 2     \*\* (5.) ... military point of view.)  
I.e., from a French military point of view, as it would enhance the factor of surprise.

-----

p. 3     \* (with 6 Divs. of Third Draft following within ... days.)  
Uncertain about number of days that would be necessary for mobilization. The term "Draft" is here used merely to indicate limited-employment, i.e., not first-line troops.

-----

p. 4     \* (10.) ... separate tabulation.)  
The tabulation was not included in the Journal. - Ed.

-----

p. 5     \* (13.) ... Divs. to be taken out of Army Group.)  
The entire western front, including the southern part, i.e., two to four Divs. of the frontier security force, and twelve Divs. after mobilization. -- Six Divs. (mobilization plan) provided for northern border. Six Divs. (Belgium) as a containing force on Belgian border if a Franco-British force should attack through Belgium.

p. 5     \*\* (14 c) )  
No paragraph b). - Ed.

- p. 9 \* (Afternoon Session b) (c)  
No paragraph c) - Ed.
- p. 9 \*\* (d) Occupation of the islands and the northern corner.)  
The "islands" might be the Frisian islands (Dutch).  
Between 1931 and 1934 there was talk of "avy plans to  
secure these islands in the event of war, as outposts  
against Britain.
- p. 9 \*\*\* (c) East: ... Dirschau Bridge?)  
The railroad bridge at (Polish) Tczew, connecting  
Danzig and the Corridor.
- 

- p. 10 \* (Graudenz: Possibly raiding force in civilian clothes.)  
A special task force organized by OKW & Abwehr (Adm.  
Canaris) to seize strategic Vistula bridge.
- p. 10 \*\* (Danzig will be left to its own resources.)  
Danzig had an SA Division (Sturmabteilung, Nazi para-  
military organization)
- p. 10 \*\*\* (Summary.)  
Written in the privacy of his room. The preceding  
entries were running notes made in the notebook  
during the Fuehrer's address.
- 

- p. 12 \* (e) Gdynia. Shelling with K 5 Gun.)  
28 cm railway gun.
- p. 12 \* (Evening: ... Ribbentrop -- Ciano)  
The first three words are illegible. They could mean  
"Mu/ssolini / West neutral".

- p. 13 \* (.... Other car shifts not before 22.)  
The entry may have reference to preparations by the Reichsbahn for Party Rally, e.g. assembly of trains.
- p. 13 \*\* (OQu I: Two-thirds of 22nd Div.)  
I.e., two Regts. of the triangular Div. (Airborne).
- p. 13 \*\*\* (First Bn. 16th Inf. Regt.)  
# (Sorau)  
A paratroop experimental Bn. activated in western part of Germany, to be transferred to troop training center in Silesia (Sorau).
- p. 13 ## (Bock must start attack on Y-Day.)  
## (Otherwise wait 8 days.)  
Y refers to date of attack (D-Day).  
AGp. North, commanded by von Bock, was smaller than AGp. South, under von Rundstedt, which was believed to face the Polish main concentration. The entry possibly refers to a pending decision as to whether von Bock was to attack on Y-Day even if the Polish northern wing should prove to be the stronger, or in that case wait the pre-arranged eight days during which the Polish Army would regroup to meet the threat of the larger German force in the South.
- p. 13 (Asterisk omitted) (Evacuations by Todt.)  
Saarbruecken area.
- p. 13 \*# (Tenth Armd. Div. (Gen. Schaal) is split up in small groups, for protection of railroad lines.)  
In Protectorate. Schaal protested against misuse of tanks for that purpose.
- p. 13 \*\*# (Move to Zossen 23 Aug.)  
Prepared General Headquarters with largest Army communications center in woodlands outside Berlin.  
(The entry "Wandern" remained unexplained.)
- 
- p. 14 (Last line of the day omitted:)  
"Gas ammunition. Trouble with leak proofing? See Sixth Section." (Sixth Section became Gen Qm Section after beginning of war. - Ed.)
- p. 14 (Asterisk omitted) (3.) No Transport Columns 7 and 8.)  
No details remembered.

p. 15 \* (Todt withdraw several days before.)  
I.e., before start of hostilities.

p. 15 \* (Netzebruch.)  
Netze river marshes on Polish border, where neither side could operate. Protect boundary between AGps. North and South.

p. 15 \*\* (Fighter operation "Red".)  
Red was code for Eastern theater, Blue for western theater.

-----

p. 16 \* (Guerilla warfare ...)  
OQu IV was instructed to see to it that intelligence disseminated to field units would draw proper attention to the possibility of partisan warfare in operational theaters.

-----

p. 17 \* (Conference at Army Group 2.)  
This is AGp. 2 of the peacetime organization of the German Army, under command of von Leeb, not von Bock's Army Gp. on the eastern border. It became AGp. C.

p. 17 \*\* (C in C Army Group 2.)  
\*\* (Industrial evacuation.)  
Saarbruecken area.

p. 17 \*\*\* (... last evacuations on receipt of Y-Day order.)  
Start of hostilities in the East.

p. 17 # (Check with 6th Section.)  
Gen Qu Section

p. 17 ## (... occupation of Luxembourg territory.)  
Entry by French armed forces.

p. 17 ### (Reinforcement east of Graudenz.)  
East of Corridor, i.e., in East Prussia.

p. 17 \*# (OQu IV report on Italy.)  
Striking out of an entry indicates that matter has been taken up with Section concerned.

- p. 18 \* (Location of demolition switches ...)  
On the Polish side. Were to be seized to prevent demolition.
- p. 18 \*\* (Time: X-Day, if possible before X Hour.)  
X-Day is Mobilization Day.  
Usually X referred to Hour (Zero Hour).
- p. 18 \*\*\* (c) ... (Clear with 5th Sec.)  
Office of Transportation Chief.
- p. 18 # (Canaris.)  
Canaris, Head of OKW - Abwehr, kept Halder informed on diplomatic developments, which he learned through his intelligence channels, as a favor among friends; OKW - OKH set-up did not provide for any official channeling of such information. Another source of information was the organic OKH intelligence organization, OQu IV.
- p. 18 # (Attolico.)  
Italian Ambassador.
- p. 18 \*# (Fuschl.)  
Ribbentrop's chateau near Salzburg.
- p. 18 \*\*# (OQu IV brings word of Russian Treaty.)  
Same as footnote #
- 

- p. 19 \* (Left prong. ... b) )  
Fourth Army, in Pomerania, would cut across Tucheler - Heide Moors (in Corridor) to link up with Third Army in East Prussia.
- 

- p. 22 \* (III. 2.) ... Zipser Neudorf.)  
Town in Slovakia, strategically located south of Polish border.
- 

- p. 23 \* (5.) ... Army Reichenau.)  
Tenth Army, in AGp. South.

- p. 23 \*\* (OKW Conference ... 1.) ... (Slovak protest) ...)  
Reading of "protest" is not certain. - Ed.

- p. 24 \* (Op. Sec. ... Policy on fire volume in West.)  
There were to be differentiations as between French and the other western neighbors.
- p. 24 \*\*\* (2.) Should we put in operation prearranged schedule ... ?)  
The German term "Spannungsstufen" refers to the "waves" of a fixed schedule; I: order troops, II: Reservists, for tighter closing of border.
- 
- p. 25 \* (4.) b) Situation would be easier. ...)  
From the point of view of command because such an order would permit institution of certain preparations.
- p. 25 \*\* (4.) b) ... order "Defense Plan West" ...)  
The defensive plan based on "playing dead" and letting the French start hostilities.
- p. 25 \*\*\* (Checked with 11th Sec.)  
Later Foreign Armies East.
- p. 25 \*# (Arrange with Army Group.)  
Regarding use of roads in Slovakia.
- p. 25 \*\*# (1000 Jeschonneck: ... Barkhausen has no instructions.)  
Probably refers to Seventh Air Force Div.
- p. 25# \*\*\* (6.) ... Checked with 3rd Sec.)  
Later, Foreign Armies West.
- p. 25### (Holland: ... "German" Brigade ...)  
Composed of Netherlands citizens of German or mixed extraction.
- 
- p. 26 (Asterisk omitted) (Canaris: Situation at Berlin Police Hq)  
Count von Helldorf. Hanged after the 20th July, 1944, as one of the conspirators.
- p. 26 (Asterisk omitted) (Evacuation of ... XII Corps Area.)  
Mil. District XII, i.e., the Saarbruecken industrial area.



p. 27 \* (Telephone restrictions lifted on Britain and France).  
Probably relating to tapping of telephone lines.

p. 27 \*\* (von Boeckmann ..... Executive Power).  
Executive Power gives Army Commanders authority  
to promulgate laws in occupied territories.

p. 27 \*\*\* (Exercises).  
Could not be reconstructed from notes.

p. 27 \*# (K men).  
Operations of Organization K were under OKW control  
(Canaris). Organization K was the nucleus of Regt.  
Brandenburg, the military sabotage and special tasks  
organization (e.g. operations in foreign uniforms).

p. 27 \*\*# (Jablunka Pass).  
On Slovak - Polish border.

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p. 28 \* (ObdH ..... 2 quotas).  
Fuel in the German Army was issued in quota units  
sufficient to move all vehicles of, e.g. one Div. over  
100 km on level, or 75 km on hilly roads.

p. 28 \*\* (Helldorf.)  
Police Commissioner of Berlin. (see p.26)

p. 28 \*\*\* (The Army ..... flinching back)  
Cancellation of attack on 25 Aug.

p. 28 \*# (Siewert.)  
Adjutant of von Brauchitsch. Time probably 1630 or 1700.

p. 28 \*\*# (Engel.)  
One of Hitler's aides-de-camp. A frequent source of  
information on OKW.

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p. 29 \* (Objectives of forcible means farther:)  
"Ziel der Gewalt weiter." The shorthand notes are  
fairly clear and suggest no other rendering. Gen. Halder  
can no longer interpret this entry which he believes  
he made hurriedly at the telephone. - Ed.

p. 29 \*\* (Goering - Kompr.)  
"Kompr." (in long hand) could not be reconstructed.

p. 29 \*\*\* (.. We shall respect sovereignty.)  
I.e., " We shall respect neutrality. "

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p. 30 \* (ObdH ..... to maintain "deception".)  
"Taeuschung fahren." Refers to the plan of the Polish campaign, according to which railroad movements were to run to the center of the front, between AGps. North and South, so as to keep the enemy in the dark as to the direction of the main concentration for the "hard solution". This "hard solution", i.e. the decisive attack on one of the wings, was to be launched while the deception movements in the center were still going on.

p. 30 \*\* (Air force ..... as of 6.8.)  
Should read 6.9.

p. 30 \*\*\* (Coulondre.)  
French Ambassador.

p. 30 ## (Ott)  
German Mil. Attaché in Tokyo.

p. 30 \*\*# (... tribute to the Japanese.)  
Gen. Halder could not remember the nature of the demonstration contemplated, whether it was designed to regain friendship of Japanese Army, or to let them know that the German Army felt the same way.

-----

p. 31 \* (ObdH: Stick it out.)  
Meaning, don't let anyone change your plans! After opening of hostilities was called off on 25 Aug., all commanders wanted changes in their orders.

p. 31 \*\* (We must not agree to any changes.)  
Air Force was particularly insistent about accommodation of its wishes.

-----

p. 32 \* (Oster:)  
C of S, OKW - Abwehr.

p. 32 \*\* (Finance Minister Popitz.)  
Although Min. of Finance, he joined the group working against Hitler. Was hanged after the 20th July, 1944.

-----

p. 34 \* (Ask Weizsaecker.)  
Probably request to see Gen. Halder. See entry at 2200.

p. 34 \*\* (Sillein)  
\*\* (Deutschendorf.)  
Localities in Slovakia.

p. 34 \*\*\* (ObdH 4.) ... achieve maximum objective.)  
Elimination of Corridor.

p. 34 \*# (... bearing shown by Army.)  
How Army bore up under strain of a last-minute cancellation of all measures that had been set in operation.

-----

p. 35 \* (OQu IV: a) ... (von Farnenheim) ).  
German Mil. Attaché at Brussels.

p. 35 \*\* (OQu IV, b) )  
Probably diplomatic friction, possibly about transit of Fourth Lt. Div. through Slovakia.

-----

p. 36 \* (Holland ... attention to them.)  
Holland was offended that her willingness to act as mediator was ignored, with all Powers looking to Belgium.

p. 36 \*\* (Russia:...) )  
Could not be reconstructed from context.

p. 36 \*\*\* (Buhle ... SA unit "Feldherrnhalle"....)  
SA formation, later a Div., named after the site of the abortive putsch in Munich, in 1923. The members of the SA had semi-military training, but were not regarded as fully trained.

-----

p. 37 \* (Wagner ... Concentration Camps.)  
There was a report that the government was going to put these persons, considered unreliable elements, into Concentration Camps on outbreak of the war. The A-1 File could have been an SD register.

p. 37 \*\* (For build-up "White")  
No recollection of "Mobilization White". "Red" was preparedness assembly in East, "Blue" preparedness assembly in West.

-----

p. 38 \* (1130 Conference .... Chief Gen. Staff.)  
Gen. Halder.

p. 38 \*\* (e) ...assembly area of Fourth Army.)  
Mil. District II (Stettin).-- The Second-Line Div. is  
a Landwehr Div.

p. 38 \*\*\* (Bock... to free operational forces )  
By organizing special units for border protection, etc.

-----

p. 39 \* (ObdH ... put them into a new Div.)  
A GHq Reserve Div. The military drill in the SA forma-  
tion produced no effective soldiers.

p. 39 \*\* (Siewert)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 40 \* (Requests:... c) .. Red Zone.)  
Zone nearest French border. Saarbruecken.

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p. 41 \* (c) Schnee Eifel ... forward of base line)  
The terrain of Schnee Eifel was too rugged to allow  
depth for a border position. Depth then had to be  
obtained by siting the main line of resistance away from  
the border (Pruem position.)

-----

p. 42 \* (Goering) Stuelpnagel relieved of his post.)  
Joachim von Stuelpnagel, Chief of Replacement Army,  
worked against Goering in the Fritsch and Blomberg cases;  
not a relative of Heinrich and Otto von St. Fromm now  
combined this post (BdE) with that of Chief of Army  
Equipment((Ch H Rust.)

p. 42 \*\* (0840 ObdH ... not cleared with ObdH.)  
ObdH remembered the relation between Ludendorff and Hinden-  
burg and he was not going to be reduced to a mere figure-  
head by his Chief of Staff.

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p. 43 \* (Conference Italy -- Western Powers...)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 43 \*\* (AGp. South... Second Armd. Div. 89 km to the east..)  
Must have been mistake or refers to something else.

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- p. 44 \* (... K-organization has occupied several groups.)  
Cf. p.27, note \*#.
- p. 44 \* (Bridges:.... too Birago.)  
An Austrian bridge type.
- 
- p. 45 \* (Fromm .... a).... Acting Corps Hq II.)  
Should be Corps Hq III, the home Mil.District (stell-  
vertretendes Generalkommando) of III Corps.
- p. 45 \*\* (Fromm.... Allocation ... to lower echelons must be  
stopped.)  
Unauthorized assignments within Army areas.
- p. 45 (Asterisk omitted) (Navy: Second and Third draft will be  
achieved.)  
Not the Army Drafts. Coastal Defense units.
- p. 45 \*\*\* (... Group Command C)  
"Gruppenkommandos" become Army Gps. on mobilization.  
This is AGp. C on the Rhine.
- 
- p. 46 \* (Tenth Army .... MT Regt. inside)  
Could not be reconstructed.
- p. 46 \*\* (Economy switched over ... Artillery?)  
Industry switched over to a prepared war production  
program with certain priorities. Artillery, apparent-  
ly not on the priority program, was short at the time.
- 
- p. 48 \* (OQu IV..... check list on enemy forces!)  
A check list that would tell at a glance which enemy  
Divs. were: a) destroyed; b) damaged; and c) intact.
- 
- p. 49 \* (Report in the morning ..... Reports to ObdH .....  
afternoon of the following day.)  
The complete report for e.g., Monday must reach ObdH  
on Tuesday afternoon at the latest.
-

- p. 50 \* (Doeberitz)  
\*\* (Wahn)  
Troop training centers.
- p. 50 \*\*\* (Army Hq 1..... efficient execution of the evacuation.)  
The Todt Organization evacuated several ten thousand tons of industrial machinery from the Saarbruecken area where a French offensive was feared. Border fortifications were not finished yet.
- 
- p. 51 \* (Gen Qu: ..... six light, eight medium guns)  
Could be Btrys.
- p. 51 \*\* (ObdH: ..... b) Activate Staff Bockelberg .)  
For Mil. Administration in Poland.  
(Reference to Fritsch-Blomberg) Cannot reconstruct.  
Fritsch went to front as Col. of his Arty.Regt., but did not command it. He was killed at an advanced Observation Post cut off by a sudden enemy advance.
- p. 51 \*\*\* (ObdH:.... d. Armeesabteilung...\*\*\*)  
An organization similar to an Army Hq, independent in operational matters, but subordinate to a regular Army Hq (AOK) in all organizational matters. This arrangement, in most cases of temporary nature, is introduced where the number of components is too large for effective control by a single Army Hq (e.g. more than five Corps).
- 
- p. 52 \* (Put nothing into Jueterbog.)  
Artillery School at Jueterbog, needed for training. Should not be filled with Divs. pending shipment to front.
- p. 52 \*\* (Loetzen can be started!)  
"Loetzen antreten". Fortification area in East Prussia is to be included in Theater of Operations.
- p. 52 \*\*\* (Fourth Army Arys?)  
(Arys. is an Arty. training center in East Prussia.)  
Footnote refers to line above: Reports too long for oral presentation were left for study ("Lesematerial".)
- p. 52 \*# (Keep tight reins on OQu IV!)  
ObdH thought that von Tippelskirch was extending his interests and activities to fields far removed from his own; possibly he was dabbling too much in politics.
-

p. 52a \* (Armeeabteilung ..... Hasse (?) - (seventy?) -  
Hasse was 70 and too old for this Armee-Abteilung.

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p. 53 \* (1030 Gen Gu ..... Weapons)  
What will be the effect on arms production?

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p. 53 \*\* (1130 OQu IV: ..... Wagner - Gercke?)  
Mention of these two names under OQu IV is unusual.  
Cannot be reconstructed.

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p. 56 \* (ObdH: ..... Sodenstern.)  
Refers to Heeresgruppe 2, the peacetime organization dealing with all military matters concerning the West. At outbreak of war, von Leeb takes over from von Witzleben who, being younger, takes command of an Army in the field. Sodenstern, the C of S of Witzleben, stays with von Leeb.

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p. 56 \*\* (OQu I ..... Will !)  
Col. Will Bedeis - Befehlshaber der Eisenbahntrouppen, Chief of Railroad Troops.

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p. 57 \* (Situation at Lomza ..... holding out (18?).)  
Refers probably to Polish Eighteenth Army.

---

p. 57 (Asterisk omitted) (SS Artillery of the Armd. Corps.)  
von Bock had very little Armor and so took an improvised Armd. Div. organized in East Prussia that consisted of everything that could be found; probably it included SS Artillery. Kuechler (Fourth Army, East Prussia) did not want this unit with him and offered to turn it over to GHq Reserve, away from the front. This case, and similar incidents led to a protracted exchange with Himmler which dragged into 1941 but never received any satisfactory action.

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Volume I. List of Errata.

- p. 6 15.): For "Wilhelma Kanal" read: "Wilhelmina Canal".  
14 August 1939, 1st paragraph: For "assessinent" read:  
"assessment".
- p.11 11th paragraph: For "is continously restraining influence"  
read: "is a continuously restraining influence!!"
- p.16 a) For "Deputy Cofs" read: "Deputy Cs of S".
- p. 24 24 August 1939, OQu I, Op.Sec.: 3.) For "We don't shoot;  
first;" read: "We don't shoot first".
- p.27 26 August 1939. 4th paragraph: For "traffic foad" read:  
"traffic load".
- p.30 Op.Sec.: For "d Divs." read: "5 Divs."  
OQu IV: For "Coulandre" read: "Coulondre".
- p.33 1900. For "some to aid" read: "come to aid".
- p.37 2nd paragraph. For "all register" read: "all registers".  
" For "strocities" read: "atrocities".  
Wagner: For "Corps Command Area XII read: "Mil.Dist.XII".
- p.40 0945: For "all ont Divs." read: "all front Divs."
- p.43 1130: For "obstavle" read: "obstacle".  
For "Fortidications" read: "Fortifications".  
AGp. North: For "the enemy has taken back" read: "the enemy  
has been taken back".  
For "Briade Brand" read: "Brigade Brand".
- p.49 Third line: For "Falicia" read: "Galicia".  
Seventh line: For "in the distriction of Warsaw" read:  
"in the direction of Warsaw".
- p.52 Third paragraph: For "one Rocket projector Bn." read:  
One Chem. Mortar Bn."
- OcdH: For "caube started" read: "can be started".
- p.52a 1230 Sodenstern g) For "agree with that by OKH" read:  
"agrees with that by OKH".



FOOTNOTES TO VOL. II.

- p.1 \* (2.) Lost ... south wing) Ground-persistent mustard gas, developed in Russia after 1918 under German auspices. The idea was to deny enemy ground by blocking areas with Lost gas, since the 7 Divs. of the 100,000 men Army could not protect Germany's borders.-- The connection in which this gas is mentioned here could not be exactly reconstructed. Possibly something was found that was interpreted as preparations for using the gas.
- p.1 \*\* (3.) Order regarding arms.) Refers to arms in possession of civil population. Wanted a legal opinion.
- p.1 (Asterisk omitted.) (4) OQu IV....approach indirectly) I.e. through some friend at OKW.
- 
- p.2 (Asterisk omitted.) (Notes for ObdH. Propaganda Organization.)  
ObdH wanted a Press Relations Officer. Gen. Halder proposed Grosskurth. The post went to Lt. Col. Radke.
- 
- p.3 (Asterisk omitted.) (Gen. Becker.) Chief of Army Ordnance Office.-- Ed.
- p.3 (Asterisk omitted.) (ObdH....Neutrals...work fast!)  
I.e., bring Polish campaign to a quick close so as to present world with an accomplished fact.
- 
- p.4 (Asterisk omitted) (Hierl on phone!)  
Chief of Reich Labor Service. Labor Service units were Army auxiliaries in supply transport and construction services.
- p.4 (Asterisk omitted) (Etschelt.)  
Legal representative (Syndikus) of foreign press in Berlin. A close collaborator in resistance.
- p.4 (Asterisk omitted.) (Iron Cross II Class.)  
1939 Clasp to Iron cross received in World War I. Had to receive this decoration before any higher decoration could be awarded.

p.5 \*(Bogatsch: a).... 15 Btrys)  
AAA, which belonged to Air Force, needed for Seventh  
Army sector.

p.5 \*\* (ObdH.... carrying the service rifle!)  
ObdH wants less men with automatic weapons or  
MGs

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p.6 \* (Fieseler Storch planes)  
A German low speed Army cooperation plane, much  
used for courier purposes. Later used also for  
airlanding operations.

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p.10 \* (Morning Reports.....Free Kinzel for Warsaw.)  
footnote canceled.

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p.11 (Asterisk omitted) (A day of disgrace.....)  
It was felt that Germany had capitulated to  
Russia in yielding ground fought for by her  
soldiers.

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p.13 \* (V. High Command East soon.)  
Refers to establishment of High Command East,  
the Mil. Administration Command. Was displaced  
by Government-General and kept only military  
functions.

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p.14 \* (Brigade turned over to Police.)  
Brigade Eberhardt was an irregular formation  
organized in Danzig territory out of SA, etc.

p.14 \* (von Döck.... Brigade Eberhardt.)  
The organization felt very independent, as  
soldiers not very effective, no training.  
Parts were taken into 60th Div.

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P.

- p.15 \* (2.)... Corps Wodrig)  
Gen. Albert Wodrig, organized an improvised Corps in East Prussia out of SA, Home Guard and other bodies. Was absorbed by regular Army organization.
- p.15 \*\* (von Stuelpnagel.....Kewisch)  
A World War I friend of von Brauchitsch who wanted a post. Central Branch (Personnel Off. of Gen. Staff) found one in Rear Area.
- p.15 \*\*\* (Becker:)  
Footnote canceled.
- p.15 # (MunaEast)  
Ammunition Depot East (Munitions-Anstalt)
- p.15 ## (100)  
Designation for a new poison gas.
- 
- p.16 \* (60 cm gun....for use in massed concentrations)  
That was Becker's personal idea.
- p.16 \*\* (Smoke.... Field How. projectiles)  
Not a smoke screen but a blanket of 2 - 3 km depth. (Only theoretical.)
- 
- p.18 \* (Gas: 100 etc.)  
See Footnote ## p.15  
See
- p.18 \*\* (50 mm tank)  
Tank III, medium tank with 50 mm armor (Front nose plate, rear plates). --Ed.
- p.18 \*\*\* (IIa... behind Dutch and Belgian fortifications)  
Should read: stand by behind....fortifications. I.e., as viewed from enemy side.
- p.18 # (Keitel (OKW): History three times).  
Probably reference to Franco-German conflicts in past century. -- Belgium has wrong military-political front, should join Germany's side.
- 
- p.19 \* (Jeschonneck:.....Freeze AAA ammunition)  
Don't use any more in East to permit accumulation of a small reserve.

- p.21 \* (von Etzdorf: German help for Belgium and Holland)  
Planned offer of German help in the event of a violation of their neutrality by British.
- p.21 \*\* (Bock and Leeb, establish contact. (He has all the material.))  
Bock must be informed on everything on taking over sector in the West.
- 
- p.22 \* (von Etzd. l. ) No undue importance)  
Refers to some report bearing on international relations.
- 
- p.24 \* (ObdH.... regular chain of command.)  
Lower echelons have to be ordered to use mine detectors. Jacob, the Eng.-Corps Chief, could not make them see the importance of the instruments.
- p.24 \*\*\* (9th Sec. )  
Topographic section of the Gen. Staff, under OQu I. -- Ed.
- 
- p.25 \* (Das Frontschwein..... )  
Doggerel circulating at the front, meaning something like:  
"The dogface has to face the mess,  
And where is the SA and SS?" --Ed.
- 
- p.26 \* (16.... and Air Force(!?! ))  
Hinting at offensive on 1 November.
- 
- p.28 \* (Fuehrer Memorandum.)  
Hitler's personal memorandum to ObdH opposing the idea of a defensive war, as advocated by the latter.
- 
- p.29 \* (ObdH: Home Defense (Alvensleben.))  
A home defense organization against Polish marauders, under one Alvensleben, probably in portion of Poland adjoining East Prussia. Gauleiter is aware of existence of this irregular armed force and does nothing to stop it.

p.30 \* (ObdH....fundamental changes.)  
Should read: Attacks, wait and see, fundamental changes. The latter refers to the possibility of political changes within Germany, i.e., removal of Hitler.

p.30 \*\* (ObdH. a)...program "Panzer".)  
Heavy dust in the Polish campaign had damaged tank engines. "Termin Panzer" was a program of speedy reconditioning of the engines, with a certain deadline.

p.30 \*\*\* (Bottom of page:Armeeabteilung H.)  
See vol. I p.51, note\*\*\* This particular Armeearbeitung may have been formed for Holland, hence the letter H.

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p.31 \* (ObdH/Beck. GHq Resrves won't start coming in before 5 October)  
Should be 5 November.

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p.32 \* (Wagner..... "Ordensburgen.")  
A historical allusion to the castles of the Teutonic Order which conquered and ruled over East and West Prussia and the Baltic States in the Middle Ages. Occupation is to be organized in some such manner.

p.32 \*\* (Evening....Wilhelm.)  
Wilhelm Arendts, a civilian friend, joins Military Command, France, in 1940.

p.32 \*\* (ObdH. d) (Stapf) Model - quiet Ia.)  
Calculated to moderate Model's excessive attachment to Goering. The Ia officer, also called the Gen. Staff Officer of his organization, is the resident Gen. Staff representative, as it were.

p.32 # (Strictly military appraisal of the situation.)  
ObdH ordered Gen. Halder to write a report in favor of an offensive solution, strictly confining himself to military reasoning.

p.32 ## (Bottom of page. Landwehr Divisions.)  
See Glossary.

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\* (


- p.33 \* (Becker....a) Detector will be tried out on S-mines.)  
An anti-personnel mine.--Ed.
- p.33 \*\* (b) Box-frame mine detector.)  
Tentative translation of "Entwicklung auf vorgeschobenem Rahmen." The term was not explained.--  
Ed.
- p.33 \*\*\* (d)"Fire-rafts" against positions.)  
"Brander gegen Stellungen." A remote-controlled demolition vehicle.-- Ed.
- p.33 # (e, Hammer vehicles.)  
"Hammergeraet." Probably a flail-type mine detonation vehicle on the general principle of the "Scorpion" used by U.S. and British forces.
- 
- p.34 \* (Org. Sec.... until order is given.)  
Should read: "...Third Draft until order is given."  
May refer to equipment with trucks. Could not be reconstructed.--Ed.
- p.344 \*\* (Seventh Section. Erratum, read: Seven Bns.)  
The relation to 8.35 Btrys is obscure. Could not be read as "Seventh Section" of OKH, which is part of the Historical Branch.-- Ed.
- p.34 \*\*\* (40 Jueterbog 8.8 cm AA.)  
40 8.8 cm AAA Guns belonging to Jueterbog Artillery School.--Ed.
- p.34 # (OQu IV.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p.34 ## (Krebs)  
Headed the German element in the commission for the delimitation of the Russo-German demarcation line.
- 
- p.35 \* (Buhle:.....a) 100 watt armored reconnaissance car)  
100 watt radio transmitter.

p.36 \* (Details: a)... Airborne operation.50-100)  
Might refer to strength of detachments.

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p.37 \* (SS Adolf Hitler?)  
First SS Armd.Div. "Leibstandarte - SS Adolf Hitler". Formed by expansion of Hitler's Body-guard Regt.

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p.37 \*\* (Dust!)  
Markings will not show clear enough when tanks are dust-covered. (Markings omitted in translation!)  #

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p.38 \* (Fuehrer Conference...a) Still more from the East.)  
Offensive front in the West to be reinforced by Divs. from Poland.

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p.39 \* (Before 1300... Training, lighting.)  
Illumination of road blocks.

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p.40 \* (Notes for ObdH.....B)  
Gen. Brand (Arty.)

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p.40 \*\* (Memo for ObdH.....OQuI.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p.40 \*\*\* (Transfer to H.)  
Gen. Halder could not recall if H. was any definite locality. The letter H often stood for Hauptbefehlsstelle (Hq) when location was not yet determined.

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p.41 \* (ObdH:;;; Check points for stopping of movement.)  
In the light of the experience of 25 Aug., when the movement across the Polish border was stopped only with great difficulty, lines near the border were established which must be passed only on a last-minute code.

p.41 \*\* (ObdH:..... Officer appointments in Rear Services)  
Throughout the war, the officer replacement bottleneck was in COs of Div. Clms. and of Inf. Bns.

p.41 \*\*\* (Haseloff.)  
to BdE, who wanted a change.

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p.43 \* (( K) P-Day system)  
Preparation Day. Once an offensive had been decided on, preparation days were needed to get forces ready for jump-off. This was "P-Tag System." Time allowed for preparations (p) between issuance of order for and opening of an offensive. The situation at that time was changing constantly, and all changes entailed regroupings.

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p.44 \* ((Notes for ObdH:..c) Details... Sixth Army and Student.)  
Airborne operations, which at that time were to take place in sector of Sixth Army.

p.44 \*\* ((Thomas....Belgium.....(sowing)))  
I.e., if spring sowing is interfered with by operations.



- p.45 \* (3)...operation "Student".)  
Airborne operations to seize bridges in Holland and Belgium.
- p.45 \*\* (ObdH's report to the Fuehrer.....Counter-memorandum.)  
A counter memorandum by ObdH in reply to Hitler's personal memorandum (see note \*, p.28) in which ObdH attempted to prove that any offensive was ruled out at that moment.
- p.45 \*\*\* (..... Wants to fly there himself tomorrow.)  
In order to deter Hitler, von Brauchitsch deliberately exaggerated what was merely slackness and bad behavior as a result of the prolonged alert, into incipient mutiny reminiscent of 1918. Hitler flared up and wanted to know where all this had happened, he would take care of that.
- p.45 # (Any other method undebatable.)  
I.e., occupation of Belgium was the only effective means to protect the Ruhr.
- p.45 ## (Death sentence, West, East)  
Hitler wanted to know how many death sentences had been carried out in the West and in the East. He was put off by telling him that statistics would be obtained from Gen Qu.
- p.45 ### (Railroads.)  
The conduct of soldiers on trains and in railroad stations was also mentioned as proof of the general deterioration of discipline. It is an old experience that the discipline of a unit or even individual discipline of soldiers is reflected by behavior in transit.
- 
- p.47 \* (Démarche treated with sarcasm and sneering.)  
Refers to diplomatic steps by the Belgium and Dutch Envoys, in connection with a political visit of the King of the Belgians to the Queen of the Netherlands.
- p.47 \*\* (He)  
"He" refers to Hitler.
- p.47 \*\*\* (Belgian Ambassador....Belga.)  
Belgian news agency.

p.48 \* (ObdH:...a)... Reserved road.)  
Gen. Halder coined the term "Rollbahn" at that time. He meant by it a good road, suitable and exclusively reserved for motorized and tank movements to and from a specific area, on which such traffic could "roll" freely. The word became widely accepted and in the Russian Campaign practically any wide track that served as line of communication for a larger organization, was called a "Rollbahn". Strictly speaking, it applied only to the automobile highway from Smolensk to Moscow.

p.48 \*\* (ObdH: b).... Follow up Sedan.)  
First mention of the plan of a breakthrough at Sedan. AGp. A was then already under command of von Rundstedt.

p.4

p.49 \* (ObdH: ... Take advantage of movement.)  
Instruction to AGp. B. Take advantage of movement to give road training if offensive is launched after 15 Nov. (i.e., on 19 Nov.)

p.49 \*\* (ObdH: Report Schwetz.)  
Schwetz is a Troop Training Center on the Sder river.

p.49 \*\*\* (Jacob: 6 Columns B.)  
Columns of ordinary 8 and 16 ton bridges.  
Regular equipment of Div. and Corps Eng. Bns.

p.50 \* (ObdH:

p.50 \* (ObdH: "Sponeck". Action taken!)  
Refers probably to procurement of equipment for projected paratroop operation by 22nd (Airborne) Div.

p.50 \*\* (ObdH: .... flyer - motorcyclist.)  
No details remembered.

p.51 \* (Memo for ObdH: .... Men on leave, own circles.)  
"Urlauber, eigene Kreise." Reading is somewhat doubtful. It could mean about leaks or careless talk by military personnel on leave within their families or close friends.

p.51 \*\* (Chevallerie.... Study courses on Sedan.)  
Special War Academy courses on the projected Sedan operation.

p.52 \* (Op.: ObdH concerned.... without order.)  
von Kleists instructions were to push only through the southernmost tip of Holland (Maastricht) and strike into Belgium, south of the Albert Canal. Something in ObdH's talk with von Bock must have aroused the former's concern that von Bock might also strike with his forces opposite the border between Albert Canal and Waal river. This would have been contrary to the plans of the Supreme Command (Hitler) which at that time had not decided as yet to seize the whole of Holland.

p.52 \*\* (Can Guderian also read our signals?.)  
It was feared that wrangling with Guderian over wording of reports would never end if he could read the signals radioed by the Liaison Off. to GHq. The matter was finally settled in such a manner that Liaison Offs. would send their reports with a special code after notifying the CG or the C of ShofAbth Army or Group concerned of the general content.

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p.53 \* (Jodl:.... b) Utilize.)  
The entry consists only of the word "Ausnuetzen". There is no clue as to what is to be utilized, exploited, or taken advantage or made the most of.--Ed.

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p.54 \* (Memo for ObdH.....7) "Broken word".)  
In those days, when the highest Army Commanders, with some exception, wanted or did their best to keep the war in the West from breaking out in earnest, there was much talk of "Wortbruch". That is, that, inasmuch as Hitler had not kept his word (to bring Germany peace) the Generals were under no obligation to follow his orders. The originator of this formulation might have been Beck.

p.56

p.56 \* (Notes for ObdH:...b)....Senne.)  
Senne is a Troop Training Center near Paderborn.

p.56 \*\* (Fuehrer's address.....taking the offensive)  
Aimed against the proponents of defensive warfare.

p.56 \*\*\* (ObdH... (Day of crisis).)  
With the approach of an explosion in the West, everything was being done to frustrate Hitler's desire to launch the offensive in the West. Hitler, through an efficient spy system or a sixth sense that made him aware of the atmosphere of tension and nervousness, must have known what was afoot and threatened he would suppress any opposition in the Gen. Staff with brutal force. Upon their return to Zossen from the Berlin conference, they were met by the message that they were to return to the Chancellery immediately. ObdH went into Hitler's room, while Gen. Halder waited outside. After the conference he told the latter that he had been lectured on the "Spirit of Zossen", the stiff-necked attitude of the Gen. Staff which kept it from falling in with the Fuehrer.

p.56 # (French frontiers of 1540)  
Evidently refers to the prospective Franco-German frontier in the event of a German victory over France. It would give the fortresses of Metz, Toul and Verdun and the Lorraine iron-ore district to Germany.

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p.57 \* (Mariendorf.)  
Footnote canceled.

-----

p.58 \* (OQu I, Fourth Section)  
Training Section.

p.58 (Asterisk omitted.) (Popitz, Schacht, Thomas.)  
In varying degrees, these three worked in the opposition to Hitler.--Ed.

p.58 \*\* (Raeder, Thurner, Dankwarts.Talk them out of it!)  
Three high civil servants who were to play an important part in administration of the conquered western countries. They wanted generals' uniforms in keeping with their position. Gen. Halder always maintained that soldiers' uniforms were for soldiers only. That question came up time and again later on.

p.59 \* (d)... Curtis versus Messerschmitt.)  
Curtis planes were considered superior to the German Messerschmitt planes.

p.59 \*\* ( f) Regierungspraesident.)  
High-ranking civil servant, chief of a Regierungsbezirk, intermediate between a Province and a Kreis and roughly equivalent to a French Département.

-----

p.60 \* (Varna radio monitoring post).  
Varna, in Bulgaria, might have been used inofficially as a listening post of what went on in Turkey.

-----

p.61 \* (von Leeb...against SS decree.)  
A storm of indignation and protest went through all ranks in the Army as a result of a decree by Himmler, enjoining German women to bear children, fathered by other men, while their husbands were at the front.von Leeb was particularly outspoken.

p.61 \*\* (Bottom of page: Saint Barbara.)  
Patron Saint of the Artillery.

-----

p.62 \* (Notes for ObdH.....a) ...for Navy elements)  
Could not be reconstructed.

p.62 (Asterisk omitted) (Xylander.)  
Correction: "Report on front observations."

Volume II. List of Errata.

- p. 2 Fourth line: For "Tomania" read: "Romania".
- p. 3 Notes for ObdH: For "Training instructions for new informations" read: "Training instructions for new formations".
- p. 4 b) ObdH: 2.): For "seen" read: "soon".
- p. 9 From Fuehrer's train: 1.) For "Warsaw broadcasts" read: "Warsaw broadcasts".
- p.14 Third line and bottom line: For "Everhard" and "Eberhard" read: "Eberhardt".
- p.15 von Stuelpnagel. The "Notes" appearing under this entry should be read as a separate entry, beginning at the left margin.
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- p.20 Afternoon von Leeb, third paragraph: For "(wages mark)" read: "(wages 1 Mark)".
- p.21 von Stuelpnagel: For "at the qualified disposal" read: "at the unqualified disposal".
- p.30 ObdH: Interrogation mark instead of exclamation point at the end of this paragraph.
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- p.33 20 October 1939. For "Bockelberg commendation" read: "Re Bockelberg commendation".
- p. 3 Instructions for new informations read: "Training instructions for new informations".
- p.43 Second paragraph: For "on ground operations" read: "for ground operations".
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FOOTNOTES TO VOL. III.

- p. 1     \* (0900 Demonstration ... Infantry cart.)  
Hand-drawn, two-wheeled carts which are de-  
tached from the Company trucks closely behind  
the lines and used to transport machine guns,  
mortars, and other heavy equipment to the com-  
bat position. They help conserve the physical  
strength of troops for the tasks ahead.
- 
- p. 2     \* (Blaskowitz: ... Stengel 209 Saxon.)  
Blaskowitz comes in to talk over officers in  
his command. For some reason mention is made  
that Stengel is a native of Saxony. The re-  
mark must not be construed as a reflection on  
the military qualities of the person referred  
to.
- p. 2     \*\* (Kinzel: ... Romanian operation from the  
north.)  
I.e., the possibility of a Russian invasion of  
Bessarabia and Bukovina.
- 
- p. 3     \* (13 Dec. Notes for Obdd: ... 5.) Anonymous  
letters.)  
Both Obdd and Gen. Halder received many anony-  
mous letters denouncing Hitler and pleading  
with the High Command to do something about  
him. The writers ranged from ultra-monarchists  
to Communists. With such divergence of moti-  
vations for their opposition it was realized  
that the writers would not have a common pur-  
pose after the overthrow of Hitler and that  
their original animosities would prevent for-  
mation of any working coalition for the govern-  
ment of Germany.
- p. 3     \*\* (Salmuth, d) .. from Wahn.)  
Troop Training Center.
- 
- p. 6     \* (17.) ... as Post CO.)  
An organizational detail that could not be re-  
constructed.
- p. 6     \*\* (OQu IV: a) ... Reich Chancellery.)  
Line should read: a) (Reich Chancellory).  
Question of Norway. Pre-  
ventive action. Public  
sentiment. Leading per-  
sonalities to Berlin....  
I.e., to forestall British action in Norway...  
Ask OQu IV for data file on Denmark and Nor-  
way. Memmerich is head of Map Section.
- p. 6     \*\*\* (OQu IV: a) ... OQu IV.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 7      \* (Memo for ObdH: 1.) ... some Arty. Btrys. have 5 MGs.)  
Their Table of Equipment allowed only for 3 MGs. Everybody wanted to be "protected" against the enemy and future shortages. At the same time MGs were short in the Inf.

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p. 7      \*\* (ObdH: machine gun belts!)  
I.e., give them the latest! This item was a new and better type of MG belt.

---

p. 8      \* (Spicherer Heights.)  
Spicherer Moehren, a hillcrest west of Saarbruecken. If taken by the French, it would have afforded them unobstructed observation of the Saar Valley, and so had to be protected by fortifications.

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p. 9      \* (ObdH: a) K 12.)  
21 cm railway gun, super-long (196 calibers). - Ed.

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p. 10      \* (1030: (Commanding General) Pu..)  
Name incomplete. - Ed.

---

p. 10      \*\* (3.) ... 100.)  
Designation of the gas.

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p. 11      \* (OH: 1.) ... 8 mines?)  
Anti-personnel mines. - Ed.

---

p. 12      \* (Gercke: ... "Immediate offensive.")  
"Sofortfall". If enemy attacks first, all restrictions, camouflage, etc. will be discarded.

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p. 13      \* (Central Branch: ... Kewisch.)  
Persons suggested as replacements.

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p. 14      \* (Gercke: ... about getting "State Secretary".)  
See 31. 12.

p. 14      \*\* ( g) Fuel? ... consumed in three days (500 km)  
Footnote cancelled.

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p. 17      \* ( c) Reply from Fromm regarding signature.)  
The German word is "Federfuehrung". When  
several agencies cooperate on a project, one  
has "Federfuehrung", i.e., it works out the  
matter, formulates joint conclusions in the  
final draft, and signs for all.

-----

p. 18      (Asterisk omitted) (1100 von Salmuth ... two  
days.)

In order to be able to take suitable counter  
measures against Hitler if OKW should unex-  
pectedly issue marching orders, OKH thought  
it should insist on a four-day alert period  
for assembly of the troops deployed far to  
the rear of Germany. Hitler, who at that  
time pretended that he feared a sudden march  
of the French into Belgium, pressed for a  
shorter period. Salmuth ( C of S, AGp. B),  
on being consulted by Gen. Halder, stated  
that the shorter period (2 days) would suffice.

-----

p. 20      \* (Op. Sec.: ... also Sixteenth Army.)  
Materiel of Leeb's AGp. C as also AGp. B's  
Sixteenth Army (a quieter sector) was anti-  
quated.

p. 20      \*\* (Org. Sec.: Balance tank types.)  
I.e., equal distribution of the MII-III.

-----

p. 24      \* (4th line: Remember common graves!)  
I.e., of German and Italian fighters in the  
Spanish Civil War.

-----

p. 25      \* (Eglseer: ... Special defense detachments.)  
In violation of direct orders, Gen. Halder  
placed "Sperrtruppen" along the Italian border.  
They were specially trained small units with  
the mission to block the few passes in the  
area (by demolitions, etc.) on receiving a cer-  
tain codeword. The reasons for these very  
hush - hush preparations were  
1) Gen. Halder's distrust of the Italians  
and  
2) to keep the Border Guard (reinforced  
customs guard) keyed up to military  
pitch.

-----

p. 26      \* (2.) K 3 and K 5.)  
K 3: 24 cm mobile gun, range, 41,010 yds.  
K 5: 28 cm railway gun, range, 67,900 yds.- E

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- p. 27      \* (Reichberg's letter.)  
Could not be reconstructed.
- p. 27      \*\* (... von Bock. Kesselring instead of Bock.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 27      \*\*\* ( 3.) ... recuperator spring.)  
The tentative reading of the shorthand note was "Vorholfeder".
- p. 27      # ( 4.) Women are "shirkers".)  
Refers to Himmler's (SS) Decree that German women should bear children for the Fuehrer, even if their husbands at the front could not be the fathers. Those unwilling were "shirkers".
- p. 27      ## (Article in "Schwarzes Korps".)  
The SS weekly.
- 
- p. 29      \* (First line: ... "Flying start.")  
I.e., assembly not directly behind frontier, but in great depth, with Divs. moving into their places as they arrive at the front after opening of the offensive. Requires meticulous coordination of railroad movements.
- p. 29      \*\* (ObdH: ... not be left standing in the open.)  
I.e., would freeze up at that time of year.
- p. 29      (Asterisk omitted) (Abwehr...)  
Could not be reconstructed. May refer to incidents in Poland.
- 
- p. 30      \* (OKW. ... In contrast to 18.)  
I.e., the German offensive on the Western front in March, 1918.
- p. 30      \*\* (Changed method: ... that we may start off at any day.)  
I.e., "Sofortfall".

- p. 32      \* (von Itzdorf: ... (Graf Spee).)  
The sinking of the German "pocket battleship"  
Graf Spee at the mouth of the La Plata river  
by the British.
- p. 32      \* (Russia: ... Tanner's offer.)  
Refers to a peace offer by the Finnish Foreign  
Minister Tanner. (The Russo-Finnish war was  
on at that time.)
- 

- p. 34      \* (1 July: 1 Btry. K 12 Gun.)  
21 cm railway gun. - Ed.
- 

- p. 35      (Asterisk omitted) (Org. Order ... GK.)  
"Geheime Kommandosache". Clas-  
sified matter: high-grade Secret,  
but not Top Secret. - Ed.
- 

- p. 35      \* ( 3.) Gercke: ... Not two weeks!)  
I.e., recommendation disapproved.
- 

- p. 36      (Asterisk omitted) (Fifth paragraph ... change in  
procedure.)  
This refers to Hitler's insistence on a shorter  
alert period (see 7.1., Salmuth) which became  
more accentuated when it was discovered that  
the Dutch were fully informed of the pattern  
adopted for closing up to the frontier prior  
to the jump-off. Troops were not told about  
the change for security reasons.
- 

- p. 36      \* (Last paragraph ... Ju 88.)  
Junker 88, a two-engine bomber.
-

p. 37      \* (Sixth paragraph ... Holland on full scale.)  
"Summe von Aktionen vorwegziehen! Aus dem Stand. wuenscheswert als Vorwegmassnahme: Hollaendische Sache in vollem Umfang."  
This entry still refers to the struggle between OKH and Hitler for the four-day alert. Hitler wanted to have the Armies launch the offensive on shortest notice, i.e., "leap from wherever they stand." As a result, the first wave on X-Day, consisting only of the troops already at the frontier, would be comparatively weak, and so they would be able to carry out only the "Aktionen" (a favorite term of Hitler's, meaning special tasks), which were planned as essential preliminaries of the offensive (seizure of bridges, preventing demolitions, removal of road blocks, etc.). But now, instead of being left to special troops (e.g., Regt. Brandenburg), these "actions" were to be carried out by the entire frontier echelon as the first act, as an integral part of the plan for the offensive. In this connection, Hitler stated that occupation of all Holland, too, was to be one of the "actions" anticipating the main offensive ("Vorwegmassnahme"), being designed to protect the right shoulder and flank of the Armies entering Belgium.

p. 37      \* (Third line from bottom ... Spread rumors. Marras.)  
Telling something to the Italian Mil. Attaché, Marras, would be a good way to launch rumors.

-----

p. 38      \* (von Greiffenberg ... Army Hq 18 - 2.)  
Meaning could not be reconstructed.

-----

p. 39      \* (( e ) AGp. A. ... through Luxembourg.)  
Against French border.

p. 39      \*\* (( e ) ... in southern Luxembourg.)  
To interdict entry of French troops.

-----

p. 40      \* (( a ) 2.) Conference.)  
Marginal lettering indicates the order in which these items were actually taken up. -  
Ed.

-----

p. 42      \* (Gen. Brand: ... as against about 30 Btrys.  
per km.)  
I.e., on Western Front in World War I.

p. 42      \*\* ( 5. ) Doorn. ... Chief.)  
This entry always means "Chief of the Gen.  
Staff", i.e., Gen. Halder himself will at-  
tend to the matter.

-----

p. 44      \* (Third line: "Emergency".)  
The "Sofortfall", in case the Allies should  
strike first.

p. 44      \*\* (Fourth line: ... "Attack".)  
There is now to be no difference any more in  
the preparations for either case. All is  
geared to immediate striking.

p. 44      \*\*\* (Air Force: ... Busche.)  
Should be "Busch".

p. 44      # (Defamation Decree, ("Schmachverfuegung").)  
This is apparently not the 1934 law, but a  
closer description was not obtained. - Ed.

p. 44      ## (OQu IV. 4.) Pappenheim.)  
German Mil. Attaché in Brussels.

p. 44      ### (ObdH: ... 2.) ... connected with operations.)  
Hitler's order that no member of a former rul-  
ing house must have an important command posi-  
tion, so as to prevent any monarchistic propa-  
ganda.

-----

p. 45      \* (Conf. with ObdH, Tirpitzufer.)  
Address of OKH - Offices in Berlin.

-----

p. 46      \* (Seventh paragraph: Thomas: ... 50,000 tons.)  
The original reads "II Quartal", but obviously  
"third quarter" is meant. - Ed.

- p. 47      \* (Top line: Fats program 1941.)  
It is not quite clear why the "fats program"  
is here brought in with metals production and  
manpower questions.
- 
- p. 48      \* (Bottom: ... 13,000 with full steel quota.)  
These figures refer to production of chemical  
warfare agents.
- 
- p. 49      \* (3.1 XIV.)  
Probably refers to Mil. District XIV (non-  
territorial Corps area Magdeburg, for Ar-  
mored troops). - Ed.
- 
- p. 50      \* (13.) ... Pers. Div. Ask Chief of Staff.)  
German: "Chef fragen" or "Cheffragen". In  
the former case the translation would be "Ask  
Chief ...", in the latter, "Chief questions".  
All personnel questions ultimately had to be  
referred to ObdH, but Gen. Halder did not re-  
fer to him as "Chef". Possibly Gen. Halder  
made this note as a reminder to himself to  
give this matter his personal attention. - Ed.
- p. 50      \*\* (Preparation for construction of fortifica-  
tions South: ... in enemy country? ...)  
German: "Im Feindland?" Could not be recon-  
structed.
- p. 50      \*\*\* (Eschenbach smudge-producing agent.)  
Between "agent" and "test" is the German no-  
tation "15 ko." No interpretation could be  
obtained from Gen. Halder. - Ed.
-

p. 52

\* ( 8. ) ... all-out attack on Maginot Line.)  
The enemy was to be persuaded that Germany planned to make the decisive effort on the Maginot Line front. To this end, OKH ordered not only intensive planning activities in its own Sections and in AGp. C, but also announcement of a conference of Landraete (the top government officials) of the districts that would be affected by such an offensive, as well as broadcasting of plans for traffic restrictions and large-scale repair work on the main roads through the area; the object was to spread the idea among the population that major troop and supply movements were impending.  
("Complete switch in plans" was used as translation for "Grosse Schwenkung" before information was offered what the German phrase might have reference to contemplated large-scale regrouping. - Ed.)

p. 52

\*\* ( 8. ) ... )  
The original has two entries under 8.).

p. 52

\*\*\* ( 10. ) List of operations codes ... Siebert.)  
Both Army and Air Force had long lists of codes for the multitude of special operations that were to precede the launching of the offensive (e.g., Eben Emael, seizure of Meuse bridges by special troops in foreign uniforms capture of dams and road blocks by paratroopers, etc.) The threatening confusion made it necessary to compile a veritable dictionary.

p. 53

\* ( 4. ) Removal of GHq to H.)  
"Stellungswechsel nach H". Could refer to a change in location of GHq after (nach) the question of Holland has been settled (one way or other, either with peaceful or military methods). -- "H" is also the symbol for Hauptbefehlsstelle (GHq) when locality is not yet determined.

p. 53

\*\* (Buhle: Homogeneous materiel in Artillery units.)  
The German expression of "rasserein" (racially pure), which might easily lead to misinterpretations, in this context merely means reduction to single types of guns to facilitate ammunition supply and maintenance. A similar effort was made to reduce the vast number of motor vehicle types in all units.



- p. 54      \* (Top: ... George of Saxony.)  
Ex-Crown Prince George of Saxony, friend of  
Gen. Halder.
- p. 54      \*\* (Maintenance Services: ... 23 Motor Transport  
Districts.)  
Industrial areas affording good repair faci-  
lities for automotive equipment were organiz-  
ed as "Heimatkraftfahrbezirke", which serviced  
designated units. - Ed.
- 
- p. 55      \* (Notes: ... c) 4.) ... (See additional  
notes.)  
Additional notes prepared for report to ObdH;  
not included in the Diary. - Ed.
- p. 55      \*\* (Notes: ... h) ... Air Force.)  
Air Force personnel resisted Military Police  
patrols.
- 
- p. 56      \* ( 5.) ... would increase.)  
I.e., by reducing the number of trucks in use,  
the absolute number of trucks lost as a result  
of ordinary wear would also be reduced and be  
brought into a better relation to the fixed  
new output of trucks.
- 
- p. 59      \* ( n) 4.) Safety valve question.)  
This refers to a relaxation of rules govern-  
ing presentation of grievances. It was in-  
tended as a safety valve for opposition sen-  
timent in the Army.
- 
- p. 60      \* (1630 Brand: ... Antwerp East: ... 3 Divs.)  
I.e., and the Div. Arty. of three Divs.
- p. 60      \*\* (Liège: ... 5 - 6 Divs.)  
I.e., the Div. Arty. of five or six Divs.
- 
- p. 61      \* (Third line: 25 Divs.)  
I.e., The Div. Arty. of 25 Divs.
- p. 61      \*\* (Jacob: ... 3,000 trucks (2,500 from Todt.)  
I.e., Organization Todt.

- p. 63      \* ( 5. ) ... Seventh Air Div.  
22nd Regt. trained for air landing. Seventh  
Air Div. is Paratroop Div.
- 
- p. 64      \* ( 10. ... Weitzel. )  
Head of SS in Cologne.
- p. 64      \*\* ( 11. ) ... method adopted in France.  
Gen. Halder could not remember details of that  
method.
- p. 64      \*\*\* ( 12. ) Hesse. )  
ObdH's propaganda specialist.
- 
- p. 67      \* (Second paragraph: Do Projectors. )  
Rocket Projector. - Ed.
- p. 67      \*\* (Second paragraph: No order for smoke ammuni-  
tion yet.)  
The eventual attack on the Maginot Line would  
require the laying down of a smoke blanket of  
unprecedented magnitude. The smoke-filled am-  
munition for the "Do" projector was then still  
in the development stage.
- p. 67      \*\* (Signals Chief: a) "Festa" cable. )  
Designation for a type of armored cable.
- 
- p. 68      \* ( Tippelskirch II. )  
Brother of OQu IV Tippelskirch.
- 
- p. 69      \* ( Hermann. )  
Staff portraitist for the Leipziger Illustrier-  
te, a slick-paper magazine running a series of  
portrait paintings of German Generals.
- p. 69      \*\* (Gercke: ... to hide behind the Field Marshal.)  
I.e., Goering. The railroad situation was  
chronically bad.
- p. 69      \*\*\* (Notes for ObdH: 4.) ... (see 9 Feb. 1940.)  
See p. 66, Org. Sec. c). Nothing had been done  
about this matter since that day, so Gen. Hal-  
der brought it up again to get action.

p. 70      \* (2nd paragraph: Boehler.)  
4.7 cm AT Gun.

p. 70      \*\* (Planes: ... Do 17 P.)  
Possibly Dornier 217 P.

p. 70      \*\*\* (Planes: ... one chain per month.)  
German: "Kette". A formation of three aircraft.

-----

p. 71      \* (Bombers: ... 11 Gruppen P.)  
Possibly Dornier 217 P.

p. 71      \*\* (Bombers: ... 1 Condor Gruppe.)  
"Condor", a four-engined transport plane;  
(Focke-Wulf 200).

-----

p. 72      \* (Top line: 391 2 cm Btrys.)  
20 mm four-barreled AA Gun (2 cm Flakvierling 38).

p. 72      \*\* (Foreign Office.)  
Either von Etzdorf or von Weizsaecker.

-----

p. 73      \* (Gercke: ... (Columns, Labor Service, Bns.)  
I.e., all military shipments issuing from  
lower echelon commands, as they tied up too  
many trains.

-----

p. 74      \* (Gercke: ... ZI Motor Transport Districts.)  
See note, p. 56.

-----

p. 75      \* (Conference with C in C First Army: a) ...  
Directions from a central point.)  
Entry could not be reconstructed.

-----

p. 76      \* (Oh: ... e) Inf. hand-carts.)  
Small hand-carts to take heavy Inf. weapons  
into line. Conserve strength of troops.

- p. 77      \* (von Etzdorf: ... Kawabe.)  
Japanese Military Attaché.
- p. 77      \*\* (Roehricht: ... Standard designations for  
battles.)  
Standard nomenclature of engagements for entry  
in individual military records.
- p. 77      \*\*\* (OQu IV: Visit to 58th Div.)  
Not a routine procedure. OQu IV happened to  
be a personal friend of the Commander of that  
Div.
- p. 77      # (OQu IV: ... (rather a little less for the  
front).)  
I.e., more when troops go back for rest.
- p. 77      ## (Rumors about Baldur.)  
Baldur von Schirach, the Nazi Youth Leader.
- 

- p. 79      \* (Weinknecht: ... Division Clms.)  
Truck Clms.; one Column (10 trucks) has load  
capacity of 30 tons.
- p. 79      \*\* (ObdH: 1.) East. Troop training centers in  
area South (Air?).)  
I.e., what about air observation?
-

p. 80      \* ( 7.) Raschik: ... ask Chief of Staff.)  
See note, p. 50.

p. 80      \*\* ( 9.) ... 4 trestle bridges.)  
No Eng. Corps specialist was available to supply an explanation for these condensed notes. The probable explanation is that this entry concerns considerations about supplying the shortage of bridging equipment which might hamper operations in Holland and Belgium, where many canals would have to be crossed. Since it was impossible to fill the requirements of both Inf. ("Brueckenstege", footway bridges for single-file crossing) and Armor, it was thought best to let Armor have trestles on which tanks could cross without any decking. The necessary timber would have to be ready to be brought up behind the armor, so that the bridges could be finished for use by Inf. and motor vehicles.

p. 80      \*\*\* ( 9.) ... Prepare timber for subsequent decking.)  
See preceding note.

-----

p. 83      \* ( b) K 5 Gun.)  
28 cm (railway gun (Length of tube 16 calibers).

-----

p. 84      \* (Top: Four K 5 Guns (56 km).)  
               I.e., range of 56 km.

p. 84      \*\* (Five Bruno 28 cm Guns (36 km).)  
Not the same as K 5. (Length of tube 45 ca-  
libers.)

p. 84 - (Asterisk omitted) (Theodor)  
A 24 cm railway gun.

p. 84 \*\*\* (K 12 Gun ... What against?)  
This 21 cm railway gun, supposedly with a tube 196 calibers long, just had no targets to fire on at the opening of the campaign. (Gen. Halder was generally opposed to such super-heavy artillery.)

p. 84      # (ObdH: a) ... Demonstration Bn. remains at  
disposal of GHq.)  
 Opposite this entry in the original is a group  
 of figures, the meaning of which could not be  
 reconstructed:

|               |   |   |    |
|---------------|---|---|----|
| 3             | 9 | 7 |    |
| $\frac{4}{5}$ |   | 6 | 2  |
|               |   | 1 |    |
|               |   | 8 | 10 |

p. 85      \* ( c ) ... 4, 6, 10. )  
The meaning of these figures could not be re-constructed.

p. 85      \*\* ( c) Use mild steel.)  
                 "Flusseisen". - Ed.

p. 85 \*\*\* ( i) 1.) ... Mil. District XX.)  
West Prussia, a new Mil. District formed after  
conquest of Poland.

- p. 86      \* (Guderian: a) .... 400 cars in repair.)  
German: "Wagen". Probably short for "Kampf-  
wagen", i.e., tanks. - Ed.
- p. 86      \*\* (Guderian: c) Wahn.)  
Troop training center.
- p. 86      \*\*\* (Guderian: d) ... Inspectorate 6.)  
Inspectorate of Armd. Troops.
- p. 86      # (Central Branch: ... as an expert on Finland.)  
Commanded German troops in Finland in World  
War I.
- p. 86      ## (Op. Sec.: ... the second Echelon? XXXXIV  
Corps.)  
Interpretation uncertain. Original has "41"  
added later with a different pencil. Gen.  
Halder sometimes used Arabic instead of Roman  
numerals for Corps numbers. XXXXIV Corps was  
commanded by Reinhardt. Second Echelon would  
then refer to the second armor wedge.
- 
- p. 87      \* (h) Ch.)  
Stands for "Chief" and means that Gen. Halder  
himself would attend to the matter.
- p. 87      \*\* (winter: ... "Falke", "Geier", "Habicht".)  
Codes of projected attacks across the Upper  
Rhine.
-

p. 88 \* (Ocu IV: ... b) ... Press Sec. 5.)  
Press Relations Officers.

p. 88 \*\* ( d) ... "securité" in France.)  
Sieburg, a well-known journalist and expert on France, discussed the French concept of "security", from which deductions could be made on dispositions and plans of the French High Command.

p. 88 \*\*\* (Wandel: ... Siegfried Guns.)  
38 cm railway gun (52 calibers), range 60,900 yds.

p. 88 # (Denmark. Air Force wants Denmark.)  
Air Force wanted Denmark for extension of its air warning network and for advanced fighter bases.

---

p. 89 \* (22 February ... (The "Fire Brigade" Division.)  
"Eingreif-Division." An alerted Division in defensive warfare, which must be ready to counter unexpected enemy thrusts and generally hold the line pending arrival of other Divs. The commander must be able to meet unexpected situations with quick decisions.

p. 89 \*\* (1245: ... Railroad movements sometimes unnecessary.)  
Entry could not be reconstructed.

---

p. 90 \* ( 7.) Not Salck at General Army Office.)  
Inspectorate of Armd. Troops was connected with General Army Office (Allgemeines Heeres-Amt).

p. 90 (Asterisk omitted) ( 14.) ... )  
I.e., AGp. C launches containing attack when AGps. A and B open offensive.

---

p. 91 \* (Top: Muenstereifel.)  
Proposed as location of GHq during the campaign in the West. Keitel must be consulted.



- p. 92 \* ( 5.) Horses in Hqs.)  
~~Were not~~ needed. Could be combed out.
- p. 92 \*\* ( 7.) ... 400 cubic meter.)  
I.e., 400000 liter (approx. 100000 gal.).
- p. 92 \*\*\* ( 8.) ... to get hold of the man.)  
I.e., Student (Air Force).
- p. 92 # ( 10.) ... (Reserve Officers).)  
Austrian officers are not up to German standards, but should not be brought together with Regular Army officers, who might be too "Prussian". Reserve Officers would be less likely to clash with them.
- 
- p. 93 \* (Tng. Section: ... Wahn - Senne.)  
Two troop training centers.
- p. 93 \*\* (Org. Sec.: ... "General der Panzertruppe.")  
An "Arms Chief" (see glossary under "OKH").
- p. 93 \*\*\* (1130 ... Felsennest.)  
The Fuehrer Hq near Muenstereifel.
- 
- p. 95 \* (Greiffenberg: 1.) a) ... at Crailsheim.)  
School for "Commando" troops.
- p. 95 \*\* (Fieseler Storch.)  
Name of German low-speed Army cooperation plane, used for courier purposes and also for airlanding operations.
- p. 95 \*\*\* (planes!)  
Footnote canceled.
- 
- p. 96 \* (Buhle: ... b) ... Landwehr Divs.)  
See glossary.
- p. 96 \*\* ( g) ... for Infantry and Artillery.)  
It was difficult to get officers for the conventional arms, because Air Force and Armor were more glamorous.

p. 98 \* (von Greiffenberg: ... Guderian in command.)  
Footnote canceled.

---

p. 99 \* (Keitel OKW: ... Bad business.)  
OKW communicated directly with AGp. C in this matter, bypassing OKH.

p. 99 \*\* (ObdH: ... 3.) ... "Rot".)  
New surveying for this Artillery plan.

---

p. 100 \* ( 8.) ... Fixed locations!)  
Decision whether these Training Inspectors were to have "Offices" in addition to "function", or should come under jurisdiction of a high-echelon ZI Command.

p. 100 \*\* ( 9.) ... /Two words illegible /)  
Could be Volltmann.

p. 100 \*\*\* (Gercke: ... Even Protectorate.)  
"waste motion" should read "Idling" (Leerlauf).  
"Also Protectorate" instead of "Even protectorate." "All right ... " refers also to b).

p. 100 # (Buhle: ... 2.) ... (Information Centers.)  
I.e., where troops returning from furlough were told the locations of their units.

---

p. 103 \*\* ( 5.) ... remove the road blocks.)  
I.e., this would have warned the enemy that a German attack was imminent. The Field Marshal is Goering.

p. 103 \*\* ( 7.) 11.) ... See Appendix.)  
\*\*\* Not enclosed in the Diary. - Ed.

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- p. 104      \* (Canaris: a) Radke - SD?)  
Canaris gave warning that the Security Service (SD) was out to get Radke for his insistence on not letting the complaints about SS activities in Poland be shelved.
- p. 104      \*\* (Rabenau: ... 80 carloads.)  
i.e., of documents from Polish Military Archives. (Rabenau - OQu V, Historical Div.)
- p. 104      \*\*\* (ObdH: 1.) ... Godesberg to Felsenest.)  
Meaning of entry could not be reconstructed.
- 
- p. 105      \* (Greiffenberg: ... Deathhead Div. in Holland.)  
See p. 106 "von Brauchitsch - Keitel". The military quality of the Deathhead Div. was considered dubious.
- 
- p. 106      \* (Status reports: ... d) First bridge launchers.)  
On Tank IV Chassis.
- p. 106      \*\* ( e. ) ... 4.7 cm AT. )  
i.e., Bns.
- p. 106      \*\*\* ( e. ) ... no travelling trolleys.)  
A substitute for Artillery caissons to facilitate road travel of guns.
- p. 106      # (Personnel ... Buhle wants to become C of S.)  
The culmination of the career of Gen. Staff Officer was a field command or the next best thing, the post of C of S to a high-ranking field commander.
- p. 106      ## (von Brauchitsch - Keitel. ... to release SS Regt.)  
Could be SS Adolf Hitler.
- p. 106      ### ( ... are tied down, as it is.)  
By the envisaged operation against Holland, which was not yet decided upon at that time.
- 
- p. 108      \* (3 March ... telegram to AGp. C.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 109      \* (Gercke: ... not kept currently informed.)  
I.e., by OKW.

p. 109      \*\* (Roehricht: l.) ... General z.B.V.)  
See Glossary.

p. 109      \*\*\* (von Ziehnberg: l.) Shifting.)  
I.e., to the front.

-----

p. 111      \* (Sixt: ... b) ... travelling trolleys...)  
See p. 106, note \*\*\*.

p. 111      (Asterisk omitted) (b.) ... How will they be  
fired?)  
"Abschussfrage". (A tentative translation in absence of explanation. - Ed.)

p. 111      (Asterisk omitted) (d.) ... Intermediate stage..)  
I.e., train GHq Artillery for cooperation with Armor.

-----

p. 113      \* (Col. Schaefer: ... lost letter.)  
A plant, to mislead enemy intelligence.

-----

p. 114      \* (Hollidt: ... Government-General.)  
I.e., Frank, the Governor.

p. 114      \*\* ( ... protective cordon.)  
A zone that was to be under military jurisdiction.

-----

p. 117 \* (1700 ... d) ... in the front line!)  
With all Armor closed up to the frontier,  
there is no room left for the Mt. Corps.

p. 117 \*\* (1100 ... Zeughaus.)  
The old Arsenal in Berlin, then a museum.

---

p. 118 \* (Tippelskirch: ... of Mannerheim's.)  
The Finnish Military Representative was  
strikingly well informed on what went on in  
Russia. This entry is showing the reason,  
that is, he could use the connections which  
Marshal von Mannerheim still had from Czarist  
days among the pre-Revolution assistants to  
Soviet commanders.

p. 118 \*\* (Gen Qu: ... 2.) ... 80 good ones.)  
Should probably be "40". Otherwise, the fi-  
gures would add up to 180, instead of 140.

p. 118 \*\*\* ( 7.) ... Art. 175.)  
Homosexual offenses.

---

p. 119 \* (Buhle: ... b) ... "Panzerabwehr".)  
"Anti-tank defense" (Panzerabwehr) sounded too  
passive. "Panzerjaeger" suggestive of the  
hunter who brings down the big game sounded  
more in keeping with the task.

---

p. 120 \* (a) ... only three groups.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 120 \*\* ( f.) Storch plane operation (156).)  
Probably stands for "156th Div.", not "156  
Storch planes."

p. 120 \*\*\* ( f) ... southern boundary.)  
I.e., of Sixteenth Army, see p. 128, Bogatsch.

p. 120 # ( g) Bridge at Cannes.)  
Should be "Canne". - Ed.

p. 121      \* (1400 AGp. B. ... No command tanks.)  
Commanders needed radio transmitters.

p. 121      \*\* (Trojan Horse?)  
Rhine barges carrying troops below deck were to arrive at the Nijmegen bridge before the German attack in order to prevent demolition of this very important Rhine crossing by the Dutch.

p. 121      \*\*\* (SS TV)  
Could be SS Deathhead or Waffen-SS (SS Truppenverband).

-----

p. 122      \* (Jeschonneck.)  
I.e., Gen. Halder tells Jeschonneck.

p. 122      \*\* ("Raubvogelkaefig.")  
Collective code for the various operations across the Upper Rhine.

-----

p. 123      \* (von Bock: ... b) ... SS Div.)  
SS Deathhead.

p. 123      \*\* ( ... "all fouled up".)  
I.e., from the air.

p. 123      \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg: ... 0 - 1 posts.)  
Aides of Ia officers.

p. 123      # (Heusinger: a) Perl.)  
A "commando" action was planned at this point, where the German, French, and Luxembourg borders meet. AGp. C had to be notified so that passage to the front would be authorized for the two Assault Cos.

-----

p. 124      \* (Wagner: ... Plottnitz. Qu XVII Corps.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 124      \*\* (Bottom: ... Schinkel Vase for approval.)  
A classicistic vase designed by the famous Prussian artist and architect of the early 19th century, which was usually given as a farewell gift to foreign Military Attachés.

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- p. 125      \* (1100 - 1330 ... conference with Dr.)  
Dr. Goerdeler, one of the chief figures of  
the opposition movement in Germany. See  
Foreword.
- 
- p. 126      \* (Wagner: ... f) ... ammunition for a whole  
Bn.)  
I.e., one whole Bn. per Div., for all Divs.
- p. 126      \*\* (Hemmerich: a) ... Eng. Officers.)  
Technical specialists (Eng. officers) enjoy-  
ed certain privileges which Hemmerich wanted  
to obtain also for the specialists in the  
Cartographic Section.
- 
- p. 127      \* (von Ziehlberg: ... for former Gen. Staff  
Officers.)  
I.e., whether they ought to be authorized in  
their new posts to wear the distinctive red  
piping on the trouser seams and the collar  
patch of the Gen. Staff Corps.
- 
- p. 129      \* (Gen. Qu - Weinknecht: ... Preparations for  
PWs (72,000).)  
Maximum capacity of existing PW camps.
- p. 129      \*\* (Bottom: ... Max ...)  
Maj. Max Leyherr (a son-in-law). Ruth von  
Hobe-Schrfeld (a daughter).
- 
- p. 130      \* (Greiffenberg reports back.)  
After his accident at the Chem. smoke demon-  
stration, see p. 117.
- p. 130      \*\* ( 1.) ... political material.)  
See p. 129, 22 March, Siebert.
- p. 130      \*\*\* ( 3.) Map for Benito.)  
Mussoline.

p. 135 (Asterisk omitted) (Second paragraph: ... northern operation.)  
I.e., AGps. A and B.

p. 135 \* (d) Plane landing incident.)  
The incident of Jan. 10, see p. 24.

p. 135 \*\* (1700 - 1900 ... Send for Kubler.)  
XVIII Corps (Mt. Corps).

p. 135 \*\*\* (Blaskowitz: ... must be taken out.)  
I.e., out of the High Command East set-up.

p. 135 # (... placed under Mil. Distr. CG.)  
I.e., must be organized in the manner of a Mil. District.

p. 135 ## (Take Blaskowitz out.)  
I.e., out of High Command East, and give him a job in the West.

-----

p. 136 (Asterisk omitted) (29 March ... Dictate the notes ...)  
Gen. Halder would dictate his shorthand notes of important conferences (here the Fuehrer conference of 27 March) into the machine for distribution to the various Sections of the Gen. Staff, to save himself the trouble of oral orientation.

-----

p. 137 \* (Buhle: ... d) ... 20,000 to reserves ...)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 137 \*\* (Wagner: ... c) Ib officers.)  
See Glossary.

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p. 138 \* (0930 ... b) ... northern sector.)  
Context would indicate "southern sector", see below.



- p. 140      \* ( d) ... gun pointers.)  
Kuebler is complaining of excessive paper work.
- p. 140      \*\* (2000 ... Major Seiderer.)  
Major Georg Seiderer, son-in-law.
- p. 140      \*\*\* (Interim Table of Organization.)  
For 263rd Div.
- p. 140      # (Bv TO)  
see Glossary.
- 
- p. 143      \* (von Ziehlberg: a) ... Section Chief in OKH.)  
The Attaché Group becomes a Section.
- 
- p. 144      \* (Fellgiebel: a) ... increased by 20.)  
Apparently a telescoped entry. Could not be reconstructed.
- 
- p. 145      \* ( b) ... to enemy countries.)  
E.g., through Switzerland or Sweden.
- p. 145      \*\* ( e) Clash with Goering ...)  
I.e., in his capacity of dictator over allocation of strategic materials.
- p. 145      \*\*\* (Lt.Col. Muench: ... OKW, Sec. L.)  
L stands for "Landesverteidigung" (National Defense Section). - Ed.
- p. 145      # (von Ziehlberg: ... Danzig or Augsburg.)  
"D" in Danzig stood for "Durchfuehrer", carry out; "A" in Augsburg for "Absage", cancellation.
-

p. 146 \* ( 5.) ... OQu - OQu I.)  
The original shows arrows within the parenthesis, obviously indicating the desired changes, but they were too confused for interpretation. - Ed.

p. 146 \*\* ( 7.) ... Bluecher's inquiry.)  
Bluecher was German envoy in Finland.

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p. 147 \* ( 10.) ... c) ... Conference with Buerkel.)  
Possibly on future Military Administration of prospective occupied territories.

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p. 148 \* ( g) Schmidt - Dankwart.)  
High-ranking civil servants (Ministry of Interior). Training course is for civil administrators in prospective occupied territories.

p. 148 \*\* ( i) ... b) ... Luftgau.)  
Air Force Service Command.

p. 148 \*\*\* ( 1) ... (Thomas).)  
Refers to political material.

p. 148 # (Bottom: ... back to Camp.)  
I.e., Zossen. - Ed.

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p. 150 \* (Thomas ... "harpoons".)  
"Harpune", a mine detonating device that operated somewhat on the principle of a harpoon.

p. 150 \*\* (7 April: ... Saw Gerti.)  
Gerti Leyherr, one of Gen. Halder's daughters.

p. 150 \*\*\* (von Stuelpnagel: a) ... From the Eastern frontier.)  
I.e., Italian eastern frontier with Yugoslavia.

p. 151      \* (Roehricht: a) ... (150,000).)  
To avert a railroad congestion.

---

p. 151      \*\* (Stapf ... Field Marshal.)  
Goering. - Ed.

---

p. 153      \* (1000 ... under our administration.)  
German: "in unsere Betreuung", literally:  
"under our friendly care, or, custody".

---

p. 154      \* (Second paragraph: ... against Northwest.)  
I.e., the northwestern part of Romania.

---

p. 154      \*\* (1900 ... c) ... elements of 69th Divs.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 154      \*\*\* ( d) ... Ju 88s.)  
Junker 88, a twin-engine bombers.

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p. 155      \* (1930 ... of long-range Ren. Staffeln.)  
Should be "close-range Ren. Staffeln", as  
appears from the context.

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p. 156      \* (Gen. Brand: a) ... drop of muzzle velocity.)  
I.e., causing shorts.

---

p. 156      \*\* (Baumholder.)  
Troop training center.

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- p. 157      \* (Unold ... b) ... 3,000 rounds in too minutes.)  
Gen. Halder doubts the correctness of this figure.
- 
- p. 158      \* (OQu IV - Etzdorf: ... b) ... State Secretary ...)  
von Weizsaecker.
- 
- p. 160      \* (Nolte: ... Fehmarn.)  
Island in the Baltic off the coast of Holstein.
- p. 160      \*\* (Technische Hochschule.)  
Technical university.
- p. 160      \*\*\* (ObdH: ... a) ... get us advance notice!)  
I.e., of British movements.
- p. 160      # ( b) ... South.)  
I.e., if the Allies land on the Aegean coast.
- p. 160      ## ( ... East.)  
I.e., if no Allies land on the Black Sea coast.
- p. 160      ### ( c) ... has not yet started.)  
I.e., if troops destined for "Gelb" have not yet reached the front in the West and so still need rolling stock.
- p. 160      \*# (.e) ... Not liaison officer with OKW.)  
Footnote canceled.

- p. 161      \* (Top: Official designation of battles.)  
For entry in individual Army records. - Ed.
- p. 161      \*\* (After return from Berlin ... c) Liaison ...)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 161      \*\*\* (Gen. Qu: ... c) ... Rubber blocks.)  
On tank treads. - Ed.
- p. 161      # (Reported British landing at ...)  
Locality was reported, but did not register  
in Gen. Halder's ear.
- p. 161      ## (Transp. Chief: ... b) ... opposed to plan.)  
There was constant bickering between the  
Reichsbahn and the Transp. Chief.
- 
- p. 162      \* (OQu IV: ... letter to Gen. Werth.)  
Hungarian Chief of Staff.
- 
- p. 163      \* (ObdH: ... Tank Command 40.)  
A temporary command composed of elements  
from Armd. Troop School.
- p. 163      \*\* (... taken away by Air Force?)  
See p. 155, 1930. Bogatsch.
- p. 163      \*\*\* (Chief, Central Branch: ... uniform of  
Gen. Staff.)  
Time that has to elapse before uniform of  
Gen. Staff Corps may be worn by newly ap-  
pointed officers.
- p. 163      # (J 12 5018.)  
An unidentified telephone number, probably  
at OKH.

p. 164 \* (Second paragraph: (Through Army Group!).)  
Exclamation point indicates indignation, as such information should have come through regular intelligence channels.

p. 164 \*\* (AGp. A: Three Bns.)  
Arty. Bns.

p. 164 \*\*\* (... Schwetzingen.)  
Arty. Training Center.

p. 165 \* (5.) Leeb successor to Becker.)  
I.e., as Chief, Ordnance Off. This is Emil Leeb (without "von"), the brother of Wilhelm von Leeb, C in C AGp. C

p. 166 \* (ObdH ... b) ... from the air.)  
To keep them out of the hands of the British.

p. 166 \*\* (... understanding with Koth.)  
Norwegian Foreign Minister.

p. 167 \* (OQu IV ... 12th Branch.)  
Section Foreign Armies West.

p. 168 \* (17 April ... Gercke: BUTC.)  
See Glossary.

p. 169 \* (Gercke: N-3 not yet.)  
Possibly refers to the original plan that the offensive in the West would follow "Weseruebung" within a specified interval.

p. 169 \*\* (Gehlen: ... Mil. District XVIII.)  
Tyrol, Salzburg, Styria and Carinthia. The ammunition here were explosives and mines, destined to be used to close the German-Italian border. See 13.1.1940. Italy was still building fortifications against Germany.

p. 170 \* (Housinger: ... b) ... several Divs.)  
I.e., it would take several Divs. to hold Narvik.

p. 171 \* (Top: Schlarauffia mine bridges.)  
"Schlarauffia" is the trade-name of a German  
innerspring mattress. Probably a device for moving  
safely over minefields.

p. 171 \*\* (1500 Report to ObdH: . . . Storch planes.)  
See p. 95, note \*\*.

p. 171 \*\*\* (Op. Sec. a) . . . Vassberg-Lueneburg.)  
The northernmost bomber field in Germany.

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p. 172 \* (Gen. Brand: . . . muzzle velocity.)  
See p. 156, note\*.

p. 172 \*\* (Wagner: Terboven . . .)  
Gauleiter of the Rhineland. -- Ed.

p. 172 \*\*\* (21 April . . . Noon return to Zeppelin.)  
I.e., Zossen. -- Ed.

---

p. 173 \* (d) 82/02 AT rifle.)  
28/20 mm tapered-bore AT rifle. The digits were  
deliberately reversed for camouflage purposes.

p. 173 \*\* (Gercke: . . . potato trains.)  
Essential supply movements for the population  
always had to be taken into consideration in  
planning troop movements.

---

p. 174 \* (Erfurth: a) . . . Bzura . . .)  
The battle on the Bzura river in the 1939 Polish campaign, which at one point looked critical for the Germans.

p. 174 \*\* (b) . . . Activity reports.)  
Reports on experiences and observations, usually written by Gen. Staff Liaison Officers.

p. 174 \*\*\* (c) . . . OQu IV.)  
Probably should be OQu V. Historical Sec.

p. 174 # (Jacob: a) . . . on the Upper Rhine.)  
See p. 163, Jacob.

p. 174 ## (Jacob: . . . c) . . . Eng. Corps Command.)  
Fortifications were no longer among the functions of High Command East.

p. 174 ### (f) . . . Issue order!)  
I.e., to stop that practice.

p. 174 \*# (Military District XVIII.)  
See note p. 169. Italy.

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p. 175 \* (von Greiffe berg: . . . b) Sponeck.)  
Footnote canceled .

p. 175 \*\* (OQu IV: a) . . . until we have field to ourselves.)  
German: "Dalmatien erst wenn Narrenfreiheit vorhanden."  
An allusion to the almost total unrestraint of the four days of revelry preceding Lent, when "all bars are down'."

---

p. 176 \* (1300 . . . released as of now.)  
May mean that the Div. is withdrawn from the contingent for Norway.

p. 176 \*\* (1700 von Greiffenberg . . . b) . . . horse-drawn Artillery.)  
I.e., GHq Artillery.

p. 176 \*\*\* (Wagner: a) . . . Terboven.)  
See p. 172, note \*\*.

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p. 177 \* (Buhle: . . . by Mt. Div.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 178 \* (b) . . . Morossow . . . has disappeared.)  
German: "Morossow, unser Mitspieler ist verschwunden!"  
Morossow was a Romanian politician. The entry is  
not explained. - Ed.

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p. 179 \* (Gen. OH . . . between officers and men.)  
I.e., undue familiarity.

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p. 179 \*\* (Gen. Ott: . . . Kayser . . .)  
Commandants of two Army training centers.

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p. 179 \*\*\* (82/02 AT rifle.)  
See p. 173, note \*.

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p. 180 \* (Top: General political situation.)  
"Political" means "International". - Ed.

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p. 180 \*\* (Roechricht: . . . "essential for war effort.")  
So as to get priority for building materials.

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p. 181 \* (f) Light Artillery Cmps.)  
Arty. Cmps for ammunition re-supply from  
ammunition dumps.

---

p. 182 \* (0930 (with Mieth): . . . b) We shall leave them. . .)  
May refer either to Hqs or certain personalities.

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p. 182 \*\* (Thiele: . . . On Felsenest.)  
I.e., deliberate disruptions to make it impossible  
for OKW to call up during critical hours when OKW  
interference was not wanted.

---

p. 184 \* (Jodl: . . . another five days or so.)  
Until Hitler has made up his mind to launch the  
offensive.

---

- p. 185 \* (b) Terboven must release Raeder.)  
Raeder, a civil administrator, later Chief of Civil Administration Belgium.
- p. 185 \*\* (1230 Canaris . . . excepted in attacks.)  
German: "Bei Angriffen Frauen ausgenommen."  
Refers to a detail in the Norwegian operation, which Gen. Halder could not reconstruct.
- p. 185 \*\*\* (Buhle: . . . b) . . . (divided by railroad).)  
I.e., wheeled elements by road.
- p. 185 # (d) . . . magnesium charges . . .)  
To facilitate observation in fog.
- 
- p. 186 \* (Sweden: . . . Uthmann.)  
German Mil. Attaché.
- 
- p. 187 \* (1300 ObdH . . . our special trains.)  
Complete Operational Hq made up of railroad trains.
- 
- p. 189 \* (Jacob: a) Rosenheim.)  
Large Eng. Corps training center. -- Ed.
- p. 189 \*\* (b) LZ bridges.)  
A sectionalized semi-permanent bridge. -- Ed.
- 
- p. 190 \* (North: . . . our national territory.)  
German: "Die Form, in der wir Daenemark in unseren Hoheitsbereich einbeziehen . . ."
- 
- p. 191 \* (Mieth: . . . we must do "Braun" alone.)  
I.e., without Italian participation.
- 
- p. 192 \* (Wagner: . . . role of Administrative Chief.)  
German: "Verwaltungschef."
- p. 192 \*\* (Vice President.)  
Deputy Provincial Governor.

- p. 193 \* (von Greiffenberg: Stopping possible at 1200.)  
I.e., if offensive is called off.
- p. 193 \*\* (Keitel 1213: Augsburg.)  
Code for cancellation of operation, see note, p. 145.
- p. 193 \*\*\* (OQu IV: . . . Much German spoken.)  
An allusion to the numerous German-speaking former members of the Austro-Hungarian Army in the Romanian Gen. Staff.
- p. 193 # (Bottom: . . . barrier against Hungary.)  
German: "Riegel vor Ungarn".
- 

- p. 194 \* (Top: . . . Nish not out of the question.)  
Possibly refers to permission to use this line as a link with Bulgaria.
- p. 194 \*\* (von Greiffenberg: . . .)  
No entry, meaning that his report contained nothing of importance.
- p. 194 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg: . . . c) . . . remain where they are.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 194 # (Train FD 7.)  
FD means "Fern-D-Zug", Long-distance Express Train.
- 

- p. 195 \* (Top: to XXI Corps.)  
The Hq that organized the preparations for invasion of Norway. - Ed.
- p. 195 \*\* (Notes for ObdH: . . . b) Gerath - 3000 -.)  
Entry could not be reconstructed.
-

- p. 196 \* (Jodl: a) . . Hauptschulungsleiter . . .)  
Superintendent of Schooling Activity.
- p. 196 \*\* (Reich Gaue 43 - 45.)  
This may be an error. The numbering of "Gau"  
(Party districts ranking in size with provinces)  
in Germany ended with 42; "Ausland" (foreign  
countries) was Gau 43. - Ed.
- p. 196 \*\*\* (120 Kreisleiter.)  
Party district leaders.
- p. 196 # (b) . . . submarines 7/8 May.)  
No punctuation in this sentence. Meaning could not  
be reconstructed.
- p. 196 ## (von Stuelpnagel: . . . Airplane charts.)  
German: "Flugzeug Tafeln". Possibly a slip of the  
pen for "Flugzeug Staffeln" (shorthand).
- p. 196 ### (von Greiffenberg: 10 May. 0535.)  
Hour of arrival at Godesberg.
- 

- p. 198 \* (. . . inserted at end of Vol. III.)  
The calendar was kept by Gen. Halder's adjutant.  
Some entries by Gen. Halder are indicated with  
asterisks.
-

FOOTNOTES TO VOL. IV

- p. 1 \* (2215 Nordhausen: . . . "Danzig".)  
D for Danzig stands for "Durchfuehren!", carry out the plan. The cancellation code was "Augsburg", standing for "Absage".
- P. 1 \*\* (About 0700. . . a) . . . Nijmegen bridge destroyed.)  
Several innocent looking freight barges were to be near the Nijmegen Bridge at the Zero-Hour to prevent its being blown up by the Dutch.
- 
- p. 2 \* (About 1100: Message from Sperrle.)  
Air Force reports this advance, which was observed from the air.
- p. 2 \*\* (No decision yet: . . . "Gneisenau".)  
Codes for two operations. No details available.
- 
- p. 5 \* (1207 Gercke: . . . "Zigarre".)  
Code for bringing up of GHq Reserves.
- 
- p. 10 \* (Second line and 6th paragraph: AGp. B.)  
Should be "A". - Ed.
- 
- p. 11 \* ((e) 10 Replacement Divs.)  
Obsolete term. What is meant is activation from Replacement units.
- 
- p. 12 \* (OCu IV: . . . l'Oeuvre.)  
Paris newspaper.
- 
- p. 13 \* (16 May. Second Paragraph: . . three more Corps Hqs will stand by.)  
As more Divs. are being brought up to sustain the advance, Corps Hqs must be available to take command of them. Together with the Hq, the Divs. become a Corps. The Corps Hq as such has no combat troops, only Corps troops (Corps Arty., AT, Eng., Sig., etc.).

p. 16 \* (1630 . . . Vizepraesident v. Kraushaar.)  
High-ranking civil servant directly below a  
Regierungspraesident (see footnote Vol. II, p.59).

---

p. 17 \* (Second line: None (3 from Reserve)).  
Could not be reconstructed.

---

p. 17 \*\* (2130 . . . Seyss-Inquart.)  
A civilian. The Austrian State Minister who  
turned Austria over to Hitler.

---

p. 22 \* (Second paragraph: OQu II.)  
Footnote canceled. See glossary.

---

p. 25 \* (AGp. B: . . . water line.)  
A geographical concept, not clearly defined,  
referring to the area criss-crossed by water-  
ways in such a way as to preclude mechanized movements.

---

p. 26 \* (Heusinger, . . . 2.) . . . Pater noster.)  
An allusion to the conveyor belt system by which  
Divs. were being brought up to protect the moving  
front of Fourth Army. Sixteenth Army was divert-  
ing them to its own sector.

---

p. 27 \* (Translations.)  
The original of the Churchill letter could not be  
obtained. The text here is a re-translation of the  
German translation. - Ed.

---

p. 31 \* (Last line: their neighbor on the left.)  
On the right wing of the adjoining Army Gp.

---

p. 33 \* (Seventh paragraph: GK)  
"Geheime Kommandosache", i.e., top secret.

---

p. 35 \* (5th line: . . . will be completed for 15 July.)  
Actually the operation started much earlier; but  
on 24 May this may have been the date set.

- p. 37     \*     (A report on foreign situation.)  
Gen. Halder cannot remember by whom this report was made. There may have been a reason why he did not want to put down the name.
- 
- p. 38     \*     (0930 . . . in our Ju.)  
I.e., the Junker plane at the disposal of OKH.
- 
- p. 39     \*     (Kossmann: . . . Reason: Mussert.)  
Mussert, the Chief of the Dutch Nazi Party, did not want to be under Army control.
- 
- p. 41     \*     (Memorandum on "Leitervorschriften".)  
Gen. Halder could not recall the nature of these instructions.
- 
- p. 42     \*     (End of 29 May: . . . to the Ground Forces, AA Bns.)  
I.e., with all the conquering going on, the Air Force AAA also wanted its share of glory.
- p. 42     \*\*     (30 May, 1940 -- first paragraph: Le Débat.)  
An allusion to the title of Emile Zola's novel on the Franco-Prussian war, 1870/71, which contains a most graphic picture of the defeat suffered by the French in the battle of Sedan.
- \*
- p. 43     \*     (Gercke. . . AGp. A.)  
Should be AGp. B. - Ed.
- p. 43     \*\*     (Morning Conf. . . . 20 Divs.)  
Footnote canceled.
- 
- p. 47.     \*\*     (Fourth paragraph: . . . Third Draft Divs.)  
I.e., troops roughly corresponding to German Third Draft units in combat effectiveness, which was relatively low (see Glossary - Draft).
- p. 47     \*\*     (1230 . . . Baroness Dyker.)  
Gen. Halder's hostess while GHq was at Godesberg.

p. 57 \* (Third paragraph: . . . "kleiner Baer".)  
A secondary operation, subsidiary to "Tiger"  
(offensive from the central part of AGp. C).

-----

p. 64 \* (Gen. v. Rocques, former Inf. Commander of Sixth Div.)  
In the German peacetime Div., Inf. and Artillery  
components had separate commanders.

-----

p. 71 \* (5th paragraph: . . . seems to be closed.)  
In the absence of a situation map, the apparent  
contradiction could not be resolved. - Ed.

-----

p. 72 \* (1345 . . . Div. Sponeck.)  
The Div. formed for the air invasion of Holland.

p. 72 \*\* (Bottom line . . . to have these woods in our back.)  
Woods in back of the front line conceal movements  
and preparations.

-----

p. 78 \* (5th paragraph: OQu Belgium.)  
Supply Chief for Belgium.

p. 78 \*\* (5th paragraph: von Falkenhansen.)  
Military Commander Belgium.

-----

p. 82 \* (6th paragraph: 60th Div.)  
The original has "60 Divs.", which Gen. Halder  
cannot explain. The 60th mot. Div. had overstrength.  
(1/3 Div. is 1 Regt.)

-----

p. 84 \* (1600 . . . Military District Hqs (Ib).)  
The Ib Officers are in charge of organizational  
matters connected with demobilization.

p. 84 (Asterisk omitted.) (Consultation with Gehlen . . . e) . . .  
use of minefields.)  
Mines were conceived by Gen. Halder as the  
"Engineers' artillery", to protect flanks,  
disengagements, etc., always in the war of  
movement. The extensive use of mines  
created many new problems, especially in  
connection with the danger to friendly per-  
sonnel, and for this reason Engineers fought  
rather shy of these ideas.



p. 95 \* (Eight Gp. Hqs)  
Heeresgruppenkommandos are Hqs of wartime Army Gps. (i.e., a Hq over grouped Armies). Heeresgruppen are the wartime Army Hqs.

---

p. 99 \* (Erfurth: . . . c) Militaer-Wochenblatt.)  
German Military periodical, Gen. Staff wanted some control of its editorial policies.

---

p. 99 \*\* (Erfurth: . . . d) . . . Part played by CGs and Gen. Staff.)  
Air Force and Navy always had star billing in the newspapers. Infantry came off second best, and Gen. Staff was pushed into the background.

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p.100 \* (Buerkner:)  
An associate of Canaris (Abwehr).

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p.100 \*\* (2100 Conference with Mueller . . . for their solution.)  
I.e. a plenipotentiary of the Fuehrer for political questions. Eventually this job was taken over by Abetz, German Ambassador to Vichy France.

---

p.100 \*\*\* (ObdH has flown to Berlin.)  
About this time ObdH asked Gen. Halder to begin to do some operational thinking about Russia. Gen. Halder volunteered this information; there is no entry about it.

---

p.101 \* (von Greiffenberg: . . . b) . . . Greiffenberg must take over OQu I.)  
For the planned operation in Russia.

---

p.101 \*\* (Wagner: a) Wolff-Metternich, art historian.)  
In connection with seizure and inventorying of art treasures, as function of Mil. Administration in France (Gen Qu). - Ed.

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p.101 \*\*\* (Wagner: e) . . . by base set-up for southward drive of right wing.)  
I.e., the supply base set up near the Channel coast when the right wing of the German Army drove south to the Loire after the battle at the Somme.

p. 103 \* (0930 Kuechler and Marcks.)  
Kuechler's C of S.

---

p. 107 \* (3.) . . . (effect of sand?))  
This refers to possible German recovery of South-West Africa with its deserts as part of a peace-settlement with Britain and the British Commonwealth.

---

p. 109 \* (1800 Thoma . . . Ordnance Dept, Sec. VI.)  
Armor and Motorized Equipment Branch of the Army Ordnance Office.

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p. 109 (~~Asterisk omitted.~~) (von Greiffenberg.)  
I.e., the questions of national defense to be dealt with by Gen. Staff in peacetime, From what direction are conflicts to be anticipated, from west or east?

---

p. 110 \* (1100 von Stuelpnagel 2.) . . . yesterday.)  
Probably refers to plans for campaign against Russia.

---

p. 112 \* (f) Relation between Town Commandants and Post Troop Commanders.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 114 (~~Asterisk omitted.~~) (Railroad Troop Commanders.)  
Should be: Inspector of Railroad Troops (now distinct from Eng. Corps).

---

p. 114 \*\* (von Greiffenberg . . . for the two-thirds . . . of the 13 Divs.)  
The two Regts. in the line of the thirteen Divs. constituting the first assault wave.

---

p. 116 (~~Asterisk omitted.~~) (b) Artillery cover of water lanes.)  
"Bruecken". The flank protection by land-based Artillery for the shuttle lanes of invasion traffic.

p. 118 \* ( b) Projected "rejuvenation".)  
May mean mere rehabilitation or substituting younger men for the older soldiers in the Divs.

p. 118 \*\* ( f) . . . would then run to one-half billion.)  
The original reads: eine halbe Million (one-half million). If the reference is to the necessary funds for maintenance of Armd. Divs., one-half billion (German: Milliarden) might be too high.  
Could not reconstruct the entry.

-----

p. 119 \* (Buhle: . . . c) . . . as Sub-Area Hqs. - (Gen Ou!))  
Territorial administrative Hqs, carrying out the administrative functions of Gen Ou in occupied territories.

p. 119 (Asterisk omitted.) (von Greiffenberg . . . map exercise.)  
"Planspiel", not "Kriegsspiel",  
This study could not be conducted as a map maneuver because of the lack of data on Britain. The enemy side thus had to be taken by the CG.

-----

p. 120 \* (Abberger: . . . from the Rhineland and Speerenberg.)  
Speerenberg is Eng. Corps Training Center.

p. 120 (Asterisk omitted.) (Abberger: 1.)  
1.) Need for secrecy was over.  
2.) Towed rafts for bulk supplies,  
e.g., gasoline.

-----

p. 124 \* (1000 . . . a) . . . Simon has assumed office.)  
A Gauleiter, became Administrator of Luxembourg.

p. 124 (Asterisk omitted.) (Gen. Brand : K 12 plus K 5.)  
K 12 21 cm (extreme long range).  
K 5 28 cm railway gun (67,900 yds).

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p. 127 \* ( k) . . . Thomsen.)  
German Chargé d' Affaires in Washington, after recall of Ambassador.

-----

p. 129 \* (German policy: . . . Germanic sectionalism must be transcended!)  
I.e., the perverse sectionalism of the various Germanic peoples, especially the Scandinavian nations, which blinded them to Nordic ideals and made them resist inclusion in the Greater German Reich.

p. 130 (Asterisk omitted.) (Wagner . . . repair shop districts.)  
Coordination with units which will  
have repairs done there.

-----

p. 131 \* (Afterwards conference with ObdH . . . soft attitude toward France.)  
ObdH was accused of promoting a "soft" attitude toward France.

-----

p. 132 \* (Cylix. OKM.)  
Oberkommando der Marine - Navy High Command.

-----

p. 132 \*\* (c) . . . "péniche".)  
Type of barge on French rivers. The Navy insisted on drawing distinctions between French, Belgian (campine) and German river craft (Prahm). For the Army they were all river barges.

-----

p. 134 \* (Wuestefeld: . . . tank ditch on Russian border.)  
See vol. III, p. 60 (Conference with Himmler on 2 Feb. 1940.)

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p. 134 \*\* (Brand: . . . Bruno (short, long and heavy).)  
28 cm railway gun, tube 40 calibers (short)  
28 cm railway gun, tube 45 calibers (long)  
A "heavy" Bruno was not found in available tabulations.  
(Is not the same as K 5 28 cm, which has a tube of 76 caliber length.)

-----

p. 137 \* (g) end: Film strip on English coast.)  
Aerial photographs of the English coast.

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p. 137 \*\* (Buhle. c) One Rocket Projector Regt. (Do) of three Bns.)  
"Do" is a six-barreled 15 cm Rocket Projector.

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p. 138 \* (Boehme: b) "Black Line" ("Fuehrer Line").)  
Demarcation line for projected detachment from France of the Départements Pas de Calais and du Nord, which were to be included in a new Flemish State. See also p. 214, note\*.

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p. 138 \*\* (Boehme, c) . . . Would necessitate control of national frontiers.)  
I.e., of French national frontiers; to keep out undesirable and subversive elements.

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p. 138 \*\*\* (Greiffenberg . . b) . . Losses due to ice.)  
River ice in the past winter damaged many barges.

p. 139 \* (n) . . . Cable water,) "Kabelwasser". Gen. Halder could not explain the term.

---

p. 140 \* (2000 - 2200, ObdH . . . a) 2.) . . America might become effective.)  
Gen. Halder could not remember whether only American aid or actual entry of the U.S. into the war was envisaged.

---

p. 143 \* (Fourth line: . . on high seas missions.)  
I.e., as commerce raiders.

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\* \*

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p. 144 (Asterisk omitted.) (c) . . . against enemy surface attacks.)  
I.e., as protection of invasion craft near British coast; own shore Btrys. give effective protection near French coast.

---

p. 147 \* (Jacob: a) . . Work against it! Important!)  
I.e., he should oppose the earlier target date. Army could not have completed preparations. Possibly a maneuver of Navy to have entire plan dropped by showing the Army could not hold up its end.

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p. 147 \*\* (von Ziehlberg: . . . 29 Ib.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 147a \* (Bottom: 3 tanks.)  
Campine: Small craft in use on Canals in Holland and Belgium.  
Péniche: See p. 132, note \*\*.

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p. 148 \* (Wagner: . . . Lumber and Forest Administration.)  
One of the normal functions of Gen Gu which also in peacetime maintains an organization for proper management of timberlands on Army training areas.

---

p. 150 \* (ObdH . . . Troop loading in port.)  
The original has "unloading" (Entladung). Gen. Halder thought it was a slip of the pen.

p. 152 \* (d) East. . . . Stablack.)  
Locality in East Prussia.

---

p. 153 \* (07C0 . . . "B" and Herbert bridging equipment.)  
"B" bridges have an eight and a sixteen ton rating and are normal equipment of Div. and Corps Eng. Bns. Herbert bridges, heavy, sectionalized bridges (Austrian type) found in GHq Bridge Clms.

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p. 155 \* (c) "Black Line" in Burgundy dropped.)  
An earlier plan called for detachment of French territory also in Burgundy, (see p. 138, note\*)

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p. 156 \* (g) Brittany, what incredible stupidity!)  
Refers to German sponsoring of a "separatist" movement in Brittany!

p. 156 \*\* (Wilhelm Arendts.)  
A civilian friend of Gen. Halder. Later joined staff of Mil. Commander France.

p. 156 \*\*\* (Wagner (Gen Qu). . . . Nothing must be sold.)  
Refers to inventoring and freezing of all art treasures.

---

p. 158 \* (von Ziehlberg: . . . to wear Gen. Staff uniform.)  
The distinctive features of the Gen. Staff uniform was wide red pipings on the trouser seams.

p. 158 \*\* (I oppose . . . the "Museums".)  
Gen. Halder was very interested in broadening the cultural and historical activities of OQu V, but did not want to be saddled with the Army Museums throughout the country.

---

p. 159 \* (OQu V: # . b) Ruth Groener.)  
Daughter of Gen. Groener. Probably refers to papers of late Gen. Groener, German Defense Minister under the Weimar Republic.

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- p. 160 \* (Stapf: . . . Remote Control by ObdM.)  
Probably a mistake for "ObdL", Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.
- p. 160 \*\* (von Ziehlberg: . . . Osterode.)  
Locality in East Prussia. This refers to prospective location of GHq for the Eastern campaign.
- 
- p. 162 \* (( b ) . . . Concrete tunnels.)  
The guns were pulled into concrete tunnels after firing.
- p. 162 \*\* (W752 . . . K 5 gun.)  
28 cm railway heavy gun.
- 
- p. 163 \* (Demonstration. . . . disregards our actual problem.)  
I.e., that fire would have to be delivered from the landing-craft up to the moment they touched bottom.
- 
- p. 164 \* (von TThoma. . . . ammunition carriers.)  
A French, armored ammunition carrier greatly resembling a small tank. Dropped ammunition as it passed by firing positions.
- p. 164 \*\* (von Greiffenberg: a) . . . "Seeloewe".)  
Code for invasion of England.
- 
- p. 166 \* (Bogatsch: . . . Method: . . . effective only 2 minutes.)  
There is an unexplained contradiction between this statement and the one following.
- 
- p. 167 \* (2300 Dingler, a) . . . from Seventh Armd. Div.)  
Seventh Armd. Div. is Rommel's. He kept a staff of photographers busy for himself.
- 
- p. 168 \* (1745)  
In the original "1800" is corrected to read "1745". Probably slip of the pen.
-

p. 169 \* (Heim: Wenig and Frank.)  
Probably the head of the Government-General.

---

p. 173 \* (von Stuelpnagel: a) . . new directive from Fuschl.)  
I.e., from Ribbentrop. Fuschl was Ribbentrop's  
Chateau near Salzburg.

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p. 174 \* (2.) Romania: . . . if Hungarians start off again.)  
I.e., to invade Romania.

---

p. 174 \*\* (Wagner: . . . Army Supply Sec.)  
The two main functions had expanded to a point where  
separate Departments had to be established for each.

---

p. 175 \* (b) Romania: . . . 120 men.)  
The 200 men in the oil plants are anti-sabotage  
specialists, probably from the Canaris organization.  
, No explanation could be offered for the "120 men  
outside Romania."

---

p. 175 \*\* (c) . . Jews is on in the East.)  
I.e., in the Government-General.

---

p. 176 \* (Ott: . . with incendiary charge.)  
" "Ausstoss" Granaten des Granatwerfers, die als  
Brennzuender wirken,"

---

p. 176 (\*Asterisk omitted.) (Weinknecht: Administrative Orders.)  
Orders covering supply, traffic,  
evacuation, administration of occupied  
territories and other details of  
operations concerning the Gen Qu  
Service. Are the counterpart of  
Operational Orders.

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p. 180 \* (von Ziehlberg: . . uniform for Arendts.)  
Footnote canceled.

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- p. 181 \* (Buhle: . . . c) Reorganization of Truck Clms.)  
 Since supply trains had a fixed number of cars, distribution would be handled more efficiently if capacity of Truck Clms. were adjusted to train capacity.  
 Note to a). Concentration around industrial centers, e.g., Magdeburg, Suhl, etc.
- p. 181 \*\* (1000 . . . c) Langemarck celebration.)  
 In memory of the heroic action of some Companies composed exclusively of volunteer university students in the battles at Langemarck (Belgium) in the first months of World War I.
- p. 181 \*\*\* (00u IV: . . . Transylvania.)  
 I.e., in ceding to Hungary the province of Transylvania annexed in 1918.
- 
- p. 182 \* (Wagner: . . . 2) Administration.)  
 Footnote canceled.
- 
- p. 183 \* (Bruns:)  
 German Mil. Attaché in Spain.
- p. 183 \*\* (. . . by common effort at Gibraltar.)  
 I.e., regaining Gibraltar is conceived as an all-Spanish effort, a national goal, uniting all classes.
- p. 183 \*\*\* (Wahle:)  
 German Mil. Attaché in Romania.
- \*
- p. 184 \* (lt. Col. Becker . . . Otto.)  
 Plenipotentiary German General in Slovakia.
- 
- p. 185 \* (2100 von Ziehlberg: Falkenstein affair.)  
 Refers to irregularities in the Gen. Staff funds for grants in aid.
- p. 185 \*\* (Hoth: . . . (might be used in Pomania).)  
 Stever was Hoth's Ia officer.
- p. 185 \*\*\* (Gericke: . . . b) Reich Railroads reluctant about accepting the latter.)  
 The French and Belgian rolling stock was turned over in compensation for Reichsbahn rolling stock destroyed while on loan to Army.

p. 187 \* (c) . . . Northeastern Line.)  
The line separating Alsace-Lorraine from France,  
to keep the French element among the refugees  
from returning to this territory.

p. 187 \*\* (c) Belgium.)  
Black Line, see p. 138, note \*.

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p. 188 \* (10000 Roehricht: a) . . Suippes not suitable.)  
Mourmelon-le-Grand and Suippes, two localities  
southeast of Reims.

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p. 189 \* (1200 Gen Bogatsch . . . over English coast.)  
Obtained an excellent film of the English in-  
vasion coast.

p. 189 \*\* (00u I - Op. Sec. . . . Cavalry, yes or no.)  
I.e., should the Cavalry Div. be retained?  
Had not proved itself. Was eventually mechanized.  
in first year of Russian campaign.

p. 189 (Asterisk omitted.) (Liss: Situation in North Africa.)  
Normal troop contingent in North  
Africa was 8 Inf. Divs., and some  
Cavalry. During the war new troops  
were raised in North Africa, reaching  
a total of 13 Divs. at the time of the  
Armistice. The 3½ Cav. Divs. were not  
Divs. as such, but Spahis montés in Bn.  
strength, which added up to 3½ Divs.

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p. 190 \* (2.) . . . to balance and adjust.)  
To improvise and organize to offset losses suffered  
in crossing and landing.

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p. 191 \* (Third paragraph: . . Ninth Army.)  
Calais has to give up cross-Channel lift to Boulogne,  
to make up for its restricted  
loading facilities. See p. 190.

p. 191 \*\* (B) . . . Putzier.)  
Airborne Div. trained for special tasks in England.  
Should be used over very wide area, not as a compact  
Div.

p. 191 \*\*\* (d) . . . Richtshofen.)  
I.e. Support by airborne troops.

p. 193 \* (The Fuehrer: . . . in the political field.)  
"Political" in this instance means "foreign relations".

---

p. 195 \* (Jeschonneck: . . . Railroad Arty. spurs.)  
Railway guns must have a system of tracks so as to be able to fire in several directions. The lay-out, resembling an outspread hand ("Klaue") is very conspicuous from the air and attracts bombers.

---

p. 196 \* (Beier: C of S, Mil. District XXI.)  
Wartheland, roughly coinciding with the Polish Province of Poznan.

p. 196 \*\* (Thoma: . . . Transfer of an unqualified officer. . . without prior consultation.)  
I.e., Thoma complains that he was not first consulted.

p. 196 \*\*\* (von Sodenstern: . . b) . . from S plus 2 on.)  
"S" stands for "Start".

p. 196 # (von Etzdorf. . . Spanish Cameroons.)  
This probably refers to the small Spanish Colony in that area, known as Fernando Po.

---

p. 197 \* (North Africa: Comparison between De Gaulle and Yorck.)  
This is a historical allusion to the Prussian General Yorck (later Count Yorck von Wartenburg), who went over to the Russians after their victory over Napoleon in 1812, while Prussia was still officially an ally of France.

p. 197 \*\* (Gen. Buhle: . . . c) Personnell shifts.)  
Personnel was to be shifted between Fifth and Sixth Drafts to equalize ages within each group.

---

p. 198 \* (Gen. Brand. . . . undercutting of base.)  
Method of firing at base of cliff to cause collapse of slope, facilitating approach of tanks. (Was used to cross the Albert Canal in Belgium.)

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- p. 199 \* (Bogatsch: . . . a) Herbert ferries ready.)  
Heavy ferries for AAA in cross-Channel fleet.  
Used Herbert bridging equipment (see p.153, note \*).
- p. 199 \*\* (von Greiffenberg: . . . c) . . . AHq 7.)  
Norway and Holland were planned as bases for  
diversionary maneuvers against the English East  
Coast. "Herbstreise" was the code for these  
maneuvers.
- 
- p. 200 \* (Gen. Mueller: . . . Gen z.b.V.)  
He would no longer be Gen. Qu, but Gen. z.b.V. (General  
on special assignment responsible for maintenance of  
discipline, counter-espionage, and legal matters in  
the Field Army). He was directly responsible to ObdH.
- p. 200 \*\* (Evening: Supper with Eugen H.)  
A cousin of Gen. Halder.
- p. 200 \*\*\* (Col. Foertsch: . . . (taking the broad view).)  
I.e., problems are to be viewed not from the tactical  
point of view of the lower echelon commander, but  
rather from the higher level where successes and  
reverses are viewed in terms of their efforts on  
entire operations and campaigns.
- p. 200 # (Conference with ObdH: . . . question of counter  
measures.)  
This was a serious problem, as AAA had been with-  
drawn by the Air Force.
- 
- p. 201 \* (Long-distance talk with von Toppelskirch:  
Second paragraph: . . . work together with Gen. Staff.)  
I.e., the Romanian Gen. Staff.
- 
- p. 202 \* (Liss: . . . Organization of French transitional Army.)  
The 200,000 men Army allowed to France under the  
Armistice as a stage in reducing its strength to  
the level authorized.
- p. 202 \*\* (Morning: . . . on organizational and military-political  
matters.)  
Possibly connected with Romania and Bulgaria.
- 
- p. 204 \* (Sixth paragraph: The western bank of the Meuse river.)  
Should be "Marne river".

p. 205 \* (OCu I: . . . Reorganization of Thirteenth Div. completed.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 206 \* (f) Kummersdorf.)  
Artillery Proving Ground.

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p. 208 \* (Chem. Warfare Chief: a) Captured Adamsite smoke composition.)  
Smudge pots of a ground-persistent gas.

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p. 208 \*\* (Gen. Mueller . . . : a) . . . for cowardice.)  
I.e., prosecution of the Bn. CO.

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p. 209 \* (Chief Op. Sec.: . . . Britain: . . . (one Geschwader).)  
Footnote canceled, See Glossary.

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p. 210 \* (OCu IV: . . . Dakar: . . . "Travailler pour le roi de Prusse.")  
"To work for (the benefit of) the King of Prussia."  
An 18th century slogan, coined during a diplomatic crisis in the time of Frederick the Great.

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p. 210 \*\* (Dakar: . . . over the Rif.)  
The mountain range separating French and Spanish Morocco.

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p. 211 \* (Speidel: . . . for administrative work.)  
"Neigung der Zivilverwaltung zu ministerieller Taetigkeit." I.e., to take upon itself the function of policy making instead of carrying out the orders or directives of the occupying power.

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p. 213 \* (Top: b) Procedure for "Green Line".)  
The demarcation line between the Occupied and Vichy France.

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p. 214 \* (7th paragraph: . . . Départements in the North of France.)  
I.e., the Départements Pas de Calais and du Nord,  
(see p. 138, note \*)

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p. 214 \*\* (7th paragraph: . . . from the west coast across the continent to the east coast.)  
From former German South West Africa to former German East Africa.

- p. 215 \* (OQu I: a) . . . on training for "Winter Manual".)  
Instructions for troop training during winter  
(contained directives for preparation of Russian  
campaign).
- p. 215 \*\* (OQu I: . . d) . . change over to organizing  
supply on Corps basis?)  
Only Div. and Army had such an organization.
- p. 215 \*\*\* (ObdH: a) . . von Stuelpnagel, Vienna.)  
Otto von St. (a cousin of Heinrich von St., former  
OQu I), Commander of Vienna Mil. District.
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- p. 216 \* (OQu IV: a) . . (oil district, corset stay).)  
German units were to bolster up Romanian units  
in the event of a war with Russia (act as "corset  
stays"). (Army slang.)
- p. 216 \*\* (von Ziehlberg: . . a) . . "Askania Werke".)  
The actual purpose of the construction work on  
GHq was camouflaged under the fiction that the  
buildings were destined for a new plant of the  
Berlin instrument firm "Askania Werke".
- p. 216 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg: a) . . Spala.)  
Jasio. Locality in Galicia (Poland).  
Spala. Locality near Minsk.
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- p. 219 \* (von Etzdorf: . . . only by a gigantic fraud).  
In this sentence von Etzdorf was quoting either  
Ribbentrop or Hitler.
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- p. 220 \* (Gen. Ott: . . "Sturm-Kpn." instead of "Schuetzen-Kpn.")  
"Assault Cos.", later "Grenadier Cos." instead of  
"Rifle Cos.". The rifleman of the Armd. Div. thought  
of himself as something more daring than an  
ordinary foot soldier. He needed a more formidable  
designation, in keeping with clanking and truculent  
tanks.
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- p. 223 \* (Liss: a) Memorandum on North Africa.)  
A study dealing with transport questions and the possibilities of a landing on the North African coast.
- p. 223 \*\* (Liss: . . . b) . . . Scapini's trip.)  
Scapini was a blind leader of the French war veterans and became Minister of Prisoner of War Matters. In that capacity he visited PW camps in Germany.
- p. 223 \*\*\* (Buhle: Order on reshuffling of motor vehicles.)  
The object was reducing the number of vehicle types in any given unit; the goal, units with single types of vehicles (reinrassige Einheiten). The multitude of vehicle types complicated maintenance and repair in a critical degree.
- p. 223 # (Buhle: . . . Activation of special rehabilitation units.)  
"Sondertruppe zum Zwecke der Bewaehrung". Probably the "Bewaehrungsbataillon" (Rehabilitation Bn.), a penal unit for soldiers whose court martial sentence has been suspended to give them an opportunity to redeem themselves at the front. Different from the "Feldsonderbataillon" (Special Field Bn., see VI, 84; VII, 3), a punishment unit proper.
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- p. 225 \* (von Etzdorf, second paragraph: . . . (Iraq, etc.).)  
Russia was to be won over by the prospect of gaining Iraq, which would (in addition to the oil wells) have fulfilled her age-old desire for a warm-water port on the ocean.
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- p. 226 (Asterisk omitted.) (Wagner: a) . . . Paris.)  
Goering wanted Air Force personnel to be free of any restrictions in buying up the things that could be had in French stores. Gen. Halder wanted regulations that would enable Germans without soldier connections to get some of these goods.
-

p. 227 \* (Thiele: . . b) Illegal Transmitter Locating Col)  
"Schwarzsender Kp."

p. 227 \*\* (Dr. Etscheid.)  
A political confidant of Gen. Halder. He was  
Syndicus (legal adviser) of the Berlin Foreign  
Press Assn.

p. 227 \*\*\* (Gen. von Stuelpnagel . . . b) . . French Transition  
Army.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 227 # (Gen. von Stuelpnagel . . . e) . . . Succession by  
Mieth not acceptable.)  
von Stuelpnagel wanted to leave Armistice Commission  
and proposed Mieth as his successor. (see also p.229)

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p. 228 \* (Gercke: . . Otto program.)  
First mention of code for railroad program in  
preparation for Russian campaign.

p. 228 \*\* (Gercke: . . Coal, sugar beets, potatoes.)  
Gen. Staff planning must take into account the  
normal transport needs of the economy (coal) as  
well as the additional requirements at harvest  
time (sugar beets, potatoes). The requirements  
for "Otto" must be brought in harmony with these,  
and vice versa.

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p. 229 \* (Heusinger-Reinhard . . b) . . Terrain for training.)  
The Gibraltar task force needed a training ground re-  
producing as closely as possible the conditions they  
would encounter at Gibraltar.

p. 229 \*\* (Fellgiebel-Thiele: . . Take down of lines in France.)  
Lines put up in the war.

p. 229 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg: . . Personnel changes contingent on  
"Seeloewe".)  
I.e., on the cancellation of "Seeloewe", which was  
announced on that day.  
The original plans for Seeloewe submitted by the  
Gen. Staff were always matched by Navy counter-  
proposals that offered less than what was called  
for by these plans. When Gen. Staff readjusted  
its specifications to fit the Navy's contribution,  
the Navy found that it could not give as much  
as previously promised. And that went on until  
plans for invasion were postponed indefinitely.



p. 230 \* (Top: . . . least desirable solution.)  
This would have been the same as "Military  
Administration" but with the emphasis on OKW  
instead of the OKH.

p. 230 \*\* (Gen. Stb. Vet.)  
Footnote canceled. See Glossary.

p. 231 \* (g) . . . but no Fortress Eng. Bns.)  
Gen. Halder was opposed to such specialization  
as he was against overspecialization throughout  
the Army. Such troops would be idle most of the time.

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p. 232 \* (Gen. Petzel: . . . Mil. District XXI.)  
Wartheland, see p. 196, note \*.

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p. 235 \* (e 4.) Mariampol.)  
Germany wanted to buy Mariampol from Russia.

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p. 236 \* (b) Assault Arty.)  
Guns on self-propelled mounts (SPM).

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p. 237 \* (Ochsner: "Composition N".)  
A poison gas.

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p. 237 \*\* (Ott: . . . d) Personnel matters: Peacetime Army  
doctors to the front.)  
I.e., the surgeons of the peacetime Army.

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p. 237 \*\*\* (Ott: . . . e) . . . Mixed trains.)  
I.e., for serious and light casualties.

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p. 238 \* (State Secretary Pfundtner: . . . Dankwarts.)  
Pfundtner was State Secretary in the Ministry of  
the Interior. Dankwarts was one of his officials  
who was temporarily assigned to Gen Qu's office.  
Very active in administration of occupied countries.

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p. 238 \*\* (Reinhardt: . . . Condition reports.)  
Periodical reports on condition of Divs., especially  
regarding materiel shortages.  
Correction: 1 mot. Rcn. Co. (instead of Bn.).

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- p. 239 \* (General Intendant Kleberger.)  
Chief Administrative Officer, under Gen Qu/
- p. 239 \*\* (Gen. Keitel . . . titular promotions.)  
Promotions conferring on officers (mainly re-activated after retirement) a higher rank without increase in pay.
- p. 239 \*\*\* (Gen. Keitel . . . "E" officers.)  
"E" stands for "Ergaenzung" (supplement) and is not to be confused with officers of the Ersatzheer (Replacement Army). E-Officers were retired company officers who (with the consent of the Allied Military Commission) could be used in office and administrative positions in the 100,000 men Army. They wore no uniforms and had status of civilian employees. In addition to their regular pension they received only a small stipend. In World War II they put on uniform and were placed in jobs which required no up-to-date field officer training. Promotion of regular Army officers was not impaired by seniority of E-Officers, whose status called for different considerations.
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- p. 240 \* (Heusinger: . . d) Thirteen special Ketten.)  
A "Kette" consists of three aircraft.
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- p. 241 \* (f) Gibraltar: . . within our time schedule.)  
The time lapse between Felix and target date for Barbarossa (May), i.e., four months.

- p. 241 \*\* (f) Gibraltar: . . Weakness of "Seelowe" planning.)  
Should be "Felix" (code for operation against Gibraltar).

- p. 241 \*\*\* (Gen. Brand: . . attacks on convoys.)  
Enemy convoys in the Channel.
-

- p. 242 \* (Gercke: . . . armored Diesel cars.)  
The lightly-armored locomotives were to be detached in the combat zone, where the heavily-armored Diesel cars would take over.
- p. 242 \*\* (von dem Borne (Gen. Staff Off.).)  
The Ia Officer (see Glossary) is often referred to as the Gen. Staff Officer.
- p. 242 \*\*\* (Jodl.)  
Jodl jr., not Alfred Jodl, Chief of Armed Forces Operations Staff, OKW.
- p. 242 # (Gen. Wecke: . . . now under OKH control.)  
Security Zone in Slovakia: A German-controlled zone on the Moravian-Slovak border, to protect the Protectorate to the east.

&

- p. 243 \* (Report by Gen. Kuebler: . . . Besangon area.)  
Met the conditions for a training area for the Gibraltar operation. (Geological formations.)
- p. 243 \*\* (Heusinger: b) / . IIa Sections.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 243 \*\*\* (Noon: Farewell luncheon for Roehricht.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 243 # (Heusinger: . . . Government General as Mil. District.)  
Mil. District in the sense of the peacetime Corps Area (Wehrkreis).

- p. 244 \* (Gen. Felber: . . . C of S of AGp.)  
AGp. C.

- p. 245 \* ((3f) Lake Chad.)  
I.e., a strip of French Africa from Tunisia to Lake Chad in Central Africa, embracing portions of Sahara and Equatorial Africa.

- p. 246 \* (Gen. Obst. Fromm: . . . reinforced Jaeger Bns.)  
Inf. Bns. with special equipment for fighting in hill country.

p. 249. \* (Brand reports in as his successor.)  
Not the Chief Arty. Officer.

p. 249 \*\* (Evening: Grand-Veneur.)  
A famous restaurant near Fontainebleau.

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p. 250. \* (Top line: . . . for introducing all officers sent  
to Gibraltar with scouting missions.)  
The German "einfuehren" translated as introducing  
could also mean "briefing."

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p. 251 \* (Mauer Lake.)  
Lake in East Prussia between Angerburg and Loetzen.

Omission (VOLUME V.)

The Chief of the Army General Staff.

First Entry: 31 October 1940.

Last Entry: 22 February 1941.

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p.1 \* (von Ziehlberg: Baurat Henne...)  
"Baurat": Title of a high-ranking Civil Engineer  
in the German Civil Service. - Ed.

p.1 \*\* (Heusinger.... "gas explosion")  
German: "Schlagende Wetter," the fire damp  
(methane) explosion of coal mines. An explosive  
gas was introduced into the galleries of  
the Gibraltar "Rock" and then set off to  
demolish them.

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p.2 \* (Buhle:...,b)...Four weak Bns. to Eighteenth  
Armd. Div.)  
i.e., not full strength.

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p.3 \* (OQu IV: Buzzings from the Reich Chancellery  
(Engel))  
One of Hitler's aides, who sometimes came  
with inside information. The German word  
used here is "Nebengeräusche" (buzzings).

p.3 \*\* (d)....Leopold...)  
King of the Belgians.

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p.4 \* (1600....l.)....(Steinbauer)..)  
Kuebler's Artillery Officer.

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p.5 \* (Max, Gerti and Ruth).  
Major and Mrs. Max Leyherr and Ruth von Hobe.  
(Two daughters and a son-in-law.)

p.5 \*\* (3 November.....transitional Army).  
France was to have a transitional Army of  
200,000 men, as an intermediate step between  
the larger peacetime army and the army allowed  
her under the terms of the Armistice.

p.6 \* (5.)...Air defense service  
I.e., British air warning system.

p.6 \*\* (5b).....Turkish Thrace..()  
I.e., Turkey in Europe, from Bulgaria. --Ed.

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p.7 \* (10)...internees in Switzerland will be returned.  
Civilian internees in Switzerland. (Note is incomplete. --Ed.)

p.7 (Asterisk omitted.) (Engel:....)  
I.e., Instructions from Fuehrer, brought by Engel, an aide.

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p.8 \* (Took Ruth.....)  
Cf: p: 5

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p.11 \* (Ulex:.....c)...."Chord" position.  
German: "Sehnenstellung," translated here as chord (of a segment). I.e., the line of fortification forms a straight line, not following the curvature of the frontier.

p.11 \*\* (Col. Ochsner:...Mortar-fired Adamsite shells.)  
"Ausstossbuechsenengeschosse Adamsit." Gen. Halder thought they were fired from mortars.

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p.12 \* (Hauser: We discuss the manner in which the work of the General Staff.....should be presented).  
I.e., for a history of the War.

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- p.13 \* (Amphibian tanks:... Green color patch .)  
To be worn on the uniform collar.  
Riflemen of the Armd. Divs. did not want to wear the white collar patch of ordinary Infantry.
- p.13 \*\* (Ehlfeldt:.....R-projectiles).  
Roechling projectiles (super -long AC shells).
- p.13 \*\*\* (Jacob:...c) SS, Herbert and LZ bridge equipment.)  
Super - heavy (SS), heavy (Herbert) and light sectional (LZ), bridging equipment.

-----

p.14 \* (OQu I:....Definite objectives)  
I.e., they should now concentrate on firm planning for matters which up to then were more or less theoretical projects.

p.14 \*\* (Major Seiderer).  
Major George Seiderer, son-in-law.

p.14 (Asterisk omitted). (Heusinger:....4).  
German High Command, i.e., the Commander of German troops in the event of Bulgaria's participation.

p.14 \*\*\* (Fricke)  
Naval Operations Staff.

p.14 # (Battery Gneisenau).  
Footnote canceled.

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p.15 \* (Gercke:...a)....Askania).  
Code for Eastern GHq. (cf. vol.IV, p.218)

p.15 \*\* (Gercke: h) Trains.....cannot go to the ZI).  
For lack of locomotives.

p.15 \*\*\* (Gercke:i)....this means a very long march).  
I.e., to the southern border of Bulgaria.



p.16 \* (10 Nov..... Roh. and... H-Gelting).  
Rohowsky and Baron von Hobe-Gelting, two  
relatives by marriage.

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p.17 \* (~~E~~leventh Armd. Div..... Schweidnitz).  
For time being to Schweidnitz troop-training  
center (Silesia).

p.17 \*\* (Missions for Hansen and for Bulgaria).  
Hansen to Romania.

p.17 \*\*\* (Col. Gen. (Gen. Obst.) Strauss..... to cover  
Foerster).  
I.e., to protect Foerster against Hitler's  
hostility.

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p.18 (Asterisk omitted). (Gen Qu... Organization of  
"Supply Districts")  
"Versorgungsbezirke", or Home Supply Bases,  
groupings of supply depots and workshops for  
individual Armies.

p.18 \* (Gen Qu... will be static)  
I.e., not loaded on trains.

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p.19 \* (Portugal:..... 3 - 0 - 3.)  
3 Inf., no Cav., and 3 Arty. Regts.

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p.20 \* (Org. Sec..... d) Alert groups).  
"Bereitschaftsgruppen", which are kept on  
alert for earlier employment than the rest,  
if they should be needed.

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p.21 \* (Gen. Mueller:..... XXXIX Corps).  
Kuetler's Corps, training for Gibraltar  
operation.

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p.22 \* (Greece!... culprit in Italy and Germany.)  
I.e., for the launching of false interpreta-  
tion of situation.

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p.24 \* (Keitel...f) E - Officers Corps).  
See IV, p. 239, note \*\*\*

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p.26 \* (b.)  
The Dardanelles.

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p.27 \* (Heusinger 1)...Felix).  
Code for Gibraltar operation.

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p.29 \* (d)...Forschungs - Institut.)  
Also known as Reichsforschungsamt, a telephone line-tapping organization, set up by Goering and kept under his exclusive control throughout.

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p.32 \* (Buhle:.....of the Twelfth Draft).  
I.e., they will receive full complement of trucks.

p.32 \*\* ( b)....Third Draft).  
I.e., one personnel Btry., as cadre.

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p.35 (Asterisk omitted) (1100:.....Canaris....Etscheit)  
Etscheit, legal consultant to important foreign newspapers in Berlin, belonged to the 1938 opposition against Hitler.

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p.37 \* ( h).....Iron bridge, no decision yet).  
This weak bridge would have to be strengthened for any military rail transports into Spain. Any work of that nature would immediately be correctly interpreted by enemy agents, and therefore had to be put off to the last moment.

-----

p.38 \* ( b) Hq for Armd. Group)  
Question whether they should be given same status as Army Hqs, or remain subordinate to Army Hqs. The first alternative was not adopted before fall 1941, and then only for two Armd. Groups; see VII, 112 for first mention of the new status.

p.38 \*\* (Kinzel.....a)...Their demands are put aside.--  
AAA!)  
We give them AAA and can ignore the rest of their demands.

p.39 \* (Romania.....Size of his Staff.)  
Military Mission to Romania.

p.39 \*\* (Juettner).  
C of S of Lutze, Chief of the S A (Brownshirts)

p.39 \*\*\* (Juettner:.....d).....Feldherrnhalle)  
SA unit.

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p.40 \* (General Mueller:.....c)..no replacements can  
be found for armament workers.)  
Armament workers were furloughed back into  
their factories.

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p.41 \* (Geroke:.....c) Mining of railroad bridges in  
France.  
Installation of demolition charges in recon-  
structed bridges.

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p.45 \* (von Eitzdorf....blame on the Army.)  
The Italian policy makers tried to shift all  
blame for the military reverses in Albania  
on the Generals.

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p.47 \* (Heusinger:...Ireland:...Heinkel planes...for  
four Armd. Divs.)  
Gen. Halder could not reconstruct the meaning  
of this entry.

p.47 \*\* (Gibraltar:.....gas explosion).  
Cf. p.1, note \*\*

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p.48 \* (Gen. Brand:.....Must be taken from our flank).  
I.e., from the Channel Coast defenses. -Ed.

p.48 \*\* (c)...Ninth Section)  
Cartographic Section. - Ed.

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p.49 \* (f)...Huntzinger -Warlimont: Against Nigeria,  
through Sahara.)  
To forestall British and Free-French attacks  
on Dakar.

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p.50 \* (Heusinger, Jodl)  
Jodl jr., a General in the Mt. troops.--Ed.

p.50 (Asterisk omitted) (1800...."Marita")  
The code for the march into Bulgaria. --Ed.

p.50 \*\* ("Otto program").  
Preliminary to "Barbarossa", the code for the  
invasion of Russia. - Ed.

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p.57 \* (ObdH:...a) M 60)  
Probably the 61.5 cm Karl Howitzer. --Ed.

p.57 \*\* (Hillersleben).  
Artillery Proving Ground near Magdeburg.--Ed.

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p.61 \* (d)...Attila)  
Occupation of Vichy,-France.

p.61 \*\* (b)...my operational plan  
I.e., for "Attila".

p.61 \*\*\* (b)....Sec. Foreign Armies)  
Probably Section Foreign Armies West.

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p.63 \* (h)"Zone of communications Hungary.")  
Hungary becomes Com Zone of the German  
Army.

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p.66 \* (Night flight training at Briesg).  
Flying School in Silesia.

p.66 \*\* (Col IV. Oestermann).  
Chief of the Finnish Gen. Staff

p.66 \*\*\* (Release of colonial experts.)  
I.e., from PW camps.

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p.67 (Asterisk omitted) (Heusinger: b)....)  
I.e., Seventeenth Army takes over in the East.  
Twelfth Army Hq is assigned to "Marita".

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p.68 \* (Gercke: a)... (at least two weeks).  
The start of the Russian campaign will be  
delayed at least two weeks.

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p.71 \* (Talvela....offensive to the Southeast)  
The plan for an offensive against Leningrad,  
through the area between Lake Ladoga and Lake  
Onega, based on Finland.

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p.72 \* (von Rabenau...."Aus meinem Leben")  
Correction: "Aus seinem Leben." Von Rabenau's  
biography of Gen. von Seeckt, the founder  
of Germany's post-war Army.

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p.73 \* (100 pair skis).  
A small number, but probably only for patrols.

p.73 \*\* (c)...Chenillettes).  
French track-laying armored ammunition carriers.

p.73 \*\*\* (f)...Judicial authority? (No!) )  
Twenty-second Div., trained for air landings,  
was now under Air Force tactical control.

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p.76 (Asterisk omitted) (Hemmerich...Business procedure.)  
Correction: "Geschaeftsgang", chain of command.  
Map section was then directly under Gen. Halder,  
but a change was desirable.

p.76 (Asterisk omitted) (Heusinger...a)...as a pre-  
caution.)  
I.e., by way of a conservative estimate.

p.76 \* (Heusinger...b)...Problem.)  
Road construction had always been treated as  
a local affair, which precluded large-scale  
and unified planning. Coordination under Transp.  
Chief desirable.

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p.77 \* (von Ziehlberg:...Canteen girls).  
In GHq.

p.77 \*\* (Radke:...a)...Hesse )  
A writer and protégé of ObdH, employed by  
him on propaganda tasks.

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p.78 \* (Gercke:...a)...Light Z bridge)  
Sectional railroad bridge for rapid construc-  
tion.

p.78 \*\* (Gen Qu: (with Baentsch and Wagner): )  
Herbert Wagner, in Transp. Section, not Gen.  
Wagner, Gen Qu.

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p.79 \* (Leyherrs).  
Family of Gen. Halder's son-in-law, Maj. Max  
Leyherr.

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p.80 \* (Field Replacement Bns....Chief of Army  
Equipment)  
BdE.

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p.80 \*\* (Peacetime organization....Inspector of Training  
ing also desired..)  
Footnote canceled.

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p.80 \*\*\* (Mil. District VIII).  
Silesia.

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p.81 \* (von Thoma:....b)....Gin)  
Locality in France.

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p.82 \* (Gercke:....52 trains.)  
i.e., per day.

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p.82 \*\* (Ochsner:.... heavy howitzer M)  
M 60. Cf. p. 57, note \*.

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p.82 \*\*\* (Kurow).  
In Poland

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p.82 # (Paulus: c) ....going on leave).  
Footnote canceled.

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p.83 \* (OQu IV:....c)....Movement and Party).  
Footnote canceled.

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p.83 \*\* (d) Uthmann)  
Mil. Attache for Scandinavian countries.

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p.86 \* (OQu I:....a decade's pay).  
Pay was not computed by weeks, but by ten-day  
periods.

p.86 \*\* (b)....Hq at Predeal  
Locality in Romania, summer residence of the  
King of Romania.

p.86 \*\*\* (Op. Sec:....(Russian invasion))  
In Bessarabia.

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p.87 \* (c) von Briesen's theories. Test firing under  
Ott).  
von Briesen had developed new patterns of  
infantry fire. His theories were to be tested  
under supervision of Gen. Ott (Inf. Chief).

p.87 \*\* (OQu IV:....b) Heinrichs.)  
The new Chief of the Finnish General Staff,  
replacing Oestermann.

p.87 \*\*\* (von Altenstadt:....b)....as of 1 February 1941)  
Deportation to the Lublin "reservation".

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p.88 \* (von Ziehlberg:....books....Frederick the Great).  
It was the custom on the birthday of Frederick  
the Great to make presents of books to Gen.  
Staff officers in recognition of services  
rendered.

p.88 \*\* (Doering assassinated in Bucharest.)  
Major in the German Gen. Staff. Was assassinat-  
ed by a Greek in Bucharest on that day.

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- p. 89      \* (Night flying: ... Ketten.)  
A "Kette" consists of three aircraft. The  
Do 17 probably is Do 217. - Ed.
- p. 89      \*\* (Heusinger: b) ... Minister Benzer.)  
Political adviser to List.
- p. 89      \*\*\* (Funck.)  
Designated by OKH as German Commander in  
Libya.
- p. 89      # (10 February.)  
To leave on that date.
- p. 89      ## (Eglseer.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 89      ### ("Marita": ... bridge construction.)  
Following diplomatic representations by Russia,  
OKH was directed to clear with OKW before  
starting any bridge construction on Danube.
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- p. 90      \* (Evening: ... von Toppelskirch.)  
Left his post as OQu IV. Incoming OQu IV is  
Matzky.
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- p. 91      \* ( f) 110 trains are required.)  
Entry could not be reconstructed.
- p. 91      \*\* (Buhle: ... (Bridges 20 tons possible.)  
Entry could not be reconstructed.
-

p.92 \* ( e) Gercke. )  
Gercke's personal troubles relating to his first marriage.

p.92 \*\*\* ( OGU IV:....b) Rokhno.... )  
Another name for Pripet marshes, which were an important factor in the planning for the initial operations in Russia.

p.92 \*\*\* ( c)....400 interpreters. )  
Signal Service, for radio intelligence.

p.92 # ( b)....Barbarossa )  
Code for the Russian operation appears here for the first time, supplanting "Otto". Originated sometime in December, 1940, after Molotov's visit to Berlin.

p.92 ## ( 3.) Regiment Brandenburg. )  
800th Regt. for special missions (z.b.V.)  
Trained for "Commando" type missions and sometimes operated in foreign uniforms. - Ed.

p.92 ### ( 4.)...."Sonnenblume". )  
Code for the campaign in North Africa.

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p.93 \* ( Afternoon...c)....Cord). )  
Major Cord von Hobe, a son-in-law.

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p.95 \* ( Bogatsch:.....Ketten... )  
Footnote canceled.

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p.96 \* ( Koestring. )  
Mil. Attaché in Moscow.

p.96 \*\* ( Roessing). )  
Mil. Attaché in the Baltic States and Finland.

p.96 \*\*\* ( Bruckmann) )  
Mil. Attaché in Bulgaria.

p.96 # ( ....special German unit..... )  
Probably the Co of Regt. Brandenburg mentioned on p.92 . --Ed.

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p.99 \* ( Ott:...Briesen exercise.. )  
See p.87, note \*.

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p.100 \* ( Buhle:...c) "Alpenveilchen" ).  
Unidentified operation.

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p.102 \* ( f)... "Renntier" )  
Probably OKW theater in northern Norway.

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p.103 \* ( c) Eight-wire overhead line. )  
Another explanation suggested for "achtfaches  
Gestaenge" was " telegraph poles with 8  
insulators."

-----

p.104 \* ( Commander --- Libya )  
"Befehlshaber der deutschen Heerestruppen  
in Libyen", title of Rommel. Theoretically  
he was under OKH control, but such control  
was ineffective.

-----

p.106 \* ( Gen. Leeb.....Pennants for automobiles. )  
Only troop commanders were entitled to  
them, but Rear Services wanted them, too.

-----

p.109 \* ( a)....Plovdiv... )  
Philippopol, in Bulgaria. --Ed.

-----

p.112 \* ( Gen Qu: a) ....Ic AGp. D )  
AGp D, the operational term for Mil. Commander  
France.--Ic, see Glossary.

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p.112 \*\* ( OQu V:...Eight Army in Poland )  
Attack on manner in which Blaskowitz con-  
ducted operation in Poland. He always  
remained under a cloud.

-----

p.112 (Asterisk omitted) ( 0930.... )  
Revival of custom as "Barbarossa" approaches.

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- p.113 \* (...foreign currency restriction).  
German troops in Romania were not to use Romanian money.
- p.113 \*\* (Lt. Gen. Dilm.....Field Supply Chief).  
CG of Supply Troops. This is not a function of Gen Qu, who is in the Gen. Staff.
- p.113 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg....states of the Ia in the Division).  
The question was whether the Op. Off. at Div. level should be given C of S status. (Has it only from Corps upward.)

-----

p.114 \* (Ochsner:....b)....A new Do Regt.)  
"Do" is designation for Rocket Projectors.---  
---Ed.

p.114 \* (Buhle:....in charge of Ibs)  
- See Glossary

-----

p.115 \* (SS ferries).  
S (Schwer-Heavy) or SS (Ueberschwer -Super-heavy) were joint developments of Army and Navy for "Seelowe". Consisted of two pontoon-like, covered craft, to which a deck was hinged. Could be used in rough seas (surf) and up to wind velocity 5. Each craft had an engine. Very popular with troops and supply service. Could be loaded on railroad/flatcars and on flatbed trailers. Another type used was the "Sybel Ferry", named after the manufacturer of an aircraft engine. At the outbreak of the war, Sybel had a large number of these engines on hand from a canceled export order, and proposed it through Udet (Air Force) as a marine engine. The idea was accepted, and engines with aerial propellers were mounted on decks fastened rigidly across pairs of old-type open pontoons. The Army did not like this type (noisy, high fuel consumption, non-sectional construction, but Goering pushed it. Manufacture was discontinued and the ferry disappeared when the supply of engines was exhausted.

-----

p.116 \* (Morning Conference: Second convoy)  
I.e., of German troops and supplies to Libya.

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p.118 \* (Heusinger:....c) Highway)  
Possibly the ancient invasion route through the  
Shipka Pass in Bulgaria.  
(Impassable before end of February because  
of snow.)

p.118 \*\* (Radke:....a)....Oberkriegsverwaltungsrat.  
High-ranking civilian employee in Gen Qu  
Section.

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p.120 \* (Gen.Brand.....M1)  
35.5 cm Heavy How.

p.120 \*\* (Morning conf....Abwehr)  
The OKW Counter-intelligence organization,  
headed by Admiral Canaris.

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p.121 \* (Buhle...d)....Chief Armored Troops Officer).  
Footnote canceled.

p.121 \*\* (Major Forster: Ia, Military Government).  
Should be Government-General (Poland).  
Mil. Government was the World War I  
designation.

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FOOTNOTES TO VOL. VI

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p. 3 \* (f.) ... is being watched.)  
By German Intelligence.

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p. 4 \* (ObdH ... 3.) 110 Renault.)  
French Arty. Prime Movers.

p. 4 \*\* (Leyherr family.)  
I.e., visit by family of M. Leyherr, son-in-law.

-----

p. 7 \* (Bogatsch: a) Air Support Hq Staff ....)  
Koluft Stab - Kommandeur der Luftkrafte. In charge of  
Air Force elements attached to Ground Forces (Rcn., AAA),  
usually at Army level. Abolished after 1942, when Air  
Force took control also of Rcn. missions.  
"signal communications" (Nachrichtenverbindung) might  
refer also to channeling of Intelligence reports.  
b) "Air Force" should read "Air Fleet" (Luftflotte),  
the territorial air command. - Ed.

p. 7 \* (Bogatsch .... e) ... 22-24, i.e. 50%.)  
Should read: We have specified 50 Bns.  
Received 31 mixed Bns; requested / figure missing - Ed. /  
(received 60-80% of total requested.)  
11 light Bns.; requested 22-24 (received 50% of total  
requested.)

-----

p. 8 \* (Fellgiebel:.... Seehausdienst.)  
"Chi-Ueberwachung" could be a reference to the OKW digests  
of all intercepted press and radio reports. -- "Sonder-  
dienst Seehaus" was an organization of the German Foreign  
Office for the purpose of monitoring foreign broadcasts.

-----

p. 9 \* (ZI. Weise.)  
Hubert Weise, General of AAA.

p. 9 (Asterisk omitted) (Buhle: ....)  
800th Regt. is Regt. Brandenburg, an organization trained  
for sabotage and commando-type actions. The Regt. was  
here proposed as a highly mobile riot squad, as it were.

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p. 10 \* (e) Suedwind.)

Code of a study dealing with a possible French uprising against occupation forces.

-----

p. 14 \* (c) on the "Mountain"

I.e., Berghof, Hitler's mountain villa at Obersalzberg.-  
Ed.

-----

p. 17 \* (c) ... Lofoten raid.)

The British commando raid on the Lofoten islands in Northern Norway. - Ed.

-----

p. 17 \*\* (Brand: b) .. citadel)

"K Battery". The reference is to heavy siege guns. - Ed.

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p. 18 \* (d) R projectile.)

Roechling projectile. Named after the industrialist who had promoted development of this super-long shell with folding fins. Very effective against concrete and armor plate.

-----

p. 19 \* (Gen. Ott ... kneeling position for aiming etc.)

Refers to the reintroduction of the kneeling position in firing, to increase stability for the rifle.

-----

p. 20 \* (Heusinger ..... propaganda show.)

I.e., to do actual work on frontline positions only and leave rear positions (which would have only defensive character and so would not be needed) in the talking stage. Yet, both troops and officers were to be encouraged to believe that all preparations were for defensive purposes only.

-----

p. 23 (Asterisk omitted) (Wagner ..... c)

"Command Posts" of Gen Qu. "Befehlsstelle" should rather be translated by "Forward Gen Qu Hq". These Hqs were instituted to make the top command of the Supply Organization more flexible.

-----

- p. 24 \* (Wagner... a) ... Delivery of the cruiser)  
Sale of S.S. Luetzow was part of the commercial deal between Germany and the U.S.S.R. Rumor had it that the design of the cruiser was faulty.
- 
- p. 25 \* (Operations Sec.:..... Seventeenth Army.... Mountains...)  
I.e., the West Beskid range on the northern edge of the Carpathian Mts.
- p. 25 \* (Bottom of page: Zeppelin)  
Code for GHq at Zossen, outside Berlin. Had the largest signal center of any Army installation.
- 
- p. 26 \* (Buschenhagen: Solvaer.)  
Gen. Halder could not reconstruct this entry.
- 
- p. 27 \* (Barbarossa: 50% cannot be taken out of Norway.)  
I.e., for operation "Silberfuchs", the campaign in Northern Finland, to seize Murmansk.
- p. 27 \*\* (Personnel ..... "furlough personnel".)  
To avoid the hazardous transfer by sea, these troops were to be shipped through Sweden, which had granted transit privileges for personnel going on furlough.
- 
- p. 29 \* (5. - in Great Russia)  
Russia proper, as distinct from the Ukraine and White Russia.
- 
- p. 30 (Asterisk omitted) (Wagner:..... c)  
Gen. Halder suggested that the reference to OKW Rear Area, an unusual term, might be to Finland, which was an OKW theater of operations.  
It does not appear unlikely, however, that the reference might be to OKW intentions in Rear Areas of the Russian front (see p. 29, 5. Rear Areas). Wagner, whose function as Gen Qu comprized also administration of occupied territories, would have to know about them.-- Ed.
- 
- p. 32 \* (Gen. Rommel ..... on the base line of the arc)  
"Man wird nicht auf der Sehne .... angreifen koennen."  
The line from Agedabia to Tobruk, forming the base line of the arc-shaped coastline of Cyrenaica.
-



p. 33 \* ((Noon:)... State Secretary of the Foreign Office.)  
Ernst von Weizsaecker.

p. 33 \*\* (George.)  
Georg Seiderer, one of Gen. Halder's sons-in-law.

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p. 34 \* (Paulus-Heusinger-Bork (not Beck):... a)... light troops.)  
Intermediary units between Inf. and Mt. units.

-----

p. 37 (Omission) Date line: 27 March 1941.  
(To be inserted between "noon" and "From 0930..")

p. 37 (Asterisk omitted) (1300-1430:... a)  
List's right wing, deployed on the Bulgarian border for invasion of Greece, was leaning on the Yugoslav border, directly north of the Yugoslav-Greek border. With Yugoslavia's entry into the war, List's mission was facilitated in that he was enabled to strike into Greece through a small corner of Yugoslavia. (That is, his right wing helped his right wing, i.e., himself, get into Greece.)

(1300 - 1430:..... b)  
Driving a wedge through southern Yugoslavia, would prevent a link-up of Yugoslav and Greek forces.

-----

p. 40 (Asterisk omitted) (Bogatsch.....)  
Army Air Commander (should be Air Support Commander, -  
Koluft.)  
Group Air Commander (also Air Support Commander, but only  
"Gruf1"- Gruppenfliegerkommandeur, a little lower in rank  
than "Koluft".)

p. 40 \* (Wagner ..... Merk's organization.)  
Ernst Merk, Deputy Gen Qu in Romania.

-----

p. 41 (Asterisk omitted) (Wagner.....)  
"Operation 25." Code for the operation against Yugoslavia.  
(Entry should have had separate line. Is not connected  
with "Administrative Orders", which refer to "Barbarossa".)

-----

p. 44 \* (Conference with ObdH..... Iron Gate)  
The name of the narrow gorge of the Danube near Orsova.  
Blockage of this passage would have interrupted the  
steady flow of vital oil barge convoys from the Romanian  
oil fields.

---

p. 45 (Asterisk omitted) (Gen. Brand:.... c)....  
K 3 is a 24 cm gun with high muzzle velocity.

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p. 47 \* (OQu IV... a). Jaeger Bn. 27 idea.)  
Finnish formation created by Ludendorff in 1916/17, under  
German command.

p. 47 \*\* (OQu IV... c) Bircher, Danniker)  
Swiss Army officers, who were very close to German Gen.  
Staff.

p. 47 \*\*\* (OQu IV.... d) ... Gen. Marras.)  
Gen. Marras. Italian Mil. Attache.

p. 47 # (Keitel.... e) E-officers.)  
Footnote canceled. See IV, 239, note \*\*\*.

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p. 51 (Asterisk omitted) (Heusinger:..... c)..)  
See Footnote p. 44.

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p. 52 (Asterisk omitted) (ObdH..... c): 4.)  
Should read: Have Reinhardt and Vietinghoff launch  
attack ahead of schedule. ("Vorverlegen R... und V...")

(Heusinger..... 2)....)

It could not be recalled whether "Zusammenbinden List"  
indicated that List should keep his forces together, or  
whether there was an intention to make List's operation  
tie in with operation by 22nd AB Div. and the Paratroop  
Regt. at Plovdiv.

p. 53 \* (Heusinger: 1).... Agram.)  
Zagreb, the capital of Croatia. Hungary, feeling  
technically bound by a Treaty of Friendship with the  
Yugoslav State, insisted her soldiers could set foot  
on Yugoslav territory only after that State had ceased  
to exist with the creation of a Croat national State.-Ed.

---

p. 54 \* (Schuchard ..... Wiesbaden:)  
I.e., the Armistice Commission set up at Wiesbaden.

p. 54 \*\* (Heusinger:..... 2.) Sixteenth Regt."  
Paratroop Regt.

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p. 55 \* (Morning reports: Operation Iron Gate....)  
An airborne operation to prevent blocking of the river  
passage. See note \*, p.44.

-----

p. 56 \* (Heusinger..... c)... Mil. Distr.VIII)  
Silesia.

p. 56 \*\* (... Mil. Distr. IV)  
Saxony.

-----

p. 57 \* (b.Mil.Distr. XVII)  
Upper and Lower Austria.

p. 57 \*\* (Mil Distr. VIII)  
Silesia

p. 57 \*\*\* (Mil. Distr.IV)  
Saxony.

p. 57 # (Mil. Distr. III).  
Brandenburg.

p. 57 ## (d)... Mil. Distr. XVIII)  
Tyrol.

p. 57 ## (Mil. Distr. I)  
East Prussia.

-----

p. 58 (Asterisk omitted) (4.) Waffen SS - Poland.)  
The 1939 incidents complained of by the Army.

p. 58 (Asterisk omitted) (Org. Sec..... Estimated Needs:.....)  
The Mobile Div. was a projected new type of Div., inter-  
mediate between a mot. and a conventional Inf.Div. (e.g.,  
1 mot. Regt.)

-----

p. 59 \* (Heusinger:.... 1 Do 17 Group)  
Probably DO 217 K-2, a bomber.- Ed.  
The "Groups" referred to here are "Gruppen" (see Glossary.)

p. 59 \*\* (Paulus:..... "Haifisch".)  
Code for deception measures maintained after cancellation  
of "Seeloewe" (invasion of England.)

p. 59 \*\*\* (....ObdH.... Ueskueb.)  
Other name of Skoplje. Already reported taken, might be  
mistake for Nish.- Ed.

-----  
p. 60 \* (Maria - Theresia Academy.)  
Military Academy, founded by the Empress Maria Theresia.

-----  
p. 61 \* (Heusinger:.... b).... 52nd Do Projector Regt.)  
Six-barreled rocket projectors, 15 cm caliber. - Ed.

p. 61 (Asterisk omitted) (Wagner: Greek Army....)  
The shorthand entry read for Army was not quite clear,  
and Gen. Halder had no direct recollection of the  
conversation. However, such a policy as regards the Greek  
Army would have been entirely justified inasmuch as the  
German Army was impressed by the effective Greek resistance  
to the Italians.

-----  
p. 63 \* (Conf. ObdH..... 2.)..Transfer 60th Div.)  
Was stationed in East Bulgaria for political reasons  
(as a means of pressure against Turkey.)

-----  
p. 64 \* (Wagner:..... b) Constanza: One ship can sail.\*)  
Refers to shipping of supplies for List through  
the Bosphorus.

p. 64 \*\* (List needs nothing for Kavala.)  
Port in Greek Thrace, where supplies could have been  
received by sea via Bosphorus.

-----  
p. 65 \* (von Greiffenberg... British still have artillery in  
area)  
I.e., fighting is still hard.

p. 66 \* (Irmingard.)  
Gen. Halder's daughter, married to Maj. Goerg Seiderer,  
one of the instructors at the Maria Theresia Academy  
at Wiener-Neustadt.

---

p. 70 \* (Operation Silberfuchs.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 70 \*\* (Conference with ObdH:.... Airborne Div.... once it is  
landed in Africa .)  
If not dropped over the battle area, it would need motor  
transport of other units to get to the front.

---

p. 74 \* (Conference with ObdH..... Ic.)  
The Ic Officer is in charge of transmission of reports  
apart from enemy intelligence.

---

p. 74 \*\* (von Glaise..... to keep out Italian instructors. )  
Because of the unpopularity of the Italians in Croatia.

---

p. 74 \*\*\* (Wagner:.... "flying start".)  
The offensive is launched before deployment of all Divs.  
in the assembly area has been completed. The Divs. ar-  
riving after opening of the attack are fed directly into  
the offensive. This method requires a very adaptable  
supply machinery.

---

p. 76 (Asterisk omitted) (von Ziehlberg:.... Organization of  
training in Gen. Staff....)  
The usual career of the Gen. Staff officer after comple-  
tion of the requisite schools begins as Ib officer at  
Div., followed by a similar top at Corps or higher. If  
he shows himself good material he goes back to Div. as Ia  
officer, and from there to higher posts, e.g. C of S. The  
culmination of any Gen.Staff officer's career is a com-  
mand post in the field (Div. and up ).

---

p. 77 \* (Dr. Handloser.)  
Surgeon General.

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p. 81 \* (Zeppelin.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 81 \*\* (Georg Seiderer.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 83 \* (Sending airborne troops...)  
See p. 70, note \*\*.

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p. 84 \* (7.) 900th Brigade.)  
A Training Brig. sent to front to gather first- hand  
experience.

p. 84 \*\* (8.) Special Field Bns.\*\*)  
Penal units. Sentences were actually served in them,  
instead of in prison. Different from Rehabilitation  
Bns., in which a man rehabilitated himself, and which  
therefore carried a lighter moral stigma.

p. 84 \*\*\* (a.) Technical Emergency Service.)  
"Technische Nothilfe" (Te-No). An organization started  
shortly after World War I for the object of operating  
vital services in case of Leftist strikes. Later became  
part of the Nazi Party system.

---

p. 86 \* (Wagner..... Forward Gen Qu Hqs.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 86 \*\* (b)... additional 10,000 cubic meter)  
10 million liter, roughly 2.5 million gallons.

---

p. 87 \* (Greece: Embarkation of enemy troops)  
British troops, not Greek.

p. 87 \*\* (Operation "Merkur".)  
The operation against Crete.

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p. 88 \* (Fellgiebel: a) ... short wave sets.)  
\*\* (Monitoring companies as relays..)  
Footnote canceled. (Explanation incorporated in text.)  
The signals were in the codes of the Army Gps. in order  
to enable these Hqs to listen in.

p. 88 \*\*\* (Buhle: Foreign Legionnaires for Africa.)  
Germans from the former French Foreign Legion.

---

p. 89 \* (Brennecke:..... Push straight ahead into the country!)  
Refers to the mission of AGp. North in the impending Russian offensive.  
AGp. North was instructed to push straight on Leningrad and not seek flank protection on the Baltic. In the subsequent campaign, this plan was followed and AGp. North was at Leningrad long before Estonia was cleared.

p. 89 \*\* (Wagner (Gen Qu)... Corps Headquarters (reduced).)  
"Hoeheres Kommando". Corps of lower establishment, lacking some of the usual Corps troops.

p. 89 \*\*\* (Heusinger:..... a) land march elements)  
Wheeled vehicles of Armd. units use roads in redeployment. Tracked vehicles are transported by rail to save tracks.

p. 89 #(Mil. District XVII)  
Upper and Lower Austria.

p. 89 ##(Mil. District III)  
Brandenburg.

-----  
p. 90 \* (...2.) OKH Monitoring Cos.)  
See p. 88, note \*\* (Should be Intercepting Co.)

p. 90 \*\* (von Ziehlberg... Salmuth/Greifffenberg/Foertsch)  
Salmuth gets an Army Corps. Greifffenberg takes Salmuth's place, Foertsch Greifffenberg's.

-----  
p. 91 \* (Fuehrer:...b) .. Floesti)  
Center of the Romanian oil district.

p. 91 \*\* (...b)... Cernavoda)  
Site the important Danube bridge in the Dobrudsha.

-----  
p. 92 \* (ObdH... will talk to Fuehrer)  
to  
Von Brauchitsch did not want Goering (ObdH) have complete control of disposition and employment of Ground Forces assigned to that mission.

p. 93 \* (d.)  
Suggested improvements for 1941.---

p. 93 \*\* (Order to Paulus:)  
The German word "Befehl" was not well chosen here. It is rather an emphatic reminder of what OKH thought best for the operations in Africa. Being a plan for that theater it is directed more to Rommel than to Paulus.-- Rommel formally, was still under OKH at the time (see 3 May) but OKW also was heard. The result was confusion.

-----

p. 94 \* (Radke: .... Tiedemann -- SS.)  
Tiedemann had sharply critized the conduct of the SS in the invasion of Holland. The SS was sending reports directly to the Fuehrer and claimed all credit for itself.

p. 94 \*\* (Case Mieth.)  
Mieth, who was indiscreet in his talk about Hitler was denounced by a reserve officer present at the time. (See entry 10 March, 1941, Radke:.... p.20) From that time on, Hitler, quite characteristically, would make spiteful remarks whenever Mieth's name was mentioned, without ever saying clearly what he had against him.

p. 94 \*\*\* (Heuerberg - Wichung incident)  
Gen. Halder could not reconstruct the incident.

p. 94 # (OQu IV. Return..... date of our attack)  
I.e., the scheduled date for the invasion of Russia; the Japanese Attaché was returning via Russia.

p. 94 ## (..5.) Bor district)  
Bor copper mines.

-----

p. 96 \* (..ObdH.. official order of ObdH.)  
I.e., the instructions outlined on p.93.

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p. 97 \* (16 Divs. unallocated)  
Remain very far in the rear.

p. 97 \*\* (2 x 2)  
Two behind the other two.

p. 97 \*\*\* (b) implementation orders)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 97 (Asterisk omitted) (Paulus...)  
It was very difficult to keep any sort of check on Rommel. Reckless, if successful, he went in for the spectacular and neglected such pedestrian functions as looking after his supply lines, etc. All means to control him failed. After he had managed to shake off the OKH, he tagged along with the OKW, and when he tired of that, he began to deal directly with the Italians, playing Mussolini against Hitler.

-----

p. 98 \* (West:... our movements to the West)  
The "Haifisch" deception operation.

p. 98 \*\* (Southeast: .... in the Banat.)  
Wholesale stealing.

p. 98 \*\*\* (Salmuth... d) taking over of XXX Corps)  
See p. 90, note \*\*

-----

p. 99 \* (Buhle:.... Siege Gun units, partially mobile)  
With not enough traction for all pieces, a traction pool furnished transport when needed.

Paragraph c) probably refers only to GHq troops.

p. 99 \*\* (Capt. Loyke:... c) to that post.)  
The time-consuming coastal route to Benghazi tied up much-needed shipping, but while Malta was under British control it was impossible to cut across to Benghazi from Sicily.

p. 99 \*\*\* (as result of waterfront explosions)  
Explosion of an ammunition ship, which damaged harbor installations.

p. 99 # (Krumpelt OQu 2)  
OQu (Supply Officer) Second Army.

p. 99 ## (. . . show enormous rapacity.)  
I.e., a vast appetite for booty and insatiable hunger for spare parts and tools, which they keep losing continuously. He cannot keep control of his own supplies.

-----

p. 100 \* (Ehlfeld.... will weaken the West for about three weeks)  
I.e., until the arrival of new Artillery.

---

p. 101 \* (d) Bordeaux Supply base for "Isabella")  
Code for defense measures against an Allied invasion of Spain.

---

p. 102 \* (Bogatsch:....d).... 9 Me 111 (Twin-engine fighters.)  
Messerschmitt 111.

---

p. 103 \* (Mueller... death sentences... during operations)  
Death sentences formerly had to be confirmed by ObdH. Requirements of operations called for relaxation of rule so that CGs of Armies and Army Gps. (supreme judicial authorities) could decide.

---

p. 104 \* (OQu IV... a).... for propaganda purposes.)  
In India.

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p. 105 \* (Gen. Buhle:.... b).... the third Btrys.)  
I.e., personnel only.

---

p. 107 \* (Wagner.....d)... Advance Supply Point system)  
"Stuetzpunktsystem". Forward supply bases within the zone of operations shorten supply hauls for troops and so enable them to advance faster. If supplies do not follow quickly enough, troops start requisitioning, which is wasteful of time for a force on the move, or develop a tendency not to move too far away from the nearest supply point.

---

p. 108 \* (b) Political instructions for Greece.)  
On relations to the Italians and the German-Italian demarcation line.

---

- p. 109 \* (g) Bn. is reported in Nish and Saloniki.)  
Report that Bulgarians started requisitioning of rolling stock.
- p. 109 \*\* (n) ...using 4,800 trucks... !!)  
In view of the chronic shortage of trucks, it appeared more appropriate for Air Force to transfer the Div. by air.
- p. 109 \*\*\* (a) Clomorings... grow more urgent)  
Supply difficulties were used by them as an alibi for the Tobruk defeat.
- 
- p. 110 \* (surf boats without motors.)  
Used for supply along coast.
- p. 110 \*\* (Buhle:...a) Foreign Legion.)  
2 Bns. composed of former German members of French Foreign Legion.
- p. 110 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg. 1.) Special aide for Propaganda)  
("Referent z.b.V."). Propaganda for the Army, in which von Brauchitsch took an intense interest.
- 
- p. 113 \* (von Ziehlberg... Ehlert.)  
Ia, Africa Corps.
- p. 113 \*\* (Gen. Brand...b)... K 5 and K 12 guns)  
Being railroad guns, they used up too much rail trackage.
- p. 113 \*\*\* (d) R projectiles.)  
Footnote canceled.
-

p. 114 \* (Radke:.....b) Strength through Joy)  
The Nazi recreational organization.

p. 114 \*\* (ObdH with....)  
ObdH took someone along when going to the Fuehrer to report, Gen. Halder intended to note down with whom and afterwards must have forgotten to.

p. 114 \*\*\* (Gen. Leeb:..... Exchange....)  
Exchange of conventional for tapered-bore tubes.

p. 114 # (Sybel ferry:..... for AAA.)  
There were two types of ferries used by the Army: S or SS, and Sybel ferries.  
S (Schwer, heavy) and SS (Ueberschwer, super-heavy) ferries were a joint Army-Navy development for Seeloe, to serve as landing craft. They consisted of two covered, ponton-like craft, with individual power plants, to which a deck was hinged. Could be used in rough seas (surf) up to wind velocity 5. Were very popular with troops and supply services. Could be loaded on RR flatcars and flatbed trailers.  
Sybel ferries were named after a manufacturer of a small aircraft engine. At outbreak of the war, the Sybel concern had a large quantity of these engines on hand, from a canceled export order, and proposed the type to Gen. Udet as a marine engine. The idea was accepted and the engines, with aerial propellers, were mounted on decks struck across two conventional open pontons. Army did not like the type (noisy, high fuel consumption, rigid construction of ferries) but Goering pushed their use. Manufacture of Sybel ferries was discontinued when supply of engines ran out.

p. 114 ## (Storage of ammunition)  
Possibly refers to special conditions prevailing in hot climates, reducing the effectiveness of ammunition.

-----

- p. 115 \* (Diehernfurth)  
Army Training Ground.
- p. 115 \*\* (Oct. 1941)  
Date when available in quantity.
- p. 115 (Buhle (First Line. Omission))  
List of Divs. showing respective level of readiness....
- p. 115 (Asterisk omitted) (Report from 22nd AB Div.)  
Gen. Halder was opposed to any kind of over-specialization. Specialized troops just sat around doing nothing against the time when they would be needed, and developing the attributes of primadonnas. He would have had all Divs. trained in the elements of air transport loading and unloading.
- p. 115 \*\*\* (Buhle:.... Replacement Reserve II)  
World War I term here used by Halder in talk with Buhle, another World War veteran, Ersatzreserve I consisted of trained men over a certain age. Ersatzreserve II were all untrained men not yet called to the colors.
- 

- p. 116 (Asterisk omitted) (Conference with ObdH.... 3.)  
One of the attempted compromise solutions for the situation created by Rommel's unwillingness to cooperate with OKH. "Deutscher Chef" could not be put over Rommel since he was Rommel's junior, but as a trusted OKH man, he was to "advise" the Italian Chief of Staff. His other function would be, to shake up and take control of the supply organization and rear services so flagrantly neglected by Rommel despite their vital importance for him so far from his home base.
-

- p. 118 \* (4.) ... President of the British Veterans Assn.)  
This is a mistake due to confusion of names. The President of the British Legion at that time was Sir Ian Hamilton. -- Ed.
- p. 118 \*\* (1230.... b) must not follow.... too far forward)  
Would interfere with troop movements.
- p. 118 \*\*\* (b) No 30-ton truck columns on secondary roads)  
Would choke secondary roads.
- p. 118 # (a) Armd. Groups are echeloned in great depth!)  
Several days' marches deep.
- p. 118 ## (h)... hogish hoarding by units)  
A certain amount of hoarding was tolerated, though it was contrary to regulations. However, the practice developed to proportions where some units had serious shortages because others put away too many "silent reserves".
- 
- p. 119 \* (von Z. c) Gause to be promoted to General.)  
On becoming German Chief of Staff attached to Italian Gen. Staff.
- p. 119 \*\* (d)... Spala and Reichshof.)  
Reichshof: Germanized name of Rzeszow, a town in southern Poland.
- p. 119 \*\*\* (Askania)  
Code for GHq in East Prussia.
- p. 119 # (Kloenne)  
Industrialist. Bulgarian Consul General in Berlin.
- p. 119 ## (Me and Ho planes.)  
Messerschmitt and Heinkel.
-

p. 120 \* (Mines... 15,000 S Mines)  
Anti-personnel mine.

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p. 122 \* (Heusinger: d) ... we cannot move their ground elements)  
I.e., trains, workshop units, etc. The situation is  
different if the Div. should revert to Army control.

p. 122 \*\* (2 Cos to AGp. North.)  
Regt. Brandenburg (800th) assigned for protection of  
Hqs.

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p. 123 \* (c) Evacuation of 60,000 children.)  
From East Prussia in the event of Russian air raids.

p. 123 \*\* (Adenauer.)  
Brother of the well-known Mayor of Cologne and Center  
Party leader.

p. 123 \*\*\* ("Veilchenredoute".)  
Title of a musical comedy.

p. 123 # (Gen Qu:... missions requested... must be refused.)  
According to Gen. Halder, these SS police units wanted  
to be as far forward as possible in order to be first  
in place when police action was called for. Since  
they forced themselves into the scheduled road move-  
ments, their requests came under the purview of Army Hqs.

---

p. 124 \* (Conf. with ObdH.... c) Hanstein's out-of-turn promo-  
tion denied.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 124 \*\* (Heusinger... a)... command set-up in Romania.)  
I.e. the question of the status of the German Training  
units in relation to Antonescu as C in C of Romanian  
Army.

p. 124 \*\*\* (1500 - 1730 .... Kleist/Zeitzler.)  
Zeitzler was Kleist's C of S.

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- p. 125 (Asterisk omitted) (Buhle:..... 4.)  
"Panzer Ersatz Div." not a conventional Army term.  
Was probably coined by Buhle with tank repair centers,  
where Armd.Divs. were refitted between the Yugoslav  
and the Russian campaign.
- 
- p. 126 \* (von Thoma: Traffic control.)  
The important question for Armd. Divs. as to who had  
priority to pass whom.
- p. 126 \*\* (von Etzdorf... Supply line via Toulon (!) .)  
In view of the difficulties of maintaining the flow  
of supplies to Africa, not the least of which was the  
limited capacity of the Brenner railroad line, it  
would have been highly desirable to secure Toulon as  
a shipping base. ?! indicates Gen. Halder's mournful  
realization that nothing would come of the plan.
- p. 126 \*\*\* (Papen protests against his mission.)  
Entry could not be reconstructed.
- 
- p. 127 \* (Col. Ochsner:... Safety regulations for Rocket Projector  
Troops.)  
They were too complicated for troops, which resented  
them as slowing down loading, etc.
- p. 127 \*\* (Ossoaviachim.)  
A Russian peacetime organization to promote air-  
mindedness and interest in parachute jumping. The  
organization had jump training towers in several  
cities.
- p. 127 \*\*\* (Heusinger... b)... AGp. South.)  
This would require sending German troops to Hungary,  
which were more urgently needed to concentrate weight  
in AGp. South.
-



p. 128 \* (Wagner:.... b) 30-ton truck columns.)  
Belong to Army Hqs.

p. 128 \*\* (...60-ton truck columns.)  
Under Gen. Qu.

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\* &  
p. 129 \*\* (Gen. Paulus.)  
Mistaken translation. Should read:  
"I instruct him that in placing the reserves, account must be taken of the fact that the West-East railroads might have to be used all at the same time (die moeglicherweise gleichzeitig notwendige Belegung der West-Ostbahn.)" Reserves were to be placed so that they could be moved east rapidly; accordingly they were to be strategically distributed to avoid mutual interference of the movements when all lines of the west-east system had to be used to their fullest.

p. 129 \*\*\* (Morning conference:..... 1,328 men.)  
Losses were reported in the order of the difficulty of their replacement. Tanks were the hardest to replace.

-----  
p. 130 (Asterisk omitted) (Maj. Schildknecht...)  
Operational reserves are the reserves which, e.g., an Army Gp. will use to influence a large operational plan.  
Strategic reserves are unallocated reserves far in the rear of a country, which will be assigned to one of several operating elements (Army Gps.) according to need.

-----  
p. 131 \* (Buhle:.... e).... for "Haifisch")  
Transfer of this unit to the Normandy for exercises was part of the deception maintained after cancellation of Seeloe in the fall of 1940. The local population was expected to pass on information to England that "big things were doing here" and so help maintain a state of continuous nervousness.

-----  
p. 132 \* (100-1200. Ride to Reichshof.)  
The Germanized name of Rzeszow, in southern Poland.

p. 134 \* (Italy..... 100,000 are to be shipped by rail)  
From Romania.

p. 134 \*\* (OQu IV:.... Training.... in Syria.)  
I.e., Training of German detachments by French instructors with knowledge and experience of warfare in that part of the Near East.  
Gen. Halder was not sure whether these plans were proposals or agreements.

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p. 135 \* (Gen. Buhle:... b) . . .)  
Hqs, later to be placed under a Reich Commissar (for Lithuania, White Russia, Ukraine and one more for the Caucasus.) The Barbarossa plan envisaged these territories as independent regions, in which the Wehrmacht Befehlshaber (Armed Forces Commanders) would act as diplomatic-political representatives.

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p. 136 \* (Lt. Col. Radke:.... SS... Reich... across Germany.)  
As a propaganda tour.

p. 136 \*\* (Lt. Col. Radke:..... a) ..(religious orders).)  
Refers to the wholesale closing of religious institutions going on at that time.

-----

p. 137 \* (Stieff:.... the Italians.... looking after the country.)  
The occupied country was supposed to be administered jointly.

-----

p. 138 (Asterisk omitted) (von Bernuth - Buerker)  
Security Divs. Command understands that Div. must be broken into Bns. for effective action against partisans et. These direction beams were essential in desert warfare where owing to the lack of cover, tanks had to attack in smoke blankets.

p. 138 \* (Keitel... influx of E officers.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 138 \*\* (Gen. Wagner: Railroad tractors.)  
"Schienenschlepper." The traction unit of a truck trailer train that could be used also on railroad tracks. They were put to use wherever abandoned rolling stock was found (locomotives were usually either gone or damaged). Even hauls as short of 50 km, as between two demolitions, were considered economical for transloading from and to trucks. These tractors were very useful also in taking sections of trains across improvised bridges which would not have supported locomotives.

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p. 139 \* (Heusinger:.... b) "Harpune")  
Code for deception on coast of South Norway, directed  
against East coast of England.

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p. 142 \* (Morning:..... "ideal situation".)  
Western Cs of S, idle at the time, were given assignment  
of working out an old project of developing the "ideal  
vehicle", i.e. the supply vehicle of the "ideal Division"  
incorporating all wishes of the troops, for the "ideal  
situation", i.e. the time when Army would have all the  
funds they wanted and would not have to skimp.

p. 142 \*\* (Tellegibel:..... Signal communication..... through  
Sweden.)  
Telecommunications to Finland and Northern Norway.

-----

p. 143 \* (Navy:.... under cover of diversionary maneuvers.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 143 \*\* (Buhle:... b) New Balkans set-up .... supplement on  
political function.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 144 \* (e) Questions relating to Army officials.)  
Re-opening of the question of assimilation to military  
rank and status.

p. 144 \*\* (Heusinger:... f) Hungary:... before B plus 5.)  
B stands for target date of "Barbarossa".

p. 144 \*\*\* (...can be sent to Presov)  
Locality in Slovakia.

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p. 145 \* (The link between Romania and Hungary.)  
"Romania" is probably a mistake. Is more likely to  
mean "Seventeenth Army".

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p. 146 \* (Keitel....b)... take care also of the southeastern  
operation.)  
Refers to the offensive between Lake Ladoga and Lake  
Onega.

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p. 147 \* (By air to front. Warsaw (von Hobe).)  
Maj. Cord von Hobe, a son-in-law.

p. 147 \*\* (The imposing vastness.... "Tuchfuehlung")  
"Tuchfuehlung", literally, keeping in close touch with the next man so as to touch the cloth of his uniform. Keeping that sort of contact meant that there were no gaps in the front that could not be swept by interlocking fire. In "Barbarossa", gaps of 8 to 10 km, were permissible, less in wooded country. -- Divisions were to be kept together as operational units, regardless of resulting gaps.

p. 147 \*\*\* (All the work of decades)  
I.e. since the end of World War I.

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p. 148 \* (Heusinger:... 3.) "Haifisch II")  
New phase of "Haifisch", the deception maintained on the Normandy coast (see p. 131.)

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p. 150 \* (OQu I: a) Deception measures ... possibly August.)  
To mask movements of reserves from the West to the East.

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p. 151 (Asterisk omitted) (Gen. Konrad:... Uniformity....)  
OKH insisted on getting the actual aerial photographs, not the interpretations by Air Force. Valid results depended to some extent on coordination of interpretation and mutual supplementation of ground and air observations. "But Goering thought he knew everything."

p. 151 (Asterisk omitted) (Gercke:...d) ..Construction..)  
It was thought that the war in Russia would be all but concluded by next fall, in which case Turkey might come over to Germany's side. This railroad bridge in Turkish Thrace (Adrianopol) near Bulgarian border, would then be an important link.  
See also "Future plans: b)" p.199 - Ed.

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p. 151 (Asterisk omitted) (Gercke: e) ...)  
"Inspection der Eisenbahntuppen" existed before the war but lost out in importance to "Bedeis" - Befehlshaber der Eisenbahntuppen (Commander of Railway Troops) - which was in charge of field operations. Restoration became necessary when activation of new Railway Troops and many other organizational and training matters required the full-time attention of a ZI Hq. --- Brig.Hqs were needed for control of new Railway Regts.

p. 151 \* (Gen Qu:... "Armd. Forces Commander Southeast")  
"Wehrmachts-Befehlshaber Suedost"  
(See p. 89 (Wagner, Gen Qu). )

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p. 152 \* (Op.Sec.: . . a)... Reception Hqs: assembly and transfer to front.)  
"Ausladegruppe." A temporary Hq of Army Corps status, acting as "reception committee" for freshly arriving Divs. in unloading areas. Looks after billeting, feeding and additional training until Divs. are sent up to front. Sometimes the Hq becomes a Corps Hq (reduced), going up with the troops. The three phases are: Unloading, assembly and transfer to front.

p. 152 \*\* (Tobruk: ... Paria Div.) -- The name of an Italian Armd. Div

p. 152 \*\*\* (Romania: ... Dismantling of tracks on railroad bridge.)  
Probably the bridge at Cernavoda, which would be needed for motorized movements.

p. 152 # (Romania: ... Radio communication with Navy.)  
Between Germany and the German Navy in the Black Sea and Coastal Defense units. Difficulties resulted from the difference of codes.

p. 152 (Asterisk omitted) (OQu IV ... Position of Attachés ...)  
Sphere of action of "Deutsche Generale in (Bulgaria, Finland, etc.) had to be kept strictly apart from that of Attachés. The "German Generale...." form the Liaison in operational matters, "giving out", while Attachés, furnishing the home office with information on war potential, etc. of the guest nation, were chiefly "taking in".

-----  
p. 153 (Asterisk omitted.) (Top of page: Political questions..)  
Gen. Halder, following Clausewitz' doctrine, wanted to concentrate all efforts on eliminating the Russian armed forces as a factor. OKW, on the contrary, was more interested in obtaining control of the rich resources of the Ukraine and eventually pushed the campaign toward the battle of Kiev. The resulting loss of time and the diversion of Armies into that area, allowed the Russians to reform and hold Moscow.

p. 153 \* (OQu I:.... Heggenreiner....)  
Lt. Col. or Col. Acted as interpreter at Rommel's Hq.

p. 153 \*\* (Buhle:....c) Special Bn. Irak - volunteers)  
A specially trained group that would carry the war to that area in "Lawrence of Arabia" fashion.

p. 153 \*\*\* (Conf. with ObdH: a) Proclamation.... Must set forth the reasons.)  
I.e., for the attack on Russia.

p. 153 Last line should read: Radio ..... shifts of Hqs.

- p. 154 \* & \*\* (1630 - 1830 ..... threaten GHq ..... Minefields !)  
Askania, near Mauersee (see p. 119). The threat was not an actual one, and so the material and the work that went into protective minefields appeared sheer waste.
- p. 154 \*\*\* (Farbfilm - Foto)  
Name of a firm.
- p. 154 # (Koppenberg.)  
A neighbor, who liked to drop in for "inside information".  
Gerti Leyherr, one of Gen. Halder's daughters.
- 
- p. 155 \* (Jacob: ... will be moved to Cernavoda)  
As a second bridge at this important site, (see pp. 91 and 152.)
- p. 155 \*\* (Buhle: ..... c) ....)  
Married men would not be returned to the theater. ---  
Two per cent to ZI: i.e., 40 per cent of all furlough personnel; other 60 per cent in Africa.
- p. 155 (Asterisk omitted) (Buhle: ..... d) ....)  
150,000 looks like an excessive figure for attrition losses, but it might have been a deliberately pessimistic estimate.
- p. 155 (Asterisk omitted) (Buhle: .....)  
900th Brig. would be security force for GHq (Askania).
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- p. 156 \* (Situation conference: ..... Mil. District I)  
East Prussia.
- 
- p. 157 \* (Heusinger: a) ... area west of Augustow.)  
Locality near Bialystok. --- More concern about GHq.
- p. 157 \*\* (Romania: ... Hq of Romanian Third Army steps down.)  
Comes under German control.
- p. 157 (Asterisk omitted) ( In the evening... political tenor)  
Being the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces, one would have expected a proclamation kept on a more military level on the eve of so momentous a campaign.
-

p. 158 \* (Sit. conf. a) Codeword "Dortmund".)  
The start signal for "Barbarossa".

p. 158 \*\* (e)... will go to Arys.)  
Troop Training Center in East Prussia.

p. 158 (Asterisk omitted) (Gen. von Kirchheim: b)...c)...  
b) Gen. Epp, head of the Colonial League, dedicated to the recovery of German overseas colonies, had sponsored this organization to assemble and train special personnel for the re-acquired colonies. Such projects had to be dropped for the time being.  
c) Rommel vs. von Kirchheim; fundamentally, Rommel vs. everybody.

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p. 159 (Asterisk omitted) (Wagner-Baentsch: a).... adjustments..  
b) Overseas Staff..)  
a) In case of trouble let some troop transports drop out in favor of supply.  
c) "Heimatstab Uebersee". An OKW attempt to supply a solution for Rommel's largely self-inflicted logistical problems.

p. 159 \* (Wagner.... f) ... Test mobilization of "Resurrection columns" was a full success)  
"Auferstehungskolonnen", someone's whimsical designation for the columns of conscripted privately-owned French trucks to serve as a transportation pool in event of "Attila" (occupation of Vichy France).

p. 159 \*\* (Heusinger:... b) Il Duce.... (to operate on the Balkans.  
A prestige offer. Commitment was considered on Romanian front (Balkans).

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p. 165 \* (top: The original plan of operation, based on Romania)  
In this way only one prong of the pincer was left.

p. 165 \*\* (1400.... by car to new GHq)  
"Askania" near Angerburg.

p. 165 \*\*\* (Development of the situation:.... That's very good!)  
In view of the desire to destroy the Russian armed forces west of the Dniepr, Gen. Halder welcomes the enemy's stand.

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p. 166 \* (Situation:.... cross the Dvina in its upper reaches.)  
The drawback would be the great detour. The advantage the greater ease of crossing a river near its source.

---

p. 167 \* (Gercke: Change of railroad track... as planned)  
Conversion from the wider Russian to the German railroad gauge.

p. 167 \*\* (1530 ObdH.... b)... in the Crimea)  
Because of Italian aspirations to the Black Sea.

p. 169 canceled

p. 169 (Asterisk omitted) (Review of the situation.....)  
Exceptionally, Gen. Halder reads the situation map from north to south. Usually the entries begin with the southernmost unit in the sector of AGp. South, and then pass on to Center and North (from right to left.) - Ed.

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p.171 \*(Finish Gen. Oequist.....Erfurth)  
Gen. Waldemar Erfurth, Chief of German Mil.  
Mission in Finland.

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p.173 \* (AGp. South.....The conveyor belt system  
would be necessary here)  
A contincus flow of new Divs., on a conveyor  
belt, as it were.

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p.173 \*\* (AGp. Center.....Behind them.....)  
I.e., east of these Russian forces.

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p.174 \* (von Ziehlberg.....Clausius affair)  
A row with his CG. Replacement needed.

---

p.175 (Asterisk omitted) (Evening reports.....  
Moscow....operational High Command.)  
This would indicate that Moscow now has a  
clearer picture of the front and can  
substitute centralized direction for the  
uncoordinated reactions of field commands  
surprised by the attack.

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p.177 \* (Gen. Himer:.....Laszlo)  
Chief, Op. Sec. in the Hungarian Gen. Staff.

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p. 178 \* (Heusinger, Grolmann, Koerner... day route)  
The country between the Dniepr and Dvina rivers, the only gap in the belt of major rivers protecting Moscow.

p.178 (Asterisk omitted) (Evening reports.... South penetration beyond the Horyn river...)  
Should read: Armd. Gp.1 has ordered relentless thrust (ruecksichtsloses Durchstossen) beyond the Horyn river.....  
"Ruecksichtslos" here is not ruthlessness, but rather relentless perseverance in attaining the objective, i.e., to keep moving without regard to enemy centers of resistance left behind one's back. The Inf. follow-up will take care of this enemy.

p.178 (Asterisk omitted) (Daily reports.... South... ..strategic disengagement)  
Should read:.....and not indications of an operational, let alone strategic withdrawal.  
  
Operational withdrawal: Withdrawal is on the own initiative, to organize a new front. Troops must disengage quickly to regain operational freedom on a line further to the rear.

Strategic withdrawal: Abandoning of very large areas, e.g., the entire South of Russia, to concentrate on the defense of other parts of the country, considered of more vital importance.

-----  
p.179 \* (1100..... under this Corps Hq.)  
Because these two Divs. were located more favorably for this purpose.

p.179 \*\* (Gen. Wagner.... c) ... State Secretary Backe)  
in the Reich Ministry of Food.

-----  
p.180 (Asterisk omitted.) (Keitel OKW)  
"Rocket Launchers" should read "R bridging equipment" (R-Geraet) The correct designation is "RW (Roth-Wagner) Geraet", a heavy rail-road bridging equipment. Eleventh Army, deployed behind the Pruth river, and still inactive, would need much of the scarce bridging equipment, which meanwhile might be needed on the active fronts.

p.180 \* (Gen. Buhle:e).....in view of changed conditions)  
I.e. in the course of the offensive Army Gp. B had already moved outside the territory of the Government-General, where it was also in charge of the static military establishment.

p.182 \* (2nd paragr.....eastern part of Polesia)  
The region of the Pripet marshes.

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p.185 \*(Enemy intelligence:.....Rositten)  
This Rositten is in Latvia (Rezekne). The high  
(Army Gp.) Hq had disappeared some days earlier.

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p.185 \*\*(Spain.....Rembertow)  
Troop Training Center near Warsaw.

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p.186 (Asterisk omitted) (To celebrate.... lower Staff)  
"Unterstab", the NCO clerks of the GHq.

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p.187 \* (top line;..... with combat forces)  
I.e., not just reconnaissance forces

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p.187 \*\* (Afternoon...visit by the Fuehrer to the camp)  
i.e. OKH Hq

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p.190 (Asterisk omitted) (In AGp. Center....the hand  
supplies.-)  
The term used here is "Handkoffer" (hand luggage) a term coined by Gen. Halder to distinguish smaller truck Cms. carrying a few days' supplies and moving with the combat troops, from the "Passagiergut" (the heavy luggage sent by express), the complete carried issue of supplies which follows in bounds.

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p.190 \* ((b) Fuel situation.....beginning 6 July.)  
Start of a new offensive.

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p.190 \*\* (Gen.von Waldau:.....of air strength)  
against Leningrad. / Omitted in the translation-  
--Ed./

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- p.191 \* (Col. von Ziehlberg:.....Decorations.....  
10 July and 1 August)  
Possibly historic dates. They were target  
dates for distribution of decorations throu-  
ghout the entire Army.
- p.191 \*\* (In AGp. North I Corps should better not move  
off to the East.)  
The enemy was trying to divert it in that  
direction.
- p.191 (Asterisk omitted) (Evening reports....Approve  
date.....)  
Should read: "Date is approved." There were  
divergences between ObdH, who wanted to go  
easy, and Gen. Halder, who wanted to move in  
the direction of Moscow as quickly as possible.
- 

p.192 \* (top: by the old Russo - Estonian frontier.)  
I.e. before Russian annexation of the Baltic  
States in 1939.

p.192 \*\* (Field Marshal von Leeb....b)....to move up  
XXIII Corps...)  
GHq Reserve. The principle followed was to  
let the command most likely to need rein-  
forcements do the moving of GHq Reserves to  
the front. Being interested in getting these  
reinforcements, the command would overcome  
any obstacles in getting them in back of the  
frontline.

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p.193 \* (Fourth paragraph.....This accounts for  
his passivity.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p.195 \* (Fourth line:....."in pursuit")  
The Hungarian report is quoted ironically. It  
was no "pursuit" of a enemy that the Hungari-  
ans had beaten; the enemy just withdrew.

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p.196 \* (Enemy intelligence, 3rd paragraph:.....in the  
space of two weeks.)  
Gen. Halder explained this sentence meant only  
that the forces of the first Russian mobiliza-  
tion wave had been destroyed within two weeks  
from the opening of the war.

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p.199 \* (Bottom line:....by groups concentrated at the crossings.)  
I.e. Dvina river will not be held by a continuous enemy line.

-----

p.200 \* (Col. Ochsner:.....Do Projector)  
"Do" Six-barreled Rocket Projectors.  
Heavy Rocket Launcher: In 1941, 280 or 320 mm rockets fired from their shipping crates. The necessary elevation is given by a tilted frame on which the crated rockets rest.

p.200 \*\* (Wagner a)....Bv. TO)  
Bevollmaechtigter Transport Offizier ---  
Plenypotentiary Transport Officer, the representative of the Transport Chief (Gercke) at Army Gp. or Army level.

p.200 \*\*\* (c)....Center: Armor within close distance from Moscow)  
I.e., that much fuel, and in the case of Infantry all the general supplies could be delivered to enable these troops to reach the named Moscow looks like a long distance, but may be correct due to the fact that the road net in sector of AGp. Center was relatively good.

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p.201 \* (in North....as far as Ostrov)  
Should read: Hoepfner, beating off attacks against his flank, has pushed as far as Ostrov, just north of the Dvina river.

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p.202 \* (Heusinger:....a)...the last Regt.)  
The second Regt. of the Div. (two-Regt. Div.) is diverted while in transit.

p.203 \* (Wagner.... B v TO)  
Footnote canceled

p.203 \*\* (Buhle:....a)...organization has proved unworkable!)  
I.e., the combination of horses and motorized equipment. The Cav.Div. was a hobby of ObdH. It became an Armd. Div. in 1942.

p.203 \*\*\* ((b)... Suitable for new missions (...on Balkans etc....))  
Gen. Halder was thinking over possibilities just in case Hitler suddenly wanted to start a new war somewhere on the globe. Anatolia was mentioned a few days earlier, see p.197.

p.203 # ((d) Chenillettes..)  
Tracked armored ammunition carriers.

p.203 ## ((e)...supply installations have been diverted(!))  
Probably to the Murmansk front.

-----  
p.205 (Asterisk omitted) (Gen. Ott....Inf. Supply Clms....) Erroneous  
Erroneous Translation: Infanterie Kolonnen--  
An innovation: ammunition Clm. like that of Artillery (not a Supply Clms.)

-----  
p.207 \* (Evening situation South: ...in Romania.)  
I.e., the Romanian front.

p.207 \*\* (South:.....inside the enemy positions)  
The line on the old Russian border.

p.207 \*\*\* (Finland:....only the last Regt.)  
I.e., only the second Regt. was diverted.  
(cf. p. 202, note.)

p.207 # (Situation: South:...far to the south(road conditions?))  
Are roads really so bad that Corps must spread itself over such a wide area? Armor should be kept together!

p.207 ## (...west of Minsk.)  
"Minsk" is wrong. In the absence of a situation map the mistake could not be corrected.

p.208 \* ( Summary:...north-south operation east of the Dniepr. )  
This refers to the possibilities of cooperation between AGps. Center and South in this eventuality. Center would help South, which had been checked in its advance by the Dniepr river.

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p.209 (Asterisk omitted) ( 2300... "inner ring".... "outer ring".... )  
These are not encircling rings in the same sense as in the battle of Bialostok. The question here is whether the operation should be limited to slicing off a small area by an Armor-Inf. team, or be given maximum scope.

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p.212 \* ( (3) Details:.....b) battle at Smolensk )  
It was assumed that a crushing defeat in that battle would dispose of organized opposition all the way to the Wolga river. Armd. thrust then would destroy the remaining war industries east of the Wolga.

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p.214 \* ( Situation: South .....on both sides of Mogilev. )  
I.e., one Russian Div. on each side of Mogilev. -Ed.

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p.214 \*\* ( Seventeenth Army..... Stalin line.... )  
Not the real Stalin Line. Any time a line of prepared positions was breached, the field commands reported a breakthrough of the "Stalin Line".

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p.214 \*\*\* ( Center:... from the direction of Nevel. )  
Footnote canceled.--- The heading "North" should have been several lines earlier, preceding "Also von Leeb's right wing...."  
The right wing of AGp. North is here reported on under "Center" because its operation has bearing on Third Armd. Gp. (Hoth) of AGp. Center.

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p.215 \* (Radio intelligence....(from north to south.))  
"from north to south" is mentioned specifically because this is a reversal of the customary order of notation (from south to north). The notation is consistent with usual practice, however, in that it is from right to left.

p.216

p.216 \* (Gen. Buhle:....."Rehabilitation Bns.")  
Longer sentences were served in "Penal Bns." p.84, note \*\*. A penal unit for soldiers whose court martial, sentence has been suspended to give them an opportunity to redeem themselves at the front. Different from "Special Field" Bns., where actual sentences were served, see p.84.

p.218 (Asterisk omitted.) (AGp. North....Porkhov - Pog....)  
Pog probably should read Log (6 km NW of Strugi-Krassnije)

p.219 \* (Center: ... At Shklov. Eleventh)  
Possibly Twelfth and Seventh Armd. Divs.

p.226 \* (Situation:..... South... Stalin line)  
This designation was indiscriminately applied to all sorts of fortified lines.

p.228 \* ((h) Karl Gun....)  
80 cm Gun. Range 51,400 yds. weight of projectile (AC) 16,540 lbs. --Ed.

p.234 \* (Sixth Paragraph:...Passed on verbaton to AGp. South)  
In order to dissociate himself from the order and to indicate that he could not assume responsibility for it, Gen. Halder would pass it on with the opening phrase "The Fuehrer has ordered....." Since it implied criticism, this form of transmittal was later prohibited.



- p.236 \* (South:.....SS "Wiking")  
An SS Div., made up mostly of Scandinavian,  
Dutch and Flemish.
- 
- p.238 \* (Gen. Jacob:.....b) material from Belgrade  
c) Lanninger.....  
Footnotes canceled.
- p.238 (Asterisk omitted.) (Evening.....)  
Correction: Both Reinhardt and von Manstein  
commanded Armd. Corps, not Divs.
- 
- p.239 \* (Gen. Brennecke.... rushed off to the west)  
I.e., into Estonia, which was not yet entirely  
in German hands.
- p.239 (Asterisk omitted.) (Situation: South)  
I.e., on the western bank of the Dniestr,  
which makes a wide turn.
- 
- p.241 \* (Gen. Buhle: a).....including Second and  
Fifth in the total.  
These two Divs. existed already, but needed  
much new materiel after the Balkans Campaign.
- p.241 (Asterisk omitted.) d)  
Correction: Should read "Heavy Rocket Launchers"
- 
- p.242 \* (b).....Upper Dniestr)  
Should be "Dniepr".
- 
- p.248 \*\* (.....transloading at Varena)  
Locality in Slovakia, but identity uncertain.
- 
- p.247 \* (AGp. North:... The "eastern front")  
AGp. North also had a "western front", facing  
Estonia.

p.248 \* (Gen. Wagner....2)....Transfer instrument receives signature.)  
Gen. Halder signs for ObdH, who is at AGp. North. (Performance of functions which normally are in ObdHs province is usually noted in the Diary. --Ed.)

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p.251 \* ((c) 1) Observed enemy movements (from north to south))  
(See cf. note p.215)

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p.253 (Asterisk omitted) (Col. Liss.....a)  
Correction:.....that the units are still Brigs. and not Divs.,.....

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p.256 \* (2.) A special organization under Balk)  
Armd. Forces Chief in OKH  
(Correction :....for checking....)

p.256 (Asterisk omitted) (Gen. Wagner....a)  
Correction :.....native food stocks

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p.260 \* (I stress the following points: a)....XXXV Corps.)  
The organization is not a full Corps, but a "Hoeheres Kommando", i.e., a Hq of Corps status with fewer special troops than the usual complement of a first-line Corps Hq. When acting merely as an Hq, this type of organization is referred to throughout the translation as "Corps Hq (reduced)". In the field, with combat troops attached, it is more convenient to refer to it as Corps. Reichenau was given this incomplete Corps because there were no other reserves available. --Ed.

-----

p.261 (Asterisk omitted) (Development of the situation:....the eastern front von Kluge's Army...)  
In the wide envelopment, von Kluge's Army has a western front, facing the rear of the enemy fronting west, and an eastern front.

p.261 \* (Development of the situation: (Second Paragr:)  
...a damper on all higher Hqs.)  
I.e., Army and Army Gp. Hqs, and OKH.

-----

p.262 \* ( 1100-1200...a) Splitting of Armd. Gp. 1!:)  
III Corps mot. is turned over to Reichenau's  
Sixth Army, for the battle of Kiev, which  
Gen. Halder opposed.

-----

p.263 \* (ObdH went to AGp. Center....Strauss)  
The intended meaning is "in general direction  
of Stalingrad. Second Army (von Weichs) takes  
the right wing of Ninth Army to its north,  
while Ninth Army (Strauss), its own left wing,  
assumes command of right wing of AGp. North  
(von Leeb). (Von Leeb's left wing is an error  
in the original).- Ed.

-----

p.264 \* (Second paragr.....have been reached)  
This refers to the objective (i.e., the high  
ground of Smolensk) set forth in the initial  
directive for the invasion.

p.264 \*\* (Center:.....second series of battles)  
From the Beresina river to the line now reached.

-----

p.266 \* (Gen. Wagner:.....b)...for von Kluge's new group  
von Kluge (Fourth Army) Assumes control of  
elements of Second and Ninth Armies for invest-  
ment of Smolensk.

6 -----

p.267 \* (Evening situation:.....pockets)  
(Omission in translation:) "...also many guns  
captured."

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p.268 \* (Gen. Buhle:.....b)....will be returned to the  
Z I)  
To be brought to full strength.

-----

- p.269 \* (1130 - 1600....a)....by lateral expansion)  
Contact between units is not absolutely essential, especially if depth can be maintained. See p.147, note\*\*.
- p.269 \*\*\* (a....)....need for clear-cut disposition by sectors)  
Should read: " need for clear-cut allocations (i.e., of supply) by (front) sectors.
- p.269 \*\*\* (b)....especially in North and South.)  
The "resources for developing opportunities" are the reserves and special troops available to Army Gp. Hqs, which are to make the most of the initiative held by their troops. In both North and South, there are openings for exploitation with these reserves.
- p.269 (Asterisk omitted.) (The AGp. Cs of S briefly comment.....)  
The objectives given at the outset of the campaign are nearly reached. Thought must be given now to the continuance of the operation, in order to avoid an operational vacuum when these goals are achieved.
- 
- p.271 \* (ObdH calls up von Bock)  
ObdH had to call up, because Gen. Halder did not want to be in any way identified with the new project.
- p.271 \*\* (Turkey:.....in Caucasasia and Turkestan)  
Slip of the pen for "Kurdistan".
- 
- p.272 \* (Gen. Konrad:...a)....is critical of the Army)  
Goering always echoed Hitler's criticism of the Army, when progress was slow.
- p.272 (Asterisk omitted) (1800 - 2015....1.)  
Hitler did not have the patience to let anything come to fruition that by its nature required a slower development.
- p.272 \*\*\* ( 3).... as soon as ready.)  
Gen. Halder considered such a frontal advance senseless, because Moscow was defended by a whole series of fortified lines, one behind the other.
- p.272 \*\*\* (No hurry).  
The implication was that this was not an important front, so that Bock could take his time.

- p.273 \* (Second line:.....of a purely tactical character.)  
Here is the origin of Hitler's obsession not to yield an inch of ground even after holding a position no longer gave any advantage. He thought he could thus disrupt the enemy's operational designs just as similar tactics on the part of the Russians disrupted the German plans.  
At the beginning of the war Hitler was afraid the Russians might withdraw and so escape destruction, now he was annoyed because they did not budge.
- 
- p.275 \* (Gen. Buhle: a).....on Sixteenth Armd. Div.)  
at Velikie Luki a few days before.
- p.275 \*\* (e)...to the Staff of the Armored Troops Chief)  
One of the "Arms Chiefs" in OKH.
- 
- p.276 \* (Evening:.....AGp Center.....guarded by partisans)  
This method had the purpose of compelling the Germans to halt to open fire, and so pinning them down for a time.
- 
- p.278 \* (Col. Ochsner:.....Heavy Roded Launchers)  
Footnote canceled.
- p.278 \*\* (Fellgiebel:....Cipher operations procedure)  
I.e., when code should or should not be used.
- p.278 \*\*\* (Lt. Col. Staeff.....Directives, not orders!)  
Armd. Gp. 3 protests against being given "orders" wants only broad "directives". (i.e. indication of objective, with details of execution left to its own judgment).
-

p.279 \* (e)...North...for immediate needs,  
I.e., the "Handkoffer" (hand supplies). See  
note on p. 190.--Ed.

p.279 \*\* (e)..... immobilization of trailers.)  
Trucks were not powered to pull trailers (one  
or two) on roads turned into bogs by heavy  
downpours.

p.279 \*\*\* (Center:... Bridge )  
Footnote canceled.

p.279 # (Col. Breith....Traffic...control)  
To keep unauthorized vehicles off certain roads.

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p.280 \* (a).....cooking kettles...)  
A critical item, because of the glycerine  
filling between the two jackets, which had  
to be replenished from time to time while  
in use. This glycerine bath, on the double-  
boiler principle, prevented burning of food  
in the kettles, the contents of which could  
not be stirred while the kitchen was rolling.

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p.282 \* (Center:..... from their Sectors..)  
For rehabilitation.

p.282 \*\* (c)...for the period of rehabilitation)  
I.e., their ground personnel.

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p.283 \* (Major Meyer-Rides.....from Libya)  
Probably should be Syria. --Ed.

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p.284 \* (Evening situation:.....On the Eastern front..)  
I.e., the eastern front behind the Uman  
pocket.

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p.285 \* (The movement of the Inf. Div.)  
Footnote canceled.

p.285 \*\* (Radke: a)....Basic order.)  
On handling of secret material.

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p.286 \* (Second line:.....finally closed.)  
See pp.30, 49, 58, 76, 94.

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p.288 \* (End of volume VI without date: )  
Possibly 25 July 1941. --Ed.

p.288 \*\* (foresighted supply!)  
Equipment of troops with smoke ammunition  
is not a matter of changing basic issues  
(organization). The necessary orders must  
be given to the Supply Chief ample time.

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FOOTNOTES TO VOL. VII

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p. 1 \* (2.)... on its extreme left wing.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 3 \* (South:.... Eleventh Army.)  
Entered separately in this tabulation, because it  
operates from supply base in Romania.

p. 3. \*\* (a) West:..... for an amnesty)  
For French civilians.

p. 3 \*\*\* (c) The crime rate is down)  
Among soldiers.

p. 3 # (e) Special Field Bn.)  
Penal units, see Vol. VI, p.84 note\*\*. - Ed.

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p. 5 ( Asterisk omitted) Evening situation... Center:.... eastern  
flank.... eastern front.)  
The envelopment east of Smolensk.

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p. 6 \* (GHq Reserves: 0 : 28)  
All GHq reserves allotted, none available any more, as  
against the enemies 28 reserves Divs., which can be  
committed on any part of the front.

p. 6 \*\* ( Center:.... are building a bridge across the Dniepr.)  
To the southern bank of the river.

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p. 7 \* (East:... Cooperation with the Economics Organization)  
"Wirtschafts-Ruestungsamt." - Reich agency concerned with  
planning of economic exploitation of prospective occupied  
territories in the east, in connection with procuring raw  
material and food for the German Armed Forces. - Ed.

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p. 8 \* (c) Quarters.... kitchen kettles)  
See Vol. VI p. 280 (footnote)

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p. 9     \* (Gen. Gause..... of a consistent personnel policy.)  
To be careful whom he takes into his Staff, so as to  
have a strong pro-OKH group.

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p. 11     \* (First Paragr. .... the Armd. Divs.)  
At the weakest part of any ring enclosing the pocket,  
i.e., where the link up is made in the east.

p. 11     \*\* (Center:..... on his eastern front.)  
I.e., the sector of his Army Gp. east of Smolensk.

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p. 12     \* (Sodenstern:..... pressure coming from the west.)  
Compare preceding page, note \*: The Armd. Gp. on the  
eastern end of the pocket was naturally subjected to  
heavy pressure from the enemy trying to break out east-  
ward.

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p. 14     \* (Sixth line:..... The Supply Area)  
Correction: The Home Depot (Versorgungsbezirk) offered  
eighteen ammunition trains.... ten ammunition trains....  
lost in Marshalling Area (Sammelgebiet ) (Warsaw -  
Frankfurt/Oder).....  
Sammelgebiet (Marshalling Area) is the railroad net  
where supplies are kept loaded in trains subject to  
"call" from front Supply agencies.

p. 14     \*\* (5.)..... Gen Qu (See.I)  
The original reads Gen Qu (I); probably means Gruppe I  
of the Gen Qu Section, Planning and Organization of  
supply in the field. - Ed.

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p. 18     \* (Second line: Hohenzollernstrasse)  
Gen. Halders' private address in Berlin. - Ed.

p. 18     \*\* (OQu IV. 1.) Bansai)  
Japanese Mil. Attaché in Berlin.

p. 18     \*\*\* (OQu IV. 2.) ... Just)  
German Mil. Attaché in Bucharest.

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p. 19 \* (Gen. Brand:..... K 3 Bn.)  
24 cm, range 41,011 yds.

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p. 22 \* (Third Par..... between the frontier and Minsk.)  
I.e., railroad traffic has been restored on this section of the line.

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p. 24 \* (Center:..... This will have to be settled by OKH order!)  
This was strictly an Army Gp. command matter, but Guderian did very much what he wanted and the matter had to be enforced by a top echelon order.

p. 24 \*\* (von Ziehlberg:..... internal tensions)  
I.e., within the Gen. Staff about decorations and also politics.

p. 24 \*\*\* (..his full confidence in my policies)  
Adding the advice not to let himself be deflected from his clear line by what was going on.

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p. 25 \* (1700.....b)..... operational objective.)  
Gen. Halder's opposition to any major operation against the Korosten Group, as wanted by Hitler, (see p.20, 2.)

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p. 26 \* (Fourth line:... GHq Reserve of 135 trains.)  
I.e., trains kept loaded with supplies, ammunition, etc.

p. 26 \*\* (b) safety margin)  
Silent reserves and conservative estimates.

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p. 31 \* (von Bock, on phone:..... offensive with limited objectives)  
"Kleine Loesung".

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p. 32 \* (2.) Boetticher's )  
German Mil. Attache in Washington. - Ed.

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- p. 33 \* (Major Pistorius ..... Schubert's Group)  
A Combat Team made up of elements of AGp.'s Center and North.
- 
- p. 36 \* (Second paragraph: ... are separated by natural obstacles (marshes) .)  
"Capability for modifying the situation" means here: Possibilities for regrouping forces.
- 
- p. 37 \* (.) Supplies: ..... 3 day reserve on hand)  
All this applies to ammunition.
- p. 37 \*\* (c) Nikolayev: ..... are reported already moving northward  
I.e., to push eastward again since there is no enemy left to cut off in the south.
- 
- p. 39 \* (Situation: In South, ... The same old story again!)  
This Armd. drive from the north was useless, since it was bound to arrive too late to catch the enemy, who had always an escape route open to the east.
- p. 39 \*\* (2.) ... "Bridgehead" ...)  
A salient in the frontline.
- 
- p. 39 (Asterisk omitted) (Situation... old story again!)  
It is too late to accomplish anything by moving south. Should have moved eastward in the direction in which the enemy was fleeing.
- 
- p. 40 \* (Lt.Col. von Kahlden: ..... Artillery emplacements are a problem.)  
Water table too close to surface.
- p. 40 \*\* (Gen. Wagner ..... Organization Todt II program.)  
Second echelon of Todt organization, working in the areas farther to the rear.
-

p. 42 \* (Noteworthy: ... propaganda in enemy territory.)  
Refers to the work of the Propaganda Section of ObdH in Ukraine (Hesse, see III, p. 64, Note \*\*\*, V, p. 77, note \*\* and VI, p. 20.).

p. 42 \* (Situation: ... Center: ... The costly \*\* fighting.)  
Costly for both sides.

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p. 44 \* (North: ... They want to take Third mot. Div. out ...)  
The original has "30th mot. Div." No such unit existed. Confusion due to fact that 30th Inf. Div. operated in the adjoining sector.

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p. 46 (Asterisk omitted.) (Third line from top )  
Correction. Read: "Scheduled" for "balanced supply movements".

p. 46 \* (Gen. Keitel . . . a) . . the number of Division Commanders . . . is steadily mounting.)  
The two main factors were nervous strain and incompetence.

p. 46 \*\* ( c) . . Naples to Murmansk. )  
I.e. Personnel Div. was in contact with all theaters of operations and so had its finger on the pulse of general opinion.

-----

p. 47 \* (Third line from top.)  
The tracks would be ruined.

-----

p. 48 \* (Evening Situation: . . North: . . Narva "Bottleneck".)  
A narrow corridor from the main front to Narva.

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p. 49 \* (Wagner . . 2.) . . hoarding of supplies.)  
The old complaint about too many "silent reserves", causing shortages in some units and generally disrupting planned allocation.

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p. 51 \* (Situation: . . . North: . . Third mot. Div.)  
See p. 44, note \*.

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p. 54     \*     (Col. Metz . . . German communities.)  
The German settlements in the Ukraine had been  
decimated by the 1923 famine and the countryside  
had begun to revert to its original steppe character.

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p. 55     \*     (North: . . . In I Corps.)  
The way the Roman numeral is written in the original  
may easily be misread for L (50).

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p. 55     \*\*     (Radke: . . . b) . . . Free Corps.)  
Reference to the foreign volunteer legions which were  
then in the planning stage.

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p. 56     (Asterisk omitted:) (Situation: South: . . . Romanian Border  
Div.)  
No explanation could be obtained. - Ed.

---

p. 59     \*     (Fuehrer Directive . . . WFSTL.)  
I.e., Wehrmachts Fuehrungsstab-Landesverteidigung.  
(Armed Forces Operations Staff.) (See Glossary.)

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g

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p. 60     (Asterisk omitted:) (2, lines 3/4)  
Correction. "zu einer konzentrischen  
Operation" actually means "for a con-  
vergent drive".

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p. 61     (Asterisk omitted:) (Afternoon . . . spent in conferences. . .)  
These conferences (Aussprachen) were of  
a more formal character, dealing with  
basic issues.

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p. 61     \*     (Fifth paragraph . . . remaining in the offensive.)  
I.e., defensive warfare is impracticable on this front.

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p. 61     \*\*     (Evening situation: . . . Center: . . . against the  
eastern front.)  
I.e., the part of the front of Center facing east.  
Other parts of this projecting sector were facing north  
and south and even west, because of the enemy pocket.

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p

p. 62 (Asterisk omitted:) (Conference with Gen. Obst. Guderian . . .)  
Gen. Halder, von Bock and other high-ranking generals  
opposed a major battle at Kiev, which loomed so large  
in Hitler's mind. Even Guderian was against it because  
Moscow was a much more attractive objective, and it was  
hoped that Hitler might listen to him.

---

p. 63 \* (Gen. Buhle: . . . d) "Service Companies".)  
German: "Betreuungskompanien."

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p. 66 \* (Capt. in the Gen. Staff.)  
Beck introduced in the Gen. Staff Corps the distinction  
between "in (im) the Gen. Staff" and "of (des) the Gen.  
Staff". An "in" officer was one who worked in the Gen.  
Staff proper, an "of" officer was one with Gen. Staff  
training assigned to a troop unit. The distinction was  
never widely adopted.

p. 66 \*\* (Gen. Wagner . . . f) Shifting of ammunition stocks.)  
Stocks left over from the French campaign.

---

p. 71 \* (First paragraph: . . . The final decision is up to Fourth  
Army.)  
I.e., Buck-passing by von Bock.

p. 71 \*\* (Gen. Buhle: . . . d) Russian 7.62 cm Gun.)  
A Krupp design sold to Russia after being rejected by  
the German Army Ordnance Office. The Russians demon-  
strated the effectiveness of the gun against the German  
Army, which then accepted it for its AT Artillery.

p. 71 \*\*\* (g) French Legion.)  
Composed of French volunteers, sponsored by the Vichy  
Government.

---

p. 73 \* (General von Waldau . . . air-borne operations on the  
Crimea is vetoed.)  
By Goering as Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force.

---

p. 79 \* (Noon: . . . fall of Viborg.)  
Gen. Oehquist was the former Commander of the fortress of  
Viipuri (Viborg), ceded to Russia after the Russo-Finnish  
war 39/40.

---

p. 81 (Asterisk omitted:) (Last entry under 2 Sep.)  
Brother of one of Gen. Obst. Halder's  
sons-in-law.

p. 81 \*\* (Col. Toussaint . . . Hungarian "River Guard".)  
For the Danube.

p.81 \*\*\* (Casualties: . . . 31 August.)  
Date probably wrong, possibly mistake for 21 August.

---

p. 82 \* (Visit to AGp. North . . . characteristics of Army Gp.  
North.)  
I.o., of its C in C, von Leeb.

p. 82 \* (Situation: . . . Order is issued. . . .)  
OKH is directed to order Guderian back.

p. 82 \*\* (. . . on the northern bank of the Dniepr.)  
Here, the far bank of the meandering river. - Ed.

---

p. 83 \* (Gen. Keitel . . . 3.) . . . Intermediate decoration.)  
Between Iron Cross First Class and Knight's Cross.  
This was the "German Cross" (in gold or silver).  
Its appearance gave rise to the Army slang "Spiegelrei"  
(Fried Egg).

---

p. 87 \* (AGp. Center: . . . its opposite number, Kleist.)  
I.o. Armd. Gp. 1, in AGp. South, forming the other  
prong of the drive.

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p. 94 \* (Own operational airplanes . . . - 336 (100%).)  
Gen. Halder could not explain the figures.

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p. 96 \* (Siege warfare . . . Geschwader . . .)  
See Glossary.

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p. 99 \* (Operational situation: . . . eastern front of AGp. Center.  
See p. 61, note \*\*. The area around Yelnya.

p. 99 \*\* (Local attacks in western direction.)  
I.o., Russian attacks.

- p. 100 \* (Noon: . . . Zone of action . . .)  
For the big offensive against Moscow ("Teifun"),  
see p. 134. - Ed.
- p. 100 \*\* (Gen. Paulus: . . . Armd. Corps Reinhardt.)  
I.e., XXXXI Corps. Gen. Halder often referred to units  
by name if he knew the Commander well. This sometimes  
may cause confusion with the Combat Teams or Groups  
of Div. or Corps strength put together for special  
purposes, which were officially designated by the name  
of the Commander. - Ed.
- 
- p. 102 \* (Evening situation: . . . eastern central front.)  
I.e., of AGp. Center, see notes p. 61 and 99.
- 
- p. 104 \* (Evening situation: South: . . . the encircling ring has  
now been closed.)  
I.e., the ring around Kiev.
- p. 104 \*\* (. . . from the outside.)  
I.e., from the east.
- p. 104 \*\*\* (. . . turn to his new mission.)  
In the direction of Tula.
- p. 104 # (North: . . . west of the Neva.)  
I.e., on the western bank of the Neva river.
- 
- p. 105 \* (Gen. Follgiebel . . . e) . . . between AGps. South and  
Center.)  
I.e., telephone connection between the two AGps.  
east of the Dniepr.
- 
- p. 106 \* (Situation: . . . a) . . . southward from the Dniepr.)  
With the Dniepr swinging sharply to the west in the  
area, the southern bank is the far bank. - Ed.
- p. 106 \*\* (( c) . . . like billiard balls.)  
I.e., they bounce off one side and then butt against  
the opposite side.
- p. 106 \*\*\* (Hausinger/Stieff: . . . for operation Teifun.)  
Code for the big fall offensive against Moscow,  
see p. 100, note \* and p. 134 sqq.



p. 107 \* (von Sodenstern . . . He would like to get rid of them.)  
Primadonnas, publicity-minded, and generally not popular with the Army.

p. 107 \*\* (Gen Gu a) . . . AGp. Rear Areas.)  
Now turned over to OKW administration; therefore the mention of "safeguarding of our (i.e. OKH) interests."

p. 107 \*\*\* (. . . with the Reich Marshal.)  
Reich Marshal Goering, as head of the Four Year Plan Authority. - Ed.

p. 107 # (. . . 30-day stock.)  
An iron reserve.

p. 108 (Asterisk omitted:) (Schedule of arrivals Nevel. . .)  
Of units transferred from North to Center for the big fall offensive against Moscow.

p. 109 \* (AGp. North, second paragraph: . . . cave-ins. . .)  
Roadbeds collapsed under the weight of tanks.

p. 107 \*\* (Gen Gu a) . . .)  
p. 110 \* (Gen Jodi. V. Group Kleist.)  
Armd. Gp. 1. of Ed.

p. 110 \*\*\* (Group Guderian.)  
Armd. Gp. 2. of Ed.

p. 107 # (. . . 30-day stock.)  
p. 111 \* (First paragraph: . . . Group Mackensen.)  
A Combat Team. - Ed.

p. 111 \*\* (Center and North: . . . Center. . .)  
p. 108 (Asterisk omitted:) the enemy facing AGp. Center. - Ed.

p. 111 (Asterisk omitted:) (Bogatsch-Kinzel: . . . a) . . . operational  
p. 110 defense line. . .)  
i.e., a defense line of more than tactical significance, one that has bearing on the defense plan for a theater.

p. 107

p. 112      \*    (Situation . . . of the encirclement.)  
I.e., the moment when the encircling ring is sealed.  
The friendly troops are fewest there and the enemy  
usually throws his weight against that weak link.

p. 112    \*\*    (Seventh paragraph: . . XXXXI Corps Hq.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 113 \* (Gen. Buhle: . . . b) Hot-weather equipment.  
d) Snow-runners.)  
b) Also for Southern Russia.  
d) Iron runners to which wheels of horse-drawn  
vehicles are clamped, converting these vehicles to  
sleds.

p. 113    \*\*    (Gen. Wagner . . . e) . . . Gauleiter Koch.)  
Reich Commissar for the Ukraine. -- Ed.

p. 115 \* (Evening Situation: . . . North: . . . Group Schmidt.)  
I.e., the XXXIX mot. Corps. . .

p. 116 \* (Situation: South . . . "Defensive opposition".)  
In quotes because Gen. Halder did not believe the report correct; it seemed to him that the enemy was really attacking.

p. 116    \*\*    ( ... Taking out of Divs. for Guderian ... )  
For his drive on Tula within the framework of the big  
fall offensive against Moscow. With the ring around  
the pocket consolidated, they were no longer needed there.

p. 117 \* (Gen. Wagner, . b) . . OKW order.)  
I.e., OKW must issue the order because OKH lacked  
jurisdiction about those areas.

p. 119 \* (Gen. Jacob: . . . b) Sybel ferries. . . a great success.)  
Perhaps mistake for "S or SS-ferries", since Sybel  
ferries were generally unpopular.

p. 126 \* (Evening Situation: . . North: . . Corps Schmidt.)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 120 \*\* (c) . . . Col. Wuthmann.)  
C of S, Sixteenth Army.

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p. 121 \* (1.) . . f) . . Rehabilitation Bn.)  
Probationary unit, see vol. VI, p. 216, note \*.

p. 121 \*\* (2.) . . . Reichshof.)  
Germanized name of Rzeszow in Southern Poland.

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p. 124 \* (OQu IV . . . Special Staff F.)  
F probably stands for Felmy.

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p. 126 \*\* (Col. Housinger: . . c) . between it and Seventeenth Army.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 127 \* (Top line: Cross-checked tabulations.)  
Comparison with older observations, corroborated by  
PW statements.

p. 127 \*\* (b) . . Cav. Div. (Teheran).)  
Either "stationed at Teheran" or "coming from Teheran".

-----

p. 129 \* (In South . . . over the Samara.)  
River northwest of Dnyepropetrovsk. - Ed.

p. 129 \*\* (Situation: South: . . against enemy artillery.)  
Kleist, in a surprise thrust, carried penetration as  
far as the Artillery positions.

-----

p. 133 \* (Gen. Wagner: . . Military Administration employees.)  
Gen. Halder was against bringing up this perennial  
question (assimilation to military status), which he  
wanted shelved for good.

p. 133 \*\* (Col. Popoff. . . Col. of the Gen. Staff Knesch. .)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 135 \* (Afternoon . . . on behalf of Goerdeler.)  
Goerdeler's name is written in shorthand, as  
precaution, see Editor's Foreword. Count Lehnndorf  
was well chosen as an emissary since he lived on an  
estate nearby and so could make this visit look  
just a neighborly one. His son was arrested in  
connection with the events of 20 July, 1944, and executed.

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p. 137 \* (Evening situation: . . . brought forward to the front.)  
This was an indication that the enemy intended to make  
a stand.

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p. 138 \* (60th birthday of ObdH . . . (Lutze) . . .)  
C of S of the SA (Brownshirts). - Ed.

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p. 140 \* ( e) . . . "Feuerzauber".)  
Code for a very silent reserve of BdE, which did not  
necessarily appear in periodic reports, but could be  
produced when the "impossible" was demanded.

p. 140 \*\* (. . . for their rapid mobilization.)  
By public notice or postcard.

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p. 141 \* (Situation: . . . South: . . . Kleist's Panzer Army. . .)  
and \*\* Armd. Gp. 1 (and 2) had been raised to the status  
of full Armies. Armd. Gp. 3 and 4 were elevated  
some months later.

p. 141 \*\*\* (. . . the lagging elements. . .)  
I.e., the Inf. attached to Armd. Gp. 2. - Ed.

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p. 142 \* (Armd. Gp. 4)  
Hoepfner's Group. - Ed.

p. 142 \*\* (Armd. Gp. 3)  
Hoth's Group. - Ed.

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p. 146 \* (... under two Air Fleets.)  
Air Force command approximately equivalent to Ground Forces Army.

p. 146 \*\* (... Bomber Gruppen,)  
See Glossary.

p. 146 \*\*\* (... Ren. Staffeln)  
See Glossary.

p. 146 # (d) ... Systems "Hell" and "Dunkel".)  
I.e., night intercession with the aid of searchlights ("Hell" - bright) or electronic devices ("Dunkel" - dark). System "Hell" was eventually discarded.

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p. 148 \* (d) ... for conversion to light Divs.)  
An intermediate form between Inf. and Mt. Div.

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p. 149 \* (Second line: ... Benefits for disabled soldiers.)  
Was to be given prominence in propaganda (Radko's department), since troops were particularly interested in this question (e.g., also occupational retraining, etc.)

p. 149 \*\* (Von Bock: ... "Special Communiqué.")  
This may refer to a "special communiqué" (Wehrmacht communiqué), in which von Bock felt slighted, or von Bock may have thought it was time to get one out to show the impressive progress of the offensive.

p. 149 \*\*\* (Gen. Wagner ... c) Fuel: Monthly requirements 90,000.)  
Probably 90,000 tons.

p. 149 # (Gen. Wagner: ... g) ... 20,000 prisoners.)  
This figure seems too high, since that number of prisoners would just make a Div. It might mean 1 Bn. of guards. - Ed.

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p. 150 \* (10 October ... Thoroughbred stallion.)  
Mentioned by Gen. Halder in self-derision because he considered his accident a fitting punishment for a man of his age unwise enough to mount such a horse.

p. 150 \*\* (Fort Boyen.)  
An obsolete fort in the East Prussian fortifications zone converted into an Army hospital.

p. 151 \* (Second line: . . . Some energetic "persuading".)  
Gen. Halder deliberately uses a horseman's expression ("vorwaertstreibende Hilfen"; embracing spurs, thigh pressure) to imply a combination of sharp order and gentle persuasion.

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p. 152 \* (Lt. Col. Beguelin . . . Chief Inland.)  
A Section of the General Armed Forces Office (AWA, see Glossary), maintaining liaison between OKW and civilian agencies in ZI.

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p. 154 \* (Col. Heusinger: a) . . . striking efficiency.)  
The choice of establishing a line that can be held with maximum economy of forces, or one that offers the best jump-off base for next year's operations.

p. 154 \*\* (. . . through Gen. Staff channels.)--  
I.e., the Cs of S of Army Gps. and Armies, so that they too could make their suggestions.

p. 154 \*\*\* (b) "Jagdkommandos".)  
Anti-partisan units with great mobility and special toughness. - Ed.

p. 154 # (Lt. Col. Langhaeuser: . . . Ia assignmant in 292nd Div.)  
A Liaison Officer was no longer needed in AGp. North where the situation had become static.

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p. 155 \* (Col. Balck . . . Armored Forces Chief.)  
German: "General der schnellen Truppen", one of the Arms Chiefs (see Glossary under OKH).

p. 155 \*\* (Gen. Wagner . . . b) Grain Threshing drive. 15 Dec. to 15 Jan.)  
In the Ukraine, to save the 1941 crop. Population was gone. The plan called for six to eight Divs. Two or three were finally assigned.

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p. 156 \* (1.) . . . b) . . . Expeditions.)  
From this base it was planned to send out expeditions to destroy the Russian armament industry in the Ural region.

p. 156 \*\* (a) . . . the confines of Russia.)  
I.e., no operations in Iran or Afghanistan.

p. 157 \* (Schwab-Gesterding.)  
OKH Press Relations officer, see VI p. 136.

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p. 159 \* (Lt. Col. Gebb. . . sick CG Second Army.)  
In the absence of ObdH, Gen. Halder had  
to deal with this matter, which was the exclusive  
province of ObdH.

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p. 160 \* (Situation: . . . he does not let us look over his  
shoulders.)  
There were no longer any Gen. Staff Liaison Officers,  
since they were needed in OKH, Army Gp., too, could  
not find out what he was doing.

---

p. 160 \*\* (Point a) . . . "curtailment".)  
von Bock meant this as a reproach, which was  
unwarranted.

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p. 165 \* (Evening situation: . . . enemy thrusts with artillery  
support.) as significant  
This fact is specifically noted, because the enemy  
in this sector had shortly before lost his artillery.

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p. 168 \* (Wagner . . . NSKK. . .)  
The National Socialist Motor Corps (Nationalsozial-  
istisches Kraftfahrer Korps) had functioned as Motor  
Transport Auxiliary since the Polish Campaign.

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p. 169 \* (Armd. Gp. 3 . . . are being relieved.)  
This sector is being taken over by Inf. Divs.

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- p. 173     \*     (Ministerial-Direktor.)  
Ministerial Director. High-ranking civil servant  
in a ministry (here the Ministry of Food), im-  
mediately below State Secretary. - Ed.
- p. 173     \*\*     (Banat.)  
Rich agricultural district in Yugoslavia, north  
of Belgrade, with many German settlers and under  
direct German administration, see VI, p. 95.
- p. 173     \*\*\*     ( /word illegible/. )  
Perhaps "Darré" (Minister of Food). In that case  
entry should read: Darré's food program.
- 
- p. 174     \*     (Gen. Bogatsch . . . to Zennelin.)  
OKH Hq Zossen near Berlin. The portion of his  
staff was not needed at the front during winter.
- 
- p. 175     \*     (Generaloberstabsarzt.)  
Medical Corps Officer of the rank of a Lt. Gen. - Ed,
- 
- p. 176     \*     (Bottom line: February 1941.)  
Should be "1942". - Ed.
- 
- p. 178     \*     (Col. von Bernuth . . . Baumholder.)  
Troop Training Center in the Palatinate. - Ed.
- 
- p. 180     \*     (1400 - 1600 Arys.)  
Artillery training ground in East Prussia, near  
Angerburg. - Ed.
-



- p. 182 \* (Col. Heusinger . . . Rabenau.)  
For archival purposes in connection with the writing of the history of the war.
- p. 182 \*\* (Entries in Wehrpass.)  
Wehrpass is the military record in booklet form which every male German of military age had to possess. All data connected with his military life and training were entered, incl. the battles and campaigns, for which a standard nomenclature was needed. During active military service, the Wehrpass was turned in for the Soldbuch, or paybook, which also contained all pertinent data. - Ed.
- p. 182 \*\*\* (Lt. Col. Radke . . a) . . Rabenau's religious writings.)  
The OQu V had very deep religious interests.
- 
- p. 183 \* (Gen. Wagner . . . Army Motorization Staffs.)  
"Heeresmotorisierungsstaeb" are agencies of the Gen Qu, charged with keeping a close eye on the truck situation in the Army, make suggestions to relieve the tight situation, etc.
- p. 183 \*\* (Bottom line: . . . compulsory delivery quotas.)  
Forced requisition.
- 
- p. 184 \* (Situation conference.)  
Footnote canceled.
- 
- p. 185 \* (Fifth paragraph: . . a road across Lake Ladoga.)  
I.e., across the ice of the lake. - Ed.
- 
- p. 194 \* (k) . . 15 cm Guns (11,300).)  
The figures indicate range in meters. - Ed.
- p. 194 \*\* (1) Caucasian Legion.)  
A formation of anti-Soviet Caucasians.
- 
- p. 198 \* (Gen. von Guendell.)  
Commandant of GHq.
- 
- p. 199 \* (AGp. North: . . . east of the Neva.)  
The figure "80" appears unreasonably high.

p. 203 \* (1230 Gen. Keitel . . . a) . . . in capacity of adviser.)  
Gen. Halder agreed that as an exception to the rule, he could go ahead in the matter, but should only act as an adviser, not press the matter.

p. 203 \*\* (Gen. Gerkce a) . . . (coal and water).)  
Changing the gauge of Russian tracks did not solve all problems of operation. Water pumps and coaling points were much farther apart than on western railroads, as Russian engines were built for longer runs.

p. 203 \*\*\* (Speed is indicated by bridges.)  
I.e., load rating of bridges. Trains must slow down to a walk in going over improvised bridges. It is, however, not so much the weight of the cars as that of the locomotive, which is the limiting factor. Also some bridges were so weak that trains had to be put across in sections.

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p. 204 \* (von Leeb: . . . next to 223rd Div.)  
I.e., attack through the sector of 291st Div., adjoining that of 223rd Div.

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p. 205 \* (Afternoon. Report to Fuehrer: . . . Norway: . . . (U.S.).)  
I.e., as a precaution against a possible landing attempt by U.S. forces.

-----  
p. 207 \* (Gen. Gerkce: . . . no cause for anxiety.)  
20% of the engines could not be kept in going order at the prevailing low temperatures, and French and Belgian locomotives froze in even before the German did.

-----  
p. 209 -(Asterisk omitted.) (Par. 2. . . unsatisfactory . . . set-up.)  
Being with, but not of, the Army, the Rcn. Staffeln were not treated too well by Army Supply. And, while being of, they were not with, the Air Force which, not getting anything out of them for itself, thought the Army ought to take care of them.

-----  
p. 210 \* (Col. von Bernuth: . . . d) Indicator shells.)  
"Deutgeschosse": Shells containing a charge producing colored smoke on detonation to indicate target areas, e.g., to aircraft.

p. 211 .\*\*(Situation, third paragraph: . . . traffic in a western direction.)  
Might also be troop transports, which would indicate that previous movements in an eastern direction were not evacuations but rather took out relieved troops.

---

p. 212 (Asterisk omitted.) (Matzky-Kinzel: . . . "Interpretation Group" . . .)  
To evaluate and digest individual reports.

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p. 212 \* (Gen. Buhle . . . e) Mobile Divs.)  
This term comprizes both Armd. and mot. Divs.

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p. 213 \* (Situations . . . North: . . . (reconnaissance).)  
"Kronstadt area" refers to the mainland south of Kronstadt (Ingermanland).

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p. 215 \* ( 5.) Armd. Gp. 4 . . . .)  
According to the situation map this should be "Armd. Gp. 3". - Ed.

---

p. 216 \* (Top line: Ground Forces Liaison at ObdL.)  
"General des Heeres" (not necessarily a General).  
This position in the Air Force was analogous to that of the "Arms Chiefs" in OKH (see Glossary under OKH).

---

p. 216 \*\* (Gen. Buhle: . . . f) . . . Army Artillery Commanders.)  
Before that, there had been only Corps Artillery Commanders.

---

p. 216 \*\*\* ( e )  
Letters c) and d) missing. - Ed.

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p. 216 # ( e ) . . . . Transnistria.)  
The territory between Dniestr and Bug. - Ed.

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p. 216 ## ( f ) . . . police records.)  
German "Abtransport 1900 uebelbeleumundeter Franzosen.."  
- Ed.

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p. 217 \* (Center: . . . . Burslomy.)  
Locality not found on situation map or otherwise identified.

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p. 219 \* (Gen. Geroke . . . rail operations of Army.)  
The Reichsbahn was obstreperous, considered  
itself a purely commercial concern.

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p. 222 \* (OCu I: . . . the latter for reorganization.)  
I.e., not for loss replacement but for reorgan-  
ization of Ground Forces Bn. Aviation preparatory  
to operations next spring.

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p. 222 \*\* ((b) Apparently one movement each. . .)  
I.e., scheduled movement of a whole Div. (50-60 trains).)

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p. 223 \* (1230 Brennecke . . . Fuel supply not through.)  
I.e., to troops, which could fuel up their  
vehicles and retreat with them.

---

p. 224 \* (1300 Sodenstern . . . enemy pressure.)  
The Div. was taken back from a salient to a  
straight line because Hitler insisted on freeing  
some Bns.

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p. 224 \*\* (1320 . . . a) "Walkuere".)  
Two waves of new activations.

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p. 224 \*\*\* (. . . mixed Signal Co.)  
Radio and wire.

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p. 224 # (. . . Gross Born, Mlava, Wattern, Neuhammer.)  
Troop training centers. - Ed.

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p. 225 \* ( b ) Rheingold.)  
Men on occupational deferment status and the last gleanings from the Replacement Army.

p. 225 \*\* ( b ) . . . domestic economy . . . trucks.)  
and \*\*\* Many of the deferred men were key workers in the critical automobile industry.

p. 225 # (1330 . . . conference with the Fuehrer.)  
I.e., Goering will speak to the Fuehrer about it.

p. 225 ## (von Ziehlberg: . . . New Year proclamation.)  
I.e., drafting of proclamation to troops.

p. 225 ### (OOu I: . . in administrative matters.)  
Supply, materiel, personnel, etc.

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p. 226 \* (Situation: . . South: . . . reinforcements.)  
General reinforcements, i.e., construction troops, materiel.

p. 226 \*\* (North: . . Ladoza front.)  
Southern shore of Lake Ladoza. - Ed.

\* \* \*

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p. 229 - \* (Top: . . replacements for the front.)  
To get NCO replacements for the front.

p. 229 \*\* ( b ) Jagd Kommandos.)  
Raiding Bns. for special raiding and mopping-up purposes and anti-parachutist work, thus mainly committed against partisans. - Ed.

p. 229 \*\*\* ( c ) . . . Will let us know about them.)  
I.e., Fromm will find out, when these units would be available.

p. 229 # ( d ) . . . Open!)  
It should be remembered however that these are open trucks, a drawback at that time of the year.

p. 229 ## ( g ) . . . which Field Army does not want.)  
Because of age.

p. 229 ### ( Gen. Gercke: a ) . . Kleinmann.)  
Railroad specialist.

- p. 230 \* (b) . . . sounds rather listless.)  
Fellgiebel (Signals) monitored radio traffic between Army etc. Hqs and units to supervise radio discipline. OKH received reports.
- 
- p. 231 \* (Gen. Matzky: . . . b) . . . 70° longitude!)  
Boundary between respective spheres of interest runs through western Siberia (approximately Tobolsk) and Iran. - Ed.
- 
- p. 232 \* (Brennecke: . . . of the "corridor".)  
The narrow strip on east bank of the Neva, east of Leningrad held by the Germans.
- 
- p. 233 \* (1300 . . . Carry on the functions. . .)  
I.e., Gen. Staff functions.
- p. 233 \*\* (. . . administrative part.)  
I.e., that part of ObdH's functions which normally would be carried out by a War Minister.
- p. 233 \*\*\* (1.) . . . and cannot be created.)  
It is German tactical doctrine in drawing up plans for an offensive not to consider rear positions. . .  
. . . Troops react negatively if they know that rear positions have been prepared. It makes them feel the command does not expect success.
- p. 233 # (ac) . . . threats to the flanks.)  
Hitler thought such threats did not matter.
- p. 233 ## (d) . . . must be transferred by sea.)  
So as not to tax the overburdened railroads.
-

p. 234 \* (5.) Denmark . . . territorial basis.)  
The new organization of the garrison need not have  
the structure of a Division,

p. 234 \*\* (Center: . . . over railroad embankment.)  
German: " Feind fuehrt Verstaerkung auf Bahndamm  
heran." Theoretically this could also mean:  
"against the railroad embankment", but the map  
suggests the above translation. - Ed.

p. 234 \*\*\* (Field Marshal von Kluge . . . Enemy in Leova!)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 235 \* (Situation conference: . . . no prepared positions  
in the rear.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 236 \* (Situation, third paragraph: . . . Odoyev.)  
Not located on 1:300,000 situation map. - Ed.

p. 236 \*\* (Fourth paragraph: . . . The Commanding Generals.)  
I.e., Corps CGs. - Ed.

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p. 237 \* (Dispatching of officers . . . self-confidence.)  
To get them to understand the situation. OKH  
cannot help because of lack of transportation.

p. 237 \*\* (22 December . . . hollow-charge projectiles.)  
Hitler had reserved the decision on their release for  
combat use to himself, since he feared copying by the  
enemy.

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p. 238 \* (Center: . . . defensive successes.)  
German: " Abwehrerfolge". Means that the enemy has  
gained no operational success and was beaten back  
with heavy loss. If friendly forces pass to counter  
attack, a "Verteidigungserfolg" may grow out of it.  
The two terms are often used very loosely.

p. 238 \*\* (Heusinger . . . von Hobe.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 239 \* (Many telephone conversations . . . Second Panzer Army.)  
von Kluge was simultaneously Army Gp. C in C and  
C in C of his old Fourth Army. His thinking was  
still concentrated on Fourth Army.

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p. 239 (Asterisk omitted.) (Hq XXIV and Hq 216 Inf.)  
Should read: "Troops of XXIV Corps  
under Hq of 216th Inf. Div,

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p. 241 \* (Situation: . . . extension to the west possible.)  
Because Seventeenth Army has its front facing north.

---

p. 242 \* (Gen. Jacob: . . . a) . . . 60 shell-proofs.)  
Larger structures put together from pre-fabricated  
sections; reinforced concrete beams.

---

p. 242 \*\* (. . . labor detachments.)  
Forced labor formations.

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p. 243 \* (( b) . . . would take seven weeks.)  
I.e., in case the West Wall should be needed again.

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p. 244 \* (Third paragraph: . . . Foerster has been relieved.)  
Richthofen, an Air Force General, who was always  
very critical about the effectualness of Ground  
Forces Commanders, was put in command of an Army  
Corps on Gen. Halder's insistence, to show how he  
would do it. He did not last long in his new command.

---

p. 244 \*\* (OQu I: . . . (Instructional Pamphlet).)  
OQu I, in charge of operations, had to see to it  
that tactical experiences were speedily applied  
everywhere on the front,

---

p. 244 \*\*\* (30 December . . . operational situation.)  
I.e., a situation that may affect the entire  
southern theater.

---

p. 245 \* (Gen. Wagner . . . . from paper mill.)  
A factory near Leningrad.

---



p. 247 (Asterisk omitted.) (First paragraph: . . . "Koenigsberg position" . . .)

Any kind of rear position was taboo to Hitler. He prohibited even theoretical consideration of such alternatives. Hq Ninth Army, like most other Hqs, however, considered several potential lines of resistance in the rear. Although such discussions were kept to a very small circle at top level, the idea had spread throughout Ninth Army that such positions actually existed. With increasing enemy pressure, unit commanders gave the order to fall back on one of these non-existent defense line and so created a very difficult tactical situation.

One of these lines had somehow been given the name "Koenigsberg position", and Hitler jumped to the conclusion that it was all von Brauchitsch's fault (he was gone two weeks at the time) and let go at him in a frenzy of rage, merely because von Brauchitsch had at one time been commandant of the Fortress of Koenigsberg.

Gen. Foerster (cf. p. 244) was involved in this retreat.

p. 247 \* (Fifth paragraph: . . . loss of confidence.)  
I.e., in Hitler.

p. 247 \*\* (13 January . . . 30 below freezing.)  
- 21° Fahrenheit. - Ed.

p. 247 \*\*\* (Bottom line: 42 degrees of frost.)  
- 43° Fahrenheit. - Ed.

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p. 249 \* (OQu I: "New West Wall".)  
The Wall on the Atlantic Coast.

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p. 250 \* (8 January . . . to protect the supply road.)  
The road Roslavl - Yukhnov. The Fuehrer was in fine form when he could strain his ingenuity on such little makeshifts.

p. 250 \*\* (. . . with all legal consequences!)  
Hoepfner was associated with the Generals who prepared the pre-Munich overthrow of Hitler (1938). Gen. Halder believes that Hitler had a fair idea of the entire cast of the show, but had no tangible evidence for action against them. Hoepfner was one of the men whom Hitler singled out for vicious remarks on every occasion, and now that he gave him the opportunity, Hitler came down on him as hard as he could. Following the events of 20 July 1944, Hoepfner was tried and hanged.

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- p. 251 \* (10 January . . . Fourth Panzer Army.)  
Formerly Armd. Gp. 4 - Ed.
- p. 251 \*\* (12 January . . . South: . . . taking over Second Army.)  
From AGp. Center. - Ed.
- 
- p. 254 \* (Gen. Wagner: . . . retreat of AGp. Center.)  
I.e., if and when the need should arise. Nothing of this planning was to come to Hitler's ears.
- p. 254 \*\* (208th Day.)  
Probably one of the gloomiest days of that winter. The Cs in C about that time were almost unanimous in their desire to abandon the Russian front and fall back to the Government-General. Darkest pessimism was intensified by a book on the retreat from Russia in 1812, by Gen. Coulaincourt, which had just been put out by a Paris publisher. The copies of the book passed from hand to hand, were avidly read and had devastating psychological effects. Its circulation was finally prohibited. Gen. Halder, for whom the Russian winter was a family tradition through the diary of an ancestor who had survived the retreat, was well aware of the hardships suffered, but realized that giving up the ground conquered at such great cost was no solution and more lives would have to be paid for recapture the following spring.
- 
- p. 255 \* (Bonin . . . German Cross in Gold.)  
The "Fried Egg", see p.83, note\*, Bonin was the first to receive it.
- p. 255 \*\* (18 January . . . von Bock, who received his briefing.)  
von Bock took over the command of AGp. South after Reichenau's collapse.
- p. 255 \*\*\* (Col. Ehlfeldt . . . "Do" Rocket Projector Bns.)  
His idea was that the development of Arty. lay in the field of "Do" projectors.
- 
- p. 256 \* (Situation . . . linked with Kharkov.)  
I.e., an inference made from intercepted radio traffic. Actually the offensive was further south.
- 
- p. 257 \* (20 January . . . Boundary gap.)  
On boundary of AGps. Center and North. See 19 January.  
- Ed.

p. 258 \* (f) . . . from the West for the East (?)  
The question mark denotes that the availability of these Divs. is uncertain.

---

p. 259 \* (Gen. Wagner . . . Report on Vyazma.)  
Vyazma contained large supply dumps. Evacuation had to be prepared beforehand against a general retreat.

---

p. 261 \* (Gen. Jacob . . . on the Vistula.)  
Buildings and other structures, as well as, e.g., fruit trees, in German fortress areas were subject to special legislation, whereby they could be razed on the approach of the enemy, so as not to obstruct the field of fire or afford cover to the enemy.

---

p. 262 \* (Oberstabsarzt Dr. Schreiber).  
Oberstabsarzt is equivalent to Major, Med. Corps. - Ed.

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p. 265 (Asterisk omitted.) (Situation:)  
There is a marked decrease in diary entries since the resignation of von Brauchitsch (ObdH) in Dec., 1941, which continues, with some exceptions in spring and summer, 1942, to the end of Gen. Halder's official career in Sep., 1942. It was now his function to come to the daily Fuehrer situation conferences, and what notes he needed for them he put on loose sheets of paper which were later destroyed.  
Notes on Gen. Halder's situation reports during that period can be found in Gen. Jodl's Diary. - Ed.

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p. 269 \* (Maj. Pistorius: . . . investigation on Kaufmann and on Foerster.)  
This case was connected with the affair of the non-existent "Koenigsberg" position. (See p. 247.)

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p. 263 \* (Gen. Jordan . . . (Oak leaves).)  
The first cluster on Knight's Cross of the Iron Cross. - Ed.

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p. 264 \* (3 February . . . Busch and von Kuechler.)  
Busch was C in C Sixteenth Army. - Ed.

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p. 26

p. 265 (Asterisk omitted.) (Gen. Heusinger . . . mud period.)  
When the deep snow on Russian roads melts and turns to slush and the water has not yet drained off, locomotion between towns is all but impracticable. Any sort of outdoor activity in villages is suspended. That is the time, after the real winter is over, when the Russian peasants must hole up for as long as two to four weeks.

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p. 266 \* (Capt. Wagner . . . naval situation.)  
Review of the situation in Atlantik and Mediterranean.

p. 266 \*\* (Situation: . . . to gain momentum.)  
After being stopped by snowstorms on the previous day (q.v.).

p. 266 \*\*\* (OQu I: . . . "Rheingold" Divs.)  
See p. 225, note \*.

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p. 270 \* (Top: . . . small party.)  
German: "kleine Herrengesellschaft" . - Ed.

p. 270 \*\* (Lt. Col. Haas: . . . Regt. Grossdeutschland.)  
Was to be expanded to a Div. - Ed.

p. 270 \*\*\* (Bottom: . . . Sponeck's death sentence.)  
Gen. Count Sponeck, who had withdrawn the 46th Div. from the Kerch peninsula on 29 Dec. (See p. 243). The sentence was later commuted to imprisonment in a fortress, in Southern Germany, where he was murdered in the great "clean-up" that followed the 20 July, 1944.

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p. 271 \* (17 February . . . Leibstandarte.)  
SS Adolf Hitler, then a mot. Div. - Ed.\*

p. 271 \*\* (18 February . . . dense concentrations of enemy (23 Feb?).)  
Omission: Should be "enemy Cav." An attack was anticipated for 23 Feb., the "Day of the Red Army". - Ed.

p. 271 \*\*\* (19 February . . . Ostashkov - Toporets.)  
By the Russians. The line was behind the enemy front. - Ed.

- p. 272 \* (Capt. Weygold . . . . Very impressive.)  
The two battleships "Scharnhorst" and "Gneisenau" successfully ran the British gauntlet in the Channel and reached their home base. - Ed.
- p. 272 \*\* (Major Weller (Qu Rome).)  
Chief of German Supply Hq in Rome, controlling supply and troop movements to Naples on their way to North Africa.
- p. 272 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg . . . . by reorganization of OKH.)  
Gen. Halder had always signed "i.A." (im Auftrag, by order, i.e., of ObdH) and continued to do so after von Brauchitsch had left. He thought it improper that Keitel, in OKW, should send him instructions, etc., without any such qualification, as if these instructions came directly from him and not from the Fuehrer. The issue was settled by Keitel using his own letterheads, not OKW's.
- p. 272 # (Gen. Heusinger . . . . Southeastern operation.)  
Against the Caucasus. - Ed.
- p. 272 ## (State Secretary Kleinmann.)  
Hitler gave State Secretary Kleinmann a date by which the unsatisfactory railroad transport situation would have to be cleared up or he would turn him over to the Gestapo, adding ominously "and you know what that means."
- 
- p. 273 \* (22 February . . . . "Fortress Demyansk".)  
The area around Demyansk became a fortress under siege by the Russians.
- 
- p. 274 \* (24 February . . . paradoxically quiet day.)  
(German: "auffallend. . .") The Russians had the troops and the opportunities, but did not undertake anything. (There should be no emphasis under quiet day.) - Ed.
- p. 274 \*\* (In the Izyum pocket. . . . pressure to the north.)  
Inside the pendulous sac on the west bank of the Volkhov. - Ed.
- 
- p. 275 \* (Gen. Herrlein . . . . Inf. Chief to ObdH.)  
Should be "OKH" . - Ed.
-

- p. 276 \* (Maj. Zedler . . . German Detachments.)  
German: "Deutsche Kommandos", i.e.; the  
Demonstration units detached to the Romanian Army.
- p. 276 \*\* (Maj. von Below: . . . Army Arms Schools.)  
German: "Waffenschulen der Sonderwaffen". "Sonder-  
waffen were branches of the Army other than Inf.
- p. 276 \*\*\* (Ministerialdirigent Dankwarts.)  
High ranking civil servant in Ministry, directly  
below "Ministerialdirektor", see p. 173, note \*. - Ed.
- p. 276 # (28 February . . . from both sides.)  
I.e, out of Sevastopol and from the Kerch front. - Ed.
- p. 276 ## (. . . weaker ones against II.)  
XI Corps, fronting the Izyum bulge. - Ed.
- p. 276 ### (. . . western wing of XXIII Corps.)  
The Russian breakthrough on the boundary of AGps. Center  
and North in January had cut very far to the south  
behind the front of AGp. Center. This bulge roughly  
resembled Cape Cod Bay, with the sectors of Armd. Gp. 3  
and Ninth Army forming the shape of Cape Cod. On such  
a map, XXIII Corps (Ninth Army) would be holding the  
area of Provincetown, fronting north, west and south  
(with another Corps to its east). - Ed.
- p. 276 \*# (Asterisk should be after "Oak leaves".)  
See p. 263, note \*.
- 
- p. 277 \* (1 March 1942 . . . on the eastern front. . .)  
There was also a small western front on this salient. - Ed.
- p. 277 \*\* (2 March, third paragraph: . . . corridor to II Corps.)  
The Corps was isolated. - Ed.
- 
- p. 278 \* (Gen. Brand. . . Karl Gun . . .)  
The "Thor" (Hammer) siege howitzer. Two models, 54 cm and  
61.5 cm caliber. Used against fortifications. - Ed.  
Gen. Halder, who came from the Artillery (the traditional  
arm of his family since the 16th century), considered  
these and other super-heavy guns wasteful toys. The  
Fuehrer, however, who rated himself, among other firsts,  
as "the world's greatest Artillery specialist" (eclipsing  
also Napoleon), doted on these expensive noisemakers.
- p. 278 \*\* (Col. von Ziehlberg: . . . Kommandogruppen von Seydlitz and  
Zorn.)  
Combat Teams of more than Div. strength, given the  
mission to open a corridor from Staraya Russa to  
II Corps, surrounded in the "fortress" Demyansk.

- p. 279 \* (Gen. Keitel . . . Complaints about the Personnel Div.)  
Gen. Halder was dissatisfied.
- p. 279 \*\* (Gen. Gercke . . . Will.)  
Col. Will, Co of the Railroad Troops in the field  
(Bedeis). - Ed.
- 
- p. 280 \* (Second paragraph: . . . offensive Army.)  
I.e., the maximum strength that could be given it.
- p. 280 \*\* (Gen. Zorn . . . in II Corps sector.)  
To protect southern flank of Seydlitz, attacking south  
of Lake Ilmen.
- 
- p. 281 \* (9 March . . . western front of Ninth Army.)  
Cf. p. 276 note ###.
- p. 281 \*\* (10 March . . . Georg Seiderer.)  
One of Gen. Halder's sons-in-law.
- 
- p. 282 \* (Fuehrer conference . . . immediate impressions. . .)  
His attention became absorbed by any minor attack  
of the Russians, and in the process he lost sight of  
the great picture and what his reaction to that pin-  
prick might mean for the over-all situation.
- p. 282 \*\* (. . . western front of Ninth Army.)  
Cf. p. 276, note ###.
- p. 282 \*\*\* (. . . too much freedom of decision!)  
In keeping with his neurotic personality, Hitler some-  
times would drop a decision into someone else's lap,  
who then could be blamed in case of failure.
- 
- p. 283 \* (Col. Thiele . . . on transfer to OKW.)  
A signal communications specialist entrusted with the  
delicate task of protecting Gen. Halder's telephones  
against tapping by political agencies. Together with  
his Chief, Gen. Fellgiebel, he was killed after the  
20 July, 1944.
- p. 283 \*\* (Gen. Brand . . . Dora Gun.)  
80 cm Gun, range 51,400 yards, weight of projectile  
16,540 pounds. Also known as "Gustav". - Ed.

- p. 284 \* (Gen. Jacob . . . rate of fuel consumption.)  
They were kept mobile to be committed wherever needed.
- 
- p. 285 \* (6Qu I . . . warfare in the East.)  
This was no longer warfare of Armies, but . guerilla warfare, causing relatively heavy losses. Also discussion of problems to be coped with when spring weather would turn the forests into bogs.
- p. 285 \*\* (von Kuechler . . . Volkhov breach.)  
The narrow access to the pendulous sac in this sector. - Ed.
- p. 285 \*\*\* (Zorn's sector.)  
Zorn protected the south flank of Seydlitz in his attack from Staraya Russa to relieve Demyansk.
- 
- p. 286 \* (Col. Peters . . . ByTO.)  
See Glossary.
- 
- p. 287 \* (Major Leyherr.)  
A son-in-law. - Ed.
- p. 287 \* (Maj. von Hobe.)  
Another son-in-law. Appointed Ia in Grossdeutschland Div., which Gen. Halder considered a critical post with respect to possible political developments.
- p. 287 \* (23 March . . . islands operation.)  
Islands in Gulf of Finland. Troops came from OKW theater, Finland. - Ed.
- p. 287 \* (Gen. Lt. Mueller . . . outside the Army.)  
Nazis in the Army would go with their grievances not through channels, but directly to the Party.
- 
- p. 288 \* (Gen. Heusinger . . . "Siegfried".)  
Code for assembly for operation "Blau" (the 1942 summer offensive).
- p. 288 \* (25 March . . . Center . . . (supply road).)  
The front here was right at the vital supply road Roslavl - Yukhnov. - Ed.



- p. 289 \* (Gen. Bogatsch . . . Turning over business.)  
Gen. Lohmann was the new Air Force representative.  
at OKH. - Ed.
- p. 289 \*\* (Reich Labor Leader Hierl.)  
Former teacher of war history at the War Academy;  
also Gen. Halder studied under him. Had personality  
difficulties in the Army and so, at an early date,  
looked to the Party for a more suitable field of  
activities.
- 
- p. 290 \* (28 March . . . our "bridge".)  
A thin barrier pushed across the bottleneck access  
to the sac. - Ed.
- p. 290 \*\* (. . . most talkative besides.)  
He was continuously on the phone, talking to Gen. Halder.
- p. 290 \*\*\* (29 March . . . against the "corridor".)  
Between II and X Corps, see p. 285, note \*\*.
- p. 290 # (Gen. Schmudt: . . . disciplining.)  
Gen. Schmudt approached Gen. Halder with the argument  
that, as an outsider, Hitler was denied the confidence  
of the Officers' Corps, and suggested that it would be  
beneficial all around if he were to go to the various  
Hqs to "sell" the Fuehrer.
- p. 290 ## (Col. Ehlfeldt: . . . Assault badge.)  
The Artillery considered itself entitled to it just  
as much as the frontline Inf. man.
- 
- p. 291 \* (30 March . . . von Witzleben.)  
Relieved of his post as Mil. Commander France, von  
Rundstedt took his place.
- p. 291 \*\* (31 March . . . "Brueckenschlag".)  
A simultaneous drive northward from Rzhev and south-  
ward from Demyansk, to pinch off the big bulge between  
AGps. Center and North. (I.e., "striking a bridge"  
from Provincetown to Gloucester, cf p. 276, note ###.)
- p. 291 \*\*\* (. . . in its Rear Area.)  
Against partisans and the Russian Cav. Corps Belev.- Ed.
- p. 291 # (. . . Heeresnachschubfuehren.)  
In charge of all horse-drawn columns - Ed.

- p. 292     \*     (Gen. Heusinger. . . . Command set-up.)  
In each of the successive phases of "Siegfried"  
("Blau"), as the three offensive groups were launching  
their part of the larger operation, there was to be  
a different commander. The signal network had to be  
planned accordingly.
- p. 292     \*\*     (von Ziehlberg: . . . . Exchange Kinzel-Gehlen.)  
Gehlen, a very able Gen. Staff Officer, became  
the new Chief of Section Foreign Armies East.
- 
- p. 293     \*     (5 April . . . Gen. Herrlein . . . . Pre-military training.)  
Refers to revival of the old plan to have the SA  
(Brownshirts) take charge of pre-military training.
- 
- p. 294     \*     (von Ziehlberg. . . . Decorations on 20 April.)  
Hitler's birthday. - Ed.
- p. 294     \*\*     (Lt. Col. Christ. . . . on technical developments.)  
In all technical developments the Gen. Staff would  
only specify what it needed, leaving the rest to  
the Ordnance Office under BdE (see Glossary under "OKH")  
Christ, who just came in new from Org. Sec., proposed  
to put development projects directly under Gen. Staff,  
Such a change was undesirable.
- p. 294     \*\*\*     (8 April . . . von Seydlitz' attack.)  
At Staraya Russa, see 18 March, etc. - Ed.
- 
- p. 295     \*     (Situation . . . . situation at Pogostye . . . more diffi-  
cult.)  
Pogostye, an important road and railroad junction,  
had to be held at all cost.
- 
- p. 296     \*     (11 April . . . . orders for operation "Blau".)  
The great summer offensive against the Don. - Ed.

- p. 297 \* (OQu I . . . . Anti-partisan Jagdkommandos.)  
Bns. trained for fighting partisans. - Ed.
- p. 297 \*\* (OQu I . . . . Assault Bns.)  
Same as "Schockbattallione" in World War I. Gen. Halder did not like them because of their "primadonna" attitude, which made them unavailable between special assignments.
- p. 297 \*\*\* (Lt. Col. Christ . . . . new Hq AGp. South.)  
AGp. South was to be split into two new Gps., a southern and a northern, designated respectively "A" (Caucasus) and "B" (Don, Stalingrad).
- p. 297 # (von Ziehlberg . . . . Liaison Officer from Org. Sec. .)  
Christ was not the right man for the job.
- p. 297 ## (Count Stauffenberg . . . . troops of its own.)  
So that they would not always have to ask for them from Gen. Halder.
- p. 297 ### (Average daily casualties . . . . 3,478 (58).)  
The figures in parenthesis refer to officers.  
A comparison with the casualty reports indicates that the last line should read: 3,402 (73). This is interesting for the mounting officer casualty rate.  
Ed.
- 
- p. 298 (Asterisk omitted.) (Gen. Brand . . . . Artillery tactics.)  
Correction: "Employment of Artillery." (German: "Artillerie-Kampffuehrung") The meaning here is: What are appropriate Artillery targets? - Ed.
- P. 298 \* (Col. von Ziehlberg . . . . AGp. A.)  
Mission in Caucasus. - Ed.
- p. 298 \*\* (16 April . . . . Russian Thirtythird Army.)  
Was encircled after the Battle of Vyazma. - Ed.
- 
- p. 299 \* (Reich Labor Service Leader Hierl . . . . incorporation into Army.)  
E.g., as AAA, Guard, etc. units. Retained their distinctive uniform and organizational identity. - Ed.
-

p. 300 \* (20 April . . German red-letter day attack.)  
On the Fuehrer's birthday. - Ed.

p. 300 \*\* (The gap . . .)  
Between II and X Corps. - Ed.

p. 300 \*\*\* (von Ziehlberg . . . . archive collection.)  
The official unit war diaries of the Polish Campaign were stored in a wooden structure in Potsdam, pending construction of permanent storage space in the War Archives. Second copies could be obtained because the units, contrary to regulations, had kept two copies during the campaign with a view to having one for themselves.  
It was suggested at the time that there might have been foul play on the part of those close to the Party, who wanted to write history with a special slant.  
Hitler had war diaries abolished in 1942, undoubtedly out of a desire better to control the facts on which writing of the history of the war would have to be based.

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p. 301 \* (21 April . . between Rostov and Yelets.)  
On the Don front. - Ed.

p. 301 \*\* (Gen. Wagner . . Administrative Orders for "Blau".)  
The Gen Qu's counterpart of the operational order.

p. 301 \*\*\* (Gen. Matzky: "Legions".)  
Foreign contingents.

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p. 302 \* (23 April . . Col. Dr. Speidel.)  
In Germany, the doctor title becomes an integral part of the name. There were a number of higher officers who had acquired degrees while attending universities as part of their official duties to become specialists in some particular field. - Ed.

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p. 303 \* (Lt. Col. Mueller-Hillebrand . . . for AGp. North.)  
Would be needed in this sector because of the marshy terrain.

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p. 304 (Asterisk omitted.) (29 April . . . Tirpitzufer.)  
OKH Offices.

p. 304 \* (3 May . . . "Exchange-Tel.")  
Exchange Telegraph, a news agency in Moscow. - Ed.

p. 304 \*\* (. . . Polit. Liaison Sec.)  
The reading of the shorthand for "Heerwesen Abt." is  
not certain. - Ed.

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p. 305 \* (4 May . . . Baroness Dyker.)  
Gen. Halder's hostess at Godesberg in 1940 (cf. IV 47.)  
called at GHq in her capacity as high official of the  
German Red Cross.

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p. 306 \* (6 May . . . corridor in Sixteenth Army.)  
The German corridor between II and X Corps. - Ed.

p. 306 \*\* (Gen. Osterkamp . . . civilian employees.)  
The ever-recurrent question of their assimilation  
to military rank and their treatment in the Army.

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p. 307 \* (1800 General Schell . . . economy.)  
I.e., of the German economy for the war effort.

p. 307 \*\* (Lt. Col. Mueller-Hillebrand . . . tank developments.)  
Tanks V and VI.

p. 307 \*\*\* (General Zorn . . . on the northern front.)  
Footnote canceled.

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p. 308 \* (10 May . . . in Wandel's sector.)  
The thin skin over the enemy sac behind the front  
of his sector, see p. 290, note \*. - Ed.

p. 308 \*\* (General Oberstabsveterinaer Schulze.)  
Maj. Gen. (Vet. Corps). - Ed.

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p. 309 \* (Gen. Mueller . . . reconnaissance of Italian border.)  
(Correction: Col. Mueller.) Gen. Halder knew that the  
Italians were building fortifications along their  
border with Germany. Although any spying on the Ally  
was strictly forbidden, he had the fortifications sur-  
veyed from the German side with very efficient long-  
range optical instruments.

p. 309 \*\* (Lt. Col. Mueller-Hillebrand . . . AT Guns.)  
There was not enough to go around, as many had been  
lost during winter. Now the question was, which  
units should get the new guns.

p. 309 \*\*\* (Bottom . . . operation "Fridericus".)  
Code for the operation to liquidate the Izyum salient  
prior to launching "Blau". - Ed.

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p. 310 \* (Top: Prof. Fontaine.)  
Major General (Vet. Corps). - Ed.

p. 310 \*\* (Prof. Handloser.)  
Major General (Med. Corps). - Ed.

p. 310 \*\*\* (Col. von Ziehlberg . . . Staff assistants.)  
German: "Fuehrer-Gehilfen". Graduates of the War  
Academy, who were on probation for six months  
to one year before acceptance in the Gen. Staff  
Corps.

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p. 311 \* (At noon . . . Third Honved Army.)  
Hungarian Reserve Army, corresponding to German  
"Landwehr" (see Glossary). - Ed.

p. 311 \*\* (1800 . . . "Christophorus" vehicle . . .)  
New trucks. Were brought to the front by road  
because there was not enough rail transportation for  
them. Preparations had to be made for this by setting  
up filling stations, repair shops, etc. on the route  
of march.

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p. 313 \* (Lt. Col. Mueller-Hillebrand . . . Chemical Warfare  
Troops at OKH.)  
German: "General der Nebeltruppe." - Ed.

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p. 314 \* (Gen. Bogatsch . . . Air Force Service Area.)  
German: "Luftkreis".

p. 315 \* (Col. Ehlfeldt . . . Ingermanland.)  
The area on the mainland south of Kronstadt.

p. 315 \*\* (Gen. Jacob . . . fuel.)  
I.e., for trucks on construction jobs for the Atlantic Wall.

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p. 316 \* (24 May . . . Cav. Corps Belov.)  
The First Guard Cav. Corps, led by a very enterprising and skillful commander, broke through the German lines, was cut off later, and worked with partisans around Yelnya and Dorogobuzh. Large elements managed to evade encirclement by moving south (still behind the German lines), merged with other partisan groups, and finally escaped.

p. 316 \*\* (. . . Artillery activity from the outside.)  
The front of AGp. Center in this area, between the regular Russian forces and the Cav. Corps had a depth of only 20 km (12 miles). - Ed.

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p. 319 \* (Lt. Col. Mueller-Hillebrand . . . (concerning Armd. Divs.).)  
Footnote canceled.

p. 319 \*\* (Gen. Matzky . . . during the operation.)  
Gen. Halder did not want to be bothered by them during the big offensive.

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p. 320 \* (30 May . . . by releasing Volchansk.)  
Owing to the favorable tactical situation, von Bock proposed to start the Wolchansk operation before the opening of "Blau", and obtained the Fuehrer's agreement.

p. 320 \*\* (31 May . . . "Erika Schneise".)  
A "Schneise" is a very straight lane kept open in forests to indicate border lines and facilitate care and exploitation. The breached front of Wandel's Combat Gp. which was periodically closed, ran parallel with such a lane, named "Erika" for identification purposes.

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p. 321 \* (Lt. Col. Pistorius . . . Anton-Ilona . . . AGp. D.)  
"Anton", a modification of the "Attila" plan (occupation of Vichy France), in cooperation with Italian forces.  
"Ilona", a modification of the "Isabella" operation to counter a British landing in Portugal. The ports of Bilbao and Santander would be seized to forestall the British and troops would move to the Spanish-Portuguese border.  
"AGp. D". There was only a Military Command France, (since France was no active theater), but in respect to possible military operations, the organization was synonymous with AGp. D.

- p. 322 \* (Lt. Col. Jais . . . "Herkules".)  
"Herkules". A projected Italian operation to seize Malta.
- p. 322 \*\* (Hungarian Gen. Uizasz (Second Bureau).)  
G-2 Section. - Ed.
- 
- p. 323 \* (Heusinger . . . cannot yet be estimated.)  
In "Blau" (see p. 296 note \*) three groups were to attack successively. The time intervals between the attacks had bearing on priority for transportation of replacements.
- 
- p. 324 \* (Callers: . . . Ia, Eight Armd. Div.)  
Gen. Halder could not remember the name after the caller had left.
- p. 324 \*\* (Col. von Ziehlberg: . . . for the Fuehrer.)  
The Fuehrer had assigned this mission to a protégé, who was to write the history of the war for him. Col. Scherff, a Gen. Staff officer and capable writer, was given the mission of writing the history of the war as a personal glorification of the Fuehrer. Gen. Halder protested against this reversal of previous arrangements. (Cf. p. 300, note \*\*\*)
- p. 324 \*\*\* (11 June, Situation . . . have escaped south.)  
I.e., into a sort of no-man's land behind the German line.
- p. 324 # (Col. Ehlfeldt: . . . possibilities.)  
The transfer of Artillery to the Leningrad-Kronstadt front after completion of the siege of Sevastopol.
- 
- p. 326 \* (Lt. Col. Crome:)  
A confidant of Gen. Halder.
- 
- p. 327 \* (15 June . . . boundary of AGps South . . .)  
Should be "Center" and North . . . - Ed.
- p. 327 \* (16 June . . . is rather embarrassing.)  
More of a liability than an asset.
-



- p. 328     \*    (Gen. von Greiffenberg . . . to change plans.)  
I.e., as situation indicates. There should be no rigid  
plan and leaders should be able to take advantage of  
new opportunities.
- p. 328     \*\*    (17 . . . In North.)  
The Velizh pocket was German and moreover in AGp.  
Center territory. Probably the Volkhov pocket was  
meant. - Ed.
- 
- p. 329     \*    (Gen. Keitel . . . court of honor cases.)  
Footnote canceled.
- p. 329     \*\*    (Gen. Woehler . . . Deception measures.)  
To cover "Blau". Center will do as if it were  
to launch an offensive.
- 
- p. 330     \*    (Top: . . . Peenemuende.)  
Experimental station for "V"-weapons. - Ed.
- 
- p. 331     \*    (21 June . . . Major Reichel . . . is dead.)  
The body of the officer was not found, but the  
condition of the plane left no doubt about his fate.
- 
- p. 334     \*    (Afternoon: . . . at the Vorwerk.)  
Quarters formerly occupied by von Brauchitsch, now a  
VIP house.
- 
- p. 335     \*    (von Kluge . . . Operation "Seydlitz".)  
Called after a popular song on Frederick the Great's  
famous Cavalry General ("Seydlitz aus dem Busch". . .).  
The objective was cleaning out the bulge west of Ninth  
Army.
- p. 335     \*    (von Kluge . . . starting middle of August.)  
The references to place names indicate operations  
planned to capture the areas. The Ostashkov operation  
by AGp. Center in cooperation with AGp. North, which would  
push south from Demyansk, was planned to liquidate the  
Russian penetration on the AGp. boundary. (Cf. pp. 276 and 291.)
-

- p. 336 (Asterisk omitted.) (Situation ... enemy's hinterland.)  
German: "...in der Tiefe ..." i.e., operational reserves far to the rear. Reserves "aus der Tiefe" would not be the concern of the Gen. Staff, as that would refer to tactical reserves directly in back of the front. - Ed.
- p. 336 \* (OQuI ... for the military periodicals.)  
The Gen. Staff Quarterly and the "Militärwochenblatt". The latter had deteriorated and Gen. Halder wanted influence on the editorial policy to raise its level.
- p. 336 \*\* (29 June, Situation ... rear of Ninth Army.)  
West of Ninth Army, in the great sac (see p. 335 note\*)  
Ed.
- 
- p. 338 \* (3.) ... along the bottleneck.)  
Probably the narrow foothold east of the Nova, anchored on Schluesselburg.  
(2.) Erratum: Pogostye must be disposed of ... ). Ed.
- p. 338 \*\* (Volkhov bridgehead.)  
At Kirishi.
- 
- p. 339 \* (2 July ... Situation ... a little to the east.)  
I.e., the pressure rides with the advance and so hits the wing on its flank.
- 
- p. 340 \* (Assignment of missions ... to the front.)  
By the Gen. Staff, as observers. The 1942 Army was an entirely new Army after the losses and changes of the preceding winter, and the Gen. Staff had to find out directly what it was worth.
- 
- p. 342 \* (Third paragraph : ... Nikolayevka ...)  
In order to avoid confusion it should be noted that this Nikolayevka is a suburb of Alexeyevka on the lower Tikhaya Sosna and not the Nikolayevka some 60 km west, just south of Novi Oskol. - Ed.
- p. 342 \*\* (... 8 July 0000 hours.)  
These organizations were taken over from AGp. A to form von Bock's new AGp. South.
-

- p. 343 \* (Fourth paragraph: . . . concern for the West.)  
Because of the possibility of a British invasion.
- p. 343 \*\* (Bottom: . . . Gen. Staff personnel matters.)  
I.e., the Gen. Staff officers in his command.  
Gen. Halder thought he had too many yes-men around.
- 
- p. 344 \* (7 July 1942. Situation: Azov.)  
I.e. AGp. A, which operated on the sac of Azov.
- p. 344 (Asterisk omitted.) (South . . . Weichs . . .)  
Armee-Gruppe Weichs. Not an Army Group (Heeresgruppe) but an intermediate command echelon interposed when the number of units becomes too large for Army Gp., to handle. Armee-Gruppe Weichs formed the northern anchor of the southern front, where it jutted out so as to form also a front facing north; here, permanent positions had been prepared by Jacob. Weichs also had an offensive mission (Woronezh). His command also comprised non-German troops. - Ed.
- 
- p. 345 \* (North: Attacks against our corridor.)  
Between II and X Corps.
- p. 345 \*\* (Gen. Obst. Fromm . . . three Replacement Divs.)  
Obsolete term. Refers to new activation with replacement elements.
- 
- p. 346 \* (In Center . . . gradually melting away.)  
Many Russians made their way through the German lines and joined partisan groups.
- p. 346 \*\* (Int. Col. von Altensteit . . . of the Crimea.)  
May refer to a planned evacuation of the population.
- 
- p. 348 \* (12 July, end . . . Wanka)  
A friend of Gen. Halder, then a Col. in Org. Sec.
- 
- p. 349 \* (Situation conference . . . with all its consequences.)  
Refers to Fridericus II. - A change in all top posts would only create confusion and delays.
-

- p. 351 \* (15 July..... in the South.)  
The asterisk refers to Ruoff (following sentence).  
His command was Seventeenth Army. - Ed.
- p. 351 \*\* (Lt. Col. Mueller - Hildebrand:..... 3.7 cm AT Gun.)  
With the increasing thickness of armor on Russian tanks this AT weapons was now obsolete. Recommendation was made to use it as Inf.Gun.
- p. 351 \*\*\* (How. 42 or 43.)  
Available lists show no such Howitzer. Possibly the 8.8 cm AT gun is referred to here. - Ed.
- p. 351 (Asterisk omitted) (16 July ..... Camp Fritz)  
"Lager Fritz, a section of Askania, the GHq.
- 
- p. 353 \* (Lt.Col. Ehrenhaus..... Guard Bn.)  
This Bn. changed frequently, since the Bns., being crack units, were sent back to the front.
- p. 353 \*\* (18 July..... Center..... Fourth Army Sector.)  
For a long stretch the road closely paralleled the southern front of Fourth Army. - Ed.
- p. 353 \*\*\* (At the situation conference..... his most lordly order)  
Gen. Halder ironically speaks of "allerhoechster Befehl", the attribute denoting the most exalted quality of an order given by royalty.
- 
- p. 354 \* (18 July end:..... ("dry front").)  
Voronezh to Kursk, a sector of the front without water barriers. - Ed.
- p. 354 \*\* (19 July, Situation..... 97th Jaeger Div.)  
First degree of the transition from Inf.Div. to Mt. Div. "Light Div." are the second degree, are therefore nearer to Mt. Divs. Similar in organization and mode of employment to the Mt. Div., but has more motor transport for use in level country. - Ed.
-

- p. 356 \* (20 July.... North... at Uritsk.)  
In the southwestern outskirts of Leningrad, 15 km  
from center of city.
- p. 356 \*\* (Col. Radke:.... classified matter.)  
Protection of classified matters against spying by  
Party.
- p. 356 \*\*\* (Col. von Ziehlberg.... (There are two.)  
They were to be combined into one because operation  
of two was wasteful of food.
- 

- p. 357 \* (Center:... "Southeast trip".)  
Of the big bulge north of Smolensk. - Ed.
- 

- p. 358 \* (Fuehrer situation conference.... against the Gen.Staff.)  
I.e., Gen. Halder himself. Hitler's rage on that day  
exceeded anything experienced before and took such  
forms that Jodl and Keitel felt constrained to step in  
to calm him down.
- p. 358 \*\* (... command machinery and its possibilities.)  
I.e., Hitler is incapable of grasping that his constant  
interference is throwing everything into disorder.
- 

- p. 359 \* (Second paragraph:... defensive successes.)  
German "Abwehrerfolg", see p. 238, note \*.
- 

- p. 360 \* (Situation.... Mot. enough fuel.)  
I.e., the German troops were short of fuel.

- p. 360 \*\* (Lack of fuel and ammunition!)  
The same.
- 

- p. 361 \* (Gen. Herrlein:.... Glamorizing of Infantry.)  
To make Inf. more attractive to volunteers, who  
preferred everything else, but especially Armor and  
the Air Force.
-

- p. 363 \* (AGp. B.... (hill bastion).)  
A prominent topographical feature north of Stalin-grad. - Ed.
- p. 363 \* (AGp. Center..... corner of Sixth Army)  
Footnote canceled.
- 
- p. 369 \* (Phone talks....transportation situation)  
"Grossdeutschland" was to go to France; no transportation was available.
- 
- p. 365 \* (Lt. Col. Mueller- Hillebrand:....leaving behind its packs)  
To speed up the pursuit.
- p. 365 \* (1 August.... to Ruoffs advance)  
Seventeenth Army. - Ed.
- p. 365 \* (Callers:..... Chief of Field Transportation.)  
Gercke's Section. The term is the one used in World War I. Its WW II equivalent was Chief of Railroad Transport.
- p. 365 \* (OKH officers.... report)  
Only the officers having to do with operations in OKH belonged to the Gen. Staff Corps.
- 
- p. 366 \* (Gen. Keitel..... Fuehrer's personal staff.)  
I.e., to advise the Fuehrer on appointments and promotions. He knew only those who forced themselves to his attention, and his right-hand man, Keitel (OKW), whose career had been confined to offices, had no large circle of acquaintances in the Army. Moreover, Hitler was distrustful of the professional officer class and wanted "Volksofficiere", officers from the common people.
- p. 366 \* ("Fuehrer situation conference..... "standards of honor")  
... of the Officers Corps, especially in the selection of marriage partners, a subject on which very rigid standards were observed.
-

- p. 367 \* (Center..... Schmitt's Group.)  
Second Panzer Army. - Ed.
- 
- p. 368 \* (Situation..... Ruoff..)  
Should be Fourth Panzer Army. - Ed.
- p. 368 \*\* (Center..... Ninth Army)  
Ninth Army front though now more reminiscent of the  
Cotentin peninsula ( Cherbourg) (cf. p. 276, note \*\*\*)  
... still had a western, northern and eastern front.-Ed
- p. 368 \*\*\* (Gen. Matzky..... Turk Bns.)  
Bns. made up of ex-Soviet PWs., mostly of Turkestan  
and Caucasus origin. - Ed.
- p. 368 # (Gen. Wagner.... Op. Section.)  
The operations assumed major proportions, far exceeding  
the scope of more police actions.
- 
- p. 369 \* (6 August... Situation ... west bank..)  
Maikop is west of the upper Kuban river. - Ed.
- 
- p. 370 \* (Lt.Col. Boehm.... von Schenkendorff's Div.)  
Anti-Partisan specialist in AGp. Center.
- p. 370 \* (8 August.... "Schlingpflanze".)  
Operation not identified. Plan was abandoned. - Ed.
- p. 370 \*\* (Gen. Koestring.... in the Caucasus)  
Koestring had been Attache in Moscow and traveled  
much in Russia.
- p. 370 (Asterisk omitted) (Conference at Fuehrer Hq....." Wirbel-  
wind"....).  
Operation projected to wipe out the Sukhinichi salient  
by a drive from the south by Second Panzer Army.
-

p. 377 \* (Cord comes in.)  
Cord von Hobe, Ia, Grossdeutschland. Had already left for France where the Div. was to follow him.

p. 377 \*\* (Lt. Col. Mueller-Hillebrand.... Inf. Divs. having only six Bns.)

With difficulties in replacing combat casualties steadily increasing, a change became necessary in the basic organization of the Division. At first the triangular structure was retained, with Regts. reduced to two Bns. As the war took an ever growing toll of experienced Regtl. Commanders, it proved necessary to cut the Div. to two Regts. of 3 Bns. each. It is an axiom that a good Regtl. Commander can make up for indifferent Bn. Commanders, and vice versa, However, this situation was aggravated by the shortage of Bn. Commanders which had been bad ever since the sudden over-expansion of the German Army (viewed as a danger by all responsible officers), when all capable, older officers moved into the higher command posts and newcomers to field rank did not have the time to gather the necessary experience.

-----

p. 372 \* (Col. Hampe..... activities of the Technical Troops.)  
A military technical service for rebuilding factories in occupied territories; had also oil production specialists, who would soon be needed in the Caucasus oil region.

-----

p. 373 \* (Situation.... Third Armd.Div.)  
Should be Third Panzer Army. - Ed.

-----

p. 376 \* (Situation.... Salmuth... attacks west and south of Voronezh.)  
Should be east instead of west. - Ed.

-----



- p. 378-379 (Asterisk omitted) (Lt. Col. Merz von Quirnheim (his full name.))  
One of the first victims of the retaliation for the 20 July, 1940.
- p. 378/379 \* (19 August..... expanding his bridgehead.)  
Over the Don.
- p. 378/379 \* (Gen. Herrlein.... training projects for summer.)  
Should be "winter".
- p. 378/379 \* (21 August.... slow crossing of the Caucasus.)  
On an earlier occasion, when Gen. Halder tried to point out the difficulties of operations in the Caucasus (which rises to 18,526 ft. in Mt. Elbrus). Hitler contentuously replied: " You and your Caucasus! For all you make it out it isn't anything bigger than the Grunewald!"(The Grunewald is a pleasant wooded area within the city limits of Berlin, very flat. - Ed.)
- 
- p. 380 \* (Situation.... Mount Elbrus.)  
Highest peak of the Caucasus and of Europe(18,526 ft.)
- p. 380 (Asterisk omitted) (At the Fuehrer Hq.... diluted.... to a containing action.)  
I.e., the Fuehrer reinterprets his original intentions.
- 
- p. 381 \* (Gen. Blumentritt and Maj. Lau... care of horses.)  
For lack of facilities and care, horses were lost at a rate of 1,500 a day during the winter. Someone had to be given the responsibility and power to prevent the recurrence of such a disaster in the coming winter.
- 
- p. 384 \* (27 August, last entry..... AGp. Supply Chiefs.)  
From Gen. Qu control.
- p. 384 \*\* (Bottom line:... has been discontinued)  
Too light as an AT weapon and unsuited as Inf.Gun.
-

- p. 385 \* (Lt. Col. Brand...)  
Died in the explosion of the bomb intended for Hitler on 20 July 1944.
- p. 385 \* (Last entry of 28 August ... Command of the Ground Forces)  
Richthofen, an Air Force General, who had Goering's and Hitler's ear, was again ranting against the Army.
- 
- p. 386 \* (Situation.... North.... in the bottleneck)  
The narrow/touching Lake Ladoga at Schluesselburg corridor
- 
- p. 389 (Asterisk omitted) (Situation:... thrown away into that defensive effort.)  
The German verb used is "eingebuttert" which is equivalent to "thrown down the rathole". In situations provoking such language, the Army often spoke also of "ver-Modeln" or "ver-Rommeln" which would be "fouling up a la Model, or, a la Rommel".
- 
- p. 390 \* (8 September ... to take it back.)  
List had convinced Jodl that it would be folly to try to get over the Caucasus.
- 
- p. 392 \* (Fuehrer order on war of defense.)  
While the Russians had begun to learn from the Germans how to conduct large operations, Hitler also had learnt a lesson. He had seen how Russian stubbornness in not giving up ground had upset the timetable of some well-conceived operations. That he believed to be the epitome of defensive warfare, and so he intended to prohibit any yielding, for any reason, whatsoever. Gen. Halder refused to issue such an order, whereupon Hitler wrote it himself.
- p. 392 \*\* (12 Sep.... "Central" solution.)  
Decision between two plans for the main effort against Stalingrad. Either from the central front: Sixth Army, or from the southern wing: Fourth Panzer Army. Sixth Army was eventually assigned to the task.
- p. 392 \*\*\* (Afternoon.... appointment of a new ObdH.)  
Correction: ObdH should read C in C (after List's removal.) Hitler took over for the time being.
-

p. 393 \* (Geheimrat Sauerbruch.)  
Famous surgeon; Head of the Charité Hospital in  
Berlin.

p. 393 \*\* (Col. von Ziehlberg: "Changing of the Guard.")  
(Mussolini's phrase.) von Ziehlberg, the Gen. Staff  
personnel chief proposed that the entire inner circle  
should resign when Gen. Halder left. Gen. Halder  
declined.

p. 393 \*\*\* (Gen. Kress... 99th Jaeger Regt.)  
Footnote canceled.

-----

p. 396 \* (Gen. Herrlein..... glamorize Infantry.)  
(Cf. p. 361, note.)

-----

p. 397 \* (24 September..... with in the Idea.)  
Footnote canceled.

-----

p. 398 \* (....within the Armd.Gp.?)

Gen. Halder takes the negative stand on that point.

p. 398 \*\* (...understood by Moltke?)

An order states time, place, direction, strength and other details concerning a plan. It would be better to give directives broadly outlining the plan, general objectives, and resources, and leaving the rest to the best judgment of the appointed commander.

p. 398 \*\*\* (effects of actions.)

Throughout, Gen. Halder was preaching to higher echelon commanders that, e.g., a penetration in a single Div. sector, tactically a setback, need not necessarily have an adverse effect on the over-all operation; as long as it could be contained, it might even react to one's advantage as it drew away enemy forces. The commander must not allow himself to become nervous and view the situation with the eyes of e.g., the Bn. Commander whose position has been overrun.

p. 398 (Asterisk omitted) (Use psychology in leadership.)

Gen. Halder decried the mechanical approach in official relationships, based exclusively on organizational hierarchy. Organization is a two-way relationship, in which both parties give and take. The psychological needs forming its foundation must be recognized and used to best advantage.

-----

p. 399 \* (April 15..... back to Armed Forces.)

Had been loaned to domestic economy.

-----

p. 400 \*\* (November.... 3. 135)

As Gen. Halder resumes writing in his Diary on recovering the use of his right hand following his accident on 10 Oct, 1941, he computes the calendar to establish the place of the day in the consecutive order of days since the 22 June, 1941.

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MAPS  
WAR JOURNAL  
OF  
FRANZ HALDER

Volume IX



# THE PRIVATE WAR JOURNAL

OF

GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

Chief of the General-Staff  
of the  
Supreme Command of the German Army (OKH)

14 August 1939 to 24 September 1942

## MAPS

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## CONTENTS

**Frontispiece:** GENERAL OBERST FRANZ HALDER

**Volume I:** Prefatory Note

Editor's Foreword

Frequent German Abbreviations and Terms

Military Districts

The Polish Campaign. Part I: 14 August - 10 September 1939

**Volume II:** The Polish Campaign. Part II: 11 September - 6 December 1939

**Volume III:** The First Winter. 7 December 1939 - 9 May 1940

**Volume IV:** The Campaign in France. 10 May 1940 - 30 October 1940

**Volume V:** The Second Winter. 31 October 1940 - 20 February 1941

**Volume VI:** The Campaign in the Balkans and Russia.

Part I: 21 February 1941 - 31 July 1941

**Volume VII:** The Campaign in Russia. Part II: 1 August 1941 - 24 Sept. 1942

**Volume VIII:** Footnotes


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# **THE POLISH CAMPAIGN**

**VOLUMES I-II**






# THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939 1

Terrain, Communications,  
and Permanent Fortifications

## LEGEND

- Paved Roads
- - - Good Unpaved Roads
- + + + Railroads
- • • Permanent Fortifications

20 0 20 40 60 80 100  
SCALE OF MILES



VON BOCK

XXXX 4 von KLUGE

(8 inf. divs.  
1 panzer div.  
1 lt. mecz div.)

XXXX 3 von KUECHLER

(7 inf. divs.  
1 panzer div.  
1 cav. brig.)

THORN GROUP

(5 inf. divs.  
1 cav. brig.)

NORTH GROUP

(4 inf. divs.  
5 cav. brigs.)

POSEN GROUP

(5 inf. divs.  
1 cav. brig.)

XXXX 8 von BLASKOWITZ

(7 inf. divs.)

SILESIAN GROUP

(9 inf. divs.  
2 cav. brigs.)

XXXX 10 von REICHENAU

(7 inf. divs.  
3 panzer divs.  
2 lt. mecz divs.)

CRACOW GROUP

(4 inf. divs.  
1 cav. brig.  
1 mecz brig.)

XXXX 14 LIST

(9 inf. divs.  
1 panzer div.  
1 lt. mecz div.  
3 mountain divs.)

4 German motorized divs. were used in Poland; exact initial locations are not known.



VON RUNDSTEDT

HUNG



# THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939 2

Dispositions of Opposing Forces  
31 August, 1939, and German Plan





By nightfall of 5 Sept.  
25,000 of the Thorn  
Group were cut off  
and were surrendering.

POSEN GROUP

THORN GR.

THORN GR.

NORTH GROUP

SILESIAN GROUP

SILESIAN GROUP

CRACOW GROUP

UPPER SILESIA

14 LINST

PRZE

CARPATIAN MOUNTAINS


HUNGARY




# THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939 3

Situation at Dark, 5 September, 1939

20 0 20 40 60 80 100  
SCALE OF MILES









# THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939 4

Situation at Dark, 8 September, 1939









# THE CAMPAIGN IN POLAND, 1939 5

Situation at Dark, 14 September, 1939

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SCALE OF MILES









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
Situation at Dark, 20 September, 1939



**THE CAMPAIGN**  
**IN**  
**FRANCE**


**VOLUMES III-IV**





| OF DIVISIONS |   |   |   |   |    |     |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    |    | TOTAL |
|--------------|---|---|---|---|----|-----|-----|---|----|--------------|---|----|----|----|----|----|-------|
| ARMY         |   |   |   |   |    |     |     |   |    | Home Reserve |   |    |    |    |    |    |       |
|              | 7 | 1 | 9 | 2 | 3  | 4   | 5   | 6 | 7  | 8            | 9 | 10 | 11 | 12 | 13 | 14 |       |
| Infantry     | 3 |   |   |   |    |     | 2   | 4 |    | 3            | 2 | 2  | 4  | 3  |    | 35 |       |
| Artillery    | 1 |   |   |   |    |     |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 1  |       |
| Engineers    | 2 |   |   |   |    |     | 2   | 4 |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 16 |       |
| Armoured     |   |   |   |   |    |     |     |   |    | 5            |   |    |    |    |    | 3  |       |
| Machine-guns |   | 2 |   |   |    |     |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 3  |       |
| Cavalry      |   |   | 2 |   |    |     |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 5  |       |
| Fortress     |   |   | 1 |   |    | (4) | (4) |   | 2  |              |   |    |    |    |    | 13 |       |
| Cavalry      |   |   | 2 |   | 1  | 3   |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 2  |       |
| Polish       |   |   |   |   |    |     |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 1  |       |
| British      |   |   |   |   |    | 1   |     |   |    |              |   |    |    |    |    | 1  |       |
| TOTALS       | 7 | 6 | 9 | 8 | 16 | 10  | 10  | 9 | 16 | 2            | 2 | 5  | 8  | 9  | 5  | 15 |       |

- Notes (1) ... divisions in Third and Fourth ... distribution unknown  
 (2) ... independent cavalry brigades  
 (3) Only British division under French Army commander  
 (4) 34 separate tank battalions in addition to the 12 in the 3 armored divisions






# THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST, 1940

Situation 16 May, 1940, and Principal  
Routes of Advance of Opposing Forces

0 20 40  
SCALE OF MILES






**GHO RESERVE**  
The use made of this reserve is not known precisely.




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
Situation 21 May, 1940, and Approximate Allied Lines 15 and 18 May



## LEGEND

- Allied line 15 May
- == Allied line 18 May











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
Situation in Flanders, 26 May, 1940,  
and Situation at Beginning of Second Phase,  
5 June

















# THE CAMPAIGN IN THE WEST, 1940

6

Direction of German Drives and  
Situation of the Armistice, 25 June

0 50 100  
SCALE OF MILES







7



IRISH  
SEA

MIDDLEBROUGH

LEEDS

HULL

NORTH

HUMBER

SEA

MANCHESTER

LIVERPOOL

THE  
WASH

NORWICH

BIRMINGHAM

CAMBRIDGE

DEBEN

• DUXFORD

• COVENTRY

MARTLESHAM

HARWICH

ENGLAND

ESSEX

LONDON

READING

CROYDON

BIGGIN HILL

• KENLEY

WOOLWICH

GRAVESEND

ROCHESTER

LYMPNE

HAWKINGE

TUNBRIDGE WELLS

BRIGHTON

THAMES

ESTUARY

NORTH FORELAND

RAMSGATE

DEAL

• DOVER

FOLKSTONE

DUNGENESS

DUNKERQUE

CALAIS

BOULOGNE

DIEPPE

LE HAYRE

CHERBOURG

FRANCE

BRISTOL CHANNEL

ENGLISH CHANNEL

DORSET

SOUTHAMPTON

BOURNEMOUTH

WEYMOUTH

PORTLAND

GOSPORT

PORTSMOUTH

ISLE OF WIGHT

HAMPSHIRE

SUSSEX

KENT

WALES

Wales

ENGLISH


# **THE SECOND WINTER**

**VOLUME V**

**THE CAMPAIGN**  
**IN THE**  
**BALKANS AND RUSSIA**

**VOLUME VI**





# GERMAN OF RU

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
SCALE OF

# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

1

Topography and Principal Vital Centers of European Russia

## LEGEND



Vital centers

200 100 0 200


SCALE OF MILES






# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA ①

Communications, Fortifications, and Russian Dispositions on 22 June, 1941




## EASTERN SIBERIA

24 inf. divs.  
10 cav. divs.  
11 tank brigs.  
10 air divs.








# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

THE DRIVE TO SMOLENSK  
22 June - 21 July, 1941

40 20 0 40 80 120  
SCALE OF MILES






# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA


THE OCCUPATION OF THE UKRAINE  
21 July - 14 September, 1941

40 80 0 40 80 120  
SCALE OF MILES

3

b








# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

4

Advance of German Sixth Army to  
Kiev, June–September, 1941


10 0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70

SCALE OF MILES









# THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN 1940-1941

## ITALO-GREEK WAR

Initial Italian Advance and Stabilized Front  
About 1 March 1941

0 10 20 30 40 50 60  
SCALE OF MILES

GERMANY

2 Italian  
AMBROSIO

TRIESTE  
Fiume  
MARVOLAC

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## THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN 1940

### INVASION OF YUGOSLAVIA

Initial Dispositions, and  
12 April, 1941

0 50 100  
SCALE

## THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN 1940-1941

### CONQUEST OF CRETE

German Plan and Axis  
Dispositions


0 10 20 30 40  
SCALE OF MILES

INITIAL STRENGTHS OF  
OPPOSING FORCES:  
Italians - 162,000  
Greeks - 150,000

2 Italian divs.

XXXX  
9

XXXX  
11



0 50 100  
SCALE


## THE BALKAN CAMPAIGN 1940-1941


### CONQUEST OF CRETE

German Plan and Axis  
Dispositions

0 10 20 30 40  
SCALE OF MILES










B U L G A R I A

**SOFIA**

**STUMME**

 HARTMAN
**BOHME**

# 12 LIST

Approximate location  
of Melkos Line.

|                         |  |
|-------------------------|--|
| Surrendered<br>10 April |  |
|-------------------------|--|

Greeks evacuated eastern portion of Melaxas Line prior to German attack.

GALLI POLI

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F

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SEAN GEE A

PLAIN  
OF  
HESSALY

THESES


ATHENS

CORINTH

PIRATES

**THE CAMPAIGN**  
**IN**  
**RUSSIA**

**VOLUME VII**





# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

## BATTLE OF KIEV


Crossing of the Dnieper  
Situation 14 September, 1941


5

N.

20 15 10 5 0 20 40

SCALE OF MILES





THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA  
THE DRIVE ON MOSCOW  
14 September - 7 December 1941

40 20 0 40 80 120  
Miles  
SCALE OF MILES

First appearance  
in this campaign


Replaced von Schoberl  
who was killed 14 Sept

Surrendered  
16 Oct





N OF (a)  
1941  
120

THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA (6)  
THE RUSSIAN WINTER OFFENSIVE  
December, 1941 - March, 1942 (b)  
0 100 200 300 400  
SCALE OF MILES














NICKOLAEV

Dnieper R.

KHERSON

PEREKOP

Potters Sea

CRIMEAN

PENINSULA

YEVPAORIYA

BLACK  
SEA

SIMFEROPOL

SEVASTOPOL


XXXI  
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10






# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

## BATTLE OF KHARKOV

Situation 17 May, 1942

10 0 10 20 30 40  
SCALE OF MILES

N.



a





# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

9

b



## BATTLE OF KHARKOV Situation 25 May, 1942










# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

## SIEGE OF SEVASTOPOL

November, 1941—July, 1942



### LEGEND

-  Fort
-  Russian defensive positions
-  Axes of German advance

KHERSONESE  
PENINSULA


BLACK  
SEA


SEVASTOPOL

MT.

Sevastopol Harbor

LENIN








# THE GERMAN OFFENSIVE

The German Offensive  
June — November 1941

100 0  
SCALE



# THE GERMAN INVASION OF RUSSIA

11

The German Offensive,  
June — November, 1942

100 0 100 200 300

SCALE OF MILES



## LEGEND

- Line of beginning of offensive
- - - Line of end of offensive

